Antonio vs.
Barroga, 23 SCRA 357 Appellants opposed the motion to dismiss alleging that the other defendants had
G.R. No. L-23769
FACTS:
Appeal interposed by Regina Antonio and others from order of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan dismissing their complaint filed against Pelagio Barroga,
the Director of Lands and others. Appellants' action was for the annulment of
Free Patent No. 26383 and the corresponding original certificate of title No. 2799
both issued in the names of Pelagio and Marcelo Barroga. Their complaint
substantially alleged that they were the children of the deceased Jorge Antonio
who, during his lifetime, was the absolute owner of a parcel of land located in
Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. That the defendants applied with
the Bureau of Lands for a free patent in connection with said parcel of land,
alleging that it was public land although they knew that it was the private
property of Jorge Antonio; that subsequently, the free patent and certificate of
title already mentioned were issued in the names of said defendants, who on
March 26, 1961 mortgaged and/or sold the property to the defendants Francisca
Bautista and Inocencio Salvador, for which reason the latter two were impleaded
as defendants.
Within the reglementary period appellees filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint upon the ground that appellants' cause of action had already
prescribed. Appellants filed a written opposition thereto and on May 28, 1962
the lower court denied the motion because the grounds relied upon had to be
established by evidence. In view of this, appellees filed their answer alleging
therein that the late Eusebio Rellera, their predecessor in interest, was the
absolute owner of the land and that Rellera's legal heirs had sold the same to
Pelagio Barroga, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale.
On July 15, 1963, appellants filed an amended complaint — which was admitted
by the lower court — to implead the Director of Lands as defendant. Within the
reglementary period.
admitted in their answer that their predecessor in interest, Eusebio Rellera, was
the absolute owner of the land in question and that they acquired the property
from Rellera's legal heirs. From this they concluded that the land was private
property and that therefore the free patent and original certificate of title issued
in favor of the Barrogas were void because the Director of Lands had no right to
dispose of private property.
The lower court ruled that the first was well founded and dismissed the
complaint.
Appellants now raise in effect the same issues, namely: that the Barrogas are
concluded by their admission that the land in question was private property;
that, consequently, it was not within the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of it in favor of any party, and that, as a result, the free patent and the
original certificate of title mentioned heretofore issued in the name of the
Barrogas were void and must be ordered cancelled.
RULLING:
We find no merit in appellants' contention.
It is true that by filing the application for a free patent Barroga impliedly
admitted either the invalidity or insufficiency of Titulo Real No. 12479 issued in
the name of his predecessor in interest on July 22, 1894, but neither the
allegation made in his answer that his aforesaid predecessor in interest was the
absolute owner of the property covered by said Titulo Real nor his implied
admission of the latter's invalidity or insufficiency are grounds for the annulment
of the free patent and original certificate of title in question. Evidently, it was
Barroga's privilege to rely or not to rely upon his claim of private ownership in
favor of his predecessor in interest and of whatever the latter's Titulo Real was
worth. He decided not to rely upon them and to consider instead that the
property covered by the Titulo Real was still part of the public domain. Acting
accordingly he applied for a free patent and was successful. It must be borne in
mind that the Titulo Real was not an indefeasible title and that its holder still had
to prove that he had possessed the and covered by it without interruption during
a period of ten years by virtue of a good title and in good faith.
We may well presume that Barroga felt that he had no sufficient evidence to
prove this, for which reason he decided to acquire the land as part of the public
domain. The preliminaries dispensed with, the applicant then introduced its proofs in
support of the petition, summed up by the lower court as follows:
Having arrived at this conclusion, We are constrained to agree with the trial
court that because the record shows that the complaint was filed many years
after the free patent and certificate of title it sought to annul had become final With respect to Lots 1, 2, and 3, plan PSU 65686
and indefeasible, the facts set forth in said pleading do not constitute a cause of
action in favor of appellants. Lots 1, 2 and 3, are adjoining lots & are situated in the Province of Quezon, Said
lots were surveyed for the Roman Catholic Church on November 3, 1928
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs. (Exhibit P-5) and the survey plan approved on October 20, 1929 (Exhibit F-6).

