Professional Documents
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Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in
be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section escrow are supposed to guarantee the payment of all valid and legal
1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of claims against the employer, but these claims are not limited to
the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment
bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be have been violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for
accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its license, the
the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247
thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date (reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement
when the appellant received the appealed decision and/or of other liabilities the recruiter may incur.
award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal. As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the for a standing fund, as it were, to be used only as a last resort and
other requisites aforestated shall not stop the not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of
running of the period for perfecting an appeal. recruited workers that may be adjudged against the employer. This
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the amount may not even be enough to cover such claims and, even if it
Administration involves a monetary award, an could initially, may eventually be exhausted after satisfying other
appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon subsequent claims.
the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the award of about P170,000 to the dismissed employee, the herein
Commission in an amount equivalent to the private respondent. The standby guarantees required by the POEA
monetary award. Rules would be depleted if this award were to be enforced not
ISSUE: against the appeal bond but against the bonds and the escrow
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other
placed in escrow the amount of P200,000 as required by the POEA obligations the recruiter may incur.
Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee
perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC? (YES) to exceed the amount of P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds
HELD: and escrow money required of the recruiter.
It was. The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local
that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, employers, as the petitioner observes, but there is a simple
an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to
required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. more stringent requirement because of the special risks to which our
Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment workers abroad are subjected by their foreign employers, against
of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually whom there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The overseas
affirmed on appeal to the NLRC. recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and
the escrow money are intended to insure more care on the part of
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the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to whom our Review of law in its entirety and its intendment must be
overseas workers are to be sent.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a given effect
statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken One part of a statute is as important as the other. The statute should
that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was be construed and given effect as a whole. A provision which is unclear
enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of by itself may be made clear by reading and construing it in relation to
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conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Under the whole statute.
the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by In construing a statute, courts have to take the thought conveyed by
Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be the statute as a whole; construe the constituent parts together;
disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it
ascertain the legislative intent from the whole act; consider each and
has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a
every provision thereof in the light of the general purpose of the
superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the
contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and statute; and endeavor to make every part effective, harmonious and
Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a sensible.
provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever Fertilizer and Pesticides Authority vs. Manila Pest Control
possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of Petitioner: Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA)
the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the Respondent: Manila Pest Control Company (MAPECON)
POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the FACTS:
same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Petitioner FPA is an attached agency of the Department of
Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for Agriculture, created pursuant to P.D. 1144, "Creating the Fertilizer
perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA. and Pesticide Authority and Abolishing the Fertilizer Industry
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the Authority,"
working class, conformably to the mandate of the Constitution. Respondent MAPECON is a franchised and licensed urban pest
By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further control operator. It is accredited by the National Committee on
protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once again its Urban Pest Control (NCUPC) to engage in the manufacture,
commitment to the interest of labor. distribution, and application of its 38 patented pest control products.
The petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner Respondent Woodrow Catan is the MAPECON Dumaguete City
Branch Manager.
Vicente Laohan of the FPA issued a certificate that MAPECON-
Dumaguete branch had no license to operate, and that its pesticide
products were not registered with the FPA, prohibiting them from
engaging in the business as they are violations of PD 1144.
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Respondents MAPECON and Catan filed a complaint for educating the agricultural sector in the use of these
injunction with a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or inputs."
restraining order and damages, against Laohan and Turtal before Other provisions specifying agriculture:
the RTC of Dumaguete, seeking to enjoin them from disturbing their Preamble of P.D. 1144
business operations. Trial Court granted the petition. "to provide assistance to the agricultural sector"
In an amended complaint, respondents impleaded the FPA and its "fertilizer and pesticides are vital inputs in food
officers Cornejo and Deen as defendants. Respondents production"
(MAPECON) alleged that Cornejo and Deen sent letters to several "need to educate the agricultural sector".... Etc.
clients of MAPECON advising them to desist from dealing with the Sec. 6 of P.D. 1144
company, because it had no license to engage in pest control. RTC Powers and functions -- the FPA shall have
ruled in favor of respondents MAPECON and Catan. jurisdiction over all existing handlers of pesticides,
Hence, this appeal which raises a lone issue for resolution. fertilizers and other agricultural chemical
ISSUE: inputs."
W/N the acts or business operations of respondent MAPECON are (2) to promoted and coordinate all fertilizer and
under the jurisdiction or regulatory power of the petitioner. pesticides research
HELD/RATIO:
Sec. 8
The MAPECON is an urban pest control operator. FPA has jurisdiction
Prohibitions Governing Sale and Use of Fertilizers
only over agricultural pesticides, not urban pest control products.
and pesticides -- it shall be unlawful for any handler
Basics in statutory construction : "in interpreting the meaning and
of pesticides, fertilizer, and other agricultural
scope of a term used in the law, a review of the whole law must be
chemicals ....
made, and its intendment must be given effect. The various
provisions of P.D. 1144 show its consistent intent to apply the term
'pesticides' only to agricultural use. Thus, urban pest control Wisdom / Practicality of Law
operators and their urban pesticides are excluded from its coverage." It is the duty of the legislature to make the law; of the Executive to
Most significant provision - sets the parameters of the powers and execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. This
duties of the FPA. division of responsibility, as mandated by the Constitution, precludes
Sec 1 of P.D. 1144 - Creation of the Fertlizer and Pesticide one department from encroaching upon the power of the other.
Authority - The Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority, herein after Accordingly, since the legislature is primarily the judge of the
referred to as the FPA, is hereby created and attached to necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any
the Department of Agriculture for the purpose of assuring
law, Courts may not take any of these matters into account in
the agricultural sector of adequate supplies of fertilizer
construing or interpreting the law. As long as laws do not violate the
and pesticide at reasonable prices, rationalizing th
manufacture and marketing of fertlizer, protecting the public Constitution, the courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of
from the risks inherent in the use of pesticides, and whether or not they are wise or salutary.
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Because of the proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld
RCBC vs. IAC the delivery to RCBC of a certificate of sale covering the
auctioned properties.
Petition for the review of the decision of Intermediate Appellate Court February 13, 1985 SEC belatedly issued a writ of
(IAC) annulling the decision of trial court and directing the Register of preliminary injunction stopping the auction sale which had been
Deeds to suspend issuance of the owners copies of the land titles to conducted by the sheriff two weeks earlier.
RCBC until matters are resolved in SEC March 13, 1985 RCBC filed with the Regional Trial
Facts: Court an action for mandamus against the provincial sheriff of Rizal
September 28, 1984 BF Homes filed a "Petition for and his deputy to compel them to execute in its favor a certificate of
Rehabilitation and for Declaration of Suspension of Payments" (SEC sale of the auctioned properties.
Case No. 002693) with the Securities and Exchange Commission March 18, 1985 SEC appointed a Management
(SEC). Committee for BF Homes.
One of the creditors listed in its inventory of creditors and May 8, 1985 RTC granted RCBCs petition
liabilities was RCBC. June 4, 1986 B.F. Homes filed a complaint with
October 26, 1984 RCBC requested the Provincial the IAC praying for the annulment of the judgment of RTC
Sheriff of Rizal to extra-judicially foreclose its real estate mortgage April 8, 1986 IAC rendered a decision, setting
on some properties of BF Homes. aside the decision of the trial court, Register of Deeds of Pasay City
October 29, 1984 A notice of extra-judicial foreclosure had taken the SEC Resolution dated October 16, 1986 (which
sale was issued by the sheriff, scheduled on November 29, 2984 denied B.F. Homes petition to annul the auction sale) as its cue for
November 28, 1984 SEC issued a TRO enjoining RCBC proceeding with the transfers of title, despite an explicit directive of
and the sheriff from proceeding with the public auction sale Court of Appeals (before IAC) to suspend issuance of new land titles
Sale was rescheduled to January 29, 1985 in RCBCs name
January 25, 1985 SEC ordered the issuance of a writ (Shorter version: B.F. Homes applied for a Petition for Rehabilitation and for
of preliminary injunction upon petitioner's filing of a bond. Declaration of Suspension of Payments in SEC but RCBC asked requested
for an extra judicial foreclosure sale and the sheriff issued one and
January 29, 1985 Only then did the petitioner file a
scheduled the auction on November. The SEC issued a TRO for the auction
bond
and it was rescheduled on January 29 of the following year. The SEC issued
Presumably, unaware of the filing of the bond, the sheriffs
a writ of preliminary injunction but the B.F. only filed a bond after 3 days, the
proceeded with the public auction and RCBC was the
day which the auction will be held. The sheriff continued the auction on
highest bidder
January 29 (presumably unaware of the filing of bond) and RCBC was the
February 5, 1985 BF Homes filed in the SEC a motion
highest bidder. B.F. applied to a motion to annul the auction (it was denied)
to annul the auction sale and to cite RCBC and the sheriff for
and because of this, the sheriff withheld the transferring of the title to RCBC
contempt
so RCBC went to trial court for mandamus against the sheriff and the trial
court granted the petition. B.F. went to CA for the annulment of judgment of
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trial court and CA reversed the decision of trial court. It was only on March Only upon such appointment of the management committee did the
18, 1985, after RCBC filed a petition in the trial court, that SEC appointed a provision in Section 6 c which decrees suspension of actions for
Management Committee for B.F. Homes.) claims against the petitioning corporation take effect
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continue until the final disposition of the said criminal There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the
case. President sweeping authority to remove municipal officials.
The Constitution (in their time) says that the President "shall . . .
Issue: exercise general supervision over all local governments," but
W/N the suspension was valid. supervision does not contemplate control.
The President's supervisory authority over municipal affairs
disqualified by the proviso " as may be provided by law," a clear
Held: indication of constitutional intention that the provision was not to be
No. self-executing but requires legislative implementation.
the Chief Executive power to remove specifically enjoins that the said
Ratio: power should be exercised conformably to law, which we assume to
Contrast between 2 laws mean that removals must be accomplished only for any of the
By section 9 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Republic causes and in the fashion prescribed by law and the procedure.
Act No. 409), "the Mayor shall hold office for four years unless the power of the President to remove or suspend the Mayor of
sooner removed." the City of Manila is confined to disloyalty to the Republic or, at
But does not contain any provision for this officer's removal the most, for the other causes stipulated in section 2078 of the
or suspension. Revised Administrative Code, and that the suspension of the
This silence is in striking contrast to the explicitness with petitioner for libel is outside the bounds of express or unwritten
which Republic Act No. 409 stipulates for the removal and law.
suspension of board members and other city officials. It is clear that the case of Lacson is libel and NOT disloyalty,
Since the Charter is silent on this part, section 64 (b) of the dishonesty or oppression,
Revised Administrative Code does confer upon the President The most closest condition to the suspension or removal is
the power to remove any person from any position of trust or misconduct but the Court could still not uphold the suspension
authority under the Government of the Philippines for disloyalty to because the President should not be given the power to remove any
the Republic of the Philippines. officer at his own pleasure.
The Congress is presumed to have been aware of section 64 (b) of "Fixity of tenure destroys the power of removal at pleasure
the Revised Administrative Code and to have in mind this section otherwise incident to the appointing power . . . The reason of
and other removal statutes that may be enacted in the future, in this rule is the evident repugnance between the fixed term
employing the phrase "unless sooner removed." and the power of arbitrary removal . . ."
