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JE MAINTIENDRAI:
Vernon D. Sorrell
,Dry
Submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree
Master of Arts
in the Department of West European Studies,
Indiana University
June 1989
Dist ) [:.:,
Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in
partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of
Master of Arts.
Thesis Committee 1.
William Z. Shetter, Ph.D.
Chairman
ii
row
To J.K.A. Groenewoud
VS
Bloomington, Indiana
June, 1989
iv
VITA
EDUCATION:
PROFESSIONAL INFORMATION:
MILITARY EDUCATION:
OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS:
B - Organizational Charts
vi
INTRODUCTION
-- m.,.,... m mmm m m i1
are responsible for securing and facilitating NATO Lines of
contrast the Dutch Army with the other armed services of the
2
successfully accomplishing its primary missions on the
3
CHAPTER I
4
Briel (1572) and causing a general uprising in the provinces
established.
5
successes during the revolution but by its involvement in
6
forced James II to seek refuge in France. William's ascent to
throne.
In the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the
Dutch Army was defeated in the battles at Fontenay, Tournai,
and Rocoux by the French Army, which threatened to exploit
its successes to the north. French territorial conquests were
annulled, however, by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748).
7
War of Austrian Succession and weary of the financial burdens
force at Den Helder (1799), and joined the French Army in the
8
Dutch soldiers, mostly conscripts, fought as part of the
9
of French military intervention, however, prompted the Dutch
10
was forced to withdraw to its main line of defense fairly
Bernhard in Zeeland.
formations.
From liberation in 1945 to 1951, the reconstituted Dutch
11
primarily engaged in the East Indies. Largely as a result of
12
virtue of its missions against an elusive enemy requiring
high land or amphibious mobility, physical stamina and
logistical self reliance.1 9 Unable to compete effectively for
new recruits with the Royal Army at home, the KNIL relied
heavily on foreigners and natives to replenish its ranks.2 0
Financial shortages and an intense rivalry with the Royal
Dutch Navy resulted in the KNIL being downgraded from an army
13
to 1953. 23
Tensions between the Netherlands and Indonesia resulted
Lebanon (1979-1983).
14
threefold: 1) a greater public and political pragmatism
regarding the limited size of the country and its relatively
small population; this was further exacerbated by the Belgian
15
Chapter I - Endnotes
5. Switzer, 31-33.
7. Switzer, 28-29.
8. Ibid., 30.
16
9. C.M. Schulten, "De Koninklijke Landmacht en Haar
Geschiedenis sinds 1813," Ons Leger, March !987, 23.
17
responsible for securing the "outer islands" from both an
internal as well as external threat. No small task, given
that the combined length of coastlines in the territory
exceeded the circumference of the earth. See: G. Teiler, "An
Outline of the Military History of the Dutch East Indies," Je
Maintiendrai., 141.
18
CHAPTER II
deterrence.
19
the estuaries of the Rhine, Maas and Scheldt rivers, and is
known as the "Gateway to Europe." A vast network of roads and
waterways connects harbor and airfield facilities in the
Netherlands to the heavily industrialized Ruhr. Dutch transit
trade has traditionally been the cornerstone of its economy
and currently accommodates nearly 40% of all European cross-
20
virtue of its international economic interdependence and
Dutch are the 2nd and 20th Guards Armies of the Group Soviet
21
within NATO regarding a possible war in the Central Region;
22
maximize the involvement of the United States; 2) The
23
Defense Organization and Force Structure
Ministry of Defense
requests.
Following a 1974 reorganization, the Defense Ministry is
structured in essentially four administrative levels (the
24
ministry, the central organization, the armed service boards,
Royal Belgian Navy since 1948 and the Naval Commander of the
25
Orion patrol aircraft, and 22 Lynch helicopters. 1 9
refitted Walrus. 2 1
26
h. -mm mm m-l
all equipped with operational F16 fighters, one transport
27
The main missions of the Royal Netherlands Army (KL)
conscripts.
28
W N -,A - . - - d
(15.0).26
40% of the defense budget, the navy and air force 20% each,
29
the Marechaussee 2%, and the central organization, pension
30
system (EDDS). 32 In the first instance, however, the
31
the "hidden costs" of its NATO contribution with respect to
FINABEL
32
National Armaments Directors (CNAD), a NATO agency, and the
years. 36
1986. Since 1984 other European NATO states have applied for
membership: Portugal (1984), Turkey (1987), and Greece,
33
-
Eurogroup
34
3
to air missile developments. 9
NATO. Among the armed services, the army has generally been
largest service.
