1
G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY,
petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERESITA
VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA and PEDRO ORDONEZ,
respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued
reserving and designating certain parcels of
land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as
the "Cavite Export Processing Zone" (CEPZ). For
purposes of development, the area was
divided into Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase
IV was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation,
formerly Filoil Industrial Estate, Inc. The same
parcel was later sold by Filoil to the Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
Before EPZA could take possession of the area,
several individuals had entered the premises
and planted agricultural products therein
without permission from EPZA or its
predecessor, Filoil. To convince the intruders to
depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a
P10,000-financial-assistance to those who
accepted the same and signed quitclaims.
Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo
Aledia, father of respondent Loreto Aledia.
Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent
Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro
Ordoñez filed in the respondent Commission
on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint
(Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for "justice
and other reliefs and remedies" ("Katarungan
at iba pang tulong"). The CHR conducted an
investigation of the complaint.
According to the CHR, the private
respondents, who are farmers, filed in the
Commission on May 10, 1991 a verified
complaint for violation of their human rights.
They alleged that on March 20, 1991, at 10:00
o'clock in the morning. Engineer Neron
Damondamon, EPZA Project Engineer,
accompanied by his subordinates and
members of the 215th PNP Company, brought
a bulldozer and a crane to level the area
occupied by the private respondents who
tried to stop them by showing a copy of a
letter from the Office of the President of the
Philippines ordering postponement of the
bulldozing. However, the letter was crumpled
and thrown to the ground by a member of
Damondamon's group who proclaimed that:
"The President in Cavite is Governor Remulla!"
On April 3, 1991, mediamen who had been
invited by the private respondents to cover
the happenings in the area were beaten up
and their cameras were snatched from them
by members of the Philippine National Police
and some government officials and their
civilian followers.
On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of
injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP
Company and Governor Remulla and their
subordinates to desist from committing further
acts of demolition, terrorism, and harassment
until further orders from the Commission and to
appeal before the Commission on May 27,
1991 at 9:00 a.m. for a dialogue (Annex A).
On May 25, 1991, two weeks later, the same
group accompanied by men of Governor
Remulla, again bulldozed the area. They
allegedly handcuffed private respondent
Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the
other respondents, and fired a shot in the air.
On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary
Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction
Order reiterating her order of May 17, 1991
and expanded it to include the Secretary of
Public Works and Highways, the contractors,
and their subordinates. The order reads as
follows:
Considering the sworn statements of the
farmers whose farmlands are being bulldozed
and the wanton destruction of their irrigation
canals which prevent cultivation at the
farmlands as well as the claim of ownership of
the lands by some farmers-complainants, and
their possession and cultivation thereof
spanning decades, including the failure of the
officials concerned to comply with the
Constitutional provision on the eviction of rural
"squatters", the Commission reiterates its Order
of May 17, 1991, and further orders the
Secretary of Public Works and Highways, their
Contractors and representatives to refrain and
desist from bulldozing the farmlands of the
complainants-farmers who have come to the
Commission for relief, during the pendency of
this investigation and to refrain from further
destruction of the irrigation canals in the area
until further orders of the Commission.
This dialogue is reset to June 10, 1991 at 9 00
a.m. and the Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways or his
representative is requested to appear. (p. 20,
Rollo; emphasis supplied)
On July 1, 1991, EPZA filed in the CHR a motion
to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of
authority to issue injunctive writs and
temporary restraining orders.
On August 16, 1991, the Commission denied
the motion.
On September 11, 1991, the petitioner,
through the Government Corporate Counsel,
filed in this Court a special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR
acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
restraining order and injunctive writ; that the
private respondents have no clear, positive
right to be protected by an injunction; that
the CHR abused its discretion in entertaining
the private respondent's complaint because
the issue raised therein had been decided by
this Court, hence, it is barred by prior
judgment.
On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a
temporary restraining order, ordering the CHR
to cease and desist from enforcing and/or
implementing the questioned injunction
orders.
In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked
for the immediate lifting of this Court's
restraining order, and for an order restraining
petitioner EPZA from doing further acts of
destruction and harassment. The CHR
contends that its principal function under
Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is
not limited to mere investigation" because it is
mandated, among others, to:
a. Investigate, on its own or on
complaint by any party, all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political
rights;
b. Adopt its operational guidelines
and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt
for violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court;
c. Provide appropriate legal measures
for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as
Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to
the under privileged whose human rights have
been violated or need protection;
d. Monitor the Philippine
Government's compliance with international
treaty obligations on human rights. (Emphasis
supplied.) (p. 45, Rollo)
On November 14, 1991, the Solicitor General
filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that
he be excused from filing a Comment for the
CHR on the ground that the Comment filed by
the latter "fully traversed and squarely met all
the issues raised and discussed in the main
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition" (p. 83,
Rollo).
Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ
of injunction or restraining order against
supposed violators of human rights, to compel
them to cease and desist from continuing the
acts complained of?
In Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. vs. Commission on
Human Rights, et al., G.R No. 96681,
December 2, 1991, we held that the CHR is not
a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial
body.
The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact-
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence
2
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty
of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying
the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and
definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not
have.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence it is that the Commission on Human
Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and
resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters
involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-
775, as it has announced it means to do; and
it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in
the administrative disciplinary proceedings
against the teachers in question, initiated and
conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or
civil or political rights had been transgressed.
More particularly, the Commission has no
power to "resolve on the merits" the question
of (a) whether or not the mass concerted
actions engaged in by the teachers constitute
a strike and are prohibited or otherwise
restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of
carrying on and taking part in those actions,
and the failure of the teachers to discontinue
those actions and return to their classes
despite the order to this effect by the
Secretary of Education, constitute infractions
of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are
justified by the grievances complained of by
them; and (c) what were the particular acts
done by each individual teacher and what
sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for
said acts or omissions. (pp. 5 & 8.)
The constitutional provision directing the CHR
to "provide for preventive measures and legal
aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need
protection" may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that
were the intention, the Constitution would
have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law"
(Oroso, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
76828-32, 28 January 1991; Bacalso vs.
Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967,
21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by implication
(Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No.
88158; Tobon Uy vs. Commission on Election, et
al.. G.R. Nos. 97108-09, March 4, 1992).
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal
aid services" mentioned in the Constitution
refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies
(including a preliminary writ of injunction)
which the CHR may seek from the proper
courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. Not being a court of justice, the
CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ,
for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be
issued "by the judge of any court in which the
action is pending [within his district], or by a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the
Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the
judge of a Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in
an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule
58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary
injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available
only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights and
interest of a party thereto, and for no other
purpose
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of
injunction dated May 17 and 28, 1991 issued
by the respondent Commission on Human
Right are here by ANNULLED and SET ASIDE
and the temporary restraining order which this
Court issued on September 19, 1991, is hereby
made PERMANENT.
G.R. No. 110571 March 10, 1994
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA
MANUFACTURING, INC., respondents.
NOCON, J.:
Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for preliminary
injunction is the novel question of where and
in what manner appeals from decisions of the
Board of Investments (BOI) should be filed. A
thorough scrutiny of the conflicting provisions
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980," Executive Order No. 226, also known as
the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 and
Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 is, thus, called
for.
Briefly, this question of law arose when BOI, in
its decision dated December 10, 1992 in BOI
Case No. 92-005 granted petitioner First
Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to
amend its BOI certificate of registration by
changing the scope of its registered product
from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles."
Eventually, oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion
for reconsideration of the said BOI decision
while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did
not move to reconsider the same nor appeal
therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for
reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for
review with respondent Court of Appeals
pursuant to Circular 1-91.
Acting on the petition, respondent court
required the BOI and petitioner to comment
on Mariwasa's petition and to show cause why
no injunction should issue. On February 17,
1993, respondent court temporarily restrained
the BOI from implementing its decision. This
temporary restraining order lapsed by its own
terms on March 9, 1993, twenty (20) days after
its issuance, without respondent court issuing
any preliminary injunction.
On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a "Motion
to Dismiss Petition and to Lift Restraining Order"
on the ground that respondent court has no
appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No. 92-
005, the same being exclusively vested with
the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of
the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
On May 25, 1993, respondent court denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, private respondent's motion to
dismiss the petition is hereby DENIED, for lack
of merit.
Private respondent is hereby given an
inextendible period of ten (10) days from
receipt hereof within which to file its comment
to the petition.1
Upon receipt of a copy of the above
resolution on June 4, 1993, petitioner decided
not to file any motion for reconsideration as
the question involved is essentially legal in
nature and immediately filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before this Court.
Petitioner posits the view that respondent
court acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned resolution
of May 25, 1993, for the following reasons:
I. Respondent court has no
jurisdiction to entertain Mariwasa's appeal
from the BOI's decision in BOI Case No. 92-005,
which has become final.
II. The appellate jurisdiction conferred
by statute upon this Honorable Court cannot
be amended or superseded by Circular No. 1-
91.2
Petitioner then concludes that:
III. Mariwasa has lost it right to appeal .
. . in this case.3
Petitioner argues that the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91,
"Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to
the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or
Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and
Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis
of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court
because the procedure for appeal laid down
therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226,
which provides that appeals from decisions or
orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with this
Court, to wit:
Judicial relief. — All orders or decisions of the
Board
(of Investments) in cases involving the
provisions of this Code shall immediately be
executory. No appeal from the order or
decision of the Board by the party adversely
affected shall stay such an order or decision;
Provided, that all appeals shall be filed directly

with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the order or decision.
On the other hand, Mariwasa maintains that
whatever "obvious inconsistency" or
"irreconcilable repugnancy" there may have
been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O.
226 on the question of venue for appeal has
already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the
Supreme Court, which was promulgated on
February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O.
226 was enacted.
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Circular 1-91, is herein
quoted below:
1. Scope. — These rules shall apply to
appeals from final orders or decisions of the
Court of Tax Appeals. They shall also apply to
appeals from final orders or decisions of any
quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is
now allowed by statute to the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court. Among these
agencies are the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Land Registration Authority,
Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics
Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer, National Electrification
Administration, Energy Regulatory Board,
National Telecommunications Commission,
Secretary of Agrarian Reform and Special
Agrarian Courts under RA 6657, Government
Service Insurance System, Employees
Compensation Commission, Agricultural
Inventions Board, Insurance Commission and
Philippine Atomic Energy Commission.
2. Cases not covered. — These rules
shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory
orders of the National Labor Relations
Commission or the Secretary of Labor and
Employment under the Labor Code of the
Philippines, the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, and other quasi-judicial agencies
from which no appeal to the courts is
prescribed or allowed by statute.
3. Who may appeal and where to
appeal. — The appeal of a party affected by
a final order, decision, or judgment of the
Court of Tax Appeals or of a quasi-judicial
agency shall be taken to the Court of Appeals
within the period and in the manner herein
provided, whether the appeal involves
questions of fact or of law or mixed questions
of fact and law. From final judgments or
decisions of the Court of Appeals, the
aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to
the Supreme Court as provided in Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
It may be called that Section 9(3) of B.P. 129
vests appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of quasi-judicial agencies on the Court
of Appeals, to wit:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders, awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have
the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised
in cases falling within its original and appellate
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions
and interlocutory orders issued under the
Labor Code of the Philippines and by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Clearly evident in the aforequoted provision of
B.P. 129 is the laudable objective of providing
a uniform procedure of appeal from decisions
of all quasi-judicial agencies for the benefit of
the bench and the bar. Equally laudable is the
twin objective of B.P. 129 of unclogging the
docket of this Court to enable it to attend to
more important tasks, which in the words of
Dean Vicente G. Sinco, as quoted in our
decision in Conde v. Intermediate Appellate
Court4 is "less concerned with the decisions of
cases that begin and end with the transient
rights and obligations of particular individuals
but is more intertwined with the direction of
national policies, momentous economic and
social problems, the delimitation of
governmental authority and its impact upon
fundamental rights.
In Development Bank of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals,5 this Court noted that B.P.
129 did not deal only with "changes in the
rules on procedures" and that not only was the
Court of Appeals reorganized, but its
jurisdiction and powers were also broadened
by Section 9 thereof. Explaining the changes,
this Court said:
. . . Its original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and habeas
corpus, which theretofore could be exercised
only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, was
expanded by (1) extending it so as to include
the writ of quo warranto, and also (2)
empowering it to issue all said extraordinary
writs "whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction." Its appellate jurisdiction was also
extended to cover not only final judgments of
Regional Trial Courts, but also "all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of . . . quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1)
of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)
of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948," it being noteworthy in
this connection that the text of the law is
broad and comprehensive, and the explicitly
stated exceptions have no reference
whatever to the Court of Tax Appeals. Indeed,
the intention to expand the original and
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
over quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards, or commissions, is further stressed by
the last paragraph of Section 9 which
excludes from its provisions, only the "decisions
and interlocutory orders issued under the
Labor Code of the Philippines and by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals."6
However, it cannot be denied that the
lawmaking system of the country is far from
perfect. During the transitional period after the
country emerged from the Marcos regime, the
lawmaking power was lodged on the
Executive Department. The obvious lack of
deliberation in the drafting of our laws could
3
perhaps explain the deviation of some of our
laws from the goal of uniform procedure
which B.P. 129 sought to promote.
In exempli gratia, Executive Order No. 226 or
the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987
provides that all appeals shall be filed directly
with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the order or decision.
Noteworthy is the fact that presently, the
Supreme Court entertains ordinary appeals
only from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts
in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher. Judgments of
regional trial courts may be appealed to the
Supreme Court only by petition for review on
certiorari within fifteen (15) days from notice of
judgment in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being
the clear intendment of the provision of the
Interim Rules that "(a)ppeals to the Supreme
Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari
which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court." Thus, the right of appeal
provided in E.O. 226 within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the order or decision is clearly not in
consonance with the present procedure
before this Court. Only decisions, orders or
rulings of a Constitutional Commission (Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Elections
or Commission on Audit), may be brought to
the Supreme Court on original petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65 by the aggrieved
party within thirty (30) days form receipt of a
copy thereof.7
Under this contextual backdrop, this Court,
pursuant to its Constitutional power under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, and by way of implementation of B.P.
129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules
governing appeals to the Court of Appeals
from final orders or decisions of the Court of
Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to
eliminate unnecessary contradictions and
confusing rules of procedure.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a
circular is not strictly a statute or law, it has,
however, the force and effect of law
4
according to settled jurisprudence.8 In Inciong
v. de Guia,9 a circular of this Court was
treated as law. In adopting the
recommendation of the Investigating Judge
to impose a sanction on a judge who violated
Circular No. 7 of this Court dated
September 23, 1974, as amended by Circular
No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and Circular No. 20
dated October 4, 1979, requiring raffling of
cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of
the Investigating Judge, brushing aside the
contention of respondent judge that assigning
cases instead of raffling is a common practice
and holding that respondent could not go
against the circular of this Court until it is
repealed or otherwise modified, as "(L)aws are
repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or customs or practice to
the contrary."10
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226
cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91
because the former grants a substantive right
which, under the Constitution cannot be
modified, diminished or increased by this
Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers
is not entirely defensible as it seems.
Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of
E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from
decisions or final orders of the BOI and in
granting such right, it also provided where and
in what manner such appeal can be brought.
These latter portions simply deal with
procedural aspects which this Court has the
power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional
rule-making powers.
The case of Bustos v. Lucero11 distinguished
between rights created by a substantive law
and those arising from procedural law:
Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . .
Substantive rights is a term which includes
those rights which one enjoys under the legal
system prior to the disturbance of normal
relations (60 C.J., 980). Substantive law is that
part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which regulates rights and
duties which give rise to a cause of action, as
oppossed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtains a redress for their invasion.12
Indeed, the question of where and in what
manner appeals from decisions of the BOI
should be brought pertains only to procedure
or the method of enforcing the substantive
right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other
words, the right to appeal from decisions or
final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains
and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91
simply transferred the venue of appeals from
decisions of this agency to respondent Court
of Appeals and provided a different period of
appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It
did not make an incursion into the substantive
right to appeal.
The fact that BOI is not expressly included in
the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in the
third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91
does not mean that said circular does not
apply to appeals from final orders or decision
of the BOI. The second sentence of Section 1
thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall also
apply to appeals from final orders or decisions
of any quasi-judicial agency from which an
appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court
of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is
one such statute. Besides, the enumeration is
preceded by the words "(A)mong these
agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there
are other quasi-judicial agencies which are
covered by the Circular but which have not
been expressly listed therein. More
importantly, BOI does not fall within the
purview of the exclusions listed in Section 2 of
the circular. Only the following final decisions
and interlocutory orders are expressly
excluded from the circular, namely, those of:
(1) the National Labor Relations Commission;
(2) the Secretary of Labor and Employment;
(3) the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
and (4) other quasi-judicial agencies from
which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or
allowed by statute. Since in DBP v. CA13 we
upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals over the Court of Tax Appeals
despite the fact that the same is not among
the agencies reorganized by B.P. 129, on the
ground that B.P. 129 is broad and
comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI
should be excluded from
Circular 1-91, which is but implementary of
said law.
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or
superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the
manner and method of enforcing the right to
appeal from decisions of the BOI are
concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI,
which by statute was previously allowed to be
filed directly with the Supreme Court, should
now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons,
the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued on July 19,
1993 is hereby LIFTED.
G.R. No. 110379 November 28, 1997
HON. ARMAND FABELLA, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS; John Doe
(not his real name), in his capacity as
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DECS-NCR; DR.
BIENVENIDO ICASIANO, in his capacity as the
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE QUEZON CITY
SCHOOLS DIVISION; ALMA BELLA O. BAUTISTA,
AURORA C. VALENZUELA and TERESITA V.
DIMAGMALIW, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARITO A. SEPTIMO,
ERLINDA B. DE LEON, CLARISSA T. DIMAANO,
WILFREDO N. BACANI, MARINA R. VIVAR,
VICTORIA S. UBALDO, JENNIE L. DOGWE,
NORMA L. RONGCALES, EDITA C. SEPTIMO,
TERESITA E. EVANGELISTA, CATALINA R.
FRAGANTE, REBECCA D. BAGDOG, MARILYNNA
C. KU, MARRISA M. SAMSON, HENEDINA B.
CARILLO, NICASIO C. BRAVO, RUTH F.
LACANILAO, MIRASOL C. BALIGOD, FELISA S.
VILLACRUEL, MA. VIOLETA ELIZABETH Y.
HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, ADRIANO
S. VALENCIA and ELEUTERIO S. VARGAS,
respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Due process of law requires notice and
hearing. Hearing, on the other hand,
presupposes a competent and impartial
tribunal. The right to be heard and, ultimately,
the right to due process of law lose meaning in
the absence of an independent, competent
and impartial tribunal.
Statement of the Case
This principium is explained by this Court as it
resolves this petition for review on certiorari
assailing the May 21, 1993 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R.. SP No. 29107
which affirmed the trial court's decision, 3 as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED.
The Hon. Armand Fabella is hereby ORDERED
substituted as respondent-appellant in place
of former Secretary Isidro Cariño and
henceforth this fact should be reflected in the
title of this case.
SO ORDERED.4
The Antecedent Facts
The facts, as found by Respondent Court, are
as follows:
On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary
Cariño issued a return-to-work order to all
public school teachers who had participated
in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during
the period September 26, 1990 to October 18,
1990. The mass action had been staged to
demand payment of 13th month differentials,
clothing allowances and passage of a debt-
cap bill in Congress, among other things.
On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cariño filed
administrative cases against herein petitioner-
appellees, who are teachers of the
Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets
required petitioner-appellees to explain in
writing why they should not be punished for
having taken part in the mass action in
violation of civil service laws and regulations,
to wit:
1. grave misconduct;
2. gross neglect of duty;
3. gross violation of Civil Service Law
and rules on reasonable office regulations;