Why the suspension is invalid WHEREFORE the petition must be, and the same is granted, without costs.
But the contention that the President has inherent power to remove
or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken.
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Quintos vs. Lacson Olegario not being a civil service eligible, his
appointment should only be considered as
Note : no construction of laws involved ; main takeaway would be As long temporary under Sec. 682 of Revised Admin Code
as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely First issue has been thoroughly addressed by Mission v Del
interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or Rosario where the court held that EO 264 has been repealed
salutary, I think but im not sure haha by RA 557
Facts : Second issue answered by Uy v Rodriguez where the court
Jose Quintos was appointed patrolman in the Manila Police explained that unless it is shown that a detectives
Department and 2 years thereafter on December 1947 was promoted appointment is temporary he may not be dismissed except in
to the position of Detective. accordance to RA 557.
he was duly qualified to hold both offices This was reiterated in Palamine v Zagado, Mission v
Arsenio H. Lacson, the City Mayor, dismissed Quintos along with 4 Del Rosario and Abella v Rodriguez
other detectives. Counsel of appellants urges the court to review the mentioned
Quintos file case to annul the order in the CFI of Manila against the rulings but the court sees no reason or occasion for making any
respondent mayor and Police Chief Dionisio Ojeda change of revision.
CFI issued writ of preliminary injunction not to carry our order and If said law is detrimental to the detectives in Manila,
subsequently the court rendered judgement in favor of the plaintiff. proper representations and requests may be made to
Respondents appealed judgement directly to the Supreme Court the legislature
As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision,
Issues: the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of
W/N summary dismissal of a Manila city detective under the whether or not they are wise or salutary
provisions of EO 264, in view of RA 557 is valid Decision is affirmed
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Second District
Juan D. Victoria 32,918 votes ISSUE
- W/N The number of actual voters should be factored in determining
- Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay was suspended Sanggunian rank
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Held / Ratio:
1. YES CSC does have jurisdiction to decide this particular disciplinary case. 2. No. Petitioners were not denied due process of the law when they were
(Stat Con Focus) dismissed through a summary of proceedings instead of formal proceedings.
Petitioners contend that CSC has no original jurisdiction, instead Allowed in Sec. 40 of PD 807 which provides:
jurisdiction lies with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) Sec. 40. Summary Proceedings. No formal investigation
Sec. 37(b) of PD 807 states is necessary and the respondent may be immediately
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and removed or dismissed if any of the following circumstances
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall is present;
have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving (a) When the charge is serious and the
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their evidence of guilty is strong.
jurisdiction. (b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has
CSC is an agency within purview of Sec 37(b) therefore can been repeatedly charged and there is reasonable
discipline its officers and employees ground to believe that he is guilty of the present
BUT Petitioners claim that PD 807 was IMPLIEDLY REPEALED by charge.
PD 1409 which created the MSPB, an office under the CSC. Sec 5 of (c) When the respondent is notoriously
PD 1409 states board has power to: undesirable.
(5) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces Resort to summary proceedings by disciplinary authority
tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry. shall be done with utmost objectivity and impartiality to the
The Board shall have the power to punish for contempt in end that no injustice is committed: Provided, that removal or
accordance with the rules of court under the same procedure dismissal except those by the President, himself, or upon his
with the same penalties provided therein. order, may be appealed to the Commission.
Court rules that repeals by implication are not favored. **Court must This section was later repealed in the Abalos v. CSC case in May
first try to reconcile conflicting provisions. If it is irreconcilable THEN 1988, but offense took place on Nov 1983 therefore still applicable
the earlier law can be said to have been impliedly repealed by the
later law** In the case of Government Service Insurance System v. 3. Yes, their dismissal was proper as clearly provided for in Sec 40 of PD 807
Civil Service Commission it was ruled that when the law bestows two Referring again to the Government Service Insurance System v. Civil Service
government bodies with the same jurisdiction they shall have Commission case. Sec 40 is valid if the respondents are duly informed of the
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. PD 807 and 1409 have charges against them, and were given reasonable opportunity to defend
concurrent jurisdiction with respect to CSC officials and employees themselves. Petitioners filed their answer to the charges against them, and
Memorandum Circular No. 6 Series of 1978 of the CSC further submitted additional evidence for their defense when asked to do so.
stresses: decisions and determinations are appealable to the MSPB.
The CSC, however, remains the final administrative appellate body in
these matters, as provided in Sec. 8 of PD 1409
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Literal Interpretation Prosecution filed a petition to dismiss appeal
Prosecution argues that since the case was within the
plain-meaning rule or verba legis. If a statute is clear, plain and free
concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the court of first
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
instance and the trial in the city court had been duly
attempted interpretation. The rule rests on the presumption that the recorded, the appeal should have been brought to the Court
words employed by the legislature in a stature correctly expresses its of Appeals
intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. It Basis is Sec. 87 of the Judiciary Act, RA 296, as
must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no amended.
choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for Petitioners invoked the provision of Rule 50, Sec. 3 which directs that
construction or interpretation. the CA in cases erroneously brought to it shall not dismiss the
appeal, but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific
Bello vs. Court of Appeals and clear statement of the grounds therefor,
They pray that if the court of first instance should find their
Petitioners: Juan Bello and Filomena C. Bello
appeal to have been wrongly brought to it, to certify the
same to the CA or the SC
Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals (Third Division: Magno S. Gatmaitan,
Court of First Instance found that the appeal should have been taken
Guillermo S. Santos, and Ricardo C. Puno, JJ.); Hon. Francisco Llamas, as
directly to the CA and thus they dismissed the appeal.
Judge of Pasay City Court; and Republic of the Philippines
Petitioners were not notified of the dismissal of the appeal
until they were called by the Pasay city court for execution of
Teehankee, J.:
judgment (for estafa sentence)
Petitioners filed a motion to elevate appeal to CA in the city court
FACTS: City court denied the motion for having been erroneously
brought to the city court instead of the court of first instance
Petitioners were charged on Aug. 25, 1970 for estafa before the City Petitioners then filed for a petition for prohibition and mandamus
Court of Pasay against the People and respondent city court to prohibit execution of
Petitioners allegedly misappropriated a ladys ring with a judgment and to compel the respondent city court to elevate their
value of Php 1,000.00 received by them from Atty. Prudencio appeal to the CA
de Guzman for sale on commission basis. CA dismissed the petition, affirming the city courts judgment though
Petitioners were convicted after the trial and sentenced under the CA holds that the CFI should have not dismissed the appeal and
respondent city courts decision of Feb. 26, 1971 to 6 months and 1 endorsed it instead to the CA, but since the CFI was not a principal
day of prision correctional and to indemnify the offended party in the party respondent in this case, the CA cannot grant any relief
sum of Php 1,000.00 with costs of suit. Petitioners moved for reconsideration
Petitioners filed their notice of appeal to the Court of First Instance of Denied by the appellate court
Pasay City Thus, petitioners filed the present motion for review
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The failure of the rule to provide for such cases of
ISSUES: misdirected appeals to the CIF would not be a cause for
Did the courts acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the unjustly depriving petitioners of their substantial right of
petitioner-accuseds appeal? appeal
This Court cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute as to
HELD/RATIO: defeat the purpose of the legislator and stressed that it is of the
Yes. Petition is granted, appeal is elevated to the CA and petitioners are essence of judicial duty to construe statutes as to avoid such
given relief. deplorable result of injustice or absurdity
CIF acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or
when it should have endorsed it to the CA lead to absurd results
CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their petition
instead of setting aside the challenged order of the CIF because the ESGUERRA, J.: Dissenting
CIF was not a principal party respondent Rule 50, Section 3 of the Rule of Court apply to the courts expressly
CA erred in saying that it could not correct the acts of the given in the foregoing provisions
CIF and grant the relief sought of having the appeal elevated The Supreme Court cannot supply the deficiency through a judicial
to it since said courts presiding judge who should have fiat
been made under Rule 65, Sec. 3 herein principal party It must promulgate a new rule governing transfer of cases
respondent, but he was not. erroneously appealed to the CIF from judgments of inferior
Respondent judge is only a nominal party. courts in cases directly appealable to the CA
Absence of CIF as principal party respondent could have Furthermore, CIF was not party to the case hence it cannot be bound
been overlooked by any judgment herein, thus the decision of the CIF and the CA will
The real party in interest, the People as plaintiff and represented by stand.
the Solicitor General, agreed to set aside the decision of the CIF in
the interest of justice and equity Salaria vs. Buenviaje
CAs setting aside sacrificed substance to form and Petitioner: Ramon Salaria
subordinated substantial justice to procedural technicality Respondent: Hon. Carlos R. Buenviaje, Executive Judge of the CFI of
The Court thus grants the relief sought by the petitioners. Camsur Branch 7 Iriga City and Antonio V. Mendiola
Concur: Makasiar, Munoz Palma, Fernandez, Teehankee(chairman)
STATCON ISSUE: Ponente: Guerrero
Rule 50, sec 3 expressly provides that the CA shall not dismiss the Statcon: Literal Interpretation, Construction made by the one implementing
appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court the law should be given weight.
No logical reason why the CIF in a misdirected appeals to it
should not be likewise bound by the same rule Facts:
Salaria is a lessee in the land of Eliodoro Cailao
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Salaria and Cailao agreed that his monthly rental fee of P 6.00 which 2. W/N this case is covered Presidential No. 20
was later raised to P 10.00, they had NO agreement in the duration
In Dec. 1972, Cailao advised Salaria not to pay anymore and vacate Held:
the land because Salaria liked Ceferina Flores, wife of the 1. Petitioner CANNOT be ejected from the lot. (Literal Interpretation)
respondent Antonio Mendiola. Land was sold to Antonio Mendiola Sec. 4 of PD No. 20 states that: "Except when the lease is for a
and Ceferina Flores for P 300.00. After December of 1972, no rental definite period, the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the
was collected either by Cailao or Mendiola, which is why Salaria Civil Code of the Philippines insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or
deposited P 200.00 with the Clerk of Court while the case was being land on which another's dwelling is located shall be suspended until
tried otherwise provided; but other provisions of the Civil Code and the
On Aug. 23, 1974, a complaint for unlawful retainer was filed by Rules of Court of the Philippines on lease contracts, insofar as they
Antonio Mendiola against Ramon Salaria in Branch 2 of the City are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act shall apply."
Court of Iriga, Civil Case lr-431. Art. 1673 Par. 1 of the Civil Code States that the lessor may judicially
On Sept. 6, 1974, Salaria filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that eject the lessee if: "(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is
the complaint states no cause of action because PD No. 20 fixed for the duration of leases under Articles 1682 and 1687, has
suspends Art. 1673 of the Civil Code and the need of Mendiola of expired;"
the land for his own use does not fall in the exception provided in the Lease agreement has no duration therefore it comes under Art. 1687
PD. On Sept. 26, 1974, Judge Buenviaje denied the motion to which states that "If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is
dismiss understood to be from year to year"
On Oct. 21, 1974, in Salaria's answer: 1. He admitted that he has Construing Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree No. 20 in relation to Art.
been occupying the land of Cailao as lessee but the agreement was 1673 par. I and Art. 1687 of the Civil Code, it is clear and explicit that
without a fixed period. 2. As special and affirmative defenses, he Presidential Decree No. 20 suspends paragraph (1) of Article 1673.
alleged that no cause of action exists because PD No. 20 Sec. 4 Hence, the petitioner cannot be ejected at the expiration of the
suspends it; period provided under Article 1687 of the Civil Code.
