Professional Documents
Culture Documents
October 2004
Jong-Il Park
Ph. D. Candidate
Department of Sociology
University of California, Los Angeles
1
Regionalism and Nationalism in Question
nationalism destroys regional and ethnic movements within the nation-state territory.
destined to wither away as the society cross the threshold of modern nation building
identities go hand in hand (Huntington; Diamond). The point is clear: strong regional or
making, are likely to clash with nationalist movement. In other words, on its flip side, a
political identity.
political identity such as regional one in the putatively mono-ethnic Korea is quite
discourses in the East Asia in general and Korea in particular are dominated by states (see
Duara for the East Asia; Shin et al 1999 for Korea). Then, would this be an aberration in
the long historical moments in Korea? Or could it be a tell-tale sign of challenge of non-
Korea?
Furthermore, the South Korean story presents us a challenging case study as it differs
from other cases of regional and ethnic conflict (even among the cases of nation-state
2
with strong ethnic nature and stable democracy1) in that the antagonistic regions, both the
advantaged and the disadvantaged, did not make any claim of regional autonomy or
secession. Although this point might raise a familiar objection from the conventional
not happen. Moreover, the claims of single ethnic nation should not be accepted at face
value in the tradition of social constructivist approach which is widely accepted in social
science today.3
Given these general and historically specific points of interests, I specifically ask the
following two sets of questions in the present study. First, does national identity
regional identity be a base of, or obstacle to, national identity? Second, more specifically,
in the face of state domination of nationalist discourse, while the regional schism within
the nation is ever growing, how did the democracy movement leaders and state elite react
In the process of answering the questions above, I visit two historical junctures of
increasing regional gap during the Park Chung-Hee era (1961-79). The Park’s version of
initiated development projects around the country but at the same time it increased the
1
Emergence of the Northern League in Italy could be a comparable case in this sense. The affluent north of
Italy formed a political entity that even possesses a new state name, Padania, and clearly has some
secessionist motives. See Agnew for detail.
2
The most sacred credo of Korean history is mono-ethnic integrity of the nation whose role in the
conventional understanding of Korean history is undeniable. Yet, how the discourse is constructed and how
it works in politics should be the object discussion.
3
See Smith (1998) for distinction between constructivism (or modernism) and primordialism.
3
disadvantaged region, people came to realize that they are not becoming equal partners in
this national project and thus transformed into second class citizens of the national
community. From the benefit of hindsight, quite ironically, the era of national control and
regional struggle in the 80s and 90s has been a dispute between the two stories:
government version of regional rebellion and parochialism vs. movement activist version
adopted that the Kwangju Uprising provides a breeding ground for the new Korean
national identity. At the same time, there were active engagements of the state elite to
frame and manipulate the regional struggle as “betrayal of national unity” and as
conspiratorial move to dismantle the legitimate national government. I will show that
regional movement elites were keenly aware of the contentious nature of regional identity
within the nationalist discourse and thus became very cautious about making any
regionalist claims. They feared that any suggestion of regional discontent would provide
fertile ground for state denunciation and repudiation in reference to national unity. As a
result, instead of presenting the issue right in front, they had to reprioritize the regionalist
claims within the demands of democracy movement. Also, they formulated the new
Putting all together, we may reach an understanding on why the Korean regionalism
takes the current form of antagonism which is quite unique in comparative historical
4
perspective—The most noticeable trait is that the Korean form of regional struggle
evolves around the question of “who controls the state” while not addressing the issues of
regional autonomy and not questioning the meaning of region within the nation-state.
State domination of the ethnic nationalism has much to do with the answer.
Any inquiry of relationship between nationalism and regionalism should begin with
the “modernist theory”4 of nationalism. The most dominant theory in the study of
parochial identities obsolete. Gellner (1983) and Deutsch (1961) provide good starting
homogenized individuals so that they are able to “communicate contextlessly and with
precision” (Gellner: 141) with all others. Consequently, earlier “relational” identities,
linked to family, clan, and locality tend to decline, and new ‘categorical’5 identities,
which link us to a multitude of others in nationality, take on more and more importance.
point: inequality between different groups within single country has been diminished and
hierarchical order has been substituted by horizontal network. The sense of belonging to a
4
I use the conventional label of the “modernist theory” used by many others. See Smith (1998) and
Brubaker (1998) for this classification.
5
Distinction between the “relational” and “categorical” identities is adopted from the Calhoun’s analysis
(1997: 29).
