Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2008
Article
This paper studies the theoretical justification of intellectual property rights and its
jurisprudential implications. Building on a careful yet critical re-examination of Locke and
Hegel's theories of property, the paper argues that the classical idea of preserving private
property for the defense of the autonomous self is distorted when we apply their theories to
intellectual property. Firstly, since ideas or knowledge constitute an inseparable part of the self,
taking ideas or knowledge as private property is a circular construction that creates self-
alienation, as it makes self-realisation depend on the self. Secondly, licensing as incomplete
alienation not only makes the return of the selfhood from property attachment to the author /
inventor impossible, but also renders incomplete the self-realisation of the alienee through
acquisition. The self thus remains restless and the public is unsettled as well. By taking up
contemporary issues of compulsory licensing and the exhaustion of intellectual property rights,
the paper further reveals the function of the poverty of intellectual property philosophy, and
proposes a reconstruction of the jurisprudence of intellectual property.
I. Introduction
Intellectual property generally refers to creative ideas or knowledge-- "creations of the mind"
-- which include copyright and industrial property such as patents, trademarks, and industrial
designs. [FN1] Although the history of intellectual property protection could be traced back to as
early as Roman law which offered "maker's marks" legal protection, the first formal intellectual
property rights protection is said to be a decree in Venice between 1544 and 1545 which
protected copyrights against piracy. [FN2] Contemporary international protection of intellectual
property rights is based on an integrated treaty framework which goes back to the 1883 Paris
Convention protecting industrial property and the 1886 Berne Convention protecting copyrights.
Its latest development is the establishment of the World Trade *360 Organization (WTO) and the
conclusion of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
in 1995. Under the TRIPS framework, protection of intellectual property has both domestic as
well as international significance.
However, far from being a controversy free legal regime, the justification for intellectual
property has been under fierce debate for many years. Various theoretical justifications have
been framed in terms of different relationships between individual recognition and social welfare
promotion. [FN3] Different interpretations of the justification have further generated different
understandings of its central tension and different critiques of intellectual property philosophy.
Hughes argues that intellectual property could be justified by a theoretical synthesis merging the
Lockean labor theory of property with the Hegelian personality theory of property. [FN4]
Professor Drahos however regards intellectual property rights as "liberty-inhibiting privileges,"
and suggests that "talk about rights in intellectual property should be replaced by talk about
privilege." [FN5] The central tension of intellectual property rights is also variously categorised.
Some suggest that intellectual property internalises a tension between rights and privileges
consonant with the confrontation between the public and the private. [FN6] Others perceive the
tension of intellectual property as either a confrontation between private control over knowledge
and public needs for diffusion of knowledge, [FN7] or an inherent tension between protection
and limitation. [FN8] This controversy over intellectual property draws our attention to the
question of its theoretical justification.
*361 This paper offers a critical examination of the justification for intellectual property and
its jurisprudential implications by integrating case studies of judicial practice with theoretical
critiques of the legal theories underpinning intellectual property. A brief introduction of several
cases at the beginning of Part II of this article will provide a background understanding of how
intellectual property has come to be protected as inviolable private rights and its significance.
The theoretical critiques following that will lead us further to the theoretical roots of intellectual
property, ie Locke and Hegel's theories of property. The analysis will focus on the self-others
relationship that is internalised in intellectual property regime from a critical perspective. The
paper will show how self realisation as related to private property rights reveals and fails itself,
and how self-alienation then occurs in the regime of intellectual property. [FN9] Self-realisation
in this paper refers only to individuals' defense against external intervention of their autonomy
through private property ownership. Self-alienation here is used to mean the situation when the
self fails to respond to others and detaches from society because of private property ownership.
The critical perspective underpinning this paper's analysis will provide a useful framework for
the examination of the implications of applying traditional property theory to the intellectual
property regime. The Derridean concept "founding violence," which means a force to establish a
regime that cannot be justified by any other laws but itself, will also be used in this paper.
[FN10] It will be used here to describe the situation when the application of traditional property
theory into intellectual property fails to defend the self-realisation, which causes intellectual
property to be only justified by itself. [FN11] Through the critical examination of the self-others
relationship as revealed in the intellectual property regime, the paper will show the central
absurdity of the philosophy behind intellectual property.
