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Urban Crime and Criminal Justice:
The Chicago Case
MARK H. HALLER
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620 The Journal of American History
men, criminal lawyers, fixers, and politicians; and finally, criminals, whose
behavior was influenced by contact enforcement officials. These groups, by
frequent contact, developed diverse informal relationships and mutual ob-
ligations. In order to understand how the criminal justice system actually
functioned, it is as important to understand the criminal justice subculture
as to understand the characteristics of the formal system.
In Chicago, criminal activity and the criminal justice system were rooted
in the city's ethnic neighborhoods and were means of social mobility for
persons of marginal social and economic position in society. (The ethnic
political machines served the same purpose.) As a result, criminals, politi-
cians, and enforcement officials often shared experiences and values.
According to a 1930 study of 108 directors of the Chicago underworld,
30 percent were of Italian background, 29 percent were of Irish back-
ground, 20 percent were of Jewish background, and 12 percent were
blacks; but "not a single leader was recorded as native white American of
native born stock." A few groups virtually monopolized the upper levels of
crime in Chicago.1 Official positions within the criminal justice system were
also distributed largely among the same groups. As might be expected, 76
percent of the police captains were Irish. Judgeships were a reward for
party service, and each party slated judges so that the various ethnic groups
in the city would be represented. Judgeships often provided social mobility
for lawyers whose training at unprestigious law schools or whose ethnic or
religious background denied them admission to leading firms. Indeed, most
of the positions within the system, elected or appointed, were rewards for
party service. Politicians within the urban political machines looked upon
the criminal justice system as one of many means of maintaining the politi-
cal organization.2
Most of the people processed by the criminal justice system were the un-
organized offenders: juvenile delinquents, drunkards, wife-beaters, and am-
ateur thieves. Other lawbreakers were part of the more organized under-
world. The organized underworld, for purposes of analysis, can be seen to
consist of three types: professional thieves, business or labor racketeers, and
participants in organized crime.
'William F. Ogburn and Clark Tibbits, "A Memorandum on the Nativity of Certain
Criminal Classes Engaged in Organized Crime, and of Certain Related Criminal and
Non-Criminal Groups in Chicago," July 30, 1930, Charles E. Merriam Papers (Univer-
sity of Chicago Library), 9, 11.
2Ibid., 42-43, 47-48. For discussions of the background and recruitment of judges, see
Albert Lepawsky, The Judicial System of Metropolitan Chicago (Chicago, 1932), 116-41.
Interesting references about recruitment to the bench are also in Edward M. Martin, The
Role of the Bar in Electing the Bench in Chicago (Chicago, 1936). For the social back-
ground of machine politicians, see Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model
(Chicago, 1937).
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Urban Crime 621
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622 The Journal of American History
'John Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago (Chicago, 1968), 245; David W. Maurer,
The Big Con: The Story of the Confidence MAan and the Confidence Game (Indianapolis,
1940), 170-215. For discussion of the gaps in knowledge of the history of professional
criminals, see The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact-An Assessment (Washington, D.C.,
1967), 96-101.
'There are a few scholarly and many journalistic accounts of racketeering in Chicago
during the 1920s and early 1930s. Royal E. Montgomery, Industrial Relations in the
Chicago Building Trades (Chicago, 1927), 19-21; Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago,
149-67; Philip Hauser and Saul Alinsky, "Some Aspects of the Cleaning and Dyeing
Industry in Chicago-A Racket," Ernest W. Burgess Papers (University of Chicago Li-
brary). See also Fred D. Pasley, Muscling In (New York, 1931); Edward Dean Sullivan
This Labor Union Racket (New York, 1936); Gordon L. Hostetter and Thomas Quinn
Beesley, It's a Racket! (Chicago, 1929).
'Roger Touhy, The Stolen Years (Cleveland, 1959).
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Urban Crime 623
not victims. The need to develop congenial, long-term relations with cus-
tomers was itself a factor leading to systematic organization of the enterprise.
The customers, in fact, were often co-conspirators in the violation of law.
Indeed, the distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages in Chicago during
prohibition brought organized crime to a level of income and customer
support that revolutionized the city's underworld.8
In many ways organized crime resembled a business. These often in-
cluded a substantial capital investment, a regular payroll, and problems of
manufacture, distribution, and retailing. For example, in various phases of
gambling there were internal factors that led to coordination. Bookmaking
required a wire service. From early in the twentieth century, Mont Tennes
monopolized wire services. Using this as a basis-but also employing polit-
ical connections and occasional violence-he gained control of most book-
making in Chicago, and he extended his influence through much of the
United States. Most forms of gambling also had economic factors that con--
tributed to consolidation. Since a small time gambler lacked the capital to
cover his losses on a bad day, the local bookmaker or policy man was part
of a larger organization that handled financing and protection. According
to one estimate made in the late 1920s, 300 policy writers worked for a
single wheel in Chicago's black ghetto, and there were more than 6,000
policy writers in the ghetto.9
The need for protection also led to coordination of organized criminal
activities. In the early years of the twentieth century, Chicago's red-light
district achieved well-deserved fame, based on the high quality of its better
houses and the wide variety of services available. Those classic aldermen
from the First Ward, Michael "Hinky Dink" Kenna and "Bathhouse John"
Coughlin, presided over political protection of vice in the ward. Saloons,
gambling houses, and bordellos provided the funds that nurtured the
aldermen's political organization and paid enthusiastic workers who sup-
ported the party's efforts on election day. In addition to arrangements with
Hinky Dink and Bathhouse John, operators also made business arrangements
with the local police. Protection not only exempted some enterprises from
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624 The Journal of American History
police interference but also became part of a process for eliminating compe-
tition. Those who were not part of the protection arrangement would be
raided and harassed. The protection arrangement, in addition, involved
agreements for regulating fraud and violence, both in order to give custom-
ers confidence in the product and avoid open scandal that would embarrass
law enforcement agencies. Thus, the stable and systematic relationships
with politicians and police protected criminal activity and served the eco-
nomic functions of regulating competition and fraud.'0
In significant ways, the 1920s witnessed changes in the social structure of
organized crime in Chicago. Because bootlegging provided such resources
in money and organization, an unprecedented consolidation and central-
ization of organized crime occurred. Despite this, there was a continuity of
leadership that spanned the period before and after prohibition. Before
prohibition, "Big Jim" Colosimo was the leading vice figure in the First
Ward. He employed two young men, Johnny Torrio and Al Capone, as
bodyguards and business managers in the field of prostitution. When
Colosimo was killed in 1920, Torrio succeeded him and built up a boot-
legging organization that covered the central city, as well as much of the
south and west sides. After being shot, Torrio prudently retired in 1924,
and Al Capone assumed control."l
Throughout the period, underworld figures held important positions as
civic leaders and political brokers. In addition to the relationships based on
mutual interest and favors that linked the underworld to enforcement offi-
cials and politicians, there were friendships and ethnic loyalties that linked
gangsters to segments of legitimate society. The members of ethnic groups
who achieved success in business, politics, or the professions often had ties
with gangsters stemming from youthful friendship and from mutual partic-
ipation in ethnic social life. The successful criminal or racketeer was almost
"Lloyd Wendt and Herman Kogan, Lords of the Levee: The Story of Bathhouse John
and Hinky Dink (Indianapolis, 1943). See also Herbert Asbury, Gem of the Prairie: An
Informal History of the Chicago Underworld (New York, 1940), 95-141, 203-42, 243-80;
Walter C. Reckless, Vice in Chicago (Chicago, 1933), 1-98; Charles Washburn, Come
into my Parlor: A Biography of the Aristocratic Everleigh Sisters of Chicago (New York,
1934); Vice Commission of Chicago, The Social Evil in Chicago: A Study of Existing
Conditions (Chicago, 1911); Civil Service Commission, Final Report, Civil Service Com-
mission, City of Chicago Police Investigation, 1911-1912 (Chicago, 1912); Landesco,
Organized Crime in Chicago, 25-43.
'Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago, 85-105; Asbury, Gem of the Prairie, 320-74;
Kenneth Allsop, The Bootleggers and Their Era (Garden City, 1961); John H. Lyle,
The Dry and Lawless Years (Englewood Cliffs, 1960); Fred D. Pasley, Al Capone: The
Biography of a Self-Made Man (New York, 1930); Edward D. Sullivan, Rattling the
Cup on Chicago Crime (New York, 1929); Edward Dean Sullivan, Chicago Surrenders:
A Sequel to "Rattling the Cup on Chicago Crime" (New York, 1930).
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Urban Crime 625
'Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago, 169-221. For the situation in Chicago's black
neighborhoods, see Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 115-35; Drake and Cayton, Black Metropo-
lis, 470-94, 546-50. For the situation in Chicago's Italian neighborhoods before World
War I, see Humbert S. Nelli, "Italians and Crime in Chicago: The Formative Years,
1890-1920," American Journal of Sociology, 74 (Jan. 1969), 373-91.
"3Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago, 169-205.
"For a study of elite reformers and their beliefs, see David R. Johnson, "Crime Fight-
ing Reform in Chicago, An Analysis of its Leadership, 1919-1927" (master's thesis, Uni-
versity of Chicago, 1966).
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626 The Journal of American History
from the criminal justice system. They sought higher standards of com-
petence for officials-from policemen to prison guaids-and wanted criminal
justice insulated from partisan politics.'5
There were, however, differences within the ranks of reformers. One
group-especially leading lawyers, businessmen, and newspaper editors-
believed that the major function of criminal justice was to deter crime
through punishment of criminals; and they worked to eliminate delays in
justice, leniency, and coddling. In general, they also believed that the police
should concentrate chiefly upon crimes against property and persons: as-
sault, rape, burglary, robbery, and larceny.16 The other group-social settle-
ment workers, professors, and some clergymen-wished in part, to use the
criminal justice system for social reform purposes. They hoped to rehabili-
tate the criminals brought within the system and eliminate vice and tempta-
tions from the urban environment. To provide a decent environment for
children, they worked to close brothels, dance halls, taverns, and other traps
for the unwary. To protect the income of a husband for his family, they
struggled to drive out gambling and to curtail or eliminate the temptation
to drink. The city, in short, was a cesspool of iniquity; but the criminal
justice system might reduce the sinful stench.'7
The goals of criminal justice reformers-efficiency, elimination of polit-
ical corruption and favoritism, higher competence for political officials, cre-
ation of a more moral urban environment-were central to the values of
the progressive movement of the early twentieth century and of "good gov-
ernment" movements generally. During the period before World War I,
the group that sought to use the criminal justice system in order to improve
the urban neighborhood and rehabilitate youthful delinquents generally
predominated; after the war, the dominant group wanted to make criminal
justice more punitive and deterrent. In criminal justice reform, then, as in
so many reform movements, a generally humanitarian impulse in the pe-
' The sources for the reformers' beliefs are too numerous to list, see Illinois Associ-
ation for Criminal Justice, The Illinois Crime Survey (Chicago, 1929).
'1The best exemplification of the deterrent beliefs would be found in the publications
of the Chicago Crime Commission, Bulletin of the Chicago Crime Commission (later
called Criminal Justice), Jan. 31, 1921. See also Chicago Tribune, Jan. 11, 1925, Sept.
21, 1929.
IT For expressions of the reformist views on criminal justice, see the Juvenile Protective
Association of Chicago, Annual Reports; see also Jane Addams, A New Conscience and
an Ancient Evil (New York, 1912); Samuel Paynter Wilson, Chicago and Its Cess-Pools
of Infamy (Chicago, n.d.). For analysis of the division between business leaders and
social workers on law enforcement, see Graham Taylor, "Police Versus Crime-The Case
Stated," Chicago Daily News, Jan. 20, 1923; Graham Taylor to Henry B. Chamberlin,
Jan. 20, 1923, Chicago Crime Commission File No. 600-9 (Chicago Crime Commission,
Chicago, Ill.).
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Urban Crime 627
riod before the war took on a less humanitarian tone in the period follow-
ing the war.
In attempting to influence criminal justice, reformers were at a disadvan-
tage, partly because they were only marginally related to the political fac-
tions that controlled the city and partly because they were seldom directly
involved in the criminal justice system. Yet reformers had a number of ad-
vantages that stemmed from their social prestige, relative wealth, and orga-
nizational skills. They controlled the press, their values were almost univer-
sally acknowledged as normative, and they had the resources to conduct in-
vestigations and work for specific reform goals.
