1. Villavicencio vs.

Lukban (14639, March 25, 1919)

Facts:

Justo Lukban, as Mayor of Manila, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, permitted in
the city, to be closed. The police, pursuant to orders from the chief and respondent, hustled some 170
inmates aboard the steamers. The women were sent to Davao, as laborers. They were not given the
opportunity to collect belongings, and were under the impression that they were being taken to a police
station for investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao.

They were receipted for as laborers by the governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo.
The receivers were not notified the women were prostitutes expelled from Manila. Some of them got
married, others assumed clandestine relations, others went to work in different capacities, others
assumed a life unknown, and a good portion found means to return to Manila.

The relatives and friends of some of the deportees applied for habeas corpus to the Supreme Court. The
application includes all who were sent to Davao. It alleged that the women were illegally re-strained of
their liberty.

Issue:

Whether or not the authorities may validly deport the women to Davao

Held:

They were not authorized to deport the women.

It was conceded that the Mayor of Manila was motivated to protect the morals and health of the people
under his power when he deported the women to Davao. This act was condemned, there being no law or
even an ordinance to validate his act.

No person is above the law. Respondents may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty
by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts. The great writ of
liberty may not be easily evaded. No one of the defense offered constituted a legitimate bar to the
granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
 2. Kuroda vs. Jalandoni (L-2662, March 26, 1949)

Facts:

Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the
Japanese occupation, failed to discharge his duties permitting the members of his command to commit
brutal atrocities and other high crimes against civilians and prisoners, in violation of the laws and customs
of war.

Petitioner seeks the unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 68, which creates the National War Crimes Office and
prescribing the rules and regulations of trials of war criminals. He contended that the Philippines is not a
signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is
charged of crimes not based on law, national and international. In view of the fact that this has been
empaneled by virtue of an unconstitutional law and an illegal order, this commission is without jurisdiction
to try herein petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the Order is constitutional

Held:

The constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 is upheld. Article 2 of our Constitution provides that the Philippines
renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the nation.

Pursuant to the generally accepted principles of international law of the present day, including the Hague
Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established
by the United Nations, all persons guilty of planning or waging a war of aggression and of the commission
of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto are held accountable. By E.O. No. 68, the
President acted in conformity with these policies of international law which are part of our Constitution.

The Hague and Geneva conventions form part of the generally accepted principles of international law.
These were accepted by the U.S. and Japan, who were signatories to the Conventions. They form part of
the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory for our Constitution is not confined to the
recognition of international law contained in treaties to which our government may have been a signatory.
 3. Inchong vs. Hernandez (L-7995, May 31, 1957)

Facts:

The Congress enacted R.A. No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” supposedly for
economic independence and national security. The provisions of the Act, pertain to, among others, the
prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and the prohibition against the establishment or opening
by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.

On behalf of his own and other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
said Act, Lao Ichong brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration to enjoin the Secretary of Finance,
Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner
contends that the law denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their
liberty and property without due process of law. Also, he argues that the Act violates international and
treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

The Solicitor-General contends that the Act was a valid exercise of the police power of the State, as
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival and that no treaty or
international obligations are infringed.

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 violate international and treaty obligations

Held:

The Act supersedes any treaty or a generally accepted principle.

A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed. However, a treaty in conflict with
a statute shall not govern and the statute must be upheld. The Act represented an exercise of the police
power which, being inherent in the State, could not be surrendered through a treaty.

The disputed law was to remedy an actual threat to national economy posed by alien control of the retail
business and free citizens. The Act falls within the police power of the State. It does not violate equal
protection clause because there is distinction between alien and citizen. Also the same does not violate
due process of law clause because the law is prospective in operation without prejudice to aliens already
occupied.
 4. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion (139465, January 18, 2000)

Facts:

The procedure for extradition of persons committing crimes in a foreign country is governed by P.D. 1069.
Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon signed the extradition treaty with the Government of the U.S. The
Philippine Senate ratified the same. Thereafter, the DOJ received from the U.S. Department of Foreign
Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the U.S.

Petitioner designated a panel to handle the case pursuant to P.D. 1069. Jiminez through counsel,
requested copies of the extradition request from the U.S. Government and that he be given time to
comment after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. The petitioner denied the request.

Jiminez filed with the RTC to compel petitioner to furnish him the documents, to afford him an opportunity
to comment on the extradition request, and to evaluate the request objectively. Also, he filed to enjoin
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of NBI from performing any act directed to his extradition
to the U.S.

Respondent Judge Ralph Lantion, ordered that the Justice and Foreign Affairs Secretaries and the Director
of NBI from conducting from performing any act directed to the extradition to the U.S., for a period of 20
days.

Issue:

Whether or not the duties under a treaty be upheld over the accused’s right to due process

Held:

The right to due process should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by U.S.

Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no
further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. However, the
fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the
primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere.

When there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state, they should be harmonized since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the incorporation clause in the constitutional provision. However, where the conflict is
irreconcilable, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld, for the reason that such courts
are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it.

The principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may
repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, both statutes and treaties
may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.
 5. In Re: Garcia (UNAV, August 15, 1961)

Facts:

Arturo Garcia is a Filipino citizen. He contends, among others, that he had taken and finished in Spain, the
course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to
the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating there as
"Licenciado En Derecho".

Thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain and that under the provisions of the
Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Philippines and Spain, he is
entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar
examinations.

Article 11 of the Treaty provides that the nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained
recognition of the validity of their academic degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can
practice their professions within the territory of the other. He now applies for admission to the practice
of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.

Issue:

Whether or not treaty between the Philippines and Spain may be invoked to except petitioner in the
required bar examinations

Held:

The provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Philippines
and the Spain cannot be invoked by applicant.

The Treaty was intended to govern Filipinos desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens
of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. Petitioner is a Filipino citizen subject to
the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals.

Moreover, Article I thereof provides nationals of both countries who obtained degrees to practice
professions in either of the states is deemed competent to practice them in the territory of the other,
subject to its laws. Hence, the privileges are subject to the provision that before one can practice the legal
profession in the Philippines, he must successfully pass the required bar examinations.

The Treaty is not intended to modify the laws on admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for
the Executive Department may not promulgate, repeal, alter, or supplement rules for admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, such rules being reserved only to the Congress.
 6. Alih vs. Gastro (L-69401, June 23, 1987)

Facts:

A contingent of more than 200 Philippine marines and elements of the home defense implemented a
“zona” and raided the compound occupied by Rizal Alih and the other petitioners in search of loose
firearms, ammunition and other explosives.

The people inside the compound resisted the invasion which turned into a shoot-out. This resulted to a
number of casualties. The besieged compound surrendered the following morning. Sixteen male
occupants were arrested, finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The
military confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of ammunition
found in the premises.

Petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they were taken without
a search warrant as required by the Bill of Rights. Respondents, while admitting the absence of the
required search warrant, sought to justify their act on the ground that they were acting under superior
orders. It was also suggested that the measure was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace
and order problem generated by the assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco.

Issue:

Whether or not the seizure of the articles made by the respondents be considered valid

Held:

Conceding to the fact that the search done was warrantless, the raid towards petitioners’ premises is
baseless and the resulting seizure in arms and ammunition is invalid.

All are entitled to due process and superior orders cannot countermand the Constitution. The fact that
petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional short-cuts respondents
took. There was no reason to disregard the processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on
arbitrarily forcing their way into the premises.

Respondents defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military" so clearly
proclaimed in the Constitution. They simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to
determine the probable cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the
raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt.
 7. Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora (141284, August 15, 2000)

Facts:

President Joseph Estrada, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the
purpose of crime prevention and suppression. Pursuant to this, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Supt.
Edgar Aglipay, formulated a Letter of Instruction which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility
patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, Estrada
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
He also declared that the services of the Marines are temporary until such time when the situation shall
have improved.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed the petition. It contends the deployment unconstitutional
because there is no emergency situation in Metro Manila as would justify the deployment of soldiers for
law enforcement work; hence, said deployment contravenes Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not calling the armed forces and the marines to assist the PNP violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:

The President’s actions do not violate the constitutional provisions.

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.

The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with
the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can
be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint
visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
 8. Olaguer vs. Military Commission (L-54558, May 22, 1987)

Facts:

Petitioners, as civilians, were arrested and detained at Camp Crame and transferred at Camp Bagong Diwa
except for petitioner Eduardo Olaguer who remained to the former camp. They are charged with
numerous offenses: unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; conspiracy to assassinate
President and Mrs. Marcos, cabinet members and other men; arson of nine buildings; attempted murder
of different persons; and conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion.

Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition and habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. However, the
petition became moot and was dismissed because they were already released from their confinement by
the time said petition was made.

The military court created to try the case of the petitioners and its decisions still subsists.

Issue:

Whether or not a military tribunal has jurisdiction on the case even when civil courts are functioning

Held:

The decisions on civilian defendants of the military courts during the period of martial law are nullified for
lack of jurisdiction.

The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution is one by judicial process, not by
executive or military process. Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are
not courts within the Philippine judicial system. Any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian
is void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.

Military tribunals are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the
President to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein. The
power of interpreting is primarily a function of the judiciary and not of the executive. As long as the civil
courts are regularly functioning, military tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over properly cognizable by
the civil courts. Otherwise, it would be a violation of the right to due process.
 9. People of the Philippines vs. Lagman (45892, July 13, 1938)

Facts:

Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth
Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. They allegedly refused to register in the military service
notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. Respondents were duly notified by the
corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service
but had not registered up to the date of filing of the information.

Lagman contends that he has a father to support, has no military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be
killed while de Sosa argues that has a mother and a brother to support.

The Court of First Instance sentenced both respondents to one day imprisonment.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents may refuse the call to military service violating the National Defense Law

Held:

The circumstance that the respondents have dependent families to support does not excuse them from
their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board.

Section 2, Article II of the Constitution provides that the defense of the State is a prime duty of
government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal
military or civil service.

The National Defense Law, as it establishes compulsory military service, is in faithful compliance
therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army.
To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the
Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
 10. Aglipay vs. Ruiz (45459, March 13, 1937)

Facts:

The Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz, announced that he would order the issuance of the postage stamps
commemorating the celebration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. The stamps were issued though the greater part remains unsold. The further sale of the
stamps is sought to be prevented by the Gregorio Aglipay.

The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature,
contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the separation of Church and State is violated with this issuances of stamps

Held:

The issuances of subject stamps are not unconstitutional.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be advantageous
to the Government. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or
property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church.

The issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church
or religious denominations. They were not for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money
derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The only purpose in issuing and selling the
stamps was to attract more tourists to this country. What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress
itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress.

Separate Discussion:

The influence of religion is highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble, implored "the
aid of Divine Providence," they manifested their intense religious nature and placed reliance upon Him
who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere.

Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes
sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as
such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium

Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate. Thursday and Friday of
Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays because of the secular
idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes
polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the
fundamental laws of the state.
 11. Garces vs. Estenzo (L-53487, May 25, 1981)

Facts:

A wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with solicited and donated
funds pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of said council, reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of
the feast day of the saint.

The image was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day as per Resolution No. 6
which also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image for a year, until the next feast
day. After the fiesta, however, petitioner Rev. Fr. Sergio Osmena refused to return custody of the image
to the council until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the priest and posted the
required bond. He also uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain Manuel C. Veloso,
apparently in connection with the disputed image.

Petitioners moved for the annulment of the resolutions relating to the subject image contending that they
contravened the constitutional provisions on separation of church and state, freedom of religion and the
use of public money to favor any sect or church.

The lower court dismissed the complaint and upheld the validity of the resolution.

Issue:

Whether or not the resolutions were unconstitutional

Held:

The resolutions are not unconstitutional. There can be no question that the image in question belongs to
the barangay council. The resolutions do not establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor
appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was
purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular
matter.

The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio and not for the purpose
of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio
residents. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the
barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint cannot be branded as illegal.

The barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities.
The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any
suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic Church. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right
to determine who should have custody thereof.
 12. Estrada vs. Escritor (A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006)

Facts:

Alejandro Estrada requested from the Regional Trial Court for an investigation of Soledad Escritor, the
court interpreter, for living with a man not her husband, and having borne his child. Petitioner contends
that such immoral act should be made ground to fire her.

Respondent testified she was a widow when she entered the judiciary. She admitted living with Luciano
Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage when her husband was still alive but living with another
woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son.

As a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent
asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and she executed on
a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which allows members of the congregation who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. Insofar as the congregation is concerned,
there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement.

Issue:

Whether or not the conjugal arrangement constitutes disgraceful and immoral conduct

Held:

The case is remanded to the lower court to hear the government’s claims. The Filipino people, in adopting
the constitutions, manifested their adherence to the benevolent neutrality approach that requires
accommodations in interpreting the religion clauses.

Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the
same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within constitutional limits.
Accommodation of morality based on religion is allowed, provided, it does not offend compelling state
interests.

Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as it prohibits such exercise given a
compelling state interest. Should the Court prohibit and punish respondent’s conduct protected by the
Free Exercise Clause, the action would be an unconstitutional encroachment to her religious freedom. The
government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden
of demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which can override respondent’s religious belief and
practice.
 13. Taruc vs. de la Cruz (144801, March 10, 2005)

Facts:

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz
and Rustom Florano were the bishop and parish priest, respectively, of the same. Petitioners demands for
the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish. It appears that the family of Fr. Florano's wife belonged to a
political party opposed to petitioner Dominador Taruc's. Bishop de la Cruz denied their request

Taruc tried to organize an open mass to be celebrated by a certain Fr. Renato Ambong during the town
fiesta of Socorro. When Taruc informed Bishop de la Cruz of his plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade him
from pushing through with it because Fr. Ambong was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao
and his credentials were in doubt. However, Taruc carried out his plans and the Bishop excommunicated
petitioners from the church.

Bishop de la Cruz was reassigned to another diocese replaced by Bishop Rhee Timbang who also did not
find a valid reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish. Petitioners were informed of such denial
but they continued to celebrate mass and hold other religious activities through Fr. Ambong who had
been restrained from performing any priestly functions in the PIC of the same parish.

Petitioners contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their
right to due process of law. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the case before the lower court on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction but it was denied. The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of
the court and ordered the dismissal of the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction over the excommunication

Held:

The courts do not have said jurisdiction.

In our jurisdiction, the Church and the State are to be separate and distinct from each other. "Give to
Ceasar what is Ceasar's and to God what is God's.” In disputes involving religious institutions or
organizations, there is one area which the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences.

The records show that Bishop de la Cruz pleaded with petitioners several times not to commit acts inimical
to the best interests of PIC. They were also warned of the consequences of their actions, among them
their expulsion/excommunication from PIC.
 14. Lim vs. Executive Secretary (151445, April 11, 2002)

Facts:

Personnel from the armed forces of the U.S. started arriving in Mindanao to take part, with the Philippine
military, in "Balikatan 02-1", pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Petitioners Arthur Lim and
Paulino Ersando attacked the constitutionality of the joint exercise. The Senate conducted a hearing on
the "Balikatan" exercise wherein Vice-President Teofisto Guingona, Jr approved the Draft Terms of
Reference. Assistant Secretary for American Affairs and United States Charge d' Affaires signed the Agreed
Minutes of the discussion between the Vice-President and Assistant Secretary Kelly.

Petitioners contend that the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) was to provide assistance only in the case of
an armed attack by an external aggressor. Abu Sayyaf bandits in Basilan are not external armed forces
that has subjected the Philippines to an armed external attack. Also, American soldiers are not authorized
to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory.

The Solicitor-General contends that the action is based only on a fear of future violation of the Terms of
Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact specifically interpretation
of the VFA whether it covers "Balikatan 02-1”. There are no questions of constitutionality involved.
Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct
personal injury on the part of petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not the Balikatan activities are allowed by the Constitution

Held:

The Balikatan activities are under the MDT and VFA which are valid pursuant to the Constitution. The word
“activities" was made that way to give a certain leeway in negotiation. Both the history and intent of the
MDT and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities, as opposed to combat itself, such
as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.

Both the MDT and the VFA must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution especially Article 2:
Declaration of Principles and State Policies. Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law
are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation. Treaties bind parties and must be
performed by them in good faith. A party is not allowed to invoke the provisions of its internal law for its
failure to perform a treaty. Provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law.

The Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental
law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress. However, the foregoing premises leave us no
doubt that US forces are still prohibited from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory.
 15. Calalang vs. Williams (47800, December 2, 1940)

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works and Secretary of Public
Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street
and this proposition is pursuant to the provisions of C.A. 548 authorizing said Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

The Director of Public Works indorsed to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications the approval
of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification
that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street.

The Secretary of Public Works and Communications approved the recommendation and the Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced that all animal-drawn vehicles are not
allowed to pass and pick up passengers.

Maximo Calalang now contends that C.A. 548 is unconstitutional as it provides undue delegation of
legislative power and avers that it infringes the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people.

Issue:

Whether or not C.A. 548 is unconstitutional

Held:

The provisions of C.A. 548 are not unconstitutional. Section 1 of the Act provides that the Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate
rules to regulate traffic on national roads and streets. They may be temporarily closed whenever it is
advisable pursuant to public convenience, with the proper approval.

Legislative power is not conferred upon respondents. It is not the determination of what the law shall be,
but merely the ascertainment of circumstances upon which the application of law is predicated. The
Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law but it can delegate a power to determine the state
of things upon which the law makes where its own action depends. There are many things upon which
wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must be
a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation.

Social justice is the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces. It is the
adoption of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the adoption of legal measures or extra-constitutionally. It must be founded on the
interdependence among diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.
 16. Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration (L-2089, October 31, 1949)

Facts:

Section 1 of C.A. 539 provides that the President may purchase or expropriation private lands or any
interest therein, and to subdivide them into home lots or small farms for resale at reasonable prices to
tenants or to individuals who will work the lands and who are qualified to own lands in the Philippines. To
execute the abovementioned, Section 2 of the same Act provides that the President may designate any
department, bureau, office, instrumentality or a new agency.

Justa Guido filed a petition to prevent respondent from the expropriation of her two adjoining lots. She
contends that this land is in part commercial in nature, and therefore, excluded in the purview of the
provisions of C.A. 539.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s adjoining lands may be expropriated

Held:

The lands may not be expropriated for they are too small in relation to other lands to even provide land
to another and to be considered as for the benefit of the public.

The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply paramount basis for
untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress Administration or any other government
instrumentality. Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of economic status; what
it and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before
the law, equality between values given and received, and equitable sharing of the social and material
goods on the basis of efforts exerted in their production.

