Napolitano: Hamas and the Syrian Uprising
Hamas and the Syrian Uprising:
A Difficult Choice
Valentina Napolitano
Ms. Napolitano is a doctoral candidate in political science at the École des
hautes études en sciences sociales (EHEES) and a PhD researcher at the
Institut français du Proche-Orient (IFPO).
M
ore than two years since the
start of the Syrian uprising
in March 2011, Iran and the
Lebanese movement Hezbol-
lah are still strategic allies of the Syrian
regime. Both are providing it with financial
and military support, and both are directly
engaged in the armed struggle1 that the
Syrian army is waging against the revo-
lutionaries in many parts of the country.
Iran and Hezbollah justify their stance as a
duty to preserve the “axis of resistance and
refusal”2 and defend Syria, which, because
of its militant stance against Israel, they
consider a victim of a Western conspiracy.
While this alliance allows the Syr-
ian regime and its partners to exploit the
Palestinian cause to gain public sup-
port, Hamas, the Palestinian “resistance”
organization, has left the “axis.” Eleven
months after the start of the Syrian con-
flict, and under political pressure from
many quarters, Hamas finally came out in
favor of the Syrian people and broke its
partnership with the regime. What explains
Hamas’s shifting position? And how has
this positioning affected the movement’s
strategy in Syria and beyond? This article
will pinpoint the different stages that have
© 2013, The Author
73
characterized Hamas’s attitude towards the
Syrian uprising and provide an overview
of the repercussions of the Syrian protest
in the Palestinian refugee camps,3 where
the movement has built a grassroots base
over the past decade.
This article is based on press articles,
official Hamas statements and interviews
and observations gained during fieldwork
in Yarmouk, a Palestinian refugee camp
in the southern suburbs of Damascus,4
between September 2010 and May 2011.
Information concerning the role of Pales-
tinians in the Syrian revolution has been
collected through interviews conducted via
Skype with Palestinian activists living in
Yarmouk and from social-network pages
managed by Palestinian refugees in Syria.
HAMAS AND SYRIA BEFORE 2011
Hamas opened an office in Damas-
cus as a communication channel with the
“Alliance of Ten Palestinian Factions” that
had been formed in 1993 to oppose the
Oslo accords. It was only after the expul-
sion of Hamas’s leaders from their Amman
offices in 1999, however, that Damascus
became the headquarters of the move-
ment’s external wing, which was in charge
Middle East Policy © 2013, Middle East Policy Council
Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 3, Fall 2013
of managing its foreign policy. While for
Hamas Syria was its only ally in a situ-
ation of regional isolation, for Syria the
rapprochement with the movement was an
opportunity to renew its influence on the
Palestinian scene. After the signing of the
Oslo accords in 1993, the displacement of
the Palestinian political leadership inside
the West Bank and Gaza Strip deprived
Syria of any means of influencing Palestin-
ian political life. Moreover, when in 2000
Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father as
the Syrian head of state, the alliance with
Hamas, Iran and Hezbollah represented an
opportunity to gain a regional role and re-
affirm his father’s nationalist rhetoric, ac-
cording to which Syria was the only Arab
country to defend the Palestinian cause and
support the resistance against Israel.
After Hamas moved its political bureau
to Damascus, it was allowed by the regime
to set up civil-society organizations in
Palestinian refugee camps and sponsor mo-
bilization and propaganda activities there.5
Hamas was therefore obliged to adapt its
mobilization strategy to the Syrian context,
limiting its religious fervor in an attempt
to avoid provoking Syrian sensitivities and
avoid being associated with the historical
Syrian enemy, the Muslim Brotherhood.
Because of its engagement on both the
military and social levels, the movement
gained in popularity among the Palestinian
refugees in Syria. On the one hand, Hamas
tried to assert itself as the heir to Palestin-
ian nationalism by reviving armed action
against Israel. On the other, given that the
Palestinian refugees in Syria had been
politically marginalized since the 1980s,
the social services provided by Hamas in
the camps filled the void left by the PLO
factions. During the 1960s and 1970s, Fa-
tah and the left-wing political groups, with
their multiple social organizations, had
74
been the principal providers of welfare and
foremost source of income for refugees.
For this reason, when the PLO left Leba-
non for Tunis in 1982 and started to focus
its activities on the occupied territories,
the Palestinian camps entered a period of
recession, exacerbated further by the eco-
nomic crisis that hit Syria. Hamas’s social
activism in the Palestinian camps allowed
it to present itself as the sole defender of
refugee rights.
Hamas did not seek to integrate Pal-
estinian refugees in Syria into its political
program, however, despite its “right of
return” rhetoric and the financial resources
invested in social activities. Refugees have
arguably been locked out of Palestinian
political life since the signing of the Oslo
accords. The social activities promoted by
Hamas in the refugee camps have not been
aimed at establishing a local membership
or a new leadership cadre, as the lack of
refugees from Syria among the Hamas
leaders indicates. Rather, Hamas’s pres-
ence in the Syrian refugee camps should
be seen as a propaganda device. The local
grassroots support has increased Hamas’s
legitimacy among its constituents inside
the occupied territories. At the same time,
local mobilization activities organized in
the camps have allowed the movement to
give voice to its rhetoric at the regional
level. Representatives of the Syrian regime
often participated in Hamas’s public
events, thereby demonstrating its support
for Hamas and for Palestinians, in general.