4. refusal to perform official duty;
5. conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
6. absence without leave (AWOL)
At the same time, Secretary Cariño ordered
petitioner-appellee to be placed under
preventive suspension.
The charges were subsequently amended by
John Doe (not his real name)on November 7,
1990 to include the specific dates when
petitioner-appellees allegedly took part in the
strike.
Administrative hearings started on December
20, 1990. Petitioner-appellees' counsel
objected to the procedure adopted by the
committee and demanded that he be
furnished a copy of the guidelines adopted by
the committee for the investigation and
imposition of penalties. As he received no
response from the committee, counsel walked
out. Later, however, counsel, was able to
obtain a copy of the guidelines.
On April 10, 1991, the teachers filed a an
injunctive suit (Civil Case No. 60675) with the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, charging
the committee appointed by Secretary Cariño
with fraud and deceit and praying that it be
stopped from further investigating them and
from rendering any decision in the
administrative case. However, the trial court
denied them a restraining order.
They then amended their complaint and
made it one for certiorari and mandamus.
They alleged that the investigating committee
was acting with grave abuse of discretion
because its guidelines for investigation place
the burden of proof on them by requiring
them to prove their innocence instead of
requiring Secretary Cariño and his staff to
adduce evidence to prove the charges
against the teachers.
On May 30, 1991, petitioner-appellee Adriano
S. Valencia of the Ramon Magsaysay High
School filed a motion to intervene, alleging
that he was in the same situation as petitioners
since he had likewise been charged and
preventively suspended by respondent-
appellant Cariño for the same grounds as the
other petitioner-appellees and made to
shoulder the burden of proving his innocence
under the committee's guidelines. The trial
court granted his motion on June 3, 1991 and
allowed him to intervene.
On June 11, 1991, the Solicitor General
answered the petitioner for certiorari and
mandamus in behalf of respondent DECS
Secretary. In the main he contended that, in
accordance with the doctrine of primary
resort, the trial court should not interfere in the
administrative proceedings.
The Solicitor General also asked the trial court
to reconsider its order of June 3, 1991, allowing
petitioner-appellee Adriano S. Valencia to
intervene in the case.
Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee
rendered a decision on August 6, 1991, finding
the petitioner-appellees guilty, as charged
and ordering their immediate dismissal.
On August 15, 1991, the trial court dismissed
the petition for certiorari and mandamus for
lack of merit. Petitioner-appellees moved for a
reconsideration, but their motion was denied
on September 11, 1991.
The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court which, on February
18, 1992, issued a resolution en banc declaring
void the trial court's order of dismissal and
reinstating petitioner-appellees' action, even
as it ordered the latter's reinstatement
pending decision of their case.
Accordingly, on March 25, 1992, the trial court
set the case for hearing. June 8, 1992, it issued
a pre-trial order which reads:
As prayed for by Solicitor Bernard Hernandez,
let this case be set for pre-trial conference on
June 17, 1992 at 1:30 p.m., so as to expedite
the proceedings hereof. In which case, DECS
Secretary Isidro Cariño, as the principal
respondent, is hereby ordered to PERSONALLY
APPEAR before this Court on said date and
time, with a warning that should he fail to
show up on said date, the Court will declare
him as IN DEFAULT. Stated otherwise, for the
said Pre-Trial Conference, the Court will not
recognize any representative of his.
By agreement of the parties, the trial
conference was reset on June 26, 1992.
However, Secretary Cariño failed to appear in
court on the date set. It was explained that he
had to attend a conference in Maragondon,
Cavite. Instead, he was represented by Atty.
Reno Capinpin, while the other respondents
were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili. But the
court just the same declared them as in
default. The Solicitor General moved for a
reconsideration, reiterating that Cariño could
not personally come on June 26, 1992
because of prior commitment in Cavite. It was
pointed out that Cariño was represented by
Atty. Reno Capinpin, while the other
respondents were represented by Atty.
Jocelyn Pili, both of the DECS-NCR and that
both had special powers of attorney. But the
Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration
was denied by the trial court. In its order of
July 15, 1992, the court stated:
The "Motion For Reconsideration" dated July 3,
1992 filed by the respondents thru counsel, is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. It appears too
obvious that respondents simply did not want
to comply with the lawful orders of the Court.
The respondents having lost their standing in
Court, the "Manifestation and Motion," dated
July 3, 1992 filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General is hereby DENIED due course.
SO ORDERED.
On July 3, 1992, the Solicitor General informed
the trial court that Cariño had ceased to be
DECS Secretary and asked for his substitution.
But the court failed to act on his motion.
The hearing of the case was thereafter
conducted ex parte with only the teachers
allowed to present their evidence.
On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a
decision, in which it stated:
The Court is in full accord with petitioners'
contention that Rep. Act No. 4670 otherwise
known as the "Magna Carta for Public School
5
Teachers" is the primary law that governs the
conduct of investigation in administrative
cases filed against public school teachers,
with Pres. Decree No. 807 as its supplemental
law. Respondents erred in believing and
contending that Rep. Act No. 4670 has
already been superseded by the applicable
provisions of Pres. Decree No. 807 and Exec.
Order No. 292. Under the Rules of Statutory
Construction, a special law, Rep. Act. No. 4670
in the case at bar, is not regarded as having
been replaced by a general law, Pres. Decree
No. 807, unless the intent to repeal or alter the
same is manifest. A perusal of Pres. Decree No.
807 reveals no such intention exists, hence,
Rep. Act No. 4670 stands. In the event that
there is conflict between a special and a
general law, the former shall prevail since it
evidences the legislator's intent more clearly
than that of the general statute and must be
taken as an exception to the General Act. The
provision of Rep. Act No. 4670 therefore
prevails over Pres. Decree No. 807 in the
composition and selection of the members of
the investigating committee. Consequently,
the committee tasked to investigate the
charges filed against petitioners was illegally
constituted, their composition and
appointment being violative of Sec. 9 of Rep.
Act No. 4670 hence all acts done by said
body possess no legal color whatsoever.
Anent petitioners' claim that their dismissal was
effected without any formal investigation, the
Court, after consideration of the
circumstances surrounding the case, finds
such claim meritorious. Although it cannot be
gain said that respondents have a cause of
action against the petitioner, the same is not
sufficient reason to detract from the necessity
of basic fair play. The manner of dismissal of
the teachers is tainted with illegality. It is a
dismissal without due process. While there was
a semblance of investigation conducted by
the respondents their intention to dismiss
petitioners was already manifest when it
adopted a procedure provided for by law, by
shifting the burden of proof to the petitioners,
knowing fully well that the teachers would
boycott the proceedings thereby giving them
cause to render judgment ex-parte.
The DISMISSAL therefore of the teachers is not
justified, it being arbitrary and violative of the
6
teacher's right to due process. Due process
must be observed in dismissing the teachers
because it affects not only their position but
also their means of livelihood.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present
petition is hereby GRANTED and all the
questioned orders/decisions of the
respondents are hereby declared NULL and
VOID and are hereby SET ASIDE.
The reinstatement of the petitioners to their
former positions without loss of seniority and
promotional rights is hereby ORDERED.
The payment, if any, of all the petitioners' back
salaries, allowances, bonuses, and other
benefits and emoluments which may have
accrued to them during the entire period of
their preventive suspension and/or dismissal
from the service is hereby likewise ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.5
From this adverse decision of the trial court;
former DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño filed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals raising the
following grounds:
I. The trial court seriously erred in
declaring appellants as in default.
II. The trial court seriously erred in not
ordering the proper substitution of parties.
III. The trial court seriously erred in
holding that R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as
"Magna Carta for Public School Teachers",
should govern the conduct of the
investigation conducted.
IV. The trial court seriously erred in
ruling that the dismissal of the teachers are
without due process. 6
As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC decision, holding in the main
that private respondents were denied due
process in the administrative proceedings
instituted against them.
Hence, this petition for review.7
The Issues
Before us, petitioners raise the following issues:
I public services. The right of government
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding in effect that private respondents
were denied due process of law.
II
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals
seriously erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion in applying strictly the provision of
R.A. No. 4670 in the composition of the
investigating committee.
III
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the appeal and in affirming the trial
court's decision. 8
These issues, all closely related, boil down to a
single question: whether private respondents
were denied due process of law.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit. We agree with
the Court of Appeals that private respondents
were denied due process of law.
Denial of Due Process
At the outset, we must stress that we are
tasked only to determine whether or not due
process of law was observed in the
administrative proceedings against herein
private respondents. We note the Solicitor
General's extensive disquisition that
government employees do not have the right
to strike. 9 On this point, the Court, in the case
of Bangalisan vs. Court of Appeals, 10 has
recently pronounced, through Mr. Justice
Florenz D. Regalado:
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that
employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes. While the Constitution
recognizes the right of government employees
to organize, they are prohibited from staging
strikes, demonstrations mass leaves, walk-outs
and other forms of mass action which will
result in temporary stoppage or disruption of
employees to organize is limited only to the
formation of unions or associations, without
including the right to strike.
More recently, in Jacinto vs. Court of Appeals,
11 the Court explained the schoolteachers'
right to peaceful assembly vis-a-vis their right
to mass protest:
Moreover, the petitioners here, except
Merlinda Jacinto, were not penalized for the
exercise of their right to assemble peacefully
and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service
Commission found them guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service
for having absented themselves without
proper authority, from their schools during
regular school days, in order to participate in
the mass protest, their absence ineluctably
resulting in the non-holding of classes and in
the deprivation of students of education, for
which they were responsible. Had petitioners
availed themselves of their free time — recess,
after classes, weekends or holidays — to
dramatize their grievances and to dialogue
with the proper authorities within the bounds
of law, no one — not the DECS, the CSC or
even this Court — could have held them liable
for the valid exercise of their constitutionally
guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary
stoppage of classes resulting from their activity
necessarily disrupted public services, the very
evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition
against strikes by government workers. Their
act by its nature was enjoined by the Civil
Service
law, rules and regulations, for which they must,
therefore, be made answerable. 12
In the present case, however, the issue is not
whether the private respondents engaged in
any prohibited activity which may warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions against
them as a result of administrative proceedings.
As already observed, the resolution of this
case revolves around the question of due
process of law, not on the right of government
workers to strike. The issue is not whether
private respondents may be punished for
engaging in a prohibited action but whether,
in the course of the investigation of the
alleged proscribed activity, their right to due
process has been violated. In short, before
they can be investigated and meted out any
penalty, due process must first be observed.
In administrative proceedings, due process
has been recognized to include the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of
the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses
and evidence in one's favor, and to defend
one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as
to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal
which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing
or contained in the records or made known to
the parties affected. 13
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670
known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, which specifically covers
administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly
provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachers' administrative cases should
be composed of the school superintendent of
the division as chairman, a representative of
the local or any existing provincial or national
teachers' organization and a supervisor of the
division. The pertinent provisions of RA 4670
read:
Sec. 8. Safeguards in Disciplinary
Procedure. — Every teacher shall enjoy
equitable safeguards at each stage of any
disciplinary procedure and shall have:
a: the right to be informed, in writing,
of the charges;
b. the right to full access to the
evidence in the case;
c. the right to defend himself and to
be defended by a representative of his
choice and/or by his organization, adequate

time being given to the teacher for the due process is embodied in the basic
preparation of his defense; and requirement of notice and a real opportunity
to be heard. 14
d. the right to appeal to clearly
designated authorities. No publicity shall be Petitioners argue that the DECS complied with
given to any disciplinary action being taken Section 9 of RA 4670, because "all the
against a teacher during the pendency of his teachers who were members of the various
case. committees are members of either the
Quezon City Secondary Teachers Federation
Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. — or the Quezon City Elementary Teachers
Administrative charges against teacher shall Federation" 15 and are deemed to be the
be heard initially by a committee composed representatives of a teachers' organization as
of the corresponding School Superintendent required by Section 9 of RA 4670.
of the Division or a duly authorized
representative who would at least have the We disagree. Mere membership of said
rank of a division supervisor, where the teachers in their respective teachers'
teacher belongs, as chairman, a organizations does not ipso facto make them
representative of the local or, in its absence, authorized representatives of such
any existing provincial or national teacher's organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of
organization and a supervisor of the Division, RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers'
the last two to be designated by the Director organization possesses the right to indicate its
of Public Schools. The committee shall submit choice of representative to be included by
its findings, and recommendations to the the DECS in the investigating committee. Such
Director of Public Schools within thirty days right to designate cannot be usurped by the
from the termination of the hearings: Provided, secretary of education or the director of
however, That where the school public schools or their underlings. In the instant
superintended is the complainant or an case, there is no dispute that none of the
interested party, all the members of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members
committee shall be appointed by the of its investigating committee was ever
Secretary of Education. designated or authorized by a teachers'
organization as its representative in said
The foregoing provisions implement the committee.
Declaration of Policy of the statute; that is, to
promote the "terms of employment and Contrary to petitioners' asseverations, 16 RA
career prospects" of schoolteachers. 4670 is applicable to this case. It has not been
expressly repealed by the general law PD 807,
In the present case, the various committees which was enacted later, nor has it been
formed by DECS to hear the administrative shown to be inconsistent with the latter. It is a
charges against private respondents did not fundamental rule of statutory construction that
include "a representative of the local or, in its "repeals by implication are not favor. An
absence, any existing provincial or national implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is
teacher's organization" as required by Section convincingly and unambiguously
9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly
were deemed to have no competent repugnant and patently inconsistent that they
jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale
by them were necessarily void. They could not that the will of the legislature cannot be
provide any basis for the suspension or overturned by the judicial function of
dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion construction and interpretation. Courts cannot
of a representative of a teachers' organization take the place of Congress in repealing
in these committees was indispensable to statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as
ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws
requirement that would have given substance and resolve doubts in favor of their validity
and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, and co-existence." 17 Thus, a subsequent
in any proceeding, the essence of procedural general law does not repeal a prior special
law, "unless the intent to repeal or alter is
manifest, although the terms of the general
law are broad enough to include the cases
embraced in the special law." 18
The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670,
therefore, reflects the legislative intent to
impose a standard and a separate set of
procedural requirements in connection with
administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers. Clearly, private respondents'
right to due process of law requires
compliance with these requirements laid
down by RA 4670. Verba legis non est
recedendum.
Hence, Respondent Court of Appeals, through
Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who is now a
member of this Court, perceptively and
correctly stated:
Respondent-appellants argue that the Magna
Carta has been superseded by the Civil
Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) and that
pursuant to the latter law the head of a
department, like the DECS secretary, or a
regional director, like the respondent-
appellant John Doe (not his real name), can
file administrative charges against a Director of Public Schools within thirty days
subordinate, investigate him and take
disciplinary action against him if warranted by
his findings. Respondent-appellants cite in
support of their argument the following
provisions of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No.
807).
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. —
xxx xxx xxx
b) The heads of departments,
agencies and instrumentalities. . . shall have
jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers
and employees under their jurisdiction. . . .
Sec. 38. Procedure in Administrative Cases
Against Non-Presidential Appointees. —
a) Administrative Proceedings may be
commenced against a subordinate officer or
the employee by the head of department or
officer of equivalent rank, or head of local
government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional
7
directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of
any other persons.
There is really no repugnance between the
Civil Service Decree and the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers. Although the Civil
Service Decree gives the head of department
or the regional director jurisdiction to
investigate and decide disciplinary matters,
the fact is that such power is exercised
through committees. In cases involving public
school teachers, the Magna Carta provides
that the committee be constituted as follows:
Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. —
Administrative charges against a teacher shall
be heard initially by a committee composed
of the corresponding School Superintendent
of the Division or a duly authorized
representative who would at least have the
rank of a division supervisor, where the
teacher belongs, as chairman, a
representative of the local or, in its absence,
any existing provincial or national teacher's
organization and a supervisor of the Division,
the last two to be designated by the Director
of Public Schools. The committee shall submit
its findings, and recommendations to the
from the termination of the hearings: Provided,
however, that where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an
interested party, all the members of the
committee shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Education.
Indeed, in the case at bar, neither the DECS
[s]ecretary nor the DECS-NCR regional director
personally conducted the investigation but
entrusted it to a committee composed of a
division supervisor, secondly and elementary
school teachers, and consultants. But there
was no representative of a teachers
organization. This is a serious flaw in the
composition of the committee because the
provision for the representation of a teachers
organization is intended by law for the
protection of the rights of teachers facing
administrative charges.
There is thus nothing in the Magna Carta that
is in any way inconsistent with the Civil Service
Decree insofar as procedures for investigation
is concerned. To the contrary, the Civil Service
8
Decree, [S]ec. 38(b) affirms the Magna Carta
by providing that the respondent in an
administrative case may ask for a "formal
investigation," which was what the teachers
did in this case by questioning the absence of
a representative of a teachers organization in
the investigating committee.
The administrative committee considered the
teachers to have waived their right to a
hearing after the latter's counsel walked out of
the preliminary hearing. The committee should
not have made such a ruling because the
walk out was staged in protest against the
procedures of the committee and its refusal to
give the teachers' counsel a copy of the
guidelines. The committee concluded its
investigation and ordered the dismissal of the
teachers without giving the teachers the right
to full access of the evidence against them
and the opportunity to defend themselves. Its
predisposition to find petitioner-appellees
guilty of the charges was in fact noted by the
Supreme Court when in its resolution in G.R.
No. 101943 (Rosario Septimo v. Judge Martin
Villarama, Jr.) it stated:
The facts and issues in this case are similar to
the facts and issues in Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al.
v. Hon. Carlos C. Ofilada, et al. G.R. No.
100206, August 22, 1961.
As in the Cariño v. Ofilada case, the officials of
the Department of Culture and Education are
predisposed to summarily hold the petitioners
guilty of the charges against them. In fact, in
this case Secretary Cariño, without awaiting
formal administrative procedures and on the
basis of reports and "implied admissions" found
the petitioners guilty as charged and
dismissed them from the service in separate
decisions dated May 16, 1997 and August 6,
1991. The teachers went to court. The Court
dismissed the case. 19
Furthermore, this Court sees no valid reason to
disregard the factual findings and conclusions
of the Court of Appeals. It is not our function
"to assess and evaluate all over again the
evidence, testimonial and documentary,
adduced by the parties particularly where,
such as here, the findings of both the trial
court and the appellate court coincide." 20
It is as clear as day to us that the Court of
Appeals committed to reversible error in
affirming the trial court's decision setting aside
the questioned orders of petitioners; and
ordering the unqualified reinstatement of
private respondents and the payment of them
of salaries, allowances, bonuses and other
benefits
that accrued to their benefit during the entire
duration of their suspension or dismissal. 21
Because the administrative proceedings
involved in this case are void, no delinquency
or misconduct may be imputed to private
respondents. Moreover, the suspension or
dismissal meted on them is baseless. Private
respondents should, as a consequence, be
reinstated 22 and awarded all monetary
benefits that may have accrued to them
during the period of their unjustified suspension
or dismissal. 23 This Court will never
countenance a denial of the fundamental
right to due process, which is a cornerstone of
our legal system.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is hereby DENIED for its utter failure to show
any reversible error on the part of the Court of
Appeals. The assailed Decision is thus
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 131457 April 24, 1998
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL
GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA,
MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON,
NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike
staged by some alleged farmer-beneficiaries
in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform
compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997
commanded nationwide attention that even
church leaders and some presidential
candidates tried to intervene for the strikers'
"cause."
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996
Decision 1 of the Office of the President (OP),
issued through then Executive Secretary
Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424,
which approved the conversion of a one
hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from
agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area.
This led the Office of the President, through
then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona, to issue the so-called "Win-Win"
Resolution 2 on November 7, 1997,
substantially modifying its earlier Decision after
it had already become final and executory.
The said Resolution modified the approval of
the land conversion to agro-industrial area
only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares,
and ordered the remaining one hundred (100)
hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-
beneficiaries.
But, did the "Win-Win" Resolution culminate in
victory for all the contending parties?
The above-named petitioners cried foul. They
have come to this Court urging us to annul
and set aside the "Win-Win" Resolution and to
enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao
of the Department of Agrarian Reform from
implementing the said Resolution.
Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this
case is: What is the legal effect of the "Win-
Win" Resolution issued by the Office of the
President on its earlier Decision involving the
same subject matter, which had already
become final and executory?
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as
culled from the pleadings, may be stated as
follows:
1. This case involves a 144-hectare
land located at San Vicente, Sumilao,
Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto
Quisumbing, Sr. Management and
Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one
of the petitioners. The property is covered by a
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 143713 of the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a
pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing
Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc.
(DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a
period of ten (10) years under the Crop
Producer and Grower's Agreement duly
annotated in the certificate of title. The lease
expired in April, 1994.
3. In October, 1991, during the
existence of the lease, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-
hectare property under compulsory
acquisition and assessed the land value at
P2.38 million.4
4. NQSRMDC resisted the DAR's
action. In February, 1992, it sought and was
granted by the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case
No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction which ordered the DAR Region X
Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao,
Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines
(Land Bank), and their authorized
representatives "to desist from pursuing any
activity or activities" concerning the subject
land "until further orders."5
5. Despite the DARAB order of March
31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a
memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, directing
the Land Bank to open a trust account for
P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to
conduct summary proceedings to determine
the just compensation of the subject property.
NQSRMDC objected to these moves and filed
on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to
enforce the DARAB order of March 31, 1992
and to nullify the summary proceedings
undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and
Land Bank on the valuation of the subject
property.
6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992,
acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by
(a) ordering the DAR Regional Director and
Land Bank "to seriously comply with the terms
of the order dated March 31, 1992;" (b)
nullifying the DAR Regional Director's
memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and the
summary proceedings conducted pursuant
thereto; and (c) directing the Land Bank "to
return the claim folder of Petitioner

NQSRMDC's subject Property to the DAR until
further orders."6
7. The Land Bank complied with the
DARAB order and cancelled the trust account
it opened in the name of petitioner
NQSRMDC. 7
8. In the meantime, the Provincial
Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon,
headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed
Resolution No. 6,8 dated January 7, 1993,
designating certain areas along Bukidnon-
Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-
Industrial Zones where the subject property is
situated.
9. What happened thereafter is well-
narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of March
29, 1996, pertinent portions of which we quote:
Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao,
Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted
Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying
144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said
Municipality, from agricultural to
industrial/institutional with a view of providing
an opportunity to attract investors who can
inject new economic vitality, provide more
jobs and raise the income of its people.
Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th
class municipalities may authorize the
classification of five percent (5%) of their
agricultural land area and provide for the
manner of their utilization or disposition.
On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial
Land Use Committee approved the said
Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December
1993, the instant application for conversion
was filed by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf
of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial
Development Association).
Expressing support for the proposed project,
the Bukidnon Provincial Board, on the basis of
a Joint Committee Report submitted by its
Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian
Reform and Socio-Economic Committee
approved, on 1 February 1994, the said
Ordinance now docketed as Resolution No.
94-95. The said industrial area, as conceived
by NQSRMDC (project proponent) is supposed
to have the following components:
1. Development Academy of
Mindanao which constitutes following: Institute
for Continuing Higher Education; Institute for
Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical
School); Institute for Agribusiness Research;
Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and
Mindanao Sports Development Complex
which covers an area of 24 hectares;
2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which
consists of corn processing for corn oil, corn
starch, various corn products; rice processing
for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice;
cassava processing for starch, alcohol and
food delicacies; processing plants, fruits and
fruit products such as juices; processing plants
for vegetables processed and prepared for
market; cold storage and ice plant; cannery
system; commercial stores; public market; and
abattoir needing about 67 hectares;
3. Forest development which includes
open spaces and parks for recreation, horse-
back riding, memorial and mini-zoo estimated
to cover 33 hectares; and
4. Support facilities which comprise
the construction of a 360-room hotel,
restaurants, dormitories and a housing project
covering an area of 20 hectares.
The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per
Certification dated January 4, 1995, adopted
by the Department of Trade and Industry,
Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its
flagship projects. The same was likewise
favorably recommended by the Provincial
Development Council of Bukidnon; the
municipal, provincial and regional office of
the DAR; the Regional Office (Region X) of the
DENR (which issued an Environmental
Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the
Executive Director, signing "By Authority of
PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ," Office of the President
— Mindanao; the Secretary of DILG; and
Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.
In the same vein, the National Irrigation
Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office,
Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius
S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation Office,
interposed NO. OBJECTION to the proposed
conversion "as long as the development cost
of the irrigation systems thereat which is
P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the
developer . . . ." Also, the Kisolon-San Vicente
Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San
Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no
objection to the proposed conversion of the
land in question "as it will provide more
economic benefits to the community in terms
of outside investments that will come and
employment opportunities that will be
generated by the projects to be put up . . . .
On the same score, it is represented that
during the public consultation held at the
Kisolan Elementary School on 18 March 1995
with Director Jose Macalindong of DAR
Central Office and DECS Undersecretary
Clemente, the people of the affected
barangay rallied behind their respective
officials in endorsing the project.
Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable
recommendation, however, on November 14,
1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking
its powers to approve conversion of lands
under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an
Order denying the instant application for the
conversion of the subject land from
agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead,
placed the same under the compulsory
coverage of CARP and directed the
distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries
on the following grounds:
1. The area is considered as a prime
agricultural land with irrigation facility;
2. The land has long been covered by
a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA);
3. The existing policy on withdrawal or
lifting on areas covered by NCA is not
applicable;
4. There is no clear and tangible
compensation package arrangements for the
beneficiaries;
5. The procedures on how the area
was identified and reclassified for agro-
industrial project has no reference to Memo
9
Circular No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72,
Series of 1993, and E.O. No. 124, Series of 1993.
A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
Order was filed on January 9, 1995 by
applicant but the same was denied (in an
Order dated June 7, 1995). 9
10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered
the DAR Regional Director "to proceed with
the compulsory acquisition and distribution of
the property." 10
11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of
Bukidnon appealed" the order of denial to the
Office of the President and prayed for the
conversion/reclassification of the subject land
as the same would be more beneficial to the
people of Bukidnon.
12. To prevent the enforcement of the
DAR Secretary's order, NQSRMDC, on June 29,
1995, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary
injunction, 12 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
37614.
13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the
Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then
Presidential Assistant for Mindanao, after
conducting an evaluation of the proposed
project, sent a memorandum 13 to the
President favorably endorsing the project with
a recommendation that the DAR Secretary
reconsider his decision in denying the
application of the province for the conversion
of the land.
14. Also, in a memorandum 14 to the
President dated August 23, 1995, the
Honorable Rafael Alunan III, then Secretary of
the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), recommended the
conversion of the subject land to
industrial/institutional use with a request that
the President "hold the implementation of the
DAR order to distribute the land in question."
15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, issued a
Resolution 15 ordering the parties to observe
status quo pending resolution of the petition.
At the hearing held in said case on October 5,
1995, the DAR, through the Solicitor General,
10
manifested before the said court that the DAR
was merely "in the processing stage of the
applications of farmers-claimants" and has
agreed to respect status quo pending the
resolution of the petition. 16
16. In resolving the appeal, the Office
of the President, through then Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in
OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29,
1996, reversing the DAR Secretary's decision,
the pertinent portions of which read:
After a careful evaluation of the petition vis-a-
vis the grounds upon which the denial thereof
by Secretary Garilao was based, we find that
the instant application for conversion by the
Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed
with merit. To be sure, converting the land in
question from agricultural to agro-industrial
would open great opportunities for
employment and bring about real
development in the area towards a sustained
economic growth of the municipality. On the
other hand, distributing the land to would-be
beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as
there are none) does not guarantee such
benefits.
Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is
considered a prime agricultural land with
irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to
mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it
is true that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility
in the area, the same merely passes thru the
property (as a right of way) to provide water
to the ricelands located on the lower portion
thereof. The land itself, subject of the instant
petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for
several years, planted with pineapple by the
Philippine Packing Corporation.
On the issue that the land has long been
covered by a Notice of Compulsory
Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy
on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by
NCA is not applicable, suffice it to state that
the said NCA was declared null and void by
the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early as
March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC,
the DARAB correctly pointed out that under
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject
property could not validly be the subject of
compulsory acquisition until after the
expiration of the lease contract with Del
Monte Philippines, a Multi-National Company,
or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR
Regional Office and the Land Bank of the
Philippines, both in Butuan City, to "desist from
pursuing any activity or activities covering
petitioner's land.
On this score, we take special notice of the
fact that the Quisumbing family has already
contributed substantially to the land reform
program of the government, as follows: 300
hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70's
and another 400 hectares in the nearby
Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten(10)
years ago, for which they have not received
"just compensation" up to this time.
Neither can the assertion that "there is no clear
and tangible compensation package
arrangements for the beneficiaries' hold water
as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries
to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as
already stated.
Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of
identifying/reclassifying the subject property
for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to
defeat the very purpose of the law granting
autonomy to local government units in the
management of their local affairs. Stated
more simply, the language of Section 20 of
R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no
room for any other interpretation. By
unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local
government units autonomy in their local
affairs including the power to convert portions
of their agricultural lands and provide for the
manner of their utilization and disposition to
enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities.
WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and
intent of the said legal mandate and in view
of the favorable recommendations of the
various government agencies
abovementioned, the subject Order, dated
November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary,
Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET
ASIDE and the instant application of
NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED. 17
17. On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a
motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.
18. On September 11, 1996, in
compliance with the OP decision of March 29,
1996, NQSRMDC and the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
executed a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby the former donated four (4) hectares
from the subject land to DECS for the
establishment of the NQSR High School. 18
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the
title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it
discovered that the title over the subject
property was no longer in its name. It soon
found out that during the pendency of both
the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with
Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the
Court of Appeals and the appeal to the
President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich,
the DAR, without giving just compensation,
caused the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title
on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines
under TCT No. T-50264 19 of the Registry of
Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September
25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)
No. 00240227 and had it registered in the
name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT
No. AT-3536 20 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bukidnon.
19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC
filed a complaint 21 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon (Branch
9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for
annulment and cancellation of title, damages
and injunction against DAR and 141 others.
The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining
Order on April 30, 1997 22 and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997, 23
restraining the DAR and 141 others from
entering, occupying and/or wresting from
NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an
Order 24 was issued by then Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DAR's
motion for reconsideration for having been
filed beyond the reglementary period of
fifteen (15) days. The said order further
declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision
had already become final and executory.
21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a
second motion for reconsideration of the June
23, 1997 Order of the President.
22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was
challenged by some alleged farmers before
the Court of Appeals through a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the lifting of the
injunction and for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition from further trying the RTC case.
23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged
farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike
in front of the DAR Compound in Quezon City
to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996.
On October 10, 1997, some persons claiming
to be farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC
property filed a motion for intervention (styled
as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P. Case
No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decision
allowing the conversion of the entire 144-
hectare property be set aside. 25
24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held
a dialogue with the strikers and promised to
resolve their grievance within the framework
of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact
Finding Task Force (FFTF) chaired by
Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to
look into the controversy and recommend
possible solutions to the problem. 26
25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of
the President resolved the strikers' protest by
issuing the so-called "Win/Win" Resolution
penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
decision of the Office of the President, through
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated
March 29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. NQSRMDC's application for
conversion is APPROVED only with respect to
the approximately forty-four (44) hectare
portion of the land adjacent to the highway,

as recommended by the Department of
Agriculture.
2. The remaining approximately one
hundred (100) hectares traversed by an
irrigation canal and found to be suitable for
agriculture shall be distributed to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with RA
6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law with a right of way to said portion from
the highway provided in the portion fronting
the highway. For this purpose, the DAR and
other concerned government agencies are
directed to immediately conduct the
segregation survey of the area, valuation of
the property and generation of titles in the
name of the identified farmer-beneficiaries.
3. The Department of Agrarian Reform
is hereby directed to carefully and
meticulously determine who among the
claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
4. The Department of Agrarian Reform
is hereby further directed to expedite
payment of just compensation to NQSRMDC
for the portion of the land to be covered by
the CARP, including other lands previously
surrendered by NQSRMDC for CARP
coverage.
5. The Philippine National Police is
hereby directed to render full assistance to the
Department of Agrarian Reform in the
implementation of this Order.
We take note of the Memorandum in
Intervention filed by 113 farmers on October
10, 1997 without ruling on the propriety or
merits thereof since it is unnecessary to pass
upon it at this time.
SO ORDERED. 27
A copy of the "Win-Win" Resolution was
received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of
Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao,
Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24,
1997 28 and, on December 4, 1997, they filed
the present petition for certiorari, prohibition
(under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court)
and injunction with urgent prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.),
against then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto
D. Garilao.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To
Intervene 29 was filed by alleged farmer-
beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that
they are real parties in interest as they were
"previously identified by respondent DAR as
agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-
hectare" property subject of this case. The
motion was vehemently opposed 30 by the
petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the "Win-Win"
Resolution, the petitioners claim that the
Office of the President was prompted to issue
the said resolution "after a very well-managed
hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary
Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or
politically blackmailing the Office of the
President to come up with this purely political
decision to appease the 'farmers,' by reviving
and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996
which has been declared final and executory
in an Order of 23 June 1997. . . ."31 Thus,
petitioners further allege, respondent then
Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona
"committed grave abuse of discretion and
acted beyond his jurisdiction when he issued
the questioned Resolution of 7 November
1997. . . ." 32 They availed of this extraordinary
writ of certiorari "because there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law."33 They never filed a
motion for reconsideration of the subject
Resolution "because (it) is patently illegal or
contrary to law and it would be a futile
exercise to seek a reconsideration. . . ." 34
The respondents, through the Solicitor
General, opposed the petition and prayed
that it be dismissed outright on the following
grounds:
(1) The proper remedy of petitioners
should have been to file a petition for review
directly with the Court of Appeals in
accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules
of Court;
(2) The petitioners failed to file a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed
"Win-Win" Resolution before filing the present
petition; and
(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of
forum-shopping.
These are the preliminary issues which must first
be resolved, including the incident on the
motion for intervention filed by the alleged
farmer-beneficiaries.
Anent the first issue, in order to determine
whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or
not, it is necessary to draw a line between an
error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction.
An error of judgment is one which the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
and which error is reviewable only by an
appeal. 35 On the other hand, an error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained
of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-
judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. 36 This error is correctable only by
the extraordinary writ of certiorari. 37
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions
of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-
judicial functions, 38 including the Office of
the President, 39 may be taken to the Court of
Appeals by filing a verified petition for review
40 within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
said judgment, final order or resolution, 41
whether the appeal involves questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. 42
However, we hold that, in this particular case,
the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is
inapplicable considering that the present
petition contains an allegation that the
challenged resolution is "patently illegal" 43
and was issued with "grave abuse of
discretion" and "beyond his (respondent
Secretary Renato C. Corona's) jurisdiction" 44
when said resolution substantially modified the
earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which
had long become final and executory. In
other words, the crucial issue raised here
involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of
judgment which is reviewable by an appeal
under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy
to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is
11
an original special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have
correctly done. The pertinent portion of
Section 1 thereof provides:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
xxx xxx xxx
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to
truly extraordinary cases — cases in which the
act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is
wholly void. 45
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65
mandates that the person aggrieved by the
assailed illegal act "may file a verified petition
(for certiorari) in the proper court." The proper
court where the petition must be filed is stated
in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:
Sec. 4. Where petition filed. — The petition
may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution
sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or,
if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined
by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same
is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If
it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-
judicial agency, and unless otherwise
provided by law or these Rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals. (4a)
12
Under the above-qouted Section 4, the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
Regional Trial Court have original concurrent
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, 46
prohibition 47 and mandamus. 48 But the
jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also
delineated in that, if the challenged act
relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or
of a corporation, board, officer or person, the
petition must be filed with the Regional Trial
Court which exercises jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a
quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be
filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless
otherwise provided by law or the Rules of
Court. We have clearly discussed this matter
of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs.
Cuaresma, et. al.,49 through now Chief Justice
Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
. . . . This Court's original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by
this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly
Courts of First Instance), which may issue the
writ, enforceable in any part of their
respective regions. It is also shared by this
Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with
the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate
Appellate Court), although prior to the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on
August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to
issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to
those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to
be taken as according to parties seeking any
of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom
of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and
should also serve as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for
that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level ("inferior") courts should
be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. (Citations omitted)
But the Supreme Court has the full
discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly to it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the
issues raised, warrant. This has been the
judicial policy to be observed and which has
been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely:
50 Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., 51 Torres vs. Arranz,
52 Bercero vs. De Guzman, 53 and Advincula
vs. Legaspi, et. al. 54 As we have further stated
in Cuaresma:
. . . . A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition. This is
established policy. It is a policy that is
necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon the Court's time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court's docket.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to
take primary jurisdiction over the present
petition in the interest of speedy justice 55 and
to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put
an end to the present controversy which, as
correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked
national interest because of the magnitude of
the problem created by the issuance of the
assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be
discussed later, we find the assailed resolution
wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file
their petition first with the Court of Appeals
would only result in a waste of time and
money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its
own rules in the higher interests of justice is
well-entrenched, in our jurisprudence. We
reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of
Appeals: 56
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are
but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a
particular case from their operation whenever
the higher interests of justice so require. In the
instant petition, we forego a lengthy
disquisition of the proper procedure that
should have been taken by the parties
involved and proceed directly to the merits of
the case.
As to the second issue of whether the
petitioners committed a fatal procedural
lapse when they failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed resolution
before seeking judicial recourse, suffice it to
state that the said motion is not necessary
when the questioned resolution is a patent
nullity, 57 as will be taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents
claim that the filing by the petitioners of: (a) a
petition for certiorari, prohibition with
preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 37614)
with the Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for
annulment and cancellation of title, damages
and injunction against DAR and 141 others
(Civil Case No. 2687-97) with the Regional Trial
Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) the
present petition, constitute forum shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result
of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion (other than by
appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle
applies not only with respect to suits filed in the
courts but also in connection with litigation
commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this
case, in order to defeat administrative
processes and in anticipation of an
unfavorable administrative ruling and a
favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in
this case, where the court in which the second
suit was brought, has no jurisdiction (citations
omitted).
The test for determining whether a party
violated the rule against forum shopping has
been laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs.
Lopez (145 SCRA 34), . . . and that is, forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other, as follows:
There thus exists between the action before
this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity
of parties, or at least such parties as represent
the same interests in both actions, as well as
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts,
and the identity on the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered
in the other action, will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in
the action under consideration: all the
requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant. 58
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the
petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping.
The test for determining whether a party has
violated the rule against forum shopping is
where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration. A cursory examination of the
cases filed by the petitioners does not show
that the said cases are similar with each other.
The petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR
Secretary's order to proceed with the
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the
subject property. On the other hand, the civil
case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the
annulment and cancellation of title issued in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines,
with damages, was based on the following
grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for
cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDC's title,
used documents which were earlier declared
null and void by the DARAB; (2) the
cancellation of NQSRMDC's title was made
without payment of just compensation; and
(3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the
surrender of its title. The present petition is
entirely different from the said two cases as it
seeks the nullification of the assailed "Win-Win"
Resolution of the Office of the President dated
November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued
long after the previous two cases were
instituted.
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be
resolved is the motion for intervention filed by
alleged farmer-beneficiaries, which we have
to deny for lack of merit. In their motion,
movants contend that they are the farmer-

beneficiaries of the land in question, hence,
are real parties in interest. To prove this, they
attached as Annex "I" in their motion a Master
List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the
alleged master list was made pursuant to the
directive in the dispositive portion of the
assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which directs the
DAR "to carefully and meticulously determine
who among the claimants are qualified
farmer-beneficiaries." However, a perusal of
the said document reveals that movants are
those purportedly "Found Qualified and
Recommended for Approval." In other words,
movants are merely recommendee farmer-
beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in
interest is a party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment or is the party entitled
to the avails of the suit. Real interest means a
present substantial interest, as distinguished
from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest. 59 Undoubtedly, movants' interest
over the land in question is a mere
expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in
interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon
which movants based their motion is, as
intimated earlier, null and void. Hence, their
motion for intervention has no leg to stand on.
Now to the main issue of whether the final and
executory Decision dated March 29, 1996 can
still be substantially modified by the "Win-Win"
Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals
to the Office of the President of the Philippines
are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18.
Section 7 thereof provides:
Sec. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the
Office of the President shall, except as
otherwise provided for by special laws,
become final after the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
parties, unless a motion for reconsideration
thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any
one party shall be allowed and entertained,
save in exceptionally meritorious cases.
(Emphasis ours).
It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The
Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the
Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the
Decision of March 29, 1996 final and
executory, as no one has seasonably filed a
motion for reconsideration thereto, the said
Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the
case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost
its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has
no more authority to entertain the second
motion for reconsideration filed by respondent
DAR Secretary, which second motion became
the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution.
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and
Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandate that only one (1) motion for
reconsideration is allowed to be taken from
the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a
second motion for reconsideration was
permitted to be filed in "exceptionally
meritorious cases," as provided in the second
paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said
motion should not have been entertained
considering that the first motion for
reconsideration was not seasonably filed,
thereby allowing the Decision of March 29,
1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the
Office of the President in re-opening the case
and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996
Decision which had already become final and
executory, was in gross disregard of the rules
and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 60
we held:
Since the decisions of both the Civil Service
Commission and the Office of the President
had long become final and executory, the
same can no longer be reviewed by the
courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence
that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-
judicial authority, have upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata [Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497
(1956), Ipekdijna Merchandizing Co., Inc. v.
Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430,
September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res
judicata which forbids the reopening of a
matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the
judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public,
executive or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the
judgments of courts having general judicial
powers [Brillantes v. Castro, supra at 503].
The orderly administration of justice requires
that the judgments/resolutions of a court or
quasi-judicial body must reach a point of
finality set by the law, rules and regulations.
The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes
once and for all. 61 This is a fundamental
principle in our justice system, without which
there would no end to litigations. Utmost
respect and adherence to this principle must
always be maintained by those who wield the
power of adjudication. Any act which violates
such principle must immediately be struck
down.
Therefore, the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution
which substantially modified the Decision of
March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is
utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly
stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street 62 in a
1918 case, 63 is "a lawless thing, which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
head." 64
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby
GRANTED. The challenged Resolution dated
November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the
President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave
To Intervene filed by alleged farmer-
beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.
G.R. No. 81805 May 31, 1988
VAR-ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. and
COMNINOS BROS., petitioners,
vs.
TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as
Administrator of Philippine Overseas
13
Employment Administration (POEA), EDGAR T.
BUNYOG, VEDASTO NAVARRO, EUGENIO
CAPALAD, RAUL T IS, ANTONIO TANIOAN,
CELESTINO CASON, DANILO MANELA &
ROBERTO GENESIS, respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Imputing grave abuse of discretion to the
public respondent, the petitioners ask that the
public respondent's decision dated
September 9,1987 in POEA CASE No. (M) 86-
11-1080 entitled "VAR-ORIENT SHIPPING CO.,
INC. and COMNINOS BROS. vs. EDUARDO H.
ARSOLON, ET AL.," be annulled for having
been rendered without due process of law,
and that the writ of execution issued by the
POEA Administrator be set aside for being
premature because the decision is not yet
final and executory as no copy of it had been
received by petitioner's counsel. A temporary
restraining order was issued by this Court to
enjoin the execution of the decision
complained of pending the determination of
the merits of the petition.
The petitioners filed a complaint with the
Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office,
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) against the private
respondents Edgar T. Bunyog, Vedasto
Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis,
Antonio Tanioan, Celestino Cason, Danilo
Manela and Roberto Genesis, crew members
of the MPV "Silver Reefer," for having allegedly
violated their Contracts of Employment with
the petitioners which supposedly resulted in
damages arising from the interdiction of the
vessel by the International Transport Workers'
Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in
March 1986.
After joinder of the issues, the case was heard
on March 4, 1987 where the parties agreed to
submit their respective position papers and
thereafter the case would be submitted for
decision. Only the private respondents
submitted a position paper.
On the basis of the pleadings and
memoranda (Annexes A, B, Code. D, E & F)
the public respondent rendered a decision on
September 9,1987 (Annex G), the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:
14
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering as follows:
1. Dismiss of the instant case with a
reprimand and warning respondents Vedasto
Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis,
Antonio Tanioan, Celestino Cason, Danilo
Manela and Roberto Genesis, against the
commission of the same or similar offense
otherwise it shall be dealt with more severe
penalty;
2. Exclusion of Ricardo Llanes from this
case;
3. Reprimanding complainant Var-
Orient Shipping Co. for failure to comply with
its obligations pursuant to POEA rules and
regulations and warning against committing
the same or a similar offense otherwise it shall
be dealt with more severely;
4. That the case insofar as
respondents Eduardo H. ArsoIon, Apolinario
dela Cruz, Levy Montero and Danilo N. de la
Cruz are concerned, be archived, while their
names shall be included in the POEA watchlist
until they shall have voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of this office;
5. Payment by the complainants
jointly and severally, unto Vedasto Navarro,
Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis, Antonio
Tanioan, Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and
Roberto Genesis the amount of Pl,550.59
each, representing deductions from
allotments, plus Pl,000.00 as and for attorney's
fees; and
6. Payment by the complainants
jointly and severally unto respondent Edgar T.
Bunyog the amount of US$4,680.00 or its peso
equivalent at the time of payment
representing his salaries for the unserved
portion of his employment contract plus
P4,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
to be tendered thru this Office, ten (10) days
from receipt of this decision.
A copy of the decision was sent by registered
mail and delivered by the postman to the
petitioners' counsel, then Attorney Francisco B.
Figura, at his address on the 4th Floor, TRC
Building, Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro
Manila, through the receptionist, Marlyn
Aquino, on the groundfloor of said building on
September 21, 1987. According to Attorney
Figura, he did not receive the envelope
containing the decision (p. 66,
Rollo).<äre||anº•1àw>
Petitioners allegedly learned about the
decision only when the writ of execution was
served on them on November 20,1987 by
NLRC Deputy Sheriff Rene Masilungan and
Attorney Wilfredo Ong. On November 23,1987,
petitioners, through new counsel, Atty.
Quentin Aseron, Jr., filed an 'urgent Motion to
Recall Writ of Execution' on the ground that
the decision had not been received by the
petitioners, hence, it was not yet final and
executory.
On January 19, 1988, the public respondent
denied the motion. In due time, this petition
was filed wherein the petitioners allege that:
(1) they were denied due process of
law because the respondent Administrator
resolved the case without any formal hearing;
(2) the respondent Administrator
gravely abused his discretion in denying
petition petitioners' right to appeal, and
(3) in awarding to the private
respondent's damages which are not only
excessive building unfounded.
The petition is not meritorious.
The petitioners' allegation that the issuance of
the writ of execution was premature because
the decision had not been received by their
counsel is unconvincing, Atty. Figura's affidavit
on the matter is self-serving. Petitioners failed
to submit an affidavit of the receptionist
Marlyn Aquino explaining what she did with
the decision which she received for Atty.
Figura. Under the circumstances, the
respondent Administrator's ruling that the
decision had been properly served on
petitioners' counsel and that it is now final and
unappealable, should be sustained.
Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners
'allegation that they were denied due process
because the decision was rendered without a
formal hearing. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard (Bermejo vs.
Banjos, 31 SCRA 764), or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, 110
SCRA 438; Gas Corporation of the Phil. vs. Hon.
Inciong, 93 SCRA 653; Cebu Institute of
Technology vs. Minister of Labor, 113 SCRA
257), or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of (Dormitorio vs. Fernandez, 72
SCRA 388).
The fact is that at the hearing of the case on
March 4,1987, it was agreed by the parties
that they would file their respective
memoranda and thereafter consider the case
submitted for decision (Annex 7 of Bunyog's
Comment). This procedure is authorized by
law to expedite the settlement of labor
disputes. However, only the private
respondents submitted memoranda. The
petitioners did not. On June 10, 1987, the
respondents filed a motion to resolve (Annex
7, Bunyog's Comment). The petitioners'
counsel did not oppose either the "Motion to
Resolve" or the respondents "Motion for
Execution of Decision" dated October 19, 1987
(Annex 10), both of which were furnished
them through counsel. If it were true, as they
now contend, that they had been denied due
process in the form of a formal hearing, they
should have opposed both motions.
Furthermore, the petition for review does not
allege that the petitioners are in possession of
evidence, other than those which they had
attached to their pleadings, which if
produced would have altered the outcome of
the case.
The Administrator did not abuse his discretion
in ordering the petitioners to pay respondent
Edgar Bunyog's salaries for the unserved
portion of his contract plus attorney's fees, in
view of the Administrator's finding that Bunyog
did not sign the letter of the other defendants
to ITF, hence, 'he is deemed not to have
committed any offense or act to warrant his
dismissal."
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
denied for lack of merit. The temporary
restraining order which We issued is hereby set
aside.
G.R. No. 81374 April 30, 1991
JOSE R. BAUTISTA, SEVERINO GABUYO and
NORTH EASTERN COLLEGE, INC., petitioners
vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, Department of Labor and
Employment, Manila, HON. REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, Regional Office No. 2, Department
of Labor and Employment, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, DAVID R. MEDINA, in his capacity as
Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Isabela, RODEO
BAUTISTA, DOMINGO CABAUATAN, LINO
MALENAB, HERNANDO NATIVIDAD and
ALFREDO JIMENEZ, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
It has not escaped the attention of the Court
that when a party runs out of arguments, or
never had any to begin with, it usually pleads
a denial of due process. The plea may impress
at first glance, what with all its plaintive
invocation of the Bill of Rights, but it does not
often succeed upon closer examination. The
petition at bar is a case in point.
This dispute arose on December 15, 1984,
when the herein private respondents filed a
complaint against Northeastern College, Inc.,
where they were employed as janitors, and
Jose R. Bautista and Severino Gabuyo as its
President and Cashier, respectively. The
charge was violation of Articles 113 and 116 of
the Labor Code prohibiting unauthorized
deduction from the wages of workers.
The said articles are reproduced as follows:
Art. 113. Wage Deduction. — No employer,
in his own behalf or in behalf of any person,
shall make any deduction from the wages of
his employees, except:
(a) In cases where the worker is insured
with his consent by the employer, and the
deduction is to recompense the employer for

the amount paid by him as premium on the
insurance;
(b) For union dues, in cases where the
right of the worker or his union to checkoff has
been recognized by the employer or
authorized in writing by the individual worker
concerned; and
(c) In cases where the employer is
authorized by law or regulations issued by the
Secretary of Labor.
Art. 116. Withholding of wages and
kickbacks prohibited. — It shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly, to withhold
any amount from the wages of a worker or
induce him to give up any part of his wages
by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any
other means whatsoever without the worker's
consent.
After investigation, Assistant Regional Director
Pedro P. Pelaez of Regional Office No. 2,
Ministry of Labor and Employment, found the
deductions to be illegal. Nevertheless, he
disallowed reimbursement of the amounts
deducted, holding that the same were used
to pay legitimate obligations of the private
respondents to the school canteen and
Director Villano. The case was dismissed in an
Order dated January 14, 1985.
In a letter dated January 25, 1985, the private
respondents appealed this order to the
Ministry of Labor and Employment and
claimed that they had already settled their
personal obligations with their supposed
creditors. They also questioned the
disallowance of their claimed reimbursements
despite the finding that the deductions made
were illegal.
In an Order dated January 6, 1986, Deputy
Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. affirmed the
illegality of the deductions and, accordingly,
directed the petitioners to reimburse the
private respondents the amounts deducted
from their salaries.
On September 30, 1987, Regional Office No. 2
issued a Writ of Execution addressed to
respondent Deputy Provincial Sheriff David R.
Medina directing him to secure from the
petitioners the full reimbursement of the illegal
deductions, the amount of which was to be
ascertained from petitioner Gabuyo.
However, the writ was returned unsatisfied for
the reason that neither the private
respondents nor the petitioners could
determine the exact amount to be paid.
On December 7, 1987, an Alias Writ of
Execution was issued, this time fixing the
amounts to be paid each of the private
respondents, thus:
1. Lino Malenab P23,893.30
2. Hernando Natividad P23,085.43
3. Rodeo Bautista P23,705.25
4. Domingo Cabauatan
P16,079.65
5. Alfredo Jimenez P21,850.00
On December 22, 1987, the petitioners filed an
Exception to the Alias Writ of Execution with
Regional Office No. 2. They contended that
the said writ was null and void as it proceeded
from an invalid order issued pursuant to an
appeal filed out of time and without notice to
the petitioners.
In another Order dated December 29, 1987,
Regional Office No. 2 dismissed the petitioners'
Exception to the Alias Writ of Execution and
directed respondent Deputy Sheriff of Isabela
to proceed with its enforcement.
Conformably, he seized several typewriters,
electric fans, calculators and various office
equipment from the petitioners for payment of
the judgment debt.
On January 22, 1988, the petitioners filed the
present petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction to annul the Order
of the DOLE dated January 6, 1986, the Writ of
Execution dated Sept. 30, 1987, and the Alias
Writ of Execution dated December 7, 1987. On
their motion, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order on February 8, 1988, against
the implementation of the Alias Writ of
Execution.
The petitioners contend that the Department
of Labor never acquired jurisdiction over them
because they were not served with summons
or otherwise notified of the case filed against
them. They also argue that no hearing was
conducted on the private respondents'
charges in violation of the requirements of due
process.
We do not agree.
The record shows that the private respondents
gave a copy of their complaint to the
petitioners, serving this at the office of Jose R.
Bautista, where it was received by Roger
Bautista, Executive Assistant to the President.1
Such service was valid and binding, having
been made on a person in charge of the
office.
As we held in Adamson Ozanam Educational
Institution, Inc. vs. Adamson University Faculty
and Employees Association:2
Section 4, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which is
suppletory to the rules of the NLRC, provides
as follows:
Sec. 4. Personal Service. –– Service of the
papers may be made by delivering personally
a copy to the party or his attorney, or by
leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a
person having charge thereof. If no person is
found in his office, or his office is not known,
then by leaving the copy, between the hours
of eight in the morning and six in the evening,
at the party's or attorney's residence, if known,
with a person of sufficient discretion to receive
the same. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the foregoing rule, service of papers
should be delivered personally to the party or
attorney or by leaving it at his office with his
clerk or with a person having charge thereof .
...
Even without such service, the petitioners
cannot deny that they were furnished with a
copy of the Order dated January 6, 1986, as
evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 00293,3 a
copy of the letter-appeal dated January 25,
1985, as evidenced by the receipt of the same
by Roger Bautista,4 and a copy of the writ of
execution, as evidenced by the Sheriffs
Return.5
The Court notes that the only reaction of the
petitioners to these processes was an
indifferent silence. Given the opportunity to
15
object, they forfeited it with their implied
acquiescence to the orders they are now
assailing. Surely, they cannot now complain
they were denied due process, when they
were actually given the opportunity to be
heard, which is all due process requires.
Moreover, it is not true that they were denied
this opportunity in the investigation conducted
by the Regional Office No. 2 on December 19,
1984. Severino Gabuyo was interviewed then
and even explained the records of the
company and the reason for the protested
deductions. It is true that no formal hearing
was conducted, but as we have held ––
Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners'
allegation that they were denied due process
because the decision was rendered without a
formal hearing. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.6
Moreover, since the proceeding was not
judicial but merely administrative, the rigid
requirements of procedural laws were not
strictly enforceable. It is settled that ––
While administrative tribunals exercising quasi-
judicial powers are free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements they are
bound by law and practice to observe the
fundamental and essential requirements of
due process in justiciable cases presented
before them. However, the standard of due
process that must be met in administrative
tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as
the element of fairness is not ignored.7
xxx xxx xxx
It is of course also sound and settled rule that
administrative agencies performing quasi-
judicial functions are unfettered by the rigid
technicalities of procedure observed in the
courts of law, and this is so that disputes
brought before such bodies may be resolved
in the most expeditious and inexpensive
manner possible.8
16
Given all these circumstances, we feel that
the lack of summons upon the petitioners is
not sufficient justification for annulling the acts
of the public respondents.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the
invocation of due process was only an
afterthoughts on the part of the petitioners,
who obviously had not earlier realized the
extent of their liability. It was only when the
amounts of reimbursement were computed
and revealed to be not insignificant that the
petitioners were aroused from their lethargy
and decided to spring into action. But it was
too late. whatever their reason for
oversleeping then, it avails them naught at this
time.
We hold that the challenged orders were
validly promulgated.1âwphi1 The petitioners
were not denied due process when, having
the opportunity to challenge them, they
chose not to do so. The requisites of notice
and hearing have been satisfied. Due process
is only for the vigilant, not those who, having
the right to be heard, choose to be silent, only
to complain later that they have not been
heard. The Court is not moved by crocodile
tears or by those who piously invoke the name
of due process in vain to excuse their own
inattention.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with
costs against the petitioners. The temporary
restraining order dated February 8, 1988, is
LIFTED. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 87353 July 3, 1991
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., PEDRO MARTIRES, JR.
and MANUEL PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
LABOR ARBITER EDGARDO M. MADRIAGA,
CARMENCITA NANNETTE G. DE VEYRA,
respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
seeking reversal of the decision of public
respondent National Labor Relations
Commission dated November 29, 1988
ordering, inter alia, reinstatement of private
respondent Carmencita Nannette G. De
Veyra to her former position with backwages;
and its resolution dated February 21, 1989
denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On September 11, 1987, private respondent
Carmencita Nannette G. De Veyra, a Duty
Manager, filed a complaint for illegal
suspension, non-payment of salaries and other
benefits, as well as moral and exemplary
damages against petitioners Philippine Airlines,
Inc., Pedro Martires, Jr. and Manuel Panlilio.
Conciliation conferences were conducted on
September 30, 1987 and October 9, 1987.
However, in the conciliation hearing on
October 26, 1987, De Veyra's counsel
manifested that due to her dismissal in the
interim, they are no longer willing to settle the
case amicably. Hence, without prejudice to
the filing of an amended complaint by De
Veyra, both parties were directed to file their
position papers on November 12, 1987 and
their replies thereto on November 23, 1987,
after which the case will be deemed
submitted for decision.
On October 27, 1987, De Veyra filed an
amended complaint for illegal suspension,
illegal dismissal and unpaid wages with claim
for reinstatement; actual, moral and
exemplary damages; and attorney's fees and
cost of suit.
On November 23, 1987, PAL submitted its
position paper, alleging the following facts
(pp. 47-50, Rollo):
Sometime in August of 1987, the Internal Audit
and control (sic) Department of (PAL)
conducted a review of the tickets issued by
the Interline Ticket Counter located at the 6th
Floor of PAL Building because of the
uncovering of widespread fraud and
manipulation of tickets by several (of its)
employees that led to their eventual
termination from the firm.
It was on this occasion that said department
was able to confirm cases of tampering and
fraudulent manipulation of official documents
some of which involve the travel documents
of . . ., Nannette de Veyra then Senior
Supervisor, ASD, and her dependents. A
memo was issued by the Vice-President of
Internal Audit and Control Department to this
effect addressed to the Senior Vice-President
for Customer Services Group, . . . As stated
therein, the priority classifications were
tampered with enabling (De Veyra) and her
dependents to travel first class knowing very
well that they are not entitled to that privilege.
On August 26, 1987, a Notice of Administrative
charge was sent to (De Veyra) charging
among others (sic) the fact of knowingly using
falsified trip passes to reflect a higher priority
and space classification than what she and
her dependents were entitled to on vacation
travel. Being at Senior Supervisory level at the
Passenger Handling Division with access to all
aspects of our airport operations including
computer terminals installed at the airport, in
view of this incident, her presence therein was
deemed a threat to company property and
to the normal operations of the company so
she was place (sic) on preventive suspension. .
...
On September 11, 1987, (De Veyra) submitted
a letter informing the Director of PAL Manila
Station International that she hired the services
of a lawyer thereby requesting for additional
time within which to study and evaluate her
defense, . . . .
On September 18, 1987, the Director-PAL MSI
replied, granting her request for extension of
time to file her Answer to the Administrative
Charge until September 29,1987, . . .
On September 24, 1987, (De Veyra) submitted
here (sic) sworn statement alleging among
others (sic) that the tampering was done by
somebody else, . . .
On October 16, 1987, the Director-PAL MSI
issued a memo terminating the services of (De
Veyra) after evaluating the evidences (sic) on
record for serious misconduct in the use of trip
passes which were falsified to reflect higher
priority and space classification than what she
and her spouse were entitled to on vacation
travel in violation of the Company policy on
travel priority and of the PAL Code of
Discipline, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, De Veyra in her position
paper alleged the following facts (pp. 50-57,
Rollo):
1. (De Veyra) joined (PAL) as a
Facilitation Representative sometime in 1967.
2. Because of sheer hardwork (sic)
and consistent superlative performance, (De
Veyra) rose from the ranks and held the
positions of Senior Ground Stewardess, Ticket
Representative, Traffic Representative, Shift
Supervisor, Supervisor, Senior Supervisor and
finally Duty Manager until her illegal dismissal
from the Company's employ on 26 August
1987.
3. In recognition of her exemplary
performance while in the Company's employ,
(De Veyra) received several commendations.
To cite a few:
(a) Commendation dated 24 April l971-
Case of COD Exec. Baggage-Mr. A. Mutuc,
from station manager, MSI;
(b) Commendation dated 14 February
1973-from Supervisor-Ramp Handling;
(c) Commendation dated 26 March
1973-from Station Manager, Mnl, Stn. Int'l.;
(d) Commendation dated 19 May
1973-from Manager, Mnl, Stn, Intl.;
(e) Letter of Appreciation dated 3 July
1980-from Manager Commercial Training
Division, PAL Development Academy;
(f) Commendation dated l6 February
l981- from Director, MSI and
(g) Commendation dated 20 May l981-
from Director, MSI.
There are many others which are not presently
in the possession of (De Veyra) but are filed
with the Company records, . . .

4. Sometime in August 1986, while
performing her duties as Senior Supervisor at
the Manila International Airport, Ma. Minda
Santiago, a Mabuhay Club member (Travel
Agent) and a long time acquiantance (sic),
approached (De Veyra) and inquired about
the planned trip of her husband to the United
States. (De Veyra) informed Ms. Santiago that
her husband's trip was not yet definite since it
might distrupt (sic) their planned vacation tour
to Europe sometime in October 1986 where
they will both avail of her trip pass privilege
from the Company. A trip pass privilege is a
privilege to travel via the Company's airlines
free of charge or at certain discounted rates
granted to qualified employees and their
relatives.
5. Upon learning that (De Veyra's)
husband's trip was still tentative, Ms. Santiago
offered to help the former's husband to go on
a quick U.S. trip. She also offered to secure first
class accomodation (sic) for both (De Veyra)
and her husband when she found out that the
former was only entitled to a maximum of
executive class accomodation (sic) as a
senior supervisor representing that she was
close to the Company's top executives and
could easily get the required authorization for
the upgrading of their accomodation (sic).
6. Relying on her representations and
it being ac (sic) common knowledge that she
has strong, (sic) influence in the Company and
with high government officials, and aware
that upgrading of trip pass accomodations
(sic) of even the non-managerial employees is
a common practice in the company, (De
Veyra) sent her trip pass No. 883125 to Ms.
Santiago's Office (Sanyo Travel) for her
Husband's (sic) ticket on 18 August 1986.
7. Sometime in the afternoon of 19
August 1986, Ms. Santiago phoned to inform
(De Veyra) that her husband's ticket was
ready for pick up. (De Veyra) had the ticket
picked-up the following morning, 20 August
1986. On the same date (De Veyra's) husband
used ticket No. 079-4401 2138460/461 with
priority classification Y/F (First Class) on his trip
to the U.S. However, on his return to Manila on
26 August 1986, he was accomodated (sic)
only in an economy class.
8. Sometime after her husband's return
to Manila, (De Veyra) was able to talk to Ms.
Santiago where she narrated to the latter the
embarrassment experienced by her husband
on his return trip to Manila when he was given
only an economy class accomodation (sic)
despite his ticket bearing the Y/F status. After
having been informed of this, Mrs. Santiago
promised (De Veyra) that it will not happen
again and offered to have her own
accomodation (sic) upgraded to first class for
her emergency trip to Washington, U.S.A.
9. Again, relying on her
representations, (De Veyra) sent her trip pass
RRO No. 874047 dated 8 September 1986 to
Ms. Santiago's Office as what she had earlier
done with respect to TP/PRO No. 883125
dated 18 August 1986.
10. On l2 September l987, Ms. Santiago
phoned (De Veyra) informing her that her
ticket to the U.S. was ready for pick up. (De
Veyra) then instructed her driver to get said
ticket. On 14 September 1986, (De Veyra)
used her ticket No. 079-440/2234490/489 to the
U.S. and (came) back to Manila on 26
September 1986, both via first class
accomodation (sic).
11. Meanwhile, on 16 June 1987, (De
Veyra) was promoted to the position of Duty
Manager by higher management in
recognition of her consistent hard work and
efficiency despite the reluctance of her
superiors Messrs. Panlilio and Martirez (who)
were forced to sign (De Veyra's) promotion
since she was the most qualified among the
contenders to the position.
12. Suddenly, much to (De
Veyra's)surprise, she received a copy of a
Notice of Administrative Charge dated 26
August 1987 signed by Mr. Pedro Martirez, Jr.
informing her that based on an investigation
conducted by the Company's Internal Audit
and control (sic) Department, she and her
husband were found to have used trip passes
which were falsified to reflect a higher priority
and space classification than what they were
entitled to. In the same Notice, she was
informed that effective upon rer (sic) receipt
of the Notice, she is being placed on
preventive suspension since her continued
employment poses a serious and imminent
threat to the life of her other co-employees
and/or to the property of the Company. She
actually received the Notice on 4 September
1987. She was further given ten (10) days from
4 September 1987 within which to submit her
sworn statement/counter-affidavit in answer
to the charges against her, together with the
sworn statements/affidavits of her witnesses in
support of her answer as to why she should not
be dismissed from her employment. . . . .
13. (De Veyra) was placed under
preventive suspension without giving her the
opportunity to be heard, therefore violative of
her fundamental right to due process and in
utter disregard of the pertinent provisions of
the Company's Code of Discipline . . .;
xxx xxx xxx
14. In a letter dated 13 September
1987, (De Veyra) requested for a fifteen (15)-
day extension of time within which to submit
her sworn statement and for the lifting of her
preventive suspension for lack of legal basis . .
. cure the illegality of her preventive suspension.
15. Meanwhile, on 14 September 1987,
(De Veyra) filed a complaint for illegal
suspension, non-payment of salaries and all
other benefits and moral and exemplary
damages.
16. In a Memorandum dated 18
September 1987, signed by Mr. Pedro M.
Martires, Jr., (De Veyra's) request for extension
was granted while her request for the
immediate lifting of her preventive suspension
was denied. . . . .
17. Because of the serious charges
levelled against her by the Company, (De
Veyra) engaged the services of undersigned
counsel.
18. In a letter dated 23 September
1987, undersigned counsel submitted (De
Veyra's) sworn statement in compliance with
the Notice of Administrative Charge, where
she vehemently denied the charges against
her, while formally demanding for the
immediate lifting of her preventive suspension
and the immediate setting of her case for
17
hearing to enable her, with the assistance of
counsel, to prevent (sic) evidence in support
of her defense . . .
19. In a Memorandum dated 7
October 1987 signed by Mr. Martires, Jr., (De
Veyra) was informed by the Company that in
view of (sic) request for an extension of 15
days to answer the administrative charge
against her, the duration of her preventive
suspension without pay and benefit is also
adjusted to end on 18 October 1987 or more
than 30 days, in violation of the provisions of
the Labor Code and its implementing rules
and regulations. . . .
20. Suddenly, without conducting the
formal investigation demanded by
undersigned counsel dated 23 September
1987 . . ., the company issued a Memorandum
dated 16 October 1987 informing (De Veyra)
that her employment with the Company is
terminated effective 26 August 1987,
retroactive (to) the date she was placed on
preventive suspension in violation of her right
to due process and in an apparent attempt to
. . . It must be noted that (De Veyra's)
preventive suspension actually commenced
upon her receipt of the Notice of
Administrative Charge on 4 September 1987.
21. By dismissing (De Veyra) without a
formal investigation (having been)
conducted, the Company again violated the
pertinent provisions of its Code of Discipline . . .
xxx xxx xxx
22. On 27 0ctober l987, (DeVeyra)filed
an amended complaint for illegal dismissal,
illegal suspension, unpaid wages,
reinstatement of other benefits under
Company policies and practices and the
CBA, actual, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and cost of suit.
23. Based on the annexes attached to
the 14 August 1987 Memorandum of the Vice
President Internal Audit & Control to Mr.
Ricardo G. Paloma, SVP-Customer Services,
there is no showing that trip pass Nos. 883125
and 874047 were even falsified. . . . Even
assuming that what were falsified were the
18
audit coupons neither (De Veyra) nor her
husband could, under any circumstances
have any control, or even see them, therefore,
negating any possibility that they could have
participated in the completion of said
coupons. Moreover, the two (2) tickets were
issued by two different Ticket Clerks as shown
by said annexes.
24. Further, having used tickets bearing
a higher passage classification than what is
normally given to (De Veyra) and her
husband, should not be taken against her
since it is a known practice in the Company. It
could be easily done by mere verbal advice
of the Company's appropriate officials. It was
only in 1987 when the Company became
strict in allowing upgradings because of the
rampant occurrences and issued a written
Memorandum to that effect. Therefore, in
using said tickets, (De Veyra) and her husband
acted in utmost good faith and were not
participants in any wrong doing (sic) (if any),
which could constitute a ground for the
Company to have lost its trust and confidence
in her.
xxx xxx xxx
On May 31, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered
its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads (p. 82, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
respondents are declared to have illegally
suspended and dismissed complainant, and
are hereby ordered to reinstate her to her
former position with full backwages and other
benefits provided by law until actually
reinstated.
Furthermore, respondents are hereby ordered
to pay complainant P200,000.00 in moral
damages, P100,000.00 in exemplary damages,
as well as attorneys (sic) fees and costs of the
suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Labor Arbiter's decision was
modified by the NLRC, the dispositive portion
of which reads (pp. 66-67, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
a) declaring the dismissal of
complainant-appellee as illegal;
b) respondents-appellants are
ordered to reinstate complainant-appellee to
her former position with full backwages until
reinstated but not to exceed three (3) years.
The price difference between the upgraded
first class tickets and the economy class tickets
should be deducted from the backwages;
c) the award of moral and exemplary
damages are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
The motion for reconsideration was denied (p.
68, Rollo). Hence, the present petition.
On April 10, 1989, We issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the execution of the
questioned decision and resolution of the
NLRC (pp. 98-99, Rollo).
The issue is whether or not De Veyra was
dismissed illegally from employment.
PAL imputes grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC: (1) in disregarding its
evidence and the ineluctable conclusions
therefrom; (2) in holding that there was no
basis for PAL's loss of trust and confidence in
De Veyra; (3) in holding that De Veyra was not
afforded due process; and (4) in ordering
reinstatement of De Veyra notwithstanding
existing jurisprudence on the matter.
For a clearer appreciation of the
circumstances which led to the dismissal of De
Veyra from employment, it is necessary to
discuss first PAL's policy on trip pass benefit
and the mechanics for availment thereof.
Among the various fringe benefits PAL extends
to its employees is a trip pass benefit which
entitles these employees as well as their
dependents to travel via PAL free of charge.
This benefit, however, is subject to company
policies, rules and regulations. The extent of
the benefit depends upon the employee's
rank, position and years of service with the
company. De Veyra, who was at that time
Senior Supervisor, was entitled to economy
class accommodation (pp. 83-85, Rollo). An
employee eligible for a trip pass must apply
therefor by accomplishing an application
form (p. 86, Rollo). Tickets are then issued
against the trip pass authorization. In the
issuance of the ticket, the issuing clerk at the
ticket office writes on the blank portions of the
audit coupon certain data including the
priority and travel classification code of the
employee. Entries written on the audit coupon
are automatically reproduced by carbon
copying on the succeeding flight coupons. In
the case of De Veyra's tickets, entries written
on the audit coupons were different from the
entries written on the flight coupons. The
priority code first written on the audit coupons
was Q/G4/Y or first class. This was reproduced
on the flight coupons. Thereafter, "Y" was
super-imposed on "F," and "C" was added
after "Y" only on the audit coupons. hus, as a
result thereof, the priority code on the audit
coupons seemed to be Q/ G4/YC to make it
appear to the accountants of PAL that it
conformed with the travel priority of De Veyra
appearing on the travel authorization, which
was Q/G4/YC or economy class (pp. 86-87,
Rollo). As regards De Veyra's husband, his
priority classification was S/H5/Y or economy
class. The audit coupons of his tickets did not
indicate said code. However, on the "Fare
Basis" column on the audit coupons, letter "F"
was written. In contrast, the flight coupons of
said tickets showed priority code "Q" F3/YF or
first class written on the "Tour Code" column.
On the "Fare Basis" column, a capital letter "F"
was written following letter "Y" and therefore
read Y/F Priority Code Q/F3/YF corresponds to
the travel and space classification of
employees and their dependents who were
given a seventy-five percent (75%) discount of
the regular fare. Since his tickets reflected an
"FOC" or free of charge, this was an indication
that he did not pay the discounted fare
corresponding to the priority code Q/F3/YF
which he used in his travel (p.13, Rollo).
Now, upgrading of priority and space
classification, such as from economy class to
first class, must be authorized by designated
company officials through the issuance of a
form referred to as special airport concession.
However, in the said authorized upgrading,
entries on the tickets are not altered to reflect
a higher space entitlement. The ticket would
still bear economy class entitlement but during
the boarding process, the upgrading would
be effected. Special airport concessions are
issued only for valid reasons, namely, in favor
of high government officials and severely
inconvenienced revenue paying passengers
(pp. 25-26, Rollo). According to De Veyra, a
certain Minda Santiago of Sanyo Travel
secured their first class accommodations.
Minda Santiago represented to them that she
was close to PAL's top executives and can
easily get the required authorization for the
upgrading of their accommodations (p. 5,
supra). Yet, this defense was never
substantiated by De Veyra either by
presenting Minda Santiago personally to testify
or submitting her affidavit. More importantly,
there was no authorization for the upgrading
of their accommodations, at all.
The administrative charge against De Veyra
was based on her and her husband's use of
trip passes which were falsified to reflect a
higher priority and space classification than
what they were entitled to on vacation travel
when the trip passes were issued (p. 91, Rollo).
It is an established fact that the De Veyras
used first class trip passes, but what is disputed
is whether or not their trip passes/tickets were
falsified. The NLRC and De Veyra limit the
definition of the word "falsify" either to tamper
with or alter. That is not so. The word refers
likewise either to represent falsely, distort or
violate the truth (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, 1986 Edition, p. 820;
see Black's Law Dictionary, 1987 Edition, p.
542). Inasmuch as their tickets did not speak
the truth, those were undoubtedly falsified.
Having been employed with the company for
twenty (20) years and familiar with its policies
and procedures, De Veyra was, therefore,
aware that in accordance with PAL's policy
and in the absence of a valid authorization for
upgrading of priority and space classification,
she and her husband were entitled to
economy accommodation only.
Mention may be made of another
circumstance which proves the falsity of De
Veyra's tickets. In relation to her entitlement to
travel benefits, she secured a Philippine
Tourism Authority Reduced Travel Tax
Certificate (p. 87, Rollo) entitling her to pay a

