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STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY COURT COUNTY OF MONROE, HE STATE OF NEW YORK THE PEOPLE Respondent, v DECISION AND ORDER AP# 16/2496 LETICIA D. ASTACIO, Appellant. APPEARANCES For the People: R. MICHAEL TANTILLO, ESQ. Ontario County District Attorney Zach Mauer, Esq. Assistant District Attorney Ontario County Court House 27 North Main Street Canandaigua, New York 14424 For the Defendant: Bridget L. Field, Esq Times Square Building 45 Exchange Boulevard Suite 802 Rochester, New York 14614 Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Rochester City Court (Aronson, J. [Acting]) revoking the sentence of conditional discharge previously imposed upon her conviction of driving while intoxicated (VTL 1192 [3]) and sentencing her on July 6, 2017 to a 60 day term of incarceration and three years of probation. Defendant was found to have violated the terms of her conditional discharge after a hearing on June 8, 2017. A Notice of Appeal was thereafter timely filed. ‘On appeal, the defendant raises 12 points. Whether the lower court erred in modifying the terms of the conditional discharge in her absence when the court required her to secure her own “random” test ‘The terms of the conditional discharge required the defendant to “submit to any recognized tests that are available to determine the use of alcohol or drugs.” Thereafter, on May 15, 2017, the defendant was directed to immediately “submit to an ETG lab analysis of her urine sample through her personal health care provider or through a drug testing service in Monroe County.” The defendant was also provided with the same directive in a notice mailed to her. That notice further informed the defendant that if she did not submit to the ordered test, she was to appear in Court on May 30" at 12:00 p.m. Defendant contends that the provision that the defendant obtain her own test within Monroe County and pay for her own test constituted an inappropriate expansion of the terms of the conditional discharge. Defendant contends that the expansion could have been made, but her presence in court was required in order to modify the terms of the conditional discharge. ‘The People contend that there was no modification of the terms of the conditional discharge and that the issue is not preserved for review. With regard to preservation, the Court finds that the issue was not properly preserved. At no time at the hearing did defense counsel indicate that the Court Jacked the authority to order the defendant to obtain drug testing within Monroe County (People v Turner, 136 AD3d 1111, 1112, [3d Dept 2016], /v denied 27 NY3d 1140). At the hearing on June 8, 2017, the defendant testified that if she had been aware of the need for a urine test and if she had been advised that she had to have the testing done in Monroe County, she “would have come home and taken the test” June 8, 2017 Transcript p. 26). In any event, the defendant’s argument is without merit. The lower court did not improperly expand the terms of the conditional discharge. The details regarding the manner in which the testing was to be accomplished merely provided a definition of “recognized tests” and did not amount to an expansion of the terms of the conditional discharge. 2. Whether the lower court erred in directing the defendant to pay for the test The defendant contends that it was impermissible that she be ordered to pay for the test as it constitutes a law enforcement expense. In support of her argument, the Defendant cites People v Hakes (143 AD3d 1054, 1056 [3d Dept 2016], fv granted 29 NY3d 997) in which the Third Department held that a defendant could not be required to pay the costs associated with a SCRAM bracelet “since such costs do not fall within the category of restitution, but are more in the nature of a law enforcement expense.” The People contend that the defendant never inquired in to the cost of the test and that if she was unwilling to pay for the test, she could have opted to appear in court on May 30, 2017. The People further contend that the cost is properly carried by the defendant as the test is related to rehabilitation and is not a law enforcement expense. .rved for review as the defendant did not raise this issue at the Again, this issue is unpres hearing (see Turner, 136 AD3d at 1112), In fact, at the June 5, 2017 appearance, defense counsel indicated his client’s willingness to have the testing performed through “one of the providers’ (June 5, 2017 Transcript, p.9). During the defendant's testimony at the hearing on June 8, 2017 she testified that she would have been unable to comply with the order to obtain drug testing because of her doctor’s office schedule, She did not register any objection to having to pay for the test nor did she indicate that she was unable to pay for the test Hakes (143 AD3d at 1056 ), is easily distinguished. In that case, the defendant's violation of probation was not based upon the failure to wear the SCRAM bracelet, but rather the failure to pay for it. Here, the defendant was not charged with violating the terms of her conditional discharge for failing to pay for the