An examination of three reform activities provides an opportunity to ex-
plore some of the patterns by which reformers influenced criminal behavior
and criminal justice. The first was the establishment in Cook County of the
earliest juvenile court in the United States. The court was the creation of
reformers with a variety of backgrounds, including social settlement work,
leadership in the prestigious Chicago Woman's Club, and membership in
the Chicago Bar Association. The founders of the juvenile court believed
that criminal justice could serve the goals of reform and rehabilitation; and
the reformers shaped the juvenile court to their own values and goals.'8
The new court, established by the state legislature in 1899, was not a
criminal court. There were no prosecutors or defendants, and no one was
found guilty of a crime. Instead, a boy under the age of seventeen or a girl
under the age of eighteen could be brought into court, if there was evidence
of delinquency or neglect. If the court found the youth to be dependent or
delinquent, it could then make him a ward of the state and put him on pro-
bation with his parents, place him with a guardian, or assign him to an ap-
propriate institution. The important point about the court was the discre-
tionary power that the judge was expected to exercise in the interests of the
child.
After its establishment, the court's discretion was exercised under the on-
going guidance of reformers. For a while, the juvenile court, with a deten-
tion center, was located across the street from Hull House. When the legis-
lature, in establishing the court, failed to appropriate funds for probation
officers, the reformers established a Juvenile Court Committee which,
"For founding of the Juvenile Court, see Robert M. Mennel, "Attitudes and Policies
toward Juvenile Delinquency in the United States, 1825-1935" (doctoral dissertation,
Ohio State University, 1969), 147-80; Anthony Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention
of Delinquency (Chicago, 1969), 129-52. Other studies include Grace Benjamin, "Con-
stitutionality and Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court of Cook County" (master's thesis,
University of Chicago, 1932); T. D. Hurley, Origin of the Illinois Juvenile Court Law
(Chicago, 1907); Helen Jeter, The Chicago Juvenile Court (Washington, 1922).
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628 The Journal of American History
through contributions from wealthy patrons, selected and paid the salaries
of the early probation officers. When public authorities assumed financial
responsibility for the court personnel in 1907, reformers continued their
efforts to bar political influence from the selection of probation officers and
insisted that the officers be persons with a demonstrated competence in so-
cial welfare. The reformers also helped to select the judge who was named
each year to administer the juvenile court. In the early years, two women
from the Juvenile Court Committee often sat with the judge and helped
shape decisions.'9
Discretion in the interest of rehabilitation was the formal basis for the
court's decisions. Many reformers believed, however, that such decisions
could be made "scientifically." The probation officers were expected to have
social-work training and to provide background information on each youth
to guide the judge's decision. In 1909, in order to further scientific under-
standing of delinquency, reformers took the initiative in founding a Juve-
nile Psychopathic Institute. Under Dr. William Healy, the Institute became
a leading center for research into the causes of delinquency and made rec-
ommendations to the court concerning specific delinquents referred to the
Institute.20
The juvenile court was intended not only to rehabilitate delinquents but
also to intervene to aid those youths being led astray by the temptations of
city life. Under Illinois law, a juvenile might be declared delinquent if he
While the court generally dealt with more serious behavior by youths, the
language of the law reflected the hopes and views of some reformers.2'
Reformers, then, replaced the adversary model of the criminal court with
a rehabilitative model, and the juvenile court lacked the procedural safe-
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Urban Crime 629
guards of the criminal courts. As a result, some scholars have argued that the
founders of the juvenile court were insensitive to the civil liberties of the
young. In fact, many of the founders were acutely aware that the adversary
system often victimized the youths brought before the criminal courts. Prior
to the establishment of the juvenile court, young offenders seldom had
defense attorneys and thus went to trial undefended. When a delinquent did
have a defense attorney, the attorney was often more interested in his fee
than in the defense, so that the cost of the defense attorney was sometimes
another way that the adversary system victimized the defendant. If civic
reformers acted from an exaggerated faith in the possibilities of rehabilita-
tion, they acted from a genuinely realistic recognition of the failures of
adversary justice for the young and poor.22
Like so many urban criminal justice institutions, the juvenile court was
soon overburdened. Probation officers handled far more cases than they
could reasonably investigate or supervise. This made it difficult to maintain
the rehabilitative standards that were supposed to govern the court. The
number of youths found delinquent often depended more upon the avail-
ability of resources for processing them than upon the behavior of the
youths themselves. Between 1913 and 1914 the number of delinquents re-
ferred to the court rose from 1,956 to 2,916, an increase of nearly 50 per-
cent in the delinquency rate for Cook County. The reason for the increase
was that twenty-three additional probation officers were hired in 1914; and
the court could handle more cases.23 Given the intentions of the court's
founders and the realities of its operation, there are a number of questions
that need exploration, including the impact of the juvenile court upon the
definition of delinquency, upon the behavior of young persons, and upon
the opportunities for a variety of professionals to study and influence
youthful behavior in the streets of the city.
Reformers proved less successful in their efforts to influence the adult
criminal justice system. Their activities encountered resistance that stemmed
from vested interests, different values, and the influence of the criminal
underworld within urban politics. During the Progressive era, for example,
Chicago's decent citizens began a systematic campaign to rid the city of
22 Perhaps the most extreme argument that the founders of the juvenile court were
insensitive to civil liberties is Platt, Child Savers, 143-63. For other points of view, see
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force
Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (Washington, D.C., 1967), 1-40; David
Matza, Delinquency and Drift (New York, 1964), 101-51. See also, A. P. Drucker, On
the Trial of the Juvenile-Adult Offender (Chicago, 1912), 43; Louise de Koven Bowen,
Boys in the County Jail (Chicago, 1913), 3-5.
' Statistics from Clifforo1 R. Shaw and Earl D. Myers, "The Juvenile Delinquent," The
Illinois Crime Survey, 647-48.
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630 The Journal of American History
24 See note 10. The activities of the Committee of Fifteen can be followed in its Annual
Reports, Committee of 'Fifteen Papers (University of Chicago Library). See also Clifford
G. Roe, The Prodigal Daughter: The White Slave Evil and the Remedy (Chicago, 1911).
For general studies of the progressive campaign against prostitution, see Roy Lubove,
"The Progressive and the Prostitute," Historian, XXIV (May 1962), 308-30; Egal Feld-
man, "Prostitution, the Alien Woman and the Progressive Imagination, 1910-1915,"
American Quarterly, XIX (Summer 1967), 192-206.
' Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society
(New York, 1966); Wayne R. LaFave, Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into
Custody (Boston, 1965); James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior: The Manage-
ment of Law and Order in Eight Communities (Cambridge, Mass., 1968).
'Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 115-35; Chicago Committion on Race Relations, The
Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and A Race Riot (Chicago, 1922). An
interesting comparison is a description of police attitudes in an Italian ghetto in Boston
in the 1930s, William Foote Whyte, Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an
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Urban Crime 631
Italian Slum (Chicago, 1943), 123-39. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, 140-71, dis-
cusses the order maintenance function of the police.
2Quotations from Vice Commission of Chicago, Social Evil in Chicago, 329-30. See
also Carter H. Harrison, Stormy Years: The Autobiography of Carter H. Harrison, Five
Times Mayor of Chi-ago (Indianapolis, 1935), 308-09.
28 Quotation from Committee of Fifteen, Annual Report, 1914.
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632 The Journal of American History
erally made the business unprofitable. The Committee of Fifteen was able
to harass the vice operations because, in 1916, the state passed an Injunc-
tion and Abatement law. Under the law, private individuals could go to
court and, if they proved that a building was being used for immoral pur-
poses, obtain a court order closing the building completely for a year. The
committee's investigators no longer needed to rely upon the police to make
arrests under the criminal law. They could circumvent the criminal process
altogether and effectively strike at the profitability of organized prostitu-
tion.29
While reformers successfully rearranged the patterns of vice in the city,
they did not substantially alter relationships among police, politicians, and
criminals. In 1915, William "Big Bill" Thompson became mayor of Chi-
cago. He gradually removed the honest police from positions of responsi-
bility. Investigators for the Committee of Fifteen soon found the police un-
cooperative. Thompson inaugurated an era of almost unprecedented coop-
eration between politicians and criminals-a cooperation that grew rapidly
with the coming of prohibition. Nor did the reformers succeed in jailing
the vice lords. A few went out of business. But many moved their operations
to the suburbs or, in the 1920s, became successful bootleggers.30 Reformers
were too peripheral to change the vested relations of criminals with police
and politicians.
