SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
private respondents should be threshed out in a special
A. Nature and Purpose
CHING vs. RODRIGUEZ
FACTS: Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3,
2002,[5] the respondents filed a Complaint[6] against the
petitioners and Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business
Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic
Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and
Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon
Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-interest.
First Cause of Action. The respondents averred that
Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonio's and Lucina's son
when in truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth certificate
was merely simulated. On July 18, 1996, Antonio died of a stab
wound. Police investigators identified Ramon as the prime
suspect and he now stands as the lone accused in a criminal case
for murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest issued against
him have remained unserved as he is at large.
Second Cause of Action. Ramon misrepresented that
there were only six real estate properties left by Antonio. The
respondents alleged that Ramon had illegally transferred to his
name the titles to the said properties.
Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low
educational attainment, was sweet-talked by Ramon into
surrendering to him a Global Business Bank, Inc. (Global Bank)
Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of
Antonio, and the certificates of title covering two condominium
units in Binondo which were purchased by Antonio using his own
money but which were registered in Ramon's name. Exerting
undue influence, Ramon had convinced them to execute an
Agreement and a Waiver on August 20, 1996.
Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon
executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate[10] adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to
the prejudice of the respondents.
Sixth Cause of Action. Since Ramon is at large, his wife,
Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages Antonio's estate. She has no
intent to convey to the respondents their shares in the estate of
Antonio. The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss.
On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order[13] denying
the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.
On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order[19] denying the
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss:
In the case at bar, an examination of
the Complaint would disclose that the
action delves mainly on the question of
ownership of the properties described in
the Complaint which can be properly
settled in an ordinary civil action. The
relief of establishing the status of the
plaintiffs which could have translated this
action into a special proceeding was
nowhere stated in the Amended Complaint.
On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now
assailed Decision[21] denying the petition for certiorari:
nothing in the said complaint shows that the action of the
proceeding
The Issue: OTHER MATTERS WHICH CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED
IN A SPECIAL PROCEEDING AND NOT IN AN ORDINARY CIVIL
ACTION.
The Court's Ruling: We resolve to deny the instant petition. Civil
Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and
not a special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court. An
action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a
civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate
of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by
the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of Court.[32] A special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact.[33] It is distinguished from an ordinary civil action
where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.[34] To initiate a
special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.
This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the
respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought
the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument
supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever
mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance,
Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a
special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action
before the RTC may not be strategically sound, because a
settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their
intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have
been illegally transferred in his name. WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DENIED.
2. MONTAER VS SHARIA DISTRICT COURT
FACTS: On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a
Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the
Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon
City.[3]Petitioners Alejandro Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-
Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan are their
children.[4] On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. Died.
On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and
her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montaer, both Muslims, filed a
Complaint for the judicial partition of properties before the
Sharia District Court. In the said complaint, private respondents
made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim;
(3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling
Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling
S. Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated
value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the
decedent.[8] Private respondents prayed for the Sharia District
Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of
the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an
administrator for the estate of the decedent.
On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the
private respondents complaint. The district court held that
Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction
extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of
deceased Muslims. On December 12, 2005, private respondents
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On December 28, 2005,
petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration. On January 17, 2006, the Sharia District Court
denied petitioners opposition. In their Comment to the Petition
for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Sharia District
Court must be given the opportunity to hear and decide the
question of whether the decedent is a Muslim in order to
determine whether it has jurisdiction. Article 143(b) of
Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Sharia
District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a
District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and
settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of
wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment
of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or
the aggregate value of the property.
Although private respondents designated the pleading filed
before the Sharia District Court as a Complaint for judicial
partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the
decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.
We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners
that the district court does not have jurisdiction over the case
because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss
that Montaer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the
nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon
the defenses set forth in an answer[25] or a motion to dismiss.
Special Proceedings
The underlying assumption in petitioners second
argument, that the proceeding before the Sharia District Court is
an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an
erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a
quo. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are
for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special
proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a
special proceeding as a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. This Court has
applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings,
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.[31] In a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement,
and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact
of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among
the decedents heirs, which would allow them to exercise their
right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate
of the decedent.[32] Here, the respondents seek to establish the
fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently, for
private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be recognized
as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.
A civil action, in which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress
of a wrong[34] necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are
either the plaintiff or defendant.[35] On the other hand, a special
proceeding, by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or
a particular fact,[36] has one definite party, who petitions or
applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but
no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis
that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of
action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of
the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the
estate,[37] pay its liabilities,[38] and to distribute the residual to
those entitled to the same. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is
DENIED.
G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001
3. PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT
OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL
ROSARIO, respondent..
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction
in an action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages,
adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of
property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
FACTS: Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra
were registered owners of a parcel of land. Upon the death of
Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children entered
into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate. Under the
agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six
children received 1/14 share of the said property.
Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a
portion of his interest in the land. Eventually, Graciano sold the
first lot2 to a third person but retained ownership over the
second lot. On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein
petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold
the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia. On 07
October 1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and
his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private respondents
alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through
the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery,
acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein
petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the
issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher.
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher
averred that she was legally married to Graciano in 20 March
1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a
compulsory heir of the latter. After trial, the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996
holding:8
"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del
Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law
and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence
that a separation of property was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a
judicial separation of property between them, the
spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract
of sale;
"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del
Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law
and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence
 that a separation of property was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a
judicial separation of property between them, the
spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract
of sale;
"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a
valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law under
Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as
such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as an
extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher
being a compulsory heir of the deceased."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower
court's decision ratiocinating, inter alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to
make a just and legal distribution of the estate. " What
the court should have done was merely to rule on the
validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on
advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding
instituted for that purpose.
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both
are government by the rules for ordinary civil actions,
subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil
action.
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact."
An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in
the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. The term
"special proceeding" may be defined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal
pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides.
In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an
application or motion."9
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial
Law expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions
include those proceedings which are instituted and
prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and
provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity,
and that special proceedings include those proceedings
which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted
and prosecuted according to some special mode as in
the case of proceedings commenced without summons
and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are
characteristics of ordinary actions. A special proceeding
must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and
independent proceeding for particular relief, such as
may be instituted independently of a pending action, by
petition or motion upon notice."10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the
estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the
probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Thus,
under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the
deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final
order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising
the questions and on the heir. Corollarily, the Regional Trial
Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is
devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the
issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein
petitioner Natcher. At this point, the appellate court's disquisition
is elucidating:
"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of
the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in
a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. From
the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts
trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts
pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject
to specific prescribed rules.
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and
proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial court failed
to observe established rules of procedure governing the
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 163108 February 23, 2005
4. GLENN CABALLES y CHUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. EMMANUEL D. LAUREA, HON. BENJAMIN T.
ANTONIO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: On November 19, 2001, petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes
was charged with rape of a minor in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malabon City. The petitioner was arraigned on February
7, 2002 and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. The
petitioner, through counsel, commenced his cross-examination of
Pio, but failed to complete the same. The trial was set on March 6,
2003 for the petitioner to terminate his cross-examination of Pio.
However, due to the illness of the private prosecutor, the trial on
the said date did not proceed. The prosecution declared that its
next witness would be Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the Medico-Legal
Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory,
who had conducted a medico-legal examination of the private
complainant, but stated that he had not been subpoenad. On April
28, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for bail. The said counsel
manifested that he reserved his right to cross-examine any
witness the prosecution would present in case trial would
proceed on that date; on the other hand, in the event that the trial
court would cancel the trial, he would be available in May 2003
and during the first half of June 2003.
On May 13, 2003, the court issued an Order11 declaring that the
petition for bail was submitted for its resolution and denying the
petitioners motion for an earlier trial date. On June 16, 2003, the
trial court issued its Order12 denying the petition for bail, on its
finding that the evidence of guilt against the petitioner was
strong.
However, the petitioner preempted the resolution of his motion
for reconsideration and filed a Motion to Dismiss14 the case on
July 11, 2003 on the ground that his right to speedy trial had
been violated. The trial court reasoned that there was no
violation of the petitioners right to speedy trial, considering that
the apparent delays could not be attributed to the fault of the
prosecution alone. The petitioner then filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA) a "Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari and
Prohibition." Petitioner filed a manifestation with the appellate
court that he had chosen his petition to be treated as a petition
for habeas corpus without prejudice "to the concomitant
application of certiorari if the court considered the same
necessary or appropriate to give effect to the writ of habeas
corpus." On December 9, 2003, the CA issued its assailed
Resolution dismissing the petition. The CA further emphasized
that a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error; that it could not
exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over the acts or omission of the
respondent judge as a concomitant remedy; and that the remedy
for habeas corpus and certiorari are different in nature, scope and
purpose.
ISSUES: (a) whether or not the decision of the CA is already final
and executory; (b) whether the proper remedy from the
appellate courts denial of a petitioner for a writ if habeas
corpus is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court; and (c) if in the affirmative, whether or not the petitioner
is entitled to the issuance of the writ.
HELD: On the first issue, we find and so rule that the petitioners
recourse to this Court via a petition for certiorari from the
decision of the CA dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is inappropriate. Following the rule, the petitioner should
have appealed to this Court from the CA decision denying his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of his
motion for reconsideration thereof; instead, the petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. In Ex Parte Billings,26 it was held that habeas corpus is
that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of
civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the
criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of
liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be
served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when
instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom.