35
regional cooperation and stabilization in economical,
36
Chapter II - Endnotes
37
ranges) in Europe is reportedly as follows: 600 Scud B
(300km); 130 SS21 (100km); 630 Frog (70km) and numerous dual-
capable artillery pieces. NATO, in addition to its dual-
capable artillery, deploys 90 Lance (90km). NATO and Warsaw
Pact Force Comparisons and Rilksbegroting 1988, 7.
38
20. Rik Kuethe, "In de Walrus-affaire valt mij werkelijk
niets te verwijten." and Frank Lafort, "PvdA wil Walrus-
enquite." Elseviers Magazine (October 4 and August 30, 1986)
15-19 and 12, respectively.
21. Riiksbeproting 1988, 21-22.
39
33. L. BUcher, Europese Defensiesamenwerking (HKS Lecture
Transcript, 1-33, September 4, 1987); NAVQ Vademecum (The
Hague: Ministry of Defense, January 1981); and "Defense in
Europe," PB (Spring 1988).
40
CHAPTER III
41
addition to the BLS/CLAS, the board is comprised of the
42
mobilization, war preparations, and territorial aspects of
Dutch national security. To meet these responsibilities, the
the BLS: the First Dutch Army Corps (ILK); the National
the three divisions (1st, 4th and 5th divisions) but can
of combat efficiency. 5
43
are entirely mobilizable and the other brigades, except for
44
inclusive of ammunition, spare parts and fuels. Additionally,
vehicles. 8
45
responsibility for NTC missions, local implementatio 1
authorization has generally been delegated to the Provincial
46
law, coordination between civil and military authorities at
Commando Corps
47
in addition to its own training program, provides airborne
respectively.
Communications Command
Training Command
48
The Traing Command (COKL) headquarters is at Amersfoort.
Medical Command
49
teams scattered throughout the country. These paramilitary
platoons.
50
3 Air Defense 2 1 0 95 PRTL, 35mm
60 L/70, 40mm
479 Stingers, SAM
18 kilometers, respectively.
Current modernization projects of the KL include: the
51
Personnel Cycles and Retention
Personnel Cycles
52
called the Unit Accession System (ONDAS) and is
53
as Category B officers. These officers are restricted to
upon completion.
Whereas the OCT and the KMA provide primary officer
54
-4 - -
Retention
55
from Europe and a curtailment of Dutch defense
expenditures.21
in subsequent chapters.
56
Chapter III - Endnotes
9. Griffioen., 2-6.
57
the 41st Armor Brigade, have one or two companies on
Immediate Recall or RIM status. These units would rejoin
their battalions under ONDAS. Information sources: The
Military Balance 1988-1989 (London: IISS, 1988) 72-73;
Defensienota 1984 30-35; Defence White Paper 1984 23-27; and
"Defensie," Rilksbegroting 1988 (The Hague: Tweede Kamer der
Staten Generaal, 1987-1988).
14. Wilmink. Ibid., 33-35.
58
CHAPTER IV
Dutch Politics
59
not been an insurmountable obstacle to the
development and firm persistence of a stable,
effective, and legitimate parliamentary democracy
which has served the people well and which has by
and large ''3enjoyed their active support or
acquiescence.
ten parties are represented in the Eerste Kamer and only nine
parties in the Tweede Kamer of the Staten Generaal, the First
60
three times (1972, 1981 and 1982).
measures.
L C R
Political Parties
61
interests of particular religious and economic groups, has
Appeal (CDA) was formed between 1976 and 1980. Key elements
62
nine ministers, including Prime Minister Lubbers.
the CDA.
63
Democrats 66 and the Reformational Political Federation
chambers of parliament.
64
Netherlands Communist Party (CPN) appeals to left-wing
its low electorate support in 1986 and marked the first time
Europe.
of 3% annually.
65
were largely along party lines:
Dutch elections are generally low key affairs and are fairly
66
generally understood that the PvdA would return to government
the expectation was that the PvdA would win 56 and the CDA 46
won 54 and the PvdA settled for 52 seats. The CDA gains were
were largely offset by larger CDA gains. CDA and VVD support
Utrecht.
67
State of the Economy
around 14% the past two years. When natural gas flowed in
68
five Dutch workers is over 55 and eight of ten presently
armed services.
The main risks to the Dutch economy, however, continue to
"black" economy and, not unlike Belgium, tax fraud has become
Foreign Interests
69
The Netherlands is an active proponent of closer regional
the 4th largest economic entity in the world, after the USA,
Japan and West Germany. Additionally, the combined capacity
70
737-300s, 747s, telecommunications equipment, computers and
71
transport role, the Dutch government has taken firm action
20
against suspecLed violators.
