ESTATE OF POBLADOR JR. v.

MANZANO Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable of
pecuniary estimation through estafa under Article 315 of the Revised
Estate of Honorio Poblador, Jr. represented by Rafael A. Penal Code. In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) That the
Poblador Vs. Rosario L. Manzano accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by
G.R. No. 192391 means of deceit; and (2) That damage or prejudice capable of
June 19, 2017 pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.

In the case at hand, prosecution failed to establish that fraud or bad

FACTS: faith was present. Petitioner failed to show that Manzano personally
received the ₱2,800,000.00 from petitioner with the duty to hold it in
On May 1996 Elsa A. Poblador was authorized by the Probate court trust for or to make delivery to the latter. In fact, Rafael admitted that
as the administratrix of certain properties of petitioner including his he did not even know who actually paid the taxes to the BIR, and that
shares in Wack-Wack golf course. Elsa instructed Rafael, heir of Manzano's name did not appear in the documents pertaining to the
Honorio Poblador to look for potential buyers. Rafael engaged the payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax.
services of Rosario Manzano, a broker of Metroland Holdings
Incorporated. The property was sold to Metroland Holdings for the
amount of ₱18,000,000.00 which it paid ₱15,200,000.00 through a
check and the balance of ₱2,800,000.00 was allegedly given to
Manzano for the payment of the taxes.

On October 1996 the sale of the shares were annulled by the Probate
Court. Thus, Elsa returned to Moreland the ₱15,200,000.00 and
asked the BIR for a refund of the paid taxes. Meanwhile, Rafael,
through an accountant allegedly requested Manzano for an
accounting of the ₱2,800,000.00 she received on behalf of petitioner.
In response, Manzano faxed documents requested by petitioner but
when examined, there was a discrepancy in said documents as it was
found that the amount paid was only ₱80,000.00 instead of
₱1,480,000.00. This led to the filing, on December 8, 1999, of an
Information for the crime of estafa against Manzano.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Manzano is guilty of Estafa.

HELD:

No, Manzano is not guilty of Estafa.


G.R. No. 164749
ROMULO ABROGAR and ERLINDA ABROGAR, Petitioners
vs
COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and INTERGAMES, INC.,
Respondents
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case involves a claim for damages arising from the negligence
causing the death of a participant in an organized marathon bumped
by a passenger jeepney on the route of the race. The issues revolve
on whether the organizer and the sponsor of the marathon were guilty
of negligence, and, if so, was their negligence the proximate cause of
the death of the participant; on whether the negligence of the driver of
the passenger jeepney was an efficient intervening cause; on whether
the doctrine of assumption of risk was applicable to the fatality; and on
whether the heirs of the fatality can recover damages for loss of
earning capacity of the latter who, being then a minor, had no gainful
employment.
The Case
By this appeal, the parents of the late Rommel Abrogar (Rommel), a
marathon runner, seek the review and reversal of the decision
promulgated on March l 0, 2004,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed and set aside the judgment rendered in their favor on May
10, 1991 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 83, in Quezon
City2 finding and declaring respondents Cosmos Bottling Company
(Cosmos), a domestic soft-drinks company whose products included
Pop Cola, and Intergames, Inc. (Intergames), also a domestic
corporation organizing and supervising the 1st Pop Cola Junior
Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 in Quezon City, solidarily liable for
damages arising from the untimely death of Rommel, then a minor 18
years of age,3 after being bumped by a recklessly driven passenger
jeepney along the route of the marathon.
Antecedents
The CA narrated the antecedents in the assailed judgment,4 viz.:
[T]o promote the sales of "Pop Cola", defendant Cosmos, jointly with
Intergames, organized an endurance running contest billed as the "1st
Pop Cola Junior Marathon" scheduled to be held on June 15, 1980.
The organizers plotted a 10-kilometer course starting from the
premises of the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP for brevity), through
public roads and streets, to end at the Quezon Memorial Circle.
Plaintiffs' son Rommel applied with the defendants to be allowed to
participate in the contest and after complying with defendants'
requirements, his application was accepted and he was given an
official number. Consequently, on June 15, 1980 at the designated
time of the marathon, Rommel joined the other participants and ran
the course plotted by the defendants. As it turned out, the plaintiffs'
(sic) further alleged, the defendants failed to provide adequate safety
and precautionary measures and to exercise the diligence required of
them by the nature of their undertaking, in that they failed to insulate
and protect the participants of the marathon from the vehicular and
other dangers along the marathon route. Rommel was bumped by a
jeepney that was then running along the route of the marathon on Don
Mariano Marcos A venue (DMMA for brevity), and in spite of medical
treatment given to him at the Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan, he died later
that same day due to severe head injuries.
On October 28, 1980, the petitioners sued the respondents in the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City) to recover various
damages for the untimely death of Rommel (i.e., actual and
compensatory damages, loss of earning capacity, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses oflitigation).5
Cosmos denied liability, insisting that it had not been the organizer of
the marathon, but only its sponsor; that its participation had been
limited to providing financial assistance to Intergames;6 that the
financial assistance it had extended to Intergames, the sole organizer
of the marathon, had been in answer to the Government's call to the
private sector to help promote sports development and physical
fitness;7 that the petitioners had no cause of action against it because
there was no privity of contract between the participants in the
marathon and Cosmos; and that it had nothing to do with the
organization, operation and running of the event.8
As counterclaim, Cosmos sought attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation from the petitioners for their being unwarrantedly included as
a defendant in the case. It averred a cross-claim against Intergames,
stating that the latter had guaranteed to hold Cosmos "completely free
and harmless from any claim or action for liability for any injuries or
bodily harm which may be sustained by any of the entries in the '1st
Pop Cola Junior Marathon' or for any damage to the property or
properties of third parties, which may likewise arise in the course of
the race."9 Thus, Cosmos sought to hold Intergames solely liable
should the claim of the petitioners prosper.10
On its part, Intergames asserted that Rommel's death had been an
accident exclusively caused by the negligence of the jeepney driver;
that it was not responsible for the accident; that as the marathon
organizer, it did not assume the responsibilities of an insurer of the
safety of the participants; that it nevertheless caused the participants
to be covered with accident insurance, but the petitioners refused to
accept the proceeds thereof;11 that there could be no cause of action
against it because the acceptance and approval of Rommel's
application to join the marathon had been conditioned on his waiver of
all rights and causes of action arising from his participation in the
marathon;12 that it exercised due diligence in the conduct of the race
that the circumstances called for and was appropriate, it having
availed of all its know-how and expertise, including the adoption and
implementation of all known and possible safety and precautionary
measures in order to protect the participants from injuries arising from
vehicular and other forms of accidents;13 and, accordingly, the
complaint should be dismissed.
In their reply and answer to counterclaim, the petitioners averred that
contrary to its claims, Intergames did not provide adequate measures
for the safety and protection of the race participants, considering that
motor vehicles were traversing the race route and the participants
were made to run along the flow of traffic, instead of against it; that
Intergames did not provide adequate traffic marshals to secure the
safety and protection of the participants;14 that Intergames could not
limit its liability on the basis of the accident insurance policies it had
secured to cover the race participants; that the waiver signed by
Rommel could not be a basis for denying liability because the same
was null and void for being contrary to law, morals, customs and
public policy;15 that their complaint sufficiently stated a cause of
action because in no way could they be held liable for attorney's fees,
litigation expenses or any other relief due to their having abided by the
law and having acted honestly, fairly, in good faith by according to
Intergames its due, as demanded by the facts and circumstances.16
At the pre-trial held on April 12, 1981, the parties agreed that the
principal issue was whether or not Cosmos and lntergames were
liable for the death of Rommel because of negligence in conducting
the marathon.17
Judgment of the RTC
In its decision dated May 10, 1991,18 the RTC ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-
spouses Romulo Abrogar and Erlinda Abrogar and against defendants
Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc. and Intergames, Inc., ordering both
defendants, jointly and severally, to pay and deliver to the plaintiffs the
amounts of Twenty Eight Thousand Sixty One Pesos and Sixty Three
Centavos (₱28,061.63) as actual damages; One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱100,000.00) as moral damages; Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as exemplary damages and Ten Percent (10%) of the
total amount of One Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Sixty One
Pesos and Sixty Three Centavos (₱178,061,63) or Seventeen
Thousand Eight Hundred Six Pesos and Sixteen Centavos
(₱17,806.16) as attorney's fees.
On the cross-claim of defendant Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc.,
defendant Intergames, Inc, is hereby ordered to reimburse to the
former any and all amounts which may be recovered by the plaintiffs
from it by virtue of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC observed that the safeguards allegedly instituted by
Intergames in conducting the marathon had fallen short of the
yardstick to satisfy the requirements of due diligence as called for by
and appropriate under the circumstances; that the accident had
happened because of inadequate preparation and Intergames' failure
to exercise due diligence;19 that the respondents could not be
excused from liability by hiding behind the waiver executed by
Rommel and the permission given to him by his parents because the
waiver could only be effective for risks inherent in the marathon, such
a:s stumbling, heat stroke, heart attack during the race, severe
exhaustion and similar occurrences;20 that the liability of the
respondents towards the participants and third persons was solidary,
because Cosmos, the sponsor of the event, had been the principal
mover of the event, and, as such, had derived benefits from the
marathon that in turn had carried responsibilities towards the
participants and the public; that the respondents' agreement to free
Cosmos from any liability had been an agreement binding only
between them, and did not bind third persons; and that Cosmos had a
cause of action against Intergames for whatever could be recovered
by the petitioners from Cosmos.21
Decision of the CA
All the parties appealed to the CA.
The petitioners contended that the RTC erred in not awarding
damages for loss of earning capacity on the part of Rommel for the
reason that such damages were not recoverable due to Rommel not
yet having finished his schooling; and that it would be premature to
award such damages upon the assumption that he would finish
college and be gainfully employed.22
On their part, Cosmos and Intergames separately raised essentially
similar errors on the part of the RTC, to wit: (1) in holding them liable
for the death of Rommel; (2) in finding them negligent in conducting
the marathon; (3) in holding that Rommel and his parents did not
assume the risks of the marathon; (4) in not holding that the sole and
proximate cause of the death of Rommel was the negligence of the
jeepney driver; and (5) in making them liable, jointly and solidarily, for
damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.23
The CA reduced the issues to four, namely:
1. Whether or not appellant Intergames was negligent in its conduct of
the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 and if so,
whether its negligence was the proximate cause of the death of
Rommel Abrogar.
2. Whether or not appellant Cosmos can be held jointly and solidarily
liable with appellant Intergames for the death of Rommel Abrogar,
assuming that appellant Intergames is found to have been negligent in
the conduct of the Pop Cola marathon and such negligence was the
proximate cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar.
3. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to be
compensated for the "loss of earning capacity" of their son Rommel.
4. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to the actual,
moral, and exemplary damages granted to them by the Trial Court.24
In its assailed judgment promulgated on March 10, 2004,25 the CA
ruled as follows:
As to the first issue, this Court finds that appellant Intergames was not
negligent in organizing the said marathon.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct to human affairs, would do, or doing something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do.
The whole theory of negligence presuppose some uniform standard of
behavior which must be an external and objective one, rather than the
individual judgment good or bad, of the particular actor; it must be, as
far as possible, the same for all persons; and at the same time make
proper allowance for the risk apparent to the actor for his capacity to
meet it, and for the circumstances under which he must act.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the
light of human experience and of the acts involved in the particular
case.
In the case at bar, the trial court erred in finding that the appellant
Intergames failed to satisfy the requirements of due diligence in the
conduct of the race.
The trial court in its decision said that the accident in question could
have been avoided if the route of the marathon was blocked off from
the regular traffic, instead of allowing the runners to run together with
the flow of traffic. Thus, the said court considered the appellant
Intergames at fault for proceeding with the marathon despite the fact
that the Northern Police District, MPF, Quezon City did not allow the
road to be blocked off from traffic.
This Court finds that the standard of conduct used by the trial court is
not the ordinary conduct of a prudent man in such a given situation.
According to the said court, the only way to conduct a safe road race
is to block off the traffic for the duration of the event and direct the
cars and public utilities to take alternative routes in the meantime that
the marathon event is being held. Such standard is too high and is
even inapplicable in the case at bar because, there is no alternative
route from IBP to Don Mariano Marcos to Quezon City Hall.
The Civil Code provides that if the law or contract does not state the
diligence which is to be observed in the performance of an obligation
that which is expected of a good father of the family shall only be
required. Accordingly, appellant Intergames is only bound to exercise
the degree of care that would be exercised by an ordinarily careful
and prudent man in the same position and circumstances and not that
of the cautious man of more than average prudence. Hence, appellant
Intergames is only expected to observe ordinary diligence and not
extraordinary diligence.
In this case, the marathon was allowed by the Northern Police District,
MPF, Quezon City on the condition that the road should not be
blocked off from traffic. Appellant Intergames had no choice. It had to
comply with it or else the said marathon would not be allowed at all.
The trial court erred in contending that appellant Intergames should
have looked for alternative places in Metro Manila given the condition
set by the Northern Police District, MPF, Quezon City; precisely
because as Mr. Jose Castro has testified the said route was found to
be the best route after a careful study and consideration of all the
factors involved. Having conducted several marathon events in said
route, appellant Intergames as well as the volunteer groups and the
other agencies involved were in fact familiar with the said route. And
assuming that there was an alternative place suitable for the said
race, the question is would they be allowed to block off the said road
from traffic?
Also, the trial court erred in stating that there was no adequate
number of marshals, police officers and personnel to man the race so
as to prevent injury to the participants.
The general rule is that the party who relies on negligence for his
cause of action has the burden of proving the existence of the same,
otherwise his action fails.
Here, the appellants-spouses failed to prove that there was
inadequate number of marshals, police officers, and personnel
because they failed to prove what number is considered adequate.
This court considers that seven (7) traffic operatives, five (5)
motorcycle policemen, fifteen (15) patrolmen deployed along the
route, fifteen (15) boyscouts, twelve (12) CA Ts, twenty (20) barangay
tanods, three (3) ambulances and three (3) medical teams were
sufficient to stage a safe marathon.
Moreover, the failure of Mr. Jose R. Castro, Jr. to produce records of
the lists of those constituting the volunteer help during the marathon is
not fatal to the case considering that one of the volunteers, Victor
Landingin of the Citizens Traffic Action (CTA) testified in court that
CTA fielded five units on June 15, 1980, assigned as follows: (1) at the
sphere head; (2) at the finish line; (3) tail ender; (4) & (5) roving.
The trial court again erred in concluding that the admission of P/Lt.
Jesus Lipana, head of the traffic policemen assigned at the marathon,
that he showed up only at the finish line means that he did not bother
to check on his men and did not give them appropriate instructions.
P/Lt. Lipana in his testimony explained that he did not need to be in
the start of the race because he had predesignated another capable
police officer to start the race.
In addition, this Court finds that the precautionary measures and
preparations adopted by appellant Intergames were sufficient
considering the circumstances surrounding the case.
Appellant Intergames, using its previous experiences in conducting
safe and successful road races, took all the necessary precautions
and made all the preparations for the race. The initial preparations
included: determination of the route to be taken; and an ocular
inspection of the same to see if it was well-paved, whether it had less
corners for easy communication and coordination, and whether it was
wide enough to accommodate runners and transportation. Appellant
Intergames choose the Don Mariano Marcos Avenue primarily
because it was well-paved; had wide lanes to accommodate runners
and vehicular traffic; had less corners thus facilitating easy
communication and coordination among the organizers and
cooperating agencies; and was familiar to the race organizers and
operating agencies. The race covered a ten-kilometer course from the
IBP lane to the Quezon City Hall Compound passing through the Don
Mariano Marcos A venue, which constituted the main stretch of the
route. Appellant Intergames scheduled the marathon on a Sunday
morning, when traffic along the route was at its lightest. Permission
was sought from the then Quezon City Mayor Adelina Rodriguez for
the use of the Quezon City Hall Grandstand and the street fronting it
as the finish line. Police assistance was also obtained to control and
supervise the traffic. The Quezon City Traffic Detachment took charge
of traffic control by assigning policemen to the traffic route. The
particular unit assigned during the race underwent extensive training
and had been involved in past marathons, including marathons in
highly crowded areas. The Philippine Boy Scouts tasked to assist the
police and monitor the progress of the race; and Citizens Traffic Action
Group tasked with the monitoring of the race, which assigned five
units consisting of ten operatives, to provide communication and
assistance were likewise obtained. Finally, medical equipments and
personnel were also requested from Camp Aguinaldo, the Philippine
Red Cross and the Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan.
Neither does this Court find the appellant Intergames' conduct of the
marathon the proximate cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar.
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
It appears that Rommel Abrogar, while running on Don Mariano
Marcos A venue and after passing the Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission Building, was bumped by a jeepney which apparently
was racing against a minibus and the two vehicles were trying to
crowd each other. In fact, a criminal case was filed against the
jeepney driver by reason of his having killed Rommel Abrogar.
This proves that the death of Rommel Abrogar was caused by the
negligence of the jeepney driver. Rommel Abrogar cannot be faulted
because he was performing a legal act; the marathon was conducted
with the permission and approval of all the city officials involved. He
had the right to be there. Neither can the appellant Intergames be
faulted, as the organizer of the said marathon, because it was not
negligent in conducting the marathon.
Given the facts of this case, We believe that no amount of precaution
can prevent such an accident. Even if there were fences or barriers to
separate the lanes for the runners and for the vehicles, it would not
prevent such an accident in the event that a negligent driver loses
control of his vehicle. And even if the road was blocked off from traffic,
it would still not prevent such an accident, if a jeepney driver on the
other side of the road races with another vehicle loses control of his
wheel and as a result hits a person on the other side of the road.
Another way of saying this is: A defendant's tort cannot be considered
a legal cause of plaintiffs damage if that damage would have occurred
just the same even though the defendant's tort had not been
committed.
This Court also finds the doctrine of assumption of risk applicable in
the case at bar. As explained by a well-known authority on torts:
"The general principle underlying the defense of assumption of risk is
that a plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the
negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover for
such harm. The defense may arise where a plaintiff, by contract or
otherwise, expressly agrees to accept a risk or harm arising from the
defendant's conduct, or where a plaintiff who fully understands a risk
or harm caused by the defendant's conduct, or by a condition created
by the defendant, voluntarily chooses to enter or remain, or to permit
his property to enter or remain, within the area of such risk, under
circumstances manifesting his willingness to accept the risk.
xxxx
"Assumption of the risk in its primary sense arises by assuming
through contract, which may be implied, the risk of a known danger.
Its essence is venturousness. It implies intentional exposure to a
known danger; It embraces a mental state of willingness; It pertains to
the preliminary conduct of getting into a dangerous employment or
relationship, it means voluntary incurring the risk of an accident, which
may or may not occur, and which the person assuming the risk may
be careful to avoid; and it defeats recovery because it is a previous
abandonment of the right to complain if an accident occurs.
"Of course, if the defense is predicated upon an express agreement
the agreement must be valid, and in the light of this qualification the
rule has been stated that a plaintiff who, by contract or otherwise,
expressly agreed to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant's
negligent or reckless conduct, cannot recover for such harm unless
the agreement is invalid as contrary to public policy.
xxxx
"The defense of assumption of risk presupposes: (1) that the plaintiff
had actual knowledge of the danger; (2) that he understood and
appreciated the risk from the danger; and (3) that he voluntarily
exposed himself to such risk. x x x
"The term 'risk' as used in this connection applies to known dangers,
and not to things from which danger may possibly flow. The risk
referred to is the particular risk, or one of the risks, which the plaintiff
accepted within the context of the situation in which he placed himself
and the question is whether the specific conduct or condition which
caused the injury was such a risk."
In this case, appellant Romulo Abrogar himself admitted that his son,
Rommel Abrogar, surveyed the route of the marathon and even
attended a briefing before the race. Consequently, he was aware that
the marathon would pass through a national road and that the said
road would not be blocked off from traffic. And considering that he was
already eighteen years of age, had voluntarily participated in the
marathon, with his parents' consent, and was well aware of the traffic
hazards along the route, he thereby assumed all the risks of the race.
This is precisely why permission from the participant's parents,
submission of a medical certificate and a waiver of all rights and
causes of action arising from the participation in the marathon which
the participant or his heirs may have against appellant Intergames
were required as conditions in joining the marathon.
In the decision of the trial court, it stated that the risk mentioned in the
waiver signed by Rommel Abrogar only involved risks such as
stumbling, suffering heatstroke, heart attack and other similar risks. It
did not consider vehicular accident as one of the risks included in the
said waiver.
This Court does not agree. With respect to voluntary participation in a
sport, the doctrine of assumption of risk applies to any facet of the
activity inherent in it and to any open and obvious condition of the
place where it is carried on. We believe that the waiver included
vehicular accidents for the simple reason that it was a road race run
on public roads used by vehicles. Thus, it cannot be denied that
vehicular accidents are involved. It was not a track race which is held
on an oval and insulated from vehicular traffic. In a road race, there is
always the risk of runners being hit by motor vehicles while they train
or compete. That risk is inherent in the sport and known to runners. It
is a risk they assume every time they voluntarily engage in their sport.
Furthermore, where a person voluntarily participates in a lawful game
or contest, he assumes the ordinary risks of such game or contest so
as to preclude recovery from the promoter or operator of the game or
contest for injury or death resulting therefrom. Proprietors of
amusements or of places where sports and games are played are not
insurers of safety of the public nor of their patrons.
In McLeod Store v. Vinson 213 Ky 667, 281 SW 799 (1926), it was
held that a boy, seventeen years of age, of ordinary intelligence and
physique, who entered a race conducted by a department store, the
purpose of which was to secure guinea fowl which could be turned in
for cash prizes, had assumed the ordinary risks incident thereto and
was barred from recovering against the department store for injuries
suffered when, within catching distance, he stopped to catch a guinea,
and was tripped or stumbled and fell to the pavement, six or eight
others falling upon him. The court further said: "In this (the race) he
was a voluntary participant. xxx The anticipated danger was as
obvious to him as it was to appellant (the department store). While not
an adult, he was practically 17 years of age, of ordinary intelligence,
and perfectly able to determine the risks ordinarily incident to such
games. An ordinary boy of that age is practically as well advised as to
the hazards of baseball, basketball, football, foot races and other
games of skill and endurance as is an adult
x x x."
In the case at bar, the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" held on June
15, 1980 was a race the winner of which was to represent the country
in the annual Spirit of Pheidippides Marathon Classic in Greece, if he
equals or breaks the 29-minute mark for the 10-km. race. Thus,
Rommel Abrogar having voluntarily participated in the race, with his
parents' consent, assumed all the risks of the race.
Anent the second issue, this Court finds that appellant Cosmos must
also be absolved from any liability in the instant case.
This Court finds that the trial court erred in holding appellant Cosmos
liable for being the principal mover and resultant beneficiary of the
event.
In its decision it said that in view of the fact that appellant Cosmos will
be deriving certain benefits from the marathon event, it has the
responsibility to ensure the safety of all the participants and the public.
It further said that the stipulations in the contract entered into by the
two appellants, Cosmos and Intergames, relieving the former from
any liability does not bind third persons.
This Court does not agree with the reasoning of the trial court. The
sponsorship contract entered between appellant Cosmos and
appellant Intergames specifically states that:
1. COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION shall pay INTERGAMES
the amount of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱55,000.00)
representing full sponsorship fee and in consideration thereof,
INTERGAMES shall organize and stage a marathon race to be called
'1st POP COLA JUNIOR MARATHON.
xxxx
3. INTER GAMES shall draw up all the rules of the marathon race,
eligibility requirements of participants as well as provide all the staff
required in the organization and actual staging of the race. It is
understood that all said staff shall be considered under the direct
employ of INTERGAMES which shall have full control over them.
xxxx
5. INTERGAMES shall secure all the necessary permits, clearances,
traffic and police assistance in all the areas covered by the entire
route of the '1st POP COLA JUNIOR MARATHON.
12. INTERGAMES shall hold COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION,
completely free and harmless from any claim or action for liability for
any injuries or bodily harm which may be sustained by any of the
entries in the '1st POP COLA JUNIOR MARATHON', or for any
damages to the property or properties of third parties, which may
likewise arise in the course of the race.
From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the role of the appellant
Cosmos was limited to providing financial assistance in the form of
sponsorship. Appellant Cosmos' sponsorship was merely in
pursuance to the company's commitment for spo1is development of
the youth as well as for advertising purposes. The use of the name
Cosmos was done for advertising purposes only; it did not mean that
it was an organizer of the said marathon. As pointed out by
Intergames' President, Jose Castro Jr., appellant Cosmos did not
even have the right to suggest the location and the number of
runners.
To hold a defendant liable for torts, it must be clearly shown that he is
the proximate cause of the harm done to the plaintiff. The nexus or
connection of the cause and effect, between a negligent act and the
damage done, must be established by competent evidence.
In this case, appellant Cosmos was not negligent in entering into a
contract with the appellant Intergames considering that the record of
the latter was clean and that it has conducted at least thirty (30) road
races.
Also there is no direct or immediate causal connection between the
financial sponsorship and the death of Rommel Abrogar. The singular
act of providing financial assistance without participating in any
manner in the conduct of the marathon cannot be palmed off as such
proximate cause. In fact, the appellant spouses never relied on any
representation that Cosmos organized the race. It was not even a
factor considered by the appellants-spouses in allowing their son to
join said marathon.
In view of the fact that both defendants are not liable for the death of
Rommel Abrogar, appellants-spouses are not entitled to actual, moral,
exemplary damages as well as for the "loss of earning capacity" of
their son. The third and fourth issues are thus moot and academic.
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the judgment
appealed from must be, as it hereby is, REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and another entered DISMISSING the complaint a quo. The
appellants shall bear their respective costs.
SO ORDERED.26
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners submit that the CA gravely erred:
A.
x x x in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that respondent
Intergames was not negligent considering that:
1. Respondent Intergames failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the conduct of the marathon in that it did not
block off from traffic the marathon route; and
2. Respondent Intergames' preparations for the race, including the
number of marshal during the marathon, were glaringly inadequate to
prevent the happening of the injury to its participants.
B.
x x x in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that the doctrine
of assumption of risk finds application to the case at bar even though
getting hit or run over by a vehicle is not an inherent risk in a
marathon race. Even assuming arguendo that deceased Abrogar
made such waiver as claimed, still there can be no valid waiver of
one's right to life and limb for being against public policy.
C.
x x x in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in absolving respondent
Cosmos from liability to petitioners on the sole ground that respondent
Cosmos' contract with respondent Intergames contained a stipulation
exempting the former from liability.
D.
x x x m reversing the RTC Decision and consequently holding
respondents free from liability, (and) in not awarding petitioners with
actual, moral and exemplary damages for the death of their child,
Rommel Abrogar.27
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
I
Review of factual issues is allowed because of
the conflict between the findings of fact
by the RTC and the CA on the issue of negligence
The petitioners contend that Intergames was negligent; that Cosmos
as the sponsor and Intergames as the organizer of the marathon both
had the obligation to provide a reasonably safe place for the conduct
of the race byblocking the route of the race from vehicular traffic and
by providing adequate manpower and personnel to ensure the safety
of the participants; and that Intergames had foreseen the harm posed
by the situation but had not exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family to avoid the risk;28 hence, for such omission, Intergames was
negligent.29
Refuting, Cosmos and Intergames submit that the latter as the
organizer was not negligent because it had undertaken all the
precautionary measures to ensure the safety of the race; and that
there was no duty on the part of the latter as the organizer to keep a
racecourse "free and clear from reasonably avoidable elements that
would [occasion] or have the probable tendency, to occasion injury."30
The issue of whether one or both defendants were negligent is a
mixed issue of fact and law. Does this not restrict the Court against
reviewing the records in this appeal on certiorari in order to settle the
issue?
The Court can proceed to review the factual findings of the CA as an
exception to the general rule that it should not review issues of fact on
appeal on certiorari. We have recognized exceptions to the rule that
the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding in the
following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary
to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.31 Considering that
the CA arrived at factual findings contrary to those of the trial court,
our review of the records in this appeal should have to be made.
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.32 Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the
"omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of
the time and of the place."33 The Civil Code makes liability for
negligence clear under Article 2176,34 and Article 20.35
To determine the existence of negligence, the following time-honored
test has been set in Picart v. Smith:36
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence
in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the
light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value
but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their
conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to
them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the
future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent
man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in
these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of
negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its
consequences.37 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
A careful review of the evidence presented, particularly the
testimonies of the relevant witnesses, in accordance with the
foregoing guidelines reasonably leads to the conclusion that the
safety and precautionary measures undertaken by Intergames were
short of the diligence demanded by the circumstances of persons,
time and place under consideration. Hence, Intergames as the
organizer was guilty of negligence.
The race organized by Intergames was a junior marathon participated
in by young persons aged 14 to 18 years. It was plotted to cover a
distance of 10 kilometers, starting from the IBP Lane,38 then going
towards the Batasang Pambansa, and on to the circular route towards
the Don Mariano Marcos Highway,39 and then all the way back to the
Quezon City Hall compound where the finish line had been set.40 In
staging the event, Intergames had no employees of its own to man
the race,41 and relied only on the "cooperating agencies" and
volunteers who had worked with it in previous races.42 The
cooperating agencies included the Quezon City police, barangay
tanods, volunteers from the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the
Philippine National Red Cross, the Citizens Traffic Action Group, and
the medical teams of doctors and nurses coming from the Office of the
Surgeon General and the Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan.43 According to
Jose R. Castro, Jr., the President of Intergames, the preparations for
the event included conducting an ocular inspection of the route of the
race,44 sending out letters to the various cooperating agencies,45
securing permits from proper authorities,46 putting up directional
signs,47 and setting up the water stations.48
We consider the "safeguards" employed and adopted by Intergames
not adequate to meet the requirement of due diligence.
For one, the police authorities specifically prohibited Intergames from
blocking Don Mariano Marcos Highway in order not to impair road
accessibility to the residential villages located beyond the IBP Lanc.49
However, contrary to the findings of the CA,50 Intergames had a
choice on where to stage the marathon, considering its admission of
the sole responsibility for the conduct of the event, including the
choice of location.
Moreover, the CA had no basis for holding that "the said route was
found to be the best route after a careful study and consideration of all
the factors involved."51 Castro, Jr. himself attested that the route had
been the best one only within the vicinity of the Batasan Pambansa, to
wit:
COURT
q Was there any specific reason from ... Was there any specific
reason why you used this route from Batasan to City Hall? Was there
any special reason?
a We have, your Honor, conducted for example the Milo Marathon in
that area in the Batasan Pambansa and we found it to be relatively
safer than any other areas within the vicinity. As a matter of fact, we
had more runners in the Milo Marathon at that time and nothing
happened, your Honor.52
The chosen route (IBP Lane, on to Don Mariano Marcos Highway, and
then to Quezon City Hall) was not the only route appropriate for the
marathon. In fact, Intergames came under no obligation to use such
route especially considering that the participants, who were young
and inexperienced runners, would be running alongside moving
vehicles.
Intergames further conceded that the marathon could have been
staged on a blocked-off route like Roxas Boulevard in Manila where
runners could run against the flow of vehicular traffic.53 Castro, Jr.
stated in that regard:
COURT TO WITNESS
q What law are you talking about when you say I cannot violate the
law?
a The police authority, your Honor, would not grant us permit because
that is one of the conditions that if we are to conduct a race we should
run the race in accordance with the flow of traffic.
q Did you not inform the police this is in accordance with the standard
safety measures for a marathon race?
a I believed we argued along that line but but (sic) again, if we insist
the police again would not grant us any permit like ... except in the
case of Roxas Boulevard when it is normally closed from 8 a.m.
when you can run against the flow of traffic.
q You were aware for a runner to run on the same route of the traffic
would be risky because he would not know what is coming behind
him?
a I believed we talked of the risk, your Honor when the risk has been
minimized to a certain level. Yes, there is greater risk when you run
with the traffic than when you run against the traffic to a certain level,
it is correct but most of the races in Manila or elsewhere are being run
in accordance with the flow of the traffic.
xxxx
ATTY. VINLUAN
q Following the observation of the Court, considering the local
condition, you will agree with me the risks here are greater than in the
United States where drivers on the whole follow traffic rules?
a That is correct.
q And because of that fact, it is with all the more reason that you
should take all necessary precautions to insure the safety of the
runners?
a That is correct.54
xxxx
COURT:
xxxx
Q In your case in all the marathons that you had managed, how many
cases have you encountered where the routes are blocked off for
vehicular traffic?
A These are the International Marathon, Philippines Third World
Marathon and the Milo Marathon. We are blocking them to a certain
length of time.
Q What was the purpose of blocking the routes? Is it for the safety of
the runners or just a matter of convenience?
A In blocking off the route, Your Honor, it is light easier for the runners
to run without impediments to be rendered by the people or by
vehicles and at the same time it would be also advantageous if the
road will be blocked off for vehicle traffic permitted to us by the traffic
authorities.
Q So, in this case, you actually requested for the traffic authorities to
block off the route?
A As far as I remember we asked Sgt. Pascual to block off the route
but considering that it is the main artery to Fairview Village, it would
not be possible to block off the route since it will cause a lot of
inconvenience for the other people in those areas and jeepney
drivers.
Q In other words, if you have your way you would have opted to block
off the route.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q But the fact is that the people did not agree.
A Yes, Your Honor, and it is stated in the permit given to us.55
Based on the foregoing testimony of Castro, Jr., Intergames had full
awareness of the higher risks involved in staging the race alongside
running vehicles, and had the option to hold the race in a route where
such risks could be minimized, if not eliminated. But it did not heed
the danger already foreseen, if not expected, and went ahead with
staging the race along the plotted route on Don Mariano Marcos
Highway on the basis of its supposedly familiarity with the route. Such
familiarity of the organizer with the route and the fact that previous
races had been conducted therein without any untoward incident56
were not in themselves sufficient safeguards. The standards for
avoidance of injury through negligence further required Intergames to
establish that it did take adequate measures to avert the foreseen
danger, but it failed to do so.
Another failing on the part of Intergames was the patent inadequacy
of the personnel to man the route. As borne by the records,
Intergames had no personnel of its own for that purpose, and relied
exclusively on the assistance of volunteers, that is, "seven (7) traffic
operatives, five (5) motorcycle policemen, fifteen (15) patrolmen
deployed along the route, fifteen (15) boy scouts, twelve (12) CATs,
twenty (20) barangay tanods, three (3) ambulances and three (3)
medical teams"57 to ensure the safety of the young runners who
would be running alongside moving vehicular traffic, to make the
event safe and well coordinated.
Although the party relying on negligence as his cause of action had
the burden of proving the existence of the same, Intergames'
coordination and supervision of the personnel sourced from the
cooperating agencies did not satisfy the diligence required by the
relevant circumstances. In this regard, it can be pointed out that the
number of deployed personnel, albeit sufficient to stage the marathon,
did not per se ensure the safe conduct of the race without proof that
such deployed volunteers had been properly coordinated and
instructed on their tasks.
That the proper coordination and instruction were crucial elements for
the safe conduct of the race was well known to Intergames. Castro, Jr.
stated as much, to wit:
ATTY. LOMBOS:
xxxx
Q You also said that if you block off one side of the road, it is possible
that it would be more convenient to hold the race in that matter. Will
you tell the Honorable Court if it is possible also to hold a race safely if
the road is not blocked off?
A Yes, sir.
Q How is it done.
A You can still run a race safely even if it is partially blocked off as
long as you have the necessary cooperation with the police
authorities, and the police assigned along the route of the race and
the police assigned would be there, this will contribute the safety of
the participants, and also the vehicular division, as long as there are
substantial publicities in the newspapers, normally they will take the
precautions in the use of the particular route of the race.
Q Let me clarify this. Did you say that it is possible to hold a marathon
safely if you have this traffic assistance or coordination even if the
route is blocked or not blocked?
A It is preferable to have the route blocked but in some cases, it would
be impossible for the portions of the road to be blocked totally. The
route of the race could still be safe for runners if a proper coordination
or the agencies are notified especially police detailees to man the
particular stage.58
Sadly, Intergames' own evidence did not establish the conduct of
proper coordination and instruction. Castro, Jr. described the action
plan adopted by Intergames in the preparation for the race, as follows:
COURT
a Did you have any rehearsal let us say the race was conducted on
June 15, now before June 15 you call a meeting of all these runners
so you can have more or less a map-up and you would indicate or
who will be stationed in their places etc. Did you have such a
rehearsal?
WITNESS
a It is not being done, your honor, but you have to specify them. You
meet with the group and you tell them that you wanted them to be
placed in their particular areas which we pointed out to them for
example in the case of the Barangay Tanod, I specifically assigned
them in the areas and we sat down and we met.
COURT
q Did you have any action, plan or brochure which would indicate the
assignment of each of the participating group?
WITNESS
a Normally, sir, many of the races don't have that except when they
called them to meeting either as a whole group or the entire
cooperating agency or meet them per group.
COURT
q Did you have a check list of the activities that would have to be
entered before the actual marathon some kind of system where you
will indicate this particular activity has to be checked etc. You did not
have that?
WITNESS
q Are you asking, your honor, as a race director of I will check this
because if I do that, I won't have a race because that is not being
done by any race director anywhere in the world?
COURT
I am interested in your planning activities.
q In other words, what planning activities did you perform before the
actual marathon?
a The planning activities we had, your honor, was to coordinate with
the different agencies involved informing them where they would be
more or less placed.
COURT
q Let us go to ... Who was supposed to be coordinating with you as to
the citizens action group who was your ... you were referring to a
person who was supposed to be manning these people and who was
the person whom you coordinate with the Traffic Action Group?
WITNESS
a I can only remember his name ... his family name is Esguerra.
q How about with the Tanods?
a With the Tanods his name is Pedring Serrano.
q And with the Boys Scouts? (sic)
a And with the Boys Scouts of the Phils. (sic) it is Mr. Greg Panelo.
COURT
q When did you last meet rather how many times did you meet with
Esguerra before the marathon on June 15?
WITNESS
a The Citizens Traffic Action Group, your honor, had been with me m
previous races.
COURT
q I am asking you a specific question. I am not interested in the
Citizen Traffic Action Group. The marathon was on June 15, did you
meet with him on June 14, June 13 or June 12?
a We met once, your honor, I cannot remember the date.
q You don't recall how many days before?
a I cannot recall at the moment.
q How about with Mr. Serrano, how many times did you meet with him
before the race?
a If my mind does not fail me, your honor, I met him twice because he
lives just within our area and we always see each other.
q How about with Panelo, how many times did you meet him?
a With Mr. Panelo, I did not meet with them, your honor.
q Was there an occasion where before the race you met with these
three people together since you did not meet with Panelo anytime?
Was there anytime where you met with Serrano and Esguerra
together?
WITNESS
a No, your honor.
COURT
g When you met once with Esguerra, where did you meet? What a Normally, we did not have that, your honor, except the check list of
place? all the things that should be ready at a particular time prior to the race
and the people to be involved and we have a check list to see to it that
a I cannot recall at the moment, your honor, since it was already been everything would be in order before the start of the race.
almost six years ago.
COURT
g How about Serrano, where did you meet him?
Proceed.
a We met in my place.
ATTY. VINLUAN
q From your house? He went in your house?
q Following the question of the Court Mr. Castro, did you meet with Lt.
a Yes, your honor. Depano of the Police Department who were supposed to supervise
the police officers assigned to help during the race?
q So you did not have let us say a ... you don't have records of your
meetings with these people? a I did not meet with him, sir.

WITNESS q You did not meet with him?

a With the Citizens Traffic Action, your honor? a I did not meet with him.

COURT q In fact, ever before or during the race you had no occasion to talk to
Lt. Depano. Is that correct?
a Yes.
a That is correct, sir.
WITNESS
ATTY. VINLUAN
a I don't have, your honor.
Based on the question of the Court and your answer to the question of
COURT the Court, are you trying to say that this planning before any race of
all these groups who have committed to help in the race, this is not
q Because you are familiar, I was just thinking this is an activity which done in any part of the world?
requires planning etc., what I was thinking when you said this was
never done in any part of the world but all activities it has to be WITNESS
planned. There must be some planning, now are you saying that in
this particular case you had no written plan or check list of activities a In the latter years when your race became bigger and bigger, this is
what activities have to be implemented on a certain point and time, being done now slowly.
who are the persons whom you must meet in a certain point and time.
ATTY. VINLUAN
WITNESS
q But for this particular race you will admit that you failed to do it when
you have to coordinate and even have a dry run of the race you failed
to do all of that in this particular race, yes or no?
a Because there was ...
COURT
It was already answered by him when I asked him. The Court has ...
Everybody has a copy how of this time planner. Any activity or even
meeting a girlfriend or most people plan.
A TTY. F .M. LOMBOS
If your honor please, before we proceed ...
WITNESS
In the latter years, your honor, when your race became bigger and
bigger, this is being done now slowly.
q For this particular race you will admit that you failed to do it?
a Because there was no need, sir.59
Probably sensing that he might have thereby contradicted himself,
Castro, Jr. clarified on re-direct examination:
ATTY. LOMBOS
Q Now, you also responded to a question during the same hearing
and this appears on page 26 of the transcript that you did not hold any
rehearsal or dry run for this particular marathon. Could you tell the
Court why you did not hold any such rehearsal or dry run?
A Because I believe there was no need for us to do that since we
have been doing this for many years and we have been the same
people, same organization with us for so many years conducting
several races including some races in that area consisting of longer
distances and consisting of more runners, a lot more runners in that
areay (sic) so these people, they know exactly what to do and there
was no need for us to have a rehearsal. I believe this rehearsal would
only be applicable if I am new and these people are new then, we
have to rehearse.
ATTY. LOMBOS
q You also stated Mr. Castro that you did not have any action plan or
brochure which you would indicate, an assignment of each of the
participating group as to what to do during the race. Will you please
explain what you meant when you said you have no action plan or
brochure?
WITNESS
a What I mean of action plan, I did not have any written action plan
but I was fully aware of what to do. I mean, those people did not just
go there out of nowhere. Obviously, there was an action on my part
because I have to communicate with them previously and to tell them
exactly what the race is all about; where to start; where it would end,
and that is the reason why we have the ambulances, we have the Boy
Scouts, we have the CT A, we have the police, so it was very obvious
that there was a plan of action but not written because I know pretty
well exactly what to do. I was dealing with people who have been
doing this for a long period of time.60
While the level of trust Intergames had on its volunteers was
admirable, the coordination among the cooperating agencies was
predicated on circumstances unilaterally assumed by Intergames. It
was obvious that Intergames' inaction had been impelled by its belief
that it did not need any action plan because it had been dealing with
people who had been manning similar races for a long period of time.
The evidence presented undoubtedly established that Intergames'
notion of coordination only involved informing the cooperating
agencies of the date of the race, the starting and ending points of the
route, and the places along the route to man. Intergames did not
conduct any general assembly with all of them, being content with
holding a few sporadic meetings with the leaders of the coordinating
agencies. It held no briefings of any kind on the actual duties to be
performed by each group of volunteers prior to the race. It did not
instruct the volunteers on how to minimize, if not avert, the risks of
danger in manning the race, despite such being precisely why their
assistance had been obtained in the first place.
Intergames had no right to assume that the volunteers had already
been aware of what exactly they would be doing during the race. It
had the responsibility and duty to give to them the proper instructions
despite their experience from the past races it had organized
considering that the particular race related to runners of a different
level of experience, and involved different weather and environmental
conditions, and traffic situations. It should have remembered that the
personnel manning the race were not its own employees paid to
perform their tasks, but volunteers whose nature of work was remotely
associated with the safe conduct of road races. Verily, that the
volunteers showed up and assumed their proper places or that they
were sufficient in number was not really enough. It is worthy to stress
that proper coordination in the context of the event did not consist in
the mere presence of the volunteers, but included making sure that
they had been properly instructed on their duties and tasks in order to
ensure the safety of the young runners.
It is relevant to note that the participants of the 1st Pop Cola Junior
Marathon were mostly minors aged 14 to 18 years joining a race of
that kind for the first time. The combined factors of their youth,
eagerness and inexperience ought to have put a reasonably prudent
organizer on higher guard as to their safety and security needs during
the race, especially considering Intergames' awareness of the risks
already foreseen and of other risks already known to it as of similar
events in the past organizer. There was no question at all that a higher
degree of diligence was required given that practically all of the
participants were children or minors like Rommel; and that the law
imposes a duty of care towards children and minors even if ordinarily
there was no such duty under the same circumstances had the
persons involved been adults of sufficient discretion.61 In that respect,
Intergames did not observe the degree of care necessary as the
organizer, rendering it liable for negligence. As the Court has
emphasized in Corliss v. The Manila Railroad Company,62 where the
danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. 63
The circumstances of the persons, time and place required far more
than what Intergames undertook in staging the race. Due diligence
would have made a reasonably prudent organizer of the race
participated in by young, inexperienced or beginner runners to
conduct the race in a route suitably blocked off from vehicular traffic
for the safety and security not only of the participants but the motoring
public as well. Since the marathon would be run alongside moving
vehicular traffic, at the very least, Intergames ought to have seen to
the constant and closer coordination among the personnel manning
the route to prevent the foreseen risks from befalling the participants.
But this it sadly failed to do.
II
The negligence of Intergames as the organizer
was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel
As earlier mentioned, the CA found that Rommel, while running the
marathon on Don Mariano Marcos A venue and after passing the
Philippine Atomic Energy Commission Building, was bumped by a
passenger jeepney that was racing with a minibus and two other
vehicles as if trying to crowd each other out. As such, the death of
Rommel was caused by the negligence of the jeepney driver.
Intergames staunchly insists that it was not liable, maintaining that
even assuming arguendo that it was negligent, the negligence of the
jeepney driver was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel;
hence, it should not be held liable.
Did the negligence of Intergames give rise to its liability for the death
of ommel notwithstanding the negligence of the jeepney driver?
In order for liability from negligence to arise, there must be not only
proof of damage and negligence, but also proof that the damage was
the consequence of the negligence. The Court has said in Vda. de
Gregorio v. Go Chong Bing:64
x x x Negligence as a source of obligation both under the civil law and
in American cases was carefully considered and it was held:
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as
under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff
in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his
right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally or
some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and
the damage." (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.,
supra, p. 15.)
In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, in
order that a person may be held guilty for damage through
negligence, it is necessary that there be an act or omission on the part
of the person who is to be charged with the liability and that damage
is produced by the said act or omission.65 (Emphasis supplied)
We hold that the negligence of Intergames was the proximate cause
despite the intervening negligence of the jeepney driver.
Proximate cause is "that which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any new cause, produces an event, and without which
the event would not have occurred."66 In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v.
Medina,67 the Court, borrowing from American Jurisprudence, has
more extensively defined proximate cause thusly:
"* * * 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and
without which the result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom."68
To be considered the proximate cause of the injury, the negligence
need not be the event closest in time to the injury; a cause is still
proximate, although farther in time in relation to the injury, if the
happening of it set other foreseeable events into motion resulting
ultimately in the damage.69 According to an authority on civil law:70"A
prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action, if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise
to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause, even though such
injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If
no damage exists in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation
the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such act or condition is the proximate cause."
Bouvier adds:
In many cases important questions arise as to which, in the chain of
acts tending to the production of a given state of things, is to be
considered the responsible cause. It is not merely distance of place or
of causation that renders a cause remote. The cause nearest in the
order of causation, without any efficient concurring cause to produce
the result, may be considered the direct cause. In the course of
decisions of cases in which it is necessary to determine which of
several causes is so far responsible for the happening of the act or
injury complained of, what is known as the doctrine of proximate
cause is constantly resorted to in order to ascertain whether the act,
omission, or negligence of the person whom it is sought to hold liable
was in law and in fact responsible for the result which is the
foundation of the action.71
xxxx
The question of proximate cause is said to be determined, not by the
existence or non-existence of intervening events, but by their
character and the natural connection between the original act or
omission and the injurious consequences. When the intervening
cause is set in operation by the original negligence, such negligence
is still the proximate cause; x x x If the party guilty of the first act of
negligence might have anticipated the intervening cause, the
connection is not broken; x x x. Any number of causes and effects
may intervene, and if they arc such as might with reasonable diligence
have been foreseen, the last result is to be considered as the
proximate result. But whenever a new cause intervenes, which is not
a consequence of the first wrongful cause, which is not under control
of the wrongdoer, which could not have been foreseen by the exercise
of reasonable diligence, and except for which the final injurious
consequence could not have happened, then such injurious
consequence must be deemed too remote; x x x.72 (bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
An examination of the records in accordance with the foregoing
concepts supports the conclusions that the negligence of Intergames
was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel; and that the
negligence of the jeepney driver was not an efficient intervening
cause.
First of all, Intergames' negligence in not conducting the race in a road
blocked off from vehicular traffic, and in not properly coordinating the
volunteer personnel manning the marathon route effectively set the
stage for the injury complained of. The submission that Intergames
had previously conducted numerous safe races did not persuasively
demonstrate that it had exercised due diligence because, as the trial
court pointedly observed, "[t]hey were only lucky that no accident
occurred during the previous marathon races but still the danger was
there."73
Secondly, injury to the participants arising from an unfortunate
vehicular accident on the route was an event known to and
foreseeable by Intergames, which could then have been avoided if
only Intergames had acted with due diligence by undertaking the race
on a blocked-off road, and if only Intergames had enforced and
adopted more efficient supervision of the race through its volunteers.
And, thirdly, the negligence of the jeepney driver, albeit an intervening
cause, was not efficient enough to break the chain of connection
between the negligence of Intergames and the injurious consequence
suffered by Rommel. An intervening cause, to be considered efficient,
must be "one not produced by a wrongful act or omission, but
independent of it, and adequate to bring the injurious results. Any
cause intervening between the first wrongful cause and the final injury
which might reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated by the
original wrongdoer is not such an efficient intervening cause as will
relieve the original wrong of its character as the proximate cause of
the final injury."74
In fine, it was the duty of Intergames to guard Rommel against the
foreseen risk, but it failed to do so.
III
The doctrine of assumption of risk
had no application to Rommel
Unlike the R TC, the CA ruled that the doctrine of assumption of risk
applied herein; hence, it declared Intergames and Cosmos not liable.
The CA rendered the following rationalization to buttress its ruling, to
wit:
In this case, appellant Romulo Abrogar himself admitted that his son,
Rommel Abrogar, surveyed the route of the marathon and even
attended a briefing before the race. Consequently, he was aware that
the marathon would pass through a national road and that the said
road would not be blocked off from traffic. And considering that he was
already eighteen years of age, had voluntarily participated in the
marathon, with his parents' consent, and was well aware of the traffic
hazards along the route, he thereby assumed all the risks of the race.
This is precisely why permission from the participant's parents,
submission of a medical certificate and a waiver of all rights and
causes of action arising from the participation in the marathon which
the participant or his heirs may have against appellant Intergames
were required as conditions in joining the marathon.
In the decision of the trial court, it stated that the risk mentioned in the
waiver signed by Rommel Abrogar only involved risks such as
stumbling, suffering heatstroke, heart attack and other similar risks. It
did not consider vehicular accident as one of the risks included in the
said waiver.
This Court does not agree. With respect to voluntary participation in a
sport, the doctrine of assumption of risk applies to any facet of the
activity inherent in it and to any open and obvious condition of the
place where it is carried on. We believe that the waiver included
vehicular accidents for the simple reason that it was a road race run
on public roads used by vehicles. Thus, it cannot be denied that
vehicular accidents are involved. It was not a track race which is held
on an oval and insulated from vehicular traffic. In a road race, there is
always the risk of runners being hit by motor vehicles while they train
or compete. That risk is inherent in the sport and known to runners. It
is a risk they assume every time they voluntarily engage in their sport.
Furthermore, where a person voluntarily participates in a lawful game
or contest, he assumes the ordinary risks of such game or contest so
as to preclude recovery from the promoter or operator of the game or
contest for injury or death resulting therefrom. Proprietors of
amusements or of places where sports and games are played are not
insurers of safety of the public nor of their patrons.
In Mc Leod Store v. Vinson 213 Ky 667, 281 SW 799 (1926), it was
held that a boy, seventeen years of age, of ordinary intelligence and
physique, who entered a race conducted by a department store, the
purpose of which was to secure guinea fowl which could be turned in
for cash prizes, had assumed the ordinary risks incident thereto and
was barred from recovering against the department store for injuries
suffered when, within catching distance, he stopped to catch a guinea,
and was tripped or stumbled and fell to the pavement, six or eight
others falling upon him. The comi further said: "In this (the race) he
was a voluntary participant. x x x The anticipated danger was as
obvious to him as it was to appellant (the department store). While not
an adult, he was practically 17 years of age, of ordinary intelligence,
and perfectly able to determine the risks ordinarily incident to such
games. An ordinary boy of that age is practically as well advised as to
the hazards of baseball, basketball, football, foot races and other
games of skill and endurance as is an adult
x x x."
In the case at bar, the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" held on June
15, 1980 was a race the winner of which was to represent the country
in the annual Spirit of Pheidippides Marathon Classic in Greece, if he
equals or breaks the 29-minute mark for the 19-km. race. Thus,
Rommel Abrogar having voluntarily participated in the race, with his
parents' consent, assumed all the risks of the race.75
The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily
exposes himself to an obvious, known and appreciated danger
assumes the risk of injury that may result therefrom.76 It rests on the
fact that the person injured has consented to relieve the defendant of
an obligation of conduct toward him and to take his chance of injury
from a known risk, and whether the former has exercised proper
caution or not is immaterial.77 In other words, it is based on voluntary
consent, express or implied, to accept danger of a known and
appreciated risk; it may sometimes include acceptance of risk arising
from the defendant's negligence, but one does not ordinarily assume
risk of any negligence which he does not know and appreciate.78 As
a defense in negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine requires the
concurrence of three elements, namely: (1) the plaintiff must know
that the risk is present; (2) he must further understand its nature; and
(3) his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary.79 According to
Prosser:80 "Knowledge of the risk is the watchword of assumption of
risk."
Contrary to the notion of the CA, the concurrence of the three
elements was not shown to exist. Rommel could not have assumed
the risk of death when he participated in the race because death was
neither a known nor normal risk incident to running a race. Although
he had surveyed the route prior to the race and should be presumed
to know that he would be running the race alongside moving vehicular
traffic, such knowledge of the general danger was not enough, for
some authorities have required that the knowledge must be of the
specific risk that caused the harm to him.81 In theory, the standard to
be applied is a subjective one, and should be geared to the particular
plaintiff and his situation, rather than that of the reasonable person of
ordinary prudence who appears in contributory negligence.82 He
could not have appreciated the risk of being fatally struck by any
moving vehicle while running the race. Instead, he had every reason
to believe that the organizer had taken adequate measures to guard
all participants against any danger from the fact that he was
participating in an organized marathon. Stated differently, nobody in
his right mind, including minors like him, would have joined the
marathon if he had known of or appreciated the risk of harm or even
death from vehicular accident while running in the organized running
event. Without question, a marathon route safe and free from
foreseeable risks was the reasonable expectation of every runner
participating in an organized running event.
Neither was the waiver by Rommel, then a minor, an effective form of
express or implied consent in the context of the doctrine of
assumption of risk. There is ample authority, cited in Prosser,83 to the
effect that a person does not comprehend the risk involved in a known
situation because of his youth,84 or lack of information or
experience,85 and thus will not be taken to consent to assume the
risk.
Clearly, the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply to bar
recovery by the petitioners.
IV
Cosmos is not liable for the negligence
of Intergames as the organizer
Nonetheless, the CA did not err in absolving Cosmos from liability.
The sponsorship of the marathon by Cosmos was limited to financing
the race. Cosmos did nothing beyond that, and did not involve itself at
all in the preparations for the actual conduct of the race. This verity
was expressly confirmed by Intergames, through Castro, Jr., who
declared as follows:
COURT
q Do you discuss all your preparation with Cosmos Bottling
Company?
a As far as the Cosmos Bottling Company (sic) was a sponsor as to
the actual conduct of the race, it is my responsibility. The conduct of
the race is my responsibility. The sponsor has nothing to do as well as
its code of the race because they are not the ones running. I was the
one running. The responsibility of Cosmos was just to provide the
sponsor's money.
COURT
q They have no right to who (sic) suggest the location, the number of
runners, you decide these yourself without consulting them?
a Yes, your honor.86
We uphold the finding by the CA that the role of Cosmos was to
pursue its corporate commitment to sports development of the youth
as well as to serve the need for advertising its business. In the
absence of evidence showing that Cosmos had a hand in the
organization of the race, and took part in the determination of the
route for the race and the adoption of the action plan, including the
safety and security measures for the benefit of the runners, we cannot
but conclude that the requirement for the direct or immediate causal
connection between the financial sponsorship of Cosmos and the
death of Rommel simply did not exist. Indeed, Cosmos' mere
sponsorship of the race was, legally speaking, too remote to be the
efficient and proximate cause of the injurious consequences.
V
Damages
Article 2202 of the Civil Code lists the damages that the plaintiffs in a
suit upon crimes and quasi-delicts can recover from the defendant,
viz.:
Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for
all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the
act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages
have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendant.
Accordingly, Intergames was liable for all damages that were the
natural and probable consequences of its negligence. In its judgment,
the RTC explained the award of damages in favor of the petitioners,
as follows:
As borne by the evidence on record, the plaintiffs incurred medical,
hospitalization and burial expenses for their son in this aggregate
amount of ₱28,061.65 (Exhibits "D'', "D-1" and "D-2"). In instituting
this case, they have paid their lawyer ₱5,000 as initial deposit, their
arrangement being that they would pay attorney's fees to the extent of
10% of whatever amount would be awarded to them in this case.
For the loss of a son, it is unquestionable that plaintiffs suffered untold
grief which should entitle them to recover moral damages, and this
Court believes that if only to assuage somehow their untold grief but
not necessarily to compensate them to the fullest, the nominal amount
of ₱l00,00.00 should be paid by the defendants.
For failure to adopt elementary and basic precautionary measure to
insure the safety of the participants so that sponsors and organizers
of sports events should exercise utmost diligence in preventing injury
to the participants and the public as well, exemplary damages should
also be paid by the defendants and this Court considers the amount of
₱50,000.00
as reasonable.87
Although we will not disturb the foregoing findings and determinations,
we need to add to the justification for the grant of exemplary
damages. Article 2231 of the Civil Code stipulates that exemplary
damages are to be awarded in cases of quasi-delict if the defendant
acted with gross negligence. The foregoing characterization by the
RTC indicated that Intergames' negligence was gross. We agree with
the characterization. Gross negligence, according to Mendoza v.
Spouses Gomez,88 is the absence of care or diligence as to amount
to a reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property; it evinces
a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to
avoid them. Indeed, the failure of Intergames to adopt the basic
precautionary measures for the safety of the minor participants like
Rommel was in reckless disregard of their safety. Conduct is reckless
when it is an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation in
which a high degree of danger is apparent; it must be more than any
mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion,
and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simple
inattention.89 The RTC did not recognize the right of the petitioners to
recover the loss of earning capacity of Rommel. It should have, for
doing so would have conformed to jurisprudence whereby the Court
has unhesitatingly allowed such recovery in respect of children,
students and other non-working or still unemployed victims. The legal
basis for doing so is Article 2206 (l) of the Civil Code, which stipulates
that the defendant "shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity
of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded
by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the
time of his death."
Indeed, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded to the
heirs of a deceased non-working victim simply because earning
capacity, not necessarily actual earning, may be lost.
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,90 damages
for loss of earning capacity were granted to the heirs of a third-year
high school student of the University of the Philippines Integrated
School who had been killed when she was hit and run over by the
petitioner's passenger bus as she crossed Katipunan Avenue in
Quezon City. The Court justified the grant in this wise:
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but
for loss of capacity to earn money. Evidence must be presented that
the victim, if not yet employed at the time of death, was reasonably
certain to complete training for a specific profession. In People v.
Teehankee, no award of compensation for loss of earning capacity
was granted to the heirs of a college freshman because there was no
sufficient evidence on record to show that the victim would eventually
become a professional pilot. But compensation should be allowed for
loss of earning capacity resulting from the death of a minor who has
not yet commenced employment or training for a specific profession if
sufficient evidence is presented to establish the amount thereor.91
(bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
In People v. Sanchez,92 damages for loss of earning capacity was
also allowed to the heirs of the victims of rape with homicide despite
the lack of sufficient evidence to establish what they would have
earned had they not been killed. The Court rationalized its judgment
with the following observations:
Both Sarmenta and Gomez were senior agriculture students at UPLB,
the country's leading educational institution in agriculture.1âwphi1 As
reasonably assumed by the trial court, both victims would have
graduated in due course. Undeniably, their untimely death deprived
them of their future time and earning capacity. For these deprivation,
their heirs are entitled to compensation. xxxx. However, considering
that Sarmenta and Gomez would have graduated in due time from a
reputable university, it would not be unreasonable to assume that in
1993 they would have earned more than the minimum wage. All
factors considered, the Court believes that it is fair and reasonable to
fix the monthly income that the two would have earned in 1993 at
₱8,000.000 per month (or ₱96,000.00/year) and their deductible living
and other incidental expenses at ₱3,000.00 per month (or
₱36,000.00/year).93 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
In Perena v. Zarate,94 the Court fixed damages for loss of earning
capacity to be paid to the heirs of the 15-year-old high school student
of Don Bosco Technical Institute killed when a moving train hit the
school van ferrying him to school while it was traversing the railroad
tracks. The RTC and the CA had awarded damages for loss of
earning capacity computed on the basis of the minimum wage in
effect at the time of his death. Upholding said findings, the Court
opined:
x x x, the fact that Aaron was then without a history of earnings should
not be taken against his parents and in favor of the defendants whose
negligence not only cost Aaron his life and his right to work and earn
money, but also deprived his parents of their right to his presence and
his services as well. x x x. Accordingly, we emphatically hold in favor
of the indemnification for Aaron's loss of earning capacity despite him
having been unemployed, because compensation of this nature is
awarded not for loss of time or earnings but for loss of the deceased's
power or ability to earn money.
The petitioners sufficiently showed that Rommel was, at the time of
his untimely but much lamented death, able-bodied, in good physical
and mental state, and a student in good standing.95 It should be
reasonable to assume that Rommel would have finished his schooling
and would turn out to be a useful and productive person had he not
died. Under the foregoing jurisprudence, the petitioners should be
compensated for losing Rommel's power or ability to earn. The basis
for the computation of earning capacity is not what he would have
become or what he would have wanted to be if not for his untimely
death, but the minimum wage in effect at the time of his death. The
formula for this purpose is:
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income less
Necessary Living Expenses ]96
Life expectancy is equivalent to 2/3 multiplied by the difference of 80
and the age of the deceased. Since Rommel was 18 years of age at
the time of his death, his life expectancy was 41 years. His projected
gross annual income, computed based on the minimum wage for
workers in the non-agricultural sector in effect at the time of his
death,97 then fixed at ₱l4.00/day, is ₱5,535.83. Allowing for
necessary living expenses of 50% of his projected gross annual
income, his total net earning capacity is ₱l13,484.52.
Article 2211 of the Civil Code expressly provides that interest, as a
part of damages, may be awarded in crimes and quasi-delicts at the
discretion of the court. The rate of interest provided under Article 2209
of the Civil Code is 6% per annum in the absence of stipulation to the
contrary. The legal interest rate of 6% per annum is to be imposed
upon the total amounts herein awarded from the time of the judgment
of the RTC on May 10, 1991 until finality of judgment.98 Moreover,
pursuant to Article 221299 of the Civil Code, the legal interest rate of
6o/o per annum is to be further imposed on the interest earned up to
the time this judgment of the Court becomes final and executory until
its full satisfaction.100
Article 2208 of the Civil Code expressly allows the recovery of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation when exemplary damages
have been awarded.1âwphi1 Thus, we uphold the RTC's allocation of
attorney's fees in favor of the petitioners equivalent to 10% of the total
amount to be recovered, inclusive of the damages for loss of earning
capacity and interests, which we consider to be reasonable under the
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTLY AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on March 10, 2004 to the extent that it absolved
COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY, INC. from liability; REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the decision as to INTERGAMES, INC., and
REINSTATES as to it the judgment rendered on May 10, 1991 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, in Quezon City subject to the
MODIFICATIONS that INTERGAMES, INC. is ORDERED TO PAY to
the petitioners, in addition to the aw3:rds thereby allowed: (a) the sum
of ₱l13,484.52 as damages for the loss of Rommel Abrogar's earning
capacity; (b) interest of 6% per annum on the actual damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages and loss of earning capacity reckoned
from May 10, 1991 until full payment; (c) compounded interest of 6%
per annum from the finality of this decision until full payment; and (d)
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

REYES, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari
– G.R. Nos. 203287[1] and 207936[2] – under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision[3] dated August 31,
2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 122054 and the Decision[4] dated June 28,
2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 98026, both issued by the Court of Appeals
(CA).
Facts
The spouses Macario C. Domingo (Macario) and Felicidad S.D.
Domingo (Felicidad) (Spouses Domingo) ate the parents of
respondent Engracia D. Singson (Engracia) and petitioners Renato
S.D. Domingo (Renato) and his co-heirs whom he represents herein,
namely: Consolacion D. Romero (Consolacion), Josefina D. Borja,
and Rafael, Ramon, and Rosario, all surnamed Domingo (collectively,
the petitioners).[5]
During their lifetime, the Spouses Domingo owned a parcel of land,
situated in F. Sevilla Street, San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TC1) No. 32600 (23937) 845-R,[6] and the
house built thereon (subject property). Macario died on February 22,
1981, while Felicidad died on September 14, 1997.[7]
It appears that on September 26, 2006, Engracia filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila a complaint[8] for ejectment/unlawful
detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 9534, against Consolacion,
Rosario, Rafael, and Ramon. Engracia claimed that she is the
absolute owner of the subject property, having bought the same from
the Spouses Domingo as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale[9]
dated June 6, 2006. She likewise averred that TCT No. 32600 (23937)
845-R was already cancelled and TCT No. 12575[10] covering the
subject property was already issued under her name. The petitioners
only learned of the supposed sale of the subject property when they
received the summons and a copy of Engracia's complaint in Civil
Case No. 9534.
Consequently, on July 31, 2006, the petitioners filed a complaint[11]
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, which sought the
nullity of the sale. They alleged that the Absolute Deed of Sale dated
June 6, 2006, upon which Engracia bases her ownership of the
subject property, was a nullity since the signatures of their parents
appearing thereon as the supposed vendors were forged.[12] The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 70898 and was raffled to Branch 160
of the RTC.
Meanwhile, on February 28, 2007, Renato, Consolacion, and Ramon
filed a Joint Affidavit Complaint[13] with the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) of Pasig City, claiming that Engracia falsified the signatures of
their parents in the Absolute Deed of Sale and, thus, charging her with
the crimes of falsification of public document, estafa, and use of
falsified documents. Consequently, on May 6, 2008, the OCP filed an
Information[14] with the RTC, charging Spouses Engracia and Manuel
Singson (Spouses Singson) with the crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 137867 and was raffled to Branch 264 of the RTC.
On July 11, 2008, the Spouses Singson filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings Due to Prejudicial Question[15] with the RTC in Criminal
Case No. 137867. They alleged that the validity and genuineness of
the Absolute Deed of Sale, which is the subject of Civil Case No.
70898 then still pending with the RTC Branch 160, are determinative
of their guilt of the crime charged.[16] Accordingly, they prayed that the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867 be suspended pursuant to
Section 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.[17] The private prosecutor
filed an opposition to the motion, stating that Criminal Case No.
137867 can proceed independently from Civil Case No. 70898
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 3 ofRule
111 of the Rules of Court.[18]
On February 12, 2010, the RTC Branch 264, issued an Order[19] in
Criminal Case No. 137867, which granted the motion to suspend the
proceedings filed by the Spouses Singson. The private prosecutor
sought a reconsideration[20] of the Order dated February 12, 2010, but
it was denied by the RTC in its Order[21] dated June 7, 2011.
Unperturbed, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari[22] with the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 122054, claiming that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion when it directed the suspension of the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867 on the ground of prejudicial
question. They pointed out that the bases of their respective claims in
both Civil Case No. 70898 and Criminal Case No. 137867 are the
forged signatures of their deceased parents.[23] They claimed that
where both a civil and criminal case arising from the same facts are
filed in court, the criminal case takes precedence.[24]
On August 31, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision[25] in CA-G.R. SP
No. 122054, which denied the petition for certiorari. The CA opined
that all the elements of a prejudicial question under Sections 6 and 7
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are present; hence, the RTC did not
abuse its discretion when it directed the suspension of Criminal Case
No. 137867.[26]
Meanwhile, Civil Case No. 70898 was initially set for pre-trial
conference on February 7, 2008.[27] However, upon motion[28] of
Engracia, the pre-trial was reset on March 6, 2008.[29] During the pre-
trial conference on March 6, 2008, Engracia moved that Rafael be
substituted by his heirs since he had already died on October 15,
2007.[30] Thus, the RTC issued an Order[31] dated March 6, 2008
directing the petitioners to comment on Engracia's motion to substitute
Rafael as plaintiff in the case below. On April 8, 2008, Engracia filed a
Motion to Dismiss[32] the case on the ground that the petitioners failed
to substitute the heirs of Rafael as plaintiff in the case. The motion to
dismiss was consequently denied by the RTC in its Order[33] dated
November 12, 2008 for lack of merit.
The continuation of the pre-trial conference, which has been sidelined
pending the resolution of Engracia's motion to dismiss, was then set
on March 19, 2009.[34] On March 12, 2009, Engracia's counsel, with
her conformity, withdrew his appearance as counsel in the case.[35]
During the pre-trial conference on March 19, 2009, the petitioners and
their counsel appeared. Engracia was likewise present although
without her new counsel. Accordingly, pre-trial was again reset on
June 1, 2009 to afford Engracia time to secure the services of a new
counsel.[36]
Thereafter, Atty. Tristram B. Zoleta entered his appearance for
Engracia and moved that the pre-trial conference on June 1, 2009 be
reset on July 13 or 20, 2009.[37] However, Judge Amelia A. Fabros
(Judge Fabros) was reassigned to Muntinlupa City and Judge Myrna
V. Lim-Verano (Judge Lim-Verano) was named to replace Judge
Fabros as Presiding Judge of Branch 160.[38] On June 17, 2010,
Judge Lim-Verano, having previously presided over Criminal Case
No. 137867, recused herself from adjudicating Civil Case No. 70898.
[39]
Civil Case No. 70898 was subsequently raffled to Branch 264 of
the RTC then presided by Judge Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr. (Judge
Janolo). On July 15, 2010, Judge Janolo issued an Order,[40] setting
the pre-trial of the case on August 25, 2010.
On August 12, 2010, the petitioners' counsel moved to reset the pre-
trial on September 15, 2010 due to previously scheduled hearings in
the trial courts of Malolos City and Parañaque City.[41] Accordingly, the
pre-trial was reset on October 6, 2010.[42] On October 6, 2010, the
respective counsels of the parties jointly agreed to reset the pre-trial
on December 9, 2010.[43]
However, the pre-trial scheduled on December 9, 2010 was again
reset on January 24, 2011.[44]
On December 27, 2010, the petitioners filed a motion,[45] which sought
to exclude Rafael as being represented by Renato. They averred that
they were unable to effect a substitution of the heirs of Rafael as
plaintiffs in the case since they could not locate them.
On January 27, 2011, the petitioners' counsel failed to appear and the
pre-trial was reset on March 24, 2011.[46] In the morning of March 23,
2011, the petitioners' counsel informed Renato that he would not be
able to attend the pre-trial conference since he was indisposed and
asked the latter to go to the RTC and request for a resetting of the
hearing. When the case was called, the petitioners and their counsel
failed to appear, which thus prompted Engracia's counsel to move for
the dismissal of the complaint.and be given time to file the proper
pleading. Thus, the RTC gave Engracia's counsel 10 days within
which to file a motion to dismiss. The continuation of the pre-trial was
reset on May 26, 2011.[47]
On April 5, 2011, Engracia filed a motion to dismiss[48] in compliance
with the RTC's directive.[49] During the pre-trial on May 26, 2011, the
RTC gave the parties' respective counsels, upon their request, five
days to file a comment on the motion to dismiss and a reply to such
comment, after which time the motion to dismiss is deemed submitted
for resolution.[50]
On July 29, 2011, the RTC Branch 264 issued an Order[51] in Civil
Case No. 70898, dismissing the petitioners' complaint due to their and
their counsel's repeated failure to appear during the scheduled pre-
trial hearing dates.
The petitioners then filed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 98026, insisting that the RTC erred in dismissing their
complaint on a mere technicality. They also claimed that Engracia's
motion to dismiss is but a mere scrap of paper since the same did not
comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The
CA, in its Decision[52] dated June 28, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 98026,
affirmed the RTC's dismissal of the petitioners' complaint.
Issues
Essentially, the issues set forth for the Court's resolution are: first,
whether the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867 were properly
suspended on the ground of prejudicial question; and second,
whether the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No.
70898 due to failure to prosecute was proper.
Ruling of the Court
The petitions are denied.
First Issue: Suspension of the
proceedings in Criminal Case No.
137867 on the ground of prejudicial question
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a
case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally
in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the
is.sues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an
issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the
criminal action can proceed.[53] The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.[54]
For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to
cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final
resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present:
(1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try
said question must be lodged in another tribunal.[55]
Based on the issues raised in both Civil Case No. 70898 and Criminal
Case No. 137867 against the Spouses Singson, and in the light of the
foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed appears to
be a prejudicial question in the case at bar. The defense of the
Spouses Singson in the civil case for annulment of sale is that
Engracia bought the subject property from her parents prior to their
demise and that their signatures appearing on the Absolute Deed of
Sale are true and genuine. Their allegation in the civil case is based
on the very same facts, which would be necessarily determinative of
their guilt or Innocence as accused in the criminal case.
If the signatures of the Spouses Domingo in the Absolute Deed of
Sale are genuine, then there would be no falsification and the
Spouses Singson would be innocent of the offense charged.
Otherwise stated, a conviction on Criminal Case No. 137867, should it
be allowed to proceed ahead, would be a gross injustice and would
have to be set aside if it were finally decided in Civil Case No. 70898
that indeed the signatures of the Spouses Domingo were authentic.
The petitioners' reliance on Section 3[56] of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, in relation to Article 33[57] of the Civil Code, is misplaced.
Section 3 provides that a civil action for damages in cases provided
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which may also
constitute criminal offenses, may proceed independently of the
criminal action. In instances where an independent civil action is
permitted, the result of the criminal action, whether of acquittal or
conviction, is entirely irrelevant to the civil action.[58]
The concept of independent civil actions finds no application in this
case. Clearly, Civil Case No. 70898 is very much relevant to the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867. To stress, the main issue
raised in Civil Case No. 70898, i.e., the genuineness of the signature
of the Spouses Domingo appearing in the Absolute Deed of Sale, is
intimately related to the charge of estafa through falsification of public
document in Criminal Case No. 137867; the resolution of the main
issue in Civil Case No. 70898 would necessarily be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the Spouses Singson.
Accordingly, the RTC Branch 264 correctly suspended the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867 on the ground of prejudicial
question since, at the time the proceedings in the criminal case were
suspended, Civil Case No. 70898 was still pending.
Second Issue: Dismissal of the
petitioners' complaint in Civil Case
No. 70898
Under the Rules of Court, the parties and their counsel are mandated
to appear at the pre-trial.[59] Pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is
not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it serves a vital
objective: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if
not indeed its dispensation.[60] Thus, the failure of a party to appear at
the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent party is the
plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed, which shall be with
prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. If it is the defendant
who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his
evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis
thereof.[61]
Civil Case No. 70898 was initially set for pre-trial on February 7, 2008.
In July 2010, after more than two years, Civil Case No. 70898, which
was still in the pre-trial stage, was re-raffled to Branch 264 presided
by Judge Janolo; the latter immediately scheduled the pre-trial on
August 25, 2010. What transpired thereafter is a series of resetting of
the hearing due to the failure of the petitioners and/or their counsel to
appear during the scheduled pre-trial dates. During the scheduled
pre-trial on March 23, 2011, the petitioners and their counsel again
failed to appear without informing the RTC of the reason for their non-
appearance. Clearly, the petitioners' wanton disregard of scheduled
pre-trial indeed justified the dismissal of their complaint.
It should be stressed that procedural rules are not to be disregarded
or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted
in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules they are to be
followed, except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they
may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.[62]
The petitioners have not shown any persuasive reason, which would
justify a relaxation of the rules on pre-trial. That the petitioners'
counsel was supposedly indisposed during the pre-trial on March 23,
2011 does not excuse the petitioners themselves from attending the
pre-trial. Moreover, the petitioners have failed to advance any valid
justification for their and their counsel's failure to attend the previously
scheduled pre-trial hearings. Accordingly, the trial court could not be
faulted for dismissing the complaint under Section 5 of Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court.
The petitioners' claim that the motion to dismiss filed by Engracia with
the RTC is a mere scrap of paper for her failure to comply with the
mandatory provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court is without merit. Said sections provide that:
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act
upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written
motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the
hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of
hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice.
Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to
all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the
hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of
the motion.
Sec. 6. Proof of service necessary. No written motion set for hearing
shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof.
The pertinent portions of the motion to dismiss filed by Engracia with
the RTC read:
NOTICE
CLERK OF COURT
RTC, Branch 264
Pasig City [San Juan Station]
ATTY. EMERITO M. SALVA
Counsel for the Plaintiffs
15th Floor, Washington Tower, Asia World
Complex, Marina Bay, Pacific Avenue
Parañaque City
G r e e t i n g s:
Please submit the foregoing motion [in compliance with the order of
the Honorable Court during the hearing on March 23, 2011] for the
consideration and resolution of the Honorable Court immediately upon
receipt hereof.
(Sgd.)
TRISTRAM B. ZOLETA
EXPLANATION
Copy of this pleading was sent to the counsel for the plaintiffs through
registered mail due to lack of messenger at the time of service
rendering personal service not possible.
(Sgd.)
TRISTRAM B. ZOLETA[63]
That the notice of hearing is addressed to the petitioners' counsel and
not to the petitioners directly is immaterial and would not be a cause
to consider the same defective. The requirement under Section 4 of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court that the notice be addressed to the
opposing party is merely directory; hat matters is that adverse party
had sufficient notice of the hearing of the motion.[64] Further, even if
the notice of hearing in the motion to dismiss failed to state the exact
date of hearing, the defect was cured when the RTC considered the
same in the hearing that was held on May 26, 2011 and by the fact
that the petitioners, through their counsel, were notified of the
existence of the said motion.[65]
Anent the supposed lack of proof of service of the motion to dismiss
upon the petitioners, suffice it to state that a copy of the said motion
was served upon and received by the petitioners' counsel on April 15,
2011.[66] The petitioners were duly given the full opportunity to be
heard and to argue their case when the RTC required them to file a
comment to the motion to dismiss during the hearing on May 26,
2011, which they did on May 30, 2011.[67] "What the law really
eschews is not the lack of previous notice of hearing but the lack of
opportunity to be heard"[68]
Considering, however, that the complaint in Civil Case No. 70898 had
already been dismissed with prejudice on account of the petitioners'
and their counsel's persistent failure to appear during the scheduled
pre-trial hearings, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867
should now proceed. There is no longer. any prejudicial question in
Criminal Case No. 137867 since the complaint in Civil Case No.
70898 had been dismissed without definitely resolving the question of
whether the signatures of the Spouses Domingo in the Absolute Deed
of Sale .are genuine. Thus, it is up for the RTC Branch 264, in
Criminal Case No. 137867, to resolve the said issue.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 203287 and 207936 are hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated August 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 122054 and the Decision
dated June 28, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 98026 issued by the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 264, is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with
Criminal Case No. 137867 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Jardeleza, and Tijam, JJ.,
concur.

JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court challenging the Decision[2] dated July 25, 2008 and the
Resolution[3] dated December 5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88101.
The case arose from an altercation between respondent Orico
Doctolero (Doctolero), a security guard of respondent Grandeur
Security and Services Corporation (Grandeur) and petitioners John
E.R. Reyes (John) and Mervin Joseph Reyes (Mervin) in the parking
area of respondent Makati Cinema Square (MCS).[4]
Petitioners recount the facts as follows: on January 26, 1996, between
4:30 to 5:00 P.M., John was driving a Toyota Tamaraw with plate no.
PCL-349. As he was approaching the entrance of the basement
parking of MCS, Doctolero stopped him to give way to outgoing cars.
After a few minutes, Doctolero gave John a signal to proceed but
afterwards stopped him to allow the opposite car to move to the right
side. The third time that Doctolero gave John the signal to proceed,
only to stop him again to allow a car on the opposite side to advance
to his right, it almost caused a collision. John then told Doctolero of
the latter's mistake in giving him signals to proceed, then stopping him
only to allow cars from the opposite side to move to his side.
Infuriated, Doctolero shouted "PUTANG INA MO A" at John. Then, as
John was about to disembark from his vehicle, he saw Doctolero
pointing his gun at him. Sensing that Doctolero was about to pull the
trigger, John tried to run towards Doctolero to tackle him.
Unfortunately, Doctolero was able to pull the trigger before John
reached him, hitting the latter's left leg in the process. Doctolero also
shot at petitioner Mervin when he rushed to John's rescue. When he
missed, Mervin caught Doctolero and pushed him down but was
unable to control his speed. As a result, Mervin went inside MCS,
where he was shot in the stomach by another security guard,
respondent Romeo Avila (Avila).[5]
Grandeur advances a different version, one based on the Initial
Report[6] conducted by Investigator Cosme Giron. While Doctolero
was on duty at the ramp of the exit driveway of MCS's basement
parking, John took over the left lane and insisted entry through the
basement parking's exit driveway. Knowing that this is against traffic
rules, Doctolero stopped John, prompting the latter to alight from his
vehicle and confront Doctolero. With his wife unable to pacify him,
John punched and kicked Doctolero, hitting the latter on his left face
and stomach. Doctolero tried to step back to avoid his aggressor but
John persisted, causing Doctolero to draw his service firearm and fire
a warning shot. John ignored this and continued his attack. He caught
up with Doctolero and wrestled with him to get the firearm. This
caused the gun to fire off and hit John's leg. Mervin then ran after
Doctolero but was shot on the stomach by security guard Avila.[7]
Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a
complaint for damages against respondents Doctolero and Avila and
their employer Grandeur, charging the latter with negligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees. They likewise impleaded
MCS on the ground that it was negligent in getting Grandeur's
services. In their complaint, petitioners prayed that respondents be
ordered, jointly and severally, to pay them actual, moral, and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation costs.[8]
Respondents Doctolero and Avila failed to file an answer despite
service of summons upon them. Thus, they were declared in default in
an Order dated December 12, 1997.[9]
For its part, Grandeur asserted that it exercised the required diligence
in the selection and supervision of its employees. It likewise averred
that the shooting incident was caused by the unlawful aggression of
petitioners who took advantage of their "martial arts" skills.[10]
On the other hand, MCS contends that it cannot be held liable for
damages simply because of its ownership of the premises where the
shooting incident occurred. It argued that the injuries sustained by
petitioners were caused by the acts of respondents Doctolero and
Avila, for whom respondent Grandeur should be solely responsible. It
further argued that the carpark was, at that time, being managed by
Park Asia Philippines and MCS had no control over the carpark when
the shooting incident occurred on January 26, 1996. It likewise denied
liability for the items lost in petitioners' vehicle.[11]
On January 18, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment[12] against
respondents Doctolero and Avila, finding them responsible for the
injuries sustained by petitioners. The RTC ordered them to jointly and
severally pay petitioners the following: P344,898.73 as actual
damages; P360,000.00 as lost income; P20,000.00 as school
expenses; P300,000.00 as moral damages; P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P75,000.00 as attorney's fees; and costs of suit.
[13]
The trial thereafter continued with respect to Grandeur and MCS.
On April 15, 2005, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint against MCS. It, however, held Grandeur solidarily liable
with respondents Doctolero and Avila. According to the RTC,
Grandeur was unable to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employees because it failed
to prove strict implementation of its rules, regulations, guidelines,
issuances and instructions, and to monitor consistent compliance by
respondents.[14]
On September 19, 2005, upon Grandeur's motion for reconsideration,
the RTC issued an Order modifying its April 15, 2005 Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration
is hereby GRANTED, and the decision dated 15 April 2005 is hereby
modified, as follows:
The Court renders judgment in favor of plaintiffs finding defendants
Orico Doctolero and [Romeo] Avila liable for negligence and to pay
plaintiffs, the following amounts:
1. [P]344,898.73 as actual damages;
2. [P]360,000.00 as the reasonable lost (sic) of income and
P20,000.00 in the form of tuition fees, books, and other school
incidental expenses;
3. [P]300,000 as moral damages;
4. [P]100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5. [P]75,000.00 as attorney's fees;
6. costs of suit.
The Court, however, orders the DISMISSAL of the complaint filed
against defendants Grandeur Security and Services Corporation and
[MCS]. It is likewise ordered the Dismissal of both the Counterclaims
filed by defendants Grandeur Security and Services Corp., and [MCS]
for the right to litigate is the price we pay in a civil society.
SO ORDERED.[15] (Emphasis in the original.)
In reconsidering its Decision, the RTC held that it re-evaluated the
tacts and the attending circumstances of the present case and was
convinced that Grandeur has sufficiently overcome the presumption of
negligence. It gave credence to the testimony of Grandeur's witness,
Eduardo Ungui, the head of the Human Resources Department (HRD)
of Grandeur, as regards the various procedures in its selection and
hiring of security guards. Ungui testified that Grandeur's hiring
procedure included, among others, several rounds of interview,
submission of various clearances from different government agencies,
such as the NBI clearance and PNP clearance, undergoing neuro-
psychiatric examinations, drug testing and physical examinations,
attending pre-licensing training and seminars, securing a security
license, and undergoing on the job training for seven days.[16]
Furthermore, the RTC held that Grandeur was able to show that it
observed diligence of a good lather of the family during the existence
of the employment when it conducted regular and close supervision of
its security guards assigned to various clients. In this regard, the RTC
cited Grandeur's standard operational procedures, as testified to by
Ungui, which include: (1) daily marking before the security guards are
posted; (2) post-to-post station conducted by the branch supervisor
and vice-supervisor; (3) round the clock inspection by the company
inspector to determine the efficiency and fulfilment by the security
guards of their respective duties; (4) a monthly area formation
conducted by the operation officer; (5) a quarterly area formation
conducted by the operation officer; (6) a general formation conducted
every six months by the president, vice-president, operation officer
and HRD head; (7) a yearly neuro-psychiatric test; (8) a special
seminar conducted every two years; (9) re-training course also held
every two years; and (10) monthly briefing or orientation to those
security guards who committed violations.[17] The RTC likewise gave
weight to the memorandum/certificates submitted by Grandeur as
proof of its diligence in the supervision of the actual work
performances of its employees.[18]
Petitioners assailed the RTC Order dated September 19, 2005 before
the CA.
The CA dismissed petitioners' appeal and affirmed the RTC's Order. It
agreed that Grandeur was able to prove with preponderant evidence
that it observed the degree of diligence required in both selection and
supervision of its security guards.[19]
The CA likewise rejected petitioners' arguments against the additional
evidence belatedly adduced by Grandeur in support of its motion for
reconsideration before the RTC. It ruled that the additional
memoranda and certificate of attendance to seminars which Grandeur
attached to its motion for reconsideration can be considered as they
are related to the testimonial evidence adduced during trial.[20]
Finally, the CA rejected petitioners' argument that MCS should be held
liable as indirect employers of respondents. According to the CA, the
concept of indirect employer only relates to the liability for unpaid
wages and, as such, finds no application to this case involving
"imputed negligence" under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. It held that
the lack of employer-employee relationship between respondents
Doctolero and Avila and respondent MCS bars petitioners' claim
against MCS for the former's acts.[21]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in
its Resolution dated December 5, 2008.[22]
Hence, the present petition.
The sole issue for the consideration of this Court is whether Grandeur
and MCS may be held vicariously liable for the damages caused by
respondents Doctolero and Avila to petitioners John and Mervin
Reyes.
We deny the petition.
I Philippines (BSP) and the security guards assigned to it by an agency
Petitioner contends that MCS should be held liable for the negligence
of respondents Avila and Doctolero. According to petitioners, since the
act or omission complained of took place in the vicinity of MCS, it is
liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. They reasoned
that MCS hired the services of Grandeur, whose employees (the
security guards), in turn, committed harmful acts that caused the
damages suffered by petitioners. MCS should thus be declared as a
joint tortfeasor with Grandeur and respondent security guards.[23]
We cannot agree. MCS is not liable to petitioners.
As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission.
[24]
This general rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
The law, however, provides for exceptions when it makes certain
persons liable for the act or omission of another. One exception is an
employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort committed by his
employee under paragraph 5 of Article 2180.[25] Here, although the
employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously
liable on the basis of the civil law principle of pater familias for failure
to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of one's subordinates
to prevent damage to another.[26]
It must be stressed, however, that the above rule is applicable only if
there is an employer-employee relationship.[27] This employer-
employee relationship cannot be presumed but must be sufficiently
proven by the plaintiff.[28] The plaintiff must also show that the
employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the
tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant,
as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.[29]
In Mamaril v. The Boy Scout of the Philippines,[30] we found that there
was no employer-employee relationship between Boy Scout of the
pursuant to a Guard Service Contract. In the absence of such
relationship, vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
cannot apply as against BSP.[31] Similarly, we find no employer-
employee relationship between MCS and respondent guards. The
guards were merely assigned by Grandeur to secure MCS' premises
pursuant to their Contract of Guard Services. Thus, MCS cannot be
held vicariously liable for damages caused by these guards' acts or
omissions.

Neither can it be said that a principal-agency relationship existed
between MCS and Grandeur. Section 8 of the Contract for Guard
Services between them explicitly states:
8. LIABILITY TO GUARDS AND THIRD PARTIES
The SECURITY COMPANY is NOT an agent or employees (sic) of the
CLIENT and the guards to be assigned by the SECURITY COMPANY
to the CLIENT arc in no sense employees of the latter as they arc for
all intents and purposes under contract with the SECURITY
COMPANY. Accordingly, the CLIENT shall not be responsible for any
and all claims for personal injury or death that arises of or in the
course of the performance of guard duties.[32] (Emphasis in the
original.)
II
On the other hand, paragraph 5 of Article 2180[33] of the Civil Code
may be applicable to Grandeur, it being undisputed that respondent
guards were its employees. When the employee causes damage due
to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises
the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable
only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a
family.[34] The "diligence of a good father" referred to in the last
paragraph of Article 2180 means diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees.[35]
To rebut the presumption of negligence, Grandeur must prove two
things: first, that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of
respondents Doctolero and Avila, and second, that after hiring
Doctolero and Avila, Grandeur had exercised due diligence in
supervising them.
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held:
On the matter of selection of employees, Campo vs. Camarote, supra,
lays down this admonition:
"x x x In order that the owner of a vehicle may be considered as
having exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he should
not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a
professional driver's license; he should have carefully examined
the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his
experience and record of service. These steps appellant failed to
observe; he has therefore, failed to exercise all due diligence required
of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of driver.
Due diligence in the supervision of employees, on the other hand,
includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the
guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions
intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its employees and the
imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in
case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of
acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer.
To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern
of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should
regularly report on their supervisory functions.[36] (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted.)
In the earlier case of Central Taxicab Corp. v. Ex-Meralco Employees
Transportation Co.[37] the Court held that there was no hard-and-fast
rule on the quantum of evidence needed to prove due observance of
all the diligence of a good lather of a family as would constitute a valid
defense to the legal presumption of negligence on the part of an
employer or master whose employee has, by his negligence, caused
damage to another. Jurisprudence nevertheless shows that
testimonial evidence, without more, is insufficient to meet the required
quantum of proof.[38]
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court
found that "[p]etitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris
familias in the selection and supervision of employees through oral
evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any
other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the
apparent biased nature of the testimony."[39] There, the supposed
clearances, results of seminars and tests which Leonardo allegedly
submitted and complied with were never presented in court despite
the fact that, if true, then they were obviously in the possession and
control of Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC). Subsequently, in
a different case also involving MMTC, the Court held that "in a trial
involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit
concrete proof, including documentary evidence."[40]
A

Here, both the RTC and the CA found that Grandeur was able to
sufficiently prove, through testimonial and documentary evidence, that
it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and hiring of its security guards. As testified to by its HRD
head Ungui, and corroborated by documentary evidence including
clearances from various government agencies, certificates, and
favorable test results in medical and psychiatric examinations,
Grandeur's selection and hiring procedure was outlined as follows:
1. Initial screening;
2. Submission of personal bio-data;
3. Submission of the following documents and clearances: (1)
NBI Clearance; (2) PDICE Clearance; (3) Barangay
Clearance; (4) PNP Clearance; (5) Birth Certificate; (6) High
School Diploma/Transcript/College Diploma; (7) Reserved
Officers Training Corps or Citizens Army Training certificate;
(8) Court Clearances; and (9) resignation or clearance from
previous employment;
4. Pre-licensing training (15 days or 150 hours) for those without
experience or pre-training course (56 hours) for applicants with
working experience as security guard;
5. Undergo neuro-psychiatric examination, drug testing and
physical examination;
6. Submit and secure a security license before being given an
application form;
7. Series of Interviews by Grandeur's Recruiting Officer,
Personnel Clerk, Head of Human Resources Department,
Operation Department or Security Officer, Senior Security
Officer, Chief Security Officer, Assistant Vice President for
Operations, Assistant Vice President for Accounting, and
recommending approval by the Vice President and the
President.
8. The applicant undergoes on-the-job training (OJT) for seven
days assigned in the field or within Grandeur's office; and
9. The applicant then undergoes a probationary period of six
months after which the employee automatically becomes
regular upon meeting the company standards.[41]
Unlike in the aforecited MMTC cases, the evidence presented by
Grandeur consists not only in the testimony of its HRD head but also
by documentary evidence showing respondents Doctolero's and
Avila's compliance with the above hiring and selection process
consisting of their respective: (1) private security licenses;[42] (2) NBI
Clearances;[43] (3) Medical Certificates;[44] (4) Police Clearances;[45] (5)
Certificate of Live Birth[46]/Ceitification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar appertaining to date of birth;[47] (6) Certificates issued by the
Safety Vocational and Training Center for satisfactory completion of
the Pre-Licensing Training Course;[48] (7) High School Diplomas;[49] (8)
SSS Personal Data Records;[50] (9) Barangay Clearances;[51] (10)
Court Clearance;[52] (11) Neuro-psychiatric result issued by Goodwill
Medical Center, Inc. for Doctolero's pre-employment screening as
Security Guard[53]/Evaluation Report by Office Chief Surgeon Army,
Headquarters, Phil. Army, Fort Bonifactio Metro-Manila for Avila
showing an above-average result and no psychotic ideations;[54] (12)
Certification from Varsitarian Security and Investigation Agency, Inc.
that Doctolero has been employed with said agency;[55] (13) Certificate
issued by Cordova High School showing that Doctolero had
completed the requirements of the courts of Institution in Citizen Army
Training-1;[56] (14) Certification by Grandeur that Doctolero has
submitted the requirements for his application for the post of Security
Guard.[57] Thus, we agree with the RTC and CA's evaluation that
Grandeur was able to satisfactorily prove that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection of respondents Doctolero and Avila.
Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the
required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the
employer's burden is overcome.[58]
B
The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the
circumstances of employment. Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that
the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee during
the performance of the latter's assigned tasks would be enough to
relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article
2176 of the Civil Code.[59]
Here, Grandeur's HRD head, Ungui, likewise testified on Grandeur's
standard operational procedures, showing the means by which
Grandeur conducts close and regular supervision over the security
guards assigned to their various clients.[60] Grandeur also submitted as
evidence certificates of attendance to various seminars[61] and the
memoranda[62] both those commending respondents for their good
works[63] and reprimanding them for violations of various company
policies.[64] We agree with the CA that these may be considered, as
they are related to the documents and testimonies adduced during
trial to show Grandeur's diligence in the supervision of the actual work
performance of its employees.

Considering all the evidence borne by the records, we find that

Grandeur has sufficiently exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Hence,
having successfully overcome the legal presumption of negligence, it
is relieved of liability from the negligent acts of its employees,
respondents Doctolero and Avila.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 25,

2008 and the Resolution dated December 5, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Tijam, and Reyes, Jr., JJ.,

concur.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the October 29, 2012
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95638,
which reversed and set aside the July 14, 2010 Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3 in Civil Case No.
6363-R for "Breach of Contract of Carriage & Damages." Also
challenged is the March 6, 2013 CA Resolution[3] denying the motion
for reconsideration on the assailed Decision.
Factual Antecedents
Judith D. Darines (Judith) and her daughter, Joyce D. Darines (Joyce)
(petitioners) alleged in their Complaint[4] that on December 31, 2005,
they boarded the Amianan Bus Line with Plate No. ACM 497 and
Body No. 808 as paying passengers enroute from Carmen, Rosales,
Pangasinan to Baguio City. Respondent Rolando M. Quitan (Quitan)
was driving the bus at that time. While travelling on Camp 3, Tuba,
Benguet along Kennon Road, the bus crashed into a truck (with Plate
No. XSE 578) which was parked on the shoulder of Kennon Road. As
a result, both vehicles were damaged; two passengers of the bus
died; and the other passengers, including petitioners, were injured. In
particular, Joyce suffered cerebral concussion while Judith had an eye
wound which required an operation.
Petitioners argued that Quitan and respondent Eduardo Quinones
(Quinones), the operator of Amianan Bus Line, breached their
contract of carriage as they failed to bring them safely to their
destination. They also contended that Quitan's reckless and negligent
driving caused the collision. Consequently, they prayed for actual,
moral, exemplary and temperate damages, and costs of suit.
For their part, Quinones and Quitan (respondents) countered in their
Answer[5] that, during the December 31, 2005 incident, Quitan was
driving in a careful, prudent, and dutiful manner at the normal speed
of 40 kilometers per hour. According to them, the proximate cause of
the incident was the negligence of the truck driver, Ronald C.
Fernandez, who parked the truck at the roadside right after the curve
without having installed any early warning device. They also claimed
that Quinones observed due diligence in the selection and supervision
of his employees as he conducted seminars on road safety measures;
and Quitan attended such seminars including those required by the
government on traffic safety. They likewise averred that Quitan was a
licensed professional driver who, in his 12 years as a public utility
driver, had not figured in any incident like the one at hand.
During the trial, Judith testified that Quitan was driving at a very fast
pace resulting in a collision with the truck parked at the shoulder of
the road.[6] Consequently, the bone holding her right eye was fractured
and had to be operated.[7] She claimed that, as a result of incident,
she failed to report for work for two months.[8]
To prove the actual damages that she suffered, Judith presented
receipts for medicine, and a summary of expenses, which included
those incurred for the ritual dao-is. She explained that she and Joyce
are Igorots, being members of Ibaloi, Kankanay-ey, an indigenous
tribe;[9] and as their customary practice, when a member who meets
an accident is released from the hospital, they butcher pigs to remove
or prevent bad luck from returning to the family.[10]
Moreover, to support her claim for moral damages, Judith testified that
she suffered sleepless nights since she worried about the result and
possible effect of her operation.[11]
On the other hand, respondents presented Ernesto Benitez (Benitez),
who, on behalf of respondents, testified that he bought the medicines
and paid petitioners' hospitalization expenses, as evidenced by
receipts he submitted in court.[12]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 14, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision ordering
respondents to pay petitioners the following:
1. Moral Damages of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00);
2. Exemplary Damages of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00);
3. Attorney's Fees of Fifteen Percent (15%) of the Damages, plus
Total Appearance Fees of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P16,500.00); and
 4. Costs of Suit.[13]
The RTC held that since the respondents already paid the actual
damages relating to petitioners' medical and hospitalization expenses,
then the only remaining matters for resolution were: whether
respondents were liable to pay petitioners a) actual damages
representing the expenses incurred during the dao-is ritual; and,
Judith's alleged lost income; b) moral and exemplary damages; and,
c) attorney's fees.
The RTC noted that petitioners did not present any receipt as regards
the expenses they incurred during the dao-is ritual. As regards their
claim for Judith's lost income, the RTC held that petitioners similarly
failed to substantiate the same as there was no showing that Judith's
failure to report for work for two months was because of the incident.
Thus, the RTC did not award actual damages for lack of evidence.
However, the RTC awarded moral damages grounded on Judith's
testimony regarding her pain and suffering. It likewise awarded
exemplary damages by way of correction, and to serve as example to
common carriers to be extraordinarily diligent in transporting
passengers. It also granted petitioners attorney's fees plus costs of
suit on the ground that petitioners were compelled to litigate the case.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its October 29, 2012 Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC Decision.
The CA stressed that respondents did not dispute that they were liable
for breach of contract of carriage; in fact, they paid for the medical and
hospital expenses of petitioners. Nonetheless, the CA deleted the
award of moral damages because petitioners failed to prove that
respondents acted fraudulently or in bad faith, as shown by the fact
that respondents paid petitioners' medical and hospitalization
expenses. The CA held that, since no moral damages was awarded,
then there was no basis to grant exemplary damages. Finally, it ruled
that because moral and exemplary damages were not granted, then
the award of attorney's fees must also be deleted.
On March 6, 2013, the CA denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.
Issues
Hence, petitioners filed this Petition raising the issues as follows:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF PETITIONERS FALL[S]
UNDER ARTICLES 20,1157,1759, 2176,2180 AND 2219 OF
THE CIVIL CODE THEREBY ENTITL[ING THEM] TO MORAL
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE XXX AWARD OF DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES BY THE TRIAL COURT BECAME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY SINCE HEREIN RESPONDENTS DID
NOT QUESTION THE SAME IN THEIR APPEAL BUT
MERELY QUESTIONED THE AMOUNTS OF AWARD [FOR
BEING] EXORBITANT.[14]
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners maintain that respondents are liable to pay them moral and
exemplary damages because the proximate cause of their injuries
was the reckless driving of Quitan. As regards Quinones, his fault is
presumed considering that he did not offer proof that he exercised
extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of his
employees. They added that the negligence of respondents resulted
in the latter's failure to transport them to their destination thereby
constituting a breach of their contract of carriage. They also argued
that the RTC's grant of damages and attorney's fees in their favor
already attained finality because when respondents appealed to the
CA, they only questioned the amounts given by the RTC for being
exorbitant, but not the award itself.
Respondents' Arguments
Respondents, on their end, posit that they are not liable to pay moral
damages because their acts were not attended by fraud or bad faith.
They add that since petitioners are not entitled to moral damages,
then it follows that they are also not entitled to exemplary damages;
and same is true with regard to the grant of attorney's fees as the
same necessitates the grant of moral and exemplary damages.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
First of all, petitioners contend that the awards of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees by the RTC already attained
finality because respondents did not dispute such grants when they
appealed to the CA but only the fact that the amounts were exorbitant.
Such contention is without merit.
A plain reading of the assigned errors[15] and issues[16] in the
Appellants' Brief of respondents with the CA reveals that they
questioned the awards of moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees made by the RTC to petitioners. Since respondents
timely challenged the awards when they interposed an appeal to the
CA, the same had not yet attained finality.
Going now to the main issue, the Court fully agrees with the CA ruling
that in an action for breach of contract, moral damages may be
recovered only when a) death of a passenger results; or b) the carrier
was guilty of fraud and bad faith even if death does not result; and
that neither of these circumstances were present in the case at bar.
The CA correctly held that, since no moral damages was awarded
then, there is no basis to grant exemplary damages and attorney's
fees to petitioners.
To stress, this case is one for breach of contract of carriage (culpa
contractual) where it is necessary to show the existence of the
contract between the parties, and the failure of the common carrier to
transport its passenger safely to his or her destination. An action for
breach of contract differs from quasi-delicts (also referred as culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra contractual) as the latter emanate from the
negligence of the tort feasor[17] including such instance where a
person is injured in a vehicular accident by a party other than the
carrier where he is a passenger.
The principle that, in an action for breach of contract of carriage,
moral damages may be awarded only in case (1) an accident results
in the death of a passenger; or (2) the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad
faith, is pursuant to Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206(3) of the
Civil Code, and Article 2220 thereof,[18] as follows:
Article 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be
awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning
Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there
may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
xxxx
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies
to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or
in bad faith. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforesaid concepts of fraud or bad faith and negligence are basic
as they are distinctly differentiated by law. Specifically, fraud or bad
faith connotes "deliberate or wanton wrong doing"[19] or such
deliberate disregard of contractual obligations[20] while negligence
amounts to sheer carelessness.[21]
More particularly, fraud includes "inducement through insidious
machination."[22] In turn, insidious machination refers to such deceitful
strategy or such plan with an evil purpose. On the other hand, bad
faith does not merely pertain to bad judgment or negligence but
relates to a dishonest purpose, and a deliberate doing of a wrongful
act. Bad faith involves "breach of a known duty through some motive
or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud."[23]
In Viluan v. Court of Appeals,[24] and Bulante v. Chu Liante,[25] the
Court disallowed the recovery of moral damages in actions for breach
of contract for lack of showing that the common carrier committed
fraud or bad faith in performing its obligation. Similarly, in Verzosa v.
Baytan,[26] the Court did not also grant moral damages in an action for
breach of contract as there was neither allegation nor proof that the
common carrier committed fraud or bad faith.[27] The Court declared
that "[t]o award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore,
without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as
required by [Article 2220 of the Civil Code], would be to violate the
clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial
legislation.[28]
Meanwhile, in Gatchalian v. Delim,[29] and Mr. & Mrs. Fabre, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals,[30] the Court found the common carriers liable for
breach of contract of carriage and awarded moral damages to the
injured passengers on the ground that the common carrier committed
gross negligence, which amounted to bad faith. Particularly, in Mr. &
Mrs. Fabre, Jr., the gross negligence of the common carrier was
determined from the fact that its driver was not engaged to drive long
distance travels; he was also unfamiliar with the area where he
detoured the bus as it was his first time to ply such route; the road
was slippery because it was raining, yet the bus was running at 50
kilometers per hour resulting in its skidding to the left shoulder of the
road; and the bus hit the steel brace on the road at past 11:30 p.m.
The Court also noted that other than the imputation of gross
negligence, the injured passengers therein pursued their claim not on
the theory of breach of contract of carriage alone but also on quasi-
delicts.
Since petitioners are not entitled to either moral, temperate,
liquidated, or compensatory damages, then their claim for exemplary
damages is bereft of merit.
Finally, considering the absence of any of the circumstances under
Article 2208[33] of the Civil Code where attorney's fees may be
awarded, the same cannot be granted to petitioners.
All told, the CA correctly ruled that petitioners are not entitled to moral
and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The October 29, 2012
Decision and March 6, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 95638 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Perlas-Bernabe,
and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

Clearly, unless it is fully established (and not just lightly inferred) that
negligence in an action for breach of contract is so gross as to amount
to malice, then the claim of moral damages is without merit.[31]

Here, petitioners impute negligence on the part of respondents when,

as paying passengers, they sustained injuries when the bus owned
and operated by respondent Quinones, and driven by respondent
Quitan, collided with another vehicle. Petitioners propounded on the
negligence of respondents, but did not discuss or impute fraud or bad
faith, or such gross negligence which would amount to bad faith,
against respondents. There being neither allegation nor proof that
respondents acted in fraud or in bad faith in performing their duties
arising from their contract of carriage, they are then not liable for
moral damages.