When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby
commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court.27
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended
as substitute for the trial courts function.28 It cannot take the
place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be
used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be
raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in
a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of
whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any
reason, null and void.29 The writ is not ordinarily granted where
the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in
the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas
corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.30 The orderly
course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies
exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional
circumstances are extant.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a
proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole purpose of having
the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that
the cause of his detention may be inquired into and his
statements final. The only question to be resolved is whether the
custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty.
We agree with the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus cannot be joined with the special civil action for certiorari
because the two remedies are governed by a different set of rules.
Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court mandates that the
joinder of causes of action shall not include special actions or
actions governed by special rules, thus proscribing the joinder of
a special proceeding with a special civil action.
CA rightly dismissed the petition because the petitioner failed to
establish his right to the writ. It was inappropriate for the
petitioner to file a petition for habeas corpus assailing the trial
courts order denying his motion to dismiss the case for failure to
comply with the timeline provided for by the said Rules. After
due consideration, the Court finds the instant motion untenable.
Even then, the petitioner failed to establish his claim that he was
deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. While it
is true that the trial was reset to June 19, 2003, or more than one
month from April 30, 2003, the petitioners counsel himself
manifested that he was available for trial during the first half of
June 2003. There was a difference of only four (4) days from the
trial date set by the court and the available dates suggested by
the petitioners counsel. It bears stressing that trial dates cannot
be set solely at the convenience of the petitioners counsel. The
trial dates available in the calendar of the court and of the
prosecutor must also be taken into account.
Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner was deprived of his
right to a speedy disposition of the case simply because the
private prosecutor failed to submit a medical certificate for his
absence during the trial of March 6, 2003. Moreover, the
petitioner failed to establish any serious prejudice by the delay of
the trial, and that the State deliberately delayed the trial to
prejudice him. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit.
5. ALAN SHEKER vs ESTATE OF ALICE SHEKER
FACTS: The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice
O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to
file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim
for agent's commission due him amounting to
approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain
parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount
of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or
to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale
of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent)
moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on
the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in
Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid;
(2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum
shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation
why the money claim was not filed and served personally.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order
dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on the
grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied. The petition is imbued with merit.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In
the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for
in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable
in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the
Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules
governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special
proceedings, as far as practicable. The word practicable is
defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put
into practice, done or accomplished. This means that in the
absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be
applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where
doing so would not pose an obstacle to said
proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and
initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal
service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims
against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate
proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such
as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the
present case.
ISSUE: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent
money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to
attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping?
HELD: The Court rules in the affirmative. The certification of non-
forum shopping is required only for complaints and other
initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent
money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory
pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding
was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of
the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of
administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate
administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they
would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.
Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim
against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a
money claim against the estate. The RTC should have relaxed and
liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a
written explanation for non-personal service, again in the
interest of substantial justice. WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED.
RULE 74 SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES
1. [G.R. No. L-21725. November 29, 1968.] - AURELIO
ARCILLAS, Petitioner, v. HON. GREGORIO D.
MONTEJO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga, Respondents.
FACTS: Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased,
sought the cancellation of TCT. It was claimed that at various
dates after the death of the deceased, several transactions
affecting Lot No. 276 transpired, prominent among which were
the separate sales of their respective shares and participation in
Lot No. 276 executed by four (4) other children of the deceased in
favor of co-heir Vicente Arcillas.
Recognizing then the merit of petitioners ground, respondent
Judge issued an order on December 1, 1963 temporarily holding
in abeyance resolution of the November 12 petition until the
termination of the intestate proceedings. Geronimo Arcillas, this
time joined by Vicente Arcillas and the widow Modesta Alfaro,
opposed the issuance of letters of administration to herein
petitioner, arguing that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was the only
property left by the deceased and the deceased left no debts, the
petition for administration was improper. On March 8, 1963
respondent court denied the November 16 petition for the
issuance of letters of administration and at the same time gave
due course to the November 12 petition.
ISSUES: whether respondent Judge acted properly (1) in
dismissing the administration proceedings under the authority of
Section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon averments that
the estate left no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in its
distribution are all of age and (2) in maintaining that the
"cadastral motion" brought under the provision of Section 112 of
the Land Registration Act was the more proper proceeding under
the circumstances. Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of
Court, if the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs and
legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see
fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
Register of Deeds and should they disagree, they may do so in an
ordinary action of partition. And primarily anchored on the
proposition that inasmuch as in the present case the minimum
requirements of the aforementioned Section obtain, i.e. the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age,
respondents claim that there is no necessity for the institution of
special proceedings and the appointment of an administrator for
the settlement of the estate for the reason that it is superfluous
and unnecessary. In other words, respondents apparently view
Section 1 of Rule 74 as mandatory upon the heirs so long as the
deceased left no will nor any pending obligations to be paid and
his heirs are all of age. We cannot entirely agree with the
respondents.