Lot 1 was acquired by the Roman Catholic Church thru Rev. Father Raymundo
Esquenet by purchase from the spouses Atanacio Yranso and Maria Coronado
on October 20, 1928 (Exhibits G, G-1), portion of Lot 2 also by purchase thru
Rev. Father Raymundo Esquenet from the spouses Benito Maramot and Venancia
Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court Descaller on May 22, 1969 (Exhibits M, N-1), while the remaining portion of Lot 2
and Lot 3 were already owned and possessed by the Roman Catholic Church
G.R. No. 75042
even prior to the survey of the said three lots in 1928.

Records of burial of the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria, Quezon showed

FACTS: that even as early as November 1918, Lot 3 has already been utilized by the
Roman Catholic Church as its cemetery in Candelaria, Quezon

On February 2, 1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by

Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, filed an application for confirmation of title to four (4) With respect to the parcel of land described in plan PSU-112592:
parcels of land. As basis for the application, the applicant claimed title to the
This land was formerly owned and possessed by the spouses Paulo G. Macasaet
various properties through either purchase or donation dating as far back as
and Gabriela V. de Macasaet. Said spouses, on February 26, 1941, donated this
1928.
lot to the Roman Catholic Church represented by Reverend Father Raymundo
In behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Deve- Esquenet.
lopment, the Solicitor General filed an Opposition, alleging therein among
others, that the applicant did not have an imperfect title or title in fee simple to
the parcel of land being applied for. For his part, the Fiscal in a Manifestation dated July 22, 1980, said 'the State will
not adduce evidence in support of its opposition and will submit the instant case
At the initial hearing, only the Provincial Fiscal in representation of the Solicitor
for decision.'
General appeared to interpose personal objection to the application. Hence, an
Order of General Default against the whole world was issued by the Court a
quo except for the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development.
Evaluating the applicant's submitted proofs, the court a quo concluded, on the
basis of acquisitive prescription at the very least, that the former had adequately
shown title to the parcels of land being claimed.
Since the acquisition of these four (4) lots by the applicant, it has been in
continuous possession and enjoyment thereof, and such possession, together
with its predecessors-in-interest, have been open, public, continuous, peaceful,
adverse against the whole world, and in the concept of owner.
Accordingly, the court ordered the registration of the four parcels together with
the improvements thereon 'in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
LUCENA, INC., a religious corporation sole duly registered and existing under
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
Against this decision, the Solicitor General filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
the following grounds:
1. Article XIV, Section 11 of the New Constitution (1973) disqualifies a private
corporation from acquiring alienable lands for the public domain.
2. In the case at bar the application was filed after the effectivity on the New
Constitution on January 17, 1973.
which was denied by the lower court for lack of merit.
Still insisting on the alleged unconstitutionality of the registration, the
Republic elevated this appeal.
The First Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered its
Decision, finding the judgment a quo to be supported by law and the evidence
on record, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.
A reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision was sought by Appellant
Republic of the Philippines, but for lack of merit, its motion for reconsideration
was denied, by Resolution of the First Civil Case Division, Intermediate
Appellate Court which resolution reads in full:
"Considering appellant Republic of the Philippines' "Motion for
Reconsideration" filed on June 4, 1986; the Court RESOLVED to DENY the Motion
for Reconsideration for lack of merit, grounds raised therein having all been
considered in the decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. The issue raised in this case involves the question of whether the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a corporation sole is qualified to apply for
confirmation of its title to the four (4) parcels of land subject of this case.
2. Corollary thereto is the question of whether or not a corporation sole
should be treated as an ordinary private corporation, for purposes of the
application of Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution.
Article XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution, in part provides:
"Sec. 11. x x x. No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred
hectares x x x ."
Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition
(b)
of ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
 conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
RULLING:
There is no merit in this petition. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit and
the appealed decision and Resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
In its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner contends that the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lucena (private respondent herein) which is admittedly a corporation
sole is disqualified to own and register its title over the parcels of land involved
herein.
In its petition it likewise argued that being a juridical entity, private respondent
cannot avail of the benefits of Sec. 48(b) of the public land law which applies to
FILIPINO citizens or NATURAL persons. On the other hand, private respondent
in its MEMORANDUM espoused the contrary view.
Being disputed before this Court is the matter of the applicability of Art. XIV Sec.