City Courts decision ordered: 1. Salaria to vacate the land in 3
months. 2. Salaria is excused to pay back rentals, because of 2. Case is covered by the PD No. 20 (Statcon)
financial hard up, from Jan. 1973 to the time he vacates it, the P - The ground relied upon by the lessor in this case, namely, personal
200.00 will be returned to him use of the property by the owners or lessors or their families is not
In the appeal to the CFI of Camsur, the decision was affirmed with one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees enumerated in
modification. The P 200.00 is given to Mendiola. Article 1673 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 6359, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 20.
Issues: Accordingly, the lessee, petitioner herein, cannot be ordered to
1. W/N under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 20, the private vacate the premises of the land in question pursuant to said law.
respondent can eject the petitioner from the lot in question on the - Memorandum Circular No. 970 issued by the Office of the President
ground that he needs the lot for own use construes PD No. 20 (protection of low-income members of society)
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1. Although the construction put by the executive branch of the considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to
government on a particular law is not necessarily binding upon the warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the
courts, it must be given some weight as it comes from that branch of nullity of one part will vitiate the rest.
the government caned upon to implement the law. (Gabio vs.
Ganzon, No. L-11664, March 16,1961, 1 SCRA 713,718)
Barrameda vs. Moir
2. The construction of the office charged with implementing and
Petitioner: Juan Barrameda vs. Judge Percy M. Moir (Judge of First
enforcing the provision of a statute should be giving controlling
Instance)
weight. (Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, l
Petition for Mandamus. Barrameda went to justice of the peace then the
9337, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617).
court of First Instance to try a parcel of land, both courts decided against him
with the Court of First Instance dismissing him and ordering the justice of the
Note: Sec. 4 of RA 6126 and Sec. 4 of RA 6359(amended by PD No. 20)
peace to proceed with execution of judgment. Case did not state sufficient
protects low-income members of society too.
facts to cause action from the courts. Judge states that Act Nos. 2041 and
2131 are repugnant to the Philippine bill of July 1, 1902.
Decision: Decision of the CFI is reversed except the withdrawal of Mendiola 2041: Justices of the peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate
of the P 200.00. Salaria is ordered to pay back rentals at P 10.00 per month. questions of title to real estate or any interest therein when the value of the
property in litigation does not exceed two hundred pesos, and where such
value exceeds two hundred pesos but is less than six hundred pesos the
Valid in part, void in part justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the court of first
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant instance.
2131: above provision was amended by substituting exclusive original
to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
jurisdiction to exclusive jurisdiction
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The
Philippine Bill: Original jurisdiction of court of first instance is ALL civil
separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the actions which involve title to or possession of real property, or of any interest
legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity, of the therein
statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far All is a comprehensive word, the Philippine Bill orders The Court of First
independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Instance to have jurisdiction on ALL civil actions. Jurisdiction of Supreme
legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it Court and Court of First Instance can be added to but not diminished by
could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to Philippine legislature.
make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the ISSUE:
legislative intent. Are Acts No. 2041 and 2131 void and repugnant to the Philippine Bill?
HELD:
Only part of the Act is voided: where the Justice of the Peace is given
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute
jurisdiction to try land title cases because the Philippine Bill only allows the
are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, Court of First Instance to do so with exclusive jurisdiction. See above.
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- Sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) of Republic Act No. 8180 do
Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy not contravene section 19, Article XII of the Constitution
G.R. No. 124360 - Sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) of R.A. No. 8180 do not
permeate the essence of the said law; hence their nullity
Petitioner: Francisco Tatad will not vitiate the other parts thereof
Intervenors also argue:
Responent: THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND - The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 restores
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE the disproportionate advantage of the three big oil firms
Caltex, Shell and Petron over the small oil firms
- The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180
G.R. No. 127867
"disarms" the new entrants and seriously cripples their
Petitioners: Edcel C. Lagman, Joker Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto
capacity to compete and grow
Tanada, FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM
- Ultimately the total nullification of Republic Act. No.
DEBT COALITION (FDC), SANLAKAS,
8180 removes substantial, albeit imperfect, barriers to
monopolistic practices and unfair competition and trade
Respondents: Hon. Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), Hon. Francisco
practices harmful not only to movant-intervernors but
Viray(Secretary of Energy) CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON Corporation,
also to the public in general
and PILIPINAS SHELL Corporation, respondents.
Section 5. Liberalization of Downstream Oil Industry and Tariff
Treatment.
Intervenors: EASTERN PETROLEUM CORP., SEAOIL PETROLEUM
b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of
CORP., SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC., TWA, INC., and DUBPHIL GAS this Act, tariff shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate
of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of
Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents concerning RA 8180 seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the
FACTS: same as that for imported crude oil Provided, That beginning on January 1,
On Nov. 7, 1997 the SC declared R.A. 8180 as unconstitutional for 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall
three reasons: be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by
- It gave more power to an already powerful oil oligopoly an Act of Congress.
- It blocked the entry of effective competitors Section 6. Security of Supply. - To ensure the security and continuity of
- It will give the oligopoly unchecked power that will prejudice petroleum crude and products supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and
consumers and compromise general welfare importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on December 3, 1998 their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever
Respondents contend: is lower.
- EO 392 is not a misapplication of RA 8180
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Section 9. Prohibited Acts. - To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels YES.
and monopolies in the downstream oil industry, the following acts are hereby Statistics shown in a hearing of the Senate
prohibited. Committee on Energy show that the 4% tariff
b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a difference gives a 20 centavo/ liter advantage to the
price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract Big 3 of the oil industry and the new players
customers to the detriment of competitors. themselves have said that the 4% differential is
Respondents argue further: oppressive to them
- 4% tariff differential in Sec. 5 (b) will be beneficial, as it The necessary equipment to import and store oil will
will encourage construction of new refineries and the use ensure that the minimum inventory requirement will
of local labor and goods not become any less burdensome to new players in
- The minimum inventory requirement in Section 6 will their second, third or fourth years of operation
not prejudice new players as it will be easier for them to The definition of predatory pricing is too loose. The
burden the costs after their first year of operation presence of this provision does not dissolve the
- The Section 9 provision on Predatory pricing does not clear danger of oil oligopolies dictating prices
offend the Constitution The SC is not reviewing the wisdom on the
- The SC cannot review the wisdom of an economic economic policy. It is merely its compatibility with the
policy as it lacks the power and competence constitution. All other issues with the repeal of RA
8180 must be dealt with by Congress
YES.
Respondents, Petitioner Garcia, and the Intervenors all argue that The SC ruled that these provisions cannot be
Sec. 5(b), Sec. 6 and Sec. 9 (b) should be independent and independent despite the inclusion of a separability
separable from the rest of RA 8180 and therefore should not affect clause.
the validity of the act as a whole. As a defense they cite the acts Sec. 5(b), Sec. 6 and Sec. 9 (b) of RA 8180 are the
separability clause: ones intended to carry out the policy of the law
Section 23. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any section or embodied in Section 2 of the act
provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It shall be the policy of the State to
affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect. deregulate the downstream oil industry to foster a truly competitive market
Which they feel clearly shows that the intent of the legislators to make the which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and
provisions independent. adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high-quality
ISSUES: petroleum products.
W/N Sec. 5(b), Sec. 6 and Sec. 9 (b) of RA 8180 are unconstitutional Sec. 5(b), Sec. 6 and Sec. 9 (b) are the key
W/N The validity of Sec. 5(b), Sec. 6 and Sec. 9 (b) of RA 8180 should affect provisions of RA 8180 and without these in place,
the validity of the entire act Congress could not have deregulated the oil industry
Held/Ratio Motion for Reconsideration DENIED
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Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Kapunan: Order seeking to enjoin respondent from implementing certain provisions
General Rule of Statutory Construction: The valid portion of a of a statute, if of B.P. Blg. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of
separability clause creates the presumption that the legislature intended Section 4 (paragraph 1) of B.P. Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary
separability to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution
Exception: When the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and Sec. 4. Special Disqualification - In addition to violation of
connected as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and
whole the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby
This case does not fall under the exception declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials
Sec. 5(b), Sec. 6 and Sec. 9 (b) are severable from the main statute enumerated in section 1 hereof.
and their removal would not affect the validity and enforceability of Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who
the remaining provisions. The law can still stand on its own has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he
The principal intent of RA 18180 is to open the country to fair and is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years
free competition and the reasoning in assailing Sec. 5(b), Sec. 6 and of age at the commencement of the term of office to which
Sec. 9 (b) is that they are all anti-competition. By removing these he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the
provisions, the deregulation law realizes its objective. same elective local office from which he has retired
The crucial test is to determine if the removed provisions cripple the Dumlao alleges that such provision is directed insidiously against
whole statute. In this case they do not, but rather, the removal of him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely
these provisions strengthen the Act. arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation
To declare RA 8180 void as a whole is to bring us back to our Petitioners Igot and Salapantan assail the validity of the several
original problem of regulation, and prejudice those who have already statutory provisions including section 7 of B.P. Blg. 51, and sections 1, 4
invested in the oil industry under the context of RA 8180 (paragraph 2), and 6, of B.P. Blg. 52
Same petitioners question the accreditation of the some political
parties by respondent, on the ground that it is contrary to Section 9 of
Dumlao vs. COMELEC
XII
Petitioners:
Petitioners pray that the statutory provisions be declared null and
Patricia Dumlao - former Nueva Vizcaya governor who filed a CoC
void for being violative of the Constitution.
for the position of Governor in the next elections
Romeo Igot - taxpayer, qualified voter, member of the JBC
ISSUE:
Alfredo Salapantan - taxpayer , qualified voter W/N Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 52 is valid.
Respondent: Comelec
FACTS:
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, the first paragraph of section 4 of B.P. Blg. 52 is valid
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No, the second paragraph of section 4 of B.P. Blg. 52 is declared null and to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of
void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."
guaranteed to an accused. This case is not an appropriate case because neither
Valid in part, void in part Dumlao nor petitioners Igot and Salapantan are with cause
I. The Procedural Aspect: of action
Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence, II. The Substantive Aspect:
traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution Dumlaos contention that Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 52 is discriminatory
Misjoinder of parties and actions (Petitioner Dumlao's interest is against him personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the
alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan) disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the
The respectively contest completely different statutory provisions challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC
Such petition falls short of 3 out of 4 criteria which should be complied The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer
with in the exercise of the function of judicial review guard of equal protection is neither well taken.