". . . section 1 does not preclude the heirs from instituting
administration, proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or
obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an
ordinary action of partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to
divide the estate among themselves as they may be fit, or to
resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them
to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of
action. Said Section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be
gleaned from the use made therein of the word may.
Having decided to institute administration proceedings (as in the
case at bar) instead of resorting to the less expensive modes of
settlement of the estate, i.e. extrajudicial settlement or ordinary
action for partition, the heirs may not be rebuffed in the exercise
of their discretion granted under Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court merely on the ground that the expenses usually common
in administration proceedings may deplete the funds of the
estate. The resultant delay and necessary expenses incurred
thereafter are consequences which must be deemed to have been
voluntarily assumed by the heirs themselves so that they may not
in the future be heard to complain of these matters.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
setting aside the appealed orders and directing respondent Judge
or whoever is presiding the court below to reinstate Special
Proceedings No. 632; the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding
with the hearing of the "cadastral" motion dated November 12,
1962 is hereby made permanent.
[G.R. No. L-23758. May 20, 1968.]
2. MAXIMINA OYOD DE GARCES, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. ESMERALDA BROCE, ET AL., Defendants. ESMERALDA
BROCE, Defendant-Appellant.
Facts: Maximina Oyod de Garces, Gregorio Oyod and Pio V.
Garces sought the termination of a lease and annulment of sale, in
favor of defendants Tranquilino Broce and Esmeralda Broce, and
the return by the latter, of a parcel of land described as Lot No.
228-D of the subdivision of Lot No. 228 of the Cadastral Survey of
San Carlos, Negros Occidental, with an area of 354,250 square
meters more or less, that plaintiffs claimed to be their property
pro-indiviso.
4. That in 1930 the heirs of Severo Oyod executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial partition
5. That on September 5, 1951 the heirs of Severo Oyod executed a
Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement
6. That Fortunata Oyod executed a lease agreement in favor of
Tranquilino Broce on October 28, 1957
7. That on September 25, 1962, the heirs of Fortunata Oyod
Barbon executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Sale in favor of
Esmeralda P. Broce
ISSUES: That the questions before this Court are as follows:
(a) Which should prevail, the Extra-Judicial Settlement of 1930 or
that of 1951?
(b) If the 1930 Extra-Judicial Settlement is upheld, then the buyer
Esmeralda Broce bought on September 25, 1962, Lot No. 228-D,
as described in the 1930 document.
(c) If the 1951 Extra-Judicial Settlement is upheld, then Fortunata
Oyod owned an undivided share in Lot No. 288; and what
Esmeralda Broce acquired in 1962 is not Lot No. 228-D
specifically, but an undivided share of 1/4 in Lot 228.
After due hearing, the court rendered judgment on July 11, 1964,
upholding the due execution and validity of the 1930
extrajudicial partition by the heirs of Severo Oyod and Bonifacia
Mahinay of Lot No. 228, and of the sale in 1962 to Esmeralda
Broce of Lot No. 228-D by the heirs of Fortunata Oyod. Both
parties appealed
HELD: 1. REMEDIAL LAW; EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION;
UNREGISTERED PUBLlC INSTRUMENT; EFFECT. The
controversy here lies on the effect of the execution of the
extrajudicial partition in 1951, which was duly recorded in the
Registry of Deeds, upon the 1930 agreement which, although
embodied in a public instrument, was admittedly not registered.
Held: The requirement that a partition be put in a public
document and registered has, for its purpose the protection of
creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. Thus, the intrinsic validity of a
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not
come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of the
creditors are not affected. Considering that the voluntary division
of the estate of the deceased, by the heirs among themselves, is
conclusive and confers upon said heirs exclusive ownership of
the respective portions assigned to them, the extra-judicial
partition made by the heirs of Severo Oyod in 1930 could not
have been cancelled or substituted by the execution, by some of
these heirs, of another extra-judicial settlement of the same
estate in 1951 even if the latter document be registered,
particularly since one of the co-signers of the 1930 agreement,
Eugenia Oyod, had died on January 8, 1950 (Exh. D) before the
second extra-judicial settlement was made.
2. DEBTS OF THE ESTATE; HOW SATISFIED. There is no
basis to the lower Courts order to defendant-appellant.
Esmeralda Broce, to assume a proportionate share of the
indebtedness contracted by the surviving heirs of the deceased
Severo Oyod with the Philippine National Bank. The fact that the
property in dispute originally formed part of the estate of said
deceased person and that the obligation was contracted prior to
its purchase by herein defendant-appellant, to pay the taxes due
on the estate of the deceased, does not render the vendee
answerable therefor. In the present case, there is no proof that
the heirs of Fortunata Oyod received from the estate of Severo
Oyod no property other than Lot 228-D. It does not even appear
that this obligation to the Philippine National Bank was duly
constituted as an encumbrance on the whole Lot. 228. As mere
vendee of Lot 228-D, Defendant-Appellant cannot be required to
share in the payment of an obligation contracted by the heirs of
the estate, of which she is not one.
