SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION: Issues and Challenges

Pat Gibbons,

Contrary to common perception there has been a marked (and welcome) reduction in
the number of active conflicts in recent years (Human Security Report 2005).
However, more often than not an end to overt physical violence is followed only by
continued societal fragmentation (Loane et al, 2007). States tend to experience a
period of stasis that feature a number of characteristics which include, an uncertain
political institution; an economy skewed by the war effort; fragmented
society/societies with limited social capital; and continued suffering and need for
protection (ibid). It is estimated that almost half of these states return to full blown
conflict within five years of peace settlements (World Bank, 2004).

The purpose of this paper is to critically analyse the issues and challenges facing these
post-conflict societies. It begins by clarifying some of the terminology associated
with societies in transition. This is followed by a description of the societal
(re)building process or what is commonly referred to as nation(re)building. In
post-conflict societies this process is complicated given that the (re)building process
needs to address many disparate issues not least the causes and legacy of the disaster.
Finally, the paper uses the Northern Ugandan context to describe that complexity of
the transition process.

Terminology and Rationale

The term society is used to mean a group of people who live in a particular territory,
are subject to a common system of political authority, and are aware of having a
distinct identity from other groups around them (Giddens, 1997). Based on the
assumption that conflict leads to polarisation of interests into two or more groupings/
sub-national societies, the post-conflict transition process generally seeks to establish
some level of social interaction under a common governing authority. Many
sociologists have difficulties with this conception, given that the use of the word
society in preference to state emphasises social interaction over the governance
and management function; however most of the literature on societies in transition
employs this understanding. To this end, the term state, in this paper, refers to the
political apparatus (government institutions, plus civil service officials) ruling over a
given territorial order, whose authority is backed by law and the ability to use force
(ibid).

The term institution(s) is closely associated with both concepts society and state.
It refers to a pattern of social interaction, having a relatively stable structure, that
persists over time (ICAAP, 2009) or social practices that are regularly and
continuously repeated, are sanctioned and maintained by social norms, and have a
major significance in the social structure (Abercrombie et al, 1984). So while the
state can (re)establish state structures/ organs these rarely deserve the label social
institutions until they have embraced the values of the larger population and have
been normalised over time.
The Oxford English Dictionary (2008) defines transition as: the process or a period
of changing from one state or condition to another. This definition acknowledges that
transition can be identified as a process of change and it also respects the temporal
nature of this change. The term transition is used in a wide variety of contexts.
Even in development discourse, aid specialists employ the word transition as a label
to describe the process of change in very disparate contexts, including: the transition
from one recognised societal stage of development to another (e.g. traditional to
modern); from one economic system to another; the transition of a societal
institution from one recognised system to another (e.g. from an economic system of
socialism to capitalism); or the transition from one approach to external support to
another (e.g. support that focuses on relief aid to one that is labelled as development
aid).

Many other terms are also used by aid technocracy to describe this latter process or
period of change from relief to development. Such terms include continuum,
contiguum, and rehabilitation. All of these terms, including transition, assume an
inherent difference between relief and development. Before analysing these terms
one most recognise that the literature is dominated by Western racial discourse, which
some would argue, employs a Eurocentric functionalist view of society. This
functionalist view presents a society as a social system whose parts (institutions,
groups and individuals) work towards stability and ordered development in line with
Western liberal democratic values. Duffield (1996) articulated this view in his paper
that was aptly titled the Symphony of the Damned. It should be noted that despite
its limitations, cultural-functionalism continues to be the preferred approach of aid
technocracy at the expense of radical change. To this end, contemporary conflicts1
are frequently viewed as some kind of (temporary) interruption in the ordered pattern
of development.

The term continuum has been long associated with natural disasters. In these
situations the cause of the disaster is deemed apolitical and the relief effort is
theoretically designed to support weakened/ overwhelmed societal institutions to meet
the basic needs of their citizens. In the early 1990s there were efforts to apply
continuum thinking to complex political emergencies2. This shift in thinking was
prompted by a number of problems/ limitations of the relief effort namely: its
potential to undermine local economies and coping strategies (Anderson, 1996); a
paradigm shift in the approach to humanitarian intervention from assistance to action
primed by the greatly strengthened role of the UN in promoting its agenda for peace
in post-Cold War intra-state conflicts (Slim, 1997); and a very significant increase in
the relief budget relative to the development aid budget (Duffield, 1994).
Conceptually, continuum thinking serves to reduce the distinctions between relief and
development theory and practice in what is commonly referred to as developmental
relief. Advocates of this developmental relief criticise the classical humanitarian
approach on the basis that it was nave and argued that its failure to recognise the root

1
Contemporary conflicts refer to the prevailing pattern of political and violent conflicts at the
beginning of the 21st century.
2
Complex political emergencies are characterised as: more often than not they are intra-state, it is
difficult to discern combatants from non-combatants; violence is frequently directed at civilians and
civilian structures; the situation on the ground is fluid; mechanisms of accountability are limited; and
there is a multiplicity of causes and actors.
causes of the disaster rendered the relief effort counterproductive and suggest that on
occasions it served to prolong protracted disasters (Gibbons 2006) . Classical
humanitarians on the other hand, challenge the blurring of the relief development
divide for a number of reasons including: its failure to prioritise the needs of victims
encouraging the instrumentalisation of aid to meet the political and military needs of
donors; it creates barriers between humanitarians and the population they serve; and it
places aid workers in a compromised position forcing them to deal with political
issues beyond their capacity and authority (ibid).

The contiguum concept arose following analysis of post-conflict societies in the early
1990s. It was generally accepted that the chronological linear path to development
envisaged by the continuum rarely materialised. On the contrary it was evident that
crises zones and peace zones coexisted in the same societies, and it was also apparent
that peace zones experienced frequent returns to violence even if these were short
lived. While the contiguum concept was never popularised to the extent of the
continuum, it was recognised by the highest authorities in the late 1990s (Pirotte et al.
1999).

The term rehabilitation came to prominence in the early 1990s and has maintained
its popularity among many leading aid technocrats and donors. Its popularity
increased at the time when the coherence agenda came to the fore (Macrae et al
2001). This was a period when the relief budget had increased significantly and
donor fatigue had set-in. Following critical analysis of the impact of this relief aid,
there were calls for greater coherence in the aid effort between and within donor
organisations. This effort is epitomised in the catchphrase linking relief,
rehabilitation and development (LRRD). Given the rationale for LRRD thinking,
authors vary in their analysis of the rehabilitation concept. Rebelle (1999) suggests
that it is largely a donors and actors concept established with limited in-depth analysis
of the contexts and practices in the field. The temporal dimension was considered
central to the rehabilitation process. One could say that the rehabilitation phase
provided donors with an agreed timeframe that served to place limits on interventions
in protracted disaster situations. However, these arbitrary timeframes appeared to
give more attention to donor willingness to engage rather than the societal
reconstruction processes in the many and varied contexts in which they were applied
(ibid). While recognising the limitations of the LRRD approach as initially applied,
the European Commission (2008) argues that the approach has evolved to recognise
the realities on the ground. The Commission contends that the LRRD approach has
been significantly strengthened in a number of ways, including by: integrating the
LRRD approach to the crisis cycle which in-turn monitors the cyclical fashion in
which crises evolve; establishing ad hoc crises management groups that manage
support to evolving crises on site; and putting in place mechanisms to address the
bureaucratic and cumbersome financial procedures that negatively impact on timely
supports in crises situations.

Not all academics would subscribe to the rehabilitation concept either in its original
or indeed evolved conception. Pugh (1998), in interrogating the rehabilitation
concept, dismisses the centrality of a rehabilitation timeframe suggesting that the
cultural adjustments required in post-disaster situations (particularly in post-conflict
contexts) may well be measured in terms of generations rather than months or years.
He draws distinction between the minimalist rehabilitation, that can focus on either a
putting back together that mirrors the society prior to the conflict or even an act of
social engineering towards building a (Western style) liberal democracy, and
transformative rehabilitation that he defines as:
A process of social, political and economic adjustment to, and underpinning
of, conditions of relative peace in which the participants, especially those who
have been disempowered and immiserated by violence, can begin to prioritise
future goals beyond immediate survival. Survivors not only need a stake in
achieving these adjustment goals but need ultimate direction over the means
to achieve them.
This transformative rehabilitation places those affected by the disaster at the centre of
the reconstruction process. The transformative nature of the rehabilitation process
respects the need for (progressive) change from pre-disaster societal conditions and a
need to respect both the rehabilitation process as well as its products. This emphasis
on process has encouraged many to adopt the term transition to refer to that period
of time in a crisis when external assistance is most crucial in supporting or
underpinning existing fragile cease-fires or peace processes by helping to create the
conditions for political and economic stability, security, justice and social equity
(UNDG/ ECHA Working Group, 2004).

The term transition is now employed by a broad range of aid stakeholders. It is

most frequently applied to post-conflict situations while the language of LRRD
prevails in post-natural disaster contexts (TEC, 2007). There is no universally agreed
definition of the term transition and in more recent years there has been a tendency
for stakeholders to use the terms transition, post-conflict and peace-building
interchangeably (JICA, 2006).

Societal Transition a Multi-Dimensional Concept

Transition contexts are typically unique. The complexity of the transition process
mirrors the complex nature of the political emergency from which it originates. The
transition context can be best described in a multidimensional fashion. The
dimensions include the;
direction/ path from war to peace and vice versa (JICA, 2006);
sectoral dimension, that accepts that the transition process must apply across a
range of sectors including political, economic, social, security etc. (Ottaway,
2002; Ramsbottom et al 2005);
temporal dimension respecting the phased nature of the process from negative
to positive peace (Ramsbottom et al 2005);
spatial dimension that recognises varying regional and local contexts within
each post-conflict society (Loane et al 2007); and
social systems dimension that appreciates the challenges to link individuals,
communities, local, regional and international actors toward some coherent
peace agenda (Lange, 2006).

The direction/ path in transition is neither uni-linear nor uni-directional. While

donors may clearly define an intervention as relief, rehabilitation or indeed
development, the situation on the ground is rarely that clear cut. It is quite common
for these states of development to coexist in the same society or region. Similarly,
given that almost half post-settlement contexts return to full-blown physical violence
within five years of signing an agreement (World Bank, 2004) and so many societies
have remained in a state of neither peace nor war (negative peace) for protracted
periods, it is understandable that violations to post-conflict settlements are
commonplace. To this end, the transition process can be described as multi-
directional. The ICRC (2001) portrays the response to this multi-directional need in
its egg protection framework, developed by the Central Tracing Agency and
Protection Division. It presents three types of intervention that are neither hierarchal
nor dependent but that need to be carried out simultaneously in conflict/ post-conflict
situations namely: responsive actions that address emerging and established patterns
of abuse/ violence; remedial actions aimed at restoring peoples dignity and providing
acceptable standards of human security; and environmental-building actions that are
aimed at creating and consolidating an environment conducive to full respect for the
rights of the individual.

This environment that is conducive to full respect for human rights and which allows
individuals to reach their full potential is multi-sectoral and crosses all societal
institutions; political, economic, social, and legal (ibid). Ramsbottom et al (2005)
analyses the societal reconstruction process by sector and emphasises the interlocking
requirements of (re)building social institutions. JICA (2006) warns against
underestimating the challenges of this task. In illustrating the enormity of the
challenge, it describes many of common features of post-conflict societies on a
sectoral basis, namely: law and order, social, economic and political.

In both conflict and transition contexts human security is frequently limited due to:
Security institutions of the state lacking the capacity or will to protect its
citizens;
Confused mandates in the provision of civil protection;
Weak institutions of Law and Order;
Limited or no regulation of weapons and an insecure environment curtailing
free movement; and
Ongoing depletion of resources leading to dependency on others for day-to-
day basic human needs.

Social destruction is evidenced at a number of systems levels including the individual

(psychosocial), families, communities, and societal. This damage can be evidenced
by:
Polarisation of peoples in line with ethnic groups, religion, race etc. at all
societal levels;
Societal trauma brought about by violence and insecurity. Such trauma results
in degeneration of social and cultural living patterns often expressed by high
levels of alcohol and drug abuse, domestic violence, changes in normative
sexual behaviour and a rise in crime levels;
Reshaping of societal demographic patterns brought about by population
displacement and return;
Destruction or weakening of civil society organisations (CSOs) with
community relations strained by the legacy of the conflict; and
The challenge to (re)integrate actual or perceive perpetrators and victims.