A final illustration of reform activity is provided by the Chicago Crime
Commission. The commission, established by the Chicago Association of
Commerce in 1919 after a particularly flagrant payroll robbery, acted as a
watchdog for the business community. The commission's operating direc-
tor, Henry B. Chamberlin, a former newspaperman, attorney, and civic re-
former, took steps to develop personal contacts with key officials such as the
police chief, state's attorney, and various judges in the municipal and crimi-
nal courts. He also placed observers in the courts to keep notes on all felony
trials in the county. The orientation of the commission was punitive, and
its major goal was to make "justice" more certain, swift, and severe.3'
The Chicago Crime Commission undertook numerous campaigns to re-
form criminal justice. By the later 1920s it had decided that the major area
of corruption and laxity in the criminal courts was the system of plea bar-
29 Committee of Fifteen, Annual Report for years 1912 to 1930; and special reports
of the Committee of Fifteen for the 1920% Ernest W. Burgess Papers (University of
Chicago Library).
30Reckless, Vice in Chicago. See also Lloyd Wendt and Herman Kogan, Big Bill of
Chicago (Indianapolis, 1953); William H. Stuart, The Twenty Incredible Years (Chi-
cago, 1935).
" Bulletin of Chicago Crime Commission, Jan. 31, 1921.
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Urban Crime 633
' Illinois Crime Survey, 204, 209. Of the 276,000 persons arrested in Chicago in 1924
(including misdemeanors), more than 200,000 were discharged by the courts. Chicago
Daily News, Jan. 21, 1925. See also, Donald J. Newman, Conviction: The Determination
of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial (Boston, 1966).
" For background of the campaign, see Chicago Crime Commission File No. 11170,
as well as numerous newspaper clippings in the same file. For analysis of the judicial
election of 1927, see Chicago Crime Commission File No. 9578; Martin, Role of the Bar,
75-85.
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634 The Journal of American History
Commission, demanded that the three judges be removed from the criminal
courts. The judges requested a judicial investigation of the charges. As a
result, a panel of six judges was established to hear evidence. Neither the
impugned judges nor the commission defended the system of felony waiv-
ers and plea bargaining, although it was then and remains today a basic
feature of criminal justice. Instead, the commission attempted to place the
blame upon the judges, and the judges attempted to place the blame upon
the state's attorney. After hearing evidence, the panel of judges brought in
a report that placed responsibility for felony waivers upon the state's attor-
ney. To no one's surprise, the judges were exonerated.34
During the next few years, as Loesch surveyed the courts, he periodically
issued bitter charges, fatherly admonitions, and grudging praise. In the
long run, however, his campaign exercised little influence upon the essen-
tially discretionary and bargaining nature of the criminal court process. The
reformers continued to believe that the discretionary administration of jus-
tice resulted from corruption or laziness; and the judges never offered a
reasoned justification for the system which departed so greatly from the
way the courts were supposed to operate.35
There were a number of factors, then, that undermined the universalistic
standards of the legal system and that explained the informal relations of
criminals, politicians, and criminal justice officials. One was the heterogene-
ity of the neighborhoods and life styles of the city. Gambling was widely
accepted among some groups and within certain neighborhoods; violation
of liquor laws before prohibition and violation of prohibition laws in the
1920s had wide support among some ethnic groups for whom drinking was
part of a way of life; even prostitution in certain red-light districts became
part of standard entertainment and business activity of the area. Where
such activities were accepted, the police were under little day-to-day pres-
sure to enforce unpopular laws and, in fact, were under considerable pres-
sure to develop informal relations that would maintain order rather than
enforce the law. The criminal justice system, as part of the larger political
system, often operated to provide jobs, favors, and income for politicians
and officials. Furthermore, the criminal justice system was overburdened.
Policemen, faced with more petty and serious crimes than could be handled
'It is based on the many newspaper clippings in Chicago Crime Commission File No.
11170. It is interesting that John J. Healy, the Crime Commission lawyer who presented the
commission's case against the judges, had earlier blamed the state's attorney for felony
waiver abuse. See John J. Healy, "The Prosecutor (in Chicago) in Felony Cases," The
Illinois Crime Survey, 285-331.
"See Chicago Crime Commission File No. 11170; also newspaper clippings, Frank
Loesch File, Chicago Crime Commission.
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Urban Crime 635
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