In spite of Hamas’s short history in
Syria, and notwithstanding its inability
or unwillingness to provide the refugees
with a role in Palestinian political life,
Hamas has over the past decade been able
to secure a central role in the camps. It
has improved the social conditions of an
important section of Palestinian society;
 Napolitano: Hamas and the Syrian Uprising
monopolized the camps’ spaces through its
regular public activities; and given rise to
hopes that it will be able to change the bal-
ance of power in its struggle against Israel.
However, the Syrian revolution and its
repercussions for both Hamas’s policy and
living conditions in the Palestinian camps
have profoundly affected the movement’s
strategy in Syria and its grassroots support.
THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION
When the Arab Spring started in Tu-
nisia in 2010 and then spread to Egypt in
2011, the militant stance of Syria towards
Israel led many commentators to assume
it would be spared from the protest move-
ments spreading throughout the Arab
world. Bashar himself stated that Syria
would not be “engulfed” by the Arab
Spring. However, Syria proved not to be
an exception. A protest movement started
in March 2011, spreading from the town
of Deraa to the majority of Syrian villages
and towns, demanding the overthrow of
the Assad regime. The regime’s repressive
response to the first protests set in motion
a cycle of violence that led to the revolu-
tion’s spread all over the country.6
Even before the start of the revolution,
newspapers reported that Khaled Meshal,
head of the Hamas Political Bureau in Da-
mascus, had met with the Syrian president
and advised him to implement reforms
so as to avoid the protests that had under-
mined the governments of Tunisia and
Egypt.7 With the exception of this meeting,
Hamas adopted a “wait-and-see” attitude
during this first phase of the revolution.
When the Assad regime demanded that
Hamas prove its loyalty, Hamas instead
sought to remain neutral. Its first published
statement about the Syrian uprising was
vague and ambiguous. It described the
events as an “internal affair” and tried to
75
please the regime without alienating the
opposition, emphasizing the role of Syria
as host country for the “resistance” groups,
while also underlining the legitimacy of
the people’s demands.8
This stance needs to be understood in
the light of Hamas’s delicate position in
Syria. For over a decade, Syria had pro-
vided Hamas with important logistical and
material support; as a guest, Hamas was
expected to show its gratitude towards the
authorities. At the same time, Hamas is
a Palestinian political actor. Any kind of
stance, whether in favor of or against the
regime, would directly affect the Pales-
tinian community in Syria. They have
vivid memories of the expulsion of nearly
300,000 Palestinians from Kuwait as a
result of Yasser Arafat’s support for Iraq
during the 1990 Gulf war. Hamas was in-
tent to avoid repeating the PLO’s mistake.
Since the start of the revolution, rumors
had circulated in Arab newspapers about
its effects on Hamas’s policy. As early as
April 2011, many Arabic and international
newspapers referred to the decision of
Hamas leaders to leave the country and
establish their Political Bureau in Qa-
tar instead. While the Hamas leadership
denied this, the search for an alternative to
Damascus had already begun.
The first evidence of Hamas’s chang-
ing regional policy was the signing of the
reconciliation accords with Fatah in May
2011.9 The reconciliation process was
reinvigorated by Hamas’s willingness to
invest in key domestic-policy issues at a
time when its longstanding regional strat-
egy was in jeopardy. It was also helped
along by the demonstrations in Ramallah
and elsewhere on the occupied West Bank,
inspired by the Arab Spring. Among other
things, these protestors demanded an end
to the Hamas-Fatah rift.
Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 3, Fall 2013
More proof of Hamas’s changing
strategy was its rapprochement with Egypt,
Jordan and Qatar, which it had initiated in
an attempt to find an alternative base for
its leaders in case the strategic relationship
with Syria were broken. Khaled Meshal’s
visit to Amman at the end of January 2012,
years after relations with Jordan had been
broken off, was the main proof of Hamas’s
regional efforts — even if this meeting
was more a means for the Jordanian king
to pacify his internal opposition than a real
opening towards the Palestinian move-
ment. The rapprochement with Egypt and
the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in that
country allowed Hamas’s leaders in Gaza
more freedom of movement. The deputy
head of Hamas’s political bureau, Mousa
Abu Marzouk, was also able to establish
an office in Egypt. Qatar, already a close
ally of the Palestinian movement, helped
Hamas in its diplomatic campaigns and
hosted a Hamas office.
In April 2011, Meshal was accused by
the Syrian press of having criticized Sheikh
Yousef al-Qaradawi for using his Friday
prayers to instigate a religious conflict in
Syria by encouraging the anti-regime pro-
tests among the Syrian Sunni community.
These statements, which Hamas imme-
diately denied, can be read as an attempt
by the Syrian regime to punish Hamas for
its neutral stance on the Syrian crisis and
to pit it against one of the most important
theorists of the Muslim Brotherhood, the
movement’s own parent organization. This
episode was a part of Syria’s campaign of
disinformation, which involved spreading
fear of sectarianism among Syrians through
the media and putting up posters in pub-
lic places invoking national unity in the
struggle against fitna (chaos).10
The Syrian regime not only put
political pressure on Hamas; it also tried
76
to implicate it in the internal crisis. The
Assad regime’s militias (shabbiha) repeat-
edly spread rumors in the districts border-
ing Palestinian refugee camps claiming
that Hamas partisans had participated in
clamping down on the anti-regime demon-
strations. In the suburb of Hajar al-Aswad,
near the Yarmouk refugee camp, members
of the Syrian security services were spot-
ted wearing scarves with Hamas’s symbol
while suppressing protests.11 The Assad
regime thus attempted to provoke rage
among Syrians against the Palestinians of
Yarmouk and to implicate Hamas in its
campaign to divide and weaken the oppo-
sition to its rule.