G.R. No. L-47475 May 6, 1942
3. DONATO LAJOM, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE P. VIOLA,
RAFAEL VIOLA, and SILVIO VIOLA, defendants-appellees.
The plaintiff-appellant, Donato Lajom, filed a complaint, which
amended on May 16, 1939, praying, among other things, that he
be declared a natural child of the late Dr. Maximo Viola and
therefore a co-heir of the defendand-appellees, Jose P. Viola,
Rafael Viola, and Silvio Viola, legitimate children of said Dr.
Maximo Viola; a new partition be ordered, adjudicating one-
seventh of the estate to the plaintiff and two-sevenths to each of
the defendants. Among the allegations of the complaint are the
following:
2. That the plaintiff is a natural child, impliedly
recognized and tacitly acknowledged by his father, the
late Dr. Maximo Viola
4. That from early childhood until before the year 1889,
and even thereafter, the plaintiff had been living with
his father, the late Dr. Maximo Viola, and had been
enjoying the status of a son, not only within the family
circle but also publicly, on account of the acts of his said
father;
6. That a testate proceeding was instituted in the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, covering the estate left by
the said Dr. Maximo Viola, registered as civil case No.
4741 of said Court; and this special proceedings was
already closed
8. That the herein defendants willfully, deliberately and
fraudulently concealed the truth from the Court that
they have a natural brother who should also participate
in the estate of their deceased father, with the single
and avowed intention to deprive deliberately and
 fraudulently the herein plaintiff of his lawful
participation in the estate in question;
9. That the herein defendants partitioned among
themselves the estate in question
By an order dated July 31, 1939, the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija sustained the defendants' demurrer and dismissed
the case. The Court held that the complaint did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action because its allegation
called for the exercise of the probate jurisdiction of the court and
consequently did not constitute a cause of action in an ordinary
civil case like the present. It was further held that the court had
no jurisdiction because there was no allegation that the late Dr.
Maximo Viola was, at the time of his death, a resident of Nueva
Ecija; on the contrary, the complaint showed that the will of the
deceased had already been probated in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan and that court having first taken cognizance
of the settlement of the estate, the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija could no longer assume jurisdiction over the same
case.
The two grounds for sustaining the demurrer to the complaint
will now be discussed. First, as to the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija. In the present case, the defendants
partitioned the estate among themselves in the administration
proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Even
granting that the partition was binding against the whole world
(though it will be shown later that it was not), nevertheless it
could not have a more puissant finality than a decree of title
under the Torrens system. Upon the authority of the Severino vs.
Severino, the legal title obtained by the defendants to the
plaintiff's share in the estate, in the partition approved by the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, must yield to the superior and
inviolate rights equity of the plaintiff, who abstained from taking
part in that partition because of the promise made to him by the
defendants that they would deliver to him lawful share as an
acknowledged natural child.
The defendants having, according to the complaint, promised to
give the plaintiff his share in the inheritance, his right to demand
partition of the inheritance does not prescribe. In the case just
cited, this court upheld two propositions: (1) that a judicial
partition in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs who
were not parties thereto; and (2) that in such cases, the heir who
has been deprived of his share in the estate may bring an action
for reivindication with the prescriptive period against the
persons put in possession by the probate court.
Upon the authority of the decision just cited, the plaintiff in the
present case is entitled to be considered and declared a natural
son of Dr. Maximo Viola, voluntarily acknowledged by him
through his own acts. In view of the repealing provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure in section 795 thereof, the period for
bringing an action by a natural child voluntarily recognized by
the father under Law 11 of Toro, for declaration of the status of a
natural child, should be 10 years from the death of a natural
father. In this case, less than six years have elapsed from the
death of Dr. Maximo Viola to the filing of the complaint. In any
event this matter of prescription of the action has not been set up
as a defense.
G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012
4. NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA
D. NERI-CHAMBERS, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP
UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY, Respondents.
The Facts
During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven
children, two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut
(Gonzalo), and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique
Neri (Enrique). Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and
Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties with a
total area of 296,555 square meters located in Samal, Davao del
Norte.
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband,
Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his
minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia,
and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate
with Absolute Deed of Sale. On June 11, 1996, the children of
Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the said
homestead properties against spouses Uy (later substituted by
their heirs)before the RTC, assailing the validity of the sale for
having been sold within the prohibited period. In their amended
answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that the sale
took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the
issuance of the homestead patents.
The RTC Ruling
On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering,
among others, the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale
occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale is still
void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their
hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to
sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC
and dismissed the complaint of the petitioners. Similarly, the CA
declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent sale as
valid and binding with respect to Enrique and his children.
The Issues
I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE"
AS FAR AS THE SHARES OF EUTROPIA AND VICTORIA WERE
CONCERNED, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR
INHERITANCE;
II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE"
WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARESOF ROSA AND DOUGLAS,
THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE; and
III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR PRESCRIPTION HAS SET
IN.
The Ruling of the Court
 The petition is meritorious. In the execution of the
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of
Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that
Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and
that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly
represented therein, the settlement was not valid and
binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. -
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided
in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
notice thereof. (Underscoring added)
Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon
any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof." However, while the settlement of the estate is null and
void, the subsequent sale of the subject properties made by
Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor
of the respondents is valid but only with respect to their
proportionate shares therein. Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of
the Rules of Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. When the property of the child under
parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the
mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal
guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian
of the childs property, with the duties and obligations of guardians
under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by Section 2
hereof. For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another
suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the
property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural
purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any
reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the
limits of administration.13 Thus, a father or mother, as the natural
guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have
the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such
power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the wards
property and even then only with courts prior approval secured
in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of
Court.14
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf
of his minor children without the proper judicial authority,
unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority,15 is
unenforceable. Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale.
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is
invalid and therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and
Douglas, only the shares of Enrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda
and Rosa in the homestead properties have effectively been
disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "
Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro
indiviso co-owners of the homestead properties with Eutropia,
Victoria and Douglas, who retained title to their respective 1/16
shares. They were deemed to be holding the 3/16 shares of
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas under an implied constructive
trust for the latters benefit. WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is GRANTED.
5. BENATIRO vs CUYOS
FACTS: Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed
with nine children. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of
land. On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent
Gloria) filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial
Court (RTC), a petition[4] for Letters of Administration. The petition was
opposed by Glorias brother, Francisco. In the hearing held on January 30,
1973, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared. Both
counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle
their case. The trial court on even date issued an Order[5] appointing Gloria
as administratrix of the estate. Subsequently, in the Order[7] dated
December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that when the Intestate Estate hearing
was called on that date, respondent Gloria and her brother, oppositor
Francisco, together with their respective counsels, appeared;
that Atty. Yray, Franciscos counsel, manifested that the parties had come to
an agreement to settle the case amicably. The Court of First Instance
(CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to make a project of partition
within 30 days from December 12, 1975 for submission and approval of
the court.
In his Commissioner's Report[8] dated July 29, 1976,
Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to
all the heirs to cause their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976
in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a
conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs,
only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend; that per
return of the service, these three heirs could not be located in their
respective given addresses; that since some of the heirs present resided
outside the province of Cebu, they decided to go ahead with the scheduled
meeting.
CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new administrator of
the estate, purportedly on the basis of the motion to relieve respondent
Gloria ,as it appeared that she was already residing in Central Luzon.
On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale[13] over the six parcels of land constituting the intestate estate of the
late Evaristo Cuyos in favor of Columba for a consideration of the sum
of P36,000.00. Respondents filed a complaint against
petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before the Commission on the Settlement of
Land Problems (COSLAP) of the Department of Justice, which on June 13,
2000 dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.[14] Salud Cuyos brought the
matter for conciliation and mediation at the barangay level, but was
unsuccessful.[15]
On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of the Order. They alleged that the CFI Order dated December
16, 1976 was null and void and of no effect, the same being based on a
Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and irregular. The CA
granted the petition and annulled the CFI order.
ISSUE: whether the CA committed a reversible error in annulling the CFI
Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved the Commissioners
Report embodying the alleged compromise agreement entered into by the
heirs of Evaristo and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos.
HELD: We rule in the negative. The remedy of annulment of judgment is
extraordinary in character[25] and will not so easily and readily lend itself to
abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47
impose strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.:
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the
annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. The annulment may
be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
 Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed
of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that
annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC may be based "only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction," jurisprudence
recognizes denial of due process as additional .ground therefor.[26] An action
to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is
extrinsic or collateral in character.[27] Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a
fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the
case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his
side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing
party.[28] Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having
a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates
upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is
alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a
party from having his day in court.
While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated
December 16, 1976, we find that it should be annulled not on the ground of
extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of
the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for
lack of due process. However, there is nothing in the records that would
establish that the alleged subpoenae, supplemented by telegrams, for the
heirs to appear in the scheduled conference were indeed sent to the heirs.
Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for
the purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties.
Considering that no separate instrument of conveyance was executed among
the heirs embodying their alleged agreement, it was necessary that the
Report be signed by the heirs to prove that a conference among the heirs was
indeed held, and that they conformed to the agreement stated in the Report.
Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that
the conference was not held accordingly and in annulling the assailed order of
the CFI.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of
Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule
plainly states, however, that persons who do not
participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial
settlement will not be bound thereby. It
contemplates a notice that has been sent out or
issued before any deed of settlement and/or
partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all
interested parties to participate in the said deed
of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not
after such an agreement has already been
executed as what happened in the instant case
with the publication of the first deed of
extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of
due process of law, it is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any
right or of any obligation. The CFI's order being null and void, it may be
assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such
judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,
unless barred by laches.[41] Consequently, the compromise agreement and
the Order approving it must be declared null and void and set aside. We
find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from
assailing the judgment after the lapse of 24 years from its finality on ground
of laches and estoppel.
Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action
for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within
four years from its discovery and, if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is
barred by laches or estoppel. The principle of laches or "stale demands"
ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only
sometime in February 1998 and filed the petition for annulment of judgment
in 2001. Moreover, we find that respondents' right to due process is the
paramount consideration in annulling the assailed order. It bears stressing
that an action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not
prescribe.[45]
Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has
no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In
contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed of
Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the
issuance of titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent
transfers are void ab initio. No reversible error was thus committed by the
CA in annulling the judgment. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. L-19060 May 29, 1964
6. IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA,
FRANCISCO GERONA and DELFIN GERONA, petitioners, vs.
CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN, respondents.
In the complaint, filed with the latter court on September 4, 1958,
petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco
and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the
legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman;
that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate
daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la
Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman
married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, namely,
respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica, Pacita
and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman
died on September 11, 1945; that subsequently, or on May 6,
1948, respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement
of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently
misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs
of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although they well knew
that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that respondents had
thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer
certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the name
of said deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer certificates of
title to be issued in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th
individual interest for each; that such fraud was discovered by
the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case;
that petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their
(petitioners) share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th
interest thereon; and that the respondents refused to heed said
demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners.
Accordingly, the latter prayed that judgment be rendered
nullifying said deed of extra-judicial settlement, insofar as it
deprives them of their participation of 1/18th of the properties in
litigation; ordering the respondents to reconvey to petitioners
their aforementioned share in said properties; ordering the
register of deeds to cancel the transfer certificates of title secured
by respondents as above stated and to issue new certificates of
title in the name of both the petitioners and the respondents in
the proportion of 1/8th for the former and 7/8th for the latter;
ordering the respondents to render accounts of the income of
said properties and to deliver to petitioners their lawful share
therein; and sentencing respondents to pay damages and
attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners'
mother, the deceased Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to
share in the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a
spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners' action is barred
by the statute of limitations. After appropriate proceedings, the
trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother
was a legitimate child, by first marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman;
that the properties described in the complaint belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife,
Camila Ramos; and that petitioners' action has already
prescribed, and, accordingly, dismissing the complaint without
costs. On appeal taken by the petitioners, this decision as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with costs against them.
Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs
of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for
partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of
limitations of action; that, if affected by said statute, the period of
four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual
discovery of the fraud perpetrated by respondents, which, it is
claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957; and that accordingly, said
period had not expired when the present action was commenced
on November 4, 1958.
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule,
an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is
true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in
question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations
operates as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is
asserted by the possessor of the property.
When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-
judicial settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of
the late Marcelo de Guzman, and secured new transfer
certificates of title in their own name, they thereby excluded the
petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and, consequently,
set up a title adverse to them. And this is why petitioners have
brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the
ground that the same is tainted with fraud.
Although, there are some decisions to the contrary, it is already
settled in this jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance of real
property based upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting
from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations. Inasmuch
as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-
judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution
thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years
from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have
taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said
instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents
exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial
settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world.
As correctly stated in the decision of the trial court:
In the light of the foregoing it must, therefore, be held
that plaintiffs learned at least constructively, of the
alleged fraud committed against them by defendants on
25 June 1948 when the deed of extra-judicial settlement
of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman was
registered in the registry of deeds of Bulacan.
Plaintiffs' complaint in this case was not filed until 4
November 1958, or more than 10 years thereafter.
Plaintiff Ignacio Gerona became of age on 3 March 1948.
He is deemed to have discovered defendants' fraud on
25 June 1948 and had, therefore, only 4 years from the
said date within which to file this action. Plaintiff Maria
Concepcion Gerona became of age on 8 December 1949
or after the registration of the deed of extra-judicial
settlement. She also had only the remainder of the
period of 4 years from December 1949 within which to
commence her action. Plaintiff Francisco Gerona
became of age only on 9 January 1952 so that he was
still a minor when he gained knowledge (even if only
constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on
25 June 1948. Likewise, plaintiff Delfin Gerona became
of legal age on 5 August 1954, so that he was also still a
minor at the time he gained knowledge (although
constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on
25 June 1948. Francisco Gerona and Delfin Gerona had,
therefore, two years after the removal of their disability
within which to commence their action (Section 45,
paragraph 3, in relation to Section 43, Act 190), that is,
January 29, 1952, with respect to Francisco, and 5
August 1954, with respect to Delfin.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed, with costs against petitioners herein. It is so ordered.
[G.R. No. L-19064. January 31, 1964.]
7. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE of PAZ E.
SIGUION TORRES, deceased, ALBERTO S. TORRES, Petitioner-
Appellant, v. CONCHITA TORRES and ANGEL S.
TORRES, Oppositors-Appellees.
FACTS: Alberto S. Torres, claiming to be one of the four
legitimate children of Paz E. Siguion Torres who died intestate on
December 18, 1959, prayed for the issuance in his favor of letters
of administration in connection with the properties left by the
decedent, with an aggregate value of about P300,000.00.
This petition was opposed by Conchita Torres, one of the heirs,
on the ground that the appointment of an administrator is
unnecessary in view of the fact that on January 27, 1960, the
heirs of the deceased (including petitioner) had already entered
into an extrajudicial partition and settlement of the estate,
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. This was
answered by petitioner who, while admitting that such
extrajudicial partition was signed by the heirs, contended that
attempts at the actual designation of their respective shares had
failed thus needing the courts intervention. It was also claimed
that some properties of considerable value were not included in
said extrajudicial partition.
In the circumstances, we agree with the lower court that a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased is not
here necessary.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"SECTION 1. Extra-judicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the
decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a
public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir
or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an
affidavit filed in the office of the Register of Deeds. It shall be presumed that the
decedent left no debt if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration
within two years after the death of the decedent."
Thus, where the decedent left no debts and heirs or
legatees are all of age, as in this case, there is no
 necessity for the institution of special proceedings and
the appointment of an administrator for the settlement
of the estate, because the same can be effected either
extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for
partition. Indeed, the bare allegation that "the estate has
an existing debt of P50,000.00 from third persons"
cannot be considered a concise statement to constitute
a cause of action. Nor does the unverified statement that
there are other properties, not included in the deed of
extrajudicial partition in the possession of one of the
heirs, justify the institution of an administration
proceeding because the same questions that may arise
as to them, viz. the title thereto, and their partition, if
proven to belong to the intestate, can be properly and
expeditiously litigated in an ordinary action of partition.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed
from, the same is hereby affirmed.
G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958
8. BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.
Facts: Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He left for
parcels of land. He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and
several nephews and nieces, children of deceased brothers and
sisters. On July 25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his
widow executed an affidavit stating that "the deceased Teodoro
Tolete left no children or respondent neither ascendants or
acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews
or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife of
the deceased, the one and only person to inherit the above
properties". On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all
the above parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of
P10,000. On June 17, 1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said
parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for P50,000.
In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the
administration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete and having
secured her appointment as administratrix, brought the present
action. The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon,
had no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication and that
Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold to him, and
that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said
properties. After trial the Court of First Instance rendered
judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera, declaring that the
affidavit of adjudication, the deed of sale are all null and void.
ISSUES: I -The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that
respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action to recover her and
her co-heirs' participation to the lands in question had not
prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed.
II - The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the petitioners
are innocent purchasers for value.
III - The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the lower court's denial
of petitioner's motion for new trial.
HELD: the right of action of the administratrix has prescribed
and lapsed because the same was not brought within the period
of two years. Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows:
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. If it shall appear at any
time within two years after the settlement and distribution of an estate
in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of
this rule, that an heir or other has been unduly deprived of his lawful
participation of the such heir or such other person may compel the
settlement estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for
the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. . . .
Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs. If
the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so
in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee,
he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit
filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the
decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of
administration within two years after the death of the decedent.
It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted contains
two parts, the first referring to a case in which there are two or
more heirs interested in the estate of a deceased person, and the
second in which there is only one heir. The section was taken
from Section 596 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190,
as amended by Act No. 2331). Said Section 596 as amended, was
as follows:
SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal
Proceedings. Whenever all the heirs of a person who died intestate
are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no debts due from the
estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, by agreement duly
executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and
divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without
proceedings in court.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule
74. In Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs,
both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial
settlement.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial
settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. The
provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs
from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of
two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1)
to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of
the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied
with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken
part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails to comply
with both requirements because not all the heirs interested have
participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals
having found that the decedent left aside from his widow,
nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.
But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still
unavailing to the defendants. The action is one based on fraud, as
the widow of the deceased owner of the lands had declared in her
affidavit of partition that the deceased left no nephews or niece,
or other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on
fraud and which has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act
no. 190; Article 1146, Civil Code), does not appear to have lapsed
the action was instituted. Judicial proceedings where instituted in
March, 1950 and these proceedings must have been instituted
soon after the discovery of fraud. In any case, the defendants
have the burden of proof as to their claim of the statute of
limitations, which is their defense, and they have not proved that
when the action was instituted, four years had already elapsed
from the date that the interested parties had actual knowledge of
the fraud.