The Court also sustains the CA's finding that petitioners are not
entitled to exemplary damages. Pursuant to Articles 2229 and 2234[32]
of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded only in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages.

SERENO, C.J.:
Before this Court is a Rule 45 Petition[1] assailing the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision and Resolution,[2] which reversed the Decision[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC granted the entreaty of
petitioner spouses Elvira and Edwin Alcantara for the quieting of title
and reconveyance of possession of Lot No. 16932 occupied by
respondent spouses Florante Belen and Zenaida Ananias.
FACTS OF THE CASE
In 2005, Spouses Alcantara filed before the RTC a Complaint [4]
against Spouses Belen for the quieting of title, reconveyance of
possession, and accounting of harvest with damages. Petitioners
argued that their neighbors, respondents herein, had extended the
latter's possession up to the land titled to Spouses Alcantara, and
usurped the harvests therefrom.
Spouses Alcantara claimed that they were the registered owners of
Lot No. 16932 - a 3,887-square-meter parcel of land planted with
trees and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-36252.[5]
Elvira Alcantara traced her ownership of the property to her
inheritance from her mother, Asuncion Alimon. By virtue of an Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication dated 24 March 1993,[6] Free Patent No. (IV-5)-
3535 dated 28 August 1974 and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-512[7] issued on 17 January 1975 were cancelled, and, in lieu
thereof, TCT No. T-36252 was issued in the name of Elvira Alcantara.
In addition to the certificate of title, Spouses Alcantara submitted as
evidence the Tax Declarations of the property registered to them and
their predecessors-in-interest, receipts[8] of their payments for real
property taxes, and a Sketch/Special Plan[9] of Lot No. 16932
prepared by Geodetic Engineer Augusto C. Rivera.
On the strength of a sales agreement called Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tuluyan ng Lupa,[10] respondents countered Spouses Alcantara's
claims over the property. Spouses Belen alleged that they bought the
property from its prior owners. Even though respondents did not have
any certificate of title over the property, they supported their claim of
ownership with various Tax Declarations under the name of their
predecessors-in-interest. Spouses Belen also submitted a
Sketch/Special Plan[11] of Lot No. 16932 prepared by Geodetic
Engineer Hector C. Santos.
Furthermore, Spouses Belen attacked the OCT of Asuncion Alimon.
They claimed that fraud attended the issuance of a Free Patent to her,
considering that the Belens had occupied the property ever since.
According to respondents, they already protested her title still pending
before the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).[12]
In its Decision dated 9 February 2009, the RTC gave more weight to
the certificate of title and Tax Declarations presented by petitioners,
declaring them the absolute owners of Lot No. 16932. The trial court
further dislodged the use of the Tax Declarations registered under the
names of Spouses Belen and their predecessors-in-interest, because
these documents did not have the technical description of the land
and its boundaries; and in contrast, the TCT of Spouses Alcantara
defined the subject property by metes and bounds, with a technical
description approved by the Land Management Bureau.
The RTC went on to conclude that respondents were claiming Lot No.
16931, a property different from Lot No. 16932, viz:[13]
There is clear evidence that what the plaintiffs are claiming based on
their title is Lot No. 16932, and what the defendants are claiming to
have bought from their predecessors-in-interest, is a different lot with
different boundaries and technical descriptions to that of Lot No.
16932. The land covered by the plaintiffs title has an area of 3,887
square meters only and its boundaries consist of the following "NW-by
Lot 1691 6; NE & SE-by Lot 16934; S-by Lot 16930; and SW-by Lot
16931." On the other hand, the lot bought by the defendants has
4,368 square meters with the following boundaries: "N-Paulino
Velasco; E-by Felix Velasco; South-Cipriano Dayo and Crisanto Delos
Reyes; and W-by Casiano Meraña." The difference is made more
manifest by the survey plan (Exhibit "E''; Records, p. 213) prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Augusto C. Rivera which is part of the Cadastral
Lot survey for San Pablo City, showing that the defendants' propet1y
which they bought is Lot No. 16931, not Lot 16932, covered by the
title of the plaintiffs. x x x
xxxx

The evidence of the defendants consisting of tax declarations (Exhibit
"4"; Records, p. 278) show that what is tax declared in their names is
Lot No. 16931, not Lot No. 16932.
x x x. The evidence also shows that while the lot purchased by the
defendants from their predecessors-in-interest has been tax declared
since 1948, Lot No. 16932 covered by plaintiffs title was only tax
declared in 1983 in the name of the plaintiffs mother Asuncion Alimon.
This simply goes to show that if indeed what was purchased by the
defendants is Lot No. 16932, the said lot should have been
covered by the tax declarations issued to their predecessors-in-
interest as early as 1948. Yet it clearly appears that Lot 16932 was
declared only in 1983. (Emphasis supplied)
Spouses Belen successfully appealed before the CA. The appellate
court found that respondents had presented their claims of ownership
over Lot No. 16932, and not Lot No. 16931.
The CA then declared that Asuncion Alimon was not a possessor or
cultivator of the subject land, a fact that voided the Free Patent issued
to her, as well as the resulting OCT and TCT. The appellate court
additionally held that Elvira Alcantara was not a legal heir of Asuncion
Alimon.
Since petitioners failed to show their legal entitlement to Lot No.
16932, the CA went on to declare respondents the owners of that
property. Moreover, it ordered the cancellation of OCT No. P-512 and
TCT No. T-36252.
Spouses Alcantara moved for reconsideration,[14] but to no avail.
Before this Court, petitioners bewail the conclusions of the CA that
respondents own Lot No. 16932 and that petitioners' title to the realty
is void. Petitioners assert that the Tax Declarations and the Kasulatan
ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa submitted by Spouses Belen pertain to
Lot No. 16931. Spouses Alcantara further posit that the Free Patent
granted to Asuncion Alimon can only be litigated in reversion
proceedings. Moreover, they allege that respondents cannot properly
assail, for the first time on appeal, the right of Elvira Alcantara to
succeed Asuncion Alimon.
In their Comment,[15] respondents do not deny that Lot No. 16932 is
different from Lot No. 16931.[16] They nevertheless assert ownership
over Lot No. 16932, alleging that their exhibits - the Tax Declarations
and the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa - showed their
superior right over the realty. They also maintain that the CA correctly
cancelled the Free Patent of Asuncion Alimon and declared Elvira
Alcantara a mere adoptee of Alimon.
ISSUE OF THE CASE
The nature of the action filed by petitioners below is for the quieting of
title and the recovery of possession against the occupants of the
property, Spouses Belen. To quiet title, Article 477 of the Civil Code
requires that the claimants must have a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property that is the subject matter of the action.[17]
As for the recovery of possession, Spouses Alcantara pray for the
possession and use of the subject lot and the right to harvest from it,
which are the reliefs granted in an accion reivindicatoria.[18] In this
judicial remedy, a party claims ownership over a parcel of land and
seeks recovery of its full possession.[19]
Therefore, in these proceedings, the Court is tasked to review
whether the CA committed errors of law in concluding the legal issue
of ownership in favor of respondents on the basis of their Tax
Declarations and the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa
notwithstanding the TCT of Spouses Alcantara. In other words, we are
presented with the question of whether a certificate of title may be
sufficiently defeated by tax declarations and deeds of sale. Before us
is thus a question of law as elucidated in Gaerlan v. Republic:[20]
The distinction between a "question of law" and a "question of fact" is
settled. x x x. In Republic v. Vega, the Court held that when petitioner
asks for a review of the decision made by a lower court based on the
evidence presented, without delving into their probative value but
simply on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then
a question of law is raised.
In the present case, there seems to be no dispute as to the facts, and
the question presented before us calls for a review of the CA's
conclusion that the documents and evidence presented by petitioner
are insufficient to support her application for registration of title.
Hence, the petition is properly filed.
RULING OF THE COURT

The appellate court held that the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng
Lupa and the Tax Declaration submitted by respondents pertained to
the lot in litigation and reasoned that the "description of the property
as shown by the statement of the boundaries in the tax declaration
bespeaks of the lot in litigation as described in the Deed of Sale
submitted in evidence by the appellants."[21] Based on these
documents, the CA adjudged Spouses Belen the lawful owners of Lot
No. 16932.
However, in the first place, these exhibits do not involve Lot No.
16932. As correctly assessed by the RTC, the parcel of land
described in the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa does not
correspond to the description of Lot No. 16932 as contained in the
realty's certificate of title claimed by petitioners. TCT No. T-36252
reads:[22]
Beginning at a point marked "1" of lot 16932, Cad-438-D, being N. 46-
17 W., 5367.86 m. from BLLM No. 1, Cad-438-D, San Pablo City
Cad.; thence N. 65-45 E., 63.74 m. to point 2 S. 20-56 E., 68.88 m. to
point 3; S. 76-30 W. 28.67 m. to point 4; S. 76-47 W., 31.59 m. to
point 5; N. 24-50 W., 57.36 m. to point 1; point of beginning.
Containing an area of THREE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
EIGHTY SEVEN (3,887) SQUARE METERS. x x x.
On the other hand, the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa
pertains to the following:[23]
Isang (1) lagay na lupang niyugan na natatayo sa Nayon ng San
Marcos, Lungsod ng San Pablo. Ang kabalantay sa HILAGA ay
Paulino Velasco; sa SILANGAN ay, Felix Velasco; sa TIMOG ay
Cipriano Dayo at Crisanto Meraña Reyes; at sa KANLURAN - ay
Casiano Meraña; may lawak na 4,368 metros parisukat, humigit-
kumulang, x x x ayon sa Boja Declaratoria Blg. 23949. x x x.
A cursory reading of the above excerpts clearly shows that the lot
claimed by petitioners is not the property conveyed in the deed of sale
presented by respondents. Aside from their difference in size, the two
properties have distinctive boundaries. Therefore, on the face of the
documents, the CA incorrectly ruled that these pertained to Lot No.
16932.
The ruling of the CA that respondents own Lot No. 16932 based on
their Tax Declarations is likewise erroneous. Tracing the history of the
Tax Declarations registered under the names of respondents to those
of their predecessors-in-interest, we find that none of these refers to
Lot No. 16932.
The oldest Tax Declaration exhibited by respondents is No. 3902[24]
issued to Martin Belen in 1948. It covers a 4,368-square-meter lot with
the same boundaries as those indicated in the Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tuluyan ng Lupa. This document was followed by the following Tax
Declarations covering the same property and registered to
respondents' predecessors-in-interest: (1) No. 12041;[25] (2) No.
34046;[26] (3) No. 20303;[27] (4) No. 51502;[28] (5) No. 23439[29] (which is
the subject of the Kasulatang Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa); (6) No. 63-
914;[30] (7) ARP No. 91-06422;[31] and (8) the present Tax Declaration,
ARP No. 94-059-018.[32]
The last three Tax Declarations were already registered to Spouses
Belen. Indicated on the dorsal portion of these documents are the
following: the parcel of land, area, and boundaries covered by the Tax
Declaration. Through all of these details, we read that the exhibits
presented by respondents refer to Lot No. 16931, having an area of
around 4,368 square meters[33] and delineated by metes and bounds
different from those described in TCT No. T-36252. Hence, the RTC
accurately ruled that the evidence of respondents "consisting of tax
declarations x x x shows that what is tax declared in their names is
Lot No. 16931, not Lot No. 16932."[34]
Even assuming that the Tax Declarations of respondents pertain to the
subject property, this Court finds that the CA incorrectly applied the
law on land titles. The appellate court should not have set aside the
RTC's appreciation of the certificate of title registered to Spouses
Alcantara just because Spouses Belen presented their Tax
Declarations.
Based on established jurisprudence,[35] we rule that the certificate of
title of petitioners is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of their
ownership of the property. The irrelevant Tax Declarations of Spouses
Belen cannot defeat TCT No. T-36252 of Spouses Alcantara, as it is
binding and conclusive upon the whole world.[36] Cureg v. Intermediate
Appellate Court[37] explains:
[A]s against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or
tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof
of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title indicates true
and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed
premises. Petitioners' OCT No. P-19093 should be accorded greater
weight as against the tax declarations x x x offered by private
respondents in support of their claim x x x.
Aside from presenting a certificate of title to the claimed property,
petitioners submit as evidence the Tax Declarations registered to them
and to their predecessors-in-interest. The earliest Tax Declaration on
record is No. 58760[38] registered to Asuncion Alimon in 1983.
Subsequent to that issuance are the following Tax Declarations: (1)
No. 59-992;[39] (2) ARP No. 91-48014;[40] (3) ARP No. 94-059-0019;[41]
and (4) the present Tax Declaration, 99-059-00795.[42] The back pages
of all these Tax Declarations exhibited by petitioners uniformly refer to
Lot No. 16932, having an area of 3,887 square meters with
boundaries as described in TCT No. T-36252.
These Tax Declarations,[43] together with the certificate of title[44]
presented by petitioners, support their claims over Lot No. 16932.
Therefore, the CA incorrectly disposed of the property in favor of
respondents, considering the indefeasibility of the Torrens title
submitted as evidence by petitioners. In Pioneer Insurance and
Surety Corp. v. Heirs of Coronado,[45] we discussed the instant legal
issue as follows:
Indubitably, a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. The real purpose of the Torrens System of land
registration is to quiet title to land and put stop forever to any question
as to the legality of the title.
In the same assailed ruling, the CA went beyond the contents of the
TCT and concluded that its issuance was a nullity. It went on to
declare the Free Patent issued to Asuncion Alimon void and ruled that
Elvira Alcantara was not a lawful heir of Asuncion Alimon.
In declaring the nullity of the Free Patent, the CA held thus:[46]
A Free Patent cannot be issued to Alimon because it cannot be issued
to a person who is not a possessor or cultivator of the land or is not
paying taxes that will justify segregation from the public land of the
land applied for. Alimon intentionally applied for a Free Patent absent
the foregoing requirements.
Noticeably, the CA failed to cite any specific exhibit on record showing
that Asuncion Alimon did not possess the land when she applied for
the patent. In effect, it jumped to conclusions without any sufficient
basis for its premise. This form of adjudication is flawed, as no less
than the Constitution mandates that a court decision must express
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.[47]
Anent the legal status of Elvira Alcantara, the CA stated:[48]
On the other hand, appellee Elvira Alcantara is just a "Palake" of
Alimon who had transferred the land to themselves. Appellee is not a
legal heir of Alimon. Margarito Belarmino, who testified for the
appellees, admitted in court during cross-examination that appellee
Elvira Alcantara is just a "Palake" or adopted.
In Bagayas v. Bagayas,[49] this Court reiterated that courts must refrain
from making a declaration of heirship in an ordinary civil action
because "matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be
ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose
of determining such rights."[50] Straightforwardly, the CA is precluded
from determining the issue of filiation in a proceeding for the quieting
of title and accion reivindicatoria.
While there are exceptions to this rule, none obtains in this case.[51]
There is no allegation on record that, as regards the parties, a special
proceeding was instituted but was finally closed and terminated. In the
proceedings before the RTC, none of the parties exhaustively
presented evidence regarding the issue of filiation, save for the
above-cited testimony of Margarito Belarmino. Neither did the trial
court make any pronouncement as regards that issue. Given,
therefore, the dearth of evidence and discussion on filiation a quo, the
CA should not have adjudicated the status of Elvira Alcantara as a
legitimate daughter or an adopted child in succeeding to the rights of
Asuncion Alimon.
All told, we find that the CA committed an error of law in giving
precedence to the Tax Declarations and irrelevant deed of sale of
Spouses Belen over a Torrens title to Lot No. 16932 registered to
Spouses Alcantara. The appellate court likewise erred in nullifying the
title of petitioners over the realty, because it did not provide any basis
for invalidating the Free Patent of Asuncion Alimon. Finally, we find
fault on the part of the CA in improperly declaring Elvira Alcantara an
adopted child outside the confines of a special proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Spouses
Elvira Alcantara and Edwin Alcantara is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated 26 August 2011 and Resolution dated 12
January 2012 in CA-G.R. CV No. 94638 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court Decision dated 9 February 2009 in
Civil Case No. SP-6207 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ.,

concur.

SPS. CARBONELL v. METROBANK
Sps. Cristino and Edna Carbonell Vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company
G.R. No. 178467
April 26, 2017
FACTS:
The petitioners alleged that they had experienced emotional shock,
mental anguish, public ridicule, humiliation, insults and
embarrassment during their trip to Bangkok, Thailand because of the
respondent's release to them of five US$ 100 bills that turned out to
be counterfeit.
They withdrew US$ l, 000.00 in US$ 100 notes from their dollar
account at the respondent's Pateros branch. While in Bangkok, they
had exchanged five US$ 100 bills into Baht, but only four of the US$
100 bills had been accepted by the foreign exchange dealer because
the fifth one was "no good." Because of currency’s rejection, they had
asked a companion to exchange the same bill at Norkthon Bank in
Bangkok, thereat the dollar bill was declared “fake, and was
confiscated by the bank teller. On the next day, they had been
confronted by the shop owner at the hotel lobby because their four
US$ 100 bills had turned out to be counterfeit after they had bought
jewelry.
Upon the petitioners’ return to the Philippines, they had confronted the
manager of the respondent's Pateros branch on the fake dollar bills,
but the latter had insisted that the dollar bills she had released to them
were genuine, for the bills were certified by Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) after examination. They had demanded moral
damages of ₱10 Million and exemplary damages.
Prior to the filing of the suit in the RTC, the petitioners had two
meetings with the respondent's representatives. In the course of the
two meetings, the latter's representatives reiterated their sympathy
and regret over the troublesome experience that the petitioners had
encountered, and offered to reinstate US$500 in their dollar account,
and, in addition, to underwrite a round-trip all-expense-paid trip to
Hong Kong, but they were adamant and staged a walk-out.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. The petitioners appealed,
but the CA ultimately promulgated its assailed decision affirming the
judgment of the RTC with the modification of deleting the award of
attorney's fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in affirming the judgment of the
RTC.
HELD:
No. The court affirmed with the judgment of the RTC. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right, damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm
was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called dmimum absque injuria.
In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore, the injured
person alone bears the consequences because the law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act that does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. For instance, in BP I Express Card Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, the Court turned down the claim for damages of a
cardholder whose credit card had been cancelled after several
defaults in payment, holding therein that there could be damage
without injury where the loss or harm was not the result of a violation
of a legal duty towards the plaintiff. In such situation, the injured
person alone should bear the consequences because the law afforded
no remedy for damages resulting from an act that did not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. Indeed, the lack of malice in the conduct
complained of precluded the recovery of damages.
Here, although the petitioners suffered humiliation resulting from their
unwitting use of the counterfeit US dollar bills, the respondent, by
virtue of its having observed the proper protocols and procedure in
handling the US dollar bills involved, did not violate any legal duty
towards them. Being neither guilty of negligence nor remiss in its
exercise of the degree of diligence required by law or the nature of its
obligation as a banking institution, the latter was not liable for
damages. Given the situation being one of damnum absque injuria,
they could not be compensated for the damage sustained

BRION, J.:
Carlos Borromeo lost his wife Lillian when she died after undergoing a
routine appendectomy. The hospital and the attending surgeon submit
that Lillian bled to death due to a rare, life-threatening condition that
prevented her blood from clotting normally. Carlos believes, however,
that the hospital and the surgeon were simply negligent in the care of
his late wife.
On January 22, 2010, the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CV No.
89096[1] dismissed Carlos' complaint and thus reversed the April 10,
2007 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No.
2000-603-MK[2] which found the respondents liable for medical
negligence.
The present petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the CA's
January 22, 2010 decision.
ANTECEDENTS
The petitioner, Carlos Borromeo, was the husband of the late Lilian V.
Borromeo (Lilian). Lilian was a patient of the respondent Family Care
Hospital, Inc. (Family Care) under the care of respondent Dr. Ramon
Inso (Dr. Inso).
On July 13, 1999, the petitioner brought his wife to the Family Care
Hospital because she had been complaining of acute pain at the lower
stomach area and fever for two days. She was admitted at the
hospital and placed under the care of Dr. Inso.
Dr. Inso suspected that Lilian might be suffering from acute
appendicitis. However, there was insufficient data to rule out other
possible causes and to proceed with an appendectomy. Thus, he
ordered Lilian's confinement for testing and evaluation.
Over the next 48 hours, Lilian underwent multiple tests such as
complete blood count, urinalysis, stool exam, pelvic ultrasound, and a
pregnancy test. However, the tests were not conclusive enough to
confirm that she had appendicitis.
Meanwhile, Lilian's condition did not improve. She suffered from
spiking fever and her abdominal pain worsened. The increasing
tenderness of her stomach, which was previously confined to her
lower right side, had also extended to her lower left side. Lilian
abruptly developed an acute surgical abdomen.
On July 15, 1999, Dr. Inso decided to conduct an exploratory
laparotomy on Lilian because of the findings on her abdomen and his
fear that she might have a ruptured appendix. Exploratory laparotomy
is a surgical procedure involving a large incision on the abdominal
wall that would enable Dr. Inso to examine the abdominal cavity and
identify the cause of Lilian's symptoms. After explaining the situation,
Dr. Inso obtained the patient's consent to the laparotomy.
At around 3:45 P.M., Lilian was brought to the operating room where
Dr. Inso conducted the surgery. During the operation, Dr. Inso
confirmed that Lilian was suffering from acute appendicitis. He
proceeded to remove her appendix which was already infected and
congested with pus.
The operation was successful. Lilian's appearance and vital signs
improved. At around 7:30 P.M., Lilian was brought back to her private
room from the recovery room.
At around 1:30 A.M. on July 16, 1999, roughly six hours after Lilian
was brought back to her room, Dr. Inso was informed that her blood
pressure was low. After assessing her condition, he ordered the
infusion of more intravenous (IV) fluids which somehow raised her
blood pressure.
Despite the late hour, Dr. Inso remained in the hospital to monitor
Lilian's condition. Subsequently, a nurse informed him that Lilian was
becoming restless. Dr. Inso immediately went to Lilian and saw that
she was quite pale. He immediately requested a blood transfusion.
Lilian did not respond to the blood transfusion even after receiving two
500 cc-units of blood. Various drugs, such as adrenaline or
epinephrine, were administered.
Eventually, an endotracheal tube connected to an oxygen tank was
inserted into Lilian to ensure her airway was clear and to compensate
for the lack of circulating oxygen in her body from the loss of red blood
cells. Nevertheless, her condition continued to deteriorate.
Dr. Inso observed that Lilian was developing petechiae in various
parts of her body. Petechiae are small bruises caused by bleeding
under the skin whose presence indicates a blood-coagulation problem
- a defect in the ability of blood to clot. At this point, Dr. Inso suspected
that Lilian had Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC), a blood
disorder characterized by bleeding in many parts of her body caused
by the consumption or the loss of the clotting factors in the blood.
However, Dr. Inso did not have the luxury to conduct further tests
because the immediate need was to resuscitate Lilian.
Dr. Inso and the nurses performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(CPR) on Lilian. Dr. Inso also informed her family that there may be a
need to re-operate on her, but she would have to be put in an
Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Unfortunately, Family Care did not have an
ICU because it was only a secondary hospital and was not required
by the Department of Health to have one. Dr. Inso informed the
petitioner that Lilian would have to be transferred to another hospital.
At around 3:30 A.M., Dr. Inso personally called the Perpetual Help
Medical Center to arrange Lilian's transfer, but the latter had no
available bed in its ICU. Dr. Inso then personally coordinated with the
Muntinlupa Medical Center (MMC) which had an available bed.
At around 4:00 A.M., Lilian was taken to the MMC by ambulance
accompanied by the resident doctor on duty and a nurse. Dr. Inso
followed closely behind in his own vehicle.
Upon reaching the MMC, a medical team was on hand to resuscitate
Lilian. A nasogastric tube (NGT) was inserted and IV fluids were
immediately administered to her. Dr. Inso asked for a plasma
expander. Unfortunately, at around 10:00 A.M., Lilian passed away
despite efforts to resuscitate her.
At the request of the petitioner, Lilian's body was autopsied at the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Camp Crame Crime Laboratory. Dr.
Emmanuel Reyes (Dr. Reyes), the medico-legal assigned to the
laboratory, conducted the autopsy. Dr. Reyes summarized his notable
findings as:
x x x I opened up the body and inside the abdominal cavity which you
call peritoneal cavity there were 3,000 ml of clot and unclot blood
accumulated thereat. The peritoneal cavity was also free from any
adhesion. Then, I opened up the head and the brain revealed paper
white in color and the heart revealed abundant petechial hemorrhages
from the surface and it was normal. The valvular leaflets were soft and
pliable, and of course, the normal color is reddish brown as noted.
And the coronary arteries which supply the heart were normal and
unremarkable. Next, the lungs appears [sic] hemorrhagic. That was
the right lung while the left lung was collapsed and paled. For the
intestines, I noted throughout the entire lengths of the small and large
intestine were hemorrhagic areas. Noted absent is the appendix at the
ileo-colic area but there were continuous suture repair done thereat.
However, there was a 0.5 x 0.5 cm opening or left unrepaired at that
time. There was an opening on that repair site. Meaning it was not
repaired. There were also at that time clot and unclot blood found
adherent thereon. The liver and the rest of the visceral organs were
noted exhibit [sic] some degree of pallor but were otherwise normal.
The stomach contains one glassful about 400 to 500 ml.[3]
Dr. Reyes concluded that the cause of Lilian's death was hemorrhage
due to bleeding petechial blood vessels: internal bleeding. He further
concluded that the internal bleeding was caused by the 0.5 x 0.5 cm
opening in the repair site. He opined that the bleeding could have
been avoided if the site was repaired with double suturing instead of
the single continuous suture repair that he found.
Based on the autopsy, the petitioner filed a complaint for damages
against Family Care and against Dr. Inso for medical negligence.
During the trial, the petitioner presented Dr. Reyes as his expert
witness. Dr. Reyes testified as to his findings during the autopsy and
his opinion that Lilian's death could have been avoided if Dr. Inso had
repaired the site with double suture rather than a single suture.
However, Dr. Reyes admitted that he had very little experience in the
field of pathology and his only experience was an on-the-job training
at the V. Luna Hospital where he was only on observer status. He
further admitted that he had no experience in appendicitis or
appendectomy and that Lilian's case was his first autopsy involving a
death from appendectomy.
Moreover, Dr. Reyes admitted that he was not intelligently guided
during the autopsy because he was not furnished with clinical,
physical, gross, histopath, and laboratory information that were
important for an accurate conclusion. Dr. Reyes also admitted that an
appendical stump is initially swollen when sutured and that the
stitches may loosen during the healing process when the initial
swelling subside.
In their defense, Dr. Inso and Family Care presented Dr. Inso, and
expert witnesses Dr. Celso Ramos (Dr. Ramos) and Dr. Herminio
Hernandez (Dr. Hernandez).
Dr. Ramos is a practicing pathologist with over 20 years of
experience. He is an associate professor at the Department of
Surgery of the Fatima Medical Center, the Manila Central University,
and the Perpetual Help Medical Center. He is a Fellow of the
Philippine College of Surgeons, a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of
Surgery, and a Fellow of the Philippine Society of General Surgeons.
Dr. Ramos discredited Dr. Reyes' theory that the 0.5 x 0.5 cm opening
at the repair site caused Lilian's internal bleeding. According to Dr.
Ramos, appendical vessels measure only 0.1 to 0.15 cm, a claim that
was not refuted by the petitioner. If the 0.5 x 0.5 cm opening had
caused Lilian's hemorrhage, she would not have survived for over 16
hours; she would have died immediately, within 20 to 30 minutes, after
surgery.
Dr. Ramos submitted that the cause of Lilian's death was hemorrhage
due to DIC, a blood disorder that leads to the failure of the blood to
coagulate; Dr. Ramos considered the abundant petechial hemorrhage
in the myocardic sections and the hemorrhagic right lung; the multiple
bleeding points indicate that Lilian was afflicted with DIC.
Meanwhile, Dr. Hernandez is a general surgeon and a hospital
administrator who had been practicing surgery for twenty years as of
the date of his testimony.
Dr. Hernandez testified that Lilian's death could not be attributed to
the alleged wrong suturing. He submitted that the presence of blood in
the lungs, in the stomach, and in the entire length of the bowels
cannot be reconciled with Dr. Reyes' theory that the hemorrhage
resulted from a single-sutured appendix.
Dr., Hernandez testified that Lilian had uncontrollable bleeding in the
microcirculation as a result of DIC. In DIC, blood oozes from very
small blood vessels because of a problem in the clotting factors of the
blood vessels. The microcirculation is too small to be seen by the
naked eye; the red cell is even smaller than the tip of a needle.
Therefore, the alleged wrong suturing could not have caused the
amount of hemorrhaging that caused Lilian's death.
Dr. Hernandez further testified that the procedure that Dr. Inso
performed was consistent with the usual surgical procedure and he
would not have done anything differently.[4]
The petitioner presented Dr. Rudyard Avila III (Dr. Avila) as a rebuttal
witness. Dr. Avila, also a lawyer, was presented as an expert in
medical jurisprudence. Dr. Avila testified that between Dr. Reyes who
autopsied the patient and Dr. Ramos whose findings were based on
medical records, greater weight should be given to Dr. Reyes'
testimony.
On April 10, 2007, the RTC rendered its decision awarding the
petitioner P88,077.50 as compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as
death indemnity; P3,607,910.30 as loss of earnings; P50,000.00 as
moral damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit.
The RTC relied on Dr. Avila's opinion and gave more weight to Dr.
Reyes' findings regarding the cause of Lilian's death. It held that Dr.
Inso was negligent in using a single suture on the repair site causing
Lilian's death by internal hemorrhage. It applied the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, holding that a patient's death does not ordinarily occur
during an appendectomy.
The respondents elevated the case to the CA and the appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 89096.
On January 22, 2010, the CA reversed the RTC's decision and
dismissed the complaint. The CA gave greater weight to the
testimonies of Dr. Hernandez and Dr. Ramos over the findings of Dr.
Reyes because the latter was not an expert in pathology,
appendectomy, nor in surgery. It disregarded Dr. Avila's opinion
because the basic premise of his testimony was that the doctor who
conducted the autopsy is a pathologist of equal or of greater expertise
than Dr. Ramos or Dr. Hernandez.
The CA held that there was no causal connection between the alleged
omission of Dr. Inso to use a double suture and the cause of Lilian's
death. It also found that Dr. Inso did, in fact, use a double suture
ligation with a third silk reinforcement ligation on the repair site which,
as Dr. Reyes admitted on cross-examination, loosened up after the
initial swelling of the stump subsided.
The CA denied the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
because the element of causation between the instrumentality under
the control and management of Dr. Inso and the injury that caused
Lilian's death was absent; the respondents sufficiently established that
the cause of Lilian's death was DIC.
On March 18, 2010, the petitioner filed the present petition for review
on certiorari.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues: (1) that Dr. Inso and Family Care were
negligent in caring for Lilian before, during, and after her
appendectomy and were responsible for her death; and (2) that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to this case.
In their Comment, the respondents counter: (1) that the issues raised
by the petitioner are not pure questions of law; (2) that they exercised
utmost care and diligence in the treatment of Lilian; (3) that Dr. Inso
did not deviate from the standard of care observed under similar
circumstances by other members of the profession in good standing;
(4) that res ipsa loquitur is not applicable because direct evidence as
to the cause of Lilian's death and the presence/absence of negligence
is available; and (5) that doctors are not guarantors of care and
cannot be held liable for the death of their patients when they
exercised diligence and did everything to save the patient.
OUR RULING
The petition involves factual questions.
Under Section 1 of Rule 45, a petition for review on certiorari shall
only raise questions of law. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts
and it is not our function to analyze and weigh evidence that the lower
courts had already passed upon.
The factual findings of the Court of Appeals are, as a general rule,
conclusive upon this Court. However, jurisprudence has also carved
out recognized exceptions[5] to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings
are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;[6] (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible;[7] (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;[8] (4) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;[9] (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting;[10] (6) when in making its findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
[11]
(7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court's;
[12]
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;[13] (9) when the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent;[14] (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record;[15] and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.[16]
Considering that the CA's findings with respect to the cause of Lilian's
death contradict those of the RTC, this case falls under one of the
exceptions. The Court will thus give due course to the petition to
dispel any perception that we denied the petitioner justice.
The requisites of establishing medical malpractice
Whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. This is a basic
legal principle that equally applies to civil and criminal cases. In a
medical malpractice case, the plaintiff has the duty of proving its
elements, namely: (1) a duty of the defendant to his patient; (2) the
defendant's breach of this duty; (3) injury to the patient; and (4)
proximate causation between the breach and the injury suffered.[17] In
civil cases, the plaintiff must prove these elements by a
preponderance of evidence.
A medical professional has the duty to observe the standard of care
and exercise the degree of skill, knowledge, and training ordinarily
expected of other similarly trained medical professionals acting under
the same circumstances.[18] A breach of the accepted standard of care
constitutes negligence or malpractice and renders the defendant liable
for the resulting injury to his patient.[19]
The standard is based on the norm observed by other reasonably
competent members of the profession practicing the same field of
medicine.[20] Because medical malpractice cases are often highly
technical, expert testimony is usually essential to establish: (1) the
standard of care that the defendant was bound to observe under the
circumstances; (2) that the defendant's conduct fell below the
acceptable standard; and (3) that the defendant's failure to observe
the industry standard caused injury to his patient.[21]
The expert witness must be a similarly trained and experienced
physician. Thus, a pulmonologist is not qualified to testify as to the
standard of care required of an anesthesiologist[22] and an autopsy
expert is not qualified to testify as a specialist in infectious diseases.[23]
The petitioner failed to present an expert witness.
In ruling against the respondents, the RTC relied on the findings of Dr.
Reyes in the light of Dr. Avila's opinion that the former's testimony
should be given greater weight than the findings of Dr. Ramos and Dr.
Hernandez. On the other hand, the CA did not consider Dr. Reyes or
Dr. Avila as expert witnesses and disregarded their testimonies in
favor of Dr. Ramos and Dr. Hernandez. The basic issue, therefore, is
whose testimonies should carry greater weight?
We join and affirm the ruling of the CA.
Other than their conclusion on the culpability of the respondents, the
CA and the RTC have similar factual findings. The RTC ruled against
the respondents based primarily on the following testimony of Dr.
Reyes.
Well, if I remember right during my residency in my
extensive training, during the operation of the appendix,
Witness:
your Honor, it should really be sutured twice which we call
double.
Court: What would be the result if there is only single?
We cannot guarranty [sic] the bleeding of the sutured blood
Witness:
vessels, your Honor.
So, the bleeding of the patient was caused by the single
Court:
suture?
Witness:It is possible.[24]
Dr. Reyes testified that he graduated from the Manila Central
University (MCU) College of Medicine and passed the medical board
exams in 1994.[25] He established his personal practice at his house
clinic before being accepted as an on-the-job trainee in the
Department of Pathology at the V. Luna Hospital in 1994. In January
1996, he joined the PNP Medico-Legal Division and was assigned to
the Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame. He currently heads the
Southern Police District Medico-Legal division.[26] His primary duties
are to examine victims of violent crimes and to conduct traumatic
autopsies to determine the cause of death.
After having conducted over a thousand traumatic autopsies, Dr.
Reyes can be considered an expert in traumatic autopsies or
autopsies involving violent deaths. However, his expertise in traumatic
autopsies does not necessarily make him an expert in clinical and
pathological autopsies or in surgery.
Moreover, Dr. Reyes' cross-examination reveals that he was less than
candid about his qualifications during his initial testimony:
Dr. Reyes, you mentioned during your direct testimony last
Atty.
March 5, 2002 that you graduated in March of 1994, is that
Castro:
correct?
Witness:Yes, sir.
You were asked by Atty. Fajardo, the counsel for the plaintiff,
Atty.
when did you finish your medical works, and you answered
Castro:
the following year of your graduation which was in 1994?
Witness:Not in 1994, it was in 1984, sir.
Atty. And after you graduated Mr. Witness, were there further
Castro: study that you undergo after graduation? [sic]
It was during my service only at the police organization that I
Witness:
was given the chance to attend the training, one year course.
Atty. as on the job training at the V. Luna Hospital at the
Did you call that what you call a post graduate internship?
Castro: Department of Pathologist in 1994", could you explain briefly
all of this Mr. witness?
Witness:Residency.
I was given an order that I could attend the training only as a
Atty. Since you call that a post graduate, you were not undergo civilian not as a member of the AFP because at that time they
Witness:
Castro: post graduate? [sic] were already in the process of discharging civilian from
undergoing training.
Witness:I did.
Atty. So in the Department of Pathology, what were you assigned
Atty. Castro: to?
Where did you undergo a post graduate internship?
Castro:
Witness:Only as an observer status.
Witness:Before I took the board examination in the year 1984, sir.
Atty.
So you only observed.
Atty. Castro:
That was where?
Castro:
Witness:Yes, sir.
Witness:MCU Hospital, sir.
And on the same date during your direct testimony on March
Atty. After the post graduate internship that was the time you took Atty. 5, 2002, part of which reads "well if I remember right during
Castro: the board examination? Castro: my residency in my extensive training during the operation of
the appendix," what do you mean by that Mr. witness?
Witness:Yes, sir.
Witness:I was referring to my internship, sir.
Atty.
And I supposed that you did it for the first take?
Castro: Atty.
So this is not a residency training?
Castro:
Witness:Yes, sir.
Witness:No, sir.
Atty.
Are you sure of that?
Castro: Atty.
This is not a specialty training?
Castro:
Witness:Yes, sir.
Witness:No, sir.
Atty. After you took the board examination, did you pursue any
Castro: study? Atty. This was the time the year before you took the board
Castro: examination?
Witness:During that time, no sir.
Witness:That's right, sir. Yes, sir.
Atty. You also testified during the last hearing that "page 6 of
Castro: March 5, 2002, answer of the witness: then I was accepted Atty. You were not then a license[d] doctor?
Castro:
Witness:No, sir.
And you also mentioned during the last hearing shown by
page 8 of the same transcript of the stenographic notes,
Atty. dated March 5,2002 and I quote "and that is your residence
Castro: assignment?", and you answered "yes, sir." What was the
meaning of your answer? What do you mean when you say
yes, sir?
xxxx
Okay, I stayed at the barracks of the Southern Police
Witness:
District Fort Bonifacio.
Atty.
So this is not referring to any kind of training?
Castro:
Witness:No, sir.
Atty.
This is not in anyway related to appendicitis?
Castro:
Witness:No, sir.[27]
Atty. Reyes appears to have inflated his qualifications during his direct
testimony. First, his "extensive training during [his] residency" was
neither extensive actual training, nor part of medical residency. His
assignment to the V. Luna Hospital was not as an on-the-job trainee
but as a mere observer. This assignment was also before he was
actually licensed as a doctor. Dr. Reyes also loosely used the terms
"residence" and "residency" - terms that carry a technical meaning
with respect to medical practice -during his initial testimony[28] to refer
to (1) his physical place of dwelling and (2) his internship before
taking the medical board exams. This misled the trial court into
believing that he was more qualified to give his opinion on the matter
than he actually was.
Perhaps nothing is more telling about Dr. Reyes' lack of expertise in
the subject matter than the petitioner's counsel's own admission
during Dr. Reyes' cross examination.
Atty. How long were you assigned to observe with the Department
Castro: of Pathology?
Witness:Only 6 months, sir.
During your studies in the medical school, Mr. Witness, do
Atty.
you recall attending or having participated or [sic] what you
Castro:
call motivity mortality complex?
Atty.
Your honor, what is the materiality?
Fajardo:
That is according to his background, your honor. This is a
Atty. procedure which could more or less measure his knowledge
Castro: in autopsy proceedings when he was in medical school and
compared to what he is actually doing now.
Atty.
The witness is not an expert witness, your honor.
Fajardo:
Atty.
He is being presented as an expert witness, your honor.[29]
Castro:
When Atty. Castro attempted to probe Dr. Reyes about his knowledge
on the subject of medical or pathological autopsies, Dr. Fajardo
objected on the ground that Dr. Reyes was not an expert in the field.
His testimony was offered to prove that Dr. Inso was negligent during
the surgery without necessarily offering him as an expert witness.
x x x The purpose of this witness is to establish that there was
Atty. negligence on the surgical operation of the appendix or in the
Fajardo:conduct of the appendectomy by the defendant doctor on the
deceased Lilian Villaran Borromeo.[30]
Dr. Reyes is not an expert witness who could prove Dr. Inso's alleged
negligence. His testimony could not have established the standard of
care that Dr. Inso was expected to observe nor assessed Dr. Inso's
failure to observe this standard. His testimony cannot be relied upon
to determine if Dr. Inso committed errors during the operation, the
severity of these errors, their impact on Lilian's probability of survival,
and the existence of other diseases/conditions that might or might not
have caused or contributed to Lilian's death.
The testimony of Dr. Avila also has no probative value in determining
whether Dr. Inso was at fault. Dr. Avila testified in his capacity as an
expert in medical jurisprudence, not as an expert in medicine, surgery,
or pathology. His testimony fails to shed any light on the actual cause
of Lilian's death.
On the other hand, the respondents presented testimonies from Dr.
Inso himself and from two expert witnesses in pathology and surgery.
Dr. Ramos graduated from the Far Eastern University, Nicanor Reyes
Medical Foundation, in 1975. He took up his post-graduate internship
at the Quezon Memorial Hospital in Lucena City, before taking the
board exams. After obtaining his professional license, he underwent
residency training in pathology at the Jose R. Reyes Memorial Center
from 1977 to 1980. He passed the examination in Anatomic, Clinical,
and Physical Pathology in 1980 and was inducted in 1981. He also
took the examination in anatomic pathology in 1981 and was inducted
in 1982.[31]
At the time of his testimony, Dr. Ramos was an associate professor in
pathology at the Perpetual Help Medical School in Biñan, Laguna, and
at the De La Salle University in Dasmariñas, Cavite. He was the head
of the Batangas General Hospital Teaching and Training Hospital
where he also headed the Pathology Department. He also headed the
Perpetual Help General Hospital Pathology department.[32]
Meanwhile, Dr. Hernandez at that time was a General Surgeon with
27 years of experience as a General Practitioner and 20 years of
experience as a General Surgeon. He obtained his medical degree
from the University of Santo Tomas before undergoing five years of
residency training as a surgeon at the Veterans Memorial Center
hospital. He was certified as a surgeon in 1985. He also holds a
master's degree in Hospital Administration from the Ateneo de Manila
University.[33]
He was a practicing surgeon at the: St. Luke's Medical Center, Fatima
Medical Center, Unciano Medical Center in Antipolo, Manila East
Medical Center of Taytay, and Perpetual Help Medical Center in
Biñan.[34] He was also an associate professor at the Department of
Surgery at the Fatima Medical Center, the Manila Central University,
and the Perpetual Help Medical Center. He also chaired the
Department of Surgery at the Fatima Medical Center.[35]
Dr. Hernandez is a Fellow of the American College of Surgeons, the
Philippine College of Surgeons, and the Philippine Society of General
Surgeons. He is a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Surgery and a
member of the Philippine Medical Association and the Antipolo City
Medical Society.[36]
Dr. Hernandez affirmed that Dr. Inso did not deviate from the usual
surgical procedure.[37] Both experts agreed that Lilian could not have
died from bleeding of the appendical vessel. They identified Lilian's
cause of death as massive blood loss resulting from DIC.
To our mind, the testimonies of expert witnesses Dr. Hernandez and
Dr. Ramos carry far greater weight than that of Dr. Reyes. The
petitioner's failure to present expert witnesses resulted in his failure to
prove the respondents' negligence. The preponderance of evidence
clearly tilts in favor of the respondents.
Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable when the failure to observe
due care is not immediately apparent to the layman.
The petitioner cannot invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to shift
the burden of evidence onto the respondent. Res ipsa loquitur,
literally, "the thing speaks for itself;" is a rule of evidence that
presumes negligence from the very nature of the accident itself using
common human knowledge or experience.
The application of this rule requires: (1) that the accident was of a kind
which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) that
the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive: control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) that
the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution from the injured person.[38] The concurrence of these
elements creates a presumption of negligence that, if unrebutted,
overcomes the plaintiffs burden of proof.
This doctrine is used in conjunction with the doctrine of common
knowledge. We have applied this doctrine in the following cases
involving medical practitioners:
a. Where a patient who was scheduled for a cholecystectomy
(removal of gall stones) but was otherwise healthy suffered
irreparable brain damage after being administered anesthesia
prior to the operation.[39]
 b. Where after giving birth, a woman woke up with a gaping burn
wound close to her left armpit;[40]

c. The removal of the wrong body part during the operation; and

d. Where an operating surgeon left a foreign object (i.e., rubber

gloves) inside the body of the patient.[41]

The rule is not applicable in cases such as the present one where the
defendant's alleged failure to observe due care is not immediately
apparent to a layman.[42] These instances require expert opinion to
establish the culpability of the defendant doctor. It is also not
applicable to cases where the actual cause of the injury had been
identified or established.[43]

While this Court sympathizes with the petitioner's loss, the petitioner
failed to present sufficient convincing evidence to establish: (1) the
standard of care expected of the respondent and (2) the fact that Dr.
Inso fell short of this expected standard. Considering further that the
respondents established that the cause of Lilian's uncontrollable
bleeding (and, ultimately, her death) was a medical disorder -
Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation — we find no reversible
errors in the CA's dismissal of the complaint on appeal.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. No

costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ.,

concur.

G.R. No. 222740, September 28, 2016
ST. LUKE'S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE-WILLIAM H. QUASHA
MEMORIAL FOUNDATION, DR. BRIGIDO L. CARANDANG, AND
DR. ALEJANDRO P. ORTIGAS Petitioners, v. SPOUSES MANUEL
AND ESMERALDA PEREZ AND SPOUSES ERIC AND JURISITA
QUINTOS, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1
dated September 30, 2015 and the Resolution2 dated February 2,
2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 103529, which
rulings reversed the Decision dated July 7, 20143 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 84, Malolos City, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 145-
M-2012 and remanded the case to the trial court for reception of
evidence on the amount of damages to be awarded.
As a backgrounder, in 2006, the Commission on Higher Education
issued Memorandum Order No. 10, series of 2006 which required
medical students to undergo rotating clinical clerkship in their fourth
year. As such, petitioner St. Luke's College of Medicine (St. Luke's)
entered into a Memorandum of Intent with the Municipality of Cabiao,
Nueva Ecija for the construction of a community clinic. The said facility
consisted of a six-bed medical facility in the ground floor, and a
residential space for the medical staff in the second floor.
The undisputed facts, as amply summarized by the CA, are as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In February 2010, St. Luke's sent four (4) of its 4th year medical
students to the clinic, namely: plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Perez's
daughter Jessa, plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Quintos' daughter
Cecille, Jerillie Ann Murillo (Murillo) and Miguel Rafael Ramos
(Ramos). They were tasked to complete a four-week clerkship rotation
at the clinic and like the previous batches, they were housed in the
second floor of the clinic.
According to Ramos, he and his groupmates reported for duty at the
Cabiao clinic at approximately 10 o'clock in the morning of February 8,
2010. When their shift ended at 5 o'clock that afternoon, the group
went for a jog and returned to the clinic at around 7 o'clock in the
evening. They again went out at 9 o'clock in the evening to buy
beverages, cooking oil and other items needed for their breakfast the
next day and went to sleep sometime after midnight. Ramos admitted
that one of the beverages they bought was an alcoholic beverage
called The Bar, which consisted of either vodka or gin. He also
admitted that only he and Cecille drank the alcoholic beverage which
they mixed with the soda and that they did not consume the whole
bottle.
Ramos was awakened sometime between 3 o'clock and 3:30 in the
morning of February 9, 2010 when he heard Murillo shouting from the
other side of the room that there was a fire. Ramos immediately ran to
the door which led to the living room and when he opened the same,
he saw thick smoke coming from the left portion of the living room
where there was a glow. He also felt extreme heat, prompting him to
run to the bathroom to get a pail of water with which he tried to
extinguish the fire. The girls, who had followed him to the bathroom,
stayed behind. When Ramos' attempt to put out the fire proved to be
futile, he went back to the bathroom and poured water on the girls in
an attempt to alleviate the extreme heat coming from the fire.
According to Ramos, the smoke started to seep through the bathroom
door and the group had started shouting for help. After a considerable
amount of time, he heard somebody outside instructing him to get
back from the window. When he did so, somebody broke the window
and started to dismantle the iron grills barring the same. By that time,
Ramos had started losing consciousness due to smoke inhalation and
only remembered that he was being pulled out of the building through
the window.
Unfortunately, the fire resulted in the deaths of the female medical
students, including the daughters of plaintiffs-appellants due to smoke
inhalation resulting" to asphyxia.
As a result of the deaths, defendant-appellee St. Luke's compensated
the parents of the three deceased students in the amount of
PhP300,000.00 each from insurance proceeds. (Citations omitted)
The Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) conducted an investigation on
the incident, and in a Certification dated April 18, 2011, it certified that
the fire was "purely accidental in nature due to unattended cooking,"
to wit:4
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT as appearing on The Blotter Book No.
0304-0287, pages 17 and 18, the two storey Institutional building
owned by Local Government Unit (LGU) Cabiao, Nueva Ecija was
partially razed by fire including all the contents of the second floor that
transpired on or about 090245H February 2010. The estimated cost of
damage is two Million pesos (P2,000,000.00) more or less.
Result of investigation conducted by the Investigator on Case of this
station, Bureau of Fire Protection, Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, disclosed that
the fire was purely ACCIDENTAL IN NATURE due to UNATTENDED
COOKING that occurred at the kitchen of said floor and no evidence
were gathered to show that the fire was intentionally, deliberately or
maliciously set.
Respondents had their doubts. Thus:5
xxx. xxx, plaintiffs-appellants, requested for a meeting with defendant-
appellee Dr. Alejandro Ortigas, Associate Dean for Faculty and
Student Affairs of St. Luke's. During the meeting, plaintiffs-appellants
were surprised by the presence of defendants-appellees Dr. Brigido
Carandang, St. Luke's Dean of Medicine, the Municipal Health Officer
of Cabiao Dr. De Leon, as well as Municipal Fire Marshall of Cabiao
Baby Boy Esquivel, a Cabiao police officer and its barangay captain.
The officials informed plaintiffs-appellants that the fire was caused by
the gas burner left open by the victims which greatly disturbed
plaintiffs-appellants. In a subsequent meeting, they were informed that
there was also evidence that the victims were drinking alcoholic
beverages on the night of the fire which plaintiffs-appellants refused to
accept.
Convinced that there was a cover-up, plaintiffs-appellants continued to
question individual defendants-appellees. Exasperated, defendant-
appellee Dr. Carandang allegedly asked "Ano pa bang gusto ninyo sa
amin? Nakiramay na kami."
Offended and still unconvinced, respondent Spouses Manuel and
Esmeralda Perez, the parents of Jessa, and respondent Spouses Eric
and Jurisita Quintos, the parents of Cecille, sought the help of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). In its Resolution dated August
3, 2010, the existence of which is expressly admitted by petitioners,
having quoted the contents6 and having attached a copy thereof to the
present petition,7 the NBI declared that the construction of the Cabiao
Community Clinic building was in violation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9514 (R.A. No. 9514) or the Revised Fire Code of
the Philippines, that the cause of the fire was due to faulty electrical
wiring, and that St. Luke's negligence is criminal in nature. The
pertinent parts of the said Resolution reads:8
xxxx
2. The building structure of Cabiao Community Center
The Cabiao Community Clinic/Center is a two-storey concrete
building. The ground floor is used as the municipality's lie-in clinic or
hospital during day time. The students and in particular the victims
use this facility together with the. medical complement of the
municipality for their community medical service.
On the 2nd floor was the office of Dr. LEON DE LEON, Cabiao
Municipal Health Officer, adjacent was a storage room for office and
medical supplies and documents, the bedrooms for the medical
students rendering community service, a dining area, a kitchen, and
the living-room. The second floor, it may be said, is virtually dedicated
for the board and lodging of the students while on mission. These
rooms and areas are separated from each other by wood panels
made of plywood including the wall in which the gas stove was
located. All the windows at the second floor are also covered by
permanent iron grills. There are no fire exits, fire alarms, fire
extinguishers, sprinklers, emergency lights.
The community center is a virtual fire/death trap. During night
time, medical students were left alone inside the 2nd floor with
the main gate locked from the outside and with no apparent
signs of fire alarms, fire sprinklers, fire exit plan, emergency
lights, provisions of confining the fire to its source, among
others, for the occupants fire safety and protection system. They
were on their own at the second floor, without anyone (maid or
security guard) to attend to their needs while the ground floors and the
adjoining building were uninhabited.
3. The electrical system of Cabiao Community Clinic;
Engr. DAVID R. AOANAN, Chief Electrical Section of the (sic) and
member of the NBI investigating team observed that the facility has a
main circuit breaker and the two distribution panels, located at the
ground floor, just above the comfort room of the 2nd floor. The main
breaker has a 500 amp capacity while the two distribution panels
serving the 1st floor and the 2nd floor has 200 amp capacity, each, as
against the main electrical service wire with the size 14 mm.
The ratio between the capacity of the circuit breaker and the
electrical service wire is out of proportion and became
electrically insensitive to overload and wire short circuits;
thereby negating the very purpose the circuit breaker was
designed.
The size of service wire is Small, suitable only for lighting purposes
and not to supply two buildings, dedicated for public use. Six years of
use in overload capacity would have worn out the wire and its
strength and vitality, hence it will readily overheat,
notwithstanding at the time short circuits, only few bulbs were in
use.
The electrical meter used is appropriate only to residential units and
not to service the two buildings intended for public which are
[equipped] with modern medical equipment; the old NFA and the
[Cabiao] Community Clinic.
Both live service wire and secondary electrical wires were bundled
together inside the same tube. At the 2nd floor, visible signs of cut
wires were found inside a tube, including the service wire as it
pass through going down to the main panel board and several
cut wires of the secondary breaker going to the second floor for
power distribution.
The main and secondary panel boards were wrongly situated at
the ground floor, above which is the location of a comfort room,
where water could easily slip to the panel boards.
The installation of the secondary panel board at the ground floor
distributing power to the 2nd floor defeats its purpose,
considering that if electrical trouble happens at the 2nd floor one
has to go to the 1st floor to shut off the power.
4. The construction of the Cabiao Community Center building was in
violation of the provision of Republic Act No. 9514 (Revised Fire Code
of the Philippines)
Owners, occupants or administrator of buildings or structures are
required to incorporate and provide fire safety construction, protective
and warning systems. Investigation shows that a) there were no fire
protection features such as sprinkler systems, hose boxes, hose reels
or standpipe systems and other firefighting equipment; fire alarm
systems; b) no fire exit, fire exit plan for each floor of the building
showing the routes from each other [sic] room to appropriate exits,
displayed prominently on the door of such room; c) no properly
marked and lighted exits with provision for emergency light to
adequately illuminate exit ways in case of power failure, and d) no
provisions for confining the fire at its source such as fire resistive
floors and walls.
5. The Cabiao Bureau of Fire Protection failed to perform its
mandate pursuant to RA 9514.
Under the Fire Code, the Bureau of Fire Protection is required to
conduct fire safety inspections as pre-requisite to the grant of licenses
and permits for the use and occupancy of buildings, structures,
facilities and their premises including the installation of fire protections
and fire safety equipment and electrical systems in any building
structure or facility; and the storage of explosives or combustible,
flammable, toxic and other hazardous materials.
The BFP is likewise responsible for designating fire inspectors who
shall inspect every building at least once a year, and every time the
owner, administrator or occupant [renews] its business permit or
permit to occupy; to issue a business permit or permit to operate only
after securing a Fire Safety Inspection Certification (FSIC); require the
building owner occupant to submit plans and specifications and other
pertinent documents of building/structure in order to ensure
compliance of applicable codes and standards and issue a written
notice to the owner and/or contractor to stop work on portion of any
work due to absence or in violation of approved plans and
specifications; to inspect at reasonable time, any building, structure or
premises and order the owner/occupant to remove hazardous
materials and/or stop operation if the standards are not met; to
declare and summarily abate hazardous conditions of the buildings or
structures and/or declare the same as fire hazards.
It is worthy to note that despite the long period of time from the
occurrence of the fire until the termination of this investigation, the
Cabiao BFP headed by FO3 ESQUIVEL has yet to submit its report
and findings. However, inasmuch as FO3 ESQUIVEL has bungled
the investigation of the fire by removing items from the scene of
the fire and his failure to explain the disappearance of other
electrical debris, the opening and enlargement of the iron grill
where the sole survivor passed, the back door broken, and the
non-recording of the investigations, FO3 Esquivel's action and
behaviors are highly suspect of a massive cover up of the real
cause of the fire.
xxxx
7. St. Luke's negligence is criminal in nature.
St. Luke's College of Medicine - William H. Quasha Memorial, Inc.,
being the owner and operator of the Cabiao Community Clinic is not
without liability for the fate of the fire victims. As a learning
institution, which sends out its students to rural areas to comply
with its curriculum requirement, St. Luke's has the duty and
responsibility to see to it that the premises to where it sends its
students are safe. It is significant to stress that the Cabiao
Community Clinic was established by the Municipality of Cabiao and
the St. Luke's College of Medicine in line with the latter's expansion of
its Community Medicine undertaking to the rural areas in order to train
its students in health promotion and disease prevention as well as to
provide medical service to deserving population and to undertake
clinical research on various health practices.
The victims were sent there as part of their community medicine
module in the curriculum and their assignments were determined by
the officials of the College of Medicine.
8. The origin of fire.
The Cabiao BFP has manifested its prejudice and bias and thus,
cannot be an independent, reliable and credible investigator of
this fire incident. They could not even entertain any theory, other
than the gas burner, because in doing so would place themselves in
jeopardy. They even resorted to tampering of premises by
removing all electrical wire debris, thinking that in its absence,
fire caused by short circuits cannot be proven.
It is highly probable that the origin of fire is electrical based on
the Electrical Report No. 04-10-001 submitted by Engr. DAVID R.
AOANAN, Chief, Electrical Section, NBI because of the following.
i. Presence of thick black smoke that indicates heat caused by
short-circuit
ii. Explosion or tripping off of the transformer, then a black out -
showing therefore that the circuit breaker did not trip off
iii. Inspection of the main circuit breaker and the secondary
breakers show that these did not trip off
iv. Presence of short circuited wires located at the 2nd floor, where
buddle wires were found
v. Presence of numerous spliced wires or jumped wires in three
different convenient outlets
vi. Mainboard panel is mismatched with the service wire
vii. Other defective wirings
It is a well done theory that the cause of the fire was due to faulty
electrical wiring with two reasons to support it, first is the
physical manifestation as mentioned by Engr. DAVE AOANAN
who conducted evaluation/investigation on what is left on the
building of the Cabiao Community Clinic; second is the personal
experience of MIGUEL RAFAEL RAMOS y DAVID the lone
survivor of the incident [who] narrated what he perceived during
last hour before he was rescued. MIGUEL['s] narration contradict
the theories laid down by Fire Marshall BABY BOY ESQUIVEL that
the fire was by the negligence of the victims [whom] he suspect[s] to
have left [burning a] gas stove. MIGUEL'S narration specifically
pointed out that the fire was primarily coming from the living room and
not at the kitchen which is directly in front of their door way.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents then filed a Complaint for damages against petitioners
St. Luke's College of Medicine-William H. Quasha Memorial
Foundation, Dean of Medicine Brigido L. Carandang, and Associate
Dean for Faculty and Student Affairs Alejandro P. Ortigas, claiming
that their negligence caused the deaths of respondents' daughters.
Respondents maintained that, as a learning institution which sends
out its medical students to rural areas to comply with its curriculum
requirement, St. Luke's has the contractual duty and legal
responsibility to see to it that the premises to where it sends its
students are safe and that, in the case at bar, St. Luke's refused to
recognize its obligations/liabilities.9 Respondents thus prayed as
follows:10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that
judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiffs -
1. Finding the defendants negligent and liable under their contractual
and legal obligations to Jessa and Cecille;
2. Directing defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, actual,
moral and exemplary damages; and cralawlawlibrary
3. Ordering defendants to pay the cost of suits and attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs as the Honorable Court
may deem just and equitable under the premises.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.11 It held that the
Cabiao Community Clinic was not a fire trap as there were two (2) fire
exits, and that respondents failed to present any report or finding by a
competent authority that the said Clinic was not a safe and secure
place for the conduct of St. Luke's clerkship program. The RTC did not
take into consideration the NBI Report as it was allegedly not
presented.12chanrobleslaw
The RTC further held that the Clinic is owned by the Municipality of
Cabiao, and that the latter and/or its responsible officials should have
been impleaded as indispensable parties.13chanrobleslaw
14
The RTC summarized its findings in this manner:
Albeit the Court is saddened by what happened with the untimely
death of Perez and Quintos who are both very bright with promising
future in the field of medicine, it cannot however close its eyes on the
evidence submitted before it by placing the blame on the cause of
their death[s] to the defendants just to put the fault on anybody in
order to appease their grieving love[d] ones. For in the mind of the
Court, the omission of the defendants to secure a copy of the fire
safety license of the Clinic or verify if it has one prior to its
construction before allowing their senior medical students to occupy
and reside therein is not per se a negligent act. Neither is the failure of
the defendants to orient their senior medical students, who obviously
are of legal ages already such as the deceased, on how to take the
necessary measures for their safety and security before retiring to
sleep in the night considered negligent. Likewise, the failure of the
dialogue between the parties is not a legitimate ground to declare the
defendants negligent. Put differently, the Court is not persuaded that
there is basis or justification to adjudge the defendants negligent for
the accidental death of Perez and Quintos.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and remanded the
case to the RTC for reception of evidence on the amount of damages
to be awarded.15 Addressing the .preliminary issues, the CA held that
the Municipality of Cabiao was not an indispensable party as the
Complaint was one for damages based on the allegations in the
enrollment contract. It explained that:16
While there was indeed an allegation of St. Luke's ownership of the
clinic, bulk of the arguments in the complaint were based on St.
Luke's duty to ensure its students' safety based on its obligation as a
school. Not being contractually obligated to keep plaintiffs-appellants'
children safe from any risk as a result of school-sanctioned activities,
the Municipality of Cabiao cannot be considered an indispensable
party to the action as it was not a participant in the contract of
enrollment.
Moreover, the CA held that although schools cannot be insurers of its
students against all risks, in the case at bar, the safety of the victims
was within the reach of petitioners and the hazard of a fire was not
unforeseeable.17 Also, while the fire was beyond the control of
petitioners, their decision to house their students in a place where
there are no means of escape in case of such an emergency shows a
blatant disregard for the students' welfare.18chanrobleslaw
The CA elucidated as follows:19
The testimonies of Dr. Ortigas, Dr. Carandang and Dr. Macabulos all
show a lack of effort on their part to thoroughly inspect the conditions
of the building in relation to the safety of their enrolled medical
student-clerks.
According to Dr. Ortigas and Dr. Macabulos,20 they considered the
doors leading out from the pantry and the bedrooms as fire exits.
However, as doctors who presumably have a wider degree of
foresight than most, they failed to consider that a fire might break out
in areas which would block these doors that are merely ordinary exits.
Further, Dr. Ortigas himself testified that permits are not part of their
consideration for safety and that they do not specifically look for the
same [xxx.]
xxxx
Dr. Ortigas admitted that, as a doctor, he was not concerned with the
permits issued regarding the construction and safety of the building.
However, at the time he conducted the inspections of the clinic, he
was also the Associate Dean of St. Luke's College of Medicine with
the duty to ensure that the building was safe for the security of the
enrolled students of St. Luke's College of Medicine who would be
assigned to the clinic during their clerkship and he admittedly did not
consider the same.
As Associate Dean for Student Affairs, it would be reasonable to
expect Dr. Ortigas to show concern for the safety and security of the
students enrolled in the institution thus, ensure that the premises they
were to reside in would be properly equipped in case of fires and
other calamities. He himself stated that his position as such put him
"in charge of student and student affairs, xxx and in general, the non-
academic matters involving students and the faculty." Consequently, it
is safe to conclude that his task included the safety and welfare of the
students enrolled at St. Luke's College of Medicine, one which he
miserably failed to discharge.
Defendants-appellees also made a big deal out of the procedure of
asking feedback from students which led to the assumption that the
clinic was safe and habitable. However, it must be remembered that
the students that gave the feedback were more concerned with
passing their course and presumably trusted that the school would not
send them to a location which it has independently determined to be
unsafe.
xxxx
In relation, defendants-appellees defend their judgment to send
plaintiffs-appellants' daughters to the community clinic by contending
that there has been no untoward incident since the program began in
2004. xxx.
xxxx
The same argument also runs contrary to defendants-appellees'
acceptance of the construction of iron grills on the second floor
windows of the clinic. According to Dr. Ortigas, the same were
constructed in order to prevent people from using the same to enter
the building and not designed to prevent egress therefrom. Dr. Ortigas
was specificallly questioned if there were prior incidents of intrusion
into the clinic to which he replied in the negative. If defendants-
appellees' logic of "no untoward incident has happened" is to be
applied then, the presence of the grills was unnecessary in the same
way that they found the inspection of fire safety permits to be
unnecessary. It baffles the Court, therefore, that defendants-appellees
would accept the precaution against an admittedly unlikely intrusion
but ignore any safety measures against a fire which was a great
possibility given that the clinic had flammable equipment such as a
gas burner for cooking. (Citations omitted)
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA
committed reversible error when it: (a) held that the Municipality of
Cabiao was not an indispensable party,21 (b) disregarded the findings
of the BFP that the fire was purely accidental and caused by
unattended cooking,22 and (c) ruled that petitioners were
negligent.23chanrobleslaw
We deny the petition.
A perusal of the Complaint readily shows that respondents base their
cause of action on petitioners' breach of the contractual obligation, as
an educational institution, of ensuring that their students, in the
performance of a required school activity, would be safe and secure.
The Municipality of Cabiao, not being a party to said enrollment
contract, is not an indispensable party to the case.
An indispensable party is defined by the Rules of Court as a party-in-
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action.24
In the present case, respondents premise petitioners' liability on their
contractual obligation to their students and, certainly, complete relief
and a final judgment can be arrived at by weighing the claims and
defenses of petitioners and respondents, without need of evaluating
the claims and defenses of the Municipality of Cabiao. If at all, the
Municipality of Cabiao is a necessary party25cralawred whose non-
inclusion in the case at bar shall not prevent the court from
proceeding with the action.
Indeed, the present case is one between a school and its students,
with their relationship being based on the enrollment contracts. In the
illuminating case of PSBA, et al. v. CA, et al.,26 the Court had the
opportunity to lay down the principle that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to
pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements
and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in"
obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics
or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other
sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or
where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to
life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps
are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises
and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Indubitably, institutions of learning have the "built-in" obligation of
providing a conducive atmosphere for learning, an atmosphere where
there are no constant threats to life and limb, and one where peace
and order are maintained.
In the case at bar, the Cabiao Community Clinic is to be considered
as part of the campus premises of St. Luke's. In the course
description of the clerkship program in preventive and community
medicine, it is stated that the Cabiao Community Clinic serves as the
base operation of the clerkship program.27 As such, petitioner had the
same obligation to their students, even though they were stationed in
the Cabiao Community Clinic, and it was incumbent upon petitioners
to ensure that said Clinic was conducive for learning, that it had no
constant threats to life and limb, and that peace and order was
maintained thereat. After all, although away from the main campus of
St. Luke's, the students were still under the same protective and
supervisory custody of petitioners as the ones detailed in the main
campus.
In the performance of its contractual and inherent obligations, the
Court is mindful of the attendant difficulties on the part of institutions of
learning, and the Court recognizes that the latter cannot be an insurer
of its students against all risks. Thus, as also laid out in the PSBA
case, "the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of
its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence,
here statutorily defined to be the 'omission of that degree of diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to
the circumstances of persons, time and place."28chanrobleslaw
Our next query, then, is, in relation to the fire incident, did petitioners
commit a breach of contract through negligence?
A review of the records compels the Court to answer in the affirmative.
In Mendoza, et al. v. Sps. Gomez,29 we defined negligence as "the
failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person,
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."
In Gaid v. People,30 we enumerated the elements of simple negligence
as follows: (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the
offender, and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. We explained
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in
doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or
property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the
person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued?
If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or
to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to
exist.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, it is well to remember that the victims were in the
Cabiao Community Clinic because it was a requirement of petitioners.
The students were complying with an obligation under the enrollment
contract — they were rendering medical services in a community
center as required by petitioners. It was thus incumbent upon
petitioners to comply with their own obligations under the enrollment
contract - to ensure that the community center where they would
designate their students is safe and secure, among others.
Petitioners failed to take the necessary precautions to guard their
students against foreseeable harm. As correctly found by the CA,
petitioners were remiss in inspecting the premises of the Cabiao
Community Clinic and in ensuring that the necessary permits were in
order. These precautions could have minimized the risk to the safety
of the victims. Indeed, the CA had basis in making the following
pronouncement:32
In the instant case, as previously emphasized, defendants-appellees
were aware that its medical students were residing at the second floor
of the clinic. At the very least, during inspection, they should have
thoroughly inspected the building's physical appearance and the
documents pertinent to the premises to make sure that the same
minimized the risk to the safety of the students. There is no record
that any inquiry on the condition of the premises was even made by
defendants-appellees prior to the implementation of the program. In
addition to such failure, defendants-appellees would have this Court
believe that their participation in the clinic was limited to providing the
same with medical personnel without considering that such personnel
also included its students which St. Luke's was obliged to protect from
unnecessary danger.
The petitioners were obviously negligent in detailing their students to
a virtual fire trap. As found by the NBI, the Clinic was unsafe and was
constructed in violation of numerous provisions of the Revised Fire
Code of the Philippines. It had no emergency facilities, no fire exits,
and had no permits or clearances from the appropriate government
offices.
Petitioners additionally aver that the Clinic was built under the
direction, supervision, management and control of the Municipality of
Cabiao,33 and that it ensured that there was an agreement for the
Municipality of Cabiao to provide 24-hour security to the
Clinic.34chanrobleslaw
Petitioners, however, cannot escape liability based on these
arguments. As held in Saludaga v. FEU, et al.,35 a learning institution
should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate matters of
safety and security to a third party as to do so would result to
contracting away its inherent obligation of ensuring a safe learning
environment for its students.
In Saludaga, the Court chastised therein respondent Far Eastern
University (FEU) for its total reliance on a security agency as to the
qualifications of its security guards, viz:36
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to
ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them
actually possess the qualifications required in the Security Service
Agreement. It was not proven that they examined the clearances,
psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other vital documents
enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on the security
agency about these matters or failure to check the papers stating the
qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of respondents. A
learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or
abdicate security matters in its premises to the security agency it
hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation
to ensure a safe learning environment for its students.
Similarly, we cannot turn; a blind eye on petitioners' total reliance on
the Municipality of Cabiao in ensuring the safety and security of their
students. The enrollment contract is between petitioners and the
victims, and petitioners cannot abdicate' on their contractual obligation
to provide their students a safe learning environment, nor can it pass
or contract away such obligation to a third party.
Moreover, as to the stipulation of 24-hour security in the Clinic,
petitioners failed to present evidence that this stipulation was actually
enforced or that they took measures to ensure that it was enforced.
This, once more, shows petitioners' propensity of relying on third
parties in carrying out its obligations to its students.
It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of
the contract and the failure, of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief.37 In Gilat Satellite Networks, Ltd. v.
UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.,38 the Court
expounded:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not
permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of
misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of
the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured
party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost or
suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the
promissee that may include his "expectation interest," which is his
interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a
position as he would have been in had the contract been performed,
or his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for
loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a
position as he would have been in had the contract not been made; or
his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party. Indeed,
agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or for society,
unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of every
infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make RECOMPENSE to
the one who has been injured by the failure of another to observe his
contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances,
like proof of his exercise of due diligence x x x or of the attendance of
fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability. xxx.
(Emphasis omitted)
In the case at bar, it was amply shown that petitioners and the victims
were bound by the enrollment contracts, and that petitioners were
negligent in complying with their obligation under the said contracts to
ensure the safety and security of their students. For this contractual
breach, petitioners should be held liable.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court resolves to DENY

the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals'
Decision and Resolution.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J., on leave.

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Petitioners Eddie Cortel y Carna (Cortel) and Yellow Bus Line, Inc.
(Yellow Bus Line) assail the 16 October 2014 Decision[1] and 21 April
2015 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals Cagayan de Oro City in CA-
G.R. CV No. 02980. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification
the Judgment,[3] dated 27 April 2012, of the Regional Trial Court of
Midsayap, Cotabato, Branch 18 (trial court), finding petitioners jointly
and severally liable to the heirs of SP03 Robert C. Lim (Lim) for the
latter's death.
The Antecedent Facts
The Court of Appeals narrated the facts as follows:
On 29 October 2004, Cartel was driving a bus, operated by Yellow
Bus Line, which was on its way from Marbel, Koronadal to Davao City.
At around 9:45 in the evening, as the bus was traversing Crossing
Rubber in the Municipality of Tupi, South Cotabato, Cortel noticed two
trucks with glaring headlights coming from the opposite direction.
Cortel stated that he was driving at a speed of 40 to 50 kilometers per
hour. He claimed that upon noticing the trucks, he reduced his speed
to 20 kilometers per hour. However, the bus hit a black motorcycle
which allegedly had no tail light reflectors. The impact dragged the
motorcycle at a distance of three meters before it came to a full stop.
Lim, who was riding the motorcycle, was thrown upward and then
slammed into the bus, hitting the base of its right windshield wiper.
The motorcycle got entangled with the broken bumper of the bus.
According to Cortel, Lim was wearing a black jacket and was riding
without a helmet at the time of the accident.
Felix Larang (Larang), the bus conductor, alighted from the bus to aid
Lim. Larang gave instructions to Cortel to move back to release Lim
and the motorcycle from the front bumper of the bus. Two bystanders
proceeded to the scene to assist Lim. After reversing the bus and
freeing Lim and the motorcycle, Cortel drove the bus away and went
to a nearby bus station where he surrendered to authorities. Cortel
claimed that he left the scene of the incident because he feared for his
life.
Respondent Cecile Gepaya-Lim, Lim's widow, filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 05-010.
During trial, SPO4 Eddie S. Orencio (SPO4 Orencio), the officer who
investigated the incident, testified that Lim was driving a DT Yamaha
125 black motorcycle when the accident took place. Cortel's bus and
the motorcycle were going in the same direction. SPO4 Orencio
testified that that the bus bumped the motorcycle from behind. The
motorcycle's engine and chassis were severely damaged, while its
rear rim was totally damaged by the accident.
Yellow Bus Line presented and offered in evidence photographs
showing that the bus' right front windshield and wiper were damaged.
The bus' lower right side bumper was also perforated. During the
preliminary conference, Yellow Bus Line also presented Cortel's
certificates showing that he attended the following seminars: (1) Basic
Tire Care Seminar; (2) Basic Tire Knowledge and Understanding
Retreading; and (3) Traffic Rules and Regulations, Defensive Driving
and Road Courtesy Seminar.
However, the certificates were not offered in evidence during trial.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In its 27 April 2012 Judgment, the trial court established that Cortel
was at fault. The trial court found that the bus was running fast when it
bumped the motorcycle ridden by Lim. The trial court ruled that the
accident is the proximate cause of Lim's death. The trial court also
ruled that Yellow Bus Line failed to present sufficient evidence to
prove that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of Cortel.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders
judgment against Defendants Eddie Cortely Carna and likewise
against the owners of the Yellow Bus Line, Inc., numbered bus with
Body No. A-96, and bearing Plate No. LWE-614, with PDL No. L05-
30-002730; thus pursuant to [A]rticles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines[,] said Defendants are ordered to pay jointly
and severally to the plaintiffs the following amount:
In favor of the heirs of Robert C. Lim represented by Cecil[]e Gepaya
Lim as the surviving spouse, and with [a] living child, the death
compensation of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00),
plus x x x[:]
a) Funeral and burial expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00);
b) [C]ompensation for loss of earning capacity in the amount of
P100,000.00;
(c) x x x Damages [to] the motorcycle in the amount of [Fifteen
Thousand Pesos] (P15,000.00);
d) Attorney's fees of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00);
e) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioners appealed from the trial court's decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 16 October 2014 Decision, the Court of Appeals applied the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Lim died because of the collision
between the bus driven by Cortel and the motorcycle Lim was riding.
The Court of Appeals ruled that both vehicles were driving in the same
lane and were headed towards the same direction. The Court of
Appeals noted that vehicles running on highways do not normally
collide unless one of the drivers is negligent. The Court of Appeals
further ruled that Cortel had exclusive control and management of the
bus he was driving. The Court of Appeals found no evidence that Lim
had any contributory negligence in the accident that resulted to his
death. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners failed to prove that
the motorcycle had no headlights or that Lim was not wearing a
helmet. The Court of Appeals stated that even if the motorcycle was
black and Lim was wearing a black jacket, these were not prohibited
by traffic rules and regulations. The Court of Appeals noted that upon
impact, Lim's body was thrown upward, indicating that Cortel was
driving at high speed. The damages to the motorcycle and the bus
also disproved Cortel's allegation that he was only driving at the
speed of 20 kilometers per hour.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Yellow Bus Line failed to exercise the
care and diligence of a good father of a family in its selection and
supervision of its employees. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
certificates presented by Yellow Bus Line were not admissible in
evidence because the police officer who allegedly signed them was
not presented before the trial court. In addition, Yellow Bus Line did
not offer the certificates as evidence during trial.
The Court of Appeals modified the amount of damages awarded to
the heirs of Lim. Using the formula set by this Court in The Heirs of
Poe v. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc.[5] and Villa Rey Transit, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court of Appeals recomputed Lim's lost
earning capacity, as follows:
Life
2/3 x [80- age of deceased at the time of death]
expectancy =
2/3 x (80-41]
2/3 x [39]
FORMULA – NET EARNING CAPACITY (NEC)
If:
Age at time of death of Robert Lim = 41
Monthly Income at time of death = 13,715.00
Gross Annual Income (GAI)= [(P13,715.00) (12)] = P164,580.00
Reasonable/Necessary Living Expenses (R/NLE) – 50% of GAI =
P82,290
NEC = [2/3 (80-41)] [164,580-82,290]
 = [2/3 (39)] [82,290]
= [26] [82,290]
= P2,139,540.00[7]
Thus, the Court of Appeals found that the award of 100,000 as death
compensation given by the trial court to the heirs of Lim was
inadequate. However, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount of
death indemnity from 150,000 to 50,000. The Court of Appeals
deleted the 15,000 awarded by the trial court for the damages to the
motorcycle for absence of proof but awarded 25,000 for funeral and
burial expenses. In addition, the Court of Appeals awarded 100,000
as moral damages to the heirs of Lim. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals' decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Judgment dated 27 April 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court (Branch 18), 12th Judicial Region, Midsayap, Cotabato, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Defendant[]-appellants Eddie Cortel
and Yellow Bus Line, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay jointly and
severally plaintiff-appellee Cecile Gepaya-Lim the following:
(1) Funeral and burial expenses of P25,000.00;
(2) Actual damages for loss of earning capacity of P2,139,540.00;
(3) Moral damages amounting to P100,000.00;
(4) Death indemnity of P50,000.00; and
(5) Attorney's fees of P15,000.00
After this decision becomes final and executory, interest at 12% per
annum shall additionally be imposed on the total obligation until full
payment.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
denied the motion in its 21 April 2015 Resolution.
Hence, the recourse before this Court.
The Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error m affirming
with modifications the decision of the trial court.
The Ruling of this Court
We deny the petition.
Petitioners want this Court to review the factual findings of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals. Petitioners allege that the trial
court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the bus driven
by Cortel was running fast when the accident occurred and in applying
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in this case.
The rule is that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this Court.[9] It
is also settled that questions regarding the cause of vehicular accident
and the persons responsible for it are factual questions which this
Court cannot pass upon, particularly when the findings of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals are completely in accord.[10] While
there are exceptions to this rule, the Court finds no justification that
would make the present case fall under the exceptions.
As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the result of the collision
speaks for itself. If, indeed, the speed of the bus was only 20
kilometers per hour as Cortel claimed, it would not bump the
motorcycle traveling in the same direction with such impact that it
threw its rider upward before hitting the base of its right windshield
wiper. If Cortel was driving at 20 kilometers per hour, the bus would
not drag the motorcycle for three meters after the impact. The Court of
Appeals likewise considered the damages sustained by both the
motorcycle and the bus which indicated that Cortel was driving fast at
the time of the accident. As regards petitioners' allegation that Lim
was equally negligent because he was riding without a helmet and the
motorcycle had no tail lights, the Court of Appeals correctly found that
it was self-serving because petitioner did not present any evidence to
prove this allegation.
We agree that res ipsa loquitur applies m this case. The Court
explained this doctrine as follows:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the
mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to
an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on
defendant's part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means,
literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction,
that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or
circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part
of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with
negligence.
x x x [W]here it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused
the injury complained of was under the control or management of the
defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as
in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its
control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence,
or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was
caused by the defendant's want of care.
xxxx
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the
defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury
either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and
therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to
rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to
establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is
grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause,
whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the
defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.[11]
The elements of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the accident is of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened
except for the defendant's negligence; (2) the accident must have
been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.[12]
In this case, Cortel had the exclusive control of the bus, including its
speed. The bus and the motorcycle were running in the same traffic
direction and as such, the collision would not have happened without
negligence on the part of Cortel. It was established that the collision
between the bus and the motorcycle caused Lim's death. Aside from
bare allegations that petitioners failed to prove, there was nothing to
show that Lim had contributory negligence to the accident.
The rule is when an employee causes damage due to his own
negligence while performing his own duties, there arises a
presumption that his employer is negligent.[13] This presumption can
be rebutted only by proof of observance by the employer of the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of its employees. In this case, we agree with the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that Yellow Bus Line failed to prove that it exercised
due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. Cortel's certificates of attendance to
seminars, which Yellow Bus Line did not even present as evidence in
the trial court, are not enough to prove otherwise.
We sustain the Court of Appeals in its award of loss of earning
capacity and damages to respondent. The increase in the award for
loss of earning capacity is proper due to the computation of the award
in accordance with the following formula:
Net earning capacity Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income- Living
Expenses (50% of gross annual income)], where life expectancy 2/3
(80 - the age of the deceased).[14]
We note that the Court of Appeals clearly intended to award to
respondent temperate damages amounting to P25,000 for burial and
funeral expenses, instead of the P15,000 representing the actual
damage to the motorcycle awarded by the trial court, because no
evidence was presented to prove the same. However, the term
"temperate damages" was inadvertently omitted in the dispositive
portion of the Court of Appeals' decision although it was stated that
the amount was for funeral and burial expenses. We reduce the
interest rate to 6% per annum on all damages awarded from the date
of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with
MODIFICATION the 16 October 2014 Decision and 21 April 2015
Resolution of the Court of Appeals Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R.
CV No. 02980. We ORDER petitioners Eddie Cortel y Carna and
Yellow Bus Line, Inc. to pay jointly and severally respondent Cecile
Gepaya-Lim the following:

(1) Award for loss of earning capacity amounting to P2,139,540;

(2) Temperate damages amounting to P25,000;
(3) Death indemnity amounting to P50,000;
(4) Moral damages amounting to P100,000; and
(5) Attorney's fees amounting to P15,000

We impose an interest rate of 6% per annum on all damages awarded

from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.


Facts
DMCI started construction of Torre De Manila Condominium, after it
was issued Building permit by the City Of Manila Office allowing it to
build a 49 Storey with Basement & 2 penthouse Level Residential
Conduminium.
However the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121
enjoining the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the
Building Permit og DMC citing among others, that “the Torre de Manila
Condominium, based on their development plans, upon completion,
will rise up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly
dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such towering heights, would
certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal
Roxas Boulevard vantage point.”
Building Official Melvin Q. Balagot then sought the opinion of the City
of Manila’s City Legal Officer on whether he is bound to comply with
Resolution No. 121.8 In his letter dated 12 September 2012, City
Legal Officer Renato G. Dela Cruz stated that there is “no legal
justification for the temporary suspension of the Building Permit
issued in favor of [DMCI-PDI]” since the construction “lies outside the
Luneta Park” and is “simply too far to be a repulsive distraction or
have an objectionable effect on the artistic and historical significance”
of the Rizal Monument.9 He also pointed out that “there is no showing
that the [area of] subject property has been officially declared as an
anthropological or archeological area. Neither has it been
categorically designate.
National Historical Commission of the Philippines Dr. Maria Serena I.
Diokno maintained that the Torre de Manila project site is outside the
boundaries of the Rizal Park and well to the rear of the Rizal
Monument, and thus, cannot possibly obstruct the frontal view of the
National Monument.
On 26 November 2013, following an online petition against the Torre
de Manila project that garnered about 7,800 signatures, the City
Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 146, reiterating its directive in
Resolution No. 121 enjoining the City of Manila’s building officials to
temporarily suspend DMCI-PDI’s Building Permit.
Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) issued
Zoning Board Resolution No. 06, Series of 2013, recommending the
approval of DMCI-PDI’s application for variance, which was later on
amended.
The City Council resolution later states that “the City Council of
Manila find[s] no cogent reason to deny and/or reverse the
aforesaid recommendation of the [MZBAA] and hereby ratifies]
and confirm[s] all previously issued permits, licenses and
approvals issued by the City [Council] of Manila for Torre de
Manila[.]”
On 12 September 2014, the Knights Of Rizal, a “civic, patriotic,
cultural, non- partisan, non-sectarian and non-profit organization”18
created under Republic Act No. 646,19 filed a Petition for Injunction
seeking a temporary restraining order, and later a permanent
injunction, against the construction of DMCI- PDI’s Torre de
Manila condominium project. The KOR argues that the subject
matter of the present suit is one of “transcendental importance,
paramount public interest, of overarching significance to society,
or with far- reaching implication” involving the desecration of the
Rizal Monument.
Issues
1. Whether or not Torre De Manila is a nuisance per se.
3. Torre de Manila is Not a Nuisance Per Se.
In its petition, the KOR claims that the Torre de Manila is a nuisance
per’ se that deserves to be summarily abated even without judicial
proceedings.87 However, during the Oral Arguments, counsel for the
KOR argued that the KOR now believes that the Torre de Manila is a
nuisance per accidens and not a nuisance per se.88
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety
of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with
the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.
The Court recognizes two kinds of nuisances. The first, nuisance per
se, is one “recognized as a nuisance under any and all
circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health
or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the
undefined law of necessity.”89 The second, nuisance per accidens, is
that which “depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and
its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due
hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a
thing in law constitutes a nuisance.”90
It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per
se. The Torre de Manila project cannot be considered as a “direct
menace to public health or safety.” Not only is a condominium project
commonplace in the City of Manila, DMCI-PDI has, according to the
proper government agencies, complied with health and safety
standards set by law. DMCI-PDI has been granted the following
permits and clearances prior to starting the project: (1) Height
Clearance Permit from the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines;91
(2) Development Permit from the HLURB;92 (3) Zoning Certification
from the HLURB;93 (4) Certificate of Environmental Compliance
Commitment from the Environment Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources;94 (5) Barangay
Clearance;95 (6) Zoning Permit;96 (7) Building Permit;97 (8) and
Electrical and Mechanical Permit.98
Later, DMCI-PDI also obtained the right to build under a variance
recommended by the MZBAA and granted by the City Council of
Manila. Thus, there can be no doubt that the Torre de Manila project is
not a nuisance per se.
On the other hand, the KOR now claims that the Torre de Manila is a
nuisance per accidens.
By definition, a nuisance per accidens is determined based on its
surrounding conditions and circumstances. These conditions and
circumstances must be well established, not merely alleged. The
Court cannot simply accept these conditions and circumstances as
established facts as the KOR would have us do in this case.99 The
KOR itself concedes that the question of whether the Torre de Manila
is a nuisance per accidens is a question of fact.100
The authority to decide when a nuisance exists is an authority to find
facts, to estimate their force, and to apply rules of law to the case thus
made.101 This Court is no such authority. It is not a trier of facts. It
cannot simply take the allegations in the petition and accept these as
facts, more so in this case where these allegations are contested by
the respondents.
The task to receive and evaluate evidence is lodged with the trial
courts. The question, then, of whether the Torre de Manila project is a
nuisance per accidens must be settled after due proceedings brought
before the proper Regional Trial Court. The KOR cannot circumvent
the process in the guise of protecting national culture and heritage.
The TRO must be lifted.
Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights and
prevent further injury102 until final adjudication on the merits of
the case. In the present case, since the legal rights of the KOR
are not well-defined, clear, and certain, the petition for
mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO lifted.
The general rule is that courts will not disturb the findings of
administrative agencies when they are supported by substantial
evidence. In this case, DMCI-PDI already acquired vested rights in the
various permits, licenses, or even variances it had applied for in order
to build a 49-storey building which is, and had been, allowed by the
City of Manila’s zoning ordinance.
As we have time and again held, courts generally hesitate to review
discretionary decisions or actions of administrative agencies in the
absence of proof that such decisions or actions were arrived at with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In JRS Business Corp. v. Montesa,103 we held that mandamus is the
proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part
of a tribunal in the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty, or there was an unlawful exclusion of a party from
the use and enjoyment of a right to which he is clearly entitled. Only
specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear
and certain. If the legal rights of the petitioner are not well-defined,
definite, clear, and certain,104 the petition must be dismissed. Stated
otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers
powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a
power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.105
In sum, bearing in mind the Court does not intervene in discretionary
acts of the executive department in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion,106 and considering that mandamus may only be issued to
enforce a clear and certain legal right,107 the present special civil
action for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO issued earlier
must be lifted.
There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de
Manila.
In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission,53 the Court
held that “what is not expressly or impliedly prohibited by law
may be done, except when the act is contrary to morals, customs
and public order.” This principle is fundamental in a democratic
society, to protect the weak against the strong, the minority against
the majority, and the individual citizen against the government. In
essence, this principle, which is the foundation of a civilized society
under the rule of law, prescribes that the freedom to act can be
curtailed only through law. Without this principle, the rights, freedoms,
and civil liberties of citizens can be arbitrarily and whimsically
trampled upon by the shifting passions of those who can shout the
loudest, or those who can gather the biggest crowd or the most
number of Internet trolls. In other instances,54 the Court has allowed or
upheld actions that were not expressly prohibited by statutes when it
determined that these acts were not contrary to morals, customs, and
public order, or that upholding the same would lead to a more
equitable solution to the controversy. However, it is the law itself-
Articles 130655 and 1409(1 )56 of the Civil Code- which prescribes that
acts not contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy are allowed if also not contrary to law.
In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila
project is “contrary to morals, customs, and public order” or that it
brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. On the contrary, the
City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the
standards set under the pertinent laws and local ordinances to
construct its Torre de Manila project.
There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law
prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on
the background “view, vista, sightline, or setting” of the Rizal
Monument.
Zoning, as well as land use, in the City of Manila is governed by
Ordinance No. 8119. The ordinance provides for standards and
guidelines to regulate development projects of historic sites and
facilities within the City of Manila.
Specifically, Section 47 reads:
SEC. 47. Historical Preservation and Conservation Standards.-
Historic sites and facilities shall be conserved and preserved. These
shall, to the extent possible, be made accessible for the educational
and cultural enrichment of the general public.
The following shall guide the development of historic sites and
facilities:
1. Sites with historic buildings or places shall be developed to
conserve and enhance their heritage values.
2. Historic sites and facilities shall be adaptively re-used.
3. Any person who proposes to add, to alter, or partially demolish
a designated heritage property will require the approval of the
City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) and shall be
required to prepare a heritage impact statement that will
demonstrate to the satisfaction of CPDO that the proposal will
not adversely impact the heritage significance of the property
and shall submit plans for review by the CPDO in coordination
with the National Historical Institute (NHI).
4. Any proposed alteration and/or re-use of designated heritage
properties shall be evaluated based on criteria established by
the heritage significance of the particular property or site.
5. Where an owner of a heritage property applies for approval to
demolish a designated heritage property or properties, the
owner shall be required to provide evidence to satisfaction that
demonstrates that rehabilitation and re-use of the property is
not viable.
6. Any designated heritage property which is to be demolished or
significantly altered shall be thoroughly documented for
archival purposes with a history, photographic records, and
measured drawings, in accordance with accepted heritage
recording guidelines, prior to demolition or alteration.
7. Residential and commercial infill in heritage areas will be
sensitive to the existing scale and pattern of those areas,
which maintains the existing landscape and streetscape
qualities of those areas, and which does not result in the loss
of any heritage resources.
8. Development plans shall ensure that parking facilities (surface
lots, residential garages, stand-alone parking garages and
parking components as parts of larger developments) are
compatibly integrated into heritage areas, and/or are
compatible with adjacent heritage resources.
9. Local utility companies (hydro, gas, telephone, cable) shall be
required to place metering equipment, transformer boxes,
power lines, conduit, equipment boxes, piping, wireless
telecommunication towers and other utility equipment and
devices in locations which do not detract from the visual
character of heritage resources, and which do not have a
negative impact on its architectural integrity.
10. Design review approval shall be secured from the CPDO for
any alteration of the heritage property to ensure that design
guidelines and standards are met and shall promote
preservation and conservation of the heritage property.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that the standards laid down in Section 47 of Ordinance No.
8119 only serve as guides, as it expressly states that “the following
shall guide the development of historic sites and facilities.” A guide
simply sets a direction or gives an instruction to be followed by
property owners and developers in order to conserve and enhance a
property’s heritage values.
On the other hand, Section 48 states:
SEC. 48. Site Performance Standards.- The City considers it in the
public interest that all projects are designed and developed in a safe,
efficient and aesthetically pleasing manner. Site development shall
consider the environmental character and limitations of the site and its
adjacent properties. All project elements shall be in complete harmony
according to good design principles and the subsequent development
must be visually pleasing as well as efficiently functioning especially in
relation to the adjacent properties and bordering streets.
The design, construction, operation and maintenance of every facility
shall be in harmony with the existing and intended character of its
neighborhood. It shall not change the essential character of the said
area but will be a substantial improvement to the value of the
properties in the neighborhood in particular and the community in
general.
Furthermore, designs should consider the following:
1. Sites, buildings and facilities shall be designed and developed
with regard to safety, efficiency and high standards of design.
The natural environmental character of the site and its
adjacent properties shall be considered in the site
development of each building and facility.
2. The height and bulk of buildings and structures shall be so
designed that it does not impair the entry of light and
ventilation, cause the loss of privacy and/or create nuisances,
hazards or inconveniences to adjacent developments.
3. Abutments to adjacent properties shall not be allowed without
the neighbor’s prior written consent which shall be required by
the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) prior to the
granting of a Zoning Permit (Locational Clearance).
 4. The capacity of parking areas/ lots shall be per the minimum
requirements of the National Building Code. These shall be
located, developed and landscaped in order to enhance the
aesthetic quality of the facility. In no case, shall parking areas/
lots encroach into street rights-of- way and shall follow the
Traffic Code as set by the City.
5. Developments that attract a significant volume of public modes
of transportation, such as tricycles, jeepneys, buses, etc., shall
provide on-site parking for the same. These shall also provide
vehicular loading and unloading bays so as street traffic flow
will not be impeded.
6. Buffers, silencers, mufflers, enclosures and other noise-
absorbing materials shall be provided to all noise and
vibration-producing machinery. Noise levels shall be
maintained according to levels specified in DENR DAO No. 30-
Abatement of Noise and Other Forms of Nuisance as Defined
by Law.
7. Glare and heat from any operation or activity shall not be
radiated, seen or felt from any point beyond the limits of the
property.
8. No large commercial signage and/or pylon, which will be
detrimental to the skyline, shall be allowed.
9. Design guidelines, deeds of restriction, property management
plans and other regulatory tools that will ensure high quality
developments shall be required from developers of
commercial subdivisions and condominiums. These shall be
submitted to the City Planning and Development Office
(CPDO) for review and approval. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the
“development of historic sites and facilities.” Section 48 regulates
“large commercial signage and/or pylon.” There is nothing in
Sections 47 and 48 of Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the
construction of a building outside the boundaries of a historic site
or facility, where such building may affect the background of a
historic site. In this case, the Torre de Manila stands 870 meters
outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument and “cannot possibly
obstruct the front view of the [Rizal] Monument.”57 Likewise, the Torre
de Manila is not in an area that has been declared as an
“anthropological or archeological area” or in an area designated as a
heritage zone, cultural property, historical landmark, or a national
treasure by the NHCP.58
Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the
subject of arts and culture, provides that “[t]he State shall conserve,
promote and popularize the nation’s historical and cultural heritage
and resources x x x.” Since this provision is not self-executory,
Congress passed laws dealing with the preservation and conservation
of our cultural heritage.
One such law is Republic Act No. 10066,59 or the National Cultural
Heritage Act of 2009, which empowers the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts and other cultural agencies to issue a cease and
desist order “when the physical integrity of the national cultural
treasures or important cultural properties [is] found to be in danger of
destruction or significant alteration from its original state.”60 This
law declares that the State should protect the “physical integrity” of
the heritage property or building if there is “danger of destruction or
significant alteration from its original state.” Physical integrity refers
to the structure itself- how strong and sound the structure is. The
same law does not mention that another project, building, or property,
not itself a heritage property or building, may be the subject of a
cease and desist order when it adversely affects the background view,
vista, or sightline of a heritage property or building. Thus, Republic Act
No. 10066 cannot apply to the Torre de Manila condominium project.
A FINAL WORD
It had been Rizal’s wish to die facing the rising sun. In his Mi Ultimo
Adios, the poem he left for his family the night before he was
executed, Rizal wrote:
Yo muero cuando veo que el cielo se colora Y al fin anuncia el dia
tras lobrego capuz108
[Ako y mamamatay, ngayong namamalas na sa Silanganan ay
namamanaag yaong maligayang araw na sisikat sa likod ng luksang
nagtabing na ulap.]109
[I die just when I see the dawn break, Through the gloom of night, to
herald the day]110
background- the blue sky above Manila Bay- would forever be clear of
obstruction, and we would be faithful to Rizal’s dying wish.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 16
June 2015 is LIFTED effective immediately.

Yet at the point of his execution, he was made to stand facing West SO ORDERED.
towards Manila Bay, with his back to the firing squad, like the traitor
the colonial government wished to portray him. He asked to face his
executioners, facing the East where the sun would be rising since it
was early morning, but the Spanish captain did not allow it. As he was .
shot and a single bullet struck his frail body, Rizal forced himself, with
his last remaining strength, to turn around to face the East and thus
he fell on his back with his face to the sky and the rising sun. Then,
the Spanish captain approached Rizal and finished him off with one
pistol shot to his head.

Before his death, Rizal wrote a letter to his family. He asked for a
simple tomb, marked with a cross and a stone with only his name and
the date of his birth and death; no anniversary celebrations; and
interment at Paang Bundok (now, the Manila North Cemetery). Rizal
never wanted his grave to be a burden to future generations.

The letter never made it to his family and his wishes were not carried
out. The letter was discovered many years later, in 1953. By then, his
remains had been entombed at the Rizal Monument, countless
anniversaries had been celebrated, with memorials and monuments
built throughout the world.

Rizal’s wish was unmistakable: to be buried without pomp or

pageantry, to the point of reaching oblivion or obscurity in the future.111
For Rizal’s life was never about fame or vainglory, but for the country
he loved dearly and for which he gave up his life.

The Rizal Monument is expressly against Rizal’s own wishes. That

Rizal’s statue now stands facing West towards Manila Bay, with
Rizal’s back to the East, adds salt to the wound. If we continue the
present orientation of Rizal’s statue, with Rizal facing West, we would
be like the Spanish captain who refused Rizal’s request to die facing
the rising sun in the East. On the other hand, if Rizal’s statue is made
to face East, as Rizal had desired when he was about to be shot, the