1. Actual case and controversy In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from
Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application a provincial, city or municipal office
of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's There is reason to disqualify him from running for the same
disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC office from which he had retired: The need for new blood
His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical assumes relevance
issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion The retired employee has already declared himself tired and
from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by
detailed factual record virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again
2. Proper Party Persons similarly situated are sinlilarly treated
People vs. Vera: The long-standing rule has been that "the It bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a legal classification, what it proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he and unreasonable
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
enforcement"result of its enforcement" classification based upon substantial distinctions
It was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in
is said to be a candidate for Councilor. local governments
3. Unavoidability of constitutional question To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
People vs. Vera"it is a well-settled rule that the unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal
constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be breach
determined by the courts unless that question is properly It is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office
provided they are reasonable
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2nd paragraph of Section 4 Such classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and is not
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed based on substantial distinctions
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification
heard by himself and counsel or disqualification.
An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous The disqualification in question therefore is grossly
with guilt. violative of the equal protection clause which mandates
The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of that all persons subjected to legislation shall be treated alike.
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on Where no valid distinction could be made as to the relevant
the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil conditions that call for consideration, there should be none
or military tribunal as to the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
No distinction is made between a person convicted of acts Concurs with the majority's declaration of invalidity of the portion of the
of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed second paragraph of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52
for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for Also concurs with the majority decision that in order that a judgment of
public office conviction may be deemed "as conclusive evidence" of the candidate's
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima disloyalty to the State and of his disqualification from office, such
facie evidence, there is "clear and present danger" that judgment of conviction must be final and unappealable
because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints Concurring opinions: CJ Fernando, J. Barredo, J. Abad Santos, J. Aquino
will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering (concurring and dissenting)
contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against
him.
Ambiguity, construed against party who caused it
contra proferentem also known as interpretation against the
Teehankees separate opinion:
Dissents from the adverse ruling on Dumlaos candidacy and draftsman. Where a promise, agreement or term is ambiguous, the
declining to the rule on the invalidity of the first part of section 4 preferred meaning should be the one that works against the interests
The provisions of section 4 are discriminatory and arbitrary of the party who provided the wording. The doctrine is often applied to
which thus imposes a special disqualification on Dumlao situations involving standardized contracts or where the parties are of
from running for the elective local office of governor simply unequal bargaining power. However, the doctrine is not directly
because of the classification (being a retired provincial applicable to situations where the language at issue is mandated by
governor who has receive payment of the retirement benefits law, like in insurance contracts and bills of lading.
to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have
been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
The reasoning behind this rule is to encourage the drafter of a
office......)
contract to be as clear and explicit as possible and to take into
Persons similarly situated are not similarly treated --
account as many foreseeable situations as it can.
arbitrary discrimantion
21
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The CFI held that the 5% mentioned in the contract for services referred
Reyes vs. dela Cruz to the assessed value, not the market value, because the latter was too
Petitioner: ARSENIO R. REYES speculative.
Respondent: MARCIAL DELA CRUZ et al
Ponente: MONTEMAYOR Issue:
Takeaway: Petitioner made the ambiguous provision in the contract. The Whether the contract for services referred to the assessed value (not the
same shoud not favor the party who caused the obscurity market value of the properties)
Facts: Held/Ratio
This is an appeal by Atty. Arsenio R. Reyes seeking to reverse decision of YES
CFI. The 5% could refer only to the assessed value for that was the
CFI ruled: only value then known to the parties. The market value of a
That respondents pay petitioner Reyes an amount equivalent to 5% property is, as correctly said by the lower court, too speculative. The
of the amount adjudicated to each of them, from the estate to which determination of the actual or market value of real property is quite
they were the heirs, based not on the market value but on the difficult.
assessed value of the property, appearing on the project of If we follow the theory of the petitioner, at what time was said
partition and distribution, with legal interest from the date of the filing market value to be ascertained?
of the complaint Real state values fluctuate from time to time
Being a lawyer, petitioner knew the meaning and value of every word
Respondents are the 5 heirs of the estate of deceased Anselmo S. Hilario or phrase used in said contract. It would have been so easy for him
and on September 26, 1950, respondents hired Atty. Reyes for the estate to have used and inserted said phrase, "market value", in order to
distribution: remove and avoid all ambiguity and uncertainty.
"We are hiring your services to represent us in Special Proceeding
The petitioner himself was the very person who prepared the
No. 7501, court of First Instance, Manila, in such a way that we will
contract. Therefore, if there is any ambiguity or obscurity in the
be given all the due share arising out of the will and of the law. You
interpretation and meaning of said contract, the same "shall not
will exercise all duties of an attorney to preserve and defend our
favor the party who cause the obscurity" (Art. 1377 of the Civil
rights until the project of partition is approved by the court. For and in
Code corresponding to Art. 1288 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889)
consideration of the services which you are going to render to us in
the said case we will pay you 5% of the amount adjudicated to
us. You will not be paid in cash by us for the time being that the case
is pending in court. We have no money to pay. You will not be paid
of your services when the case is terminated and our respective
shares are delivered to us by order of court."
22
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o Defendant's answer: denied liability as such would arise only
Idelfonso vs. Sibal in the event that he buys ir sells real estate without
coursing the same through plaintiff
FACTS
Direct appeal from a judgment by the Court of First Instance of Decision of CFI: absolve defendant
Manila dimissing plaintiff's complaint
Hence the present appeal
October 13, 1953 plaintiff and defendant reached a compromise
agreement and thereafter filed ajoint motion to dismiss the case
in the CFI of Manila ISSUE
W/N defendant violated the obligation imposed on him by the
o Case was dismissed compromise agreement
o Compromise agreement reads as follows: HELD/RATIO
NO
o 2b. That the defendant promises that within two (2) years
from the date hereof, he shall course through the plaintiff o There is nothing in 2b that can be construed to mean that
as Realtor the former's real estate purchase or transaction defendant bound himself to purchase real property and to
and should he (defendant) fail thereof, that is, to make pay the Php 2,000 penalty in case he failed to do so
such real estate purchase and to course the same to
plaintiff as Realtor, the defendant is liable further to pay the o Defendant's principal undertaking was to "course" or make
plaintiff an additional sum of TWO THOUSAND pesos. his real estate purchases and salesthrough plaintiff, and
should defendant fail to fulfill that obligation, he becomes
Pursuant to the agreement, defendant commissioned plaintiff to sell liable to pay plaintiff the sum of Php 2,000
some properties in Quezon Citybut these properties were sold not
by the plaintiff but by the defendant himself Defendant had constituted, in 2b, plaintiff as his
exclusive agent in the purchase or sale of real
o Defendant expressed intention to purchase properties to property with liability to pay Php 2,000 in case of
expand his book-selling business breach
o Paintiff offered to sell properties he found (the Great Eastern o There is no dispute that defendant has, in fact, coursed
Hotel, Borja Building, a Rizal Avenue lot) to defendant for through plaintiff his real estate transactions
the expressed purpose of the latter of expansion
o Ambiguity in the provision ("that is, to make such real estate
o Defendant declined for reasons that such properties were purchase and to course the same to the plaintiff as
beyond his means and that such properties Realtor" inserted after the phrase "should he fail thereof"
which follows the statement of defendant's obligation)
Now plaintiff claims that defendant has failed in relation to 2b of the
compromise agreement But following the rule that ambiguities or obscure
clauses in contracts CANNOT favor the one
who has caused them, the ambiguity must be
construed in favor of defendant
23
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compound, and that he actually had only 2, with a further pair
nearby, belonging to the municipality of Tabaco.
Qua Chee Gan vs. Law Union Rock and Insurance Company Ltd.
SC held that where the insurer, at the time of the issuance of
December 17, 1955
a policy of insurance, has knowledge of existing facts which,
Takeaway: The ambiguity must be held strictly against the insurer and
if insisted on, would invalidate the contract from its very
liberally in favor of the insured
inception, such knowledge constitutes a waiver of conditions
FACTS
in the contract inconsistent with the facts, and the insurer is
Qua Chee Gan, a merchant of Albay, instituted this action in 1940, in stopped thereafter from asserting the breach of such
the Court of First Instance of said province, seeking to recover the conditions.
proceeds of certain fire insurance policies totalling P370,000, issued
2. That the insured violated the "Hemp Warranty" against the
by the Law Union & Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., upon certain bodegas
storage of gasoline, since appellee admitted that there were 36
and merchandise of the insured that were burned on June 21, 1940.
cans of gasoline in the building designed as "Bodega No. 2"
Insurance Company resisted payment, claiming violation of that was a separate structure not affected by the fire. It is well to
warranties and conditions, filing of fraudulent claims, and that the fire note that gasoline is not specifically mentioned among the
had been deliberately caused by the insured or by other persons in prohibited articles listed in the so-called "hemp warranty." The
connivance with him. cause relied upon by the insurer speaks of "oils (animal and/or
Que Chee Gan, with his brother, Qua Chee Pao, and some vegetable and/or mineral and/or their liquid products having a
employees of his, were indicted and tried in 1940 for the crime of flash point below 300 degrees Fahrenheit", and is decidedly
arson. However, acquitted by the trial court. ambiguous and uncertain; for in ordinary parlance, "Oils" mean
"lubricants" and not gasoline or kerosene. And how many
ISSUES insured, it may well be wondered, are in a position to
W/N the insurance is void based on the following grounds: understand or determine "flash point below 300 degrees
1. Breach of hydrant warranty Fahrenheit.
2. (STATCON ISSUE) That the insured violated the "Hemp SC held that by reason of the exclusive control of the
Warranty" against the storage of gasoline insurance company over the terms and phraseology of
3. That the insured connived at the loss and that the the contract, the ambiguity must be held strictly against
fraudulently inflated the quantity of the insured stock in the the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, specially
burnt bodegas to avoid a forfeiture
If the company intended to rely upon a condition of that
HELD - No. character, it ought to have been plainly expressed in the
1. The insurance company alleges that the trial Court should have held policy.
that the policies were avoided for breach of warranty. It is argued 3. Appellant insurance company contends that the claims filed by the
that since the bodegas insured had an external wall perimeter of 500 insured contained false and fraudulent statements that avoided the
meters or 1,640 feet, the appellee should have 11 fire hydrants in the insurance policy.