The paper will develop its analysis in a sequence from the formation to function of
intellectual property rights, and from the domestic to international significance of the intellectual
property regime. While Part II examines the concept of intellectual property from Lockean and
Hegelian theories of property, Part III examines the function of intellectual property rights. Part
IV further extends the analysis of the problematic justification of intellectual property to
international practice by taking up some contemporary issues such as the exhaustion of rights
and compulsory licensing in international trade. This essay argues that the problematic
application of *362 Lockean and Hegelian property theories to intellectual property is a circular
social construction in which self realisation can only depend on the self. After revealing the
circular construction of intellectual property and the injustice of incomplete alienation, the essay
argues that at the heart of the contemporary regime lies the poverty of intellectual property
philosophy: the realisation of the self through private property that we have been taking for
granted is impossible to achieve.
*381 III. Alienation of Intellectual Property: the Violence against Founding Violence
If making "creations of the mind" intellectual property inevitably injects a founding violence
into that property, is then justice still possible? What does alienation mean to the founding
circular construction? The practical question is, if making the word "Olympic" a trademark
affects people's freedom of speech, and if copyrighting a white pages directory blocks people's
access to the information, what can we do? These questions bring us to the issue of justice that
centers at the heart of the philosophy of intellectual property. In this Part, we will first discuss
the theoretical implications of the alienation of intellectual property. Following the discussion,
we will further examine how alienation as a force against the founding violence brings in the
possibility of justice to the intellectual property regime. At the end of this Part, a brief case study
will bring us back from theory to practice to perceive the significance of the alienation of
intellectual property.
[FNa1]. LLB, Zhongshan University; LLM, Peking University; MA & Ph.D. Candidate,
University of British Columbia. The author is grateful to Dr. Jennifer Beard for her comments on
an earlier draft of this paper.
[FN1]. See the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) web site at:
<http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/> (visited 26 Aug 2007).
[FN2]. S. Sell and C. May, "Moments in Law: Contestation and settlement in the History of
Intellectual Property" (Autumn 2001) Review of International Political Economy 8:3: 475, 477.
[FN3]. According to WIPO, there are two reasons to protect intellectual property rights. One is to
serve as statutory recognition of creators' moral and economic rights in their creations, as well as
public's rights of access; the other is to promote economic and social development. WIPO,
WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use 3 (WIPO Publication No. 489 (E)).
WIPO official web site at: <http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/iprm/index.htm> (visited 26 August
2007). Bently and Sherman argue that there are two justifications for intellectual property. While
the "instrumental justification" argues that it promotes social welfare and prosperity, the other
justification is that it is an ethical and moral recognition of the productive labor of creations.
Bently, L. & Sherman, B., Intellectual Property Law 4 (Oxford University Press, 2001).
[FN4]. Justin Hughes, "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property" (1988-89) 77 Georgetown Law
Journal 287-366.
[FN5]. Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, (Dartmouth Publishing Co. Ltd.,
1996), p 220, 200.
[FN6]. S. K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights
(Cambridge University Press, 2003), p 5.
[FN7]. G. Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Science Industries: a Twentieth
Century History (Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2003), p 29.
[FN8]. United States v Jean Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 416, footnote 2 (2004). In response
to the debate about the purpose of the Copyright Clause (US Const Art 1, § 8, cl. 8), the court
(District Court for the Southern District of New York) acknowledged that there is an inherent
tension between protecting author's right to his creative work and public's right of access to that
work. See also, John D. Shuff & Geoffrey T. Holtz, "Copyright Tensions in Digital Age" (2001)
34 Akron Law Review 555, 556.
[FN12]. TRIPS, "Preamble." It states that WTO members recognize that "intellectual property
rights are private rights."
[FN19]. 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1922). The court stated that:
"The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor in its preparation does not
depend upon whether the materials ... show literary skill or originality, either in thought or in
language, or anything more than industrious collection. The man who goes through the streets of
a town and puts down the names of each of the inhabitants, with their occupations and their street
number, acquires material of which he is the author. He produces by his labor a meritorious
composition, in which he may obtain a copyright, and thus obtain the exclusive right of
multiplying copies of his work."
[FN20]. Feist Publications, Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co Inc, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
[FN21]. Ibid. 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1291-2 (1991). The Feist case however stated clearly that a factual
compilation is copyrightable as long as it "features an original selection or arrangement of facts."
Ibid. at 1290.
[FN22]. CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] S.C.J. No. 12, para 15;
Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 37, para 78.
[FN23]. Key Publications, Inc. v Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises, Inc. et. al., 945 F.2d
509, 512-514 (1991). For pre-Feist databases protection, see West Publishing Company v Mead
Data Central, Inc, 799 F.2d 1219, 1227- 1228 (8th Cir. 1986). The court asserted that, as the
compiler's arrangement and expression, West's comprehensive pagination when linked to the
compiled text is copyrightable. Ibid. at 1227-28.
[FN24]. Hasan A. Deveci, "Databases: Is Sui Generis a Stronger Bet than Copyright?" (2004) 12
International Journal of Law & Information Technology 178.
[FN26]. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v United States Olympic Comm., 483 US 522
(1987).
[FN27]. International Olympic Comm. v San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 219 USPQ.
(BNA) 982 (ND Cal 1982), aff'd, 781 F.2d 733 (9th Cir 1986).
[FN30]. Ibid. 483 US 522, 532 (1987). This might imply that the ownership of private property
sets some sort of limit on freedom of speech. You are free to express your ideas, but cannot use
other people's "private property" such as the word "Olympic" to do so. See also Aoki, K.,
"Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain
II" (1993-4) 18 Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & the Arts 261.
[FN32]. Hughes (n 4 above). Hughes examines the justifications of intellectual property based on
an analysis of Lockean "labor theory" and Hegelian "personality theory." See also Balganesh, S.,
"Copyright and Free Expression: Analyzing the Convergence of Conflicting Normative
Frameworks" (2004) 4 Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 45. Balganesh claims that
"The most commonly advocated philosophical justifications for intellectual property are the
Lockean labor theory and the Hegelian personality theory." However, Drahos examines the
contemporary theory of intellectual property beginning with interpretations of Locke, Hegel, and
Marx's writings of property. See Drahos, (n 5 above), p 1.
[FN33]. "Positive community," according to Drahos, "is defined in terms of a common which
belongs to all." Drabos, (n 5 above), p 46.
[FN34]. J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (Prentice-Hall Inc., 1997) (1690), s. 25,
27. The references are to the numbered sections of Locke's text.
[FN37]. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right 4 (T. M. Knox trans, Oxford University Press, 1967).
The references are to the numbered paragraphs of Hegel's text.
[FN38]. Ibid. para 41. In the addition of para 41, Hegel argues that "The rationale of property is
to be found not in the satisfaction of needs but in the supersession of the pure subjectivity of
personality. In his property a person exists for the first time as reason."
[FN40]. Ibid. addition to para 50. Hegel argues, "[That t]he first person to take possession of a
thing should also be its owner is an inference from what has been said. The first is the rightful
owner, however, not because he is the first but because he is a free will, for it is only by another's
succeeding him that he becomes the first."
[FN43]. As for singularity (the oneness) as opposed to totality, we mean the property of an
individual as being independent and enjoying the right of being different.
[FN44]. For totality (the wholeness) as opposed to singularity, we mean the modification of a
collective that clears out every difference or oneness of individuals through internalized
totalizing power to set up an oppressive whole. For the jurisprudential significance of the defense
of the singularity against the totality, see discussion below, Part III.B.3.
[FN45]. H. Maine, Ancient Law (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1960), p 100.
[FN48]. F. A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (Routledge, 1988), p 30-1, 34.
"Several property" is a word Hayek borrowed from Henry Maine to described private property.
[FN53]. Ibid. addition of para 59. See also discussion Part III.A below.
[FN59]. C. May & S. K. Sell, Intellectual property rights: a critical history (Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2006), p 18.
[FN60]. Ibid. p 41.
[FN66]. Mainly see Sell and May, article (n 2 above), or book (n 59 above). See also Martin
Khor, "Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights and TRIPS", in Global Intellectual Property
Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2002), p 203. Khor argues that intellectual property rights are not natural rights but
rather granted privileges as rewards for inventions.
[FN68]. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v Wodehouse, 337 US 369, 419 (1948). Dissenting
opinion of Mr Justice Frankfurter (joined by Mr Justice Murphy & Mr Justice Jackson).
[FN70]. Gary Peller, "The Metaphysics of American Law" (1985) 73 California Law Review
1221-2, 1273.
[FN72]. Hegel, (n 37 above), paras 65, 66. He goes on to give examples of things inalienable,
such as intelligence, rationality, morality, ethical life, and religion. Only slavery or serfdom
would alienate those personalities. Those personalities are themselves free mind rather than
something owned by free mind. Once these personalities are taken away, mind is no longer free,
and self is not self either. This becomes clear in Hegel's discussion against suicide. Right to
suicide is self-contradictory for Hegel, since "I, as this individual, am not master of my life,
because life, as the comprehensive sum of my activity, is nothing external to personality, which
itself is the immediate personality." Ibid. addition of para 70.
[FN75]. F. Cohen, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach" (1935) 35 Columbia
Law Review 815.
[FN76]. J. W. Singer, "Legal Realism Now" (1988) 76 California Law Review 465, 482.
[FN77]. See Part.II.C.1. above, discussion of Justice Holmes' opinion in White-Smith Music
Publishing Co.
[FN79]. J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy (William Rehg trans., MIT Press, 1998).
[FN80]. There are some counter arguments against Cohen's thesis however. See for example
Waldron, J. ""Transcendental Nonsense" and System in the Law" (2000) 100 Columbia Law
Review 16. Waldron offers a critique of Cohen's thesis. He argues that technical legal vocabulary
is not just "word-jugglery," rather something that functions to integrate legal concepts and
doctrines together and sustains the systematicity of law. However, this actually is not a valid
critique and as it fails to capture Cohen's real thesis. To my understanding, Cohen will never
deny that law gains its systematicity through the mediation of technical legal concepts. Rather, it
is this systematicity that makes law self-sufficient and lifts law out of social relation that is the
real target of Cohen's functional approach.
[FN81]. Locke, (n 34 above), para 25 onwards. In this treatise, Locke discusses the legitimacy
and limit of government, in which property is the key that separates people from the state of
nature and also sets the limit of government power. But Lockean social contract is an agreement
between the sovereign and the people, which is different from Hobbes or Rousseau's thesis.
[FN82]. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books, 1968), p 60.
[FN86]. Ibid. pp 12-4. Derrida argues that there exists an original sin of law in this very moment
of formation, a moment when law was neither legal nor illegal and exceeded "the opposition
between founded and unfounded."
[FN91]. Ibid.
[FN95]. Ibid.
[FN97]. D. Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication" 89 Harvard Law
Review 1737 (1975-6).
[FN99]. See discussion Part II.C.1 above, re: Sell & May's examination of the constant tension
throughout the history of intellectual property.
[FN101]. Hughes, (n 4 above), p 329. He argues that "a labor theory of intellectual property is
powerful, but incomplete," and that the Hegelian personal expression thesis is an ideal support
for that incompleteness.
[FN103]. Ibid. Hegel explains that "Taking possession is positive acquisition. Use is the negation
of a thing's particular characteristics. Alienation is the synthesis of positive and negative; it is
negative in that it involves spurning the thing altogether; it is positive because it is only a thing
completely mine which I can so spurn."
[FN106]. Ibid.
[FN108]. Recall that Hegel argues that some personal traits can be separated from the self only
when they are expressed into an external embodiment, and the other personal traits can never be
separated from the self. See discussion Part II.B.2 above.
[FN110]. Hegel's "disrespect" for copyrights can also be found in his discussion of the
legitimacy of new intellectual work building on someone else's work. He states:
To what extent is such repetition of another's material in one's book a plagiarism? There is no
precise principle of determination available to answer these questions, and therefore they cannot
be finally settled either in principle or by positive legislation. Hence plagiarism would have to be
a matter of honour and be held in check by honour.