The Palestinian National Movement
Hamas was not the only Palestinian
actor to take an ambiguous stance on the
Syrian revolution. The other factions of the
Palestinian national movement12 have also
been very cautious. Fatah has been banned
in Syria since 1983,13 although its partisans
are active unofficially. In spite of its histori-
cally hostile relationship with the Syrian
regime, Fatah did not make any statement
concerning the Syrian situation. The PLO
condemned the partial destruction of the
Palestinian camp al-Ramle al-Janoubi in
Latakia by the Syrian army in August 2011.
However, it took no clear stance vis-à-
vis the revolution or in defense of those
Palestinian refugees who fell victim to the
regime’s repression. It took more than 17
months from the start of the revolution
for the Palestinian president, Abu Mazen,
to make his first statements deploring the
deaths of more than 20 Palestinian refugees
in the Yarmouk camp in July 2011 and to
send humanitarian aid to Syria.
The other Palestinian political actors
in Syria can be divided into two groups,
depending on their attitude to the revolu-
 Napolitano: Hamas and the Syrian Uprising
tion. The first is represented by left-wing
factions such as the PFLP and DFLP,14
as well as Islamic Jihad.15 These factions
initially attempted to remain neutral; their
political weakness and the lack of other
possible bases for their offices left them
little choice.16 Nonetheless, when the dem-
onstrations spread to the southern suburbs
of Damascus and the Yarmouk refugee
camp in July 2012, these organizations
cooperated with Palestinians to provide
humanitarian relief for displaced Syrians
who found shelter in the camp.17 However,
they could not, and did not, break off their
relationship with the Syrian regime.
The second group of Palestinian po-
litical actors can almost be considered an
extension of the Syrian security services.
It consists of the PFLP-GC,18 a pro-Syrian
splinter group of the PFLP, and Saiqa,19
the Palestinian branch of the Syrian Baath
party. These organizations have adopted
the regime’s discourse and were involved
in putting down protests, especially in
the refugee camps, where the PFLP-GC
provided its partisans with weapons to use
against Palestinian protesters. However,
the rising violence in the Yarmouk camp
has led many leaders and members of the
PFLP-GC to defect, causing significant
changes in the organization. Moreover, in
November 2012, after months of intense
fighting inside the Yarmouk camp, the of-
fices of the PFLP-GC were taken over by
the revolutionaries.
In contrast to these political factions,
Hamas is the only Palestinian actor based
in Syria that is playing an important role
on the Palestinian political scene. For
this reason, and because of its strategic
significance for the Syrian regime, it was
put under more pressure than the other
political groups. The Syrian authorities
were not alone in demanding that Hamas
77
take a position on the events; the Syrian
opposition, particularly the Brotherhood,
made the same demand. The Brotherhood
understood Hamas’s delicate position in
Syria and its decision to remain neutral.
But it severely criticized Hamas when
Khaled Meshal decided to play the role of
intermediary between the Arab League and
the Syrian regime, after the Arab League’s
visit to Cairo in January 2012. The Arab
League had given the Palestinian leader
the task of conveying a message to the
Syrian authorities aimed at improving the
Arab observers’ mission.20
In short, Hamas leaders in Damascus
found themselves trapped between the
Syrian regime, on one side, and the opposi-
tion, on the other. While Hamas did not
want to lose its foremost ally, it could not
remain silent in the face of the bloodshed
perpetrated by the regime. Hamas also
realized that after the Arab revolutions,
Arab governments could no longer ig-
nore the people’s will, and that the Syr-
ian regime’s decision to clamp down on
peaceful protest would inevitably bring
about its collapse. For Hamas to link its
destiny to the regime’s, as Hezbollah had
done, would have undermined its popular-
ity, prevented any kind of relationship with
a future post-Bashar Syria, and made it
impossible to attract political support from
the Arab countries that had taken a stance
against the Syrian regime.21
The situation was complicated further
when the Palestinian grass roots in the oc-
cupied territories and the diaspora began to
put pressure on Hamas. In the Gaza Strip,
Hamas’s decision to ban demonstrations
in support of the Syrian revolution bitterly
disappointed the population. In Syria, its
ambiguous stance was met with strong
criticism from the Palestinian refugees.
Hamas was accused, together with the
Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 3, Fall 2013
other Palestinian factions, of not protecting
Palestinians against the regime. As a result
of these multiple pressures and the ris-
ing violence, Hamas gradually shifted its
position from ambiguity to siding with the
revolutionaries.