24
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The trial Court found that the discrepancies were a result of Jewel Villacorta owned a Colt Lancer which she brought to Sunday
the insured's erroneous interpretation of the provisions of the Machine Works Inc. for general check-up and repairs.
insurance policies and claim forms, caused by his imperfect Car was allegedly taken by 6 persons including one, Benito Mabasa
knowledge of English, and that the misstatements were ( an employee of Sunday Machine Works) and taken for a joyride in
innocently made and without intent to defraud. Montalban. The car figured in an accident which caused extensive
Trial Court ruling was affirmed. damage to the car (as well as the deaths of 2 of the persons
including Benito Mabasa, who was driving)
Villacorta vs. Insurance Commission - Lambert Empire Insurance Company has a Comprehensive Motor Car
insurance policy for P35,000 that can indemnify loss or damage to
Petitioner: Jewel Villacorta the car by:
Respondent: The Insurance Commission & Empire Insurance Accidental collision or overturning, or collision or overturning
Company consequent upon mechanical breakdown or consequent
upon wear and tear
Ponente: Teehankee
Fire, external explosion, self-ignition or lightning or burglary,
Statcon Nutshell: The pertinent issue here is the application of Empire
housebreaking or theft
Insurance Companys Authorized Driver clause which states that for
Malicious act
insurance to apply in a case where the owner of the car was not the one
driving, the driver must be one who is authorized by the owner/insured
Villacorta petitioned for recovery of total loss of vehicle from Empire
Insurance Company but respondent Insurance Commission
person. Empire Insurance company wanted to invalidate Villacortas claim to
dismissed Villacortas complaint. They sustained Empire Insurances
insurance because she did not personally authorize Benito Mabasa to drive
contention that the accident did not fall within the provisions of the
her car. However, SC ruled that since Villacorta entrusted her car to Sunday
policy either for the Own Damage or Theftcoverage
Machine Works Inc, she also necessarily entrusted it to its employees as
well. The SCs ruling implies that when there is any doubt as to the intention Respondent Commission upheld Empire Insurance Companys
of a statute, it should not be applied so restrictively as to be contrary to other contention that there is an Authorized Driver clause in relation to
established principles in law (in this case, the principle of courts to protect the provisions on their Comprehensive Motor Car insurance policy
which they stated as such: "It must be observed that under the
weaker parties in an insurance contract). This sia lso consistent with the idea
above-quoted provisions, the policy limits the use of the insured
of contra proferentem that provides that in a case of ambiguity, the
vehicle to two (2) persons only, namely
preferred meaning should be the one that works against the interests
The insured
of the party who provided the wording.
Any person driving on the Insured's Order, or with his
permission; Provided, that the person driving is
An appeal against the April 14, 1980 decision of the respondent
permitted, in accordance with the licensing or other
Insurance Commission
FACTS: laws or regulations, to drive the Scheduled Vehicle, or
has been permitted and is not disqualified by order of a
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Court of Law or by reason or any enactment or The main purpose of the Authorized Driver clause as seen in its
regulation in that behalf." text, is simply to ensure that the person whom the Insured one
entrusts his car to is a person who is duly licensed and not have any
The respondent Insurance Commission ruled that if the person disqualification to drive
driving is not the insured person, it should be someone authorized by When a car owner entrusts his car to an established car service and
the insured person and since Benito Mabasa is not known by the repair shop, he/she necessarily entrusts his car keys to the shop
Insured Jewel Villacorta, this case does not qualify under the owner and the shop employees, who are presumed to have
Authorized Driver clause of the policy permission to drive the car for legitimate purposes. This would
Respondent Insurance Company also ruled that the car was not therefore include Benito Mabasa, an employee of Sunday Machine
stolen and therefore not under the theft clause because under Works Inc.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, taking means depriving The fact that the car was unlawfully and wrongfully taken in this case
another of the possession and dominion of a movable thing with the constitutes a nature of theft as per Article 308 of the Revised Penal
intention, at the time of the taking, of withholding it with the character Code
of permanency "Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person
The insurance Company stated that Benito Mabasas taking of the who, with intent to gain but without violence against or
car cannot be construed to have felonious intent as it was only for a intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
joyride. Benito was also an employee of Sunday Machine Works Inc. personal property of another without the latter's consent,"
so there was likely no intent to withhold the car permanently Benito Mabasas body was found to have a Cal. 45 Colt pistol and an
apple-type grenade, indicating that this was not just a joyride but
ISSUE: that he had no intention of giving back the car.
Should Empire Insurance Company pay the insurance? Court rules that one who takes possession of a vehicle without the
consent of the owner is guilty of theft because his felonious intent is
HELD/RATIO already evident from the act itself because he gains utility,
YES. satisfaction and pleasure
Respondent Insurance Commissions ruling on the Authorized
Driver clause is to restrictive and contrary to the established Petition Granted. Empire Insurance Company to pay petitioner sum of
principle on Insurance Contracts P35,000 with legal interest
Insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion where the only
participation of the other party is to place their signature/adhesion on Baylon vs. Court of Appeals - Jet
the contract. This calls for greater strictness and vigilance on the
parts of the court to protect the weaker party for abuse and Petitioner: Pacionara Baylon
imposition. Respondent: Court of Appeals and Leonila Tomacruz
Ponente: Gonzaga Reyes
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Take-away: If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt Petitioner appealed before the CA. The CA maintained the
as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of decision of the RTC.
its stipulation shall control. No need to resort to extraneous
sources. The transaction in this case is a loan not an investment. In this present case, petitioner argues:
There is no loan to begin with.
Facts: Respondent gave Luanzon P150,000 not as a loan but
1996: Petitioner Baylon introduced Respondent Tomacruz to rather as an investment in the construction project of the
Rosita Luanzon. Rosita Luanzon is a contractor for twenty- latter
years. Petitioner Baylon invited Respondent Tomacruz to lend In the respondent's testimony before the lower court,
Luanzon P150,000 with a monthly interest rate or 5% to be Tomacruz used "investment", "dividends" and "commission"
used a capital for Luanzon's business. Tomacruz agreed. (Note: These are the extraneous sources referred to in the
June 22, 1987: Luazon issued and signed a promissory note Ratio)
acknowledging receipt of P150,000 from respondent and
obliging herself to pay the respondent on or before August 22, Issue:
1987. Petitioner Baylon signed the promissory note, Whether or not the P150,000 transaction was a loan
affixing her signature under the word "guarantor"
Luanzon issued a post-dated check dated Aug. 22, 1987 in the Held/Ratio:
amount of P150,000. Subsequently, she replaced the first YES.
check with another one dated Dec. 22, 1987. Monthly checks All circumstances mentioned by the petitioner cannot
of P7,500 were issued by Luanzon. However, the P150,000 override the clear and unequivocal terms of the June 22,
was not paid. 1987 promissory note whereby Luanzon promised to pay
Respondent Tomacruz made a written demand upon petitioner respondent the amount of P150,000 on or before August 22,
for payment, which petitioner did not heed thus, on May 8, 1987. The promissory note states as follows:
1989, respondent field a case for collection with the RTC of
QC. June 22, 1987.
Petitioner denied having guaranteed the payment of
the promissory note. To Whom It May Concern:
Petitioner argues that respondent gave the money to For the value received, I hereby promise to pay Mrs. Leonila
Luanzon, not as a loan but rather as an investment. Tomacruz the amount of P150,000 on or before August 22,
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. 1987.
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The above amount is covered by ___ Check no. ___ dated where none is indicated. Courts should administer the law not as they
August 22, 1987. think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to
consequences.
(signed)
Rosita B. Luanzon The axiom applies not only in the construction of general words and
Guarantor: expressions used in a statute but also in the interpretation of a rule
(signed) laid down therein. Thus, where the legislature has clearly laid down a
Pacionara O. Baylon rule for one class of cases it is not readily to be supposed that, in the
Tel No. 801-2800 same act, a different rule has been prescribed for another class of
18 P. Mapa St., DBP Village cases within the same as the first.
Almanza, Las Pinas, MM
ROBLES V. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. ET AL.
If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as
to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning Facts:
of the its stipulation shall control. Zambales Chromite Mining Corporation entered into a contract
Resort to extrinsic aids and other extraneous sources are with Jose Robles et al. for Zambales Chromite to provide and
not necessary in order to ascertain the parties' intent when deliver mining properties and Jose Robles to mine, extract,
there is no ambiguity in the terms of agreement. and sell ores from said properties upon payment of royalties.
SC ruled however that respondent must exhaust all possible Robles did not comply with contract, he under-produced ore,
legal remedies first against Luanzon before she compels did not pay wages, did not repair needed pathways and
petitioner to pay her since the petitioner is only a guarantor bridges towards mining areas (all of which are agreed to be
(Art. 2058 of the Civil Code) done in a contract) and did not pay royalties.
Upon violation of contract, Zambales Chromite wrote to Robles
Law does not distinguish, Courts should not distinguish and ordered for him to vacate the premises. Robles continued
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. The rule, operation so Zambales Chromite filed for unlawful detainer
founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and (illegal occupancy or usage of property once owned but which
phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and ownership has terminated) in the Justice of the Peace Court.
general significance. The rule requires that a general term or phrase Robles sought to dismiss in the Court of First Instance
should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the claiming that the Justice of the Peace did not have jurisdiction
other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of law. In other over mining lands.
words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute
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ISSUE: Colgate Palmolive Phil., Inc. vs. Gimenez
W/N the Justice of the Peace have jurisdiction over mining Petitioner: Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc.
land. Respondent: Hon. Pedro M. Gimenez as Auditor General and Ismael
Mathay as Auditor of the Central Bank of the Philippines
HELD:
Court of First Instance rejects robles appeal and confirms jurisdiction FACTS:
Petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General
of Justice of the Peace.
On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three
STATCON PART
applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid in
The appeal is clearly without basis. Section 1, of Rule 72 provides the aggregate sum of P113,343.99
that, The basis of this claim is Section 2 of Republic Act 601, which
a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the provides that:
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of on foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,
any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or transportation and/or other charges incident to
assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, importation into the Philippines of rice, flour, canned
at milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans, butterfat,
chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors,
any time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or
vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, poultry feed; textbooks,
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior
reference books, and supplementary readers approved
court by the Board of Textbooks and/or established public or
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of private educational institutions; newsprint imported by or
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the for publishers for use in the publication of books,
restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. pamphlets, magazines and newspapers; book paper,
Any book cloth, chip board imported for the printing of
land spoken of in this provision obviously includes all kinds of supplementary readers (approved by the Board of
land, Textbooks) to be supplied to the Government under
whether agricultural, residential or mineral. It is a well known contracts perfected before the approval of this Act, the
quantity thereof to be certified by the Director of Printing;
maxim
anesthetics, anti-biotics, vitamins, hormones, x-ray films,
in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, we
laboratory reagents, biologicals, dental supplies, and
should not distinguish. pharmaceutical drugs necessary for compounding
medicines; medical and hospital supplies listed in the
appendix to this Act, in quantities to be certified by the
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Director of Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals
applying therefor; drugs and medicines listed in the said HELD/RATIO:
appendix; and such other drugs and medicines as may "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "Where
be certified by the Secretary of Health from time to time the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish"
to promote and protect the health of the people of the Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and
Philippines shall be refunded to any importer making flavors" used in the preparation of food and those used in the
application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not
importation under the rules and regulations to be authorized to make any distinction and must construe the
promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." words in their general sense
The officer-in-charge of the Exchange Tax Administration of the "General terms restricted by specific terms -- General terms
Central Bank advised the petitioner that of the total sum of may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general
P113,343.99 claimed by it for refund, the amount of P23,958.13 had language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the
been approved. statute's object and purpose."
