Res ipsa loquitur ( the thing speaks for itself)

JARCIA VS PEOPLE (GR NO. 187926 FEBRUARY 15, 2012)

Jarcia vs People of the Philippines

GR No. 187926 February 15, 2012

Facts: Belinda Santiago lodged a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against the petitioners,
Dr. Emanuel Jarcia and Dr. Marilou Bastan, for their alleged neglect of professional duty which caused her son, Roy
Alfonso Santiago, to suffer physical injuries. Upon investigation, the NBI found that Roy Jr. was hit by a taxicab;
that he was rushed to the Manila Doctors Hospital for an emergency medical treatment; that an X-ray of the victim’s
ankle was ordered; that the X-ray result showed no fracture as read by Dr. Jarcia; that Dr. Bastan entered the
emergency room and, after conducting her own examination of the victim, informed Mrs. Santiago that since it was
only the ankle that was hit there was no need to examine the upper leg; that 11 days later, Roy developed fever,
swelling of the right leg and misalignment of the right foot; that Mrs. Santiago brought him back to the hospital; and
that the x-ray revealed a right mid-tibial fracture and a linear hairline fracture in the shaft of the bone. A complaint
for reckless imprudence resulting physical injuries was filed against the petitioners for the alleged misconduct in the
handling of the illness of Roy.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners failed to exercise the degree of care expected of them as doctors and are liable
for negligence to the private respondent.

Held: Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa liquitor as a rule of evidence is unusual to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligencce may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
specific proof of negligence. The doctrine however, is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a
mere procedural convenience the rule when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to
and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely
determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of
duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absolute and not readily available.

The requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor are:

1. The accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2. The instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in
charge; and
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury.

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act.

In failing to perform an extensive medical examination to determine the extent of Roy’s injuries, Dr. Jarcia and Dr.
Bastan were remiss of their duties as members of the medical profession. Assuming for the sake of argument that
they did not have the capacity to make such thorough evaluation at that stage they should have referred the patient to
another doctor with sufficient training and experience instead of assuring him and his mother that everything was all
right.

Torts And Damages Case Digest: Marcelo Macalinao, Et Al., V. Eddie Medecielo Ong (2005)

G.R. No. 146635 December 14, 2005

Lessons Applicable: Res Ipsa Loquitur (Torts and Damages)

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

 April 1992: Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and 2 other truck helpers to deliver a heavy piece of
machinery to Sebastian’s manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan
 While delivering, the Genetron’s Isuzu Elf truck driven by Ong bumped the front portion of a private
jeepney. Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers sustained physical injuries as a
consequence of the collision.
 Macalinao was brought to Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid treatment then to Philippine Orthopedic
Center then to Capitol Medical Center and lastly, to Philippine General Hospital due to financial
 considerations. His body was paralyzed and immobilized from the neck down. He filed against Ong and
Sebastian. A criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries was instituted but
was not ensued.
 November 7 1992: Macalinao died and was substituted by his parents.
 RTC: Ong negligent and Sebastian failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of Ong thus ordering them jointly liable to pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well
as civil indemnity for Macalinao’s death
 CA: reversed for lack of evidence
ISSUE: W/N Ong may be held liable under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

HELD: YES.

 photographs clearly shows that the road where the mishap occurred is marked by a line at the center separating
the right from the left lane
 While ending up at the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile collisions, the position of the
two vehicles gives rise to the conclusion that it was the Isuzu truck which hit the private jeepney rather than the
other way around.
 Based on the angle at which it stopped, the private jeepney obviously swerved to the right in an unsuccessful
effort to avoid the Isuzu truck.
 Since respondents failed to refute the contents of the police blotter, the statement therein that the Isuzu truck hit
the private jeepney and not the other way around is deemed established.
 While not constituting direct proof of Ong’s negligence, the foregoing pieces of evidence justify the application
of res ipsa loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself
 Res ipsa loquitur
 recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to
substitute for specific proof of negligence
 permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to
invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the
burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part
 based on the theory that defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge,
and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms and rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence
 can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily available
 grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person
 requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur:

(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; - No two
motor vehicles traversing opposite lanes will collide as a matter of course unless someone is negligent

(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants - Driving the
Isuzu truck gave Ong exclusive management and control over it

(3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated
(4) defendant fails to offer any explanation tending to show that the
injury was caused by his or her want of due care (Based on
American Jurisprudence) - defendant fails to offer any explanation
tending to show that the injury was caused by his or her want of due
care
 Macalinao could no longer testify as to the cause of the accident since he is dead. Petitioners, while substituting
their son as plaintiff, have no actual knowledge about the event since they were not present at the crucial
moment
 evidence as to the true cause of the accident is, for all intents and purposes, accessible to respondents but not to
petitioners
 two truck helpers who survived, both employees of Sebastian, and Ong, who is not only Sebastian’s previous
employee but his co-respondent in this case as well

Assumption of risk
Philippine Realty vs. Ley Construction Digest
G. R. No. 165548: June 13, 2011

PHILIPPINE REALTY AND HOLDINGS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. LEY CONSTRUCTION AND

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

SERENO, J.:
FACTS:

Ley Construction and Development Corporation(LCDC) was the project contractor for the construction of several
buildings for Philippine Realty & Holdings Corporation (PRHC), the project owner. Engineer Dennis Abcede
(Abcede) was the project construction manager of PRHC, while Joselito Santos (Santos) was its general manager
and vice-president for operations.

Sometime between April 1988 and October 1989, the two corporations entered into four major construction projects,
as evidenced by four duly notarized "construction agreements." LCDC committed itself to the construction of the
buildings needed by PRHC, which in turn committed itself to pay the contract price agreed upon.

The agreement covering the construction of the Tektite Building was signed by a Mr. Campos under the words
"Phil. Realty & Holdings Corp." and by Santos as a witness.Manuel Ley, the president of LCDC, signed under the
words "Ley Const. & Dev. Corp."

The terms embodied in the afore-listed construction agreements were almost identical. Each agreement provided for
a fixed price to be paid by PRHC for every project.

In the course of the construction of the Tektite Building, it became evident to both parties that LCDC would not be
able to finish the project within the agreed period.Thus, through its president, LCDC met with Abcede to discuss the
cause of the delay. LCDC explained that the unanticipated delay in construction was due mainly to the sudden,
unexpected hike in the prices of cement and other construction materials. It claimed that, without a corresponding
increase in the fixed prices found in the agreements, it would be impossible for it to finish the construction of the
Tektite Building. In their analysis of the project plans for the building and of all the external factors affecting the
completion of the project, the parties discovered that even if LCDC were able to collect the entire balance from the
contract, the collected amount would still be insufficient to purchase all the materials needed to complete the
construction of the building.

Seeking to recover all the above-mentioned amounts, LCDC filed a Complaint with Application for the Issuance of
a Writ of Preliminary Attachment on 2 February 1996 before the RTC in Makati City docketed as Civil Case No.
96-160

ISSUE: Whether LCDC is liable for liquidated damages for delay in the construction of the buildings for PRHC.

HELD: NO

CIVIL LAW: Obligations and Contracts, Delay

There is no question that LCDC was not able to fully construct the Tektite Building and Projects 1, 2, and 3 on time.
It reasons that it should not be made liable for liquidated damages, because its rightful and reasonable requests for
time extension were denied by PRHC.

It is important to note that PRHC does not question the veracity of the factual representations of LCDC to justify the
latters requests for extension of time. It insists, however, that in any event LCDC agreed to the limits of the time
extensions it granted.

The practice of the parties is that each time LCDC requests for more time, an extension agreement is executed and
signed by both parties to indicate their joint approval of the number of days of extension agreed upon.

As previously mentioned, LCDC sent a 9 December 1992 letter to PRHC claiming that, in a period of over two
years, only 256 out of the 618 days of extension requested were considered. We disregard these numbers presented
by LCDC because of its failure to present evidence to prove its allegation. The tally that we will acceptas reflected
by the evidence submitted to the lower courtis as follows: out of the 564 days requested, only 237 were considered.

Essentially the same aforementioned reasons or causes are presented by LCDC as defense against liability for both
Projects 1 and 2.

Inasmuch as LCDCs claimed exemption from liability are beyond the approved time extensions, LCDC, according
to the majority of the CA, is liable therefor.

JusticeJuan Q. Enriquez, in his Dissenting Opinion, held that the reasons submitted by LCDC fell under the
definition offorce majeure. This specific point was not refuted by the majority.

We agree with Justice Enriquez on this point and thereby disagree with the majority ruling of the CA.

Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides: "Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable." A perusal of
the construction agreements shows that the parties never agreed to make LCDC liable even in cases offorce majeure.
Neither was the assumption of risk required. Thus, in the occurrence of events that could not be foreseen, or though
foreseen were inevitable, neither party should be held responsible.

Under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, to exempt the obligor from liability for a breach of an obligation due to an
"act of God" orforce majeure, the following must concur:
(a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be
either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury
to the creditor.

The shortage in supplies and cement may be characterized asforce majeure. In the present case, hardware stores did
not have enough cement available in their supplies or stocks at the time of the construction in the 1990s. Likewise,
typhoons, power failures and interruptions of water supply all clearly fall underforce majeure. Since LCDC could
not possibly continue constructing the building under the circumstances prevailing, it cannot be held liable for any
delay that resulted from the causes aforementioned.

Further, PRHC is barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel from denying that it agreed, and even promised, to
hold LCDC free and clear of any liquidated damages. Abcede and Santos also promised that the latter corporation
would not be held liable for liquidated damages even for a single day of delay despite the non-approval of the
requests for extension.

PETITION GRANTED.

LCC (Last Clear Chance)

Commercial Law. Transportation. Presumption of Negligence. Contributory Negligence.
Sealoader Shipping Corporation v. Grand Cement Manufacturing Corporation
G.R. No. 167363 & G.R. No. 177466, December 15, 2010
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
Sealoader executed a Time Charter Party Agreement with Joyce Launch for the chartering of MT Viper in order to
tow its unpropelled barges for a minimum of 15 days. Sealoder also entered into a contract with Grand Cement for
the loading of cement clinkers and the delivery thereof to Manila.

Eventually, Sealoder’s barge arrived at the wharf of Grand Cement tugged by MT Viper. It was not immediately
loaded as the employees of Grand Cement were loading another vessel.
The barge was still docked at the wharf of Grand Cement when typhoon Bising struck in the area of Cebu. As it
became stronger, MT Viper tried to tow the barge away but it was unsuccessful. The towing line connecting the
vessels snapped since the mooring lines were not cast off. As such, the barge rammed the wharf which caused a
significant damage.

Grand Cement filed a complaint for damages when Sealoader ignored its demands for compensation of the damage
caused. They allege that Sealoader was negligent when it ignored its employee’s advice to move the vessels after it
had received weather updates. Sealoader filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Joyce Launch is the one liable
since it was the owner of MT Viper, and whose employees were manning the vessel. Sealoader filed a cross-claim
against Joyce Launch. Joyce maintains that the damages were due to force majeure and faulted Grand Cement’s
employees for abandoning the wharf leaving them helpless and for not warning them early on.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Grand Cement holding the two companies liable since there was complete
disregard of the storm signal, the captain of the vessel was not present and the vessel was not equipped with a radio
or any navigational facility, which is mandatory. Joyce launch did not appeal. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
decision but on MR, it partly reversed its decision finding Grand Cement to be guilty of contributory negligence
since it was found that it was still loading the other vessel at the last minute just before the storm hit, which was the
reason why Sealoder’s vessel did not move. The damages were reduced to 50%.

ISSUE:
Who should be liable for damage sustained by the wharf of Grand Cement?

HELD:
Sealoader was guilty of negligence, hence it is liable. First because it was not equipped with a radio or a
navigational facility and it failed to monitor the prevailing weather conditions. Second, it cannot pass the
responsibility of casting off the mooring lines because the people at the wharf could not just cast off the mooring
lines without any instructions from the crew of the vessel. It should have taken the initiative to cast off the mooring
lines early on.

Moreover, there was no contributory negligence on the part of Grand Cement Manufacturing Corporation. It had
timely informed the barge of the impending typhoon and directed the vessels to move to a safer place. Sealoader had
the responsibility to inform itself of the prevailing weather conditions in the areas where its vessel was to sail. It
cannot merely rely on other vessels for weather updates and warnings on approaching storms. To do so would be to
gamble with the safety of its own vessel, putting the lives of its crew under the mercy of the sea, as well as running
the risk of causing damage to property of third parties for which it would necessarily be liable. The evidence
proffered by Sealoader to prove the negligence of Grand Cement was marred by contradictions and are, thus, weak
at best. Thus, the contributory negligence of Grand Cement was not established in this case.
Hence, the award of damages in favor of the petitioner by the lower courts is reversed.

PHILIPPINE HAWK CORPORATION v. VIVIAN TAN LEE

G.R. No. 166869

FACTS: The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus with Body No. 119. The bus was owned
by petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then being driven by Margarito Avila. On March 15, 2005,
respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed before the RTC of Quezon City a Complaint against petitioner Philippine Hawk
Corporation and defendant Margarito Avila for damages based on quasi-delict, arising from a vehicular accident that
occurred on March 17, 1991 in Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon. The accident resulted in the death of
respondents husband, Silvino Tan, and caused respondent physical injuries. On June 18, 1992, respondent filed an
Amended Complaint in her own behalf and in behalf of her children, in the civil case for damages against
petitioner. Respondent sought the payment of indemnity for the death of Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary
damages, funeral and interment expenses, medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the motorcycles repair,
attorneys fees, and other just and equitable reliefs.

Petitioner denied liability for the vehicular accident, alleging that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident
was the recklessness or lack of caution of Silvino Tan. Petitioner asserted that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees, including Margarito Avila.

The trial court adjudged Avila of simple negligence and ordered Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito Avila
to pay Vivian Tan jointly and solidarily the sum of P745,575.00 representing loss of earnings and actual damages
plus P50,000.00 as moral damages. It found that before the collision, the motorcycle was on the left side of the road,
just as the passenger jeep was. Prior to the accident, the motorcycle was in a running position moving toward the
right side of the highway. The trial court agreed with the bus driver that the motorcycle was moving ahead of the bus
from the left side of the road toward the right side of the road, but disagreed that the motorcycle crossed the path of
the bus while the bus was running on the right side of the road. The trial court held that if the bus were on the right
side of the highway, and Margarito Avila turned his bus to the right in an attempt to avoid hitting the motorcyle,
then the bus would not have hit the passenger jeep, which was then parked on the left side of the road. The fact that
the bus also hit the passenger jeep showed that the bus must have been running from the right lane to the left lane of
the highway, which caused the collision with the motorcycle and the passenger jeep parked on the left side of the
road. The trial court stated that since Avila saw the motorcycle before the collision, he should have stepped on the
brakes and slowed down, but he just maintained his speed and veered to the left. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court with modification in the award of damages.

ISSUES:

(1) whether or not negligence may be attributed to petitioners driver, and whether negligence on his part was the
proximate cause of the accident, resulting in the death of Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to respondent/
whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages; and

(2) whether or not the damages awarded by respondent Court of Appeals are proper.

HELD:

1) The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable to
respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline
and correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioners tests were concentrated on the ability to drive and
physical fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in sideswiping
incidents. A review of the records showed that it was petitioners witness, Efren Delantar Ong, who was
 about 15 meters away from the bus when he saw the vehicular accident. Nevertheless, this fact does not
affect the finding of the trial court that petitioners bus driver, Margarito Avila, was guilty of simple
negligence as affirmed by the appellate court. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be
negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would
have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite
class of risks. In this case, the bus driver, who was driving on the right side of the road, already saw the
motorcycle on the left side of the road before the collision. However, he did not take the necessary
precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle, and also the passenger jeep parked on
the left side of the road, showing that the bus was negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the
motorcycle and the passenger jeep.

2) As regards the issue on the damages awarded, petitioner contends that it was the only one that appealed the
decision of the trial court with respect to the award of actual and moral damages; hence, the Court of Appeals erred
in awarding other kinds of damages in favor of respondent, who did not appeal from the trial courts decision. This
contention is unmeritorious.

Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. — No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or
the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the
assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as
the court pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.

The procedure in the Supreme Court being generally the same as that in the Court of Appeals, unless
otherwise indicated (see Secs. 2 and 4, Rule 56), it has been held that the latter is clothed with ample authority
to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case.

In fine, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded civil indemnity for the death of respondents husband, temperate
damages, and moral damages for the physical injuries sustained by respondent in addition to the damages granted by
the trial court to respondent. The trial court overlooked awarding the additional damages, which were prayed for by
respondent in her Amended Complaint. The appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even
if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision of the case.

In this case for damages based on quasi-delict, the trial court awarded respondent the sum of P745,575.00,
representing loss of earning capacity (P590,000.00) and actual damages (P155,575.00 for funeral expenses),
plus P50,000.00 as moral damages. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner assigned as error the award of
damages by the trial court on the ground that it was based merely on suppositions and surmises, not the admissions
made by respondent during the trial. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the award by the trial court for
loss of earning capacity of the deceased Silvino Tan, moral damages for his death, and actual damages, although the
amount of the latter award was modified.

The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided for by Article 2206 of the Civil Code.
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money. As a
rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity.
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary
evidence when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws,
in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence
is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.

In this case, the records show that respondents husband was leasing and operating a Caltex gasoline station in
Gumaca, Quezon. Respondent testified that her husband earned an annual income of one million pesos. Respondent
presented in evidence a Certificate of Creditable Income Tax Withheld at Source for the Year 1990, which showed
that respondents husband earned a gross income of P950,988.43 in 1990. It is reasonable to use the Certificate and
respondents testimony as bases for fixing the gross annual income of the deceased at one million pesos before
respondents husband died on March 17, 1999. However, no documentary evidence was presented regarding the
income derived from their copra business; hence, the testimony of respondent as regards such income cannot be
considered.