test; the violation was for failing to take the test. ‘The decision does not indicate whether a defendant who is ordered to wear a SCRAM bracelet and pay for it can be held to have violated the terms of probation if he does not wear the bracelet In People v Oehler (52 AD3d 955, 956 [3d Dept 2008), the Third Department affirmed the lower court's finding that the defendant, who failed to have an ordered EtG test, violated the terms of his probation where the terms of probation directed him to submit to random testing “at his expense.” In any event, even if the defendant could not be ditected to pay the cost of the EXG test, the defendant was given a second option; she was directed to appear in court on May 30, 2017 if the testing was not completed. The hearing court properly found that the defendant violated the terms of the conditional discharge by neither having the testing performed nor appearing in court as directed. 3. Whether the document requiring defendant's appearance on May 30,2017 was facially and jurisdictionally defective ‘The defendant contends that the notice was facially defective because it was dated May 23, 2015, was not signed by a judge or a clerk of the court, and failed to designate the year for appearance (it stated only May 30, not May 30, 2017). The People contend that a Notice to ‘Appear as indicated by CPL 410.40 does not have to comply with the formal requirements of an order. ‘At the June 8, 2017 hearing, Jody Carmel, a Rochester City Court Clerk, testified that she mailed a form notice to appear to the address on file for the defendant, presumably the defendant's home address (June 8, 2017 Tran: pt p. 14). As defendant points out, the notice is. incorrectly dated and fails to direct the year for appearance. Neither of those defects affects the validity of a notice to appear. There could not be any confusion on the part of the defendant as to when she was expected to appear. With regard to defendant's contention that the Notice to Appear is defective because it is not signed, CPL 410.40(1), titled “Notice to appear”, refers to the court’s ability to order a person to appear. There are no formal requirements for the notice. Instead, CPL 410.40 provides, Such order may be in the form of a written notice, specifying the time and place of appearance, mailed to or served personally upon the defendant as the court may direct.” The Notice to “Appear sent to the defendant complies with the requirements of CPL 410.40(1) and was not facially or jurisdictionally defective. 4. Whether the court erred in admitting the transcript of the May 30, 2017 court appearance where counsel made statements that were allegedly in violation of the attorney-client privilege ‘At the May 30, 2017 court appearance, defendant’s former counsel, Mr. Fiandach, informed the Court that the defendant was in Thailand and read an email he sent to the defendant. ‘At the hearing on June 8, 2017 a transcript of the May 30, 2017 proceeding was admitted into evidence. Defendant contends that the contents of the May 30, 2017 transcript contains privileged information It is defendant's burden to establish that the transeript of the May 30, 2017 court appearance contained privileged information. “The burden of proving each element of the privilege rests upon the party assert (Priest v Hennessy, 31 NY2d 62, 69 [1980)) Furthermore, “not all communications to an attorney are privileged. In order to make a valid claim of privilege, it must be shown that the information sought to be protected from disclosure was confidential communication” made to the attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or services” (Hennessy, 51 NY2d at 69). Here, the communication read to the court was ‘an email from Mr, Fiandach to the defendant, In the email, sent May 26, 2017, Mr. Fiandach indicates that he had previously notified the defendant, by telephone and text message, that the court ordered an EtG test. The email further stated that he had received a letter that he appear With the testing results on May 30, 2017 or that the defendant appear personally. Mr. Fiandach further acknowledged that phone calls and text messages to the defendant's cell did not go through. After reading the email, Mr. Fiandach indicated that his client responded to the email and inquired as to what an E1G test was. Defendant has failed to meet her burden of showing that the email contained a privileged ‘communication. There was no legal advice contained in the email and the only communication from the defendant that was relayed to the court was the receipt of the May 26, 2017 email and the query regarding the EXG test (see generally Matter of Jacqueline F.,47 NY2d 215 [1979] [client's location not privileged information]; Matter of Grand Jury of Suffolk County, 117 Misc2d 197 [Suffolk County Ct 1982] [same]; ] Matter of Doe, 101 Misc2d 388 [Sup Ct, New York County 1979] [same]. As the People contend, the disclosure of the email by defense ‘counsel was an attempt to prevent a bench warrant from being issued. Although this Court finds that there was no error in admitting the May 30, 2017 transcript, [ will address the defendant’s argument that any error cannot be deemed harmless because the transcript was used to establish that the defendant had notice of the court's directive In fact, notice of the court’s directive was established when the written notice was mailed to the defendant’s address (see People v Wong, 180 Mise 2d 749, 752 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1999]) and any error would, in fact, have been harmless. 5. Whether the defendant was denied her right to effective assistance of counsel A Actual conilict of interest Defendant contends that due to the disclosure of the email by her counsel at the May 30, 2017 court appearance, the subsequent subpoena of defense counsel, and the introduetion into evidence of the May 30, 2017 transcript, there was an actual conflict of interest. As discussed above, the information disclosed by Mr. Fiandach was not privileged, nor did the contents of the email create a conflict of interest. At the June 8, 2017 hearing date, the defendant was in court when the issue of the subpoena was raised and when the transcript was admitted into evidence. Although defense ‘counsel raised the issue of the transcript containing attorney-client privileged material, at no time did defendant contend that her attorney had a conflict of interest or indicate that she wished to retain new counsel. ally, with regard to the subpoena, defense counsel was not called to testify and Mr. Mauer indicated that the subpoena was issued when it was believed that Mr. Fiandach was no longer representing the defendant. B. Adequacy of defense counsel's performance Defendant contends that once the May 30, 2017 transcript was introduced into evidence, defense counsel should have sought the introduction of the June 5, 2017 transcript wherein he indicated that defendant did not receive his voice mail that the court had ordered an EtG test ‘The People contend that the statements made at the June 5,017 court appearance were of substantively the same nature as the ones made on May 30, 3017. Not only would it have been duplicative, but had defense counsel sought to introduce the June 5, 2017 statement it would have undermined his argument that the May 30, 2017 statements were protected by attorney. client privilege. In addition, the substance of Mr. Fiandach’s statements to the court on June 5, 2017 was the same as the substance of the testimony provided by the defendant at the hearing on June 8, 2017. Specifically, both note the issue caused by switching the defendant's cell service from Verizon to DTAC, the lack of ability to communicate other than by email, and the difficulty in returning to the United States in time to comply with the court’s directive. Mr. Fiandach’s statement to the court on June 5, 2017 did not provide any additional information to the court and {or the most part was not based on first hand knowledge. ‘The failure to offer the transcript of the June 5, 2017 court appearance did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel or indicate in any way that the defendant was not recei ing effective assistance of counsel. 6. Whether the People established a wilful violation ‘The standard of proof at a lation of a conditional discharge hearing is preponderance of the evidenee (CPL 410.70 (3]). A hearing was held, as is required, on June 8, 2017. As noted above, at the hearing Jody Carmel testified that she mailed a form notice to appear to the address on file for the defendant and that the defendant did not appear in court on May 30, 2017. Eugene Crimi, Esq., chief clerk of the Rochester City Court testified that the Rochester City Court did not receive any results of an EtG testing for the defendant from May 15, 2017 to May 30, 2017. ‘Thereafter, the defendant te: ied on her own behalf regarding the timing of her travel to ‘Thailand , the notice she received from her attorney regarding the court's directive, the communication difficulties while in Thailand, and the steps she took to return to Rochester upon learning of the need for her personal appearance in court. Following the hearing, the defendant was found to have violated the terms of her conditional discharge. As noted above, one of the terms of the conditional discharge was that the defendant was to “submit to any recognized tests that are available to determine the use of alcohol or drugs.” Furthermore, “failure to appear as ordered without reasonable cause therefor constitutes a violation of the conditions of the sentence irrespective of whether such requirement specified as a condition thereof” (CPL § 410.40 [1])- A. Failure to submit to testing The defendant states that she did not receive notice of the ordered EtG test until May 27, 2017 and even if she had been in Monroe County she would not have been able to have the test performed before May 30, 2017. Defendant's voluntary departure from the jurisdiction, although not a violation of the terms of the conditional discharge, do not provide a justifiable excuse for failing to submit to required testing. Furthermore, the defendant voluntarily made complying with the court's directive more difficult when she discontinued her ability to receive phone calls and text messages, Defendant's actions do not indicate that she “acted in good faith” in can ng out the terms of her conditional discharge (People v Harris, 143 AD3d 1181, 1183 [34 Dept 206], » denied 28 NY3d 1145). Defendant’s argument ignores the fact that had the defendant remained in the jurisdiction, or in close proximity to the jurisdiction, she would have readily been able to comply with the court's order. ‘This Court finds that the People proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated the terms of the conditional discharge both by failing to submit to EtG testing and by failing to appear in Court on May 30, 2017. B. Travel ‘The defendant contends that the Court should not have found that she violated the terms of her conditional discharge by leaving the jurisdiction of the Court. As noted above, the defendant states that it was because she was so far away that she was unable to comply with the ordered testing. Therefore, the defendant created a situation for herself where it was difficult to comply with the court ordered testing. The lower court did not find that the defendant violated the terms of her conditional discharge by traveling outside the jurisdiction. The court specifically stated, “Phe fact that the defendant absented herself from the jurisdiction intending it to be three months was not a technical violation of the conditional discharge [emphasis added]” (June 8, 2017 Transeript p. 42). C. Justifiable excuse ‘The defendant contends that she had a justifiable excuse for failing to submit to testin, 10 “With the People having demonstrated defendant’s probation violations by a preponderance of the evidence (see CPL 410.70 [3]: People v Soprano, 27 AD3d 964, 965 [34 Dept 2006]}, the burden was on defendant to set forth a justifiable excuse for such violations (see People v Costanza, 281 AD2d 120, 123 [3d Dept 2001], /v denied 96 NY2d 827 )” (People v Osborne, 38 AD3d 1132, 1132 [3d Dept 2007). Defendant again argues that she was far away with limited communication, Had she not voluntarily terminated her ability to receive voice or text communications, defendants claims would have more weight, However, both the distance she traveled and her inability to receive communications from the court or her attorney were of her own making and do not justify her failure to comply with the court's directive. 7. Whether the court failed to comply with CPL 410.10(1) Criminal Procedure Law 410,10(1) provides, “When the court pronounces a sentence of probation or of conditional discharge it must specify as part of the sentence the conditions to be complied with. Where the sentence is one of probation, the defendant must be given a written copy of the conditions at the time sentence is imposed. In any case where the defendant is given a written copy of the conditions, a copy thereof must be filed with and become part of the record of the case, and it is not necessary to specify the conditions orally.” Defendant states that she was not informed of the terms and conditions of probation at the time of sentencing nor was she provided with a written copy. It is not controverted that the defendant was not provided with a copy of the terms and conditions of probation at the time of sentencing. However, the Fourth Department has held that “the failure to give defendant a ul written copy of the conditions of probation does not require reversal of his conviction for violating probation, Before defendant was released from incarceration, his probation officer gave ions with him. Thus, him a written copy of the conditions and orally discussed each of the condi defendant was aware of the condition that he violated” (People v Shattuck, 214 AD2d 1026, 1026 [4 Dept 1995], citing People v Davey, 193 AD2d 1108 [4% Dept 1993}), At the sentencing on July 6, 2017, Judge Aronson sentenced the defendant to 60 days in three years probation and ordered her to wear a SCRAM bracelet. Judge Aronson signed the conditions of probation on the date of sentencing and the defendant signed them a week later as witnessed by a probation officer. As indicated by the July 6, 2017 transcript, there was a fair amount of commotion following the pronouncement of the sentence and the defendant exited the courtroom prior to the conclusion of the proceedings. In any event, itis undisputed that the defendant did receive a copy of the terms and conditions of probation following her release from jail. ‘The defendant signed the same, just below the statement, “I have read and understand the above conditions of probation and I agree to abide by them. I acknowledge that I have received a copy of the Order and Conditions of Probation.’ Pursuant to People v Davey (193 AD2d at 1108), the failure of the court to provide the defendant with a copy of the terms and conditions of probation does not render her sentence illegal. 