Such amount represents the 17% special excise tax on the The rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to
foreign exchange used to import irish moss extract, cases where, except for one general term, all the items in
sodium benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific
However, the auditor of the Central Bank refused to pass in audit the class.
petitioners claims for refund even for the reduced amount fixed by Though the term "stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a
the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, arguing number of articles that may be classified as food or food
that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under products, items immediately following it do not belong to
Section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law the same classification.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General To illustrate, "fertilizer" and "poultry feed" do not fall under
Auditor General affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central the category of food or food products because they are used
Bank, maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in in the farming and poultry industries, respectively.
section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it
preparation or manufacture of food or food products; Hence, cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and
such petition flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the
Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the
ISSUE: manufacture of food and food products
W/N the foreign exchange used by Colgate-Palmolive for the importation of
dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are
tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act No. 601) so as to restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection
entitle it to refund
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with them does not require the rejection of general terms in this case there was no express disapproval
entirely. there was no special session
The decision under review is reversed and the respondents are the phrase "until the next adjournment of the Congress" must
ordered to audit petitioners applications for refund which were be related with the phrase "until disapproval by the
approved by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Commission on Appointments" so that the adjournment
Administration in the total amount of P23,958.13. contemplated should refer to a regular session during which
the Commission on Appointments may be organized and
Guevara vs. Inocentes 1966 allowed to discharge its functions as such.
Respondent (Solicitor General) contends:
petitioner's ad interim appointment lapsed when Congress
Disputed Provision: adjourned its last special session called under Proclamation
No. 2 of President Marcos;
Article VII, Section 10, Subsection 4 of our Constitution an ad interimappointment ceases to be valid after each term
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
of Congress and so petitioner's appointment must have
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress. lapsed
ISSUES/HELD
W/N the ad interim appointment of Guevara is valid? NO IT IS NOT.
FACTS
The case is written in keeping with the statement we made in our RATIO
resolution dated February 16, 1966. Plain reading of the text would at once reveal that it is the clear intent
Petitioner Guevara was given an ad interim appointment as of the framers of our Constitution to make a recess appointment
Undersecretary of Labor effective only
The incumbent President Issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 which (a) until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments, or
declares all ad interim appointments made by the former Executive (b) until the next adjournment of Congress, and never a day
as having lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of longer regardless of the nature of the session adjourned.
Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966. well-settled rule of statutory construction that "when the intention of
In spite of this, the appointment is STILL INVALID the legislature is so apparent from the face of the statute that there
Petitioner now goes to the Court of a quo warranto proceeding. can be no question as to its meaning there is no room for
Petitioner Contends: construction" (Vol. 2, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 316).
ad interim appointment is valid and permanent and may only The provision contemplates two modes of termination of an ad
become ineffective either upon express disapproval by the interim appointment, or of one made during the recess of Congress,
Commission on Appointments or upon the adjournment of which are completely separate from, and independent of, each other
the regular session of Congress of 1966;
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The phrase "until the next adjournment of the Congress" does not The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Sycwin
make any reference to any specific session of the Congress, Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the
whether regular or special Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)
When the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. Sycwin then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against
UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE the properties of Varian in the IAC
DEBEMUS The IAC granted the petition of Sycwin
The framers of our Constitution in employing merely the word The IAC ordered the execution pending appeal
adjournment as a mode of terminating an appointment made during HOWEVER the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied
the recess of Congress had in mind either the regular or special as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal
session, and not simply the regular one as contended by petitioner. properties upon demand
Sycwin filed a petition with IAC praying that the surety (petitioner
Wherefore, petition is DENIED. Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc.) be ordered to pay the value
of the bond
Phil. British Assurance Co. vs. IAC
PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC. V INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT (IAC) ISSUE
Petitioner: Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. W/N an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment may be
Respondent/s: Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), Sycwin enforced on a counterbond
Coating & Wires, Inc., and Dominador Cacpal, Chief Deputy Sheriff of Manila
HELD/RATIO
FACTS YES
Private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint The counterbond was issued in accordance with
for collection of a sum of money against Varian Industrial Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court
Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Section 5. to secure payment to the
During the pendency of the suit, private respondent Sycwin Coating applicant of any judgment which he may
& Wires, Inc. succeeded in attaching some properties of Varian recover in the action
Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond Section 12. to secure the payment of any
NOTE: A supersedeas bond is issued on behalf of the judgment that the attaching creditor may
defendant to appeal judgment that is rendered against recover in the action
him/her and who is appealing to a higher court. Neither the rules nor the provisions of the counterbond
Varian Industrial Corporation posted a counterbond in the sum of limited its application to a final and executory judgment
Php 1,400,000.00 through petitioner Philippine British Assurance It is specified that the counterbond applies to the
Co., Inc. payment of ANY judgment (any means any!!!) that
The attached properties were released may be recovered
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THUS the only logical conclusion is that an 1997 : Negotiations were once again held which led to a final
execution of ANY judgment including one series of conferences and a draft text.
pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may be 1998: President Ramos approved the Visiting Forces
charged against such a counterbond Agreement (VFA) respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and
U.S. Ambassador Thomas Hubbard
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLE: Ubi lex non
President Estrada ratified the VFA through the Secretary of
ditinguit nec nos distinguere debemos
Foreign Affairs and transmitted to the Senate the Instrument of
Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish Ratification
Since the law in this case does not make any Senate concurred and the VFA entered into force after an
distinction nor intended to make any exception when Exchange of Notes between Secretary Siazon and
it speaks of ANY judgment which may be charged Ambassador Hubbard
against the counterbond, it should be interpreted to Petitioners assail constitutionality of VFA and impute to herein
refer not only to a final and executory but also a respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the
judgment pending appeal agreements.
Issues: (relevant to statcon)
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article 7
or Section 25, Article 17 of the Constitution
Bayan vs. Zamora Held / Ratio:
Doctrines: 1. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos - VFAs ratification is governed by both provisions
when no distinction is made by the law, the court should not Sec 21 , Art 7 deals with treaties or international agreements
distinguish ( this falls under the heading) in general and requires the concurrence of of all the
2. Use of comma and or signifies disassociation and members of the Senate for ratification.
independence of one thing from the others included in the No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
enumeration. effective unless concurred in by at least of all the
3. Lex specialis derogat generali- special provision of Members of the Senate
law prevail oveer general ones Sec 25, Art 17 applies to treaties which involve the presence
Facts: of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines.
1947 : Philippines and U.S. forged a Military Bases Agreement Concurrence of the Senate being one of the requisites for
1991 : Both countries negotiated for a possible extension but ratification under this provision
was rejected by the Philippine Senate
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...foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not provision does not refer to the 3 collectively but treats
be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly them as separate and independent subjects
concurred in by the Senate and... ..foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.. ->
Both provisions dont contradict each other and even share comma an or signifies disassociation and
some common ground independence of one thing from the others included in
Clear that the Constitution mandates that a treaty be the enumeration
concurred with by the Senate intent of framers is consistent with this interpretation
Sec 25 Art 17 undoubtedly applies because it specifies foreign Father B: Definitely, it can cover only one.
military bases, troops or facilities ( Lex specialis derogat Whether it covers only one or it covers three,
generali) but to an extent Sec 21 Art 7 also applies with regard the requirement will be the same.
to the purpose of determining the number of votes required to
ratify a treaty Mandatory / Directory / Prohibiture
General provision only takes effect in such cases within A mandatory statute is a statute which commands either positively
its general language which are not within the provision that something should be done, or performed in a particular way, or
of the specific enactment negatively that something should not be done, leaving the person no
It is a mistake to argue that Sec 25 Art 17 is inapplicable to choice on the matter except to obey. A mandatory statute is one that
temporary agreements because there is no placement of contains words of command or of prohibition.
permanent structures to establish military bases.
the Constitution makes no distinction between A directory statute is a statute which is permissive or discretionary
transient and permanent in nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that
nothing in Sec 25 Art 17 requires that foreign troops or no injury can result from ignoring it.
facilities be placed permanently in the Philippines ( di
ko ma highlight but eto yung relevant ratio under the Whether a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory depends
heading, yung last 2 points i mean) on its effect. If no substantial rights depend on it and no injury can
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos result from ignoring it; and the purpose of the legislature can be
Court rejects the argument that Sec 25 Art 17 is not controlling accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, then the statute
because no military bases, but merely foreign troops and will be generally regarded as directory; but if not, it will be mandatory.
facilities are involved
provision is not limited to the entry of troops and A statute will not be construed as mandatory of it will cause hardship
facilities without the any foreign bases being or injustice on the part of the public who is not at fault. Nor will a
established
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statute be interpreted as mandatory if it will lead to absurd, impossible annul Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) 372 since it
or mischievous consequences. requires Local Government Units (LGUs) to reduce their
expenditures by 25% of their regular appropriates
Mandatory enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of AO 372,
which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments
shall, must, ought, should
Pertinent sections of AO 372:
cannot, shall not, ought not
SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies,
Directory including state universities and colleges, government-
generally, may and other words importing permissiveness owned and controlled corporations and local
governments units will identify and implement measures
Use of may and shall in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the
Whether the word may is to be construed as mandatory and year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations
imposing a duty, or merely as permissive and conferring discretion, is for non-personal services items, along the following
to be determined in each case from the apparent intention of the suggested areas:
statute as gathered from the context, as well as from the language of SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by
the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
the particular provision.
emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10%
The word may will, as a rule, be construed as shall where a statute
of the internal revenue allotment (IRA) to local
provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or government units shall be withheld.
public duty, or where it concerns public interest or rights of an Petitioner contends that the above mentioned sections was
individual. The word shall may be construed as may when no exercising the power of control over LGUs when the Constitution
public benefit or private right requires that it be given an imperative vests in the President the power of supervision. Also that the
meaning. DIRECTIVE to withhold 10% of their IRA runs contrary to the Sec
286 of Local Government Code and Section 6, Article 10 of the
Pimentel, Jr. vs. Aguirre Constitution which provides for automatic release to each of these
units its share in the national internal revenue.
Solicitor General on the other hand argues that AO 372 was issued
GR number: 132988
to alleviate economic difficulties brought about by the peso
Petitioner: Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.
devaluation and that it constituted the Presidents power of
Respondent: Hon. Alexander Aguirre in this capacity as Executive Secretary
supervision because it merely directs LGUs to identify measures that
*CAPITALIZED, Bolded, Underlined AND Italicized are important statcon
will reduce total expenditures and the withholding of 10% of the
focus points.
LGUs IRA does not violate statutory prohibitions because it is
temporary in nature.
Facts:
Case is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to:
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Issue: need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Not mandatory
Main issue is whether (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" proven by the fact that it does not contain any sanction for noncompliance.
LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent; and (b) Section 4 Being ADVISORY it is still within the Presidents power of supervision.
of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal
revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of (b) Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. Basic feature of fiscal autonomy is
general supervision over local governments. the automatic release of the shares of the LGUs in the national internal
revenue as mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Held / Ratio: States that within 5 days after every quarter of the year LGUs SHALL not be
subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
Difference between Power of Control and Power of Supervision: government for whatever purpose. The word SHALL is a word of
Control: Power to nullify or alter or modify what a COMMAND that must be given compulsory meaning. Therefore, Section 4 of
subordinate officer has done in performance of duties and AO 372 in withholding 10%, even though it is only temporary does not
substitute judgement of the former for the latter matter. ANY retention is PROHIBITED.
Supervision: Oversight to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties In sum. Section 1 is upheld as ADVISORY while Section 4 is not valid at all.