In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered; that is, the
total of the earnings less expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings or income, less living and other
incidental expenses. In the absence of documentary evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the lease
and operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross income, and peg living expenses at 50 percent of the
net income (gross income less necessary expenses).

In this case, the computation for loss of earning capacity is as follows:

Net Earning = Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income Reasonable and Capacity [2/3 (80-age at
the (GAI) Necessary time of death)] Expenses (80% of GAI)

X = [2/3 (80-65)] x P1,000,000.00 – P800,000.00

X = 2/3 (15) x P200,000.00 – P100,000.00
(Living Expenses)

X = 30/3 x P100,000.00
X = 10 x P100,000.00
X = P1,000,000.00

The Court of Appeals also awarded actual damages for the expenses incurred in connection with the death, wake,
and interment of respondents husband in the amount ofP154,575.30, and the medical expenses of respondent in the
amount of P168,019.55. Actual damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as receipts, in order
to prove expenses incurred as a result of the death of the victim or the physical injuries sustained by the victim. A
review of the valid receipts submitted in evidence showed that the funeral and related expenses amounted only
to P114,948.60, while the medical expenses of respondent amounted only to P12,244.25, yielding a total
of P127,192.85 in actual damages.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for the
death of respondents husband. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.
They are awarded to allow the plaintiff to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he/she has undergone due to the defendants culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to
the suffering inflicted.

In addition, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded temperate damages in the amount of P10,000.00 for the damage
caused on respondents motorcycle. Under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered when
the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty. The cost of the repair of the motorcycle was prayed for by respondent in her
Complaint. However, the evidence presented was merely a job estimate of the cost of the motorcycles repair
amounting to P17, 829.00. The Court of Appeals aptly held that there was no doubt that the damage caused on the
motorcycle was due to the negligence of petitioners driver. In the absence of competent proof of the actual damage
caused on the motorcycle or the actual cost of its repair, the award of temperate damages by the appellate court in
the amount of P10,000.00 was reasonable under the circumstances.

The Court of Appeals also correctly awarded respondent moral damages for the physical injuries she sustained due
to the vehicular accident. Under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries. However, the award of P50,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00 in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence. Further, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondent civil indemnity for the death
of her husband, which has been fixed by current jurisprudence at P50,000.00. The award is proper under Art. 2206
of the Civil Code.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 17, 2004 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 70860 is hereby AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION. Petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation and
Margarito Avila are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally respondent Vivian Lee Tan: (a) civil indemnity in
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); (b) actual damages in the amount of One Hundred Twenty-Seven
Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos and Eighty-Five Centavos ( P127,192.85); (c) moral damages in the
amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00); (d) indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the amount of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00); and (e) temperate damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
CN (Contributory Negligence)
Fontanilla vs Maliaman
FACTS: A pick up owned by the National Irrigation Administration and driven officially by its regular driver, Hugo
Garcia, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, which resulted in the latter's death. The parents of
Francisco filed a suit for damages against Garcia and the NIA, as Garcia's employer. After trial, the court awarded
actual, moral and exemplary damages to Spouses Fontanilla. NIA appealed. The Solicitor General contends that the
NIA does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the government tasked with
governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its
special agent.

ISSUE:

May NIA, a government agency, be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not
its special agent?

HELD:

Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a
mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held
liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. (Fontanilla vs.
Maliaman, G.R. Nos. L-55963 & 61045, February 27, 1991)

RATIO:

■ Section 1 of RA No. 3601 tells us that NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate
and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Section 2, subsection f of PD 552
provides that NIA also has its own assets and liabilities and has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of
Directors. Section 2, subsection b of PD 552 provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court.

■ Of equal importance is the case of National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) vs. NWSA
Consolidated Unions, 11 SCRA 766, which propounds the thesis that "the NAWASA is not an agency performing
governmental functions; rather it performs proprietary functions . . . ." The functions of providing water supply and
sewerage service are regarded as mere optional functions of government even though the service rendered caters to
the community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society.

Like the NAWASA, the National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. While
it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest
and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function" corporation.
NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation
systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the
community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only
incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.

NOTES:

■ The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:

1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary
employer. Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, G.R. Nos. L-55963 & 61045, December 1, 1989)

SPOUSES FONTANILLA VS HON. MALIAMAN, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
GR # 55963 and 61045, Feb. 27, 1991 (Constitutional Law – Government Agency, Proprietary Functions)

FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held liable for damages resulting to
the death of the son of herein petitioner spouses caused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the said
agency. NIA maintains that it is not liable for the act of its driver because the former does not perform primarily
proprietorship functions but governmental functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver.

HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government,
because its community services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands, thus,
making it an agency with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of their
employees.