reduced travel tax of only P810.00. This
amount represents payment for economy
travel. The certificate itself provided that it
referred only to economy class travel and not
first class passage. The certificate was
purportedly presented for the purpose of
availment of the reduced travel tax privilege
of airline employees. However, the entries
appearing on the bottom left portion of her
tickets reflected a travel tax payment of
P1,350.00, corresponding to first class passage
(pp. 86-87, Rollo). In ruling that PAL has not
proven the culpability of De Veyra, the NLRC
ignored PAL's ample evidence before it. It
resolved the controversy based on a shallow
analysis thereof, which was supported by the
Solicitor General (p. 62, Rollo):
At this point, it is necessary to discuss the
procedures on how plane tickets are actually
issued by (PAL) . . . A ticket booklet consists of
the audit coupon as the first page, and the
succeeding coupons constitute the passenger
coupon and the agent's coupon. All entries in
the audit coupon are automatically
reproduced in the succeeding coupons of the
ticket booklet. Upon issuance of the ticket, the
audit coupon is detached by the issuing clerk,
which coupon goes to the Company's
Auditing Department. The other coupons are
given to the passenger and are detached
upon checking in at the counters for the
particular flight and leg of journey involved.
Records reveal that what was tampered with
was the audit coupon by super-imposing and
letter "Y" over the letter "F" and adding the
letter "C" thereto. However, the other parts of
the tickets given to (De Veyra) were not
tampered with. It is, therefore, misleading for
(PAL) to allege that (De Veyra) used
tampered tickets. As senior supervisor at the
Manila International Airport (De Veyra) had no
participation in the issuance of plane tickets.
She was not even personally present when the
tickets were being issued by the Company's
ticket clerks and therefore could not have had
any knowledge of the alleged tampering of
the Audit coupon. . . . Considering also that
there is not an iota of evidence to establish
(De Veyra's) participation in the tampering of
the audit coupons, her dismissal by (PAL) is
illegal.
While De Veyra may not have known about
the alteration performed on the audit
coupons, she cannot feign ignorance about
the falsity of their tickets, as discussed
previously. And, it is not even necessary to
prove De Veyra's participation in the
falsification of their tickets. What is material is
their use of trip passes which were falsified to
reflect a higher priority and space
classification than what they were entitled to
on vacation travel when the trip passes were
issued, supra, which served as the basis for PAL
to have lost its trust and confidence on De
Veyra. By and large, this Court has continually
recognized the right of the employer to dismiss
an employee on the ground of loss of
confidence or breach of trust (Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 75755,
November 24, 1988, 167 SCRA 758; San Miguel
Corporation v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 50321,
March 13, 1984, 128 SCRA 180; Central Textile
Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 50150, May 3,
1979, 90 SCRA 9; Valladolid v. Inciong, etc., et
al., G. R. No. 52364, March 25, 1983, 121 SCRA
205; Dole Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R.
No. 55413, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 673;
Tabacalera Insurance Co., et al. v. NLRC, et
al., G.R. No. 72555, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA
667; Riker v. Ople, et al., G.R. No. 50492,
October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 85). In fact, the
mere existence of a basis for believing that the
employee has breached the trust and
confidence reposed on him by his employer is
sufficient ground for dismissal (Sea-Land
Service, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 68212,
May 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 544). More so, in the
case of a supervisor or other personnel
occupying positions of responsibility, the loss of
the trust and confidence by their employer
may justify their termination (Associated
Citizens Bank v. Ople, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-
48896, February 24, 1981, 103 SCRA 130; New
Frontier Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
51578, May 29, 1984, 129 SCRA 502; Reynolds
Philippine Corporation v. Eslava, etc., et al.,
G.R. No. L-48814, June 27, 1985,137 SCRA 259).
Aside from finding that there was no legal
cause for De Veyra's dismissal from
employment, the NLRC also ruled that her
dismissal was arbitrary because she was not
granted a hearing on the charge against her,
in total disregard of PAL's Code of Discipline
which, inter alia, provides that (p. 65, Rollo):
ARTICLE VI
INVESTIGATION PROPER
SECTION 1. SETTING OF HEARING.
Upon the filing of the administrative charge,
the department head shall immediately set
the case for hearing, with notice to the
employee concerned, copy furnished his
union, if he is a member of any.
SECTION 2. HEARING PROPER. The
employer (sic) may be accompanied to and
assisted by a representative of his choice at
the hearing. However, the presence of such
representative shall not be allowed to unduly
delay or in any way detract from the summary
nature of the proceedings (Annex "C-2," p. 61,
Rollo).
As stated earlier, sometime in August, 1987,
the Internal Audit and Control Department of
PAL conducted a review of the tickets issued
by the Interline Ticket Counter because of the
uncovering of widespread fraud and
manipulation of tickets by several of PAL's
employees that resulted to their eventual
termination from the firm. It was on this
occasion that said department was able to
confirm cases of tampering and fraudulent
manipulation of official documents, some of
which involved the travel documents of De
Veyra and her husband. A memorandum was
issued by the Vice President of the Internal
Audit and Control Department to this effect
addressed to the Senior Vice President for
Customer Services Group. On August 26, 1987,
the Notice of Administrative Charge was sent
to De Veyra. On September 11, 1987, she
requested additional time within which to
study and evaluate her defense. On
September 18, 1987, her request was granted.
She was allowed until September 29, 1987 to
file her answer. On September 24, 1987, De
Veyra submitted her sworn statement wherein
she admitted having used tickets bearing the
upgraded priority classification. She
mentioned Minda Santiago as the person who
arranged the upgrading of their trip passes.
On October 16, 1987, De Veyra's services were
terminated by PAL. Taking into account these
circumstances, it cannot be said that De
19
Veyra was denied administrative due process
of law simply because the aforequoted
provision was not observed by PAL. There is no
violation of due process even if no hearing
was conducted where a chance to explain a
party's side of the controversy was accorded
to him. What is frowned upon is the denial of
the opportunity to be heard (Eden, et al. v.
Ministry of Labor and Employment, et al., G.R.
No. 72145, February 28, 1990, 182 SCRA 840;
Asprec v. Itchon, et al., G.R. No. L-21685, April
30, 1966, 16 SCRA 921). Since De Veyra
admitted in her sworn statement having used
tickets bearing the upgraded priority
classification; the documentary evidence of
PAL already proved the falsity of the tickets;
and De Veyra was aware of this falsity, there
was no necessity for the parties to undergo
the ritual of holding a hearing.
To reiterate, there was a legal ground for PAL's
termination of the services of De
Veyra.1âwphi1 We are not persuaded by the
opinion advanced by the NLRC that (p. 63,
Rollo):
Even assuming, arguendo, that (De Veyra)
was guilty still the supreme penalty of dismissal
was greatly disproportionate to the offense
imputed to her. After working for twenty (20)
years with (PAL), and receiving numerous
commendations and promotions at that, (De
Veyra) does not deserve the penalty of
dismissal for the violation of a company rule
which, after all, is a common practice in the
company. This is not to condone the alleged
misstep committed by (De Veyra). It is merely
to point out that in the light of the surrounding
circumstances, dismissal is too severe a
penalty. . . .
In the first place, the statement that De
Veyra's violation of PAL's rule is a common
practice in the company is misleading
because of lack of proof. In the second place,
the fact that De Veyra has worked with PAL
for twenty (20) years, if it is to be considered at
all, should be taken against her. The infraction
that she committed, vis-a-vis her long years of
service with the company, reflects a
regrettable lack of loyalty. Loyalty that she
should have strengthened instead of
betrayed. If an employee's length of service is
to be regarded as a justification for
20
moderating the penalty of dismissal, it will
actually become a prize for disloyalty,
perverting the meaning of social justice and
undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its
ranks of all undesirables (see Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company v. NLRC, et al.,
G.R. No. 80609, August 23, 1988, 164 SCRA
671).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated November 29,
1988 and its resolution dated February 21, 1989
with respect to paragraphs (a) and (b) are
hereby MODIFIED by declaring the dismissal of
private respondent Carmencita Nannette G.
De Veyra as valid; but AFFIRMED with respect
to paragraph (c). The temporary restraining
order issued on April 10, 1989 is made
permanent.
G.R. No. 109444 March 31, 1995
DELANO T. PADILLA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS in her capacity as
Chairman of the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
HON. THELMA GAMINDE in her capacity as
Board Chairman II of the MERIT SYSTEM
PROTECTION BOARD, and the ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION BOARD of the DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,
respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari,
petitioner Delano Padilla seeks to set aside the
resolution1 of public respondent Civil Service
Commission (CSC) which confirmed the
decision of respondent Merit System
Protection Board (MSPB) dismissing petitioner
from the service after finding him guilty of the
charges in the administrative complaint filed
by the Land Transportation Office (LTO) of the
Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC). Resolution No. 92-
1849 dated November 17, 1992 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration is
likewise assailed here.
The relevant antecedents of the instant
petition are as follows:
On November 2, 1988, an administrative
complaint2 for gross dishonesty, gross neglect
of duty, inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties and gross
violation of the law, rules and reasonable
office regulations was filed against petitioner
Delano Padilla, former officer-in-charge of the
Land Transportation Office (LTO) of Bacolod
City. It was alleged that petitioner succeeded
in having caused and approved the
registration and/or transfer of ownership of
twelve (12) carnapped and stolen vehicles
despite prior knowledge that existing laws,
rules and regulations were violated in the
registration and transfer thereof. As
contended by complainant LTO, petitioner
failed to require confirmation of the
Certificate of Registration and Official
Receipts corresponding to the subject vehicles
from the LTO district offices which issued the
same. Had he done so, no registration and/or
transfer of the vehicles would have been
possible because all the supporting
documents pertinent to them were spurious.
Petitioner was given five (5) days from receipt
thereof to answer the charges filed against
him.
Accordingly, petitioner filed his answer3 dated
December 26, 1988 vehemently denying the
charges against him. He contended that the
twelve (12) motor vehicles were covered by
proper clearances, certificates and similar
documents issued by the Constabulary
Highway Patrol Group (CHPG). He claimed
that the charges were baseless and were filed
only to maliciously taint his good name and
reputation.
The matter was set for hearing on April 20,
1989. However, only prosecutor Ramon Cuyco
and his witness, Alfonso Alianza, were present.
Petitioner and his counsel failed to appear
despite due notice. Consequently, the case
was heard ex-parte and was considered
submitted for decision.
After considering the evidence on record,
respondent Administrative Action Board (AAB)
of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) through then DOTC
Secretary Rainerio Reyes rendered a MERIT SYSTEM PROTECTION BOARD DATED
decision,4 the disposition portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
respondent Delano T. Padilla is hereby found
guilty of the charges filed against him, and
accordingly sentenced as follows:
(a) That he is hereby dismissed from the
service;
(b) That he is disqualified for
reemployment in the government service;
(c) That his leave credits and
retirement benefits are hereby declared
forfeited; and
(d) That his civil service eligibility is
hereby recommended to be cancelled.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the above-mentioned decision. However,
instead of ruling on the merits of the motion,
the AAB-DOTC deferred action thereon and
scheduled the case for hearing on June 30,
1989. The said hearing was reset for July 25,
1989, then September 4 and 5, 1989. On
September 14, 1989, petitioner formally
offered his evidence in writing. On October,
1989, an opposition to the said formal offer of
evidence was filed by prosecutor Cuyco.
On November 20, 1989, petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Thereafter, petitioner appealed to the Merit
System Protection Board (MSPB) seeking
reversal of the AAB-DOTC's decision.
On March 25, 1991, the MSPB rendered a
decision affirming the decision of the AAB-
DOTC. Petitioner's appeal was therefore
ordered dismissed.6 A motion for
reconsideration of the same was denied on
February 17, 1992.
Aggrieved by the foregoing rulings, petitioner
elevated the case to respondent Civil Service
Commission (CSC) invoking the following
grounds, to wit:
1.) The decision of the MSPB is not
supported by any substantial or competent
evidence.
2.) Gross errors of law and irregularities were
committed in the promulgation of the
questioned decision.
3.) Respondent Padilla was not
afforded his constitutional right of due
process.
4.) Lone witness of Complainant DOTC
admitted that Respondent Padilla is not guilty
of the charge filed against him.7
On July 16, 1992, respondent CSC issued
Resolution No. 92-888, the deterred portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE foregoing premises considered,
this Commission hereby rules that Delano T.
Padilla is guilty of Gross Dishonesty, Gross
Neglect of Duty, Inefficiency and
Incompetence in the Performance of Official
Duties and Gross Violation of Law, Rules and
Reasonable Office Regulations and is meted
out the penalty of dismissal. Accordingly, the
MSPB decision is hereby confirmed.8
A motion for reconsideration of the same
decision was denied in Resolution No. 92-1849
dated November 17, 1992.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for New
Trial seeking the reversal of Resolution Nos. 92-
888 and 92-1849. Said motion was considered
a second motion for reconsideration, hence,
was accordingly denied on February 16, 1993
in Resolution No. 93-511-A by respondent CSC.
On April 6, 1993, petitioner came to this Court
on a Petition for certiorari and raised the
following grounds for allowance of his petition,
viz.:
I
THE QUESTIONED UNDATED DECISION AND THE
RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 20, 1989 OF
DOTC WHICH THE PENALTY OUTRIGHT
DISMISSAL UPON HEREIN PETITIONER-
APPELLANT AS WELL AS THE DECISIONS OF THE