Cannot interfere with LGUs as long as they act within the
scope of their authority (Taule v Santos) Ruling:
If rules are not followed, they may order the act undone or
redone... On the other hand supervision does not cover such Petition is GRANTED. Respondents are permanently PROHIBITED from
authority (Drilon v Lim) implementing AO 372 and 43.
Local Autonomy
a more responsive and accountable local government Dissenting Opinion:
structure instituted through a system of decentralization
(Ganzon v CA)
Justice Kapunan dissents on the grounds that: (1) the Petition is premature;
Enjoy administrative autonomy as well as fiscal autonomy.
(2) AO 372 falls within the powers of the President as chief fiscal officer; and
Fiscal autonomy = power to create their own sources of
(3) the withholding of the LGUs IRA is implied in the President's authority to
revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national
adjust it in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit.
taxes released by the national government.
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Procedure and defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of Escribano v Avila
suits.
Therefore, the view of the Court of Appeals that such provisions can This
case
is
about
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Court
of
First
Instance
to
conduct
be liberally construed is WRONG. The liberality in the interpretation
the
preliminary
investigation
of
a
complaint
for
written
defamation.
and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. Litigation is NOT a game of
technicalities, BUT every case must be prosecuted in accordance FACTS:
with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy On
September
25,
1968
Congressman
Salipada
K.
Pendatun,
the
administration of justice. governor-elect
of
Cotabato,
filed
directly
with
the
Court
of
First
In Bayog vs. Natino , the Supreme Court ruled that there is nothing in Instance
of
that
province
(now
North
Cotabato)
a
complaint
for
Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 (law in which the Rule on Summary
libel
against
Mayor
Jose
Escribano
of
Tacurong,
Cotabato
(now
the
Procedure was promulgated on)
province
of
Sultan
Kudarat).
The
complaint
was
subscribed
and
SEC. 36. Summary procedures in special cases - The
Supreme Court shall adopt special rules or procedures sworn
to
before
respondent
Judge
David
P.
Avila.
It
was
supported
applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditious by
the
affidavit
of
Acting
Governor
Simeon
Datumanong.
and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to In
that
complaint
Escribano
was
charged
with
having
said
in
a
technical rules. Such simplified procedure may provide that speech,
which
was
broadcasted
on
August
26,
1968
by
a
radio
affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of
station
at
Cotabato
City,
that
"Mr.
Pendatun
is
the
worst
animal
oral testimony and that the periods of filing pleadings shall
that
ever
lived
in
this
province".
be non-extendible.
Judge
Avila
in
his
orders
of
March
5,
20
and
27,
1969
ruled
that
he
That prohibits the courts from taking late answers. However in the
current case, Florentinos explanation was not sufficient, his had
the
power
to
conduct
the
preliminary
investigation.
Escribano
allegation that he is economically destitute is not convincing because questioned
Judge
Avila's
authority
to
conduct
the
preliminary
he did not even wait for the Municipal Trial Courts resolution. Thus, investigation
of
the
offense.
the Municipal Trial Court was correct when it refused to admit his On
April
1,
1969
Escribano
filed
in
this
Court
against
Judge
Avila
answer and proceeded to render judgment in accordance with Sec. 6 and
Pendatun
the
instant
special
civil
actions
of
certiorari
and
of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
prohibition,
praying
that
the
said
orders
of
Judge
Avila
be
set
aside.
DECISION: Petition Granted, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
Escribano
also
filed
a
supplemental
petition
to
annul
Judge
Avila's
REVERSED and the decision of the RTC Branch 14 is REINSTATED. order
of
March
29,
1969.
In
that
order
he
found
that
Pendatun's
evidence
had
"established
a
probable
cause
to
believe
that"
libel
by
radio
had
been
committed
and
that
Escribano
"probably
committed
the
same".
Judge
Avila
ordered
the
arrest
of
Escribano,
40
StatCon
Post-midterms
Cases
Set
1
fixed
the
bail
at
three
thousand
pesos,
and
referred
the
case
to
the
Preliminary
investigations
of
criminal
actions
for
written
defamations
as
city
fiscal
of
Cotabato
for
the
filing
of
the
corresponding
provided
for
in
the
chapter
shall
be
conducted
by
the
provincial
or
city
fiscal
information.
A
warrant
of
arrest
was
issued
on
March
31.
of
the
province
or
city,
or
by
the
municipal
court
of
the
city
or
capital
of
the
Sometime
before
April
16
the
city
fiscal
filed
for
libel
against
province
where
such
actions
may
be
instituted
in
accordance
with
the
Escribano. provisions
of
this
article.
On
August
10,
1970
this
Court
issued
a
resolution
restraining
Judge
Defendants
Side:
Avila
from
proceeding
with
the
arraignment
of
Escribano. Pendatun
and
Judge
Avila
rely
on
section
13,
Rule
112
of
Petitioners
Side: the
Rules
of
Court
to
support
their
view
that
the
Court
of
Petitioner
Escribano,
in
support
of
his
contention
that
First
Instance
of
Cotabato
could
conduct
the
preliminary
the
city
fiscal
of
Cotabato
is
the
only
functionary
investigation:
empowered
to
conduct
the
preliminary
investigation
of
SEC.
13.
Preliminary
examination
and
the
libel
charge,
invokes
the
following
provisions
of
the
investigation
by
the
judge
of
the
Court
of
First
charter
of
Cotabato
City,
Republic
Act
No.
2364,
as
Instance.
Upon
complaint
filed
directly
with
amended
by
Republic
Act
No.
3332: the
Court
of
First
Instance,
without
previous
SEC.
23.
Powers
and
Duties
of
the
City
Attorney. preliminary
examination
and
investigation
(f)
He
shall
investigate
an
charges
of
crimes,
misdemeanors
and
violations
of
conducted
by
the
of
the
judge
thereof
shall
laws
and
city
ordinances
and
prepare
the
necessary
informations
or
make
either
refer
the
complaint
to
the
municipal
the
necessary
complaints
against
the
persons
accused.
... judge
referred
to
in
the
second
paragraph
of
(g)
He
shall
have
charge
of
the
prosecution
of
all
crimes,
misdemeanors
and
section
2
hereof
for
preliminary
examination
violations
of
laws
and
city
ordinances
triable
in
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
and
investigation,
or
himself
conduct
both
Cotabato,
and
the
municipal
court
of
the
city,
and
shall
discharge
all
the
preliminary
examination
and
investigation
duties
in
respect
to
Criminal
prosecutions
enjoined
by
law
upon
provincial
simultaneously
in
the
manner
provided
in
the
fiscals. preceding
sections,
and
should
be
find
He
also
invokes
the
following
provisions
of
article
360
of
reasonable
ground
to
believe
that
the
the
Revised
Penal
Code,
which
were
inserted
by
Republic
defendant
has
committed
the
offense
Act
No.
4363,
approved
on
June
19,
1965,
and
which
do
charged,
he
shall
issue
a
warrant
for
his
arrest,
not
empower
the
Court
of
First
Instance
to
conduct
a
and
thereafter
refer
the
case
to
the
fiscal
for
preliminary
investigation
of
written
defamations: the
filing
of
the
corresponding
information.
ISSUE:
41
StatCon
Post-midterms
Cases
Set
1
Whether
or
not
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Cotabato
is
invested
The
silence
of
article
360
on
the
power
of
a
judge
of
the
Court
of
First
with
authority
to
conduct
the
preliminary
investigation
of
the
Instance
to
conduct
a
preliminary
investigation
of
criminal
actions
for
crime
of
libel
committed
by
means
of
radio
at
Cotabato
City
or
written
defamations
does
not
preclude
a
judge
of
that
court
from
whether
that
power
is
lodged
exclusively
in
the
city
attorney
of
holding
such
investigation.
that
city. It
was
written
in
the
Charter
of
Cotabato
that
the
exercise
of
that
power
is
tied
up
with
the
rules
on
the
venue
of
a
criminal
action
for
HELD:
written
defamation.
That
power
is
lodged
in
the
Court
of
First
The
rule
is
that
in
construing
a
statute
the
mischief
intended
to
be
Instance
of
the
city
or
province
where
the
libelous
article
was
printed
removed
or
suppressed
and
the
causes
which
induced
the
enactment
or
first
published
or
where
the
offended
party
actually
resided,
or
of
a
law
are
important
factors
to
be
considered
in
its
construction. where
the
offended
public
official
held
office,
at
the
time
of
the
Was
it
intended
by
Republic
Act
No.
4363,
in
specifying
that
commission
of
the
offense.
the
preliminary
investigation
of
criminal
actions
for
written
However,
Section
78
of
the
same
charter
provides
that
the
defamations
may
be
conducted
by
the
provincial
or
city
municipal
or
city
court
of
Catabato
City
"may
also
conduct
fiscal
where
the
criminal
action
may
be
filed
to
exclude
the
preliminary
investigations
for
any
offense,
without
regard
Court
of
First
Instance
from
conducting
such
preliminary
to
the
limits
of
punishments",
a
provision
which
is
found
in
investigation
and
to
entrust
that
power
exclusively
to
those
section
87
of
the
Judiciary
Law
and
in
section
2,
Rule
112
of
fiscals
and
courts? the
Rules
of
Court.
Therefore,
it
is
safe
to
conclude
that
the
enumeration
in
the
The
petition
is
dismissed
with
costs
against
the
petitioner.
amendatory
law
of
the
public
officers
and
the
courts
that
may
conduct
the
preliminary
investigation
of
complaints
for
written
Concurring
(Teehankee):
defamation
was
designed
to
divest
the
ordinary
municipal
court
of
The
mere
non-mention
of
judges
of
the
Court
of
First
Instance
as
that
power
but
not
to
deprive
the
proper
Court
of
First
Instance
of
among
those
authorized
to
conduct
preliminary
investigations
of
that
same
power. criminal
actions
for
written
defamation
under
R.A.
4363
(which
Congress
did
not
confine
the
amendatory
law
to
laying
down
the
amended
Art.
360
of
the
Revised
Penal
Code
So
as
to
provide
a
more
guidelines
for
the
venue
of
criminal
and
civil
actions.
Since
its
purpose
restricted
venue
for
criminal
and
civil
actions
for
damages
in
cases
of
is
to
minimize
the
filing
in
municipal
courts
of
out-of-town
libel
suit,
written
defamation
under
said
Code)
cannot
be
construed
to
mean
a
the
lawmaking
body,
in
order
to
attain
that
objective,
deprived
the
withdrawal
of
the
constitutional
and
statutory
power
of
the
Court
of
ordinary
municipal
courts
of
the
power
to
conduct
the
preliminary
First
Instance
to
conduct
preliminary
investigations.
investigation
of
a
criminal
action
for
written
defamation.