5
From this perspective, the recent Korean regionalist conflict can be puzzling. It came
a while after liberation, and industrialization, and strong nationalism, and regionalism
Regional struggle, initiated by the 1980 massacre in Cholla, the southwestern region, and
democratic transition.
Similar criticism can be presented against the “liberal democracy theory.” The
proponents of this theory argue that ethnic and/or regional identity and nationalism are
regional or ethnic identity dominates, there is little chance for nation-state building. This
assessment often expressed in a form that democracy is ‘rational’ and ‘good’ while
regional/ethnic identity is ‘irrational’ and ‘evil.’ Fukuyama (1992) illustrates this line of
reasoning that in the post cold war era “irrational nationalism does not present a viable
are not considered as major players of democratic transition. It is very clear in arguing
that cultural change is a condition for democracy, and nationalism or other sub-national
identity should be obsolete to make a favorable condition for democracy. Otherwise, they
liberal theorists in general emphasize that regional or ethnic division may affect chances
of democracy where it put the unity of the nation into question. It can be a good
6
explanation of why deeply divided societies have difficulty in achieving democracy. Yet,
they do not provide an answer to why regional or ethnic struggles emerged (and re-
emerged) in modern politics and why regional conflicts exploded during the democratic
Nation
Region
(Ethnicity)
City / Neighborhood
The brief review of the two theoretical traditions reveals that they are ill-equipped to
deal with the dynamic interaction between the nationalism and regionalism within a
nation-state. The biggest failure of the theories is that they assume rigidly established
levels of identity (see Figure 1): regional under the guideline of national, and
possesses supremacy. Regional identity as a sub-national one might thrive or wither away
depending on the congruency with the grand identity of nation. It is rarely questioned
how regional is imagined within the framework of nationalism and how regional identity
7
operate in connection with national identity. Simply put, there is no serious attempt to
explain how regional identity engages with national identity in the political arena.
Nation-State
System
Nationalism
(T1, T2, …)
Racial
Regionalism Identity
accurate to say that “nation and national identity is historically contingent, context-
driven, and defined and redefined in negotiation and transaction” (Jenkins 1997: 143). It
is quite true that the history of East Asia does not exhibit much evidence of contested
nature of national identity due to state domination of nationalism discourse.7 Yet, at the
same time, recent literature in the East Asian studies challenges the static view of
6
The <Fugure 2> shows how nationalism in a society is constructed. Especially in Korea, factors such as
racial identity and nation-state system had enormous influence on the construction of Korean nationalism
and national identity (for those factors see Schmid; Shin & Robinson). Regionalism could be another
factor, I propose.
7
For state domination of national history in East Asia, especially in China and Korea, see Duara (1995;
2004).
8
national identity. Many scholars demonstrated that there are ample evidences that refute
Gluck; Vlastos). Multiple scenarios of constructing Chinese national identity are also
well documented (see Duara; Friedman). This line of reasoning leads us to a modest goal
as kinship, regional, and ethnic identities, in the field of politics, might show how nation
and nationalism work within a nation-state. Our case study of the regionalism in South
During the Park Chung-Hee regime, nationalist discourse was shaped mainly through
confrontations with the North and occasionally through the Japanese and the US
influence on the politics of the Korea peninsular. The first consequence of the “two-state
one-nation” confrontation was that any discussion on the unification of the nation was not
allowed in the civil society. People who attempted to express their opinion on unification
issue different from the state version were easily prosecuted and incarcerated. Cho Bong
Am during the Syngman Rhee regime and Chang Chun Ha during the Park regime are
well known examples of how state domination eliminated the challenging voices.
Closer observation of the confrontation of the two states reveals that both produced
very similar outcomes in nationalist discourse. First of all, both Kim Il Sung and Park
Chung-Hee uphold the purity and unity of the ethnic nation. (Shin et al.) Mythical
common ancestor was equally emphasized in the South and the North. More importantly,
9
they both charged the other as traitors of national community and consistently stressed
the need for reunification. Through this intra-national confrontation between the two
states, it is argued that the ethnic nature of Koran nationalism is further strengthened
(Shin et al.)
Shifting our attention to South Korea, the relationship between nation and region
during the Park era was somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, the regime considerably
increased the effort to integrate different communities of the country into a unified
nation. It was done through the state initiated development plan around the country side,
the Saemaeul Movement, and increased surveillance through secret service agents. On
the other hand, economic disparity within the nation resulted in growing regional schism.
As it is well known in the development studies, the take off of Korean national economy
in the 1960s is caused by deliberate plan economy of central government that distributed
the available foreign capital to strategic sites of industrialization for export economy.