11 of the 1973 Constitution to the case at bar.
Petitioner argues that considering such constitutional prohibition, private
respondent is disqualified to own and register its title to the lots in question.
Further, it argues that since the application for registration was filed only on
February 2, 1979, long after the 1973 Constitution took effect on January 17,
1973, the application for registration and confirmation of title is ineffectual
because at the time it was filed, private corporation had been declared
ineligible to acquire alienable lands of the public domain pursuant to Art. XIV,
Sec. 11 of the said Constitution.
In said case, (Director of Lands v. IAC, supra), this Court stated that a
determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings must be made. If they were then still part of the public
domain, it must be answered in the negative.
If, on the other hand, they were already private lands, the constitutional
prohibition against their acquisition by private corporation or association
obviously does not apply. In affirming the Decision of the Intermediate Appel-
late Court in said case, this Court adopted the vigorous dissent of the then
Justice, later Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, tracing the line of cases
beginning with CARINO,[1] in 1909, thru SUSI,[2] in 1925, down to HERICO,[3] in
1980, which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial
or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.
The open, continuous and exclusive possession of the four lots by private
respondent can clearly be gleaned from the following facts on record: Lot 1 and
portion of Lot 2 was acquired by purchase in 1928 and 1929, respectively. The
remaining portion of lots 2 and 3 was already owned and possessed by private
respondent even prior to the survey of said lots in 1928. In fact, records of burial
of the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria, Quezon showed that as early as
1919, Lot 3 has already been utilized by the Roman Catholic Church as its
cemetery. That at present, said three lots are utilized as the Roman Catholic
Church of Candelaria, Quezon. That said lots are declared for taxation purposes
in the name of the Roman Catholic Church. The fourth parcel of land was
acquired by donation in 1941 and same lot is utilized as church site.
It must be emphasized that the Court is not here saying that a corporation
sole should be treated like an ordinary private corporation.
Pertinent to this case is the provision of Sec. 113 Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 which
reads as follows:
"Sec. 113. Acquisition and alienation of property. --Any corporation sole may
purchase and hold real estate and personal property for its church, charitable,
benevolent or educational purposes, and may receive bequests or gifts for such
purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell real property held by it upon
obtaining an order for that purpose from the Court of First Instance of the province
where the property is situated; but before the order is issued, proof must be made
to the satisfaction of the Court that notice of the application for leave to mortgage
or sell has been given by publication or otherwise in such manner and for such
time as said court may have directed, and that it is to the interest of the
corporation that leave to mortgage or sell should be granted. The application for
leave to mortgage or sell must be made by petition, duly verified by the chief
archbishop, bishop, priest, minister, rabbi or presiding elder acting as
corporation sole, and may be opposed by any member of the religious
denomination, sect or church represented by the corporation sole: Provided, That
in cases where the rules, regulations and discipline of the religious denomination,
sect or church religious society or order concerned represented by such
corporation sole regulate the method of acquiring, holding, selling and
mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules, regulations and
discipline shall control and the intervention of the courts shall not be necessary."
There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its incorporation
is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate and personal
property. It need not therefore be treated as an ordinary private corporation
because whether or not it be so treated as such, the Constitutional provision
involved will, nevertheless, be not applicable.
In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court
in Director of Lands vs. IAC, (supra, 513), the lands subject of this petition were
already private property at the time the application for confirmation of title was
filed in 1979. There is therefore no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
appellate court.
Ang Lam vs Rosillosa
GR No. L-3595, May 22, 1950
FATCS:
The herein respondent, Potenciano Rosillosa, was the owner of a parcel of land,
planted to coconuts, and located in the municipality of Unisan, province of
Quezon, which parcel of land he had acquired by homestead and for which he
had obtained homestead title. On May 22, 1944, he sold said parcel of land to
Maximo Alpay for P10,000. In the month of July, 1944, Maximo Alpay in turn sold
said parcel of land to Eugenia Peregrina for the sum of P25,000 and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 19539 was duly issued in her name. On or about October
22, 1947, Potenciano Rosillosa instituted said civil case No. 4320 in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon against Maximo Alpay and Eugenia Faregrina to
redeem the said property under the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the
meantime the plaintiff asked for the dismissal of the case against the defendant
Maximo Alpay on the ground that the latter had ceased to have any interest in
the property sought to be redeemed.