No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is not can be made; each
case has to be judged according to its peculiar circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this
decision that the case under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for public
convenience or public use.
 17. Almeda vs. Court of Appeals (L-43800, July 29, 1977)

Facts:

Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is an agricultural share tenant of the Angeleses on a land devoted to
sugarcane and coconuts. The landowners sold the property to spouses Leonila Almeda and Venancio
Almeda without notifying respondent-tenant in writing of the sale. Gonzales seeks the redemption of the
land pursuant to the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms, with the Court of
Agrarian Relations.

The owners first offered to respondent, but the latter had no money and that respondent went personally
to the house of petitioners and implored them to buy the land for fear that if someone else would buy
the land, he may not be taken in as tenant. Petitioners contend that respondent acted as a dummy of
someone interested to buy the land.

The Agrarian Court rendered judgment authorizing, the respondent to redeem the tenanted land. The
Appellate Court, however, affirmed the decision of the Agrarian Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the sale of land to petitioners overcome the preemption of the tenant to the same

Held:

The sale of land to the petitioners cannot overcome such preemptive right. Respondent has the right to
buy the same in the exercise of such right.

The Agricultural Land Reform Code provided that tenants-farmers are given the right to preemption and
redemption. This is to bolster their security of tenure and further encourage them to become owner-
cultivators. In case the agricultural lessor sells the landholding, the lessee shall have the preferential right
to buy the same under reasonable terms and conditions.

The right of pre-emption may be exercised within 180 days from notice in writing, served by the owner
on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform. The redemption price shall be the
reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale.

Under the Constitution, property ownership is impressed with social function. Property use must not only
be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The Constitution provides for the promotion of
social justice. The State may regular the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private
property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.

Foregoing considered, although there is preemptive right on the part of the respondent, the Supreme
Court declared that he failed to exercise his right of redemption in accordance with law.
 18. Ondoy vs. Ignacio (L-47178, May 16, 1980)

Facts:

The mother of Jose Ondoy filed a complaint against respondents. Ondoy drowned while in the employ of
private respondent, Virgilio Ignacio. The latter failed to provide for the claim of compensation against him.
Ignacio contends that such omission was to be minimized based on the alleged absence of an employment
relationship.

Private respondent submitted affidavits executed by the chief engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel that
the deceased, a fisherman, was in that ship, undeniably a member of the working force, but after being
invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. The affidavit was
ignored. The hearing officer dismissed the claim for lack of merit. The then Secretary of Labor, now
Minister Blas F. Ople, denied such motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s claim for compensation be granted

Held:

The petitioner is granted the compensation of the deceased.

The deceased met his death because of drowning. There is evidence of the fact of death due to drowning.
It bears repeating that there is evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that the deceased drowned
while "in the actual performance of his work" with the shipping enterprise of private respondent. Under
the circumstances, the failure to grant the claim finds no justification in law.

Even without such evidence, the petitioner could have relied on the Workmen’s Compensation Act as the
death arose in the course of employment, with the burden of overthrowing it upon the person resisting
the claim. The failure to controvert is fatal to any defense that petitioner could interpose. Any assertion
to the contrary is doomed to futility.

As between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able
legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these cases
is not equality but protection.
 19. Salonga vs. Farrales (L-47088, July 10, 1981)

Facts:

Julita Farrales is the titled owner of the land in question in the case. She filed an ejectment case against
the possessors, Consolacion Salonga and her husband, who erected a house thereon. She also filed
ejectment cases on other lessees who also failed to pay rentals. The Olongapo City court ordered
petitioners to vacate and pay rentals in arrears. The Court of First Instance affirmed this decision.

Defendant sold to Catalino Pascua, Marciala Zarsadias and the spouses Cesar and Rosalina Quiocson the
areas respectively leased by them; while, with respect to Jorge Carvajal, a compromise agreement
undertook to pay for Carvajal's house on her land, so that the decision being executed only against
petitioners herein.

After partial payment of the rentals, petitioners offered to purchase the land but Farrales refused and
insisted on the execution of the judgment. Petitioners filed for the specific performance with the Court of
First Instance which was dismissed because there exists no legally enforceable compromise agreement.

The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court because the issue raised in the appeal is
purely legal.

Issue:

Whether or not there can be specific performance to sell the land

Held:

There can be no specific performance in this case. The offeree, Farrales, not only did not accept, but
rejected the offer of spouses Salonga to buy the land in question. There being no consent there is,
therefore, no contract to sell to speak of. As lessees, they may remove the improvements should the
lessor refuse to reimburse them, but the lessee does not have the right to buy the land.

Social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under our Constitution
and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in our constitution was not
intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto.
Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on obligations and contracts, and is beyond the
power of the Court to grant.
 20. The Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo (180906, October 7, 2008)

Facts:

Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are abducted by the military men belonging to the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) suspecting that they were members of the New People’s Army
(NPA). After 18 months of illegal detention and torture, the brothers escaped such captivity. They met
different people that are also abducted by the same group and witnessed their deaths as well.

They filed for a petition to stop the military officers and their agents from depriving them of their right to
liberty and other basic rights. While the hearing was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which
literally translates to “protection”, took effect which paved way for the respondents to change their
existing petition to an Amparo petition.

The Court of Appeals granted the Writ of Amparo and ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to furnish the respondents with all investigative
reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military
officials involved while under military custody.

Herein petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by
the appellate court.

Issue:

Whether or not there was violation of the Constitution in continuing with all investigative reports as to
the custody

Held:

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that it is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated by an unlawful act of a public official or employee. The writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

The right to security of person is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human
rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of
order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is
rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are
under threat.

Accordingly, substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The events were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo
in a clear and convincing manner with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and
tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses.
 21. Carino vs. The Commission on Human Rights (96681, December 2, 1991)

Facts:

Some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and undertook mass concerted actions to
highlight their plight resulting from alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that
had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. These are to negotiate the granting of demands
had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education.

Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order
of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing
dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. For failure to
heed the return to work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively
charged, preventively suspended for 90 days. An investigation committee was formed to hear the charges.

When the motion for suspension was denied by the investigating committee, the teachers staged a
walkout to boycott the entire proceedings. Secretary Carino dismissed a teacher and suspended three
others. The teachers submitted sworn statements to the respondent commission for the abovementioned
facts.

In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari contending that the Commission is
prohibited. Despite this, the Commission held that the striking teachers were denied due process of law
and issued a subpoena to Secretary Carino.

Issue:

Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights may adjudicate the matters involved in Striking
Teachers under the Constitution

Held:

The Commission has no power to adjudicate the case.

The Constitution clearly grants the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.

To investigate means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The
dictionary definition of investigate is to observe or study closely; inquire into systematically; to search or
inquire into; to subject to an official probe; and, to conduct an official inquiry. On the other hand,
adjudicate means to settle in the exercise of judicial authority or to determine finally.

Hence it is the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power to investigate, cannot and should
not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-
775.
 22. Meyer vs. Nebraska (262 U.S. 390, June 4, 1923)

Facts:

Petitioner was convicted in the District Court for Hamilton County, Nebraska for teaching German to a
Raymond Parpart, who is a child of ten years. Under a statute of Nebraska, the teaching of foreign
languages to students who has not yet completed the eighth grade is unlawful.

The Supreme Court of the State affirmed the judgment of conviction on the ground that the law is a valid
exercise of police power. Its violation shall be considered a criminal offense.

Issue:

Whether or not the statute may be considered unconstitutional

Held:

The statute is unconstitutional because it impairs the interests of the petitioner and fails to reasonably
relate to any end within the competency of the state.

The purpose or intention of such statute is to encourage the English language to be the native tongue of
all children raised in the State. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak
other languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected. The mere knowledge
of the German language, or any language for that matter, cannot be regarded as harmful.
 23. Pierce vs. Society of Sisters (268 U.S. 510, June 1, 1925)

Facts:

The Constitution provides a liberty interest in a parent’s or guardian’s right to decide the mode in which
their children are educated. The State may not usurp this right when the legislation does not reasonably
relate to a viable state interest.

Respondent is a corporation with the power to establish and maintain academies or schools. Hill Military
Academy is a private corporation organized in 1908 under the laws of Oregon, conducting an elementary,
college, preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting
petitioners from enforcing Oregon State’s Compulsory Education Act. Both corporations are non-public
schools.

The Act required all parents and guardians to send children between eight and 16 years to a public school.
Petitioners appealed for the grant of the preliminary restraining orders.

Issue:

Whether or not the statute interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to discern for the manner
in which they want their children to be exposed

Held:

The statute is unconstitutional. It interferes with protected liberty interests and has no reasonable
relationship to any purpose within the competency of the State.

Respondents’ arguments are meritorious because the result of enforcing the statute would be the
destruction of the schools. The State has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians
have the right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.

While the State has the duty to ensure that children receive the proper education, the Constitution
provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in the mode in which their children
are educated.
 24. Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego (89572, December 21, 1989)

Facts:

Roberto San Diego is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of B.S. in Zoology. He took the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) three times and flunked all of them. Upon a fourth application,
petitioner rejected his application under its rule that after three successive failures, a student shall not be
allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.

Respondent moved with the Regional Trial Court to compel his admission to the test. He challenged the
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 that contained the abovementioned rule.

Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong declared the order invalid. She held that the petitioner had been deprived
of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

Issue:

Whether or not MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 is unconstitutional

Held:

The NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially
proved their competence and preparation for a medical education is constitutional.

The issue in the present case is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least
initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot
be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. Every citizen has the
right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and
academic requirements.

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by
directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and
evaluations. Otherwise, we may be swamped with mediocrity.
 25. Virtouso, Jr. vs. Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan (L-47841, March 21, 1978)

Facts:

Francisco Virtouso, Jr. allegedly robbed a television set. He filed an application for habeas corpus on the
grounds that the preliminary investigation conducted by respondent judge which led to the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest lacks probable cause, and the bail recommended was excessive.

Respondent judge justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest alleging that there was no impropriety in
the way the preliminary examination was conducted. As to the excessive character of the bail, he asserted
that it was fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge of Bataan
in 1977.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant may be acquitted

Held:

The Court acquitted the petitioner pursuant to Section 191 of Presidential Decree No. 603.

Petitioner is a 17-year old minor entitled to the protection and benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code. He could be provisionally released on recognizance in the discretion of a court as he is over nine
years but under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.

The Court should give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code, which is an implementation of
this specific constitutional mandate: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building
and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being.”

The petition was resolved without the need of passing upon the issue of whether or not the procedure by
respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence of probable cause was constitutionally deficient.
 26. Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr. (204819, April 8, 2014)

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. The law guarantees universal
access to methods on contraception, fertility control, sexual education, and maternal care.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on different substantial and procedural grounds.
Among the substantial grounds are the breach of the right to life and health when it permits and mandates
the use of contraceptives as tools to family planning that the State promotes.

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. No. 10354 is unconstitutional

Held:

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as not unconstitutional although there are provisions
which are declared unconstitutional.

The RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation and also those that induce
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized
ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

Section 12 of Article II of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”

The State guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.
 27. Obergefell vs. Hodges (No. 14-556, June 26, 2015)

Facts:

The petitioners were two men whose same-sex partners had died and fourteen same-sex couples who all
brought cases in their respective District Courts challenging either the denial of their right to marry or the
right to have their marriage performed elsewhere recognized in their own state. The cases were heard in
different states, each of which defines marriage as between a woman and a man.

Petitioners argue that respondent either denied them their right to marry, or denied the recognition of
their marriage legally performed in another state. Rather than intending to devalue marriage, it was their
respect for the institution of marriage which meant that they sought it for themselves.

Each case were in favor of the petitioner in their respective District Courts. The Court of Appeals, however,
reversed the decisions, finding in favor of the respondents, who were state officials responsible for
enforcing the relevant laws.

Issue:

Whether or not the United States may recognize same-sex marriage

Held:

Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that any state shall not deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.

The right to same-sex marriage is also guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause. The Court has
recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most
fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged. The marriage laws challenged by
the petitioners are in essence unequal. They denied same-sex couples all the benefits granted to opposite-
sex couples and work as a “grave and continuing harm”, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and
lesbians.
 28. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company vs. NLRC (118978, May 23, 1997)

Facts:

Petitioner initially hired Grace de Guzman as “Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period from
November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was
again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from
June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where
probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under
civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When
petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a
memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder
about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from
the company.

The Labor Arbiter declared that petitioner illegally dismissed de Guzman, who had already gained the
status of a regular employee. Respondent commission also ruled that private respondent had indeed
been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by petitioner, however, the decision of the labor
arbiter was modified in that she deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest
nature of her acts which should not be condoned.