(Amsden), it also exposed the uneven nature of capitalist development. Mainly the
planned economic development showed that the distribution of the resources and benefits
Economic disparity between Kyongsang and Cholla province has been pointed out the
has grown by three or four times in Cholla provinces, while it is recorded ten-fold
increase in Kyongsang region. From 1960 to 1990, population change by region attests
the declining fortune of Cholla region. While it has about 25 percent of the total national
population in 1960, the proportion in the national population dropped to 11.7% of the
10
total. Millions of Cholla resident moved out of the region in search of industrial jobs in
major cities in other region while the region remained as agricultural center of the nation.
In political sphere, the power of regional units decreased considerably while the
central government increased the administrative power around the nation. An important
political event in the era was dismissal of regional assembly by the Park regime. Upon
acquisition of political power through military coup, Park dismissed the regional
assembly in the name of national security and protection of the nation from the chaotic
political process. The regional assembly was one of a few remaining building blocks of
the burgeoning democracy. Also noted was the increased penetration of state
administrative power around the country. During the Park regime, it is noted that the
number of government employees were typically increased by three times. Counting and
and upgraded census activities, was completely carried out in the Park era.
It is widely noted that the regional gap reached a level of social conflict during the
transition to democracy. Not only political parties and bureaucracy, but also employment
opportunities and marriage relations were founded regionalized. Some accuse that many
chaeb ls openly refused to hire people from Cholla region in the late 1980s (Janelli
1993). Studies show that there are barriers for inter-regional marriages (Kim 1987) and
inequality in the labor market in the 1980s for people from Cholla region (Yu 1990).
In addition to growing regional gap, we want to point out the lack of territorial
integration in the Korean national discourse. Even when it is compared to other ethnically
based nations, including Japan and Germany, Korean nation building lacks any
experience of integrating the frontier region. Japan had to incorporate Okinawa and
11
Hokkiado, politically and culturally, when it prepared to emerge as a nation-state in the
late last century (Sato). German provinces in the turn of the century had to form a federal
republic to situate themselves between the empires and nation-states (Applegate). Even
the Chinese experience shows that there was a serious discussion on federalism based on
provincial autonomy before it settled with the centralized political order (Duara 1995).
Yet, the modern Korean nation building lacked any territorial re-alignment.8 Therefore, it
has never been discussed how territorial (“regional” or “provincial” in this context)
The Kwangju Uprising in 1980 has been a crucial moment in South Korean history,
debates of Korean regionalism as well as the democracy movement in the 1980s and 90s.
Kwangju in South Cholla province, the most economically disadvantaged region in South
Korea. But it quickly became a mass uprising as citizens from all walks of life joined the
protesters after witnessing brutal suppressions by military forces including special force
provided a new momentum and it eventually lasted over nine days. At the same time,
changing leadership during the struggle and various participants, even long after the
Uprising, made the nature of the Uprising a controversial topic for researchers, political
8
The unification issue and irredentism in Manchuria might force the realignment of territory in the national
imagining in the future. But there is no chance of territorial realignment until now.
9
For historical account of the Uprising written by participants, see Lee 1999.
12
Defining the exact nature of the Uprising has been the task of many social scientists
and movement activists in South Korea, but not exactly the goal of this research. For the
sake of this research, I only identify several versions of interpreting the Uprising by
different groups of the society.10 First, it was proclaimed as a mass democracy movement
law regime. Part of the student leaders and movement intellectuals originally produced
this interpretation and after the successful transition to democracy it became an official
state version of the history11. Second, increased regional disparity during the Park regime
and rumors of regional antagonism during the Uprising provided a catalyst for the mass
uprising. We identify this factor as “regional conflict version.” Immediately following the
the Uprising—they preferred to call it a riot instead of uprising from the beginning.
According to the regime, the riot was initiated by infiltrators from the communist North
and expanded through the participation of thugs and gangs among the citizenry, the
impure elements12 of the national community. It was a challenge to our nation-state, they
argue, and had to be suppressed militarily in order to protect the national community.
Third, it is called a “class struggle” by some movement intellectuals and student leaders.
Especially in the later period of the Uprising, when lower class participants became
13
Undeniably there were many causes, demands, and groups involved in the Uprising.
It would be wise to conclude that we could find some elements of the all three
interpretations above. Instead of judging the truthfulness of the claims, my sole objective
in the study is to identify how different groups fought to justify their version of the
interpretation. Especially, I focus on how they played out during the political struggle in
First, the state elite picked up the regionalist claims and discontent from the Uprising
participants and manipulated them to support their “regional rebellion” theory. It was a
relentless effort to create a contrast between national unity and regional discontent. In the
first broadcasted message to the nation after the outbreak of the Uprising, the commander
in chief under the martial law, General Yi Hi Sung provided a rationale for military
action.
responsibility to protect the safety of state, keep the livelihood of the nation, and
patriotism to wisely resolve the current tragic situation with sensibility and self-
restraint.
The reason why the situation developed into the current state is that a
number of impure elements from other regions and communist infiltrators from
the North moved into your region in order to escalate the event into an extreme
situation. They spread malicious rumors, lead destruction of the public facilities,
and create arsons and lootings in order to incite regional sentiments and create
lawlessness. The actions of the impure elements reached the level of armed
struggle. It is self-evident that the incident will only cause destructive results for
14
It is very clear from the statement that the military juntas wanted to depict the
Uprising as ‘regional discontent’ and the leaders as ‘impure’ elements of the national
community. In numerous other statements after the Uprising, the state elite frequently
described the participants of the Uprising as sympathizers of and infiltrators from the
communist North13. The labeling is intended to marginalize them from the legitimate
inseparable unit—there is no distinction between the state and nation.14 Yet, it is not
uncommon to find a political statement in Korea, especially during the Park regime,
which includes the term “state nation”. It suggests both that there was no clear distinction
between the two historically and that the regime made a persistent efforts to equate the
state and nation to promote their legitimacy vis-à-vis the communist North Korea (see
Shin et al). At the same time, the contrast between the terms ‘state-nation’ and ‘region” is
very clear in the statement. Without doubt, the region is a part of the “state nation” and
there is an indication that the region as a sub unit ought to obey the rule of the state and
nation. The term “regional sentiment”, which became an omnipresent but ‘disgraceful’
term in the South Korean politics after the Uprising, is deliberately used to emphasize the
parochial and irrational nature of the Uprising as opposed to the harmonious familial
13
There were several rumors of North Korean spies in the Uprising but none of them were independently
verified during or after the Uprising. See KOMS for interviews of participants.
14
Walker Connor (1994) reminds us that the patriotism (loyalty to state) and nationalism (loyalty to
national group) tend to blur into a seamless whole for people who possess their own ethnically homogenous
nation-state such as Japanese and Germans (196). For (South) Koreans, however, situated in a position to
clearly recognize imperfect representation of nation through the two states, the infusion of ‘state and
nation’ is a obvious political shibboleth than anywhere else.
15
nation. It is no coincidence that the term “regional sentiment” is vehemently denied by
the movement leaders as they tried to overcome the label of “renegade region”
Rumors during the Uprising served well for the regime’s purpose of de-
paratroopers, which had played a significant role in strengthening indignation among the
citizenry of Kwangju15, became a target of the government attack. They argued that a few
‘impure elements’ of the society rabble-roused the ordinary citizens. In reaction to brutal
brutality and some picked up the verbal cue of the soldiers and concluded that they are all
from the rival region of Kyongsang. It immediately became a powerful message mainly
due to the experience of regional discrimination during the Park regime and the
predominant regional background of the military leaders.16 On the other hand, the rumor
served particularly well for the military juntas because the regime wanted to show that
the movement is for the egoistic regional gain at the sacrifice of the national unity and
security. The participants were parochial, irrational, and marginal members of the nation,
they claimed in the statement. The rumors also served well in showing the irrationality of
the mass during the Uprising. Rumors of regional background of soldiers and looting of
trucks from other regions listed to show irrationality of the mobs in Kwangju. Over all
the central message of the government propaganda was that the parochial regional
15
In numerous interviews of the movement participants compiled in the KOMS indicate that the citizens of
Kwangju believed the rumor in the fear of brutal suppression and isolation from the outside. Truthfulness
of the rumor is another question and there is no need to address this issue in this paper. In addition, it is
well known that the regional background of the generals were largely Kyongsang, over 60%.
16
In the study ethnic violence, Kuran argues that reaching to a tipping point may exponentially increase the
solidarity of ethnic group. The rumor in the Uprising might provide a tipping point in our view.
16
Even though the term “regional sentiment” is a neologism of the 1980s it was the
same old tactic used by the dictators since the Korean War to maintain the domination of
nationalist discourse. The familiar label of ‘communist rebels,’ the most popular political
repertoire of dictators Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-Hee against the opponents, was
can be verified by the identical effect of castigating the members of the nation as anti-
national and even as “national enemy”. It is especially effective when the nationalist
discourse is dominated by state and the type of nationalism is ethnic and organic.
unwittingly, tried to take advantage of nationalist discourse for their own. It was a very
predictable response considering that the nation and nationalism occupy the supreme
position in Korean politics. Not only the movement leader but also ordinary citizens
expressed their anger by employing the nationalist rhetoric. Many people expressed that
the soldiers are not members of their nation—the strongest political statement in Korean
context.
“I saw a dead body in front of the theater. People said that he was beaten to death
by paratroopers. While watching it, it came to my mind ‘how could they do this to the
“We cannot forgive the criminals who disobeyed the history and killed our nation.
In the name of nation and in the name of history we have to execute them. We have
never executed the collaborators and anti-nationals after the liberation. It is clearly
17
Catholic priest Kim Sung Yong, who played an intermediary role in bringing the
animals. They beat us, stabbed us, and shot us. How do we solve this incident? You
called us as ‘thugs and gangs’ and we will remain as ‘thugs and gangs’ when it is over.
All of us in Cholla will be ‘thugs and gangs’ and our sons and daughters will remain so.
When outsiders ask us where we are from, we people of Cholla will be perceived as
In a similar vein, many drew a comparison between the paratrooper and Japanese
cops and soldiers during the colonial rule in order to disgrace them as illegitimate
“During the 36 years of Japanese rule, we the oppressed nation fought against them
without any weapons in hand. When our soldiers, who are supposed to protect us,
aimed the weapons against us, I could not seat and do nothing in the situation [KOMS:
609]”.
“My father was involved in an independence movement during the Japanese rule
and he was labeled as ‘thug’. What a destiny. My son became a ‘thug’ of the Kwangju
And I have a firm belief that my son will be exonerated soon just like my father had
discourse at the time was comparison between the paratroopers and North Koreans. As it
is well known, the modern Korean dictators, seeking for legitimacy of their rule,
18
over the other government in the peninsular. Under these circumstances, the citizen’s
One old man cried, “How did this happen? I saw many brutal Japanese cops during
the colonial time. I saw Communists during the Korean War. I have never seen cruelty
like the killings today! Students are not criminals! These paratroopers are not our
“The special force soldiers were more brutal than the communists during the
“The soldiers asked me whether my father was a member of the people’s army
“Soldiers with Kyongsang accent rushed to me and battered with the club by
As demonstrated above, the contestation began with the question “who is the
legitimate heir of our nation” or “who betrayed the national community.” The state elite
used the term ‘national security’ while the Kwangju citizens emphasized the brutality
against the members of the same nation. Yet, the most controversial part of the
contestation is how to interpret the apparent regional inequality within the nation. As
shown in the statement of the commander of the martial law, the state elite described the
regional discontent as rebellion against the national community while ignoring the very
existence of any regional disparity. On the other hand, the movement activists were
extremely cautious of making any regionalist claims. They knew all too well that the
regionalist claims cannot work against the state propaganda of “renegade region” theory.
19
They suspected that it only isolates the region from the other part of the nation and thus
helps strengthen the state side of the story. Therefore, instead of the emphasizing the
regional inequality and discrimination, they stressed the national ordeal of democracy and
independence.
Specifically, the movement activists sought to connect the Uprising to the long list of
nationalist struggles against the external forces including the Tonghak Peasant Rebellion
avoid the trap of the ‘renegade region’ theory. In a similar effort, activists tried to locate
the Uprising at the center of the national geography. One of the leading intellectuals of
the region, professor Mun Byongnan of Chosun University claimed in a news magazine
article, “Bloodshed of Kwangju is not only for the people of Kwangju, it is for the whole
nation. People in Pusun and Taegu should pay tribute and keep it in their heart” [KDMD
vol.17: 316].