MARCH 25, 1991 AND FEBRUARY 17 1992 AND
THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT-APPELLEE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DATED JULY 16,
1992 WHICH AFFIRMED THE DISMISSAL OF THE
PETITIONER-APPELLANT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR COMPETENT EVIDENCE
AS BORNE OUT BY THE RECORDS;
II
GROSS ERRORS OF LAW AND IRREGULARITIES
WERE COMMITTED IN THE DECISION AND
RESOLUTION PROMULGATED BY DOTC AS WELL
AS IN THE QUESTIONED DECISIONS OF THE
MERIT SYSTEM PROTECTION BOARD OF THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND THE
RESOLUTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT-APPELLEE
HEREIN;
III
THE QUESTIONED UNDATED DECISION AND THE
RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 20, 1989 OF
DOTC AS WELL AS THE DECISIONS OF THE MERIT
SYSTEM PROTECTION BOARD DATED MARCH
25, 1991 AND FEBRUARY 17, 1992 AND
RESOLUTIONS NOS. 92-888, 92-1849 AND 93-
511-A DATED JULY 16, 1992, NOVEMBER 17,
1992 AND FEBRUARY 16, 1993 OF HEREIN
RESPONDENT-APPELLEE RESPECTIVELY
VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS OF HEREIN PETITIONER-
APPELLANT BECAUSE HE WAS NOT GIVEN
SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND HIMSELF,
HENCE, THE QUESTIONED DECISIONS AND
RESOLUTIONS ARE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO;
IV
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD CLEARLY SHOW
THAT THE CHARGES AGAINST THE HEREIN
PETITIONER-APPELLANT RELIED UPON BY DOTC
IN ITS UNDATED DECISION AND RESOLUTION
DATED NOVEMBER 20, 1989 AS WELL AS THE
DECISIONS OF THE MERIT SYSTEM PROTECTION
BOARD OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
DATED MARCH 25, 1991 AND FEBRUARY 21,
1992 AND THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION DATED JULY 16, 1992
PROVED THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT IS
NOT GUILTY OF THE CHARGED FILED AGAINST
HIM.9
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that his constitutional right
to due process was violated when on April 20,
1989 the scheduled hearing proceeded
despite his, and his counsel's absence. He
claims that nobody testified during the
hearing and that the supporting documents
were not presented or marked in evidence.
Petitioner's position cannot be sustained.
The essence of due process is that a party be
afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit any evidence he may have in
support of his defense. 10 In administrative
proceedings such as the one at bench, due
process simply means the opportunity to
explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. 11 In the instant case,
petitioner does not deny the fact that he was
furnished a copy of the charges against him
wherein he was required to file an answer and
to state whether he wanted a formal
investigation. Petitioner did file his answer. As
to the scheduled hearing on April 20, 1989,
petitioner admits that he was notified. The fact
that he filed a motion for postponement did
not necessarily mean that his motion was
granted, hence, the scheduled hearing
proceeded ex-parte. Consequently, a registration, Official receipt number of
decision was rendered by the AAB-DOTC.
From said decision, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. Thereafter, on account of the
liberality of the AAB-DOTC, he was heard and
was allowed to present his evidence. His
motion for reconsideration having been
denied, he filed an appeal with the MSPB and,
later on, a motion for reconsideration. Not
satisfied, he again filed an appeal with
respondent CSC and, later on a motion for
reconsideration. Clearly therefore, petitioner
was given ample opportunity to present his
case. He was not denied his right to due
process. One may be heard, not only by
verbal presentation but also, sometimes more
eloquently, through pleadings. 12 "Due
process is not semper et ubique judicial
process." 13 Hence, a formal or trial-type
hearing is not, at all times, necessary. So long
as a party is afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain his side, the
requirement of due process is complied with.
Petitioner further maintains that he is not guilty
of the charges hurled against him and that
the DOTC decision is not supported by
evidence on record.
This contention is belied by the evidence on
record.
For the purpose of determining the
authenticity and genuineness of the
Certificate of Registration attached to an
application for registration of a transferred
motor vehicle, the Department of
Transportation and Communications issued
Memorandum Circular No. 123 on December
27, 1989 with the following pertinent provision
on the mandatory requirement of a
Certificate of Clearance from the previous
agency of registration, thus:
2. In the case where the transferred
motor vehicle is being registered in any
Agency other than the Agency where the
vehicle has been originally registered, a
Certificate of Clearance shall first be obtained
from such Agency of previous registration;
provided, however, that such clearance shall
state, among others, the description of the
motor vehicle, name the registrant/owner, file
number of the Registration Certificate, date
payment and the amount of payment.
From the foregoing, a Certificate of
Clearance or confirmation is mandatory for all
transfers of ownership of motor vehicles when
done in an agency, or district office as the
case may be other than the issuing agency of
such certificate of registration. When the
requirement is dispensed with, the evil sought
to be avoided and eliminated, that is, the
concealment of the true status and identity of
the motor vehicle, remains unabated.
In the case at bench, it was clearly
established from the records that petitioner
did not require the submission of Certificates of
Clearance from the agencies of previous
registration affecting the twelve (12) motor
vehicles in question. For had he done so, he
would have discovered that the documents
submitted to him were spurious per verification
from the alleged agencies of previous
registration. This amply demonstrates
21
petitioner's obvious disregard of the law, rules
and regulations, gross neglect of duty,
dishonesty and incompetence in the
performance of official functions. To our mind,
the evidence is clear and substantial to
support the conclusion that petitioner indeed
failed to discharge an essential official
function reposed on him. In administrative
proceedings where evidence submitted is
substantial, meaning, evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support conclusion,14 the proper penalty
must be imposed on that erring official.
In a vain attempt to escape culpability,
petitioner vigorously maintains that the
documents submitted to him, i.e., the deed of
sale, the certificate of registration and the PC
Clearance of the CHPG, may properly
approximate the legal requirement of a
Certificate of Clearance or confirmation from
the previous agency. This is untenable. DOTC
rules and regulations unequivocably outline
the petitioner's duties and obligations as head
of an agency. He has to require a Certificate
of Clearance from the previous LTO issuing
agency, in addition to a clearance from
CHPG. Anything short of that is an abdication
of his duties as head of an LTO office.
On this point, we quote with favor the
following findings and conclusions of
respondent AAB-DOTC:
The absence of such "confirmation" or
"clearance" required by Memorandum
Circular No. 123, supra, was the main and sole
cause for the registration and transfer of
ownership of the eleven (11) (sic) motor
vehicles hereabove mentioned. Such criminal
violation, which are also administrative
offenses, as now prosecuted in these
administrative proceedings, are, therefore,
traceable to only one cause the complete
absence of lawfully issued "confirmation" or
"clearance". Accordingly, the following rule,
shall apply:
"El que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado." He, who is the cause of the cause is
the cause of the evil caused. (1 Cuello Calon,
Codigo Penal, 12th ed. 1968, pp. 335-336)
22
The utility, therefore, of the "spurious
documents" to support the registration and
transfer of ownership of the eleven (11) (sic)
motor vehicles, and his citation and use of
"number plates" which do not properly and
legally pertain to the said eleven (11) (sic)
motor vehicles were supportive actions to the
absence of such "confirmation" or "clearance"
in order to make possible the registration and
transfers of such vehicles clearly portrayed. In
fact respondent did succeed in so registering
said motor vehicles and in transferring the
ownership thereof, until found through an
operational audit conducted by complainant
Land Transportation Office's investigator,
witness, Mr. Alfonso Alianza. The facts
established by testimonial and documentary
evidence disclosed most clearly and positively
that respondent Delano T. Padilla, has been
proved by substantial evidence (Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642),
to have been guilty of "gross dishonesty, gross
neglect of duty, and of willful violation of law,
and reasonable office rules and regulations."
The magnitude of the acts committed
compels us, while the massive evidence
marshalled by the prosecution dictate that a
finding of guilt against respondent be a
matter of duty. Among those in the service of
the government, it has been a policy
declared that:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the
policy of the state to promote a high standard
of ethics in public Service. Public officials and
employees shall at all times be accountable
to the people and shall discharge their duties
with utmost responsibility, integrity,
competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism
and justice, lead modest lives, and uphold
public interest over personal interest. (REP ACT
NO. 6713)
The foregoing policy should always be the
polestar of official performance. Without such
guiding star, the public service shall fail.
Respondent Padilla's actions in the eleven (11)
(sic) motor vehicles did not only run afoul of
the pertinent laws, and rules connected
therewith, but also did violence the foregoing
basic policy of the state. 15
Well-settled is the rule that where findings of
an administrative body which has acquired
expertise because its jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters are amply supported by
substantial evidence, such findings are
accorded not only respect but also finality. 16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 134625 August 31, 1999
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF
REGENTS, CHANCELLOR ROGER POSADAS, DR.
EMERLINDA ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, DR.
ISAGANI MEDINA, DR. MARIA SERENA DIOKNO,
DR. OLIVIA CAOILI, DR. FRANCISCO NEMENZO
II, DEAN PACIFICO AGABIN, CARMELITA GUNO,
and MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AROKIASWAMY
WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
For review before the Court is the decision of
the Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42788,
dated December 16, 1997, which granted
private respondent's application for a writ of
mandatory injunction, and its resolution, dated
July 13, 1998, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent Arokiaswamy William
Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and
holder of a Philippine visitor's visa. Sometime in
April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoral
program in Anthropology of the University of
the Philippines College of Social Sciences and
Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City.
After completing the units of course work
required in her doctoral program, private
respondent went on a two-year leave of
absence to work as Tamil Programme
Producer of the Vatican Radio in the Vatican
and as General Office Assistant at the
International Right to Life Federation in Rome.
She returned to the Philippines in July 1991 to
work on her dissertation entitled, "Tamil
Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the
Philippines."
On December 22, 1992, Dr. Realidad S. Rolda,
chairperson of the U.P. Department of
Anthropology, wrote a letter to Dr. Maria
Serena Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean and
Graduate Program Director, certifying that
private respondent had finished her
dissertation and was ready for her oral
defense. Dr. Rolda suggested that the oral
defense be held on January 6, 1993 but, in a
letter, dated February 2, 1993, Dr. Serena
Diokno rescheduled it on February 5, 1993.
Named as members of the dissertation panel
were Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason,
Sri Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and Isagani
Medina, the last included as the dean's
representative.1âwphi1.nêt
After going over private respondent's
dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean
Consuelo Joaquin-Paz that there was a
portion in private respondent's dissertation that
was lifted, without proper acknowledgment,
from Balfour's Cyclopaedia of India and
Eastern and Southern Asia (1967), volume I,
pp. 392-401 (3 v., Edward Balfour 1885 reprint)
and from John Edye's article entitled
"Description of the Various Classes of Vessels
Constructed and Employed by the Natives of
the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the
Island of Ceylon for their Coasting Navigation"
in the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain
and Ireland Journal, volume I, pp. 1-14 (1833).2
Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed
to defend her dissertation on February 5, 1993.
Four (4) out of the five (5) panelists gave
private respondent a passing mark for her oral
defense by affixing their signatures on the
approval form. These were Drs. Manuel,
Quiason, Skandarajah, and Teodoro. Dr.
Quiason added the following qualification to
his signature:
Ms. Arokiaswamy must incorporate the
suggestions I made during the successful
defense of her P.D. thesis.3
Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form but
added the following comment:
Pipirmahan ko ang pagsang-ayon/di
pagsang-ayon kapag nakita ko na ang mga
revisions ng dissertation.4
Dr. Teodoro added the following note to his
signature:
Kailangang isagawa ang mga
mahahalagang pagbabago at ipakita sa
panel and bound copies.5
In a letter, dated March 5, 1993 and
addressed to her thesis adviser, Dr. Manuel,
private respondent requested a meeting with
the panel members, especially Dr. Medina, to
discuss the amendments suggested by the
panel members during the oral defense. The
meeting was held at the dean's office with
Dean Paz, private respondent, and a majority
of the defense panel present.6 During the
meeting, Dean Paz remarked that a majority
vote of the panel members was sufficient for a
student to pass, notwithstanding the failure to
obtain the consent of the Dean's
representative.
On March 24, 1993, the CSSP College Faculty
Assembly approved private respondent's
graduation pending submission of final copies
of her dissertation.
In April 1993, private respondent submitted
copies of her supposedly revised dissertation
to Drs. Manuel, Skandarajah, and Quiason,
who expressed their assent to the dissertation.
Petitioners maintain, however, that private
respondent did not incorporate the revisions
suggested by the panel members in the final
copies of her dissertation.
Private respondent left a copy of her
dissertation in Dr. Teodoro's office April 15, 1993
and proceeded to submit her dissertation to
the CSSP without the approvals of Dr. Medina
and Dr. Teodoro, relying on Dean Paz's March
5, 1993 statement.
Dr. Teodoro later indicated his disapproval,
while Dr. Medina did not sign the approval
form.7
Dean Paz then accepted private respondent's
dissertation in partial fulfillment of the course
requirements for the doctorate degree in
Anthropology.
In a letter to Dean Paz, dated April 17, 1993,
private respondent expressed concern over

matters related to her dissertation. She sought
to explain why the signature of Dr. Medina
was not affixed to the revision approval form.
Private respondent said that since she already
had the approval of a majority of the panel
members, she no longer showed her
dissertation to Dr. Medina nor tried to obtain
the latter's signature on the revision approval
form. She likewise expressed her
disappointment over the CSSP administration
and charged Drs. Diokno and Medina with
maliciously working for the disapproval of her
dissertation, and further warned Dean Paz
against encouraging perfidious acts against
her.
On April 17, 1993, the University Council met to
approve the list of candidates for graduation
for the second semester of school year 1992-
1993. The list, which was endorsed to the
Board of Regents for final approval, included
private respondent's name.
On April 21, 1993, Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr.
Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic
Affairs, requesting the exclusion of private
respondent's name from the list of candidates
for graduation, pending clarification of the
problems regarding her dissertation. Her letter
reads:8
Abril 21, 1993
Dr. Milagros Ibe
Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs
Unibersidad ng Pilipinas
Quezon Hall, Diliman, Q.C.
Mahal na Dr. Ibe,
Mahigpit ko pong hinihiling na huwag
munang isama ang pangalan ni Ms.
Arokiaswam[y] William Margaret Celine sa
listahan ng mga bibigyan ng degri na Ph.D.
(Anthropology) ngayon[g] semester, dahil sa
mga malubhang bintang nya sa ilang
myembro ng panel para sa oral defense ng
disertasyon nya at sa mga akusasyon ng ilan
sa mga ito sa kanya.
Naniniwala po kami na dapat mailinaw muna
ang ilang bagay bago makonfer ang degri
kay Ms. Arokiaswam[y]. Kelangan po ito para
mapangalagaan ang istandard ng In a letter, dated June 7, 1993, Dean Paz
pinakamataas na degree ng Unibersidad. informed private respondent of the charges
against her.11
(Sgd.)
On June 15, 1993, the Ventura Committee
CONSUELO JOAQUIN-PAZ, Ph.D. submitted a report to Dean Paz, finding at
Dekano least ninety (90) instances or portions in private
respondent's thesis which were lifted from
Apparently, however, Dean Paz's letter did not sources without proper or due
reach the Board of Regents on time, because acknowledgment.
the next day, April 22, 1993, the Board
approved the University Council's On July 28, 1993, the CSSP College Assembly
recommendation for the graduation of unanimously approved the recommendation
qualified students, including private to withdraw private respondent's doctorate
respondent. Two days later, April 24, 1993, degree and forwarded its recommendation to
private respondent graduated with the the University Council. The University Council,
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in in turn, approved and endorsed the same
Anthropology. recommendation to the Board of Regents on
August 16, 1993.
On the other hand, Dean Paz also wrote a
letter to private respondent, dated April 21, On September 6, 1993, the Board of Regents
1993, that she would not be granted an deferred action on the recommendation to
academic clearance unless she substantiated study the legal implications of its approval.12
the accusations contained in her letter dated
April 17, 1993. Meanwhile, in a letter, dated September 23,
1993, U.P. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda
In her letter, dated April 27, 1993, private Roman summoned private respondent to a
respondent claimed that Dr. Medina's meeting on the same day and asked her to
unfavorable attitude towards her dissertation submit her written explanation to the charges
was a reaction to her failure to include him against her.
and Dr. Francisco in the list of panel members;
that she made the revisions proposed by Drs. During the meeting, Chancellor Roman
Medina and Teodoro in the revised draft of informed private respondent of the charges
her dissertation; and that Dr. Diokno was guilty and provided her a copy of the findings of the
of harassment. investigating committee.13 Private
respondent, on the other hand, submitted her
In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, dated May written explanation in a letter dated
1, 1993, Dr. Medina formally charged private September 25, 1993.
respondent with plagiarism and
recommended that the doctorate granted to Another meeting was held on October 8, 1993
her be withdrawn.9 between Chancellor Roman and private
respondent to discuss her answer to the
On May 13, 1993, Dean Paz formed an ad hoc charges. A third meeting was scheduled on
committee, composed of faculty members October 27, 1993 but private respondent did
from various disciplines and chaired by Eva not attend it, alleging that the Board of
Duka-Ventura, to investigate the plagiarism Regents had already decided her case
charge against private respondent. before she could be fully heard.
Meanwhile, she recommended to U.P. Diliman
Chancellor, Dr. Emerlinda Roman, that the On October 11, 1993, private respondent
Ph.D. degree conferred on private respondent wrote to Dr. Emil Q. Javier, U.P. President,
be withdrawn.10 alleging that some members of the U.P.
administration were playing politics in her
case.14 She sent another letter, dated
December 14, 1993, to Dr. Armand Fabella,
23
Chairman of the Board of Regents,
complaining that she had not been afforded
due process and claiming that U.P. could no
longer withdraw her degree since her
dissertation had already been accepted by
the CSSP.15
Meanwhile, the U.P. Office of Legal Services
justified the position of the University Council in
its report to the Board of Regents. The Board of
Regents, in its February 1, 1994 and March 24,
1994 meetings, further deferred action
thereon.
On July 11, 1994, private respondent sent a
letter to the Board of Regents requesting a re-
investigation of her case. She stressed that
under the Rules and Regulations on Student
Conduct and Discipline, it was the student
disciplinary tribunal which had jurisdiction to
decide cases of dishonesty and that the
withdrawal of a degree already conferred
was not one of the authorized penalties which
the student disciplinary tribunal could impose.
On July 28, 1994, the Board of Regents
decided to release private respondent's
transcript of grades without annotation
although it showed that private respondent
passed her dissertation with 12 units of credit.
On August 17, 1994, Chancellor Roger
Posadas issued Administrative Order No. 94-94
constituting a special committee composed
of senior faculty members from the U.P. units
outside Diliman to review the University
Council's recommendation to withdraw
private respondent's degree. With the
approval of the Board of Regents and the U.P.
Diliman Executive Committee, Posadas
created a five-man committee, chaired by Dr.
Paulino B. Zafaralla, with members selected
from a list of nominees screened by Dr.
Emerenciana Arcellana, then a member of
the Board of Regents. On August 13, 1994, the
members of the Zafaralla committee and
private respondent met at U.P. Los Baños.
Meanwhile, on August 23, 1994, the U.P.
Diliman Registrar released to private
respondent a copy of her transcript of grades
and certificate of graduation.
24
In a letter to Chancellor Posadas, dated
September 1, 1994, private respondent
requested that the Zafaralla committee be
provided with copies of the U.P. Charter (Act
No. 1870), the U.P. Rules and Regulations on
Student Conduct and Discipline, her letter-
response to Chancellor Roman, dated
September 25, 1993, as well as all her other
communications.
On September 19, 1994, Chancellor Posadas
obtained the Zafaralla Committee's report,
signed by its chairman, recommending the
withdrawal of private respondent's doctorate
degree. The report stated:16
After going through all the pertinent
documents of the case and interviewing Ms.
Arokiaswamy William, the following facts were
established:
1. There is overwhelming evidence of massive
lifting from a published source word for word
and, at times, paragraph by paragraph
without any acknowledgment of the source,
even by a mere quotation mark. At least 22
counts of such documented liftings were
identified by the Committee. These form part
of the approximately ninety (90) instances
found by the Committee created by the Dean
of the College and subsequently verified as
correct by the Special Committee. These
instances involved the following forms of
intellectual dishonesty: direct lifting/copying
without acknowledgment, full/partial lifting
with improper documentation and substitution
of terms or words (e.g., Tamil in place of
Sanskrit, Tamilization in place of Indianization)
from an acknowledged source in support of
her thesis (attached herewith is a copy of the
documents for reference); and
2. Ms. Arokiaswamy William herself admits of
being guilty of the allegation of plagiarism.
Fact is, she informed the Special Committee
that she had been admitting having lifted
several portions in her dissertation from various
sources since the beginning.
In view of the overwhelming proof of massive
lifting and also on the admission of Ms.
Arokiaswamy William that she indeed
plagiarized, the Committee strongly supports
the recommendation of the U.P. Diliman
Council to withdraw the doctoral degree of
Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William.
On the basis of the report, the University
Council, on September 24, 1994,
recommended to the Board of Regents that
private respondent be barred in the future
from admission to the University either as a
student or as an employee.
On January 4, 1995, the secretary of the Board
of Regents sent private respondent the
following letter:17
4 January 1995
Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William
Department of Anthropology
College of Social Sciences and Philosophy
U.P. Diliman, Quezon City
Dear Ms. Arokiaswamy William:
This is to officially inform you about the action
taken by the Board of Regents at its 1081st
and 1082nd meetings held last 17 November
and 16 December 1994 regarding your case,
the excerpts from the minutes of which are
attached herewith.
Please be informed that the members present
at the 1081st BOR meeting on 17 November
1994 resolved, by a majority decision, to
withdraw your Ph.D. degree as recommended
by the U.P. Diliman University Council and as
concurred with by the External Review Panel
composed of senior faculty from U.P. Los
Baños and U.P. Manila. These faculty members
were chosen by lot from names submitted by
the University Councils of U.P. Los Baños and
U.P. Manila.
In reply to your 14 December 1994 letter
requesting that you be given a good lawyer
by the Board, the Board, at its 1082nd meeting
on 16 December 1994, suggested that you
direct your request to the Office of Legal Aid,
College of Law, U.P. Diliman.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.)
VIVENCIO R. JOSE
Secretary of the University
and of the Board of Regents
On January 18, 1995, private respondent
wrote a letter to Commissioner Sedfrey
Ordoñez, Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights, asking the commission's
intervention.18 In a letter, dated February 14,
1995, to Secretary Ricardo Gloria, Chairman of
the Board of Regents, she asked for a
reinvestigation of her case. She also sought an
audience with the Board of Regents and/or
the U.P. President, which request was denied
by President Javier, in a letter dated June 2,
1995.
On August 10, 1995, private respondent then
filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and
damages, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-95-24690 and assigned to Branch 81 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.19 She
alleged that petitioners had unlawfully
withdrawn her degree without justification and
without affording her procedural due process.
She prayed that petitioners be ordered to
restore her degree and to pay her P500,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages and
P1,500,000.00 as compensation for lost of
earnings.
On August 6, 1996, the trial court, Branch 227,
rendered a decision dismissing the petition for
mandamus for lack of merit.20 Private
respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which on December 16, 1997,
reversed the lower court. The dispositive
portion of the appellate court's decision
reads:21
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is
hereby reversed and set aside. Respondents
are ordered to restore to petitioner her degree
of Ph.D. in Anthropology.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend:
I students; and that only the college committee
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE WRIT OF
MANDAMUS AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO
RESTORE RESPONDENT'S DOCTORAL DEGREE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE
DOCTORAL DEGREE GIVEN RESPONDENT BY
U.P. CANNOT BE RECALLED WITHOUT
VIOLATING HER RIGHT TO ENJOYMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TO JUSTICE AND
EQUITY.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS
OF THEIR RIGHT TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS.22
Petitioners argue that private respondent
failed to show that she had been unlawfully
excluded from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which she is entitled so as to
justify the issuance of the writ of mandamus.
They also contend that she failed to prove
that the restoration of her degree is a
ministerial duty of U.P. or that the withdrawal
of the degree violated her right to the
enjoyment of intellectual property.
On the other hand, private respondent,
unassisted by counsel, argue that petitioners
acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse of
discretion in withdrawing her degree even
prior to verifying the truth of the plagiarism
charge against her; and that as her answer to
the charges had not been forwarded to the
members of the investigating committees, she
was deprived of the opportunity to comment
or refute their findings.
In addition, private respondent maintains that
petitioners are estopped from, withdrawing
her doctorate degree; that petitioners acted
contrary to §9 of the U.P. Charter and the U.P.
Rules and Regulations of Student Conduct
and Discipline of the University, which
according to her, does not authorize the
withdrawal of a degree as a penalty for erring
or the student disciplinary tribunal may decide
disciplinary cases, whose report must be
signed by a majority of its members.