Hamas’s Break with the Syrian Regime
Hamas’s cautious initial stance helped
it to prepare a “soft exit” from the Syrian
crisis. When the political situation became
favorable, Hamas adopted an increasingly
clear stance in favor of the Syrian revolu-
tion. The first official statement to signal a
change of policy appeared in late Decem-
ber 2011. Following several explosions in
Damascus’s Midan district, close to the
Yarmouk camp, the official Hamas website
published a statement declaring its support
for the Syrian people and referring to a
political exit from the crisis.22
But the real break with the Syrian
regime occurred in February 2012 with the
speech of Ismail Haniyeh, the prime minis-
ter of the Hamas-led government in Gaza,
at the al-Azhar mosque in Cairo.23 After
this speech, the Hamas leader officially
confirmed that the movement had left
Syria for Qatar, Egypt and the Gaza Strip.24
Hamas’s break with Syria was fol-
lowed by the death of the Hamas military
leader Kamal Ghannage in the Damascus
suburb of Al-Qudseia in June 2012. The
circumstances of his death remain unclear,
but his house was burned and his body
showed signs of torture.25 No proof ex-
ists to implicate the Syrian regime in the
affair, and Hamas leaders have made no
accusations. Another member of Hamas
military brunch, Ahmad Qounita, was
found dead in Edlib’s district in December
2012. Newspapers reported that he was
responsible for the military formation of
Syrian rebels. Hamas leaders denied the
78
movement’s involvement in this affair,
affirming that Qounita left the organiza-
tion before its departure from Syria.26
Those episodes have been followed by the
destruction of Hamas offices in Yarmouk
camp and the confiscation of its properties
in the country. The hostility, following the
breach in the longstanding alliance be-
tween the Syrian regime and Hamas, was
confirmed by insults on Syrian national
television against Khaled Meshal, de-
scribed as a “traitor to the resistance” and
as a “homeless resistant.”27
Hamas’s decision to take a stand
against Syria must be understood in both a
precise local and a regional context. On the
Syrian side, the failed attempt to silence
the revolt through violence over many
months brought the regime to a deadlock
and isolated it internationally. On the
regional level, the legislative elections held
in Tunisia in October 2011 and in Egypt
between November 2011 and January 2012
confirmed the political success of Islamist
movements in the region. In particular,
the victory of the Brotherhood in Egypt
influenced Hamas’s decision to distance
itself from Syria. The shifting regional
configurations led Hamas to return to its
“origins” and adopt a stance in line with
the Brotherhood’s, which supported the
Syrian revolution.
Hamas’s break with the Syrian regime
inevitably weakened the “refusal front.”
Hamas attempted to salvage its relationship
with Hezbollah and Iran, the most impor-
tant provider of funding. But when those
actors engaged on the side of the Syrian
army in the struggle against the revolu-
tionaries, many tensions arose. Hamas
condemned the involvement of Hezbollah’s
brigades in the Syrian conflict considering
it a polarizing factor in the confessional
conflict in the region.28 From its side,
 Napolitano: Hamas and the Syrian Uprising
Hezbollah threatened to expel Hamas’s
leaders from Dahye, the southern suburb of
Beirut in which its offices are based.29 The
Syrian regime, with its propaganda, raised
tensions between Hamas and Hezbollah.
It spread information about the participa-
tion of Hamas members in the struggle for
al-Quseir, accusing the movement of train-
ing hundreds of Palestinians from Syria’s
border region with Lebanon and transmit-
ting its technical expertise to Syrian rebels,
teaching them how to dig tunnels under
cities.30 Through this propaganda, the
Assad regime indicated the power of exter-
nal actors on the ground, especially that of
Qatar — accused of being Hamas’s agent.
A meeting occurred between leaders
of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran in July 2013
with the aim of ironing out their differenc-
es over the Syrian situation and rebuilding
a relationship. Hamas’s ability to consoli-
date its partnership with Qatar enabled the
movement to be less dependent on Iran,
which explains why it did not seem in a
hurry to reestablish a relationship with its
former allies.
PALESTINIAN CAMPS AND THE
REVOLUTION
Besides the political consequences of
the Syrian uprising for Hamas’s regional
policy and its partnership with the Syrian
regime, enormous changes brought about
by the Syrian protest movement have in-
evitably also affected micro-political life in
the Palestinian refugee camps and Hamas’s
political role there. The Palestinians have
been directly implicated in the revolution
because of their participation in protest or
simply because of the regime’s repression.
The refugee camps are, in fact, located in
the poorest districts on the periphery of
Syrian towns, where the revolution began
and grew into a mass movement. This
79
explains why they were early targets of
Syrian repression. The Palestinians’ social
conditions in Syria being relatively good
compared to those of refugees in other
Arab countries, the main reason for their
participation in the Syrian revolution is
political. Relations between the Palestinian
national movement and the Syrian regime
have been tempestuous ever since Hafez
al-Assad’s reign. In particular, several epi-
sodes have shaped Palestinian memory: the
Syrian army’s intervention in the Lebanese
civil war (1975-90), especially its actions
against the Lebanese National Movement
(LNM)31 and the PLO, which culminated
in the massacre at Tell al-Zaatar camp
(1976);32 Syrian support for Fatah al-
Intifada’s split from Fatah (1983); and the
War of the Camps (1985-89).33 At the same
time, the repercussions of the Lebanese
war on Syrian territory meant that Palestin-
ian refugees were repressed whenever they
showed opposition to Syria’s policy.
Indeed, the political attempts to
control and manipulate the Palestinian
national movement and the climate of
political repression that Palestinians, like
Syrians, have endured for more than 40
years have encouraged refugees to engage
with the Syrian revolution in the same
quest for “dignity” and “liberty.” How-
ever, Palestinians were initially hesitant
about taking part in the protests. This
decision must be understood in light of
their precarious status in Syria. Despite
the comparatively favorable legal status
Palestinians enjoy in Syria, they do not
have Syrian nationality.34 As such, they
are still considered “guests” in Syria and
may thus become “foreigners” at any time.
