(7)

Severino v. Severino

Facts:

Melecio Severino died on May 25, 1915. Some 428 hectares of land were recorded in the
Mortgage Law Register in his name in 1901 by virtue of possessory information
proceedings instituted by his brother Agapito Severino in his behalf.
During his lifetime, the land was worked by defendant Guillermo Severino (brother) as
administrator. Guillermo continued to occupy the land and in 1916, a survey was
conducted and Guillermos lawyer, Roque Hofilena claimed the lots for his client and
succeeded in having the title decreed in favor of Guillermo.
The alleged natural daughter and sole heir of one Melecio Severino, Fabiola Severino
filed an action to compel Guillermo Severino to convey to her 4 parcels of land or to pay
her in default, Php800,000 in damages for wrongfully causing said land to be registered
in his own name.
Felicitas Villanueva, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate also filed a complaint
in intervention claiming same relief except that for the conveyance to be made to the
estate of Melecio instead of to Fabiola Severino.
Guillermo Severino denied the charge and averred that since he was already awarded
the title, it has become res judicata and cannot be disturbed.
The lower court recognized Fabiola as the acknowledged natural daughter of Melecio
and ordered the defendant to convey 428 hectares of land to the intervenor as
administratrix of the estate.

Issue:

First: Whether or not the registration of land under the name of the administrator was valid
was there fraud involved?

Held:

NO. That Guillermo came into possession of the property as the agent of the deceased Melecio
in the administration of the property cannot be successfully disputed. He stated under oath in
the case of Montelibano vs. Severino that from 1902 up to 1913, he had been continuously in
charge as encargado or administrator, and that the Melecios possession was peaceful,
continuous and exclusive.

The relations of an agent to his principal are fiduciary and it is an old rule that in regard to
property forming the subject matter of the agency, he is stopped from acquiring or asserting a
title adverse to that of the principal. His position is analogous to that of a trustee and he cannot
be allowed to create in himself an interest in opposition to that of his principal or cestui que
trust. This is substantially in harmony with the principles of the Civil Law and American cases:

In Gilbert vs. Hewetson , a receiver, trustee, attorney, agent or any other person occupying
fiduciary relations respecting property or persons, is utterly disabled from acquiring for his own
benefit the property committed to his custody for management. No fraud is needed to be
shown.

In Massie vs. Watts, the agent cannot hold the land under an entry for himself otherwise than
as trustee for his principal.

As will be seen, an agent is not only stopped from denying his principals title to the property,
but he is also disabled from acquiring interests therein adverse to those of his principal during
the term of the agency.

(14)
B.H. Macke et. al vs. Jose Camps

FACTS:
B.H. Macke and W.H. Chandler, partners, doing business under the firm name of Macke,
Chandler And Company, allege that during the months of February and March 1905,
they sold to Jose Camps and delivered at his place of business, known as the
Washington Caf, various bills of goods amounting to P351.50; that Camps has only
paid on account of said goods the sum of P174; that there is still due them on account
of said goods the sum of P177.50
Plaintiffs made demand for the payment from defendant and that the latter failed and
refused to pay the said balance or any part of it
Macke, one of the plaintiffs, testified that on the order of one Ricardo Flores, who
represented himself to be the agent of Jose Camps, he shipped the said goods to the
defendant at the Washington Caf; that Flores (agent) later acknowledged the receipt of
the said goods and made various payments thereon amounting in all to P174; that
believes that Flores is still the agent of Camps; and that when he went to the
Washington Caf for the purpose of collecting his bill he found Flores, in the absence of
Camps, apparently in charge of the business and claiming to be the business manager of
Camps, said business being that of a hotel with a bar and restaurant annexed.
A written contract was introduced as evidence, from which it appears that one Galmes,
the former of Washington Caf sub-rented the building wherein the business was
conducted, to Camps for 1 year for the purpose of carrying on that business, Camps
obligating himself not to sublet or subrent the building or the business without the
consent of the said Galmes.
This contract was signed by Camps and the name of Ricardo Flores as a witness and
attached thereon is an inventory of the furniture and fittings which also is signed by
Camps with the word sublessee below the name, and at the foot of this inventory the
word received followed by the name Ricardo Flores with the words managing
agent immediately following his name.

ISSUE: W/N Ricardol Flores was the agent of Camps

Ruling: Yes
Evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that Flores is the agent of Camps in the management
of the bar of the Washington Caf with authority to bind Camps, his principal, for the payment
of the goods

The contract sufficiently establishes the fact that Camps was the owner of the business and of
the bar, and the title of managing agent attached to the signature of Flores which appears on
that contract, together with the fact that at the time the purchases were made, Flores was
apparently in charge of the business performing the duties usually entrusted to a managing
agent leave little room for doubt that he was there as the authorized agent of Camps.