Issue:

Whether or not there the company policy of not accepting married women is constitutional

Held:

The petitioner’s policy for non-acceptance of married women into its labor force is unconstitutional and
illegal.

In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles 130 to 138
thereof. The policy likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman
of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an
intangible and inalienable right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.

The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of
social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. Section 14, Article II of the Constitution
expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times,
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
 29. Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. (101083, July 30, 1993)

Facts:

Minor petitioners filed a taxpayer’s class suit, representing their generation and generations yet unborn,
against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to a cancel all existing Timber
Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country; cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing, or appraising new TLAs; and granting them “such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.”

Furthermore, they alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. They also claim that
the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of
the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that, plaintiffs have no cause of
action against him; and that the issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a cause for action in filing the said suit

Held:

The Supreme Court finds the arguments meritorious and that there is a cause for action for the filing of
the class suit for themselves, for others in their generation, and for the generations yet to come.

Section 16, Article II of the Constitution explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article,
that the State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR, the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.
 30. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals (110120, March 16, 1994)

Facts:

The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Barangay Camarin in Caloocan City filed a complaint with the Laguna
Lake Development Authority to stop the operation of an open garbage dumpsite in the area due to its
harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution in the area.

Petitioner’s legal and technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining
the open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate
from the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
as required under P.D. No. 1586, and clearance from petitioner as required by R.A. No. 4850. It issued a
cease and desist order to the latter to stop from dumping garbage at the dumpsite.

The dumping resumed because the plan to settle the problem failed. Petitioner issued another order to
the same effect as the previous one. The City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court
to declare null the order as it sought to be declared to have the authority to promote the health and safety
and enhance the right of the people in its jurisdiction to a balanced ecology. The lower court issued a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the cease and desist order.

The Court of Appeals held that the lower court has no jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the action for
annulment of petitioner’s cease and desist order. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case with the cease
and desist order set aside and the restraining order be re-issued.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has the authority to issue the cease and desist order

Held:

Petitioner has the authority to issue the cease and desist order.

By its express terms, R.A. No. 4850 authorizes petitioner to make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance or pollution. Section 4(d) explicitly authorizes it to make whatever order necessary in the
exercise of its jurisdiction. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has
also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. Therefore, the authority
to issue a cease and desist order is, perforce, implied.

Section 16, Article II of the Constitution provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. As a
constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This
is in consonance with the declared policy of the state to protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.

.
 31. Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague (94571, April 22, 1991)

Facts:

The 1990 budget consists of automatic appropriation including those for debt services, appropriations
under the General Appropriations Act, and appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, the Foreign
Borrowing Act; by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the
Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,”; and, by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strengthening the
Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising
out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose."

Petitioners seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177, and
P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget
pursuant to said decrees. This is pursuant to the rule that the highest appropriation should be for
education.

Respondents contend that the petition involves a political question which is the repeal or amendment of
said laws addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of the legislative body and not this Court.

Issue:

Whether or not P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967 are unconstitutional

Held:

Establishing that the petition is a justiciable question, the Court finds that P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D.
1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations.

The legislative intention of the Decrees is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in
order to enable the Republic to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the
loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need
to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to
enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain
the credit standing of the country.

Separate Discussion:

The Government budgeting process consists of four major phases:

1. Budget preparation. Tasked upon the Executive Branch to estimate of government revenues, the
determination of budgetary priorities and activities within the constraints imposed by available
revenues and by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired priorities and activities into
expenditure levels.
2. Legislative authorization. Congress deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President,
and Congress formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance
with an appropriation made by law.
3. Budget Execution. Covers the various operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of
obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities,
 the continuing review of government fiscal position, the regulation of funds releases, the
implementation of cash payment schedules, and other related activities comprise this phase of
the budget cycle.
4. Budget accountability. Evaluation of actual performance and initially approved work targets,
obligations incurred, personnel hired and work accomplished are compared with the targets set
at the time the agency budgets were approved.
 32. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon (81958, June 30, 1988)

Facts:

Petitioner is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas
employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1998 of DOLE
in the character of “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic
and Household Workers.”

It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of
the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, petitioner invokes
Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

Thereafter, the Solicitor General submits to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police
power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some
states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for
sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue:

Whether or not Department Order No. 1 is valid under the Constitution

Held:

Department Order No. 1 is declared by the Supreme Court as valid.

Police power is the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare. It consists of an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property,
in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled
in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

The Order applies only to female contract workers, but it does not discriminate between the sexes.
Equality before the law does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits
of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply
equally to all members of the same class.

What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing
class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or
group of persons. The classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial
distinctions.
 33. Tanada vs. Angara (118295, May 2, 1997)

Facts:

The Philippines joined World Trade Organization (WTO) as a founding member with the goal of improving
access to foreign markets through the reduction of tariffs on its exports. The petition seeks to nullify the
Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement. It questions the concurrence of respondents acting in their
capacities as senators.

Petitioners argue that the Agreement place products of member countries on the same footing as local
products, in contrast with the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution. These provisions contravene
constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national development and negate the preferential
treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.

Respondents, through the Solicitor-General, counter that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not
conflict with the Constitution; and that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect
developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade liberalization.

Issue:

Whether or not the WTO Agreement contravene the Constitution

Held:

The ratification of the WTO Agreement is valid as it is not in contravention with the Constitution. The
petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.

The Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism. Section 19, Article II of the Constitution
provides that the State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.

The Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade
policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices.
 34. Garcia vs. The Board of Investments (92024, November 9, 1990)

Facts:

The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation applied for registration with the Board of Investments as a new
domestic producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines. It originally specified the province of Bataan as
the site for the proposed investment but later submitted an amended application to change the site to
Batangas.

Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second District of Bataan requested a copy of the company’s original
and amended application documents. The BOI denied the request on the basis that the investors in the
company had declined to give their consent to the release of the documents requested, and that Article
81 of the Omnibus Investments Code protects the confidentiality of these documents absent consent to
disclose.

The BOI subsequently approved the amended application without holding a second hearing or publishing
notice of the amended application. Garcia filed a petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the BOI committed grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the wishes of the investor

Held:

Yes, the BOI violated the right to have access to information on matters of public concern under Article
III, Section 7 of the Constitution. The Court found that the inhabitants of Bataan had an interest in the
establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst because it will affect not only their economic life,
but even the air they breathe. The amended application was in fact a second application that required a
new public notice to be filed and a new hearing to be held.

Despite the right to access information, the Constitution does not open every door to any and all
information because the law may exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny. Thus, it
excluded the trade secrets and confidential, commercial, and financial information of the applicant, and
matters affecting national security from its order.
 35. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (78742,
July 14, 1989)

Facts:

The involved cases are to question the constitutionality of the following laws related to agrarian reform
program. Landowners are deprived of ownership as the tenants who worked in these lands were declared
new owners by E.O. No. 228 as they are qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27. E.O. No. 229 provided for the
implementation of Proclamation No. 131, the comprehensive agrarian reform law, which, in turn,
delegates power to the Department of Agrarian Reform to redistribute such lands. All of these are
amended by R.A. No. 6657 which maintains almost the same points as the previous laws.

In G.R. No. 79777, petitioners allege the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 and R.A.
No. 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants
were declared full owners by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27. The petitioners now
contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s power.

In G.R. No. 79310, petitioners are landowners and sugarcane planters who are against Proclamation No.
131 and E.O. No. 229. Proclamation No. 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of
P50 Billion.

In G.R. No. 79744, a petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer was filed. They argue that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the
President and violates the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due
process or just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.

In G.R. No 78742 petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and are unable to enjoy their right
of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of
the decree. They moved for respondents to issue said rules.

Issue:

Whether or not the laws questioned are unconstitutional

Held:

The Supreme Court ordered that R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proclamation No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and
229 are sustained against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.

A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and
the method. Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined
is the method employed to achieve it.

Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the
State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall undertake an agrarian reform program founded on
the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.
 36. Luz Farms vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (86889, December 4, 1990)

Facts:

The President approved R.A. No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its jurisdiction. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform
promulgated guideline and procedures for the implementations, including rules and regulations of some
of the provisions.

Petitioner, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, avers that it would be adversely
affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law and issuances by
the respondent. Petitioner prayed that the said law, guidelines and implementations be declared
unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the law provides the product-sharing plan, including those
engaged in livestock and poultry business.

Further, Luz Farms argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with crop or tree farming. The
land is not the primary resource in such undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the total
investments of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. The land is not the principal factor or
consideration in their industry. Foregoing considered, it maintained that it should not be covered in the
jurisdiction of the Act which covers agricultural lands.

Respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the
inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 6657 is proper.

Issue:

Whether or not livestock and poultry raising is covered under the jurisdiction of the Agrarian Reform Law

Held:

The provisions of R.A. No. 6657 does not include the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage
and the implementing rules and guidelines promulgated are declared unconstitutional.

Looking into the transcript of the Constitutional Commission on the meaning of the word “agriculture”, it
showed that the framers never intended to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government.

Further, the Commission pointed out that the reason why it used the term “farmworkers” rather than
“agricultural workers” in the said law is because the latter includes the livestock and poultry industry,
hence, since they do not intend to include the latter, they used “farmworkers” to have distinction.
 37. Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (171101, November 22,
2011)

Facts:

In 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program was passed. Hacienda Luisita was one of the lands
covered by the law. It was brought from Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation, which
is owned and controlled by Jose Cojuanco, Sr. In 1980, the Martial Law Administration filed an
expropriation suit to surrender the Hacienda to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform so the land can be
distributed to the farmers at cost.

Section 31 of the Program allows either land transfer or stock transfer s modes of distributing ownership
to farmworker-beneficiaries. The stock distribution scheme was opted by TADECO, it organized a spin-off
corporation, the Hacienda Luisita, Inc., to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.

FARM asks for the invalidation of the provision of the Program as it affords a mode of distribution
inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 31 of the Program is unconstitutional

Held:

No, it is not unconstitutional. Farmers and farmworkers have the right to own the lands they till. The law
allows two modes of land distribution: direct and indirect ownership.

The stock distribution under the Program keeps with the agrarian reform policy, as an instrument of social
justice. Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution does not constrict Congress to passing a law planted on
direct land transfer to and ownership by framers and no other, or else the enactment suffers from the
vice of unconstitutionality.
 38. Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (135385, December 6, 2000)

Facts:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit to question the constitutionality of certain provisions
of R.A. No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources.

The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution. Also, they contend that by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral
domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections
3(a) and 3(b) of said law also violates the rights of private landowners.

Issue:

Whether or not the provisions of R.A. No 8371 contravene the Constitution

Held:

The Supreme Court has not reached a decision and thus it dismisses the petition. It cannot that the Act
contravene the Constitution.

The law does not provide that grants to the indigenous cultural communities and indigenous people
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural
resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to such
people over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants
of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources,
and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private lands and belong to the indigenous cultural communities and indigenous people by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However,
the right of ownership and possession by the indigenous cultural communities and indigenous people of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance
with law, in the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain
under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small
settlers, and the rights of the indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
 39. Basco vs. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (91649, May 14, 1991)

Facts:

PAGCOR was granted the power to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. Its charter was updated through P.D. No. 1869 which
provides that it shall regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law.

Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR. It is
argued that P.D. No. 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes PAGCOR-conducted
gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking
and other vices. On the other hand, petitioners contend that the Decree also violate the local autonomy
clause because it forced cities to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as it exempts respondent
from paying them.

Issue:

Whether or not PAGCOR’s Charter contravenes the local autonomy clause of the Constitution

Held:

PAGCOR’s Charter, P.D. No. 1869 does not contravene the local autonomy clause of the Constitution

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes,
fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent
with the basic policy on local autonomy. These shall accrue exclusively to the local government. The taxing
power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.

The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. It should
be stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create
and abolish municipal corporations. If Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

Further, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR
is a GOCC with an original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National
Government. This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local
governments. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization.
 40. Dadole vs. Commission on Audit (125350, December 3, 2002)

Facts:

Petitioners, as RTC and MTC judges in Mandaue City, received a monthly allowance of P1,260 each
pursuant to the yearly appropriation ordinance. Eventually, it was increased to P1,500 for each judge.
However, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued LBC No. 55 providing the additional
monthly allowances to be given by a local government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and
cities and P700 in municipalities.

Acting on the said DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein
petitioners in excess of the amount authorized by LBC No. 55. Thus, petitioners filed with the Office of the
City Auditor a protest. However, it was treated as a motion for reconsideration and was endorsed to the
Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred the said
motion to their Head Office with recommendation that the same should be denied. Accordingly, it was
denied by the COA.

Petitioners argued that LBC No. 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by
dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional allowances to judges
stationed therein.

Issue:

Whether or not the local autonomy of Mandaue City is infringed by the mandate of LBC No.55

Held:

The local autonomy of Mandaue City is infringed by the mandate of LBC No. 55, notwithstanding that the
Circular has not been published.

Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local
autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the
President. Section 4, Article X of the Constitution provides that the President shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control.

Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of the Local Government Code provides that the law that supposedly serves as
the legal basis of LBC No. 55, it allows the grant of additional allowances to judges when the finances of
the city government allow. It does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional
allowances granted to judges. The finances of a city government may allow the grant of additional
allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city government exceed its annual expenditures.

As the alter ego of the President, the DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government
units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other
words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis. The principle of local autonomy is violated.
 41. Limbona vs. Mangelin (80391, February 28, 1989)

Facts:

Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook
of Central Mindanao (Assembly). Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, invited petitioner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation with local government officials. The latter accepted
the invitation and informed the Assembly through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session
in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress.

The Assembly held a session in defiance of petitioner’s advice, where he was unseated from his position.
Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared void and be it declared that he was still the
Speaker of the Assembly.

Pending further proceedings of the case, the Court received a resolution from the Assembly expressly
expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner filed a case before the
Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved
within the confines of the Assembly, for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become
"moot and academic" because of its resolution.

Issue:

Whether or not courts have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments

Held:

The courts have jurisdiction over the autonomous government. The Supreme Court ordered for
petitioner’s reinstatement as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Speaker thereof.

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or of power. There is decentralization of

administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions to
relieve the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enable it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises only general supervision to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law but has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own. Decentralization of power means that the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

The autonomous governments of Mindanao created by P.D. No. 1618 persuades that they were never
meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense. The Decree mandates that the President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions. Hence, the Supreme Court may
assume jurisdiction.

Under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, sessions shall not be suspended or adjourned except
by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook. However, it appears that respondents opened the sessions
themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, it is upheld that the
recess was called on the ground of good faith.
 42. Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections (161872, April 13, 2004)

Facts:

Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President but COMELEC refused to give due
course to it in its Resolution No. 6558. Respondent denied the motion for reconsideration under the
mandate of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604.

Petitioner seeks to reverse the Resolutions which he alleged in violation of his right to equal access to
opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the
number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign or are
nominated by political parties. This is in addition to his belief that he is the most qualified among all the
presidential candidates.

Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy. He claims that the form
does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it
does not ask for the candidate’s bio-data and his program of government.

Issue:

Whether or not there the opportunity to public service is unconstitutionally barred by respondent

Held:

Petitioner is not unconstitutionally barred to run for public office. Petitioner’s reliance on the equal access
clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is misplaced. The question of whether a candidate is a
nuisance candidate is remanded for the reception of further evidence is in order.

There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office. What is recognized is merely a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a
right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.

The provisions under the Article II of the Constitution are generally considered not self-executing, and
there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the “equal access” provision. The
provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline
for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action
before the courts.

The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and
orderly. It takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Ultimately, a disorderly
election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic
institutions.
 43. Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Morato (92541, November 13, 1991)

Facts:

Ma. Carmen Aquino-Sarmiento, a member of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board,
requested its chairman, Manuel Morato, she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the
voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television
productions. The request was eventually denied on the ground that the members of the board’s judgment
over a film are completely personal. Anybody who wants access thereto must first secure the member's
consent.

In a meeting to discuss the issue, 17 members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records
as classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the
chairman. Thereafter, Morato denied petitioner's request. Much later, the Board issued Resolution No.
10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and
the voting slips of the members.

Petitioner argues that the records she wishes to examine are public in character and other than providing
for reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of examination, respondents Morato and the
classification board have no authority to deny any citizen seeking examination of the board's records.

The Justice Secretary did not comment on the constitutionality of Resolution No. 10-89 on the ground
that the resolution thereof is a judicial prerogative.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution No. 10-89 is void as it contravene the right of access to official records

Held:

Resolution No. 10-89 is void. The Constitutional recognition of the citizen's right of access to official
records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the members of the board concerned, otherwise,
the said right would be rendered nugatory.

Creating MTRCB, P.D. 1986 provides that the Board’s existence is public in character; it is an office created
to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy
belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked
with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties.

The individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their
official functions, and are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character.
 44. Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission (72119, May 29, 1987)

Facts:

Government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, allegedly represented themselves as
passers of the civil service examinations for sanitarians. Respondent denied Valentin Legaspi's request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City.

Petitioner claims that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of subject employees is guaranteed by
the Constitution, and that he has no other remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the
writ of Mandamus compelling respondent to disclose said information.

The Office of the Solicitor-General contends that petitioner has no standing in the case as he failed to
show his actual interest.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent may be compelled to release the information

Held:

The Civil Service Commission should release the information to petitioner.

The object of the mandamus is to enforce public duty. The people are the real party in interest and the
relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution
of the laws.

All appointments in the Commission are made according to fitness while a public office is a public trust.
Public employees are accountable to the people. The court also noted that the information on the result
of the eligibility examination is released to the public therefore the request of petitioner is one that is not
unusual or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any
person occupying government positions.
 45. Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr. (74930, February 13, 1989)

Facts:

Ricardo Valmonte requested from Feliciano Belmonte, Jr., GSIS General Manager, the list of opposition
members of the Batasang Pambansa able to secure a clean loan of P2 million pesos each on guaranty of
Imelda Marcos. The request was premised on the right to information provision of the Freedom
Constitution.

The Deputy General Counsel of GSIS, Meynardo Tiro denied such request in regard with the confidential
relationship between the GSIS and those who borrow from it and that it would not be proper for the GSIS
to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.

Petitioners then moved for the case at bar. Separate comments were filed by Belmonte and the Solicitor-
General. Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of
Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is
therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause
of action.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of right to information

Held:

Respondents is ordered to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted
to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, inspection, not incompatible
with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution is to include government-owned and controlled corporations
and transactions entered into by them within the coverage of the State policy of full public disclosure is
manifest from the records of the proceedings. Transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-
controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be
informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.

The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy,
considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted.

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution provides that the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law.