Statements by Buthaina Shaaban, Bashar
al-Assad’s adviser, during the first weeks
of demonstrations increased Palestinians’
fear of being made the “whipping boy”
Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 3, Fall 2013
and held responsible for the crisis. In fact,
Ms. Shaaban accused Palestinian refugees
in the Deraa and Latakia camps of respon-
sibility for the anti-regime protests and
spreading chaos in those towns.35 More-
over, when Palestinians began to join the
protests, the foreign minister’s spokesman,
Jihad Makdissi, accused them of being
“impolite guests.”36
Consequently, Palestinians initially
chose to join the revolution individually.
They participated in demonstrations out-
side the refugee camps, helped Syrians to
organize the relief effort in the towns and
districts targeted by the Syrian army, and
began to disseminate information on social
networks.37 Later, Palestinian mobilization
became more collective. Yarmouk camp, in
south Damascus, and the nearby district of
Tadamon saw daily mass demonstrations
supporting the revolution. The principal
slogan used during these manifestations
was “Palestinians and Syrians are one
people!” Palestinians created local com-
mittees,38 as did Syrians, to coordinate
the protests. Finally, as the result of the
militarization of the uprising, Palestinian
engaged in armed action within the frame-
work of the Free Syrian Army and many
other armed brigades.
Collectively speaking, Palestinians
joined the revolution as a result of Syria’s
coercion and repression. The first attempt
to manipulate Palestinians was the re-
gime’s orchestration, through the PFLP-
GC, of two demonstrations in the Golan
Heights in May and June 2011 to mark the
1948 (Nakba) and 1967 (Naksa) Arab-Is-
raeli wars and subsequent refugee crises.39
On these occasions, the regime authorized
Palestinians to travel to the border with Is-
rael at Majdal Shams.40 The Golan region,
which has been under Israeli occupation
since 1967, has been the calmest frontier
80
with Israel since the signing of the 1974
ceasefire accord. Through these orches-
trated demonstrations, the Syrian regime
wanted to demonstrate to the international
community its vital importance for the
security of the region.41 The regime also
intended the protests to divert attention
from the growing internal crisis. The Pal-
estinians paid a heavy price for becoming
pawns of the Assad regime’s propaganda,
with at least 23 killed by Israeli army fire.42
The Palestinian refugee camps in De-
raa, Latakia, Homs, Damascus and Aleppo
all suffered from repression by the Syrian
army and security services. The first camp
to be affected by the Syrian intervention
was Deraa,43 attacked by the army more
than once and partially destroyed. Then
it was the turn of Al-Ramle al-Filastini
camp in Latakia.44 This camp is situated in
a Sunni district, where many protests had
been organized. For this reason, the camp
was partially destroyed in August 2011
by army bombardment. Al-Aidin camp,45
in Homs, was affected by the violent
intervention in and siege of the town in
February 2012. The Yarmouk camp in
Damascus was first subjected to a cam-
paign of arrests of Fatah partisans, who
were accused of being responsible for the
protests. In this camp, as well as in Neirab
camp46 near Aleppo, many soldiers serving
in the Palestinian Liberation Army were
killed,47 probably because they had refused
to join the Syrian army in its crackdown on
the protesters. In July 2012, the situation
rapidly degenerated in Yarmouk camp as
a result of a demonstration during which
at least 10 Palestinians were killed by the
security services. The following day, a
huge demonstration was organized in the
camp for the funeral procession. Thou-
sands of protesters participated, enraging
the regime, which soon afterward launched
 Napolitano: Hamas and the Syrian Uprising
its first armed operation in the camp and in
all the southern districts of Damascus.
This brief overview of Palestinian
involvement in the Syrian revolution indi-
cates the enormous impact that the revolt
has had on Palestinian refugee camps in
Syria. It was inevitable that Palestinian po-
litical life would be affected. For Palestin-
ians, the Syrian revolution represented not
only an opportunity to show their solidar-
ity with Syrians in their struggle to topple
the political regime, but also a chance to
affirm publicly the refugees’ discontent
with their own political leadership.
A Palestinian Protest
The political engagement of Palestin-
ian refugees in Syria, like that of other
diaspora populations, must be understood
in the light of their dual affiliation to both
the host country and their homeland. The
second and third generations of refugees,
who have been particularly active in the
Syrian revolution, were born and grew up
in Syria. They are personally concerned
with the events in Syria, but they also have
another national identity and interpret
current events in the light of their politi-
cal cause. This explains why Palestinian
refugees hoped that the success of the
revolution would advance the Palestinian
cause and at the same time allow them to
denounce their leadership.48
The first evidence of the refugees’
discontent with the policy of the Pales-
tinian factions was the protests that took
place after the Naksa commemoration in
June 2011. Following the deaths of many
youths on the Golan Heights, a funeral
procession was organized in the Yarmouk
camp. This procession turned into a dem-
onstration of the refugees’ fury against the
Syrian regime and the regime’s Palestin-
ian stalwarts, the PFLP-GC. Protesters
81
chanted slogans accusing Syria of manipu-
lating Palestinians (“The people want the
fall of the profiteer!”) and not reacting to
the Israeli violation of its national terri-
tory (“Where is the Syrian army?”). The
PFLP-GC was accused of manipulating
Palestinians in the interest of the regime
and of sending them to be killed. The
protests culminated in the setting on fire
of the PFLP-CG’s office in Yarmouk. The
subsequent clashes between refugees and
PFLP-GC guards resulted in the deaths of
at least three people.