building on the significance of the Kwangju Uprising. In fact, national surveys in the
1990s consistently showed that majority of the people outside of Kwangju perceived that
the Uprising was a regional issue (see KDMD vol. 16). The movement elite actively
sought to eliminate regional color of the movement. One of the key student leaders
during the Uprising, Chung Dongnyun in 1988 expressed his idea of how to define the
Uprising in fighting with the government propaganda. While adopting the class struggle
version of the theory, he suggests dropping the name “Kwnagju” in order to eliminate
20
“Current discussion of the cause and background of the Uprising finds excessive
distribution, and political power distribution. On the other hand, some say that
the Cholla residents wanted to fulfill their longing and political dream through
Kim Dae Jung. These interpretations are deadly wrong. The history is struggle
From now on, we should not call it 5.18 Kwangju People’s Uprising. It is
because the name denotes regional claims. People all around the country were
Long after the Uprising, the contestation of the regional vs. national remained the
same. The efforts to nationalize the conceived ‘regional’ movement continue. Yet, it has
failed to completely replace the government version of the renegade region and could not
achieve the intended goal of national symbol status. Suggestions on how to achieve the
goal is not very specific. One participant of the Uprising put it,
“Kwangju has to be reborn. And we have to develop the spirit of the movement so
Facing the stalemate, some suggest that people of Kwangju should forget about the
regional issue altogether. It is understood that region is a sub category of nation and thus
21
“You mentioned that how I am not angry about the regional discrimination as a son
about the 5.16 coup and the following regimes and their anti-historical, anti-national,
anti-state, and anti-democratic regionalism that increased the regional disparity and
alienation. How could I accept and forgive those treatments as a man of Homan, which
endured the most devastating discrimination and alienation? However, I do not agree
with you on how to overcome this. I argue that only the establishment of nationalistic
and progressive regime can solve this issue step-by-step. You argue that an elected
Honam president can solve this problem immediately (Yun 1996: 337)”.
antagonize them. They share same bloodline with us and we are no different with them
Interview of Jung Sang Yong 1988: “I am reborn in May 1980. My duty is to live
with will of the dead [during the Uprising] and uphold the true spirit of Kwangju. Some
mention regional characteristics [of Kwangju] in order to tarnish the Kwangju spirit.
democracy all people of the nation. That is to keep the dignity and self reliance of the
understanding of the location of region in the national imagining. They all presume a
rigidly subordinate role of regional identity under the umbrella of national identity. In the
22
government version, the region should not jeopardize the national security. And
suggesting any intra-national inequality was somehow translated into egoistic and anti-
national behavior. On the other hand, the movement intellectuals tried either to ignore the
regional issues or replace the whole notion of the nation. The former completely
latter position can be a little different from the former in a sense that they consider the
experience of the region should be a base of the new nation. However, it does not go
beyond the symbolic role of the region within the nation. In other words, in their
imagining, the Uprising is not necessarily a ‘regional’ experience. It does not matter
where it happened. All in all, the effort to develop new national integration outside the
purview of state power was not very successful in the Korea case.
In retrospect, the regional struggle could be a more serious issue in the Korean
politics considering the regional disparity, regionalized elite groups, and other
regionalized institutions in the 80s. There is no doubt that one of the most significant
forces that deterred the development was overarching ideology of “homogenous single
ethnic nation.” At a first glance, it seems that the homogeneity of the nation prevented the
further disintegration of the regions. I tried to show more than that. A close observation
reveals how it actually worked (or not worked) in the process. I argue that it was not
simply the nation harnessing the disintegrating regions. It was more of who controlled the
nationalist discourse and why regionalist claims were allowed (or not allowed) in the
23
domination of nationalist discourse, which heavily favored national integration and
sacrifice for the nation, there is no way of presenting regional issues. Under the
circumstances, after the uprising, the state denounced the citizens of the region as
marginal members of the nation who jeopardized the national unity and security. Facing
this uphill battle, the movement intellectuals also engaged in the nationalist discourse, by
denouncing the rulers as betrayers and slayers of nation. Engaging in the nationalist
discourse, however, they lost the ground to demonstrate the regional inequality and
discrimination. They had to abandon the regionalist claims altogether and some of them
actually did. Others tried to reconstruct the nation centered on the experience of the
place of regional identity in politics is very tenuous in South Korea especially when it
However limited it might be, there is a possibility the region becoming a symbol of new
national identity can not always dictate the local or regional identity. Certain version of
regional identity can be a base of national imagining while certain type of nationalism
Korea. The failure of regional challenge in our study attests this well known thesis on
East Asian States. At the same time, however, we do not rule out the possibility that even
in state dominated East Asian nationalisms, there are ample possibilities of challenging
24
official version of nationalism. There are multiple claims of national identity in Korea or
Another lesson from this study is that nationalism is not always a unifying force. It is
meaning of nation is always controversial and different groups present different symbol
and meaning of nation (Snyder; Allcock). Defining and maintaining the boundary of
nation can easily become a violent process. In a general sense, nationalist discourse on
the regionalist politics in Korea falls into the same category. Yet the outcome was not
deadly.
25
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