72
for more lucrative opportunities in the civilian sector.
perspective.
73
The Media
74
1. Independent Centrist
De Telegraaf 705,600
Algemeen Dagblad 392,000
1,097,000
2. Leftist
530,500
3. Independent Conservative
504,800
The Alliance
75
50,000 troops and 5,000 tanks in Eastern Europe and planned
before 1995.
Task Specialization
76
specialization. One such notion was recently popularized by
Berkhof in De Telegraaf.
77
battle tanks despite expensive modifications.
soldiers.
Public Perceptions
Since 1963, polls have indicated that the public by and large
78
4% felt it should be less.
Social Influences
79
Staphorst, have traditionally eschewed drastic cultural
80
a national scale, compromised with the dissidents within its
81
The Netherlands army has traditionally employed a large
The period between 1979 and 1985 was a turbulent one for
82
Missiles at the Woensdrecht Airbase, resulted in an
active within the peace movement, led the Soviet Analyst, LTC
83
norms. Various political and socio-economical factors
development.
84
formulate its own opinions.
the Alliance.
than authoritarianism.
85
Chapter IV - Endnotes
86
D'66 6.1% 9 6.7% 5
SGP 1.7% 3 2.1% 1
PPR 1.3% 2 2.5% 1
PSP 1.2% 1 0.5% 1
GVP 1.0% 1 0.6% 1
RPF 0.9% 1 0.2% 1
CPN 0.6% 0 0.6% 1
EVP 0.2% 0 n/a 0
Others 1.7% 0 n/a 0
150 75
87
13. F.G. de Ruiter. "Na 2000 daling van aantal
Nederlanders." NRC Handelsblad (March 27, 1987).
88
DC: USIA, 1985) 1-5.
27. Ibid.
89
four years in prison, two years of which were suspended.
Petty thieves convicted of 46 burglaries were sentenced to a
22-day excursion to a mountain camp on the Mediterranean
coastline. Source: Painton, Ibid.
90
CHAPTER V
Training
91
and pride generated by shared achievements in successfully
2
overcoming demanding challenges.
In the absence of war, challenges which will eventually
92
Because of the unavailability of training areas at the right
time, and a desire to provide every maneuver element with a
maneuvers.
93
Refresher Training Command (COHHON), under the auspices of
Mobilization
changes in rank and age. The wartime function may or may not
Immediate Recall
and the average conscript has served for only a little more
than half of this time, parliamentary approval is not
94
stipulation that KV personnel must report within 24 hours
upon notification of recall is considered reasonable by
virtue of the short distances involved between unit locations
95
W I I , -
the service.
Mobilization Exercises
96
brigade sized RIM elements are actually mobilized. One such
Deployment
97
attack along the Central Front with less than 24 hours
frame, only the most important RIM elements of the ILK would
98
considered the weakest points of the Central Front1 0 and have
to attack.
99
theoretical planning considerations of a possible
formations from the East to the Ruhr and North Sea ports,
100
u l a
100 kilometers wide, the ILK can expect anywhere from one to
(MRD) in the first echelon and one MRD and one tank division
101
elements are expected to retain the initiative and continue
should the WTO mount its main attack in the Dutch sector; a
of less than 3:1 for the WTO, thereby favoring the defender.
102
an exceedingly complex and inexact procedure. Not all units
103
Day Effectives Casualties Combat Effective %
0 90,000 0 100.0%
1 86,850 3,150 96.5%
2 85,200 1,650 94.7%
3 83,581 1,619 92.9%
4 81,993 1,588 91.1%
5 80,435 1,558 89.4%
6 78,907 1,528 87.7%
7 77,407 1,499 86.0%
catastrophic in nature.)
the ILK in personnel of 14% and for tanks of 20% after one
104
ol I
week.
conveying men and materiel from the United Kingdom and North
105
22
paid by the US government.
forward combat zone. These include, but are not limited to,
106
seven major rapid container transfer points in Rotterdam,
Kampen.24
107
the situation in close coordination with NATO, a royal
108
Support operations, the Dutch retain full implementation and
PMC is linked to the BLS via the NTC in Gouda. At no time are
time. 2
109
Summary and Conclusions
strengths of the LK, the NTC and the NATRES seem to be both
110
Chapter V - Endnotes
2. Ibid., 254-258.
11. Ibid.
111
18. Based on ILK equipment totals as reflected in Chapter
III and combined strength figures of one to two and a half
CAA.