Conflict destroys the economic fabric of society and undermines the trust and
confidence that is crucial to the success of all economies. Invariably conflicts create
their own war-economies which are characterised by:
 Unstable monetary and fiscal situations;
Racketeering and economic criminal activity;
Problems associated with the supply of goods and services due to damaged or
insecure infrastructure;
Poor demand for goods and services due to diminished purchasing power;
Relocation of companies and industries to more stable societies;
Exploitation of natural resources to fuel the war effort; and
Environmental degradation.

Many analysts believe the political or governance arena is crucial to understanding

and dealing with conflict as social and economic grievances are eventually expressed
in the political form (Miall 2005). The relationship between the political sector and
the security sector is also crucial when the latter is seen to no longer represent an
impartial authority and when civil unrest can be no longer be controlled by non-
military means. The result of such conflict is often:
Weakened leadership that sees the need to continue the war objectives albeit
without the use of physical violence;
Weak state with power sharing arrangements and limited power beyond
managing the conflict;
Resource poor state that has few resources to pursue its goals and is at the
mercy of external donors and their associated conditionalities;
Weakened state exposed to the whims of warlords or would-be spoilers to
manage the conflict;
Weakened governance institutions and local administrative organs lacking
human, financial and social capital; and
Weakened public services that frequently fail the heightened expectations of a
demanding public.

The complexity of the transition process, and not forgetting the aforementioned donor
interest in setting limits to their interventions in protracted conflicts, has prompted
many authors to focus on the temporal dimension of the process. Ottaway (2002)
describes the limitations of prescribing a timescale to the transition process for a
number of reasons including the socio-cultural challenges in (re)building social
institutions as opposed to structures and the number of external/ uncontrollable and
disparate factors that can impact on the transition process. Therefore rather than
describing the process in terms of timescales, the temporal dimension of transition is
more realistically described in terms of phases to be established in the societal
reconstruction process. In its simplest form the transition has been described as
realising three phases (Miall, 2005), namely:
An intervention phase that is characterised by negative tasks aimed at putting
an end to the physical violence and preventing relapse to war. This initial
phase is characterised by: recurring conflict, large financial demands to initiate
the (re)building process, and the recognition that there are winners and losers
in the fight for peace hence the frequent need to employ trade-offs in the
search for common ground;
A stabilisation phase that is characterised by growing confidence in evolving
social institutions and a recognition that the new authorities can deal with the
causes and consequences of the conflict; and
 A normalisation period that is characterised by the transformative actions that
render preventative negative tasks and structures obsolete, and enhanced
focus on social and cultural transformation with the support of legitimate
authorities.

A further dimension of the transition process is the spatial dimension. State conflicts
are typified by regional variations which result in the requirement for a variety of
responses based on real needs (Loane et al 2007). These real needs prompt targeted
responsive action in areas worse affected by the conflict. This targeted responsive
action is frequently designed to prime the transition process in these areas and reduce
the spill-over of the conflict into neighbouring regions.

Finally, the transition process can be analysed from the societal systems dimension.
As described earlier, social scientists that lean towards a functional perspective view
society as a system whose parts work towards stability and harmony. Lange (2006)
describes how the local impacts on the regional, national and International and
concludes that sustainable peace and development ultimately depends on those that
are affected by the disaster. Lederach (2001), in identifying the key actors in conflict
situations, describes their potential roles in the transition process at three main
societal levels. At the top level (national level) the leadership is dominated by a small
number of influential political, military and religious leaders. These leaders are
invariably associated with high-level negotiations in establishing and maintaining
relative peace, and in representing their constituency in progressing peace.
Invariably, this level of leadership involves relatively few personnel who
characteristically command high visibility, are limited in their capacity to make
radical decisions and are perceived as having significant if not exclusive power (ibid).
The middle range leaders (at national and regional levels) include a greater range of
leadership including ethnic/ religious leaders, sectoral leaders, academics and
intellectuals, NGOs as well as leaders from geographic regions who are well known to
the groups in their region and enjoy the respect of their constituency. These leaders
have direct contact with top-level leaders and they are not bound by the publicity
constraints or constituency constraints of top level leaders. Finally, grassroots
leadership involves those in direct contact with the masses on which the conflict
impacts directly. This level leadership includes local leaders, leaders of local NGOs
and CSOs, local level government workers, refugee camp leaders etc. Lederach
(2001) notes that this level of leadership is in direct contact with the people on whom
the decisions of top level leaders impacts yet they are furthest removed from the main
decision making process. Secondly, he identifies the challenges in establishing
horizontal communiqu between local leaders who frequently represent groups and
communities at the same societal levels, that share the same geographic space but
whom are divided by the conflict.

Loane et al (2007) also identify the need to focus the societal (re)building at the
individual and family level. They believe that it is important to recognise that
affected populations are not a homogenous group. In the broadest terms the needs of
people vary in terms of age, gender, ethnicity etc. In addition a conflict impacts
differently on individuals depending on many other factors including their proximity
to the conflict, their losses as a result of the conflict and their perceived losses or
gains from sustained peace.
Approaches Employed in Post-Conflict Transition Societies
The literature identifies a number of requisites for any society employing a transition
philosophy. The Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) Working
Group on Transition Issues indicated that such requisites may include:
A peace agreement that includes all the main stakeholders to the conflict;
That the Government of that society is agreeable to embarking on a transition
process;
That major donors accept the need for, and are willing to support, transition
programmes for the country;
That the Government is willing and has the capacity to work in partnership
with external actors on transitional planning, coordination and program
implementation; and
That coordination mechanisms are in place or can be adapted quickly to plan
and implement a transition program (UNDG/ECHA, 2004).

In analysing these requisites one can assume that the transition context requires the
coming together of external and internal actors to establish the social institutions that
comprise a Weberian state3. However, it would be nave in the extreme to describe
external intervention in societies in transition as anything other than a highly
politicised act. It is no wonder that Balkans States received disproportional support
post Dayton given their proximity to the so-called developed world and their
relationship with the former USSR; or indeed that interventions in Iraq and
Afghanistan have been so well resourced given the securitisation agenda pursued by
the West in the aftermath of September 9/11. The factors that encourage external
interests to intervene/ support the transition process are varied and may be political
(securitisation agenda, strategic regional alliances), economic (access to oil reserves,
economic strategic alliance), social (colonial history, diaspora ties) etc. While in-
depth analysis of the factors that encourage or limit external intervention are beyond
the scope of this paper, one must always remember that the capacity of any external
intervention is always dependent on the willingness of these external actors to
participate/ partner the transition process in line with their stipulated mandates and in
the best interest of the society in question.

Ottaway (2002) in analysing the societal reconstruction process for collapsed states
described the characteristics of two extremes in the transition process; the first is the
externally-led approach that in effect relates to an internationally recognised state
working towards the Weberian de jure state; and the second being the internally-led
approach that describes how an internationally recognised state works towards a de
facto state that slowly develops institutions. Table 1 presents the main characteristics
of these two extremes. It should be noted that the post-conflict societal transition
process is built on a mixture of these two approaches.

Table 1. Characteristics of External and Internal Approaches to Reconstruction

External Approach Internal Approach
Focus on rebuilding institutions Focus on re-establishing power

3
A Weberian State refers to a state comprising an effective administrative apparatus and is
characterised by the rule of law. Invariably it enjoys both de jure (state with international recognition)
and de facto (state constructed and maintained on basis of raw power) status with control being
exercised by formal and strong institutions.
International community drives process
Military men and politicians drive the
process
Aim is to reconstruct de jure State Aim to construct de facto State
Very costly Lack resources
Biggest challenge to move from Biggest challenge to move from imposed
imposed order to stable institutions order to stable institutions
Often quick withdrawal Often reluctant to share their new found
power
Adapted from Loane et al 2007.

The external-led approach is believed to focus on establishing institutions. However,

many authors (Loane, 2007; Ottaway, 2002) would challenge the capacity of external
actors to establish institutions. Their argument is largely based on the grounds that
societal institutions should reflect the norms and values of the society. Therefore it is
suggested that external actors can support establishing organisations and structures,
however, for these organisations to endure as societal institutions they have to be
adopted by the society and take on the culture of that society. The internal-led
approach, on the other hand, is usually built on force. The challenge in this approach
is to convert authoritarian government control based on raw power to a system of
democratic governance by establishing regular processes and institutions of
government that can eventually earn the acceptance of the population.

Ramsbottom et al (2005) arrived at similar findings in analysing external intervention

in conflict situations. They suggested that the external approach currently employed
has its origin in 1978 with the UN Security Council Resolution 435, which mandated
the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to assist the UNs Special
Representative to Namibia to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free
and fair elections under the supervision of the UN. This strategy devised for the
Settlement Proposal in Namibias decolonisation agreement also formed the template
for the enduring strategy that continues to be employed by external actors in
contemporary conflicts of the early 1990s. It positioned the UN as lead organisation.
In the more recent conflicts of the late 1990s and the 21st century the lead tends to be
taken by multilateral coalitions under a nation(s) (invariably the more powerful ones)
and supported by a plethora of stakeholders from International Financial Institutions,
regional organisations, relief and development agencies and the UN.

This strategy, which is often employed in blueprint fashion, invariably includes (ibid):
Establishing the capacity for policy planning and implementation;
Organising elections;
Re-establishing security;
The demobilisation, disarming and reintegration of ex-combatants;
Resettlement, rehabilitation and reintegration of displaced populations;
Establishing a sound macroeconomic framework/ system to implement
programmes;
Rebuilding communities, economic and social services and infrastructure;
Revising the taxation system and building the capacity of tax collection
agencies;
Reform of judicial system; and
Privatisation or reform of existing public enterprises.
The tendency has been for external actors to envision the move from collapsed/ failed
/ weakened society to a Weberian state as an architect might envision the
transformation of a green field site to a functioning building, all carried out to an
agreed timeframe. However, the reality is that no society is a green field site. Each
society is unique by definition and the uniqueness and complexity of post-conflict
societies are exacerbated by many factors not least the disparate causes and legacy of
contemporary conflicts.

The key findings of Ramsbottom et als (2005) analysis of external interventions

include, that;
The prevailing strategy has been found wanting given the very disparate
contexts in which it has been employed from situations of postcolonial
independence, failed states, weakened states, to efforts to root out perceived
threats to national/ international security;
The level of success of the external intervention largely depends on the
readiness (ripeness) of the warring parties to come to some agreement and the
extent to which the external third parties have the consent of the internal
parties i.e. legitimacy of external intervention;
External interventions in conflicts that have not reached this stage of readiness
require sustained support from external actors;
Crucial negotiations are ultimately between internal parties to the conflict,
however, external actors either lack the capacity or are overly constrained by
the conditionalities of donors to comprehensively support peaceful transition;
The external approach has been dominated by political and military
intervention over economic or socio-cultural support; and
No one operating model/ strategy can fit the needs and complexities of each
transition context. The blueprint approach has not worked and any framework
for societal transition needs to adopt a process approach tailored to the needs
of that society.

The literature on internal approaches to societal transition is far more limited. Unlike
the aforementioned blueprint that invariably holds true for the externally lead
approach to societal transition, the same cannot be said for internally driven societal
transition, however some patterns can be found from the experiences of countries,
such as Uganda, Ethopia and Eritrea, that have gained some success in rebuilding
their own societies with limited external support. Ottaway (2002) identifies the
characteristics of the internal approach to include:
The first step tends to be forcibly taking control of the state through raw
power;
This is followed by establishing some institutions of government that can over
time gain/ earn the respect of the people in so doing transform raw power into
authority;
Holding elections, which may not be along democratic lines initially;
Establishing an economy to support societal reconstruction and allowing the
government to govern its population.

Unfortunately it is easier to present failures than successes in cases that adopted both
externally-led and internally-led approaches. To position any one case as a model
could lead readers down the path of trying to establish a one size fits all approach
with the inevitable consequence of the blueprint approach.

State of the Art Approach to Societal Transition

At the risk of over simplifying the challenges faced by societies in post-conflict
transition, let us return to the analogy of (re) constructing a building. In line with the
temporal dimension of transition, one can analyse the process at three phases, namely;
the site preparation phase, the construction phase, and the operational phase. The task
in hand is complicated by the fact that the site is being occupied throughout the
(re)construction process. What are the challenges? And what parallels can be drawn
with societal reconstruction? This state of the art approach is premised on the fact
that there is a readiness on the part of the main parties to the conflict resolve their
differences by methods other than physical violence.

The Site Preparation Phase/ Intervention Phase

We have already alluded to the fact that no transition context is a green field site.
Whether one is dealing with collapsed states, failed states, weakened democracies or
indeed those situations of forced regime change, the starting point of societal
transition is invariably an assessment of existing resources including: demographic
resources, culture(s), social systems and a physical infrastructure that are damaged but
yet have a capacity on which to build. Similarly, in keeping with the building
analogy, this society is being (re)constructed in a particular spatial environment and in
the same way as a building (re)construction it needs to consider the built environment
of its surroundings, the societal (re)construction needs to consider the social,
economic, political and cultural contexts of its region and internationally. No doubt
the owners of the building should have the final say in what aspects of the old
building should be retained and built-on, and what parts should be demolished
forever, however they may employ an architect to support them with this process.
One would hope that the architect would begin the process by clarifying some basic
facts including the needs of the people who will occupy, utilise and maintain the
building. Similarly, one might hope that the people who employ the architect might
have established a clear terms of reference for the architect indicating the terms, scope
and cost of job in hand.

Therefore in preparing the site for societal (re)construction the following issues need
to be addressed as requisites for the process:
What are the needs/ wants of the population? Here one must consider peoples
basic needs (food, shelter, security, access to basic services, gainful
employment);
How can the needs and wants of people be facilitated? Here one might
consider the societal institutions required to facilitate realising peoples needs
and wants. It would appear that the Weberian construct or some version
thereof provides the most appropriate vehicle to allow for the renovated
society to meet internal needs and wants and also the vehicle to allow the
society (re)gain a position in regional (with neighbouring societies) and global
society;
Who might support the societal (re)construction process (the architect)? What
are their terms and condition? Do they have the legitimacy required?
Table 2a presents the activities to be undertaken in the first phase of societal
(re)construction. The rows in Table 2a present these activities according to sector and
also presents the challenges at different societal levels, while the columns present the
multidirectional and spatial dimensions of the transition process that respect that
relief, rehabilitation and development activities are undertaken concurrently. The
efficacy of process depends on many factors not least establishing trade-offs between
internal actors that were party to the conflict, and between internal and external actors
that agree to partner the transition process.

In learning from past experiences, one must keep in mind a number of key
characteristics that tend to dominate this intervention phase including; the
continuation of violent conflict albeit to a lesser degree and more sporadic in nature,
no plan which accommodate all factions and certain groups and individuals will want
to spoil the transition process; and the true costs of war are only recognised in the
(re)construction process and plans tend to be overly ambitious, both in terms of time
and money, to the point of rendering them useless.

While the table does not directly address the spatial dimension it should allow
stakeholders to target those sub-national regions and local areas most affected by the
conflict and to enhance the appropriateness and relevance of interventions at the local
level. It is envisaged that in the majority of cases the focus of the intervention phases
would be column 2 i.e. the relief intervention, on the basis that other activities are
largely dependent on the success of the relief effort. The focus of activities at this
phase is conflict management or in other words activities designed to stop the
physical violence and contain the conflict.

Table 2a: The Intervention Phase by directional/ path, sectoral and systems
dimensions IN PROGRESS
Relief Rehabilitation Development
Political National level: agree National level: National level: provide training/
appropriate/ acceptable Provide essential training on issues support on political processes,
decision making authority; of law, governance, negotiation etc including administration, dealing
agree the terms, scope and with corruption, intimidation etc.
conditions of the Establish transitional plan for
relationship between all progressing decision making and
stakeholders in the the sharing of power during
transition process transition.
Regional level: supporting Regional level: Regional level:
communications with centre Train on issues of law, governance,
and local levels; supporting conflict resolution, problem
intra-regional solving.
communication between
factions
Local level: Local level: Local level:
Resource local Train leaders on issues of prejudice Provide training on political
administrative offices, reduction, conflict resolution, processes at local level, issues of
support the communication mediation and facilitation exclusion, and relationship
process between local and building
civil society
Economic National: include the future National: Assessment of costs, National: develop plans for
economy in the discussions/ limit exploitation of war economy; transitional economic policy
plans; incentivise the establish measures to (re)gain around issues such as: taxation,
transition process economic trust and confidence monetary policy, fiscal policy,
trade policy, industrial policy
Regional level: Regional: assess the economic Regional: establish regional plans
needs and resources, support to address regional and local
regional centres to (re) construct realities of the economic
the economic infrastructure; (re)construction process
 Local level: provide Establish appropriate micro Provide training to (re)skill
humanitarian relief, restore finance/ credit facilities; establish affected populations, maximise
essential services, systems to police the reformed banking and credit facilities to
economy; support (re)establishing local levels; maximise the use of
trade/ market links with region local resources, encourage
corporate social responsibility
Social/ National: establish National: assess the needs of National : develop plans for
Psychosocial communication channels crucial social institutions including institution (re)building; proof
between key stakeholders, education, health, etc. assess the plans to ensure they address the
encourage visibility, social and cultural make-up of root causes and legacy of the
monitor media societal institutions, provide conflict,
training on addressing social and
cultural violence
Regional:
Local: establish Local; support the Local; provide training and
communication channels (re)establishment of inclusive civil support for the (re)establishment
between divergent groups, society organisations, provide of civil society organisations,
initiate discussions with training for organising at the local establish systems to support those
refugees and displaced level, assess and monitor the need most affected by the conflict;
peoples, prepare host of vulnerable groups
communities for return.
Security National: Control armed National: plan, train and support National: Establish plans for non-
factions, agree ceasefire, the DDR process, separation of politicised judiciary and police,
prevent organised crime, military and police, train security provide training and support to
agree plans for prisoner forces, promote human rights police and military, establish
release systems for reports
Regional: Regional: regionalise national
plans respecting local disparities,
Local: Disarmament Train police on issue of preventing Plan and support local retributive,
Demobilisation and crime, liaising with community, restorative and
Reintegration of support the establishment of traditional justice
combatants, begin structures and systems to promote systems
demining, accountability and transparency in
maintaining law and order

The Construction/ Stabilisation Phase.

This phase of the societal (re)construction phase could be compared to the time in a
building programme when the construction is ready to commence. The society is
suitably stable and societal structures can be (re)built. The architects role in this
process is supporting the (re)construction and reminding the builders of the plans that
were agreed in the earlier phase. Table 2b (Appendix 1) presents the activities to be
undertaken in the second phase of societal (re)construction. It presents these activities
according to sector and also presents the challenges at different societal levels, while
the columns present the multidirectional and spatial dimensions of the transition
process that respect that relief, rehabilitation and development activities are
undertaken concurrently.

The lions share of the resources and attention focuses on rehabilitation type activities
in line with the agreement and plans agreed in phase 1. Throughout this phase key
stakeholders will have to resolve key issues across all sectors in a bid to progress the
transition process in an inclusive manner. The continuation of relief activities
remains a priority allowing those that were reluctant to embrace the transition process
to come on-board while simultaneously enhancing the confidence and trust of all
stakeholders in the process. The big challenge in this phase is to get the balance
between conflict management activities and conflict transformation, the former
referring to those activities aimed at preventing a return to physical violence and the
latter focusing on the progressive transformation of social institutions.

Refurbishing/ Normalisation Phase

This phase in the transition process focuses on shaping the newly formed structures to
facilitate those social practices that are regularly and continuously repeated, are
sanctioned and maintained by social norms. To draw on the building analogy, the
building is refurbished with equipment that is appropriate and relevant to the needs
and wants of the occupiers and over time the building becomes characteristically
unique. A critical balance needs to be drawn at this stage between the resources
employed in enhancing the faade of the building to make attractive to external
viewers or to protect it from external criminal damage, and the furniture and fittings
on the inside, which makes it comfortable for the occupiers. There is little doubt that
the architects role is quite limited in this phase, however, there will always be small
repairs on which he/ she should be consulted depending on the occupiers ability to
develop their own maintenance capacities. To this end, the societal (re)building will
need to be shaped in such a way that the social institutions can support the individual,
groups and communities to develop, and at the same time facilitate the participation of
this society in the international and global arena.

Table 2c (Appendix 2) presents the activities to be undertaken in the third phase of

societal (re)construction. The normalisation phase focuses on the transformation of
societal institutions that reconcile intra-societal differences in line with the cultural
and political realities of the societys population, while respecting the external
influences that will impact either positively or negatively on the transformed society.
Analysts differ on the relative importance of building strong external relations versus
transformed internal societal institutions with high levels of inclusion, local
empowerment and high levels of reconciliation. The arguments from both sides are
very convincing suggest the need for joined up thinking for both to happen
concurrently.

Stakeholder Mix in Post-Conflict Transition

Every post-conflict transition process has its unique mix of stakeholders. The
complexity of this mix is illustrated in Figure 1, which presents an overview of some
of the main groupings of stakeholders. The mandates of these stakeholders are
generally well recognised, however their capacities and willingness to commit to the
transition process vary considerably depending on the political, economic and/ or
social consequences of their involvement. Detailed analysis of this broad stakeholder
mix is beyond the scope of this paper; however Appendix 3 presents a brief analysis
of the mandates and characteristics of these disparate groupings.
 Figure 1 : Overview of groupings & on
osi ti ness
/
Opp u ps Busi ate
main actors in a society in transition State gro pri v r
secto

Local
NGOs/CSOs

National
Society
Peace
Keeping
Media
Persons
Humanitarian effected by
Organisations conflict Neighbouring
States

Main Groupings
and Actors in External
Development External Societies in States
Organisations Aid Transition
Organisa-
tions
Donor
Government
Red Cross
Movement
Trans-national
corporations/
Multi- lateral private interest
UN system Organisa-
tions

Business
International Interests
Financial Regional
Institutions Organisations

The Ugandan Case

The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the complexities of societal transition by
briefly describing the post-conflict transition situation in Northern Uganda at one
point in time - January 2008. Northern Uganda is described as a societal region
undergoing post-conflict transition following two decades of conflict, which was
described by Jan Egeland, UN Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, as having
surpassed the Iraq conflict in terms of brutality and suffering (BBC, 2003). He
described the Northern Uganda Conflict as a moral outrage and one of the best
examples of a forgotten crisis of our generation (ibid). This conflict has its origins
in the failure of post-colonial authoritarian regimes to maintain power under the
leadership of Idi Amin, Milton Obote and Tito Okello, all of whom were from
Northern Uganda. The overthrow of the northern dominated military regime of
President Tito Okello in 1986 by the National Resistance Army (NRA)4 rebels led by
Yoweri Museveni marked the beginning of armed conflict in Northern Uganda. Three
main rebel groups were formed in response to the governments operations in the
north which was perceived as revenge on the population of northern Uganda for
atrocities committed during the war which brought the NRA to power.

The first group was the Uganda Peoples Democratic Forces (UPDA) composed of
the defeated soldiers from Okellos military government (ICG, 2004). The UPDA was
disbanded following a peace deal with the government of Uganda in 1988. Another
parallel rebel group was the cult movement called the Holy Spirit Movement Force
(HSMF) led by prophetess Alice Lakwena. The HSMF was defeated by the
government forces in 1987. The Lords Resistance Army (LRA) under the leadership
of Joseph Kony was then formed from the remnants of the UPDA and the HSMF.

4
The National Resistance Army (NRA) was a rebel group which took over power and formed the
national army called the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF).
Although they claim to be fighting the government of Uganda, the rebels main
targets have been the civilian community. The rebels murdered, mutilated and
maimed unspecified number of civilians (HURIPEC, 2003). Massive abduction and
forceful recruitment of children and young adults have been the main source of the
rebel force. According to Human Rights Watch (2006) the war in Northern Uganda
has resulted in:

As many as 30,000 children have been abducted by the rebel Lords

Resistance Army (LRA) and forced to serve as soldiers, labourers and sex
slaves.
To escape LRA abduction, every night as many as 40,000 children flee their
homes in the countryside to sleep in the relative safety of towns.
At least 1.3 million people have been displaced in northern Uganda. In three
districts there, an estimated 90 percent of civilians are homeless.
The LRA attacks civilians even in displaced persons camps. Many residents of
the camps have been forced to move there by the Ugandan government for
their protection. However, the Ugandan government often fails to protect
camp residents from attack.
The Ugandan government has also recruited children as soldiers.

Before analysing the transition process in the North it is important to gain some
appreciation of the context of this transition. Uganda can be described as a society in
transition from traditional to modern. Table 3 presents a number of typical
development indices for both France and Uganda. It demonstrates the development
divide between these two societies.

Table 3 Development indices for France and Uganda

France Uganda
Population total (million) 61.3 30

Population growth rate 0.6 3.2

Surface area (thousand sq 551 241
kms)
Life expectancy at birth 80.6 50.7
Mortality Rate (under 5 per 4.3 77.8
thousand)
Literacy rate (% females 15 71.2
24)
GNI (billions) 2.3 trillion 9.3 billion
GNI per capita 36,240 300

Prevalence of HIV (% popn 0.4 6.4

age 15- 49)
World Development Indicators

The development indices presented in Table 3 demonstrate clearly that Uganda is

typical of a traditional society with high population growth rates, low to medium life
expectancy, high mortality rates and relatively limited economic activity. The
challenges to Ugandas development potential is also exacerbated by the relatively
high prevalence of HIV which, despite the tremendous advances made in Uganda to
control the spread of this virus, remains relatively high.

The political situation in Uganda was described as relatively stable, however, Figure 2
presents just some of the added
challenges facing Uganda including the:

LRA
Ebola virus; Karamoja
Refugees and IDPs;
Rains
Karamoja region; SS
Flooding; Refugees
Ongoing conflict in the
ebola
North of the country; and
AIDS.

AIDS

The ebola virus is a highly infectious disease spread by bodily fluids and tissue from
humans and other primates. Ebola has a very high mortality rate killing between 50
and 90 per cent of victims. The last outbreak of Ebola in Uganda was in 2000 and it
killed almost 200 victims in the Gulu district. In January the death toll had risen to
36 and all efforts were being made to promote early diagnosis and isolation of
infected victims (Medical News Today, 2008).

According to the UN News Centre (2008), in January 2008 Uganda was home to
almost 220,000 refugees and 850,000 internally displaced persons. Most of the
refugees were from Sudan and the DRC, however in January 2008 this number was
growing as a result of the post-election disputes in Kenya.

The Karamoja region, located in the North-East of Uganda and comprising four of
Ugandas 56 districts, is home for over 1 million people. This region has experienced
severe insecurity for the past three decades. The economy in Karamoja is dominated
by cattle rearing, semi-nomadic groups. The Human Development Index for the
region is significantly lower than the rest of the country. This is a region of extreme
poverty due to deteriorating environmental conditions resulting from droughts and dry
spells together with traditional practices of cattle rustling, human rights abuses and
chronic insecurity. Cattle raiders who have reportedly sourced small arms from the
thriving gun market in neighbouring Sudan and Somalia wreak havoc on the
inhabitants of Karamoja and neighbouring districts. In the mid 1990s the Ugandan
Government was pressurised by vigilante groups in neighbouring districts to support
them in protecting their livelihoods (Quam, 1997). For more than a decade the
Ugandan armed forces have engaged in the region with the first serious attempt to
disarm civilians proving unsuccessful in 2002. A more aggressive approach to
disarmament was employed in 2006 which was since abandoned because of reported
human rights abuse owing largely to the military use of disproportional force (ibid).
The military solution to the Karamoja problem has not worked and increasingly there
are calls to employ a more comprehensive, holistic and integrated approach to address
the extreme poverty and chronic insecurity of the Karamoja region (IRIN, 2008).
Some analysts believe that the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) that is
set to guide transition activities in Northern Uganda (to be discussed later) should be
extended to support Karamojas transition from semi-nomadic to traditional status
(Resolve Uganda, 2008).

In October 2007 Uganda received its heaviest rains in 35 years. According to the
WFP (2007) there were 300,000 Ugandans affected by these floods with tens of
thousands of flood victims displaced from their homes. Many of those affected were
already living in IDP camps in the North of the country. Emergency appeals were
made by the WFP for $3.1 million to provide food aid and emergency access roads.
Given the problems in the areas affected by the floods, the focus of the relief effort
was on providing basic essentials with limited reference to rehabilitation and most
definitely not to transition.

In 2006 the main warring parties came together in Juba5 to agree a framework to bring
an end to the conflict and address the deeper social and political grievances under the
mediation of Riek Machar the Vice-president of Southern Sudan (Resolve Uganda,
2008). This framework commonly referred to as the Juba Talks or the Juba Peace
Process experienced its ups and downs between June 2006 and January 2008. The
process envisaged a five step agenda leading to an ultimate peace agreement,
including: cessation of hostilities, establishing comprehensive solutions to the
conflict, accountability and reconciliation, permanent ceasefire, and disarmament
demobilisation and reintegration. Significant milestones in these talks include:

14th July 2006 - Agreement to work towards a negotiated settlement;

4th August 2006 the LRA declared a unilateral ceasefire;
26th August 2006 the Government and LRA signed a truce;
September 2006 - the Government began to encourage displaced people to relocate to satellite
camps or to return home;
25th September 2006 - the Vice- President met with both parties separately fearing that
allegations of recent attacks would derail the process;
By early October 2006 - it appeared that neither party was fully living by the conditions of the
truce;
20th October 2006 - President Museveni travelled to Juba to meet with LRA negotiators;
1st November a further settlement was agreed between the Government and LRA, that
reinforced the initial agreement and presented a new level of optimism to the process. A
condition of the settlement was that the LRA would group in designated sites, however the
leaders refused to join these sites fearing the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments
issued on them in 2005 would be pursued;
12th November 2006 Jan Egeland met with leaders of LRA, however they denied holding
people against their will;
1st December 2006 this was the deadline for LRA to convene in designated camps, however
the previous day the LRA withdrew from the settlement alleging that three of its fighters had
been killed. The UN announced the appointment of a UN chief envoy to the conflict;
January 2007 talks breakdown when the LRA indicate its refusal to participates in talks in
Sudan and offer Kenya as an alternative;
14th March 2007 - the LRA agree to resume talks in Juba following the inclusion of South
Africa, Kenya and Mozambique. The ceasefire is extended to June 2007 and next round of
talks for April;

5
Juba is the regional capital of Southern Sudan
 31st May 2007 talks resumed in Juba with the logistical support of the UN
29th June 2007 parties to the conflict agreed on the all important principles of how justice
and reconciliation would be handled;
September 2007 Government of Uganda published the Peace, Recovery and Development
Plan for Northern Uganda. This plan sets out a comprehensive development plan for Northern
Uganda with the participation of many of the main international stakeholders including UN
agencies and NGOs including the European Union, DFID, USAID, DANIDA, Norwegian
Refugee Council, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, WHO, UNHCR and the World Bank on
various Northern Uganda issues researched and analysed over the last two decades;
December 2007 the Government of Uganda insisted on the final agreement be signed by
January 2008;
January 2008 the death of Otti (one of the LRA leaders) was confirmed indicating unrest
among the LRA leadership;
30th January the ceasefire was extended to the end of February and the US and EU joined the
negotiations as observers.

In accepting the old saying that hindsight is 20:20 vision it is interesting to briefly
analyse the early intervention phase of the Northern Uganda post-conflict transition in
an attempt to assess its strengths and weakness. This conflict has been described as
the initial phase of transition given that the key stakeholders have agreed to come
together to discuss a move from conflict to peace.

However, if one analyses the Northern Ugandan situation regarding the requisites for
a sound transition, or what is commonly referred to as the ripeness of the Northern
Ugandan Conflict for transition, it is evident that the process might have been handled
differently from the following perspectives as presented in Table 4:

Table 4: Ripeness of Northern Ugandan for Transition

Requisites for transition Juba situation

(UNDG/ECHA, 2004).
A peace agreement at the It could be argued that although talks were initiated
advanced stages that includes in 2006 the transition process only commenced in
all the main stakeholders to the September 2007 when the break-through on the
conflict; justice and reconciliation bottle-neck was reached.
The Government of that society The Government of Uganda appeared ready to
is agreeable to embark on a embark on transition, however there are many
transition process; questions regarding its commitment to the process.
Similarly it is unclear if the LRA had the required
level of commitment. The ICC indictments proved
to be a crucial factor impacting the progression of
the talks. The ICC consistently refused to retract
or delay these indictments despite requests from
both sides of the conflict to seek alternative
solutions on issues of justice and reconciliation
Major donors accept the need Major donors and other interested parties got
for, and are willing to support, involved in the process albeit delayed. It could be
transition programmes for the argued that donors might have encouraged the
country; views of all parties to the conflict in supporting the
development plan for the future of Northern
Uganda
The Government is willing and While a development plan has been prepared for
has the capacity to work in Northern Uganda by the Ugandan Government,
partnership with external actorswith the participation of external actors, there is
on transitional planning,limited firm commitment from external actors to
coordination and programme support the transition process in transforming this
implementation; forgotten crises. The provision of incentives be
they political, economic, social and/ or security
could greatly support the progression towards
peace and stability in the region.
Coordination mechanisms are in Unfortunately, the talks suffered not only from
place or can be adapted quickly delays in involving all key stakeholders but also
to plan and implement a there was a lack of continuity in the personnel
transition programme representing some of the main stakeholders.

Analysis of the intervention phase of the Northern Ugandan post-conflict transition in

line with the different dimensions of transition raises several issues/ questions. Firstly
from the sectoral perspective the process has not reached a stage where there is an
authority acceptable to all side to progress the transition process in Northern Uganda.
The development plan has been prepared, however its implementation is based on
several assumptions including:

Good faith and political will to end armed hostilities by all parties;
Continued improvement in the security situation;
Greater freedom of movement of displaced populations within an improved
security context;
Sufficient resources for pursuit of the PRDP objectives in line with a review of
current Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) ceilings;
Continued cooperation and support of international partners for humanitarian
and recovery processes within the PRDP framework;
Reconciliation promoted by all stakeholders;
Capacity of district local governments and service providers to implement the
PRDP;
Sectoral policies, plans and programmes will be reviewed and adjusted by
central and local governments in light of the conflict/post conflict situation.

Unfortunately, many of these could be viewed as killer assumptions i.e. they are
overly ambitious and unlikely to happen unless there is considerable effort and
commitment included to make them happen on the part of all stakeholders. It appears
that the political planning process was removed from the people of Northern Uganda
themselves and, while the data for this plan may be based on studies carried out in the
area, they had limited involvement in agreeing the future direction of the plan.

From a security perspective, it appears quite premature to encourage the return of

displaced persons without the provision of adequate protection. The literature
suggests that there may be questions regarding the acceptability and capacity of the
Ugandan military to provide such protection. Similarly, the PRDP emphasises the
need to rehabilitate the judiciary and police force rather than train and support their
transformation.
Understandably the existing plans for Northern Uganda focus on the provision of
humanitarian assistance. One might expect greater attention to provide improved
infrastructure to support a transformed economy. Similarly, given the root causes of
the conflict, the Government could have demonstrated greater commitment to the
(perceived) neglect of the North by proactively discriminating in its favour. While the
PRDP recognises the related needs in the conflict stricken Karamoja region, all
regions in the North of Uganda can justifiably advocate for preferential treatment
given their relatively lower development status in the Uganda context. At the district
and local levels there is limited evidence of a coherent approach to assisting/
supporting returnees to rebuild their livelihoods.

The social/ psychosocial sector will pose a major challenge to the transition in
Northern Uganda. Reports from reputable media sources in Northern Uganda
identified that six months into the life of this three year PRDP the vast majority of
local leaders were unaware of its existence. The social and cultural challenges are
profound given that the majority of population in Northern Ugandan have been
directly affected by the conflict. An estimated 90 per cent of the population were
displaced in some regions for varying durations of anything between three years and
fifteen years, lived a pitiful existence. It has been reported that this existence has
critically damaged the socio-cultural patterns of life for tens of thousands of people.
The huge numbers of reported abductions and forced behavioural change of children
has rendered them both victims and perpetrators. There is clear evidence from the
experiences of those children that both escaped from the LRA camps and those that
were rescued from these same camps, that their rehabilitation and reintegration to
society will be a tremendous challenge. The PRDP, while recognising that support
will be required, grossly underestimated the social challenges of a broad range of
victims affected by this conflict.

Conclusion
Post-conflict societal transition is a multi-dimensional complex process. There is a
great deal of knowledge available to support the societal (re)building process
following the shared learning from the many contemporary protracted conflicts that
span the globe. However, this knowledge can only be exploited if key internal and
external stakeholders are willing to engage in a meaningful way to work towards a
shared vision. There is no blueprint for the post-conflict societal process. While
societies and their respective institutions need to position/ shape themselves to
interact with neighbouring states and global society, (re)building societal institutions
is by definition a slow process given that social institutions should reflect the social
practices that are regularly and continuously repeated, are sanctioned and maintained
by social norms, and have a major significance in the social structure. The limitation
of externally-led societal institution (re)building is obvious, however, in this era of
globalisation the same can also be said for an internally-led approach. The Holy Grail
of the post-conflict societal transition process must be a coherent effort for all key
stakeholders to work together to establish a more equitable society that addresses the
root causes and legacy of the conflict.

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