Upon petition of the plaintiff Potenciano Rosillosa, who alleged that the
defendant Eugenia Peregrina could not be found and served with summons at
her known address, the respondent judge ordered that said defendant be
served with summons by publication in The Manila Chronicle. Thereafter said
defendant, having failed to appear within the period fixed in the summons, was
declared in default; and the court, after hearing the evidence for the plaintiff,
rendered a decision on April 2, 1949, ordering the defendant Eugenia Peregrina
to execute a deed of resale of the land in question in favor of the plaintiff
Potenciano Rosillosa upon payment to her of the sum of P50, which the court
found as the equivalent in Philippine currency of the original price.
It turned out, however, that the defendant Eugenia Peregrina had died in the city
of Manila as early as April 1, 1945, that is to say, several years before said civil
case No. 4820 was commenced. On September 22, 1949, the present petitioner
Ang Lam, who alleged under oath that on September 21, 1949, he was
appointed by the Court of First Instance of Manila administrator of the
estate of the deceased Eugenia Peregrina, filed a petition in said civil case No.
4820, praying that the judgment theretofore rendered therein be set aside on
the ground that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
deceased defendant Eugenia Baregrina. That petition was denied by the
respondent judge on the grounds (1) that plaintiff's action was by its nature one
in rein; (2) that the petitioner Ang Lam is the surviving husband of the defendant
Eugenia Peregrina and had the administration of the land in litigation; and (3)
that the decision of the court was handed down on April 2, 1949, whereas the
petition to set it aside was presented only on September 26, 1949, that is to say,
after the lapse (sic.) of the periods mentioned in section 3 of Rule 3# of the Rules
of Court.
ISSUE:
WON (1) that plaintiff's action was by its nature one in rein; (2) that the petitioner (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). (See Moran, Rules of Court, 2d. Ed. Vol. 1,
Ang Lam is the surviving husband of the defendant Eugenia Peregrina and had p. 9.)
the administration of the land in litigation;
With regard to the other reason adduced by the respondent judge, that the
petition to set aside the judgment was presented after the lapse of the six months'
RULLING:
period provided in Rule 38, we think said rule is not applicable.[2] That rule
provides for relief from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken against a
We are of the opinion and so hold that the judgment in question is null and void party to the case, who "by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. At the time the action was been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or has been prevented from taking
commenced said defendant had long passed to another world. Hence the an appeal." The petitioner herein was not a party to the original case, and he did
publication of the summons against her was absolutely vain and of no validity not seek relief from the judgment upon any of the grounds mentioned in section
whatsoever. 1 of Rule 38, but sought the annulment of said judgment for lack of jurisdiction
The attempt of the respondent judge to hold the said summons by publication over the person of the defendant, who had long deceased before the action was
binding upon the petitioner Ang Lam on the theory that the action was one in commenced. A judgment rendered by a court which had not acquired jurisdiction
rem and that said petitioner is the surviving husband of the defendant and is the either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant, is void. A void
administrator of the property in question, is, in our opinion, untenable. An action judgment may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally,
to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an by means of a petition filed in the same case or by means of a separate action, or
action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration by resisting such judgment in any action or proceeding wherein it is invoked.
proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that The order of the respondent judge of November 18, 1949, is set aside and the
a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly decision rendered in civil case No. 4820 on April 2, 1949, is declared null and
heard or given an opportunity to be heard. (See Patriarca vs. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, void, with costs against the respondent Potenciano Rosillosa.
393-394.)
"Actions in peraonam and actions in rem differ in that the former are
directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the
latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek
judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world."
An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action, but it is an action in
personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the
right to a tangible thing. An action for resolution of a contract of sale of real
property is an action in personam. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the
right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard
on an allegation of facts which, if true, shows an inconsistent interest, the
proceeding is in rem (Grey Alba vs. Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, 62). For instance, an
application for the registration of land under Act No. 496 is an action in rem, for
the judgment which may be rendered therein is binding upon the whole world
(Reyes vs. Razon, 38 Phil. 480, 482). The probate of a will is a proceeding in rem,
because the order of probate is effective against all persons wherever residing