While the protests organized after the
Naksa commemoration directly concerned
the PFLP-GC, the other political groups
have also been affected. The most fre-
quently chanted slogan — “People want
the fall of the factions!” — provides an
insight into the protesters’ mindset. When
Maher al-Taher, leader of the PFLP, tried
to give a speech during the funeral of the
Palestinian victims, the audience threw
stones at him. At the same time, both
Fatah and Hamas tried to profit from the
situation by presenting the Palestinian
“martyrs” as partisans of their organiza-
tions. However, the refugees responded by
putting up posters on the camp wall stating
that the dead were not affiliated with either
organization.49
The Palestinian factions have been se-
verely criticized because of their inability
to protect the refugee camps from the re-
gime’s crackdown. In reply to the factions’
call to stay out of current events in Syria,
Palestinian youths who were active in the
camps’ local committees published a state-
ment on social networks affirming that the
Palestinian factions did not represent them
and declared their support for the Syrian
revolution.50 The Palestinian factions have
been held responsible for the deaths of
refugees through Syrian army repression.51
Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 3, Fall 2013
Hamas’s break with the Syrian regime
was supported by the refugees, but the
movement’s initial softness on the regime’s
deadly attacks on the Palestinian camps
has undermined its credibility. Therefore,
Hamas’s members and partisans have re-
cently been engaged in the armed struggle
in Yarmouk camp, where they have formed
an armed brigade. The movement did not
officially confirm its involvement in the
armed action, but the engagement of its
partisans on the ground allowed Hamas to
restore a better reputation52 comparing to
the other Palestinian factions accused of
passivity. This does not mean that Hamas
will be able in the future to restore its
grassroots base in the refugee camps. Dur-
ing the Syrian revolution, Palestinian refu-
gees gave voice to their disappointment
with both the PLO and Hamas. Indeed, it
will be difficult for these actors to again
play a role in the camps’ political life with-
out taking into account refugee aspirations.
CONCLUSION
The fate of Syria remains uncertain.
The brutal war that the regime has been
waging against its people will leave the
country ravaged and its society shattered.
Even if the post-revolutionary period sees
the emergence of new political forces,
established political parties such as the
Brotherhood are expected to play an
important role in any future government.
This will probably benefit Hamas, as it
can more easily restore its former relations
with the country and facilitate the return of
1
Hezbollah provided its help to the Syrian army during the struggle of Al-Quseir, a border city with Lebanon,
where the regime was able to impose its control on rebels in June 2013. The Lebanese movement is militarily
engaged in Aleppo and the Damascus suburbs, where many Iranian military groups are also participating in
the repression of rebels by the Syrian regime.
82
its leadership to Damascus if the move-
ment so wishes. But the movement will
not enjoy the same material help that it
did during Bashar al-Assad’s reign. In the
post-revolutionary period, priority will be
given to rebuilding the country, relegating
regional policy to a secondary concern.
However, considering that Hamas was the
only Palestinian faction to take a stand in
favor of the revolution, albeit somewhat
belatedly, its chances of being favored by
future authorities are better than those of
other Palestinian actors.
Hamas’s grassroots support in the
Palestinian refugee camps will probably
not be restored. The democratization of
Syria will give Palestinians more political
liberty, allowing them to organize around
new political forces that better embody
their expectations than the current leader-
ship. Moreover, the refugees’ feeling of
being abandoned during the revolution —
when no Palestinian faction took the initia-
tive to protect them or even react to the
regime’s violations of the camps through
diplomatic intervention or by providing
humanitarian relief to Palestinian refugees
in Syria and to those who have been forced
to leave the country — has deepened the
rift between the refugees and their political
representatives.53 The image of thousands
of Palestinians fleeing the Yarmouk camp54
in July 2012 inevitably evoked memories
of the Nakba, accentuating the refugees’
feeling of abandonment by their political
leadership.
 Napolitano: Hamas and the Syrian Uprising

2
An alliance formed by Syria, Iran, the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas. It is based on opposi-
tion to common enemies (Israel, the Western countries and the pro-Western Arab regimes) and was conceived
as a political partnership that remained ideologically fluid and imposed no constraint on its members. See
Erik Mohns and André Bank, “Syrian Revolt Fallout: End of Resistance Axis?” Middle East Policy 19, no. 3
(2012): 25-35.
3
According to statistics published by United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the number of
Palestinians in Syria was 528,700 in December 2012. The majority of them are descendents of those who
arrived in the country as a result of the war of 1948, which led to the creation of the state of Israel on the his-
torical land of Palestine, provoking the exodus of thousands of refugees into neighboring countries. Another
migration wave occurred after the war of June 1967 and the occupation by the Israeli army of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip. Finally, many Palestinians arrived in Syria as a consequence of the “Black September”
of 1970, the Gulf War of 1990 and, more recently, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. In all, Syria hosts
13 camps, of which nine are officially recognized by UNRWA and three are considered to be “unofficial”
because they were built on the initiative of the Syrian authorities.
4
Yarmouk was created between 1954 and 1957. With nearly 148,500 refugees, it is currently the largest Pal-
estinian refugee camp in Syria. See the UNRWA website: http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=156.