8. Whether the sentence imposed penalized the defendant for asserting her right to a hearing “The defendant contends that because Judge Aronson stated that upon a plea he would sentence the defendant to 45 days in jail and 2 years probation, the increase in sentence to 60 2 ddays in jail and 3 years probation indicates that the sentence was retaliatory. She states that there was nothing testified to at the hearing that was not known to the court at the time the plea offer was made. “Given that the quid pro quo of the bargaining process will almost necessarily involve offers to moderate sentences that ordinarily would be greater [citations omitted], itis also to be anticipated that sentences handed out after trial may be more severe than those proposed in connection with a plea. Since no more than this emerges from the record here, it cannot be sai that [the defendant] was punished for refusing to accept the plea bargain” (People v Pena, 50 NY2d 400, 412). ‘This Court has reviewed the entirety of the transcripts and finds no indication that the defendant was penalized for exercising her tight to a hearing. Although the defendant contends that “there was no information presented during the People’s direct case that was unknown to the Court at the time of the plea offer”, the court’s sentence need not be based only on information irect case. Here, the defendant chose to te: presented in the People’s at the hearing and the Court was able to consider her testimony, as well as the statement the defendant made on July 6. 2017, when determining the sentence. In fact, itis clear that Judge Aronson did consider the defendant's words when determining the sentence, inasmuch as he stated, “[nJowhere in your presentation did I hear one word of remorse or contrition” (July 6, 2017 Transeript, p. 38), The defendant was not penalized for asserting her right (0 a hearing, 9. Whether the sentence is harsh and excessive ‘The sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. ‘The lower court properly set forth its reasons 13 for the sentence, including the defendant’s lack of remorse, her attempts to avoid her responsibilities under the criminal justice system, and her failure to surrender herself pursuant to the bench warrant, 10. Whether the requirement that the defendant wear a SCRAM bracelet was warranted, ‘The defendant was ordered to wear a SCRAM bracelet for a period of six months, Defendant contends that because she cannot drive without the presence of an IID device, she should not have been ordered to wear a SCRAM bracelet. She further contends that she should not have been ordered to pay for the use of the SCRAM device. In Hakes (143 AD3d at 1056 ) the Third Department specifically sanctioned the ordered use of'a SCRAM bracelet if the court determines that such condition would advance public afety, Here, the sentencing court was well aware of the history of defendant's criminal case, specifically the issues surrounding the defendant's misuse of the ignition interlock device and her failure to obtain an EtG test when ordered to do so, The SCRAM device provides an enhanced level of monitoring and allows for oversight of the defendant regardless of whether she complies swith a court order to obtain an E1G test. The lower court properly ordered the use of the SCRAM bracelet. With regard to the term of probation requiring the defendant to pay for the SCRAM bracelet, the Third Department has held that “[w[hile County Court can require a defendant to submit to the use of an electronic monitoring device if it determines that such a condition would advance public safety (see Penal Law § 65.10 [4]), it could not require a defendant to pay the costs associated with such monitoring since such costs do not fall within the category of 14 restitution, but are more in the nature of a law enforcement expense” (Fakes. 143 AD3d at 1056). Despite its mis; ings regarding the appropriateness of requiring the taxpayers to pay for the SCRAM bracelet, this Court is compelled to follow the holding in Hakes, * “It is axiomatic that [County] Court is bound to apply the law as promulgated by the Appellate Division within its particular Judicial Department (McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes § 72 [b] ), and where the issue has not been addressed within the Department, (County] Court is bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to apply precedent established in another Department, either until a contrary rule is established by the Appellate Division in its own Department or by the Court of Appeals’ ” (Phelps v Phelps, 128 AD3d 1545, 1547 [4" Dept 2015]. quoting D'Alessandro v Carro, 123 AD3d 1, 6 [1* Dept 2014). ‘This Court can find no authority from the Fourth Department that would allow it to uphold the condition of probation requiring the defendant to pay for the SCRAM bracelet and, while the Court of Appeals has granted leave to appeal in Hakes, at this point, being the only decision directly on point, it remains the law of the State. ‘Therefore, the defendant's sentence is modified to eliminate, from the conditions of probation, the requirement that she bear the expense of the SCRAM bracelet. As noted above, the condition requiring the defendant to wear the SCRAM bracelet was legal and appropriate and continues in all respects. This Decision does not indicate that at any time the defendant was excused from wearing the SCRAM bracelet or from complying with the conditions of probation regarding use of the SCRAM bracelet (see People v Brandon F., 299 AD2d 962, 963 [4" Dept 2002)) 15 11. Whether