He further argues that copyright law only works in a very restricted sense. He insists that
"copyright legislation attains its end of securing the property rights of author and publisher only
to a very restricted extent, though it does attain it within limits." Ibid, para 69, remarks.
[FN111]. Hughes, (n 4 above), p 339. Hughes argues that there is a "paradox of alienation" under
Hegel's theory of property. Furthermore, since the selling of an idea might just be "alienation of
personality," Hughes argues that Hegel considers the complete alienation of intellectual property
to be morally wrong comparable to slavery or suicide. Ibid. p 347.
[FN112]. Ibid. p 350. He argues that "[t]he personality theory provides a better, more direct
justification for the alienation of intellectual property, especially copies;" and proposes two
conditions for intellectual property alienation: "first, the creator of the work must receive public
identification, and, second, the work must receive protection against any changes unintended or
unapproved by the creator."
[FN117]. See discussion Part III.A above, where we reveal that Hegel's discussion of alienation
of the "product of mind" suggests exhaustion of rights doctrine which is clearly against
contemporary licensing mechanism.
[FN119]. Hegel says, "[p]hilosophy forms a circle...it circles back to itself." Ibid. addition to para
2.
[FN124]. This is inspired by Yu-Lan Fung who uses the metaphor of the perceptible table and
imperceptible squareness to explain that philosophy as knowledge transcends our experience and
Li is something that "can only be thought but not sensed." See Yu-Lan Fung, A Short History of
Chinese Philosophy (Derk Bodde ed, Macmillan Company, 1948), p 337.
[FN127]. Ibid. p 36. He points out, for the founding moment, "[I]t is, in droit, what suspends
droit. It interrupts the established droit to found another. This moment of suspense, this épokhè,
this founding or revolutionary moment of law is, in law, an instant of non-law. But it is also the
whole history of law. This moment always takes place and never takes place in a presence." His
emphasis. See also P. Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge University
Press, 2001), p 81. Fitzpatrick endorses this reading that the founding violence pertaining to law
is "an incessant violence."
[FN128]. Davies regards the moment of a "decision" as the founding moment of a legal system.
She argues that the founding decision of the legal system which "establishes its limits and
coerces conformity" is homogeneous with the juridical decision, where the founding decision is
repeated continually "in order for the limits of law to be maintained." She thus proposes to
perceive law as repeatability, as a "process which can never be reduced to a static system of
norms." Thus she reaches her thesis of the function of the founding violence through constant
repetitions. M. Davies, Delimiting the Law: Postmodernism and the Politics of Law (Pluto Press,
1996), p 100, 107.
[FN131]. Ibid. p 2.
[FN137]. M. Foucault, "What is an Author?" in The Foucault Reader (Paul Rabinow ed,
Pantheon Books, 1984), p 101.
[FN140]. Fitzpatrick, (n 135 above), p 48; and Anthony Carty "Post-Modernism in the Theory
and the Sociology of Law, or Rousseau and Durkheim as Read by Baudrillard", in Post-Modern
Law: Enlightenment, Revolution and the Death of Man (Anthony Carty ed, Edinburgh
University Press, 1990), p 87.
[FN141]. For the definitions of singularity and totality in the context of this paper, see discussion
above, Part II.B.2(a).
[FN143]. D. Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (Routledge, 1992), p 8, 17, 21.
[FN144]. Lyotard argues that "to speak is to fight" instead of to reach a consensus. See J. F.
Lyotard, The Post-modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Geoff Bennington & Grian
Massumi trans, University of Minnesota Press 1991), p 10.
[FN145]. J. F. Lyotard, Just Gaming (Wlad Godzich trans, University of Minnesota Press 1996),
p 7.
[FN150]. P. Egli & J. Kokott, "International Decision: Sebago Inc. and Ancienne Maison Dubois
& Fils SA v GB-Unic SA" 94 American Journal of International Law 389 (2000).
[FN152]. TRIPS, footnote 13, under Art 51. In requiring member states to adopt procedures to
protect a right holder against counterfeit importation, it provides that "[i]t is understood that there
shall be no obligation to apply such procedures to imports of goods put on the market in another
country by or with the consent of the right holder, or to goods in transit."
[FN154]. Ibid.
[FN155]. Compulsory License, called also Statutory License, refers to a license to use patented
or copyrighted content under reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions defined by law. For
example, a radio station with this kind of license may play copyrighted music without permission
from its right's owner but must pay the owner reasonable usage fees in accordance with law.
[FN157]. Ibid.
[FN158]. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Doha,
Qatar (2001).
[FN160]. Sell & May, (n 2 above), p 473. They argue that common elements which are shared
among different intellectual properties are "the construction of scarcity, temporal limitations, and
the individualization of knowledge creation." See also Sol Picciotto, "Defending the Public
Interest in TRIPS and the WTO", in Drahos & Mayne (eds), (n 66 above), p 224. Picciotto
regards intellectual property rights as "artificially created scarcity."
END OF DOCUMENT
(c) 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Hong Kong Law Journal
2008
Pasal
Hak Cipta © 2008 oleh Manis & Maxwell Asia; Wenwei Guan
Makalah ini mempelajari pembenaran teoritis dari hak kekayaan intelektual dan implikasi
yurisprudensi nya. Membangun pemeriksaan ulang yang cermat namun kritis Locke dan teori
Hegel properti, kertas berpendapat bahwa gagasan klasik menjaga milik pribadi untuk
pertahanan diri otonom terdistorsi ketika kita menerapkan teori-teori mereka dengan kekayaan
intelektual. Pertama, karena gagasan atau pengetahuan merupakan bagian tak terpisahkan dari
diri, mengambil ide atau pengetahuan sebagai milik pribadi adalah konstruksi melingkar yang
menciptakan keterasingan-diri, karena membuat realisasi-diri tergantung pada diri
sendiri. Kedua, lisensi sebagai keterasingan tidak lengkap tidak hanya membuat kembalinya
kedirian dari keterikatan properti untuk penulis / penemu tidak mungkin, tetapi juga membuat
tidak lengkap diri-realisasi alienee melalui akuisisi. Diri sehingga tetap gelisah dan publik kurang
tenang juga. Dengan mengambil isu-isu kontemporer lisensi wajib dan kelelahan dari hak
kekayaan intelektual, kertas lebih lanjut mengungkapkan fungsi dari kemiskinan filsafat
kekayaan intelektual, dan mengusulkan rekonstruksi yurisprudensi kekayaan intelektual.
I. Pendahuluan
Kekayaan intelektual umumnya mengacu pada ide-ide kreatif atau pengetahuan - "kreasi dari
pikiran" - yang mencakup kepemilikan hak cipta dan industri seperti paten, merek dagang, dan
desain industri. [FN1] Meskipun sejarah perlindungan kekayaan intelektual dapat ditelusuri
kembali sebagai awal hukum Romawi yang menawarkan "menandai pembuat" perlindungan
hukum, formal pertama perlindungan kekayaan hak intelektual dikatakan sebuah dekrit di
Venesia antara 1544 dan 1545 yang dilindungi hak cipta melawan pembajakan. [FN2]
perlindungan internasional Kontemporer hak kekayaan intelektual didasarkan pada kerangka
perjanjian terpadu yang akan kembali ke 1883 Konvensi Paris melindungi kekayaan industri dan
hak cipta 1886 Konvensi Berne melindungi.Pengembangan terbaru adalah pembentukan World
Trade * 360 Organization (WTO) dan kesimpulan dari Perjanjian tentang Trade-Related Aspek
Hak Kekayaan Intelektual (TRIPS) pada tahun 1995. Dalam kerangka TRIPS, perlindungan hak
milik intelektual telah baik signifikansi domestik maupun internasional.
Namun, jauh dari sebuah rezim kontroversi hukum gratis, pembenaran untuk properti intelektual
telah berada di bawah perdebatan sengit selama bertahun-tahun. Berbagai pembenaran teoritis
telah dibingkai dalam hal hubungan yang berbeda antara pengakuan individu dan promosi
kesejahteraan sosial. [FN3] interpretasi yang berbeda dari pembenaran lebih lanjut telah
dihasilkan pemahaman yang berbeda dari ketegangan pusat dan kritik yang berbeda dari
filsafat kekayaan intelektual. Hughes berpendapat bahwa kekayaan intelektual dapat
dibenarkan oleh sintesis teoritis menggabungkan teori kerja Locke properti dengan teori
kepribadian Hegel properti.[FN4] Profesor Drahos Namun hal hak kekayaan intelektual sebagai
"kebebasan-menghambat hak istimewa," dan menunjukkan bahwa "berbicara tentang hak-hak
kekayaan intelektual harus diganti dengan bicara tentang hak istimewa."[FN5] Ketegangan
pusat hak kekayaan intelektual juga beragam dikategorikan. Beberapa menyarankan bahwa
kekayaan intelektual internalises ketegangan antara hak dan keistimewaan konsonan dengan
konfrontasi antara masyarakat dan swasta.[FN6] Lain-lain merasakan ketegangan kekayaan
intelektual baik sebagai konfrontasi antara kontrol pribadi atas pengetahuan dan kebutuhan
masyarakat untuk difusi pengetahuan, [FN7] atau ketegangan yang melekat antara
perlindungan dan pembatasan. [FN8] Ini kontroversi atas kekayaan intelektual menarik
perhatian kita kepada pertanyaan pembenaran teoretis.
* Makalah ini menawarkan 361 pemeriksaan kritis pembenaran untuk properti intelektual dan
implikasi yurisprudensi dengan mengintegrasikan studi kasus dari praktek peradilan dengan
kritik teoritis dari teori-teori hukum yang mendasari kekayaan intelektual. Sebuah pengantar
singkat dari beberapa kasus pada awal Bagian II dari artikel ini akan memberikan pemahaman
latar belakang tentang bagaimana kekayaan intelektual telah datang untuk dilindungi sebagai
hak pribadi diganggu gugat dan maknanya. Berikut kritik teoritis yang akan membawa kita lebih
jauh ke akar teoritis kekayaan intelektual, yaitu teori Locke dan Hegel properti. Analisis ini akan
fokus pada hubungan diri orang lain yang terinternalisasi dalam rezim kekayaan intelektual dari
perspektif kritis. Makalah ini akan menunjukkan bagaimana realisasi diri yang terkait dengan
hak milik pribadi dan gagal mengungkapkan dirinya sendiri, dan bagaimana pengasingan diri
kemudian terjadi dalam rezim kekayaan intelektual. [FN9] Self-realisasi dalam makalah ini
hanya mengacu pada pertahanan individu terhadap intervensi eksternal otonomi mereka
melalui kepemilikan properti pribadi.Pengasingan diri di sini adalah digunakan untuk berarti
situasi ketika diri gagal untuk merespon orang lain dan melepaskan dari masyarakat karena
kepemilikan properti pribadi. Perspektif kritis yang mendasari analisis tulisan ini akan
memberikan kerangka kerja yang bermanfaat untuk pemeriksaan implikasi menerapkan teori
properti tradisional untuk rezim kekayaan intelektual. Konsep Derridean "pendiri kekerasan,"
yang berarti kekuatan untuk mendirikan sebuah rezim yang tidak dapat dibenarkan oleh hukum-
hukum lain kecuali dirinya sendiri, juga akan digunakan dalam makalah ini. [FN10] Ini akan
digunakan di sini untuk menggambarkan situasi ketika aplikasi teori properti tradisional ke
properti intelektual gagal untuk membela diri-realisasi, yang menyebabkan kekayaan intelektual
menjadi hanya dibenarkan dengan sendirinya. [FN11] Melalui pemeriksaan kritis hubungan diri
orang lain sebagaimana terungkap dalam rezim kekayaan intelektual, kertas akan menunjukkan
absurditas sentral dari filosofi di balik kekayaan intelektual.
Makalah ini akan mengembangkan analisis secara berurutan dari formasi untuk fungsi hak
kekayaan intelektual, dan dari dalam negeri untuk signifikansi internasional dari rezim kekayaan
intelektual. Sementara Bagian II membahas konsep kekayaan intelektual dari teori Locke dan
Hegel properti, Bagian III membahas fungsi dari hak kekayaan intelektual. Bagian IV lebih lanjut
memperluas analisis pembenaran bermasalah kekayaan intelektual untuk praktek internasional
dengan mengambil beberapa isu-isu kontemporer seperti kelelahan hak dan lisensi wajib dalam
perdagangan internasional. Esai ini berpendapat bahwa penerapan bermasalah * 362 Lockean
dan teori Hegel properti ke properti intelektual adalah suatu konstruksi sosial melingkar di mana
realisasi diri hanya bisa bergantung pada diri sendiri. Setelah mengungkap pembangunan
melingkar dari kekayaan intelektual dan ketidakadilan keterasingan tidak lengkap, esai
berpendapat bahwa di jantung rezim kontemporer terletak kemiskinan filsafat kekayaan
intelektual: realisasi diri melalui properti pribadi yang kita telah mengambil untuk diberikan
adalah mustahil untuk dicapai.
V. Kesimpulan
Dimulai dengan pemeriksaan Locke dan teori Hegel properti, kami telah menyelidiki dinamika
kekuatan hukum kekayaan intelektual dari kekerasan pendiri kekerasan terhadap kekerasan
pendirian. * 397 Pembangunan melingkar "kreasi dari pikiran" ke mandiri hak pribadi sebagai
pendiri kekerasan membuat realisasi diri tidak mungkin. Namun, keterasingan sebagai kekuatan
mewujudkan kepemilikan sementara pada saat yang sama meniadakan keasliannya
menyediakan sebuah kemungkinan untuk mencapai keadilan dalam rezim kekayaan
intelektual. Keterasingan lengkap seperti keadilan dibenarkan dari perspektif Hegelian,
perspektif dekonstruksionis Derridean, dan untuk kebutuhan yurisprudensi singularitas.
Perdagangan internasional bermasalah kekayaan intelektual berakar dalam paradoks dasar
filsafat kekayaan intelektual. Di satu sisi, mencakup sampai konfrontasi diri orang lain dari
konstruksi pendiri dan membuat hak kekayaan intelektual mandiri, yang membuat rezim acuh
tak acuh hanya permintaan lisensi wajib dari masyarakat. Selain itu, dalam praktek lisensi saat
ini di perdagangan internasional, pengakuan reruntuhan keterasingan lengkap kesempatan
terakhir mencapai keadilan dalam rezim kekayaan intelektual. Ketika pemindahtanganan harta
intelektual tidak lengkap, kekerasan pendiri kemudian dipertahankan, diri sehingga tetap
gelisah, dan masyarakat kurang tenang juga. Alih-alih mengkonsumsi properti, kita dikonsumsi
oleh properti. Pasukan tertulis ke dalam properti intelektual pada ketidakadilan keuntungan saat
itu pendiri seperti kehendak sendiri, penulis dan penemu menjadi rusak dan acuh tak acuh
terhadap realisasi orang lain dan keprihatinan masyarakat. Diri otonom sebagai dasar hak milik
telah hilang dalam sejarah kekayaan intelektual, menjadi hanya legenda dan mitos.
Kemiskinan filsafat kontemporer kekayaan intelektual pada konstruksi terletak dengan pendiri
bundar, serta pengakuan atas keterasingan lengkap: realisasi diri adalah mustahil, dan keadilan
tetap datang dalam rezim perdagangan internasional kekayaan intelektual. Pada akarnya, ada
terletak kemiskinan yurisprudensi kontemporer. Teori kontemporer kita masih didominasi oleh
iman obsesif dalam pengetahuan atau alasan manusia dari Pencerahan. Yurisprudensi
kontemporer masih menjunjung tinggi obsesi Pencerahan dengan narasi besar dan kebenaran
absolut, yang mengejar totalitas yang kekal pada biaya singularitas menindas dan otonomi
individu.
Semua yang nyata adalah irasional. Karena tidak rasional, dapat diubah dan harus
diubah. Oleh karena itu, hak kekayaan intelektual harus kembali ke asal mereka sebagai hak
istimewa.
[FNa1]. LLB, Zhongshan University, LLM, Universitas Peking; MA & Ph.D. Calon, Universitas
British Columbia. Penulis berterima kasih kepada Dr Jennifer Beard untuk komentarnya pada
draf awal makalah ini.