42
StatCon
Post-midterms
Cases
Set
1
Aside
from
the
provision
of
Rule
112,
section
13
of
the
Rules
of
Court,
the
statutory
power
of
judges
of
the
Court
of
First
Instance
to
Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on Election
conduct
preliminary
investigations
is
recognized
and
reaffirmed
in
Republic
Act
5180 StatCon Issue: RA 7941 acts as the mandatory statute,
"in
the
Sayo,
Montelibano
,
and
Guerrero,
cases
it
was
held
that
the
meaning it commands the process of the whole Party-List
city
court
could
not
conduct
preliminary
investigations,"
thus
giving
System. The Comelec has authority to pass IRRs but these
the
impression
that
the
ruling
in
said
cases
that
under
the
charters
of
discretionary rules shall be in accordance of the mandatory
the
cities
of
Manila
and
Bacolod
the
power
to
conduct
preliminary
statute. Party-Lists that are qualified to join the elections can
investigations
is
exclusively
lodged
in
the
city
fiscal
is
still
in
force only obey the words of the mandatory statute and in case of
merely
constitute
the
basis
of
the
city
fiscal
authority
to
conflict between the discretionary rule of the Comelec (Sec 13
concoct
preliminary
investigations
but
do
not
serve
to
of Resolution 7804) and the mandatory rule, the latter shall
withdraw
from
the
Courts
of
First
Instance
as
well
as
from
prevail.
the
city
courts
therein
their
power
to
conduct
preliminary
examinations
and
investigations.
Collector
of
Customs
vs.
Villaluz Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus by Luis K. Lokin against COMELEC
But
the
charters
of
the
cities
of
Manila,
Bacolod
Mandamus-- To compel COMELEC to proclaim Lokin as 2nd
nominee of CIBAC
and
Cebu
do
not
contain
any
provision
making
such
grant
of
power
to
city
prosecutors
exclusive
FACTS:
of
the
courts,
which
cannot
be
deprived
of
such
authority
to
conduct
preliminary
examination
CIBAC was a duly registered party-list group for the May 14, 2007
because
said
prerogative
of
the
courts
emanates
elections
nd
from
the
Constitution
itself. Luis K. Lokin was listed as the 2 nominee among the five chosen
by CIBAC
Prior to elections however, CIBAC through its president Emmanuel
Fernando
(dissenting):
Villanueva filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and
in
the
absence
of
a
statutory
grant,
a
court
of
first
instance
cannot
amendment.
exercise
the
power
of
holding
a
pre
investigation,
as
it
more
of
the
Names of Lokin and 2 others (Tugna and Galang) were withdrawn.
prosecuting
rather
than
the
judicial
function
unlike
a
preliminary
Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in this order were on the
examination,
which
as
the
first
Step
in
the
deprivation
of
one's
amended list of nominees for CIBAC
liberty,
is
deemed
best
left
in
judicial
hands.
43
StatCon
Post-midterms
Cases
Set
1
Letter with signed petitions of 81% of CIBAC members was sent to 2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the
COMELEC chairperson Benjamin Abalos to confirm withdrawal of Legislature;
Lokin and the others 3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
CIBAC won 2 seats. procedure; and
nd
Motion was filed to proclaim Lokin as 2 nominee. Villanueva and 4. It must be reasonable.
Cruz-Gonzales opposed
COMELEC ruled Villanueva acted within the scope of his authority as In a conflict between the IRR and a law, the law will prevail
CIBAC president.
CIBAC also had a right to withdraw nominations of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang based on the provisions of Section 13 of Resolution No. Sec. 8 of RA No, 7941 (Party-List Systems Act) reads:
7804 (promulgated Jan. 12, 2007) Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.- Each registered party,
Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 as unconstitutional organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five
and files for a petition of Mandamus and Certiorari (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from
which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the
ISSUES: required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have
a. Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not
lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of nominees of include any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid
CIBAC and allowing for an amended list of nominees without any basis in the for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. NO CHANGE of
law names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same
b. Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and shall have been submitted to the COMELEC EXCEPT in cases where the
violates the Party-List System Act (RA No. 7941) nominee DIES, or WITHDRAWS IN WRITING his nomination, becomes
INCAPACITATED in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be
HELD/RATIO: placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of
Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be
a. YES. considered resigned.
Legislature can delegate to executive and administrative boards the
authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs (Implementing rules and The provision must be read literally because its language is plain
regulation) as long as they are guided by standards that the and free from ambiguity.
legislature sets The Legislature clearly deprives Party-list organizations of the right to
IRRs carry out and implement legislative purpose change its nominees once the list is submitted unless they fall under
To be valid, IRRs must comply with the following requisites: the 3 exceptions in the provision.
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
b. YES
44
StatCon
Post-midterms
Cases
Set
1
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under The rule is formulated in a number of ways.
Section 8 of RA No. 7941 First variation is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to
that which is implied. Expressum facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a
statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matter, it may not,
Section 13 of the resolution states: by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
Substitution of nominees. A party-list nominee may be substituted only Second variation is the canon that a general expression followed by
when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes
exceptions therefrom implies that those which do not fall under the
incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a
exceptions come within the scope of the general expression. Exceptio
nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall
be placed last in the list of nominees. firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis.
No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls. Third variation is the axiom that the expression of one or more things
of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed, even though all
Another exception was added that allowed CIBAC to withdraw would have been implied had none been expressed.
Lokin and others
COMELEC said their intention was simply to reword or to rephrase City Government of San Pablo, Laguna vs. Reyes
the statute. However, they established an entirely new ground not GR No. 127708 March 25, 1999
found in Section 8 of RA No. 7941
When the statutes itself enumerates the exceptions to the FACTS
application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but
reasonably construed Petition to review the decision of the RTC of San Pablo City entitled
The IRR is not in harmony with the provisions of the law therefore the Manila Electric Company v City of San Pablo Laguna.
insertion of the new ground is INVALID. Section 13 of Resolution No. RTC declared imposition of franchise tax under Sec 2.09 Article D of
7804 is partly nullified Ordinance No. 56 Revenue Code of San Pablo City as ineffective
and void to MERALCO for being violative of Act no. 3648, Republic
Because of the invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7894, CIBACs Act No. 2340 and PD 551.
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin and the others is ineffectual. RTC also granted MERALCOs claim for refund of franchise taxes
paid under protest
WHEREFORE PETITION IS GRANTED Act No. 3648 Granted Escudero Electric Services Company a
legislative franchise to maintain and operate an electric light and
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius power system in the City of San Pablo
Section 10. - the grantee shall pay unto the municipal
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of
treasury of each municipality in which it is supplying electric
one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
current to the public under this franchise, a tax equal to 2%
45
StatCon
Post-midterms
Cases
Set
1
of gross earningsSaid tax shall be due and payable and RTC ruled in favor of MERALCO that the Local Government Code
shall be in lieu of any of any and all taxes of any kind, nature, did not expressly or impliedly repeal the tax exemption / incentive
or description levied, established or collected by any enjoyed by MERALCO under its charter.
authority whatsoeverand on its franchise, rights, privileges, Hence Govt of San Pablos petition in this Court
receipts, revenues, and profits from which taxes the grantee Petitioner San Pablo
is hereby expressly exempted. o RA 7160 expressly repealed Act 3648, RA 2340 and
Escuderos franchise was transferred to respondent MERALCO PD 551
under Republic Act No. 2340 o Pursuant to Section 137 and 193 of LGC, province
PD No. 551 enacted on September 1974 Section 1. Any provision now has power to impose franchise tax
of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the o Mactan Cebu International Airport v Marcos real
franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchise to generate, property tax exemption granted to airport has been
distribute, and sell electrice current for light, heat and power shall be withdrawn upon LGC effectivity
two percent (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of
electric current and transactions incident (MERALCO ISSUE
CURRENTLY PAYS THIS) W/N City of San Pablo may impose a local franchise tax pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7160 Local Government Code of 1991 the LGC upon MERALCO
authorizes the province/city to impose a tax on business enjoying a Was there an implied repeal of the MERALCO Charter by RA 7160
franchise at a rate not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of one one HELD / RATIO
percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar
year realized within its jurisdiction.
YES. City of San Pablo may impose local franchise tax on
October 5, 1992 Sangguniang Panglungsod enacted Ordinance No.
MERALCO
56 Revenue code of the City of San Pablo
Pertinent provisions of LGC
Sec. 2.09 imposed a tax on business enjoying a franchise, at
o Section 137 Franchise Tax Notwithstanding any
a rate of fifty percent of one percent of the gross annual
exemption granted by any law or other special law, the
receipts
province may impose a tax on business enjoying a franchise
Pursuant to this Section, petitioner City Treasurer sent to
at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of gross annual receipts
MERALCO a letter demanding payment of franchise tax.
o Section 193 Withdrawal of Tax Exemption
Respondent MERALCO paid under protest amount of
Privileges Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
P1,857,711.67
exemptions, or incentives granted to or presently
MERALCO subsequently filed this action before the RTC to
enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical,
declare Ordinance No. 56 null and void insofar as it imposes
including government owned or controlled corporations
the franchise tax upon MERALCO and to claim for a refund
except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered
of the taxes paid.
under RA 6938, non stock and non profit hospitals and
46
StatCon
Post-midterms
Cases
Set
1
education institutions are hereby withdrawn upon the The People of the Philippines v. Moro Sumaguina Macarandang
effectivity of this code. G.R. No. L-12088 December 23, 1959
o Section 534 Repealing Clause All genereal and
special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, Plaintiff: The People of the Philippines
proclamations and administrative regulations or part or parts Defendant: Moro Sumaguina Macarandang (Datu of Kamalig, Marantao,
thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of Lanao)
this code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 534 is a general repealing clause so YES TO ISSUE #2 Take Away: Inclusion of Secret Agent of peace and order in the category of
It is the courts view that petitioners rely correctly on the provisions of peace officer
Sec 137 and 193 of the LGC.
Paras, C. J.:
STATCON PART
o Section 193 supports the withdrawal of extant tax FACTS:
exemption privileges. By stating that unless otherwise provided Macarandang was accused and convicted of the crime of illegal
in this code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to or possession of firearms in the Court of First Instance of Lanao
presently enjoyed by all persons whether natural or juridical, Macarandang possessed a Riot Gun, Winchester, 12 GA.
including GOCCs except 1. Local water districts, 2. SN-924131 and 8 rounds of ammunitions without possessing
Cooperatives duly registered under 6938, 3. Non stock and non a proper license
profit hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn Accused invokes the appointment made by Governor Dimakuta as
upon effectivity of this Code. his legal excuse
o Limit the exemptions to the three enumerated entities. Accused was appointed as Secret Agent of peace and
o It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the order campaigns and detention of crimes and is authorized
express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence, to hold aforementioned firearm (Seryoso to. Secret Agent
excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim talaga nakalagay)
expression unius est exclusion alterius.
o Any existing tax exemption or incentive enjoyed by MERALCO ISSUE:
was clearly intended to be withdrawn Should the accused be acquitted and decision of the CFI reversed?
Petition GRANTED. The decision of RTC is reversed and set aside
and the complaint of MERALCO is hereby DISMISSED. RATIO: YES.
Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that peace
officers are exempted from the requirement of obtaining a license to
possess firearms
47
StatCon
Post-midterms
Cases
Set
1
Appointment of accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detention of
crimes puts him within the category of a peace officer
Equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
expressly covered by Section 879
RULING:
Decision of CIF is reversed and accused is acquitted.
48