the court erred in imposing a term of probation requiring the defendant to consent to a search of her person and property and to a term of the SCRAM agreement prohibiting the defendant from the use of any product containing alcohol, whether consumable or not ‘The defendant contends that she should not be subjected to searches of her person and property. Penal Law 65.10(1) provides, “The conditions of probation and of conditional discharge shall be such as the court, in its discretion, deems reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so.” The defendant contends that because she has no previous criminal history, was required to install an IID. and is required to subn to random drug and alcohol testing, the condition that she waive her Fourth Amendment rights is not “reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist [her] to do so” (Penal Law § 65.10 [1]). Penal Law 65.10 (5) further provides, “When imposing a sentence of probation the court may, in addition to any conditions imposed pursuant to subdivisions two, three and four of this section, require that the defendant comply with any other reasonable condition as the court shall determine to be necessary or appropriate to ameliorate the conduct which gave rise to the offense or to prevent the incarceration of the defendant The Fourth Department recently determined, in a case where the defendant had a history of alcohol use, that a defendant could be required to consent to waiver of his Fourth Amendment right protecting him from searches of his person, home, and personal property. The Court held, ‘that condition was properly ‘circumscribed to specified types of searches by probation officers acting within the scope of their supervisory duty and in the context of the probationary goal of rehabilitation’ ” (People v King, 151 AD3d 1651, 1653 [4" Dept 2017], /v denied, 30 NY3d 951, 16 quoting People v Hale, 93 NY2d 454, 460 [1999]). ‘The Court specifically held that the condition is * ‘reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life” (Penal Law § 65.10 [1] ), and is necessary to prevent his future incarceration (see § 65.10 [5])” (King, 151 AD3d at 165, Here, in a case involving the defendant's driving while intoxicated and her further failure to submit to an ordered EtG test, the condition that she submit to searches of her person and property was lawfully imposed by the sentencing court. The defendant further contends that the condition of probation prohibiting her from possessing any item containing alcohol (including household cleaners) was unlawfully imposed, The requirement that the defendant refrain from possessing any material containing alcohol is contained in the SCRAM agreement which is incorporated into the terms of probation. Inasmuch as this Court has determined that the sentencing court lawfully imposed the requirement that the defendant wear the SCRAM bracelet, the prohibition related to the possession of any material containing alcohol, thereby ensuring that the SCRAM bracelet operates correctly, is reasonably related to the probationary goal of rehabilitation. 12. Whether the lower court should have considered the defendant's CPL. 330.30 motion Defendant contends that the lower court erred in finding that the CPL 330.30 motion was not permitted before a re-senteneing. In fact, the lower court held both that the motion was inapplicable to the violation of a conditional discharge and that the motion was without merit, Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 provides, “At any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before sentence, the court may, upon motion of the defendant, set aside or modify the 7 vetdiet or any part thereof ...” The Fourth Department has stated, * 1e language providing that a CPL. 330.30 motion may be made at any time ‘before sentence’ should be construed to mean at any time before the original sentence. Thus, defendant's motion, made before re-sentence but long afier the original sentence, was untimely” (People v Ferrin, 197 AD2d 882, 883 [4% Dept 1993] Jv denied 82 NY2d 849). Preliminarily, the defendant has failed to included the CPL 330.30 motion in the record on appeal. ‘Therefore the Court is unable to review this contention. To the extent the Court ean address the procedural issue without a fall review of the record, the Court finds that a CPL. 330.30 motion is inappropriate after a finding of a violation of a conditional discharge Procedurally, this case was not pending after “verdict of guilty and before sentence” (id.). At the time the motion was made, the case was pending between a finding of a violation of a conditional discharge and before re-sentencing, Therefore, the lower court properly determined that a CPL. 330.30 motion could not be entertained. “The finding that the defendant violated the terms of the conditional discharge is affirmed with the exception that the conditions of probation are modified to eliminate the provision that the defendant pay for the SCRAM bracelet. ‘This constitutes the DECISION and ORDER of the Court, & Dated: December _© 2017 Hon. Wi ‘Acting Monroe County Court Judge 18,

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