5
Hamas has created many civil society organizations, which target different social categories, including a stu-
dent organization, a women’s center, a charity, a sports club and a right-of-return committee. Before the Syr-
ian revolution began, Hamas was the only Palestinian actor organizing public activities in the refugee camps.
The principal public activities were festivals for national celebrations, street demonstrations in solidarity with
the occupied territories, and mass weddings (through which the movement helped young couples to celebrate
their wedding).
6
The revolutionary mobilization started in Syria’s small towns and their districts, home to the poorest and
most marginalized segments of Syrian society. In the first year, Damascus and Aleppo, the two principal
economic and political centers, saw many demonstrations. But because of the large presence of the security
forces in these towns, the revolution took longer to assert itself. It was not until the summer of 2012 that
Damascus and Aleppo became the twin hot-spots of the revolution.
7
“Meshaal Avoids Meeting with Assad before Leaving Damascus,” al-Jazeera, February 19, 2012 (in Arabic),
www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/ab318b39-612f-4700-bb4d-6aefc374fc14.
8
Part of the statement reads: “The Syrian authorities and the Syrian people have supported the Palestinian
resistance and Palestinian rights, hosted Palestinian resistance groups, especially Hamas, and helped them
in the most difficult of situations.” And it continues: “What is happening in Syria is an internal affair. But by
virtue of our principles, we respect the will of Arab and Islamic people. We hope that the current situation
will be resolved by the people’s quests and hopes being realized, thus preserving the stability of Syria and its
role as the country of resistance.” The statement ended with the following declaration: “Hamas supports the
Syrian authorities and the Syrian people.” Statement published on Hamas’s official website, April 2, 2011.
Currently available on http://twitmail.com/email/249759057/9/.
9
These accords attempted to end the conflict between Fatah and Hamas that began in 2006. After Hamas’s
victory in the legislative elections of January 2006, which was never officially recognized by the Palestinian
Authority, major clashes started between the two movements in Gaza, ending with Hamas seizing power in
the Gaza Strip.
10
Fieldwork in Damascus, May 2011.
11
Fieldwork in Damascus, May 2011.
12
Palestinian political groups that are members of the PLO.
13
In 1983, after an internal split in Fatah, the secessionist faction, Fatah al-Intifada, was supported by Syria,
which banned Arafat loyalists from its territory and gave the movement’s offices and civil institutions to the
secessionists. In April 2013, the regime announced that it would return Fatah’s properties to Mahmoud Ab-
bas, a political choice made after the death of Abou Mousa, the principal leader of Fatah al-Intifada.
14
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was established in 1967 by George Habash fol-
lowing the collapse of the Arab Nationalist Movement. In 1969, Nayef Hawatmeh split from the PFLP and
established the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).
15
Islamic Jihad was founded in the Gaza Strip in 1980 by Fatih al-Shiqaqi.
16
Recently, several newspapers have reported that Islamic Jihad has left Syria. However, this has not been

83
Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 3, Fall 2013

confirmed by the movement’s leaders.

17
Before the violence spread all over Syria, Palestinian camps played a central role in providing humanitar-
ian relief to Syrian people. Palestinian camps become shelters for Syrians fleeing the areas affected by Syrian
army attacks.
18
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC) was founded in 1968 as
a splinter group from the PFLP, headed by a former captain in the Syrian Army, Ahmed Jibril. This organiza-
tion is the main Palestinian ally of the Syrian regime. Through it, the regime attempted to divide the Palestin-
ian political field and counter the policies of Yasser Arafat, a long-standing enemy of Jibril.
19
Saiqa was founded by Salah Jadid, a Baath leader, in 1963.
20
“Al-‘Arabi Gave Mechal a Letter for Syria,” Al-Jazeera, January 6, 2012 (in Arabic), http://www.aljazeera.
net/news/pages/b5b9ee5a-deb2-46cc-803c-3ac1f881c5ec.
21
International Crisis Group, “Light at the End of Their Tunnels? Hamas and the Arab Uprisings,” Middle
East Report no. 129 (2012).
22
Statement published on Hamas’s official website, December 28, 2011. http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.
aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2Bi1s76xaptrjrocnsfRYW/fYMAskpXWuhA3XZcjwp
cgziupgR8eCSnFxRiVvYZv%2BvWyfy7XwNQnMg%2BakeJ8wrrbzxJSvDneIT8Ix3/ZLq61nEMiI%3D.
23
The Palestinian leader said: “I salute the Syrian people who seek freedom, democracy and reform.” “In
Break, Hamas Supports Syrian Opposition,” New York Times, February 24, 2012. http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/02/25/world/middleeast/hamas-leader-supports-syrian-opposition.html.
24
“Haniyeh Officially Announces That Hamas’s Leaders Have Left the Syrian Capital Damascus,” Al-Sharq,
February 12, 2012 (in Arabic), http://www.alsharq.net.sa/2012/02/12/121138.
25
“A Hamas Military Leader Assassinated in Syria and Israel Says: He Is Not Innocent,” BBC, June 28, 2012
(in Arabic), http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2012/06/120628_syria_hamas_killing.shtml.
26
“A Leader of Al-Qassam Brigades Assassinated in the Syrian Struggle,” Sky News, December 26, 2012 (in
Arabic) http://www.skynewsarabia.com/web/article/62034.
27
“Hamas Deplores the Syrian Television Critics,” al-Jazeera, October 3, 2012 (in Arabic), http://www.
aljazeera.net/news/pages/5564f2f9-6803-4ca3-a64e-48fd8b8ea0a7.
