EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-36409. October 26, 1973.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. LORETA

GOZO , defendant-appellant.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin and Solicitor
Norberto P. Eduardo for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose T . Nery for defendant-appellant.

DECISION

FERNANDO , J : p

Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit
from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any
modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity, or at the
very least, its applicability to her, by invoking due process, 1 a contention she would
premise on what for her is the teaching of People v. Fajardo. 2 If such a ground were far
from being impressed with solidity, she stands on quicksand when she would deny the
applicability of the ordinance to her, on the pretext that her house was constructed within
the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to the well-settled
doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she would, in effect, seek
to emasculate our sovereign rights by the assertion that we cannot exercise therein
administrative jurisdiction. To state the proposition is to make patent how much it is
tinged with unorthodoxy. Clearly then, the lower court decision must be affirmed with the
sole modification that she is given thirty days from the finality of a judgment to obtain a
permit, failing which, she is required to demolish the same.
The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the decision of the lower court: "The accused
brought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the
territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built another one in
its place, without a building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, because she was
told by one Ernesto Evalle, a assistant in the City Mayor's office, as well as by her
neighbors in the area, that such building permit was not necessary for the construction of
the house. On December 29, 1966, Juan Malones, a building and lot inspector of the City
Engineer's Office, Olongapo City, together with Patrolman Ramon Macahilas of the
Olongapo City police force apprehended four carpenters working on the house of the
accused and they brought the carpenters to the Olongapo City police headquarters for
interrogation. . . . After due investigation, Loreta Gozo was charged with violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964 with City Fiscal's Office." 3 . The City Court of
Olongapo City found her guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964 and
sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month as well as to pay the costs. The Court of
First Instance of Zambales, on appeal, found her guilty on the above facts of violating such
municipal ordinance but would sentence her merely to pay a fine of P200.00 and to
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 demolish the house thus erected. She elevated the case Court of Appeals but in her brief,
she would put in the validity of such an ordinance on constitutional or at the very least its
applicability to her in view location of her dwelling within the naval base. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals, in a resolution of Juan 1973, noting the constitutional question raised,
the case to this Court.
There is, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this petition, no support in law for the
stand taken by appellant.
1. It would be fruitless for her to assert that government units are devoid of authority
to require building permits. This Court, from Switzer v. Municipality of Cebu, 4 decided in
1911, has sanctioned the validity of such measures. It is much too late in the day contend
that such a requirement cannot be validly imposed. Even appellant, justifiably concerned
about the unfavorable impression that could be created if she were to deny that such
competence is vested in municipal corporations and chartered cities, had to concede in
her brief: "If, at all; the questioned ordinance may be predicated under the general welfare
clause . . ." 5 Its scope is wide, well-nigh all embracing, covering every aspect of public
health, public morals, public safety, and the well being and good order of the community. 6
It goes without saying that such a power is subject to limitations. Certainly, if its exercise
is violative of any constitutional right, then its validity could be impugned, or at the very
least, its applicability to the person adversely affected could be questioned. So much is
settled law. Apparently, appellant has adopted the view that a due process question may
indeed be raised in view of what for her is its oppressive character. She is led to such a
conclusion, relying on People v. Fajardo. 7 A more careful scrutiny of such a decision would
not have led her astray, for that case is easily distinguishable. The facts as set forth in the
opinion follow: "It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-
appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the
municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows: '. . . 1. Any person
or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing,
obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. . . . 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should
be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued. . . . 3.
[Penalty] - Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the
violator liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not
less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said
building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be
removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. . . ." Four years later, after
the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son-in-law, appellant
Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in
Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by
a creek . . . .On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that
the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza . . . On January
18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for a building permit . . ., but again the
request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the
construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence
very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had
been living on leased property." 8
Clearly then, the application of such an ordinance to Fajardo was oppressive. A conviction
therefore for a violation thereof both in the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines
Sur as well as in the Court of First Instance could not be sustained. In this case, on the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 contrary, appellant never bothered to comply with the ordinance. Perhaps aware of such a
crucial distinction, she would assert in her brief: "The evidence showed that even if the
accused were to secure a permit from the Mayor, the same would not have been granted.
To require the accused to obtain a permit before constructing her house would be an
exercise in futility. The law will not require anyone to perform an impossibility, neither in
law or in fact: . . ." 9 "It would be from her own version, at the very least then, premature to
anticipate such an adverse result, and thus to condemn an ordinance which certainly lends
itself to an interpretation that is neither oppressive, unfair, or unreasonable. That kind of
interpretation suffices to remove any possible question of its validity, as was expressly
announced in Primicias v. Fugoso. 1 0 So it appears from this portion of the opinion of
Justice Feria, speaking for the Court: "Said provision is susceptible of two constructions:
one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or
refuse to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or
procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and the other is that
the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by Mayor, subject only to the
latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be
used for the purpose, with a view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure
convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and
proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. After a mature deliberation, we have
arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second construction, that is, construe the
provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power
to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or
specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the
meeting may be held." 1 1 If, in a case affecting such a preferred freedom as the right to
assembly, this Court could construe an ordinance of the City of Manila so as to avoid
offending against a constitutional provision, there is nothing to preclude it from a similar
mode of approach in order to show the lack of merit of an attack against an ordinance
requiring a permit. Appellant cannot therefore take comfort from any broad statement in
the Fajardo opinion, which incidentally is taken out of context, considering the admitted
oppressive application of the challenged measure in that litigation. So much then for the
contention that she could not have been validly convicted for a violation of such ordinance.
Nor should it be forgotten that she did suffer the same fate twice, once from the City Court
and thereafter from the Court of First Instance. The reason is obvious. Such ordinance
applies to her.

2. Much less is a reversal indicated because of the alleged absence of the rather novel
concept of administrative jurisdiction on the part of Olongapo City. Nor is novelty the only
thing that may be said against it. Far worse is the assumption at war with controlling and
authoritative doctrines that the mere existence of military or naval bases of a foreign
country cuts deeply into the power to govern. Two leading cases may be cited to show
how offensive is such thinking to the juristic concept of sovereignty, People v. Acierto, 1 2
and Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 1 4 There was a reiteration of such a view
in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof
that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its
terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily,
likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of it sovereignty." 1 5
Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in
character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct
language of Jellinek, 'is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive
capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.' A state then, if it chooses to, may
refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." 1 6 The opinion was
at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional
rights, not it appearance. The words employed follow: "Its laws may as to some persons
found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not
precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right
over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas
become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are
still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear.
So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military
bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory." 1 7
Can there be anything clearer, therefore, than that only a turnabout, unwarranted and
unjustified, from what is settled and orthodox law can fend the slightest degree of
plausibility to the contention of absence of administrative jurisdiction. If it were otherwise,
what was aptly referred to by Justice Tuason "as a matter of comity, courtesy, or
expediency" becomes one of obeisance and submission. If on a concern purely domestic
in its implications, devoid any connection with national security, the Military-Bases
Agreement could be thus interpreted, then sovereignty indeed becomes a mockery and an
illusion. Nor does appellant's thesis rest on less shaky foundation by the mere fact that
Acierto and Reagan dealt with the competence of the national government, while what is
sought to be emasculated in this case is the so-called administrative jurisdiction of a
municipal corporation. Within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers are
vested upon it may be validly exercised. Any residual authority and therein conferred,
whether expressly or impliedly, belongs to the national government, not to an alien country.
What is more to be deplored in this stand of appellant is that no such claim is made by the
American naval authorities, not that it would do them any good if it were so asserted. To
quote from Acierto anew: "The carrying out of the provisions of the Bases Agreement is
the concern of the contracting parties alone. Whether, therefore, a given case which by the
treaty comes within the United States jurisdiction should be transferred to the Philippine
authorities is a matter about which the accused has nothing to do or say. In other words,
the rights granted to the United States by the treaty insure solely to that country and can
not be raised by the offender." 1 8 If an accused would suffer from such disability, even if
the American armed forces were the beneficiary of a treaty privilege, what is there for
appellant to take hold of when there is absolutely no showing of any alleged grant of what
is quaintly referred to as administrative jurisdiction? That is all, and it is more than enough,
to make manifest the futility of seeking a reversal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it found
the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and modified insofar as she is required to
demolish the house that is the subject matter of the case, she being given a period of thirty
days from the finality of this decision within which to obtain the required permit. Only upon
her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed decision requiring demolition be
enforced. Costs against the accused.
Makalintal, C .J ., Zaldivar, Castro Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ ., concur.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 Barredo, J ., did not take part.
Footnotes

1. According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 1 of Constitution: "No person shall be

deprived of life, liberty property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws."
2. 104 Phil. 443 (1958).

3. Decision, Appendix A to the Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 1A-1B.

4. 20 Phil. 111 Cf. People v. Cruz, 54 Phil. 25 (1929); Tan Chat v. Municipality of Iloilo, 60
Phil. 465 (1934); Hipolito v. City of Manila, 87 Phil. 180 (1950); Uy Matiao and Co. v. The
City of Cebu, 93 Phil. 300 (1953); University City of the East v. City of Manila, 96 Phil.
316 (1954); Verzosa v. City of Baguio, 109 Phil. 571 (1960); Lopera v. Vicente, L-18102,
June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 549; People v. Soria, L-18982, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 242.

5. Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 10. She would cite Sec. 2238 of the Revised
Administrative Code, but strict accuracy would demand that she should refer to the
specific provision in the Olongapo city charter.

6. Cf. United States v. Alexander, 8 Phil. 29 (1907): Punzalan v. Ferriols, 19 Phil. 214 (1911);
United States v. Espiritusanto, 23 Phil. 610 (1912); United States v. Ten Yu, 24 Phil. 1
(1912); United States v. Abundan, 24 Phil. 165 (1913); Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil.
250 (1913); United States v. Hilario, 24 Phil. 392 (1913); United States v. Chan Tienco, 25
Phil. 89 (1913); United States v. Joson, 26 Phil. 1 (1913); Rivera v. Campbell, 34 Phil. 348
(1916); United States v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 103 (1918); Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 41
Phil. 103 (1920); Vinco v. Municipality of Hinigaran, 41 Phil. 790 (1917); People v. Cruz,
54 Phil. 24 (1929); Tan Chat v. Municipality of Iloilo, 60 Phil. 465 (1934); People v.
Lardizabal, 61 Phil. 360 (1935); Malabon Sugar Co. v. Municipality of Malabon, 61 Phil.
717 (1935); People v. Chan, 65 Phil. 611 (1938); People v. Sabarre, 65 Phil. 684 (1938);
People v. Esguerra, 81 Phil. 33 (1948); Eboa v. Municipality of Daet, 85 Phil. 369 (1950)
Manila Race Horse Trainers Asso. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60 (1951); Vega v. Municipal
Board of the City of Iloilo, 94 Phil. 949 (1954); Co Kiam v. City of Manila, 96 Phil. 649
(1955); Physical Therapy Org. of the Phil. v. Municipal Board of Manila, 101 Phil. 1142
(1957); Uy Ha v. City Mayor, 108 Phil. 400 (1960); Gaerlan v. Baguio City Council, 109
Phil. 1100 (1960); Gerena v. City of Manila, 110 Phil. 958 (1961).

7. 104 Phil. 443 (1958).

8. Ibid, 444-445.

9. Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 11.

10. 80 Phil. 71 (1948).

11. Ibid, 77.

12. 92 Phil. 534 (1953).
13. L-26379, Dec. 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 968.

14. 92 Phil. 534, 542.

15. 30 SCRA 968, 973.

16. Ibid.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

 17. Ibid, 973-974.

18. 92 Phil. 534, 542.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com