Agency by Estoppel --- One who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent, and
holds him out to the public as such, can not be permitted to deny the authority of such person
to act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third persons dealing with such person in good
faith and in the honest belief that he is what he appears to be.

Estopple---- Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he can
not, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission be permitted to falsify; and
unless the contrary appears, the authority of the agent must be presumed to include all the
necessary and usual means of carrying his agency into effect.

(21)

Cason vs. Rickards

FACTS:
Rickards was the agent in Dagupan of Smith Bell and Co. He received from Cason as a
deposit P2,000.xx. When he left the employ of Smith Bell and Co., the money was
delivered to another agent of Smith Bell and Co. in the area.
Furthermore, he notified Smith Bell that it was the money of Cason. During trial,
Rickards testified that a few days after he received the P2,000.xx he received from her
an order or warrant upon the Spanish treasury for the sum of P4,200.00
He then wrote Smith Bell asking if it could be collected. It was sent to Manila and
collected through Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and paid all of it out in the business of
Smith Bell and Co. P4,200.xx less 5% commision for collection, of which commission,
Smith Bell and Co. received the benefit.
The books which were then produced in court by Smith Bell and Co. contained an entry
or entries of the receipt by Smith Bell of this P4,200.xx.
Rickards testified that he received express directions in regard to this particular
transaction. Smith Bell and Co. did not present as witness any of their employees or
agents. They also did not present their books which according to Rickards would
corroborate his testimony.
Their lone witness was a bookkeeper of Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. The witness
could not testify to whom the cash was paid but said that based on the books of the
bank, Rickards received P4,200.xx. .
The lower court found in favor of Smith Bell and Co., relieving it from its responsibility of
P4,200.xx.
ISSUE:

First: W/N the positive testimony of Rickards can be overcome by the testimony of the
bookkeeper.

second: W/N Rickards may be held liable for the money of Cason

HELD: Judgement of the lower court cannot be affirmed and must be reversed. The case is
remanded back. Smith Bell could demonstrate the falsity of the testimony of Rickards by
producing the books which it did not. Rickards being an agent and someone who explicitly
turned over the money to Smith Bell as he left cannot be made liable to Cason.

( guys. 2 cases mani siya. aside sa libog na case. di sad ko sure kung mao ba ni kay
walay citation. so ibutang nalang sad nako ang decision sa SC sa second na case)

Sc 2ND ruling:

The agency of Rickards was supposedly for the purpose of buying rice and sacks. It existed for
the period of one year only and he admitted that, prior thereto and since the year 1882, he had
been conducting a similar business at Dagupan, but not for Smith, Bell and Co. He showed by
his book and by his declaration that during this year he received from persons at Dagupan large
sums in cash for remittance to Manila, which he effected by notifying Smith, Bell and Co. of the
amounts and using the actual cash received in the local purchase of rice and bags on their
accoulnt, thus effecting a saving to both parties of a considerable railway charge for carrying
the money to and from, and that these operations were known to his principals and approved
by them. However this course of business might affect the 2,000-peso claim or any other
deposit of money received by him, it has no bearing upon the transaction in these certificates
which were not cash deposited with him but, on the contrary, were handed to him by the
plaintiff in order to be converted into cash, which he was to collect and repay her. It appears
that he wrote to the firm at Manila asking their advise in respect to the warrants and was by
them referred to the Hongkong Bank, which undertook to effect their collection, a thing at that
precise period, at the outbreak of the revolution, of some difficulty on account of reluctance of
the Spanish Government to send into the provinces money which might serve to supply funds
to the revolutionary forces. It is not shown that Smith, Bell and Co. had ever adopted any
similar course of business in regard to the collection of similar warrants or of any drafts, or that
they had intervened in this instance otherwise than as a matter of favor to their correspondent,
or that they had received the proceeds of the collection, of had made entries thereof in their
own books, or in any manner recognized it.

The receipt given for the warrants read:

I have received from Da. Monica Cason three Treasury warrants of the value of 4,200
pesos, with the interest thereon, to collect in Manila; said amount of $4,200, when
collected from the treasury, I promise to deliver to said Da. Monica Cason, in cash, to
her order. Calasiao, October 8, 1896, F.W. Rickards.

The firm did not sign this receipt and is not referred to therein.
Articles 286 and 287 of the Code of Commerce, cited by the defendant to establish the liability
of the firm, apply to contracts made by factors, but in this case the relation of factor has not
been established. This rather appears to be an instance of an agent, if he was one, dealing in
his own and on his own responsibility and not that of his principal. (Code of Commerce, arts.
245, 246, and 247; Castle Bros., Wolf and Sons vs. Go-Juno, 7 Phil. Rep., 144.) The mere
custom of a local agent receiving monies on deposit for which his principal, the firm, might,
perhaps, on general principles of the law of agency, have made itself liable whether the money
had been actually received by it or not, does not suffice to charge them with liability for the
essentially different operation of the isolated collection of a draft for his clients, such collection
not creating any appearance of a general banking business upon which third persons had a
right to rely. Neither in fact nor in appearance was any agency for this purpose authorized or
permitted by Smith, Bell and Co., and the transaction as to these warrants was one for which
Rickards alone is responsible to the plaintiff.

(28)

Jimenez vs. Rabot

FACTS:
Gregorio Jimenez filed this action to recover from Rabot, a parcel of land situated in
Alaminos, Pangasinan
The property in question, together with two other parcels in the same locality
originally belonged to Jimenez, having been assigned to him as one of the heirs in
the division of the estate of his father
It further appears that while Gregorio Jimenez was staying at Vigan, Ilocos Sur, his
property in Alaminos was confided by him to the care of his elder sister Nicolasa
Jimenez.
He wrote his sister a letter from Vigan in which he informed her that he was pressed
for money and requested her to sell one of his parcels of land and send him the
money in order that he might pay his debts. The letter contains no description of the
land to be sold other than is indicated in the words one of my parcels of land
Acting upon this letter, Nicolasa approached Rabot and the latter agreed to buy the
property for the sum of P500. P250 was paid at once, with the understanding that a
deed of conveyance would be executed when the balance should be paid.
Nicolasa admits having received this payment but there is no evidence that she sent
it to her brother
After one year, Gregorio Jimenez went back to Alaminos and demanded that his
sister surrender the piece of land to him, it being then in her possession.
She refused upon some pretext or other to do so and as a result, plaintiff instituted
an action to recover the land from her control
Meanwhile, Nicolasa executed and delivered to Rabot a deed purporting to convey to
him the parcel of land

ISSUE: W/N the authority conferred on Nicolasa by the letter was sufficient to enable her to
bind her brother of the sale made in favor of Rabot

RULING: Yes, the authority expressed in the letter is a sufficient complianc with both
requirements (civil code and code of civ pro)
As a matter of formality, a power of attorney to convey real property ought to appear in a
public document, just as any other instrument intended to transmit or convey an interest in
such property ought to appear in a public document

Art. 1713 of the Civil Code requires that the authority to alienate land shall be contained in an
express mandate

Subsection 5 of section 335 of Code of Civil Procedure say that the authority of the agent must
be in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged

The purpose in giving a power of attorney is to substitute the mind and hand of the agent for
the mind and hand of the principal; and if the character and extent of the power is so defined
as to leave no doubt as to the limits within which the agent is authorized to act, and he acts
within those limits, the principal cannot question the validity of his act

The general rule here applicable is that the description must be sufficiently definite to identify
the land either from the recitals of the contract or deed or from external facts referred to in the
document, thereby enabling one to determine the identity of the land and if the description is
uncertain on its face or is shown to be applicable with equal plausibility to more than one tract,
it is insufficient. The principle embodied in these decisions is not, in our opinion, applicable to
the present case, which relates to the sufficiency of the authorization, not to the sufficiency of
the contract or conveyance. It is unquestionable that the deed which Nicolasa executed
contains a proper description of the property which she purported to convey.

There is ample authority to the effect that a person may by a general power of attorney an
agent to sell "all" the land possessed by the principal, or all that he possesses in a particular
city, county, or state. (Roper vs.McFadden, 48 Cal., 346; Rownd vs. Davidson, 113 La., 1047;
Carson vs. Ray, 52 N. C., 609; 78 Am. Dec., 267; 31 Cyc., 1229.) It is also held that where a
person authorizes an agent to sell a farm ("my farm") in a certain county, this is sufficient, if it
be shown that such party has only one farm in that country. (Marriner vs. Dennison, 78 Cal.,
202.) In Linton vs. Moorhead (209 Pa. St., 646), the power authorized the agent to sell or
convey "any or all tracts, lots, or parcels" of land belonging to the plaintiff. It was held that this
was adequate. In Lyon vs. Pollock (99 U.S., 668), the owner in effect authorized an agent to
sell everything he had in San Antonio Texas. The authority was held sufficient. In
Linan vs. Puno (31 Phil. Rep., 259), the authority granted was to the effect that the agent
might administer "the interests" possessed by the principal in the municipality of Tarlac and to
that end he was authorized to purchase, sell, collect, and pay, etc. It was held that this was a
sufficient power.