28
“Hamas Asks Hezbollah to Withdraw Its Fighters from Syria,” Reuters, June 17, 2013 (in Arabic), http://
ara.reuters.com/article/topNews/idARACAE9B2UN920130617.
29
“Hezbollah Is Planning to Expel Definitively Hamas from Beirut,” June 24, 2013 (in Arabic), http://www.
ahram.org.eg/News/860/2/217111.
30
“Palestinian Brigades Train to Fight Hezbollah in Syria,” Dounia News, (in Arabic) http://www.donianews.
net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32501:2013-04-26-12-25-54&catid=3:2011-07-04-18-
39-20&Itemid=205.
31
Coalition of left Lebanese parties formed during the civil war and headed by Kamal Jumblatt.
32
Tell al-Zaatar, a camp located in the eastern part of Beirut, was home to nearly 50,000 Palestinians. During
the Lebanese civil war, Christian militias decided to homogenize space and forcibly displace non-Christians.
The camp was under siege for 50 days, with thousands of casualties. Syria was accused of having participated
in this massacre of Palestinians or at least of having failed to intervene in the Christian militias’ plan.
33
The “War of the Camps” refers to the conflict that pitted the Lebanese Shia movement Amal against the
PLO in the refugee camps around Beirut, Sidon and Tyre. With the support of Syria, Amal wanted to prevent
the PLO from returning to southern Lebanon after its expulsion in 1982.
34
According to Law No. 260, enacted in 1956, Palestinians in Syria enjoy the same rights as Syrians in the
areas of education, work and military service, but keep their nationality.
35
“Buthayina Sha’aban: Palestinians Spread the Chaos in Latakie,” al-Watan News, March 27, 2011 (in Ara-
bic), http://www.watnnews.net/NewsDetails.aspx?PageID=3&NewsID=23687.
36
“Jihad Makdissi: Palestinians in Syria Are Impolite Guests,” al-Ayyam, July 15, 2012 (in Arabic), http://
www.ayyam.org/arabic/?p=14114.
37
Interview with Hossam, a Palestinian resident of Yarmouk, 39 years old, via Skype in February 2012.
38
Many months after the Syrian revolution started, local committees (ligan) were set up by groups of activists
in all Syrian towns and districts. Palestinians have created their own committees, which, like the Syrian ones,
coordinate demonstrations, disseminate information and organize relief efforts.
39
Nakba is the Arabic word for “catastrophe.” This term has been used since the 1950s to describe the cre-

84
 Napolitano: Hamas and the Syrian Uprising

ation of the state of Israel in 1948 on the territory of historical Palestine and the exodus of thousands of Pal-
estinians to the neighboring Arab countries. Naksa is an Arabic term meaning “relapse” and refers to Israel’s
victory in the Six-Day War of June 1967.
40
The Golan Heights cannot be visited without authorization from the Syrian authorities.
41
Rami Makhlouf, an important Syrian businessman and cousin of the president, claimed that if there was no
stability in Syria, “there is no way there will be stability in Israel.” See “Syrian Elite to Fight Protests to ‘the
End,’” New York Times, May 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/world/middleeast/11makhlouf.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
42
“Israeli Troops, Palestinian Protesters Clash at Golan Heights Frontier,” Washington Post, June 5, 2011.
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-06-05/world/35266386_1_yoav-mordechai-majdal-shams-palestin-
ian-protesters.
43
The camp in Deraa city was built in 1950-1951. It currently hosts 10,500 Palestinians. See the UNRWA
website: http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=145.
44
Built in 1955, the camp of Al-al-Ramle al-Filastini hosts more than 10,000 Palestinians according to statis-
tics published by UNRWA in 2010. See the UNRWA website: http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=152.
45
Built in 1949, al-Aidin camp is home to nearly 22,000 Palestinians. See the UNRWA website: http://www.
unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=148.
46
Built between 1948 and 1950, Neirab camp is home to nearly 20,500 Palestinians, according to statistics
released by UNRWA in 2010. See the UNRWA website: http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=153.
47
Palestinian army branch, currently under the control of the Syrian authorities.
48
Valentina Napolitano, “La mobilisation des réfugiés palestiniens dans le sillage de la ‘révolution’ syrienne:
s’engager sous contrainte” (The mobilisation of Palestinian refugees in the Syrian ‘revolution’: engaging
under duress), Cultures et Conflits, no. 87 (2012/2013): 119-137.
49
Phone conversation with a Yarmouk inhabitant, May 2011.
50
Statement signed by a group of Palestinian popular committees and published on the Facebook page for
Yarmouk Camp (in Arabic).
51
The statement continued: “The factions which signed the statement, including Hamas which did not, are
responsible for all the victims who died in the Palestinian camps as the result of the Syrian regime’s crack-
down.” Statement published on the Yarmouk Committee’s Facebook page, July 2012.
52
Phone conversation with a Yarmouk inhabitant, June 2013.
53
Majid Kyiali, “Palestinan Refugees Have No Representatives,” al-Hayat, April 16, 2013 (in Arabic), http://
alhayat.com/OpinionsDetails/503614.
54
According to UNRWA, more than 40,000 Palestinians fled Syria for Lebanon and Jordan, and more than
200,000 are internally displaced. See the UNRWA website http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1732.

85