We find petitioners' contention to be
meritorious.
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal,
corporation, board or person to do the act
required to be done when it or he unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, there being no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.23 In University of the Philippines Board
of Regents v. Ligot-Telan,24 this Court ruled
that the writ was not available to restrain U.P.
from the exercise of its academic freedom. In
that case, a student who was found guilty of
dishonesty and ordered suspended for one
year by the Board of Regents, filed a petition
for mandamus and obtained from the lower
court a temporary restraining order stopping
U.P. from carrying out the order of suspension.
In setting aside the TRO and ordering the
lower court to dismiss the student's petition, this
Court said:
[T]he lower court gravely abused its discretion
in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of
May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was
based on the lower court's finding that the
implementation of the disciplinary sanction of
suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to
the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing
his course, and consequently, in getting a
decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a
ruling considers only the situation of Nadal
without taking into account the
circumstances, clearly of his own making,
which led him into such a predicament. More
importantly, it has completely disregarded the
overriding issue of academic freedom which
provides more than ample justification for the
imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an
erring student of an institution of higher
learning.
From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that
the lower court should have restrained itself
from assuming jurisdiction over the petition
filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in
doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and
certain right on the part of the petitioner
being required. It is of no avail against an
official or government agency whose duty
requires the exercise of discretion or
judgment.25
In this case, the trial court dismissed private
respondent's petition precisely on grounds of
academic freedom but the Court of Appeals
reversed holding that private respondent was
denied due process. It said:
It is worthy to note that during the
proceedings taken by the College Assembly
culminating in its recommendation to the
University Council for the withdrawal of
petitioner's Ph.D. degree, petitioner was not
given the chance to be heard until after the
withdrawal of the degree was consummated.
Petitioner's subsequent letters to the U.P.
President proved unavailing.26
As the foregoing narration of facts in this case
shows, however, various committees had
been formed to investigate the charge that
private respondent had committed plagiarism
and, in all the investigations held, she was
heard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticism
may be made of the university proceedings
before private respondent was finally stripped
of her degree, it is that there were too many
committee and individual investigations
conducted, although all resulted in a finding
that private respondent committed dishonesty
in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the
basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D.
degree.
Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the
essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one's side of a
controversy or a chance seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.27 A
party who has availed of the opportunity to
present his position cannot tenably claim to
have been denied due process.28
In this case, private respondent was informed
in writing of the charges against her29 and
afforded opportunities to refute them. She was
asked to submit her written explanation, which
she forwarded on September 25, 1993.30
Private respondent then met with the U.P.
chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla
committee to discuss her case. In addition, she
sent several letters to the U.P. authorities
explaining her position.31
It is not tenable for private respondent to
argue that she was entitled to have an
audience before the Board of Regents. Due
process in an administrative context does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those
in the courts of justice.32 It is noteworthy that
the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance
of persons whose cases are included as items
on the agenda of the Board of Regents.33
Nor indeed was private respondent entitled to
be furnished a copy of the report of the
Zafaralla committee as part of her right to due
process. In Ateneo de Manila University v.
Capulong,34 we held:
Respondent students may not use the
argument that since they were not accorded
the opportunity to see and examine the
written statements which became the basis of
petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were
denied procedural due process. Granting that
they were denied such opportunity, the same
may not be said to detract from the
observance of due process, for disciplinary
cases involving students need not necessarily
include the right to cross examination. An
administrative proceeding conducted to
investigate students' participation in a hazing
activity need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. . .
In this case, in granting the writ of mandamus,
the Court of Appeals held:
First. Petitioner graduated from the U.P. with a
doctorate degree in Anthropology. After
graduation, the contact between U.P. and
petitioner ceased. Petitioner is no longer within
the ambit of the disciplinary powers of the U.P.
As a graduate, she is entitled to the right and
enjoyment of the degree she has earned. To
recall the degree, after conferment, is not only
arbitrary, unreasonable, and an act of abuse,
but a flagrant violation of petitioner's right of
enjoyment to intellectual property.
Second. Respondents aver that petitioner's
graduation was a mistake.
25
Unfortunately this "mistake" was arrived at after
almost a year after graduation. Considering
that the members of the thesis panel, the
College Faculty Assembly, and the U.P.
Council are all men and women of the highest
intellectual acumen and integrity, as
respondents themselves aver, suspicion is
aroused that the alleged "mistake" might not
be the cause of withdrawal but some other
hidden agenda which respondents do not
wish to reveal.
At any rate, We cannot countenance the
plight the petitioner finds herself enmeshed in
as a consequence of the acts complained of.
Justice and equity demand that this be
rectified by restoring the degree conferred to
her after her compliance with the academic
and other related requirements.
Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that
"[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning." This is nothing
new. The 1935 Constitution35 and the 1973
Constitution36 likewise provided for the
academic freedom or, more precisely, for the
institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning. As pointed out
by this Court in Garcia vs. Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology,37 it is
a freedom granted to "institutions of higher
learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of
authority certainly extending to the choice of
the students." If such institution of higher
learning can decide who can and who
cannot study in it, it certainly can also
determine on whom it can confer the honor
and distinction of being its graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an
honor or distinction was obtained through
fraud, a university has the right to revoke or
withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus
conferred. This freedom of a university does
not terminate upon the "graduation" of a
student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is
precisely the "graduation" of such a student
that is in question. It is noteworthy that the
investigation of private respondent's case
began before her graduation. If she was able
to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24,
1993, it was because of too many
investigations conducted before the Board of
26
Regents finally decided she should not have
been allowed to graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy
granted to institutions of higher learning, for
the constitutional grant of academic
freedom, to quote again from Garcia v.
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School
of Theology, "is not to be construed in a
niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion."
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is
the highest governing body of the University of
the Philippines.38 It has the power confer
degrees upon the recommendation of the
University Council.39 If follows that if the
conferment of a degree is founded on error or
fraud, the Board of Regents is also
empowered, subject to the observance of
due process, to withdraw what it has granted
without violating a student's rights. An
institution of higher learning cannot be
powerless if it discovers that an academic
degree it has conferred is not rightfully
deserved. Nothing can be more
objectionable than bestowing a university's
highest academic degree upon an individual
who has obtained the same through fraud or
deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is
the university's concern. It should be
empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take
measures to protect itself from serious threats
to its integrity.
While it is true that the students are entitled to
the right to pursue their educaiton, the USC as
an educational institution is also entitled to
pursue its academic freedom and in the
process has the concomitant right to see to it
that this freedom is not jeopardized.40
In the case at bar, the Board of Regents
determined, after due investigation
conducted by a committee composed of
faculty members from different U.P. units, that
private respondent committed no less than
ninety (90) instances of intellectual dishonesty
in her dissertation. The Board of Regents'
decision to withdraw private respondent's
doctorate was based on documents on
record including her admission that she
committed the offense.41
On the other hand, private respondent was
afforded the opportunity to be heard and
explain her side but failed to refute the
charges of plagiarism against her. Her only
claim is that her responses to the charges
against her were not considered by the Board
of Regents before it rendered its decision.
However, this claim was not proven.
Accordingly, we must presume regularity in
the performance of official duties in the
absence of proof to the contrary.42
Very much the opposite of the position of the
Court of Appeals that, since private
respondent was no longer a student of the
U.P., the latter was no longer within the "ambit
of disciplinary powers of the U.P.," is private
respondent's contention that it is the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal which had jurisdiction over
her case because the charge is dishonesty.
Private respondent invoke §5 of the U.P. Rules
and Regulations on Student Conduct and
Discipline which provides:
Jurisdiction. — All cases involving discipline of
students under these rules shall be subject to
the jurisdiction of the student disciplinary
tribunal, except the following cases which
shall fall under the jurisdiction of the
appropriate college or unit;
(a) Violation of college or unit rules and
regulations by students of the college, or
(b) Misconduct committed by students of the
college or unit within its classrooms or premises
or in the course of an official activity;
Provided, that regional units of the University
shall have original jurisdiction over all cases
involving students of such units.
Private respondent argues that under §25 (a)
of the said Rules and Regulations, dishonesty
in relation to one's studies (i.e., plagiarism)
may be punished only with suspension for at
least one (1) year.
As the above-quoted provision of §5 of the
Rules and Regulations indicates, the
jurisdiction of the student disciplinary tribunal
extend only to disciplinary actions. In this case,
U.P. does not seek to discipline private
respondent. Indeed, as the appellate court
observed, private respondent is no longer
within "the ambit of disciplinary powers of the
U.P." Private respondent cannot even be
punished since, as she claims, the penalty for
acts of dishonesty in administrative disciplinary
proceedings is suspension from the University
for at least one year. What U.P., through the
Board of Regents, seeks to do is to protect its
academic integrity by withdrawing from
private respondent an academic degree she
obtained through fraud.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the petition
for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 73705 August 27, 1987
VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR
LEGAL AFFAIRS and PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
July 27, 1984 Decision of the Office of the
Presidential Assistant For Legal Affairs
dismissing the appeal from the adverse ruling
of the Philippine Ports Authority on the sole
ground that the same was filed beyond the
reglementary period.
On April 28, 1981, the Iloilo Port Manager of
respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA for
short) wrote petitioner Victorias Milling Co.,
requiring it to have its tugboats and barges
undergo harbor formalities and pay
entrance/clearance fees as well as berthing
fees effective May 1, 1981. PPA, likewise,
requiring petitioner to secure a permit for
cargo handling operations at its Da-an Banua
wharf and remit 10% of its gross income for
said operations as the government's share.
To these demands, petitioner sent two (2)
letters, both dated June 2, 1981, wherein it
maintained that it is exempt from paying PPA
any fee or charge because: (1) the wharf and
an its facilities were built and installed in its
land; (2) repair and maintenance thereof
were and solely paid by it; (3) even the
dredging and maintenance of the Malijao
River Channel from Guimaras Strait up to said
private wharf are being done by petitioner's
equipment and personnel; and (4) at no time
has the government ever spent a single
centavo for such activities. Petitioner further
added that the wharf was being used mainly
to handle sugar purchased from district
planters pursuant to existing milling
agreements.
In reply, on November 3, 1981, PPA Iloilo sent
petitioner a memorandum of PPA's Executive
Officer, Maximo Dumlao, which justified the
PPA's demands. Further request for
reconsideration was denied on January 14,
1982.
On March 29, 1982, petitioner served notice to
PPA that it is appealing the case to the Court
of Tax Appeals; and accordingly, on March
31, 1982, petitioner filed a Petition for Review
with the said Court, entitled "Victorias Milling
Co., Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority," and
docketed therein as CTA Case No. 3466.
On January 10, 1984, the Court of Tax Appeals
dismissed petitioner's action on the ground
that it has no jurisdiction. It recommended
that the appeal be addressed to the Office of
the President.
On January 23, 1984, petitioner filed a Petition
for Review with this Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 66381, but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated February 29, 1984.
On April 2, 1984, petitioner filed an appeal
with the Office of the President, but in a
Decision dated July 27, 1984 (Record, p. 22),
the same was denied on the sole ground that
it was filed beyond the reglementary period. A
motion for Reconsideration was filed, but in an
Order dated December 16, 1985, the same
was denied (ibid., pp. 3-21): Hence, the instant
petition.
The Second Division of this Court, in a
Resolution dated June 2, 1986, resolved to
require the respondents to comment (ibid., p.
45); and in compliance therewith, the Solicitor
General filed his Comment on June 4, 1986
(Ibid., pp. 50-59).

In a Resolution of July 2, 1986, petitioner was
required to file a reply (Ibid., p. 61) but before
receipt of said resolution, the latter filed a
motion on July 1, 1986 praying that it be
granted leave to file a reply to respondents'
Comment, and an extension of time up to
June 30, 1986 within which to file the same.
(Ibid., p. 62).
On July 18, 1986, petitioner filed its reply to
respondents' Comment (Ibid., pp. 68-76).
The Second Division of this Court, in a
Resolution dated August 25, 1986, resolved to
give due course to the petition and to require
the parties to file their respective simultaneous
memoranda (Ibid., p. 78).
On October 8, 1986, the Solicitor General filed
a Manifestation and Rejoinder, stating, among
others, that respondents are adopting in toto
their Comment of June 3, 1986 as their
memorandum; with the clarification that the
assailed PPA Administrative Order No. 13-77
was duly published in full in the nationwide
circulated newspaper, "The Times Journal", on
November 9,1977 (ibid., pp. 79-81).
The sole legal issue raised by the petitioner is
— such rules as would aid it in accomplishing its
WHETHER OR NOT THE 30-DAY PERIOD FOR
APPEAL UNIDER SECTION 131 OF PPA
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13-77 WAS
TOLLED BY THE PENDENCY OF THE PETITIONS
FILED FIRST WITH THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
AND THEN WITH THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL.
The instant petition is devoid of merit.
Petitioner, in holding that the recourse first to
the Court of Tax Appeals and then to this
Court tolled the period to appeal, submits that
it was guided, in good faith, by considerations
which lead to the assumption that procedural
rules of appeal then enforced still hold true. It
contends that when Republic Act No. 1125
(creating the Court of Tax Appeals) was
passed in 1955, PPA was not yet in existence;
and under the said law, the Court of Tax
Appeals had exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over appeals from decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs regarding, among
others, customs duties, fees and other money
charges imposed by the Bureau under the
Tariff and Customs Code. On the other hand,
neither in Presidential Decree No. 505,
creating the PPA on July 11, 1974 nor in
Presidential Decree No. 857, revising its charter
(said decrees, among others, merely
transferred to the PPA the powers of the
Bureau of Customs to impose and collect
customs duties, fees and other money
charges concerning the use of ports and
facilities thereat) is there any provision
governing appeals from decisions of the PPA
on such matters, so that it is but reasonable to
seek recourse with the Court of Tax Appeals.
Petitioner, likewise, contends that an analysis
of Presidential Decree No. 857, shows that the
PPA is vested merely with corporate powers
and duties (Sec. 6), which do not and can not
include the power to legislate on procedural
matters, much less to effectively take away
from the Court of Tax Appeals the latter's
appellate jurisdiction.
These contentions are untenable for while it is
true that neither Presidential Decree No. 505
nor Presidential Decree No. 857 provides for
the remedy of appeal to the Office of the
President, nevertheless, Presidential Decree
No. 857 empowers the PPA to promulgate
purpose. Section 6 of the said Decree provides
— review shall become final and executory;
Sec. 6. Corporate Powers and Duties —
a. The corporate duties of the
Authority shall be:
xxx xxx xxx
(III) To prescribe rules and regulations,
procedures, and guidelines governing the
establishment, construction, maintenance,
and operation of all other ports, including
private ports in the country.
xxx xxx xxx
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, PPA
enacted Administrative Order No. 13-77
precisely to govern, among others, appeals
from PPA decisions. It is now finally settled that
administrative rules and regulations issued in
accordance with law, like PPA Administrative
Order No. 13-77, have the force and effect of
law (Valerio vs. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, 7 SCRA 719; Antique
Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, et al., 17 SCRA 316;
and Macailing vs. Andrada, 31 SCRA 126),
and are binding on all persons dealing with
that body.
As to petitioner's contention that
Administrative Order No. 13-77, specifically its
Section 131, only provides for appeal when
the decision is adverse to the government,
worth mentioning is the observation of the
Solicitor General that petitioner misleads the
Court. Said Section 131 provides —
Sec. 131. Supervisory Authority of General
Manager and PPA Board. — If in any case
involving assessment of port charges, the Port
Manager/OIC renders a decision adverse to
the government, such decision shall
automatically be elevated to, and reviewed
by, the General Manager of the authority; and
if the Port Manager's decision would be
affirmed by the General Manager, such
decision shall be subject to further affirmation
by the PPA Board before it shall become
effective; Provided, however, that if within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the record of
the case by the General Manager, no
decision is rendered, the decision under
Provided further, that any party aggrieved by
the decision of the General Manager as
affirmed by the PPA Board may appeal said
decision to the Office of the President within
thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof.
(Emphasis supplied).
From a cursory reading of the aforequoted
provision, it is evident that the above
contention has no basis.
As to petitioner's allegation that to its
recollection there had been no prior
publication of said PPA Administrative Order
No. 13-77, the Solicitor General correctly
pointed out that said Administrative Order was
duly published in full in the nationwide
newspaper, "The Times Journal", on November
9,1977.
Moreover, it must be stated that as correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, the facts of
27
this case show that petitioner's failure to
appeal to the Office of the President on time
stems entirely from its own negligence and not
from a purported ignorance of the proper
procedural steps to take. Petitioner had been
aware of the rules governing PPA procedures.
In fact, as embodied in the December 16,
1985 Order of the Office of the President,
petitioner even assailed the PPA's rule making
powers at the hearing before the Court of Tax
Appeals.
It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely
a statutory privilege and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with
the provision of law (United CMC Textile
Workers Union vs. Clave, 137 SCRA 346, citing
the cases of Bello vs. Fernando, 4 SCRA 138;
Aguila vs. Navarro, 55 Phil. 898; and Santiago
vs. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397).
Furthermore, even if petitioner's appeal were
to be given due course, the result would still
be the same as it does not present a
substantially meritorious case against the PPA.
Petitioner maintains and submits that there is
no basis for the PPA to assess and impose the
dues and charges it is collecting since the
wharf is private, constructed and maintained
at no expense to the government, and that it
exists primarily so that its tugboats and barges
may ferry the sugarcane of its Panay planters.
As correctly stated by the Solicitor General,
the fees and charges PPA collects are not for
the use of the wharf that petitioner owns but
for the privilege of navigating in public waters,
of entering and leaving public harbors and
berthing on public streams or waters. (Rollo,
pp. 056-057).
In Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas
vs. Actg. Commissioner of Customs (23 SCRA
600), this Court laid down the rule that
berthing charges against a vessel are
collectible regardless of the fact that mooring
or berthing is made from a private pier or
wharf. This is because the government
maintains bodies of water in navigable
condition and it is to support its operations in
this regard that dues and charges are
imposed for the use of piers and wharves
regardless of their ownership.
28

As to the requirement to remit 10% of the

handling charges, Section 6B-(ix) of the
Presidential Decree No. 857 authorized the
PPA "To levy dues, rates, or charges for the use
of the premises, works, appliances, facilities, or
for services provided by or belonging to the
Authority, or any organization concerned with
port operations." This 10% government share of
earnings of arrastre and stevedoring operators
is in the nature of contractual compensation
to which a person desiring to operate arrastre
service must agree as a condition to the grant
of the permit to operate.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is

hereby DISMISSED.