In the present case the agent was given the power to sell either of the parcels of land
belonging to the plaintiff. We can see no reason why the performance of an act within the
scope of this authority should not bind the plaintiff to the same extent as if he had given the
agent authority to sell "any or all" and she had conveyed only one. From what have been said it
is evident that the lower court should have absolved the defendant Pedro Rabot from the
complaint.
(ang citation sa fb kay rabot vs. ___ , wala jud ana na case sa net. mao na ni ang
makitan na naay rabot)

(35)

CMS logging vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Petitioner CMS is a forest concessionaire engaged in the logging business, while private
respondent DRACOR is engaged in the business of exporting and selling logs and
lumber.
On August 28, 1957, CMS and DRACOR entered into a contract of agency whereby the
former appointed the latter as its exclusive export and sales agent for all logs that the
former may produce, for a period of five (5) years.
CMS was able to sell through DRACOR a total of 77,264,672 board feet of logs in Japan,
from September 20, 1957 to April 4, 1962. Six months prior the end of their agreement,
CMS found out that DRACOR was using Shingko Trading to sell their logs and earned
commission for it.
CMS claimed that it was a violation of their agreement since DRACOR already received
5% commission and is no longer entitled to the additional commission to Shinko.
After the discovery, CMS directly transacted with Japanese firms without the aid if
DRACOR.
CMS sued DRACOR for the commission Shingko received while DRACOR counterclaimed
for the commission of the sales made by CMS with the Japanese firms.

ISSUE: W/N DRACOR is entitled to its commissions from the sales made by CMS to Japanese
firms

HELD: No. The contract of agency is already revoked.

The principal may revoke a contract of agency at will, and such revocation may be express, or
implied, and may be availed of even if the period fixed in the contract of agency as not yet
expired.

As the principal has this absolute right to revoke the agency, the agent can not object thereto;
neither may he claim damages arising from such revocation, unless it is shown that such was
done in order to evade the payment of agent's commission.

During the existence of the contract of agency, DRACOR admitted that CMS sold its logs directly
to several Japanese firms. This act constituted an implied revocation of the contract of agency
under Article 1924 of the Civil Code, which provides: Art. 1924 The agency is revoked if the
principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third
persons.

DRACOR is not entitled to commission since it was revoked by CMS when they transacted
directly with the Japanese firms. And it did not fall under the exception that CMS revoked the
contract of agency to evade the payment of the agents commission.
(Additional case)

Dela Cruz vs. Northern Theatrical Enterprises

FACTS:

The Northern Theatrical Enterprises, a domestic corporation opearated a movie house in

Laoag, Ilocos Norte and among the persons employed by it was plaintiff De La Cruz,
hired as special guard whose duties were to guard the main entrance of the cinema, to
maintain peace and order and to report the commission of disorder within the premises
As such guard, he carried a revolver.
One Benjamin Martin wanted to crash the gate or entrance of the movie house.
Infuriated by the refusal of plaintiff to let him in without first providing himself with a
ticket, Martin attacked him with a bolo
Plaintiff defended himself until he was cornered, at which moment to save himself, he
shot gate crasher resulting in latters death
Plaintiff was charged with homicide but was acquitted of charge after trial. In both
criminal cases against him, he employed a lawyer to defend him
He then demanded from NTE reimbursement of expenses but was refused thus he filed
present action against the company and the members of its Board of Directors to
recover not only the amounts he had paid his lawyers but also moral damages said to
have been suffered due to his worry, neglect of his interests and his family as well in the
supervision of the cultivation of his land, a total of P 15,000.
CFI rejected plaintiffs theory that he was an agent of the company and that he had no
cause of action and dismissed the complaint

ISSUE:

Main issue: W/N Plaintiff De la Cruz is considered as an agent of the corporation and as such
entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in conncection with agency

2nd issue: W/N an employee or servant who in line of duty and while in the performance of the
task assigned to him, performs an act which eventually results in his incurring in expenses
caused not directly by his master or employer or by reason of his performance of his duty, but
rather by a 3rd party or stranger not in the employ of his employer may recover said damages
against his employer

RULING: No, Plaintiff is mere employee

The relationship between the movie corporation and plaintiff was not that of principal and agent
because the principle of representation as a characteristic of agency was in no way involved.
Plaintiff was not employed to represent corporation in its dealings with 3rd parties

Plaintiff is a mere employee hired to perform a certain specific duty or task, that of acting as a
special guard and staying at the main entrance of the movie house to stop gate crashers and to
maintain peace and order within the premises.
2nd issue: No
Although the employer has a moral obligation to give employee legal assistance to aid the latter
in his case, he has no legal obligation to do so.

If the employer is not legally obliged to give legal assistance to employee and provide him with
a lawyer, naturally said employee may not recover the amount he may have paid a lawyer hired
by him. Damages suffered by plaintiff by reason of expenses incurred by him in remunerating
his lawyer is not caused by his act of shooting to death the gate crasher but rather by filing the
charge of homicide which made it necessary for him to defend himself with the aid of counsel.

Had no criminal charge against him, there would have been no expenses incurred or damages
suffered.