112
EPILOGUE
as:
113
- Dutch traditions of pacifism and neutralism were rooted
nuclear weapons.
military forces.
114
tend to ignore the differences in military preparedness,
public support.
society in general.
deployment considerations.
115
I I-I N
116
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
117
Benelux in a nutshell. Brussels: Benelux SG/N, 1986.
118
Keegan, John and Andrew Wheatcroft. Who's Who in Military
History from 1453 to the. present day. London: Hutchinson,
1976.
119
Facts and Figures - Dezence. The Hague: Government
Information Service, 1981.
120
. Staff Officers' Handbook. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US
Army Command & General Staff College, 1983.
121
Laqueur, Walter. "Hollanditis, A New Stage of European
Neutralism." Commentary (August 13, 1981).
Lippert, G. "GSFG: Spearhead of the Red Army." International
Defense Review (May 1987).
122
APPENDIX A
fowx
---- --- bou e%-
(A-I)G NIGE
-4
COUNTRY DATA
Geography
Total Area: 37,310 square kilometers
Land Area: 33,940 square kilometers
Land Boundries: 1,022 kilometers
Coastline: 451 kilometers
Environment: 30% of land area is below sea level
Government
Official Name: Kingdom of the Netherlands
Type: Constitutional Monarchy
Capital: Amsterdam, government resides in The Hague
Admin Division: 12 provinces and 4 special municipalities
Dependencies: Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles
Legal System: Civil law incorporating French penal theory
Branches: Executive (Queen and Cabinet)
First Chamber, 75 indirectly elected members
Second Chamber, 150 directly elected members
People
Economy
Gross Domestic Product: $ 124.2 billion
Exports & Imports: $ 67.9 and $ 64.9 billion (1985)
Major Trade Partners: EC Exports 71.9%, Imports 53.3%
US Exports 5.0%, Imports 8.8%
Communications
Railroads: 2,824 km w/ 1.435-meter standard gauge
Highways: 108,360 km
Waterways: 6,340 km (inland)
Pipelines: 10,230 km gas, 418 km oil, 965 km other
Radio & TV: 6 AM and 41 FM stations, 30 TV stations
Source: The World Factbook = 1987 (Washington DC: CIA)
(A-2)
APPENDIX B
ANJDDIP.I AIM
Dl.ADDA ID r*P. j
LA,Dtl
cli-M F _ ........
_ cmFH
(B-1)
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART - THE ROYAL NETHERLANDS ARMY
L DI'CI COU'CU.-
AM, QO*A
- --- - - - - - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
COMMMW k*OT
(B-2)
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART - MAJOR ARMY COMMANDS
oilotW~kr~p
(B-3)
APPENDIX C
107A.
6110AP, MAIN.
SId TA.N IN' I'll MOIP SNAI"INAI An&[.S A..spv.' sijpo.
W jWfof.AlI P N £NfIC .WI N AWP A~I l%~ Nilft~ p (O'?I
PNO!ISI
(C-1)
APPENDIX D
ROSTOCk
0 sI6th S12!22
Hamnburg ~ herin Gds x iow zea
Sietnin
nf eo
Neusirlt
207'n 5l1 wa de
0Senla?
47,
3hoe
_:
~ rnau
Hannove,
Goniger'
3rdGas dsJuterbog
0 27h
Vds ~ SS-12/22
j ale Bemnsdorf area,
8Th 0e~zgGds
1 ar urG
nb m a Riesa Gds
391h
Gs l emf 7h Dresden
Jena CI
0hroruf 79th)
Gas
(D-1)
APPENDIX E
)-LS
I U i
&. ItKK
-I A
(E-1)
APPENDIX F
PRIMARY PEACETIME LOCATIONS OF ILK
atCef' Hamburg
A - Are inclusve
of Sedorf, ohne ad lngmans
B CoAreatfromd AgsntSeeik
D AreaPeafromeOrco
-
t om
(F-1)
APPENDIX G
SHAWK
J-. PATRIOT
SCONTROL AND REPORTING
~AIR BASE
(G-1)
APPENDIX H
Legend
AAI - Air to Air Interface Site
APOD - Airport of Debarkation
DHA - Driver Holding Area
... . .
MA - Marshalling| Area
1128 KUL N/w
(H-I)
APPENDIX I
(1-1)
- W I i '4
(1-2)
VITA
EDUCATION:
PROFESSIONAL INFORMATION:
MILITARY EDUCATION:
OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS: