VI.

LAWYER’S DUTIES TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION

A. UPHOLDING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROFESSION

[A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000]

TEODORO R. RIVERA, ANTONIO D. AQUINO and FELIXBERTO D. AQUINO, complainants,

vs. ATTY. SERGIO ANGELES, respondent.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On March 25, 1983, complainants filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Sergio
Angeles on the grounds of Deceit and Malpractice.The Affidavit-Complaint[1] reads as follows:
1.....The undersigned are plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. Q-12841 and Q-13128 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City;
2.....Atty. Sergio Angeles is their counsel of record in the said cases and his office is located at
Suite 335, URC Building, 2123 Espaa, Manila;
3.....That after receiving favorable decision from the CFI on May 21, 1973 and sustained by the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court an alias writ of execution was issued in said cases;
4.....That in the first week of January 1983 we obtained from the CFI a sheriffs return, dated
November 10, 1982, stating that no leviable property can be found in the premises of the
defendants;
5.....That on or before January 13, 1983, we learned that Mr. Rodolfo M. Silva, one of the
defendants in said cases had already given Atty. Angeles a partial settlement of the judgment
in the amount of P42,999.00 (as evidenced by xerox copies of Partial Settlement of Judgment
dated September 21, 1982 and Receipt of Payment dated September 22, 1982, hereto
attached as Annexes A and B, respectively), without our knowledge.
6.....That Atty. Sergio Angeles never informed the undersigned of the amount of P42,999.00 he
received from Mr. Silva nor remitted to them even a part of that amount;
7.....That a demand letter was sent to Atty. Sergio Angeles which was received by him on
February 17, 1983, but as of this date the undersigned have not yet received any reply. (See
Exhibit C and D attached).
In his Comment filed on June 21, 1983, respondent denied the accusations and stated that
he has the right to retain the said amount of P42,999.00 and to apply the same to professional
fees due him under the subsequent agreement first with complainant Teodoro Rivera and later
with Mrs. Dely Dimson Rivera as embodied in the Deed of Assignment (Annex 8) [2] or under the
previous agreement of P20% of P206,000.00.
Complainants, in their Reply,[3]vehemently denied the assignment of their rights to
respondent.
Thereafter, this case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation in our Resolution dated November 21, 1983. The Office of the Solicitor General
considered this case submitted for resolution on April 30, 1985 by declaring respondents right to
present evidence as considered waived due to the latters failure to appear on the scheduled
hearings.However, the records from said Office do not show any resolution.
 In October 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued an Order requiring the parties
to manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this case, or whether
supervening events have transpired which render this case moot and academic or otherwise.The
copy of said Order sent to the complainants was received by their counsel on October 30, 1998
while the copy to the respondent was returned unclaimed.
Investigating Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo submitted his report on April 29, 1999 finding
respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
specifically Rule 1.01, Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 thereof and recommends his indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on June 19, 1999, issued a
resolution, the decretal portion of which reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-151
Adm. Case No. 2519
Teodoro R. Rivera, et al. vs.
Atty. Sergio Angeles

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment that Atty. Sergio Angeles is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR for his having been found guilty of practicing deceit in dealing with his
client.

The Court finds merit in the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Respondents act of deceit and malpractice indubitably demonstrated his failure to live
up to his sworn duties as a lawyer. The Supreme Court repeatedly stressed the importance of
integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyers equipment in the practice of his
profession.[4] For it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. [5]
The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has
extended to his client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to
himself the money intended for his clients. There should never be an instance where the victor in
litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for ONE (1) YEAR for having been found guilty of practicing deceit in dealing with his client.
This Resolution shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines and appended to respondents personal record.
SO ORDERED.

[Adm. Case No. 3910. August 14, 2000.]

JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN,

respondents.

Castillo, Salazar, Lazaro, Tuazon and Associates for complainant.

SYNOPSIS

Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr., the registered owner of the subject property, filed an ejectment case against
respondent, their family counsel, who hired workers to construct a piggery in the subject property of

complainant. Respondent, however, claimed that the subject property had been sold to him orally.

Subsequently, he alleged that subject property was given to him by the father of complainant (Jose Ducat,

Sr.), for past legal services. HIaTCc

The IBP found Atty. Villalon guilty of Gross Misconduct and suspended him from law practice for two (2)

years.

Upholding the decision on appeal, the Court held that the acts of respondent lawyer constitute gross

misconduct, because: respondent is presumed to know that transfer of any titled real property must be in

writing; when the transfer was first reduced in writing in October, 1991, respondent knew it was Jose Ducat,

Sr. who signed said document of sale without any special power of attorney from the registered owner

thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and as regards the subsequent Deed of Sale dated December 5, 1991 covering the

same property, respondent admitted that there was in fact no consideration for the conveyance.

The Supreme Court suspended Atty. Villalon, Jr. from the practice of law for one year because the record

did not show that he had any direct participation in the notarization of the questionable deed of sale. The

Court enjoins lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of

their practice of law.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; CANON 7 OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; DUTY OF

LAWYERS TO UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION. — The ethics of

the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and

nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct,

whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in

honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall at all times uphold the

integrity and dignity of the legal profession." The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require

in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by

any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in

the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession. HaEcAC

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

2. ID.; ID.; GROSS MISCONDUCT; ACTS COMPLAINED OF CONSTITUTE GROSS MISCONDUCT IN

CASE AT BAR. — It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares

located in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of complainant herein,

Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the property was orally given to him by

complainant's father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law,

however, that conveyance or transfer of any titled real property must be in writing, signed by the registered

owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper special power of attorney and duly notarized.

Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or ought to know, this process. Worse, when the

transfer was first reduced in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land, purportedly in favor

of "Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr.," respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose Ducat,

Sr. who signed the said document of sale without any Special Power of Attorney from the registered owner

thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife, Maria Cabrido, under the word

"Conforme." As regards the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991,

covering the same property, this time purportedly in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. only, respondent Villalon

admitted that there was in fact no payment of P450,000.00 and that the said amount was placed in that

document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a consideration. All these taken together,

coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.'s strong and credible denial that he allegedly sold the subject

property to respondent Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. and that he allegedly appeared before

respondent notary public Ducusin, convince us that respondent Villalon's acts herein complained of which

constitute gross misconduct were duly proven.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONE-YEAR SUSPENSION PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. — Unlike the circumstances

prevailing in the said case of Aportadera, the record does not show that respondent Villalon had any direct

participation in the notarization by respondent notary public Crispulo Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale

of Real Property dated December 5, 1991, which was supposedly signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.

who, however, strongly denied having signed the same. The earlier Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land dated

"this ___ day of October 1991," allegedly signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as vendor, covering the same

property, in favor of respondent "Arsenio S. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr." was not notarized. The

record also shows that Jose Ducat, Sr. and complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father and son and that they live

in the same house at 912 Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also disputed that respondent Villalon has

been the lawyer for a number of years of the family of Jose Ducat, Sr. TADaCH

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J p:

Before us is a verified letter-complaint 1 for disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr., Andres

Canares, Jr. and Crispulo Ducusin for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of the lawyer's oath.

Investigation proceeded only against respondent Villalon because it was discovered that Andres Canares

was not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed away on February 3, 1996. 2

In the letter-complaint, 3 complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

Villalon, as counsel for the family of complainant, spoke to the father of complainant and asked that he be

given the title over a property owned by complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and covered by TCT

No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had to verify the proper measurements

of the subject property. Sometime in November, 1991, however, complainant and his family were surprised

when several people entered the subject property and, when confronted by the companions of complainant,

the latter were told that they were workers of Canares and were there to construct a piggery. Complainant

complained to the barangay authorities in Pinugay and narrated the incident but respondent Canares did not

appear before it and continued with the construction of the piggery in the presence of armed men who were

watching over the construction. Complainant then went to respondent Villalon to complain about the people

of respondent Canares but nothing was done.

Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply however, the latter

answered that the subject property was already sold by complainant to respondent Canares in the amount of

P450,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991 and

notarized by respondent Atty. Crispulo Ducusin. Complainant, however, averred that he never sold the

property, signed any document nor received any money therefor, and he also denied having appeared

before respondent Ducusin who was the notary public for the Deed of Absolute Sale. Complainant

discovered that respondent Villalon claimed that complainant's father allegedly gave the subject property to

him (respondent Villalon) as evidenced by a document of sale purportedly signed by complainant.

In his Comment, 4 respondent Villalon denied that allegations of the complainant and in turn, he alleged that

the property was given voluntarily by Jose Ducat, Sr. to him out of close intimacy and for past legal services

rendered. Thereafter, respondent Villalon, with the knowledge and consent of Jose Ducat, Sr., allowed the

subject property to be used by Andres Canares to start a piggery business without any monetary
consideration. A Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land was then signed by Jose Ducat, Sr. to evidence that he has

conveyed the subject property to respondent Villalon with the name of respondent Canares included therein

as protection because of the improvements to be introduced in the subject property. Upon presenting the

title covering the subject property, it was discovered that the property was registered in the name of Jose

Ducat, Jr. and not Jose Ducat, Sr., but the latter told respondents Villalon and Canares not to worry because

the land was actually owned by him and that he merely placed the name of his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. Jose

Ducat, Sr. then suggested that the subject property be transferred directly from Jose Ducat, Jr. to

respondent Canares; hence, he (Ducat, Sr.) got the title and guaranteed that he would return the document

already signed and notarized, which he did the following day. According to respondent Canares, the trouble

began when Jose Ducat, Sr. came to his office demanding to know why he was not allowed to cut the trees

inside the subject property by the caretaker of respondent Canares. DACTSa

On January 21, 1993, Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote 5 to this Court and averred that he neither signed the Deed of

Sale covering the subject property nor did he appear before the notary public Crispulo Ducusin, who

notarized the same. He averred that respondents Villalon and Ducusin should be disbarred from the practice

of law and respondent Villalon be imprisoned for forging his signature and selling the subject property

without his consent.

In his Rejoinder, 6 respondent Villalon denied the allegations of complainant and

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

maintained that he is a member of good standing of the Integrated Bar and that he has always preserved the

high standards of the legal profession. Respondent Villalon expressed his willingness to have the Deed of

Sale examined by the National Bureau of Investigation and reiterated that the subject property was orally

given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. and it was only in October, 1991 that the conveyance was reduced in

writing. He added that the complainant knew that his father, Jose Ducat, Sr., was the person who signed the

said document for and in his behalf and that this was done with his consent and knowledge.

This Court referred 7 the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and

recommendation.

On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the report and

recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner who found respondent Atty. Villalon guilty, and

recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years and likewise directed respondent
Atty. Villalon to deliver to the complainant his TCT No. M-3023 within ten (10) days from receipt of notice,

otherwise, this will result in his disbarment.

The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez are as follows:

Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid

manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed while testifying before the Commission inspire belief as

to the truth of what they are saying. More importantly, respondent failed to impute any ill-motive on the part

of the complainant and his witness which can impel them to institute the instant complaint and testify falsely

against him. To be sure, the testimony of the complainant and his witness deserves the Commission's full

faith and credence.

Respondent's evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense (that he considered

himself the owner of the subject property which was allegedly given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow

in the face of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts.

FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent

(being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property

unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant through a Special Power of Attorney. No such

authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having given the subject

property to the respondent. This denial is not too difficult to believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat,

Sr.) is not the owner of said property.

SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a real property, whether

gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would consider

himself the owner of the subject property on the basis of the verbal or oral "giving" of the property by Jose

Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have said that.

THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. "1" for the respondent and Exh. "A-2" for the complainant)

allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares,

Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat,

Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said property.

Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

falsified document as admitted by the respondent himself when he said that the signature over the
typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer,
respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wife's signature is

tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has

(sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead of relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the

subject property was given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has

vigorously denied having executed said document which denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of the

circumstances already mentioned.

FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. "2" for the respondent and Exh. "A-3" for the

complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property

(which respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is likewise of questionable

character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied having executed said document. He claims

that he has never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does not know; that he has never

appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe to the document; and that he has never received the

amount of P450,000.00 representing the consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of

the said Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was supplied by the respondent no less when he admitted

that there was no payment of P450,000.00 and that the same was placed in the document only to make it

appear that the conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer, respondent knew or

ought to know the irregularity of his act and that he should have treated the document as another scrap of

worthless paper instead of utilizing the same to substantiate his defense. 8

After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, it appears that the findings of facts and

observations of the Investigating Commissioner, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which were all adopted by

its Board of Governors, are well-taken, the same being supported by the evidence adduced.

The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair

play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any

misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral

character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of

the court. 9 Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall at all times

uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession." The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by

clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should

be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of

the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession. 10

It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares located in Barrio
Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of complainant herein, Jose Ducat, Jr.

Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the property was orally given to him by complainant's father,

Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete knowledge of the fact that the subject property belonged to his

son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that conveyance or transfer of any titled real property must be

in writing, signed by the registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper special

power of attorney and duly notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

presumed to know, or ought to know, this process. Worse, when the transfer was first reduced in writing in

October, 1991 per Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land, 11 purportedly in favor of "Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon and/or

Andres Canares, Jr.," respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose Ducat, Sr. who signed the said document of

sale without any Special Power of Attorney from the registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and that Jose

Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife, Maria Cabrido, under the word "Conforme". As regards the subsequent

Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991, covering the same property, this time

purportedly in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. only, respondent Villalon admitted that there was in fact no

payment of P450,000.00 and that the said amount was placed in that document only to make it appear that

the conveyance was for a consideration.

All these taken together, coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.'s strong and credible denial that he

allegedly sold the subject property to respondent Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. and that he allegedly

appeared before respondent notary public Ducusin, convince us that respondent Villalon's acts herein

complained of which constitute gross misconduct were duly proven.

Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a

member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would

promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to

always live up to the standards of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional

Responsibility inasmuch as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature

and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. 12

We find, however, the IBP's recommended penalty of two (2) years suspension to be imposed upon

respondent Atty. Villalon too severe in the light of the facts obtaining in the case at bar. In Cesar V. Roces

vs. Atty. Jose G. Aportadera, 13 this Court suspended therein respondent Atty. Aportadera for a period of
two (2) years from the practice of law for two main reasons:

(i)

(ii)

His dubious involvement in the preparation and notarization of the falsified sale of his client's property merits

the penalty of suspension imposed on him by the IBP Board of Governors; and

The NBI investigation reveals that: (1) respondent misrepresented himself to Gregorio Licuanan as being

duly authorized by Isabel Roces to sell her property; (2) it was respondent who prepared the various deeds

of sale over Isabel's subdivision lots; (3) Isabel was already confined at a hospital in Metro Manila on
January 4, 1980, the deed's date of execution; (4) respondent knew that Isabel was hospitalized in Metro

Manila when he subscribed the deed; (5) he knew that Isabel died in Metro Manila soon after her

confinement; and (6) he did not give the seller a copy of the questioned deed of sale. 14

Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said case of Aportadera, the record does not show that

respondent Villalon had any direct participation in the notarization by respondent notary public Crispulo

Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991,15 which was supposedly

signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. who, however, strongly denied having signed the same. The earlier

Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land dated "this ___ day of October 1991," allegedly signed by Jose

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

S. Ducat, Sr., as vendor, covering the same property, in favor of respondent "Arsenio S. Villalon and/or

Andres Canares, Jr." was not notarized. The record also shows that Jose Ducat, Sr. and complainant Jose

Ducat, Jr. are father and son and that they live in the same house at 912 Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is

not also disputed that respondent Villalon has been the lawyer for a number of years of the family of Jose

Ducat, Sr.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct,

and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a

repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent Villalon is further directed

to deliver to the registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the latter's TCT No. M-3023 covering the

subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that

failure on his part to do so will result in his disbarment.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalon's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant

and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. ECISAD

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

A.M. No. 545-SBC December 26, 1974

PURISIMA BARBA, complainant,

vs.
HECTOR S. PEDRO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:p

Hector S. Pedro, a successful bar candidate in the 1956 examinations, having obtained an average of
81.16%, but thus far unsuccessful in his efforts to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath, which had to be
deferred because of a complaint for immorality filed against him by Purisima Barba, reiterates his plea for
admission to the bar. It is unquestioned that he had amorous relations with the complainant resulting in the
birth of a child. He failed, however, to marry her, having thereafter chosen another woman for his bride. After
the lapse of eighteen years, and considering that his conduct in the meanwhile has not on the whole shown
to be blameworthy, this Court feels that he has sufficiently atoned for that youthful indiscretion, having in
mind likewise, that people of prominence in the municipality where he resides, did intercede on his behalf.
Accordingly the long-sought privilege of membership in the bar will not be denied him any longer, but with
this caveat. He must comply with his moral and legal obligation to his child born out of wedlock with
complainant Purisima Barba.

He has in his favor a resolution of this Court that dates back to January 15, 1969: "In the matter of the
petition of Hector S. Pedro to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar, alleging that while he passed
the bar examinations given by this Court in 1956 with an average of 81.16%, he was not permitted to take
his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar by reason of an administrative complaint against him filed with
this Court be a Miss Purisima Barba of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the complaint alleging immorality in that
petitioner, sometime in July, 1953, came to her house and with lewd designs succeeded in gratifying his
carnal desires, an act repeated thereafter on three different occasions accompanied by pledges to marry, as
a result of which a child was born on April 23, 1954, a matter which when investigated resulted in a report
that the complaint was well-grounded, petitioner being prevented thus from taking his oath; the present
petition alleging further that petitioner is now married to Mrs. Estela U. Pedro, a public school teacher of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and that from January 4, 1960 up to the present, he has been employed as community
development worker with the Presidential Arm on Community Development (PACD) that he has since then
conducted himself well in his relations with the community as well as in the performance of his duties as
such official, attaching to his petition certifications of his good behavior from the Municipal Mayor of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the Provincial Development Officer of the PACD, the President of the San Nicolas Bar
Association, and the Grand Knight of the Knights of Columbus of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and a resolution
of the Ilocos Norte Bar Association and likewise enclosing an affidavit of complainant Miss Purisima Barba
attesting to petitioner's good conduct and behavior and expressing that she no longer has any opposition to
his taking his oath as a lawyer this Court resolved to defer action on such petition until petitioner has given
satisfactory proof to this Court as to the action subsequently pursued by him with reference to the child who
was born out of his relations with complainant Miss Purisima Barba."1 Thereafter came this resolution of
February 26, 1969: "Hector S. Pedro having offered proof as to the action subsequently pursued by him with
reference to the child who was born out of his relations with complainant Purisima Barba, in compliance with
the resolution of January 15, 1969, [the Court resolved] to allow respondent Hector S. Pedro to take the
lawyer's oath."2Unfortunately, before he could do so in accordance with the above resolution, there was a
letter from the aforesaid complainant Purisima Barba objecting to his taking his oath as a lawyer, premised
on the fact that the affidavit submitted by him as to her withdrawal of her opposition to his membership in the
bar did not represent her true feelings.

Thereafter, on March 6, 1969, this Court suspended the effectivity of its previous resolution of February 26,
1969, which would have allowed him to take the lawyer's oath. Moreover, he was required to comment. This
he did in a pleading submitted on March 28, 1969. He denied the allegation of falsity concerning the affidavit
of complainant. This Court then, in another resolution of April 8, 1969, referred the matter to its Legal Officer,
Ricardo Paras Jr., for investigation and report. A report was submitted on August 26, 1969. It stated that
after a careful evaluation of the testimony given by the complainant and the respondent, the conclusion is
warranted that complainant "had all along thought that the document Exhibit "A" was an affidavit of
recognition of their daughter, Imelda, and definitely not an affidavit of withdrawal of her opposition to Mr.
Pedro's admission to the Philippine Bar."3 The parties were heard on the matter on January 19, 1970, with
the complainant standing fast on her firm resolve to prevent respondent from taking the lawyer's oath. That
attitude she has maintained all this while. It remains her deep conviction that respondent lacks good moral
character, as proven by his failure to marry her "after having carnal knowledge of her." As she pointed out in
her last pleading dated July 5, 1972: "The respondent was twenty seven years old when he committed the
acts complained of and he was very much qualified to marry the complainant herein, but he did not comply
with his promise to march her to the altar. Instead he married another
woman."4

It cannot be denied that respondent's conduct left much to be desired. He had committed a transgression, if
not against the law, against the high moral standard requisite for membership in the bar. He had proven
false to his word. What is worse, he did sully her honor. This on the one side. On the other hand, eighteen
years had gone by from the time of the 1956 examinations. He was a successful bar candidate but because
of this lapse from moral propriety, he has not been allowed to take the lawyer's oath. It likewise appears,
from the testimonials submitted, that he has behaved rather well. At least, no other misdeed has been
attributed to him. There is no affront to reason then in ruling that the punishment, while deserved, has lasted
long enough. He has sufficiently rehabilitated himself. Retribution has been exacted, He has expiated for his
offense. It is understandable that the bitterness in the heart of complainant cannot easily be erased, but that
should not prove decisive. Even the most heinous of crimes prescribe after a certain period.5 Moreover, as
the transgression resulted from the frailty of flesh, the sociologist MacIver referring to it as "so powerful an
appetite," an imperative of life closely associated with the "recklessness and the caprice of desire," 6 this
Court feels that all the years he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer would satisfy the
requirement that failure to live up to the requisite moral standard is not to be taken lightly. It could also be
said that in offenses of this character, the blame hardly belongs to the man alone. 7

It must be impressed on respondent Hector S. Pedro, however, that while his plea to take the lawyer's oath
is to be granted, it is indispensable, if he expects to be a member of the bar in good standing, that he
complies with the moral and legal obligation incumbent upon him as the father of the child born out of
wedlock as a result of his relationship with complainant Purisima Barba.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of March 6, 1969, suspending a previous resolution of February 26, 1969, is
set aside and in accordance therewith, respondent Hector S. Pedro is allowed to take the lawyer's oath as
was provided in the February 26, 1969 resolution.

Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

BENGZON, C.J.:

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to
the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for
such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course
referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report
recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in
his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the
required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following
particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and

(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom —
which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination,
and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he
claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army,
passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school
diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the
equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any
certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to dwell
on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing
College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such
college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he
was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by
this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own
making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have
disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-
1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted
to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm
under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required
pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false
representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such
admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he
hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally
essential..

The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the
latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

December 3, 1948

In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects in the
1948 Bar Examinations.

Felixberto M. Serrano for respondent.

Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Abelardo Subido, and Arturo A. Alafriz (for the Philippine
Lawyers' Association) as amici curiae.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the defendant, Angel J.
Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that appeared on
the front page of the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the headline in large letters
— "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly smaller letters — "Applicants In
Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored," under the name — "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star
Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference we quote the news item in full:

Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of the law
graduates who took part in the tests, to the Star Reporter this morning.

These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in one subject, days
before the tests were given, in the Philippine Normal School.

Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed questions on said
subject fully one week before the tests.

The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests actually given
were similar in every respect to those they had seen students of this private university holding
proudly around the city.

The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the Supreme
Court institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul
the test papers of the students of the particular university possessed of those tests before the
examinations.

The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close on the heels
of the revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student body of the University of
the Philippines, on recent government tests wherein the questions had come into the possession of
nearly all the graduates of some private technical schools.

To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been called, and Mr. Justice
Padilla, who had previously been designated Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners for this year, by
authority of the Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the assistance of Mr. E. Soriano,
Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. In this connection, and for purposes of
showing the interest of the Supreme Court in the news item and its implications, it may here be stated that
this Court is and for many years has been, in charge of the Bar Examinations held every year, including that
of this year, held in August, 1948. Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this
Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule
127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations
yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year,
acts on the report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates
and examinees who have passed the examinations.

The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which occasion he testified
under oath and, answering questions directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the
author of the news item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith and in a spirit of public
service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information which formed the basis of his
publication but that he declined to reveal their names because the information was given to him in
confidence and his informants did not wish to have their identities revealed. The investigators informed
Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the confidence of the public in the regularity and cleanliness
of the Bar Examinations and also in the Supreme Court which conducted said examinations, and repeatedly
appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public service, pleading with and urging him to reveal the names of
his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in a position to start and conduct the necessary
investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties
responsible for the alleged irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make
the revelation.

In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the Supreme Court as associate Justice in
the latter part of August, 1948, was designated to succeed Mr. Justice Padilla as Chairman of the
Committee of Bar Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of Justice. The writer of this
opinion was furnished a copy of the transcript of the investigation conducted on September 18, 1948, and he
made a report thereof to the Court in banc, resulting in the issuance of the resolution of this Court dated
October 7, 1948, which reads as follows:

In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of the Star Reporter, issue of
September 14, 1948, regarding alleged leakage in some bar examination questions, which
examinations were held in August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner, and Mr. E.
Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were authorized by Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla then chairman of the
committee of bar examiners to conduct an investigation thereof, particularly to receive the
testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter responsible for and author of said news item. An
investigation was conducted on September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were taken of the
testimony of Mr. Parazo, and Mr. Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor, the new chairman of the
committee of bar examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes for the consideration of this
Court.

From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has deliberately and consistently
declined and refused to reveal the identity of the persons supposed to have given him the data and
information on which his news item was based, despite the repeated appeals made to his civic
spirit, and for his cooperations, in order to enable this Court to conduct a thorough investigation of
the alleged bar examination anomaly, Resolved, to authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr.
Parazo before him, explain to him that the interests of the State demand and so this Court requires
that he reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news item, and to warn him that
his refusal to make the revelation demanded will be regarded as contempt of court and penalized
accordingly. Mr. Justice Montemayor will advise the Court of the result.

Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear before him on October 13,
1948. He appeared on the date set and it was clearly explained to him that the interest of the State demands
and this court requires that he reveal the source of sources of his information and of his news item; that this
was a very serious matter involving the confidence of the people in general and the law practitioners and bar
examinees in particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of the bar examinations; that it also involves the
good name and reputation of the bar examiners who are appointed by this Court to prepare the bar
examinations questions and later pass upon and correct the examinations questions and last but not least, it
also involves and is bound to affect the confidence of the whole country in the very Supreme Court which is
conducting the bar examinations. It was further explained to him that the Supreme Court is keenly interested
in investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of the examination questions and is determined to punish
the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help, specially the identities of the persons who
furnished him the information and who could give the court the necessary data and evidence, the Court
could not even begin the investigation because there would be no basis from which to start, not even a clue
from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under the law he could be punished if he
refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even involve imprisonment.

Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and consider the
consequences, and if he need time within which to do this and so that he might even consult the editor and
publisher of his paper, the Star Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at his request, the
investigation was postponed to October 15, 1948. On that date he appeared, accompanied by his counsel,
Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer of this opinion in the presence of his counsel, several
newspapermen, Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and Mr. Chanliongco made a formal
demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under oath, but he declined and refused to
make the revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before this Court take action upon his refusal to
reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court first obtained, a public hearing was held on
the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney Serrano extensively and ably argued the
case of his client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 53, the first section of which reads as follows:

SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or
periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or
information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor
or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is
demanded by the interest of the state.

This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration, involving as it does interesting
and important points of law as well as questions of national importance. Counsel contends that the phrase
"interest of the state" found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and refers only to the
security of the state, that is to say — that only when National Security or public safety is involved, may this
Court compel the defendant to reveal the source or sources of his news report or information. We confess
that it was not easy to decide this legal question on which the conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a
matter of facts, the vote of the Justice is not unanimous.

In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53, particularly the
Senate were it originated, we examined the record of the proceedings in said legislative body when this Act,
then Senate Bill No. 6 was being discussed. We gathered from the said record that the original bill prepared
by Senator Sotto provided that the immunity to be accorded a publisher, editor, or reporter of any newspaper
was absolute and that under no circumstance could he be compelled to reveal the source of his information
or news report. The committee, however, under the chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an
amendment or change, by adding to the end of section 1 of the clause "unless the court finds that such
revelation is demanded by the public interest."

When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading, Senator Sotto, the author of
the original bill proposed an amendment by eliminating the clause added by the committee — "unless the
court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," claiming that said clause would kill the
purposed of the bill. This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected to the
elimination of the clause already referred to on the ground that without such exception and by giving
complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may be committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee
chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the Sotto amendment, and in defending the exception embodied
in the amendment introduced by the Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless the court finds that such
revelation is demanded by the public interest," said that the Committee could not accept the Sotto
amendment because there may be cases, perhaps few, in which the interest of the public or the interest of
the state required that the names of the informants be published or known. He gave as one example a case
of a newspaperman publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or fortifications. He argued
that if the immunity accorded a newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto amendment, the
author of the theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a vote, it was disapproved.
Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the phrase "public interest" at the end of
section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and substituted by the phrase "interest of the state,"
claiming that the phrase public interest was too elastic. Without much discussion this last amendment was
approved, and this phrase is now found in the Act as finally approved.

In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is confined to cases involving
the "security of the state" or "public safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the last amendment
proposed by Senator Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state," was approved
without much discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations on and discussion of the bill in
the Senate that the phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably by some Senators with the phrase
"interest of the state." For instance, although the bill, as amended by the Committee presided by Senator
Cuenco, used the words "public interest, "when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill before the Senate he
used in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest of the State" (interes del Estado). Again, although the bill,
as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee and discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest,
"Senator Sebastian referred to the exception by using the phrase "interest of the state." This understanding
of at least two of the Senators, who took part in the discussion, about the similarity or interchangeability of
the two phrases "public interest" and "interest of the estate," may account for the readiness or lack of
objection on the part of the Senate, after it had rejected the first Sotto amendment, to accept the second
Sotto amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state."

In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was involved, such as the theft of the
plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco was obviously giving it only as an example of what he meant by
"interest of the state;" it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not propose to define or fix
the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the state"
can not be confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public safety" alone. These synonymous
phrases, — "security of the state" and "public safety," — are not uncommon terms and we can well presume
that the legislators were familiar with them. The phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5) of
the Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of communications and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or whenpublic safety and order require otherwise;"
and Article VII, section 10(2) of the same Constitution provided that the President may suspend the
privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when thepublic safety requires
it.

The phrase "National Security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, thus: Title I,
— Crimes against National Security and the law of Nations, Chapter I, — Crimes against National Security.
Then, more recently, the phrase "National Security" was used in section 2, and the phrase "public
security" was equally used in section 19, of Commonwealth Act No. 682 creating the People's Court,
promulgated on September 25, 1945. If, as contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine
Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the immunity of newspapermen only to cases where the "security
of the state," i.e., "National Security" is involved, it could easily and readily have used such phrase or any
one of similar phrases like "public safety," "National Security," or "public security" of which it must have been
familiar. Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind and intent of the
legislators, and that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it extended the scope and the limits of the
exception when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the sources of his information.

The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more general and broader than
"security of the state." Although not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest" which may include
most anything though of minor importance, but affecting the public, such as for instance, the establishment
and maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants, parks, markets, etc., the phrase "interest of the
estate" even under a conservative interpretation, may and does include cases and matters of national
importance in which the whole state and nations, not only a branch or instrumentality thereof such as a
province, city or town, or a part of the public, is interested or would be affected, such as the principal
functions of Government like administration of justice, public school system, and such matters like social
justice, scientific research, practice of law or of medicine, impeachment of high Government officials, treaties
with other nations, integrity of the three coordinate branches of the Government, their relations to each
other, and the discharge of their functions, etc.

We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the state." Under
constitutional provision, article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court takes
charge of the admission of members to the Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the
qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the subject of the said
Bar Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar examiners who prepare the questions,
then correct the examination papers submitted by the examinees, and later make their report to the
Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination candidates who are found to have obtained to passing grade
are admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice law. There are now thousands of members of the Philippine
Bar, scattered all over the Philippines, practicing law or occupying important Government posts requiring
membership in the Bar as a prerequisite, and every year, quite a number, sometimes several hundreds, are
added to the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high
standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and
fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high
standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only
those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and
knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the
regular and usual manner. It is of public knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions
obtaining in this country, or the great demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared to other
professions, is the most popular in these islands. The predominantly greater number of members of the Bar,
schools and colleges of law as compared to those of other learned professions, attest to this fact. And one
important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the
Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the
Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or insinuation of
anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and
national importance.

If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way out and get into the
hands of Bar examinees before the examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof some
examinees succeed in illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are later admitted to the Bar
and to the practice of law, when otherwise they should not be, then the present members of the legal
profession would have reason to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be long before
the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute. The public would naturally lose confidence in the lawyers,
specially in the new ones, because a person contemplating to go to court to seek redress or to defend
himself before it would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom he is entrusting his case has legally
passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient and adequate preparation and training, and that he is
honest, or whether he was one of those who had succeeded in getting hold of Bar Examination questions in
advance, passed the Bar Examinations illegally, and then started his legal career with this act of dishonesty.
Particularly, the Bar examinees who, by intense study and conscientious preparations, have honestly
passed the Bar Examinations and are admitted to practice law, would be affected by this anomaly, because
they would ever be under a cloud of suspicion, since from the point of view of the public, they might be
among those who had made use of Bar Examination questions obtained before hand. And, incidentally, the
morale of the hundreds of students and graduates of the different law schools, studying law and later
preparing for the Bar Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in them may be born the idea
that there is no need of much law study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not difficult to obtain
copies of questions before the examinations and pass them and be admitted to the Bar.

The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners themselves, eight eminent lawyers who
in a spirit of public service and civic spirit, have consented to serve on the Committee of Examiners at the
request and designation of this Court. They would be suspected, — one or two or more of them — that
through negligence, or connivance, or downright corruption, they have made possible the release if they
have not themselves actually released, before examination day, the questions they had prepared. The
employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the Bar Examinations, specially those who copy or
mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly,
and more important still, the Supreme Court itself which has to overall supervision and control over the
examinations, would share the suspicion, as a result of which the confidence of the people in this High
Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of this Court like to think and believe, it still enjoys, might be
affected and shaken. All these considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can and will sufficiently
cause the present case to fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state,"
involving as it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and of
the entire legal profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation of the members of the
Committee of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and
connections with said examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of
the three coordinate and independent branches or departments of the Philippine Government.

In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act. No. 53 to this Court, we
have the inherent power of courts in general, specially of the Supreme Court as representative of the
Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and render possible
and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of charges of
error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the
Court. (Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil., 350; 21 C.J.S. 41, 138.) As we have previously stated, the
revelation demanded of the respondent, of the identity of his informants, is essential and necessary to the
investigation of the charge contained in the publication already mentioned.

It will be noticed from Parazo's news item as quoted in the first part of this decision, that, informants, law
graduates and bar examinees, were denouncing the supposed anomaly — consisting of the alleged leakage
of the Bar Examination questions — to the Supreme Court for due investigation. If those persons really
meant and intended to make a bona fide and effective denunciation, with expectation of results, the right
place to air their grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a newspaper; and if they truly wanted an
investigation, they should have come forward and furnished or stood ready to furnish the facts on which to
base and from which to start an investigation, instead of concealing themselves behind the curtain of press
immunity.

Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar Examination questions in at
least one subject had been obtained and used by bar examinees coming from a certain university, one week
before the examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements and answers during the investigation
said that examination questions in several subjects were involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies of
said examination questions were furnished us. No one is willing to testify that he actually saw said alleged
copies of examination questions; that they were actually and carefully compared with the legitimate
examination questions given out on the day of the examination and found to be identical; no one is ready
and willing to reveal the identity of the persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with the said Bar
Examination questions, although they as well as the university where they came from, was known; and even
the law subjects to which the questions pertained are not disclosed; and, lastly, we are not allowed to know
even the identity of respondent Parazo's informants who claim to have seen all these things.

In this connection it may be stated that in the las Bar Examinations held in August, 1948, approximately nine
hundred candidates took them, each candidate writing his answers in a book for each subject. There were
eight subjects, each belonging to and corresponding to each one of the eight bar examiners. There were
therefore eight sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying these eight sets of questions by nine
hundred candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two hundred (7,200) examination papers involved, in
the hand of eight different examiners. The examination books or papers bear no names or identifications of
their writers or owners and said ownership and identification will not be known until the books or papers are
all corrected and graded. Without definite assurance based on reliable witnesses under oath that the alleged
anomaly had actually been committed, — evidence on the identity of the persons in possession of the
alleged copies of questions prematurely released or illegally obtained and made use of, the law subjects or
subjects involved, the university from which said persons come, this Court does not feel capable of or
warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and desperately revising each and every one of the 7,200
examination books with the fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or identity in the answers of any
group of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or conclusion. Apart from the enormity of the
task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its findings and conclusions, especially in
any serious and delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of evidence. Under these circumstances, this
Court, for lack of basis, data and information, is unable to conduct, nay, even start, an investigation; and,
unless and until the respondent herein reveals the identities of his informants, and those informants and or
others with facts and reliable evidence, aid and cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further examine
and probe into the charges contained in the news items, said charges are considered and held to be without
basis, proof or foundation.

When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of his
informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to
start an investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean and above board
and specially, not only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for membership therein and the
public dealing with the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with and act as agents of
this Court in preparing the examination questions and correcting the examination papers, but also, as
already stated, to keep the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge of its
function relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do by investigating any Bar
Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and punishing those found guilty, even annulling examinations
already held, or else declaring the charges as not proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it is found that
there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of his
information, this Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted their
help and cooperation. In this Court's endeavor to probe thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity allegedly
committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty parties, if the
charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to the innocent
parties who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this because in every examination,
whether conducted by the Government or by a private institution, certain standards are unconsciously
adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of the correction of many or all of
the examination papers, it is found that only very few have passed it, the examiner might reasonably think
that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to understand, or too long, as a result of which he
may be more liberal and be more lenient and make allowances. On the hand, if too many obtain passing
grade, the examiner may think that the examination questions were too easy and constitute an inadequate
measure of the legal knowledge and training required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and
become more strict in his correction of the papers and his appreciation of the answers. So, in a case where
examinees, especially if many, succeed in getting hold of questions long before examinations day, and study
and prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that many of the
examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think that said questions were too
easy, raise the standard by being strict in his correction of the papers, thereby giving a grade below passing
to a number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the examinations.

In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent Angel J.
Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information which formed the basis of his news items or story in
the September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of his decision, and that, in
refusing to make the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The
respondent repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the names and identities of the persons
who furnished him the information. In other words, he omitted and still refuses to do an act commanded by
this Court which is yet in his power to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.)Ordinarily, in such cases,
he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand. However, considering that
case like the present are not common or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and
immediate necessity for imposing a heavy penalty, as may be done in other cases where it is advisable or
necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number of cases of a certain
offense or a crime wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent, the majority of the
members of this Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest and confinement in
jail for a period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court the
revelation demanded of him. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

Perfecto, J., concurring and dissenting:

The facts in this case, as narrated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Montemayor, justify conclusively
the finding of the majority that respondent is guilty of contempt for his stubborn refusal to obey an order of
this Court.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 53, invoked by respondent in his defense, does not protect him. It would
protect him only if we could agree with his theory that the words "interest of the state" used in the law should
be read to mean security of the state or public safety. But there is nothing in the whole text of Republic Act
No. 53 and/or in the intention of those who drafted and enacted it, as can be gleaned in the Senate journal,
or in the grammatical, rhetorical, or philosophical meaning of the words in question, that can justify the
limiting or narrowing of the scope of the ideas that they embrace within the small circle of public security or
safety of the state.

The word "interest" in the phrase "interest of the state" represents a world of ideas and concepts within the
ideas of security or safety occupy a place, however privileged, insignificant in magnitude. There is no legal
basis for us to reduce the purpose of the law, as conveyed by its very words, to a minimum that, if given
effect, would virtually amend the law without the benefit of congressional enactment. Such would be violative
of the Constitution.

In the tug of war between the theory of absolute privilege of the author of the original bill and the Senate
committee that would limit the privilege up to the point where it runs in conflict with the wide area of public
interest, the opposing sides arrived at a meeting ground in which the line of limitation was pushed up to the
place where the privilege may be in conflict with the interest of the state. No one is authorized to push that
line of limitation still farther to the fence surrounding the safety of the state. We have to stop at the line of
limitation set by Congress. To hurdle it is to transgress the law.

No matter how much we may agree with the side maintaining the absolute privilege or reducing any
limitation to an imaginable minimum, or how much we may sympathize with its failure in the Senate or in
Congress, we are powerless to retrieve that side from its plight. We are not authorized to inject in the statute
a law of our own creation, or make of a legislative failure a success, and thus defeat the legislative intent.
There is no alternative for the losing legislative side except to bide for time and wait for a more respective
mood of Congress.

Contempt of court is an offense that should not be left unpunished, especially if it consists in the
disobedience of a judicial order. The orders of a court demand obedience for their effectiveness.
Administration of justice is impossible with unenforceable judicial orders. The effectiveness of judicial orders
is the elan vital of the administration of justice. To disobey an order of court is a terrible thing because it
means sowing the seeds of anarchy and chaos. The Supreme Court, if it can help it, will never allow such a
thing to obtain.

Anyone may imagine a state or a human society smoothly functioning without an executive department or
without a legislative department. As a matter of fact, in this Republic, Congress functions only one third of
the year. During the remaining two thirds of the year the life of the nation does not suffer any impairment. It
can even be said that during those two thirds of the year there is more normalcy than during the
Congressional session when legislative reforms and the enactment of new laws cannot but produce some
public uneasiness, sometimes, amounting to a real crisis in the way of life of the people. No one can imagine
the possibility of an orderly human society without some effective system of administration of justice,
functioning without long interruptions.

While we cannot overemphasize the importance of upholding judicial authority to its full measure and this
Supreme Court will never take lightly any disobedience to or defiance of its orders, and it should mete out to
all affected parties the tremendous weight of its power and will punish, without fear or favor, the guilty
parties, regardless of who they may be, in the present case we are constrained to disagree with the penalty
imposed upon respondent.

Respondent is punished under section 7 of Rule 64, the same section we have already declared invalid in
our opinion in the Harden case, 81 Phil., 741. The provision of law applicable to respondent is contained in
section 6 of Rule 64, under which a person guilty of contempt may be fined in a sum not exceeding P1,000
or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both. Considering that there are mitigating circumstances that
attenuate respondent's responsibility, — youthfulness, honest but wrong belief in the existence of a privilege,
absence of substantial harm, — we should not impose upon respondent a stiffer penalty than that which we
imposed in the case of Benito M. Sakdalan, L-2781, the very one which, as can be gleaned from the Senate
journal, prompted the enactment of Republic Act No. 53.

We cannot agree with the proviso in the majority opinion leaving to respondent the discretion to reduce the
imprisonment imposed by the simple process of making the revelation exacted from him. The penalty should
be measured by the responsibility, and that measure cannot be left at the discretion of the guilty one. His
future revelation will not diminish or in any way affect his responsibility for the offense he has already
perpetrated. His past disobedience cannot be attenuated by a future action. The past cannot be remade.
What has been done cannot be undone. These are verities no one can eloign.

We vote to impose upon respondent two days of imprisonment.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

If, as insisted by the respondent, he wrote up and published in the newspaper Star Reporter the story (Claim
"Leak" in Last Bar Tests) quoted in full in the decision of the majority, in good faith and in a spirit of public
service, he voluntarily should have revealed the identities of his informants, thereby enabling this Court,
conformably to the alleged demands of denouncing bar examinees, to "institute an immediate probe into the
matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annual the test papers of the students of the particular
university possessed of those tests before the examinations." If he was in fact motivated by a spirit of public
service, he should at least have tried to secure their consent to the revelation. The point I want to
underscore is that newspaper reporters should be fearless as well in publishing stories as in substantiating
their truth. And if I am constrained to dissent from the ruling of the majority, it is only because the
respondent, in my opinion, cannot legally be compelled to make the revelation, in view of Republic Act No.
53 — which this Court is bound to enforce — providing that "the publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter
of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of
any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such
publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation
is demanded by the interest of the state." I have no hesitancy in believing that the phrase "interest of the
state," as used in the Act, refers exclusively to matters affecting the security or safety of the state.

In this connection, it is necessary to remember that the original bill sponsored by Senator Sotto provided for
absolute immunity. The committee on revision of laws, however, inserted an amendment by adding the
clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest." Senator Sotto's
attempt to suppress this clause failed, after which, in view of the remarks of the Chairman of the committee
presently to be mentioned, Senator Sotto proposed to change the words "public interest" into "interest of the
state," a proposal that was readily accepted. Hence, the use of the latter phrase in Republic Act No. 53.

Our task now is to discover the meaning and scope of the phrase "interest of the state," as intended by the
lawmakers. In this task, it is important to recall that the original intention of the author of the bill was to
provide for absolute immunity, and this purpose should not of course be unduly defeated by any subsequent
exception, especially when the limited sphere of the change is apparent from the deliberations of the
lawmakers. For instance, in explaining the reason of the committee for opposing Senator Sotto's advocacy
of absolute immunity and of the suppression of the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is
demanded by the public interest," added to the original bill, Senator Cuenco gave the example of a
newspaperman who publishes an information regarding theft of plans of forts and fortifications, in which
case Senator Cuenco believed that "el interes publico y el interes mismo del Estado requieran que se
publique el nombre del informante." Again, after proposing the change of "public interest" to "interest of the
state," Senator Sotto, when asked by Senator Garcia as to the essential difference between the two
phrases, explained that "La diferencia esta en que puede haber un caso de espionaje, como el citado por el
Senador Cuenco, delito en que esta interesado el Estado y no se puede discutir al autor, y la frase `public
interest' es muy elastica. En cambio, se se pone `interest of the state,' claramente se entenderia que
mediando el interes del Estado, el periodista estara obligado a revelar la fuente de su informacion." Last but
not least, it should be noted that the Act in question was prompted by the desire of its sponsor to prevent the
repetition of the case of Benito Sakdalan, a reporter who was imprisoned for refusing to reveal the source of
the information contained in a news item admittedly not affecting, like the story published by the respondent,
the security or safety of the State. It logically follows that the phrase "interest of the state" was intended to
be limited to cases portrayed by the examples (theft of plans of forts and fortifications and espionage), given
during the deliberations which solely affect the security or safety of the state.

It is immaterial whether the law did not employ phrases like "public safety," "national Security," or "public
security," or whether "public interest" and "interest of the state" were interchangeably used in the
discussions, as long as in using the phrase "interest of the state" in Act No. 53, the lawmakers definitely
knew and accordingly recorded, by specific examples, what they intended to convey. Conjectures cannot
prevail over the clear legislative intent.

The exception provided in the Act in question should be strictly construed so as not to frustrate the main
purpose of the law. This would further make the law more consonant with the spirit of the constitutional
provisions that "the privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the Court or when public safety and order require otherwise"(Article III, section 1, paragraph 5), and
that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of the press (Article III, section 1, paragraph 8).

It may not be amiss to add that the refusal of the respondent to disclose the source of his information does
not absolutely prevent this Court from verifying, by any reasonable and feasible means, the truth of the
alleged anomaly; and it is certainly not required, by the mere publication of the story in question, to admit the
accuracy of said story if its investigation should fail because of lack of evidence or of the refusal of those
who know to come out and testify.

In my opinion, the respondent has not committed any contempt of this Court.

Briones, M., dissenting:

Deploro no podeer estar conforme con la decision de la mayoria sobre este incidente. Me preocupa como al
que mas el buen nobmre, el prestigio, la respetabilidad de esta Corte Suprema — baluarte inexpugnable de
las libertades y fueros civiles — pero hay algo que me preocupa mas y esla substancia misma de esas
libertades y fueros. En realidad, en tanto la Corte Suprema crece y se agiganta en el concepto publico en
cuanto ella se mantiene enhiesta en la cima de la cumbre donde la coloca su categoria y constituye la
ultima esperanza del ciudadano cuando en su derredor todo parece crujir y requebrajarse.

El recurrido, Angel Parazo, es reportero del periodico diario "The Star Reporter" que se edita en Manila. A
raiz de los ultimos examenes de abogacia, publico un articulo informativo en el que se decia que algunos
examinandos habian visto copias de algunos cuestionarios antes de la celebracion de los examenes y que
dichas copias fueron utilizadas por los examinandos procedentes de cierta universidad privada. El
Magistrado encargado de los examenes emplazo al recurrido para que explicase la noticia y diese los
nombres de sus informantes a fin de poder investigarles minuciosamente y ver la manera de adoptar las
medidas que fueran procedentes. El recurrido comparecio, pero se nego en absoluto a revelar el origen de
su informacion. De ahi el presente expediente por desacato.

La controversia gira en torno a la interpretacion del articulo 1 de la Ley de la Republica No. 53, aprobada
por el Congreso en su ultimo periodo de sesiones. Dicho articulo se lee como sigue:

El publicista, editor o reportero debidamente acreditado de cualquier periodico, revista o

publicacion periodica de circulacion general, no puede ser compelido a revelar el origen de
cualquier noticia o informacion que le haya sido transmitida en confianza y que haya aparecido en
dicho periodico, revista o publicacion, a menos que el tribunal o una camara del Congreso o un
comite del mismo halley y determine que el interes del Estado requiere que se haga tal revelacion.

Podemos tomar conocimiento judicial de las motivaciones de esta ley como tema de historia
contemporanea. Hace dos años un juez del Tribunal del Pueblo (People's Court) lanzo publicamente
algunos ataques contra esta Corte. Un periodista, Benito Sakdalan, se hizo eco de dichos ataques
publicando bajo su firma y responsabilidad un articulo informativo acerca del particular. A instancia de parte,
un Magistrado de esta Corte mando emplazar a Sakdalan para una investigacion del incidente. Sakdalan
comparecio, pero cuando se le pregunto de quien habia recibido su informacion, negose en absoluto a
hacer la revelacion exigid. El Magistrado de referencia ordeno entonces que se le detuviera a Sakdalan en
la escribania de esta Corte por dos dias, en castigo por lo que se creyo un desacato.

El caso Sakdalan causo un revuelo tremendo en la prensa, despertando entre sus camaradas una general
simpatia perfectamente explicable. Sakdalan se convirtio en heroe del dia, por lo menos en las columnas de
los periodicos. El tono predominante de los comentarios periodisticos era que Sakdalan estaba justificado
en su negativa,que el sagrado de la conciencia del periodista debia ser respetado, y que la orden de
detencion constituia una violacionde la libertad de la prensa. El revuelo repercutio en los circulos
legislativos, culminando en las aprobacion de la Ley de la Republica No. 53 que nos ocupa.

Resulta importante y util destacar este fondo historico, pues por ello se explican ciertas caracteristicas del
proyecto de ley original presentado en el Senado. Una de las mas salientes, por ejemplo, era lo absoluto del
privilegio: no se proveia ninguna excepcion, ninguna salvedad, no pudiendose obligar al periodista a revelar
el origen de su informacion bajo ninguna circunstancia.

La medida tiene antecedentes bien conocidos en nuestra misma legislacion. Primeramente en el antiguo
Codigo de Procedimiento Civil, y ahora en el Reglamento de los Tribunales, figuran ciertas disposiciones
que restringen la libertad para testificar o el derecho de examinar a ciertos testigos sobre determinadas
materias. Verbigracia, en nuestra ley sobre pruebas y evidencias, regla 123, seccion 26, se provee lo
siguiente:
 xxx xxx xxx

(e) El abogado no puede, sin el consentimiento de su cliente, ser examinado respecto a una
conversacion que tuvo con este, o acerca de algun consejo que le diera como tal, ni tampoco el
secretario,taquigrafo o empleado de un abogado, sin el consentimiento del cliente y del abogado,
pueden ser examinados respecto a un hecho cuyo conocimiento hayan adquirido en el desempeño
de sus deberes.

(f) A ninguna persona debidemante autorizada para ejercer la medicina, la cirugia o la obstetricia,
se obligara en alguna causa civil, a revelar, sin el consentimento del paciente, cualquier informe
que dicha persona haya adquirido al sistir al paciente con caracter profesional, que
necesariamente hubo de adquirir para poder obrar con tal caracter, y que tienda a denigrar la
dignidad del paciente.

(g) El clerigo o sacerdote no puede ser examinado sin el consentimiento de su penitente, respecto
a la confesion que le haya hehco este, en su caracter sacerdotal, y en cumplimiento de los
deberes que le impone la religion a que pertenece.

(h) El funcionario publico no puede ser examinado mientras este en el ejercicio de su cargo, o
despues, respecto a lo que se le hubiese comunicado en confidencia oficial, cuando el tribunal
determine que el interes poublico se perjudicara con la revelacion.

Es indudable que la medida coloca al periodista en la categoria de estas exenciones especialisimas,

situandole al nivel del sacerdote, del abogado y del medico. El Senador Cuenco, ponente del proyecto de
ley al ponerse a discusion, dijo en parte lo que sigue a modo de explicacion de sus elevados fines:

El proyecto de ley que esta ahora bajo la consideracion de esta Camara tiene por objeto eximir al
director, redactor o reporter de un periodico, de la obligacion de revelar el nombre de la persona de
quien haya obtenido una informacion, a menos que el interes del Estado asi lo requiera. La
legislacion que se trata de dictar ne es del todo nueva. Nuestra ley procesal considera como
privilegiada y digna de ser mantenida en secreto toda communicacion recibida por el sacerdote, el
abogado y el medico en el ejercicio de su ministerio o profesion. El proyecto no solo dignifica y
eleva la profesion periodistica, sino que da facilidades a los periodicos para obtener noticias. (El
subrayado es nuestro.)

El periodismo, mas que un medio para obtener bienes materiales, es un apostolado, un

sacerdocio. El periodista no es un mercachifle, sino una persona llamada a cumplir una mision
elevada, sublime, augusta. La hoja periodica es catedra. De ella irradia la luz que difunde la
cultura, la instruccion, los principios eticos y morales, las reglas de una ciudadania honrada y
patriotica. (Diario de sesiiones del Senado, Julio 9, 1946.)

Elevar y ennoblecer la profesion del periodista y dar facilidades a los periodicos para obtener una
informacion honrada, veridica, imparcial y constructiva — cometido essencial de una buena prensa, digna
del apelativo de cuarto poder del Estado — tal es el objeto fundamental de la medida, en franse definidora
del Senador Cuenco, ponente de la misma y chairman del comite de revision de leyes del Senado. Es
importante destacar esta motivacion legislativa, pues ello nos ayuda, al interpretar la ley, a determinar si el
privilegio debe ser entendido rigidamente en contra o liberalmente en pro del periodista. Estimo que la
indicada exposicion de motivos justifica, mas aun, requiere una interpretacion liberal.

Como queda dicho, en el proyecto de ley original presentado por el Senador Sotto el privilegio se establecia
de una manera absoluta, incondicional. Sin embargo, el comite de revision de leyes del Senado al cual se
habia endosado el bill, lo informo con una enmienda, añadiendo al final del articulo 1 transcrito arriba las
siguientes palabras: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest." * Al
discutirse, sin embargo, el proyecto en pleno Senado, Sotto formulo una enmienda mediante la supresion
de la salvedad insertada por el comite, tratando asi de restaurar la fraseologia original del proyecto.
Cuenco, en su caracter de ponente y chairman del comite de revision de leyes, se opuso a la enmienda
Sotto por supresion y siguio un debate bastante extenso. Sotto dijo enfaticamente que "esas palabras
deben suprimirse porque matan el objeto del proyecto de ley. Si, como ha dicho el sesudo presidente del
comite de revision de leyes, el pretende colocar al periodista en el mismo nivel del sacerdote, tengamos en
cuenta que en el caso de este no hay esa excepcion."

Cuenco, cerrando el debate, hizo las siguientas manifestaciones en contra de la enmienda Sotto:

El Sen. CUENCO. Señor Presidente, como ya he manifestado el Comite siente no poder aceptar la
enmienda, porque puede haber casos, quiza muy contados, en que el interes publico y el
interesmismo del Estado requieran que se publique el nombre del informante. Supongamos que un
periodista publicara una informacion referente al hurto o sustraccion de unos planos de fortalezas
o de un sitio importante de defensa. Si la inmunidad que se otorga al periodista fuese absoluta,
como la que se propone en la enmienda, el autor de la sustraccion pordria quedar impune.

Señor Presidente: he sido periodista por espacio de veinticinco años y me honro en serlo, antes
que abogado, antes que legislador, pero, por lo mismo que tengo un concepto elevado de la
profesion no quisiera que se diese el caso de que una traicion al estado quedase impune: que
nosotros llevasemos a extremos exagerados la proteccion que se da al periodista.

Puesta a votacion la enmienda, fue rechazada, votanda a favor 3 y en contra 7.

Sotto, sin embargo, no se dio por enteramente derrotado. Esforzandose por sacar avante su proyecto de ley
con la menor cortapisa posible para la lilbertad de la prensa, propuso otra enmienda en el sentido de
sustituir las palabras "public interest" con "interest of the State," de tal suerte que la salvedad se leyera
como sigue: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the State." * Ya no
hubo debate sobre esta enmienda: el mismo comite la acepto, por boca de su chairman el Senador Cuenco.
Puesto a votacion, la misma se aprobo por unanimidad. Sin embargo, antes de la votacion, el Senador
Garcia pregunto que diferencia esencial habia entre las frases "public interest" e "interest of the State".
Sotto contesto que "la diferencia esta en que puede haber uncaso de espionaje como el citado por el
Senador Cuenco, delito en que esta interesado el Estado y no se puede descubrir al autor," mientras que,
por otro lado, la frase "public interest" es muy elastica." "En cambio — continuo Sotto — si se pone "interest
of the State", claramente se entenderia que mediando el interes del Estado, el periodista estara obligado a
revelar la fuente de su informacion." (Diario de Sesiones del Senado, supra.)

De lo expuesto resulta evidente que la sustitucion de la frase "public interest" por la de "interest of the
State"no fue simplemente casual e inimportante, sino que fue harto deliberada, hecha con el proposito de
restringir el alcance de la salvedad. Se dijo que la frase "public interest"es muy elastico y el Senado, en
pleno, acepto este pronunciamiento. Asi que se puso "interest of the State" para denotar que solo se podria
obligar al periodista a descurbirir, como testigo, la fuente de su informacion cuando el Estado
estuviese vitalmente interesado en la materia; es decir, cuando estuviese envuelta la seguridad del Estado,
de la Nacion, conceptos que en este caso se confundirian. En ejemplo del espionaje citado por el Senador
Cuenco, abona esta interpretacion. "Interes del Estado" tiene aqui un significado particularisimo, repelente
de otros casos extraños a la seguridad nacional: ese significado no puedeser mas que el interes del Estado
en su propia viad, en su propia seguridad. No cabe extender el alcance de la frase a otros casos en que el
Estado pudiera estar mas o menos interesado, porque si la intencion del Congreso fuera esa, la frase
"public interest" seria mas que suficiente, pues la misma cubre y comprende todos los matices
publicos desde la seguridad del Estado y de la Nacion hasta el ultimo asunto en que el publico tuviera
interes hasta cierto punto. Esta forma de interpretar es tanto mas logica, obligada, cuanto que los
legisladores aceptaron y aprobaron unanimemente el pronunciamiento de que la frase "public interest" era
muy elastica, cubria demasiado. Por tanto, hay que concluir que cuando adoptaron la frase sustitutiva
"interest of the State," la adoptaron para limitar, para restringir la salved, reduciendola solamente a algunos
casos, muy contados, segun expresion del Senador Cuenco. "¿Que casos son estos" Entiendo que deben
ser congeneres, es decir, del mismo tipo que el caso de espionaje citado; es decir, casos que afecten
vitalmente a la seguridad del Estado, de la Nacion. Verbigracia: una conspiracion para derrocar
violentamente nuestra forma de gobierno y establecer en su lugar una dictadura comunista totalitaria al
estilo sovietico, seria uno de esos muy contados de que habla el Senador ponente. No cabe aplicar,
extender la frase a casos de otra especie, de otro genero, porque ese equivaldria a establecer un
"standard," una norma de interpretacion arbitraria, hasta caprichosa, como mas adelante voy a demostrar,
apreciando que el interes del Estado esta entrañado en algunos asuntos y matices de caracter publico y
excluyendolo, sin embargo, de otros, yen esto sin mas guia y norma que la opinion harto debatible del juez
o tribunal sentenciador sobre lo que es digno de ser catalogado bajo la frase "interes del Estado" y sobre lo
que no lo es.
Resulta evidente, de lo dicho, que no es exacto y carece de fundamento lo que en la decision de la mayoria
se afirma, a saber: que las frases "public interest" o "interest of the State" se entendieron y usaron
indistintamente por los Senadores. Por el contrario, el Diario de Sesiones del Senado demuestra de un
modo inequivoco que los Senadores sabian muy bien lo que hacian al cambiar una frasse por otra y se
daban perfecta cuenta de que el cambio no era simplemente gramatical o lexicografico, sino qu entrañaba
una considerable diferencia en cuanto al significado y alcance de la salvedad o excepcion. Sabian muy bien
quela frase "public interest" es muy elastica, al decir del Senador Sotto, y que desde luego tiene un marco
mucho mas amplio que la frase "interest of the State." La presuncion es que los legisladores toman muy en
serio la tarea de legislar y que cuando cambian una frase por otra lo hacen no por simple capricho, sino con
verdadera deliberacion. La tarea legislativa no es un juego de niños. Pero ¿que mejor prueba de la
diferencia entre ambos conceptos que la misma admision de la mayoria en su decisional decir que "interest
of the State" is not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most anything
though of minor importance but affecting the public"1 ...?lawphil.net

La endoblez de la teoria de la mayoria salta a la vista si se examinan sus implicaciones y consecuencias.

¿Por que decide la mayoria que en el presente caso se halla envuelto el interes del Estado y que, por tanto,
el recurrido esta obligado a revealr la fuente de su informacion y si no lo hace incurre en desacato, punible
con prision? Por varias razones que se exponen en la decision, entre las cuales se destacan las siguientes:
(a) los examenes de abogados estan colocados bajo la alta supervision de esta Corte Suprema, cuyo
prestigio, buen nombre y respectabilidad es de supremo interes del Estado el conservar y mantener; (b)
miles de abogados se hallan esparcidos por el pais ejerciendo su noble profesion, y centenares si no miles
se anaden cada año a esa vasta legion; asi que la Corte Suprema y esta enorme masa de letrados
estanvitalmente interesados en elevar el "standard" profesional, procurando que entren solo los idoneos,
moral e intelectualmente, y este interes cae tambien bajo la catagoria de "interes del Estado"; (c) acaso por
natural inclinacion, la abogacia es la profesion mas popular en Filipinas; de ahi la abundancia de colegios y
escuelas de derecho en donde estudian miles de jovenes de ambos sexos aspirando a ponerse la toa de
Marco Tulio; de ahi naturalmente tambien el interes del Estado en que esa profesion tan popularno caiga en
descredito, cosa que ocurriria facilmente si los examenes de abogados no se efectuasen propia y
honradamente como una prueba rigida de la capacidad y caracter de los examinandos, circulando
previamente cuestionarios de "contrabando" tal como se ha denunciado en el articulo informativo que nos
ocupa; (d) entre los abogados se escoge el personal para la judicatura y la administracion de justicia —
magistrados, jueces de primera instancia, fiscales, jueces de paz y letrados en las diferentes oficinas y
agencias del gobierno; de ahi que sea naturalmente tambien interes del Estado el conservar la integridad y
buen nombre de una profesion que proporciona al gobierno y a la nacion tan valiosos servidores y
elementos; (e) en la pureza de los examenes de abogados esta envuelto no solo el buen nombre de la
Corte Suprema como queda dicho, sino tambien el buen nombre de la junta examinadora y de los
empleados de la Corte que intervienen y vigilan dichos examenes; asi que todo cargo de venalidad y
corrupcion tiene que afectar a dicho buen nombre y proyectar una sombra de sospecha sobre el mismo; de
ahi que sea interes del Estado el que se investiguen implacablemente los cargos para depurar los hechos y
hallar la verdad castigando a los culpables si los hay, y purificando de tal manera los examenes, pero si, por
otro lado, los cargos resultaren falsos, reivindicando el buen nombre de los afectados; (f) en resumen, de lo
dicho se sigue que los examenes de abogados tienen importancia nacional y, por tanto, cualesquier cargos
de venalidad, corrupcion e irregularidad tienen tambien importancia nacional y es interes del Estado el que
se investiguen hasta el limite maximo de las posibilidades legales.

En ultimo analisis, se puede decir que la mayoria estima envuelto en el presente caso el "interes del
Estado,"primero, porque se trata de la profesion de abogado — profesion de noble y vasta significacion
social, juridica y politica — y, segundo, porque tratandose de acusaciones referentes a los examenes de
abogados cuya supervision corresponde a esta Corte Suprema, el buen nombre, el prestigio y la
respetabilidad de este alto tribunal estan necesariamente afectados. Veamos ahora si la tesis puede resistir
a un examen rigido, objetivo.

No sere yo quien discuta o ponga en tela de juicio la prestancia, el elevado rango de la profesion de
abogado a la cual me honro en pertenecer. Pero ¿que hay de las otras profesiones? ¿Son ellas menos
dignas de merecer el supremo interes del Estado? Durante las deliberaciones sobre el presente asunto tuve
ocasion de formular estas preguntas y otras semejantes. Recuerdo que inclusive cite casos especificos
preguntando, por ejemplo, si en los examenes de medicos, farmaceuticos, ingenieros, dentistas y nurses,
no podira tambien considerarse envuelto el interes del Estado si al igual que en este asunto se formulasen
graves cargos de irregularidad, corrupcion y venalidad. Respecto al caso de los medicos no obtuve una
contestacion categorica, definitiva; pero con relacion a las otras profesiones, la respuesta fue
decididamente negativa; respecto a ellas, no cabria invovar el interes del Estado — su rango, su
significacion social no justificarian tal invocacion. Ahora veo que en la decision de la mayoria el ejercicio de
la medicina se incluyo entre los "casos y materias de importancia nacional, en los cuales el Estado o la
nacion entera, y no solo un ramo o instrumento del mismo como una provincia, una ciudad o una pueblo, o
una parte del publico, esta interesado o podrina quedar afectado." Asique, a juicio de la mayoria, el ejercicio
de la medicina es al parecer de indole tan nacional y tan importante como "interes del Estado"; al paso que
las otras profesiones y vocaciones quedan definitivamente excluidas del coto privilegiado.

Los farmeceuticos, sin embargo, podrian naturalmente formular las siguientes preguntas: ¿Por que se va a
postergar nuestra honrada y benemerita profesion? ¿no nos cuesta tanto tiempo y tantos esfuerzos, si no
mas, hacer la carrera que el abogado, verbigracia? ¿no prestamos acaso a la sociedad, a la humanidad, un
servicio tan util, tan indispensable y tan importante como el de cualquier otro profesional? ¿no somos
quienes preparamaos con infinito ciudado las drogas y medicamentos que prescribe y receta el medico?
¿no esta en nuestras manos la salud, la vida, e incluso la muerte de los ciudadanos, de los hombres? ¿por
que, pues, se va a sentenciar que el interes del Estado no esta vinculado en nuestra profesion?

Por su parte, los ingeniereos de todas clases — civiles, industriales, quimicos, mecanicos, navales,
mineros, etc. — podrian hacer estas embarazosas preguntas: "¿Por que todos los mimos y caricias van a
ser para los abogados? ¿nada mas que porque la mayor parte del tiempo nos ponemos la humilde blusa
del obrero y estamos casi siempre sucios -- la suciedad inherente al sudor y mugre del trabajo? ¿no
construimos acaso los caminos, los puentes, los sistemas de aquas, los sistemas de regadio, los hermosos
y enormes edificios particulares y publicos, las ingentes fabricas, en una palabra, todo eso que constituye la
maravillade los presentes tiempos, traduciendo en realidad tangible lo que no parecia ser mas que loca
fantasia de la imaginacion de los poetas? ¿no hemos acaso conquistado el secreto divino de los atomos,
desencadenando, es verdad, las fuerzas ciegas de la destruccion sobre el mundo, pero tambien abriendo
para el genero humano vastos panoramas y perspectivas de progreso y bienestar casi ilimitado? Se dice
que la abogacia es la carrera mas popular y mas codiciada en Filipinas, pero ¿no existe el peligro de que
esta popularidad se este fomentando insensatamente a expensas de la vitalidad de la nacion? ¿nose cree
acaso llegado el momento de que los caudillos y directores del pensamiento en este pais emprendan una
seria cruzada para orientar las aficiones y energias de nuestra juventud hacia carreras mas practicas y mas
constructivas no solo para ellos particularmente, sino sobre todo para la nacion? ¿por que se va a
consagrar precisamente con una sentencia judicial — nada menos que del mas alto tribunal — la
supremacia de la profesion de abogado en este pais, en desdoro de las otras profesiones, por que?"

Y asi, por el estilo, las otras profesiones podrian reclamar y pretender con jusiticia que tienen tanta
categoria como los abogados para que se considere aplicable a ellas el concepto juridico "interes del
Estado" de que habla la ley de la Republica No. 53 que nos ocupa. Y si esto fuese asi, esto es, se estimase
envuelto el "interes del Estado" en casi todas las materias, verbigracia, hasta en los examenes de nurses, al
punto de que interes del Estado equivaldria practicamente a interes publico ¿que quedaria entonces del
privilegio concedido por dicha ley a la prensa? ¿no seria mas bien una letra muerta, como predijo el
Senador Sotto al pedir la supresion de la salvedad o excepcion?

Se dice, con cierto enfasis, que la profesion de abogado tiene una calidad excepcional, un rango
privilegiado, porque de ella se escogen y nombran los magistrados, los jueces de primera instancia, los
jueces de paz y los fiscales, en una palabra, el personal basico de la administracion de justicia. Se ha
insinuado inclusive que de esa profesion surgen regularmente los lideres politicos y sociales de las
naciones y pueblos. Comencemos por esto ultimo. ¿Tienen los abogados la exclusiva del liderato publicos y
social del mundo? Esto lo diria un panegirista de la profesion en un discurso de fin de curso de un colegio
de leyes, pero la historia nos dice que el liderato no ha sido nunca cuestion profesional, sino que el lider ha
surgido como un precipitado individual o social independientemente de las profesiones y oficios. Ha habido
y hay en el mundo muchos caudillos no abogados y, por cierto, los mejores no siemprehan sido siempre los
de esta clase. Es verad que hubo un Lincoln — abogado — uno de los caudillos mas sobresalientes que la
democraica produjera en el mundo; pero tembien hubo un Washington — agrimensor — padre de la nacion
que produjo a Lincoln. Y el caso de Filipinas es todavia mas tipico como demostracion de las tesis de que el
cuadillaje no es cuestion profesional. Como todo el mundo sabe, nuestros dos mas grandes caudillos en el
pasado no eran abogados; Rizal era medico; y Bonifacio, el llamado padre de la democracia filipina, no solo
no era profesional, sino que apenas era nada, academicamente hablando — era un simple bodeguero, un
verdadero plebeyo. Sin embargo, esto no le impidio, mientras fraguaba el acero candente del Katipunan,
empaparse en las gestas de la revolucion francesa leyendo a Thiers en español. (¿Cuantos de nuestros
abogados — dicho sea entre parentesis — sobre todo de la epoca de Bonifacio, habran leido, o siquiera
visto el forro, de la Revolucion Francesa de Thiers?)
Es verdad que el personal basico de la administracion de justicia esta compuesto de abogados, pero en la
misma decision de la mayoria se reconoce que la administracion de justicia es solo una de las principales
funciones del gobierno y a renglon seguido se apunta el sistema de enseñanza publica (public school
system) como otra funcion de importancia nacional. Entonces cabe preguntar: ¿porque no se va a
considerar tambien envuelto el "interes del Estado" en los examenes de maestros, sobre todo si sonde
servicio civil? No solo los maestros constituyen la base de nuestro sistema de enseñanza publica, sino que
incluso tienen mas envergadura nacional porque se cuentan por miles, formando la clase mas numerosa de
nuestros servidores publicos. Sin embargo, en opinion de la mayoria los maestros no tienen suficiente
calibre como los abogados para que se extienda aplicable a ellos la frase "interes del Estado" usada en la
referida ley de Republica No. 53. Este no es mas que uno de los absurdos a que conduce la arbitrariedad
de la norma adoptada por la mayoria en su decision.

Analizare ahora el argumento aquiles de la mayoria. Se dice que el interes del Estado se halla envuelto en
el presente caso porque de por medio anda el prestigio, el buen nombre de esta Corte Suprema en virtud
de las facultades de alta supervision que ejerce sobre los examenes de abogados. El que escribe estas
lineas no cede a nadie en su celo por mantener incolume el prestigio de esta Corte; pero, al propio tiempo,
no puede cerrar los ojos a la realidad, a saber: que no somos mas que uno de los tres poderes del Estado;
que estos poderes son iquales y ninguno de ellos tiene mas prestigio que el otro. Los examenes de
abogados no tienen mas importancia y envergadura nacional porque los supervisamos que, por ejemplo,
los examenes de ingenieros y farmeceuticos, cuyas juntas examinandoras son nombradas por el poder
ejecutivo y son responsables ante el mismo. El poder ejecutivotiene tanto derecho como esta Corte para
velar por su prestigio y buen nombre. Si, como al parecer admite la mayoria, el interes del Estado no se
extiende a los examenes de ingenieros y farmaceuticos por no ser materia de suficiente monta nacional,
luego tampoco debe extenderse a los examenes de abogados tan solo porque la Corte Suprema tiene
intima relacion con estos en virtud de sus facultades de supervision, pues, como queda dicho, ningun poder
es mas prestigioso que el otro — desde luego esta Corte no puede pretender se mas que los otros poderes
del Estado.

Puede aducirse, por analogia, otro buen argumento en favor de la tesis de esta disidencia. Una de las
garantias constitucionales es la inviolabilidad del secreto del la comunicacion y correspondencia, excepto
cuando la seguridad publica y el orden requieran otra cosa y mediante una orden legal del tribunal.
(Constitucion de Filipinas, Articulo III, seccion 5, bill de derechos.) Es verdad que la constitucion habla
de seguridad publica, mientras que la ley de la Republica No. 53 habla de interes del Estado, pero la letra
aqui no es lo importante, sino la identidad del fondo, de la substancia del privilegio.

Se ha insinuado que si se permitiera al periodista ocultar la fuente de su informacion tratandose de asuntos

publicos de reconocida seriedad, ello fomentaria la intriga y la cobardia entre los ciudadanos, sancionando
la abyectada anonimidad, aquello de "tirar la piedra escondiendo la mano." El argumento tiene cierta fuerza,
pero es de dobrel filo. Si se admite la falta o flojedad del valor civico entre los ciudadanos "¿que de malo
hay en que, mientras se fomente y fortalezca esa virtud con la educacion de las masas y los habitos de una
ciudadania militante, se deje a la prensa cierta latitud y cierta libertad para sacar el mejor partido posible de
la anonimidad informativa en sus campañas contra la corrupcion, los abusos y las anomalias? Con esto se
lograria, por lo menos, que la prensa cumpliese y realizase su cometido social concierta efecacia
descorriendo parte del velo, y dejando que el Estado, con sus agencias de investigacion del crimen y de los
chanchullos, haga el resto. Por ejemplo, en el presente caso: ¿por quela Corte Suprema va a insistir en
actuar como se fueseuna agencia policiaca? ¿por que va a tratar al periodista como se este fuese
un detective, obligandole a revelar todos sus datos, incluso los nombres de sus informantes? Nos quejamos
de nuestra impotencia ante al silencio contumaz del recurrido: ¿por que no entregar el caso a la National
Bureau of Investigation — la famosa NBI cuya eficiencia todos reconocen — y dejar que la misma sea guien
se entienda con el recurrido y maneje la informacion de estecon la tecnica y medios de que dispone para
sus investigaciones?

En realidad, el periodista ya rinde un buen serviciocuando denuncia un anomalia si bien reservandose el

nombre de su informante. ¿Por que castigarle si insiste en conservar su secreto, excepto cuando medie la
seguridad del Estado y de la Nacion, unica salvedad que establece la ley? Esta bien que no se le premie o
aplauda por el bien que hace, pero castigarle? Es el colmo!

Es que, se dira, el periodista puede obrar de mal fe denunciando unas anomalias imaginarias y provocando
conello un tremendo escandalo con todos los daños y perjuicios que de ello pueden seguirse para el buen
nombre y la reputacion de las personas y de las instituciones. Es verdad. No se puede negar que hay
bribones en la prensa — esos que en otras ocasiones he llamado "tuisanes de la pluma," peores a veces
que los salteadores de caminos. Tampoco se puede negar que hay lo que se llama prensa amarilla,
dedicada a cultivar el sensacionalismo malsano y morboso. Pero el remedio contra esto no es la ley de la
Republica No. 53 que nos ocupa; existen otros remedios, unos en el codigo penal; otros, en la misma ley de
desacato; y otros, en el desprecio, repulsa y hostilidad de la misma opinion publica, ya que, despues de
todo, la prensa no puede vivir sino del favor publico. Poco despues de la liberacion un periodista publico un
articulo virulento denunciando supuestas anomalias o irrigularidades en relacion con los examenes de
abogados celebrados durente la ocupacion japonesa. Se le emplazo para que probase sus cargos. No los
probo: era evidente la mala fe. Le castigamos por desacato y si no se le impuso una pena mas severa fue
porque canto la palinodia retractandose. (Vease In re Francisco Brillantes, por desacato.)

La Ley de la Republica No. 53 es una medida liberal, progresiva, concebida y promulgada par capacitar la
prensa a realizar su transcendental cometido del mejor modo posible. La prensa es una de las mas
preciosas conquistas y posesiones de nuestra civilizacion. Se puede prescindir de algunas cosas — jamas
de una prensa libre, veraz, eficiente. Sin este formidable implemento social, la democracia no se puede
concebir. Por tanto, la ley debiera interpretarse libremente, hasta el maximo grado de liberalidad,
compatible con la vida y seguridad del Estado.

El caso Sakdalan, que se origino en esta Corte, fue la causa ocasional que determino la aprobacion de esa
ley. Es, en verdad, una deplorable coincidencia que el caso Sakdalan se repita en esta misma Corte con el
presente caso de Parazo, y en peores terminos y circunstancias, pues mientrs a Sakdalan se le tuvo
arrestado por solamente dos dias, a Parazo se le va a encarcelar ahora por un mes. Mucho me temo que
esta decision enturbie una ejecutoria tan preclara de liberalismo como la que abrillanta nuestra
jurisprudencia en materias sobre libertad de imprenta.

Voto en favor de la exoneracion de recurrido.

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, A.C. No. 6593

Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
*ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. * MENDOZA, JJ.

VALENCIA, Promulgated:
Respondents. ______________

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit[1] and a supplemental affidavit[2] for disbarment

against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross

immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:

1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June
23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr.
Daniel Cortes x x x

2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely,
Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and
Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;

3. xxxx

4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters,
Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller
talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and
dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told
me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinsons
Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman and a child who was later
identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido,
respectively x x x

5. xxxx

6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate
of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their daughter and
that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married at
Hongkong sometime on 1978.

7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona
Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x

8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed
financial support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of
financial constraints.

xxxx

That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in

the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I
suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and
sleepless nights; x x x

In his Counter-Affidavit,[3] Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way of

defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David

(Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia

parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his bad boy image

before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems,

Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his
difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second family.

Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that

all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino,

who finished a special secondary course.[4] Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed

and had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years.

Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of

the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26,

1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.

In her Counter-Affidavit,[5] Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She

explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void

from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valenciaclaimed

that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and

Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had

maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his

second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her

silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that

Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.

In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on

Bar Discipline:

First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings [6] in view of the criminal

complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity [7] (of

marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline

denied this motion for lack of merit.

Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss [8] the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of

Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea an absolute nullity. Since
Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality to

file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not committed any immoral act

since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed

before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion. [9]

Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the

respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of

her six (6) children.[10] The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion. [11]

On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner

San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents disbarment. [12] The Commission

on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and adopted this

recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution

in part states:

x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which
lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is
hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P.
Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his

motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.

Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that under

the circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also

argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.

Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his

profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and

irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.

 In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-

Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a

modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh

considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by

filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other

administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.

THE COURTS RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors

against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.

General Considerations

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial
questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant
do not apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. [13]We
have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. [14] First, admission to the practice
of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves
service to the public.[15] The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of
the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of
law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In
this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the
charge is wholly his or her own;[16] effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court.

As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the
filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for
admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal
profession.From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty.
Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[17] the possession of
good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to
the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness
of the respondent before he became a lawyer. [18] Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable
presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar. [19]
 Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of
the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit
applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral
conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment
proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of
discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness
than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after
she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts examination and
consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that
Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but
solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing
friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. [20] Immoral conduct is
gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys
sense of decency.[21] We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct
requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct. [22]

In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful
second marriage or multiple marriages.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23] the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and

subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of misconduct

undermined the institutions of marriage and family institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of

our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and

for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the

wayward respondent.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with

his first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondents act of contracting the second marriage was

contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of

Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.

 Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[25] where the respondent secretly

contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent

exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made

a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared his act of

contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido
established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only
corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during
the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that
the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually
exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already

married to Constancia.[26] This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a
prohibited relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the
subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the
commission of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages
were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on
the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of
Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a
lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not valid.

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an
apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.

Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had
sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life
with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.
 Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position
advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of
mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by
having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of
the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.

He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to
the Bar.[27] As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath, [28] Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court,[29] and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [30] all of which commonly require him to
obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this
second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy
when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.

He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, which commands that he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful

conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that [a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the

integrity and dignity of the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which

provides that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice

law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit

of the legal profession.

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a good

example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it

to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the

public impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy

personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted relationships.

The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms

expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of

Professional Responsibility.[31] Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,

but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [32] Lawyers are at all times subject to the

watchful public eye and community approbation.[33]Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and

private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.[34]
Atty. Valencia

We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be

administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:

x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when
they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character
is required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no
distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or
in his private life. Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall
not relieve respondents from responsibility x x xAlthough the second marriage of the
respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that respondents
exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as members of the
Bar.[35]

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. [36] To have

good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that

he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in

which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known. [37] The requirement of good moral

character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of

lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. [38] Each

purpose is as important as the other.

Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer,

Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea),

and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to

give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years

during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he

had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she

lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose

confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latters family problems, would not aggravate

the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating

the other persons feelings and affection from his wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact

remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would

have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married

man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start.

Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from

legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias

presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with

her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.

We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second marriage to

Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict

legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to

Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.

The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the

country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos second

marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition

of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty.

Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the

celebration of their marriage in Hongkong[39] leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in

Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage

outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to

retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear

to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the

family of this marriage.Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all sharing her husband with another

woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral values.

Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly

immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all

appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled
and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and

engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As

already mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of

shocking the communitys sense of decency; while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped

the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her

husband with the woman of his second marriage.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply

failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. [40] In Barrientos v.

Daarol,[41] we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but must

also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral

standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to

the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.

Conclusion

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law
through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show
the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from
Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar
is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court. [42]

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them.
The records show the parties pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of
mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties imposed
on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.

While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of supporting his
children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated
violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what
under other circumstances are commendable traits of character.

In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a
basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity
of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was
not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle
whose incidents crossed into the illicit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the
Lawyers Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty.
Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P.

Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.

Federico A. Blay for complainant.

Luciano Babiera for respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality.

Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in her verified
complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal knowledge of
her for several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she would not submit to
respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent,
through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer denying any
personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and by way of
special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality.

On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation.

The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:

EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT

Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:

1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern

University, the Chairman of the Board of which was respondent Jose B.
Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);

2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to

approach respondent in the latter's house who assured her that she
would pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go

with him to Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42,
50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;

5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the

same plane (Exh. "A") for Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they
proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador Hotel where they
stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1
975);

6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish

restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp
56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);

7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight, where

respondent had carnal knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next
morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18,
1975);

8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because

for her, she would sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in her
subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;

9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was

suspecting pregnancy because she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn,
July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;

10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college
of medicine) that respondent wanted that an abortion be performed
upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;

11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Monsato

fetched her at her boarding house on the pretext that she would be
examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);
 12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection
and an inhalation mask was placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90,
tsn, July 17, 1 975);

13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an
abortion had already been performed upon her and she was weak,
bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17, 1975);
... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)

Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom complainant
introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10,
1975; Rollo, p. 41).

Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that abdominal
examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no signs of
abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).

The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:

Edilberto Caban testified that:

1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador

Hotel with his wife and children; respondent never came to Manila
except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);

2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila

(p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).

Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:

1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent;

the latter had male companions at the hotel but he did not see any
woman companion of respondent Aznar;

2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate

with him outside the hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan.
13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).

The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General,
respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made against him.

In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations in the
complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in
furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter's approval
of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the school year
1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise contended that the defense did not
bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General because nothing has
been shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.

Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the effect that
respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit:

From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila with
respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would flunk in all
her subjects and she would never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975).
As respondent was Chairman of the College of Medicine, complainant had every reason
to believe him.
 It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to Ambassador
Hotel in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the
threat that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would fail in her Pathology
subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is true that
he presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent
usually slept with them every time the latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not
much of help. None of them mentioned during the hearing that they stayed and slept with
respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973 at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides,
Edilberto Caban testified that respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and
children in December, 1972. The dates in question, however, are February 12 to 14, 1973,
inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the present case" (Rollo, pp.
43-44).

In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar has been
substantiated by sufficient evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and
uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then recommends the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than three (3) years.

On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to determine whether
any intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p. 69).

On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case at bar be
considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report and recommendation previously submitted
together with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).

After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor General that
respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty
of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the offense
imputed upon him. With the exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses presented on
respondent's behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act complained of,
much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies of complainant herself.

While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual
intercourse with the latter, he did not present any evidence to show where he was at that date. While this is
not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he really felt unjustly
traduced.

It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a fit and
proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high
and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once
pronounced by the Court:

When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and
Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. ... In the case
of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty, he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to
meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy
 things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration
which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help
themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively
conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA 439
[1967]).

The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone with
respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children, respondent should
merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).

On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges that since a
period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his
recommendation for a three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as a
lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having been suspended during the said period and
the case dismissed for being moot and academic.

We disagree.

Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a promise to marry
(Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of respondent's marital status is
not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not
because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear
that if she would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine where
complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to believe that respondent could make good his
threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that the
respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in his own right and in fact is not practicing his
profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore
serve no redeeming purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a
lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character
precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with
upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to
continue in the practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the
highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).

Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA
591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct, as follows:

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in
addition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly
immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of
the community' (7 C.J.S. 959).

Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by
reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of
the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken
advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said
college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk
in all her subjects in case she refused.

WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken off from
the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

B. LAWYER’S RELATION WITH OTHER LAWYERS

[A.C. NO. 4947 : June 7, 2007]

ROSA YAP-PARAS, Petitioner, v. ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

GARCIA, J.:

For resolution is this Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment1 dated April 11, 2005, filed by herein petitioner-
movant Rosa Yap Paras against respondent Atty. Justo Paras, for the latter's alleged violation of a
suspension order earlier meted upon him by the Court. The motion alleges:

4. That the respondent in this case admits that he has continued his practice of law and in fact filed
pleadings in court after the receipt of suspension on the ground that the alleged filing of his motion for
reconsideration suspends or interrupt (sic) the running of the period to appeal,

and prays that for his violation of the suspension order, the respondent be declared in contempt of court and
be disbarred.

Briefly, the facts may be stated as follows:

On September 9, 1998, herein petitioner-movant filed a verified Petition2 praying for the disbarment of her
estranged husband respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras alleging acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct,
grossly immoral conduct and violation of oath as a lawyer committed by the latter.

On February 14, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution3 finding Atty. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in
violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the Court resolved to
suspend Atty. Paras from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that commission of
the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Per records, the aforesaid Resolution was received by Atty. Paras on March 18, 2005. Thereafter, he filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated March 28, 2005.4
During the pendency of Atty. Paras' motion for reconsideration, complainant-movant filed with the Court the
instant Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, alleging thereunder, inter alia, that Atty. Paras violated the
suspension order earlier issued by the Court with his continued practice of law.

In time, the Court issued a Resolution dated July 18, 2005, 5 denying for lack of merit Atty. Paras' motion for
reconsideration, to wit:

Administrative Case No. 4947 (Rosa Yap Paras v. Atty. Justo Paras) - Acting on the respondent's motion for
reconsideration dated March 28, 2005 of the resolution of February 14, 2005 which suspended him from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion for lack of merit.

The Court further Resolves to NOTE:

(a) the complainant's opposition dated April 11, 2005 to the said motion for reconsideration with leave of
Court;

(b) the respondent's motion dated May 6, 2005 for immediate resolution of the motion for reconsideration;
andcralawlibrary

(c) the complainant's motion for contempt and/or disbarment dated April 11, 2005, praying that respondent
be declared in contempt of court and ordered disbarred and to REQUIRE the respondent
to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.

In the same resolution, the Court required Atty. Paras to comment on petitioner-movant's Motion for
Contempt and/or Disbarment.

After more than a year, or on September 12, 2006 Atty. Paras filed with the Court a Manifestation 6, stating
that he had completely and faithfully served his one (1) year suspension from the practice of law from
August 25, 2005, the day after he received the denial resolution on his motion for reconsideration, to August
24, 2006.

It appearing that Atty. Paras failed to file a comment on the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, the
Court issued another Resolution dated November 27, 2006 requiring Atty. Paras to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt of court for such failure and to comply with the said resolution within ten (10)
days from receipt.

Consequently, a Comment on Motion for Contempt and Explanation on Failure to Timely File Required
Comment7 was filed by Atty. Paras denying all the allegations in petitioner-movant's Motion for Contempt
and/or Disbarment. He likewise claimed that he had never done nor made any conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, nor undermine or put to naught or
violate any of the pertinent causes enumerated in Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Here, we are called upon to impose on Atty. Paras the highest punishment to an erring lawyer - disbarment -
or to hold him in contempt for his failure to comply with this Court's resolutions.

In a number of cases,8 we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not
meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the
courts and the public from members of the bar who have become unfit and unworthy to be part of the
esteemed and noble profession. Likewise, the purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to
safeguard the functions of the court to assure respect for court orders by attorneys who, as much as judges,
are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.

We find no sufficient basis to support petitioner-movant's allegation that Atty. Paras violated the Court's
suspension order, what with the fact that Atty. Paras himself took the initiative to inform the lower courts of
his one - year suspension from law practice.9
It is clear, however, that all lawyers are expected to recognize the authority of the Supreme Court and obey
its lawful processes and orders. Despite errors which one may impute on the orders of the Court, these must
be respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts. It is well to
emphasize again that a resolution of the Supreme Court is not be construed as a mere request, nor should it
be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. 10 Court orders are to be respected not because the
justices or judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that
should be extended to the judicial branch of the government. This is absolutely essential if our government
is to be a government of laws and not of men.11

Here, Atty. Paras admitted that he had been less than prudent, and indeed fell short, of his obligation to
follow, obey and comply with the specific Order of the Honorable Supreme Court contained in Its Resolution
dated July 18, 2005 due to his deteriorating health condition which required him to undergo a coronary
angiogram and bypass graft12 . He likewise expressed his profound and immeasurable sorrowness amidst
regrets for his delayed compliance with the Court's order.

Given the above, the Court takes this opportunity to remind the parties in the instant case, as well petitioner-
movant's counsels, to avoid further squabbles and unnecessary filing of administrative cases against each
other. An examination of the records reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity between Atty. Paras and
petitioner's counsels as evidenced by the number of administrative cases between them. It is well to stress
that mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations between attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal
profession and will not receive sympathy from this Court. 13 Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy,
fairness, candor and civility.14

All told, the Court deems a reprimand with warning as a sufficient sanction for Atty Paras' failure to promptly
comply with its directives. The imposition of this sanction in the present case would be more consistent with
the avowed purpose of a disciplinary case, which is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to
protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or
inefficiency of officers of the court.15

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment is DENIED. However, Atty. Justo Paras is
hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to observe the respect due the Court in not promptly complying with
this Court's resolution, with WARNING that a more drastic punishment will be imposed upon him for a
repetition of the same act.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 944 July 25, 1974

FLORA NARIDO, complainant,

vs.
ATTORNEY JAIME S. LINSANGAN, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:p

The spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from
edifying, although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that at times zeal in the defense of one's client may
be carried to the point of undue skepticism and doubt as to the motives of opposing counsel. Some such
reflection is induced by these two administrative cases wherein respondents Jaime S. Linsangan and Rufino
B. Risma, who represented adverse parties in a workmen's compensation case, did mutually hurl accusation
at each other. The charge against respondent Linsangan filed by a certain Flora Narido is that he violated
the attorney's oath by submitting a perjured statement. When required to answer, not only did he deny the
complaint but he would also hold respondent Risma accountable for having instigated his client, the
complainant, Flora Narido, to file a false and malicious complaint resulting in what respondent Linsangan
called "embarrassment, humiliation and defamation" of a brother in a profession.

On September 9, 1971, this Court referred the above administrative cases to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Such report and recommendation was submitted on May 31 of
this year.

1. Insofar as the first case against respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is concerned, the report contains the
following: "In support of her complaint filed with this Honorable Court, complainant Narido heavily relies on
the refusal of respondent Linsangan to withdraw — despite warning — the affidavit of Milagros M. Vergel de
Dios ..., which affidavit Narido claims to be perjured. ... Mrs. Narido and Atty. Risma threatened Atty.
Linsangan with disbarment should he insist in offering the affidavit of Mrs. Vergel de Dios." 1 Nonetheless,
such affidavit was filed. It was found as a fact that there was nothing improper in presenting such affidavit,
its alleged falsity not being proven. Even if it were otherwise, still there was no showing of respondent
having violated his attorney's oath for submitting a perjured affidavit. Thus the report continues: "With
respect to the other allegations in the affidavit, suffice it to say that there is no evidence showing Atty.
Linsangan's awareness of the falsity thereof, assuming arguendo that they are indeed false. As testified by
Atty. Linsangan he has no intention whatsoever of misleading any court or judicial body, or of violating his
attorney's oath."2

2. As for the charge against Attorney Risma, the report stated the following: "This administrative complaint
stemmed from the belief of Atty. Linsangan that Atty. Risma 'by virtue of his financial interest in the Award,'
instigated the filing of Administrative Case No. 944 'in order to accomplish a short cut in winning a case even
by intimidation or unfounded threats, by depriving a party of due process and at the expense,
embarrassment, humiliation, and defamation of his undersigned brother-respondent.' ... It seems unkind to
allude evil motive to Atty. Risma. It is perhaps more apt to state that Atty. Risma's missionary zeal to fight for
the rights of his clients triggered him into filing Administrative Case No. 944. We should admire Atty. Risma's
dedication in championing the cause of the poor. Mrs. Narido, his client, is a destitute woman. She needed
every centavo of the award. To her, any delay in the payment thereof meant grave injustice; it meant
deprivation and starvation. Faced with the dilemma of his client, Atty. Risma had to rise to the challenge. In
view of this, it is more in keeping with Christian precepts to say that it must have been the plight of Mrs.
Narido — rather than his alleged financial interest — that Compelled Atty. Risma to advise his client to file
the case against Atty. Linsangan. ... There being no direct evidence to show the alleged bad faith of Atty.
Risma in advising his client to file Administrative Case No. 944 against Atty. Linsangan, the benefit of the
doubt should be resolved in favor of Atty. Risma. Consequently, the charge of instigating the filing of
'disbarment proceedings against a brother attorney with improper motives and without just ground'
necessarily fails."3

3. From the above, it was the recommendation that on such charges, both respondents should be
exculpated. It being shown in the investigation, however, although it was not one of the charges in the
counter-complaint filed against him that respondent Risma would seek to collect fifteen per cent of the
recovery obtained by his client, contrary to the explicit provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act
allowing only a maximum of ten per cent and that only where the case is appealed, there was likewise a
recommendation for admonition or reprimand. The aptness of such a penalty was predicated on the fact that
respondent Risma had not received a single centavo from the client. Moreover, it was clear such contract for
attorney's fees would not be enforced. In the meanwhile, he had been serving his poverty-stricken client
faithfully and well, even advancing some of the necessary expenses. What was recommended commends
itself for acceptance.

4. This further observation is not amiss. The two respondents would be well-advised to heed these words
from Justice Laurel, announced in Javier v. Cornejo:4 "It should be observed, in this connection, that mutual
bickering and unjustifiable recriminations, between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal
profession and will not receive any sympathy from this court." 5

5. One last word. The report submitted by the Solicitor General is characterized by thoroughness and
diligence, but its quality would have been improved had there been on the part of the Solicitor concerned a
more adequate grasp of notable opinions of this Court on legal ethics from Justice Malcolm on, thus
obviating the need for reliance on secondary authorities, both Philippine and American.
WHEREFORE, the complaint in Administrative Case No. 944 against respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is
dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent Rufino B. Risma in Administrative Case No. 1025 is exculpated from
the charge of having instigated the filing of an unfounded suit. He is, however, admonished to exercise
greater care in ascertaining how much under our law he could recover by way of attorney's fees. The
contract entered into between him and his client as to his being entitled to fifteen per cent of the award
granted her in a workmen's compensation suit is declared to be of no force and effect, the penalty imposed
being that of admonition merely only because he had made no effort to collect on the same and had even
advanced expenses for a poor client. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the records of both
respondents.

Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz
Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 778 August 14, 1936

BENEDICTO M. JAVIER, complainant,

vs.
SILVERIO Q. CORNEJO, respondent.

The complainant in his own behalf.

The respondent in his own behalf.

LAUREL, J.:

The respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo, a practicing lawyer of Lipa, Batangas, is charged with malpractice (a)
for trying to collect from a brother attorney a sum of money by means of threat, and (b) for having instigated
Severina Paz Teodoro to file a complaint against the herein complainant, Attorney Benedicto M. Javier, for
malpractice (Administrative Case No. 757) knowing fully well that the charges therein preferred were
malicious, flimsy and unfounded.

The complainant in support of his charge refers to a letter dated December 2, 1935, in which demand was
made upon him by the respondent for the delivery of P195 representing the amount collected and received
by the said complainant by virtue of a judgment rendered in a certain case in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal wherein Severina Paz Teodoro was the judgment creditor and the herein complainant was her
counsel. In the same letter the complainant was given ten days within which to turn over the said P195,
otherwise a complaint would be filed against him in this court. He was furthermore urged to settle the matter
in due time for the preservation not only of his good name but also that of the legal profession.

We find nothing improper in this letter of the respondent to the complainant which would justify us in taking
disciplinary action against the respondent. The letter was an extra-judicial demand for the payment of a sum
of money which Severina Paz Teodoro had represented to the respondent as owing to her and which she
sought to recover through his professional services. It was an honest effort on the part of the respondent to
serve the interest of his client. The lawyer owes entire "devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and exertion of his utmost learning and ability", to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied (Code of Ethics, adopted
by the American Bar Association and the Philippine Bar Association, No. 15; In re Tionko [1922], 43 Phil.,
191, 194).

As to second ground, it is alleged that the respondent in connivance with one Gregorio Tapia, induced
Severina Paz Teodoro to accuse the herein complainant before this court of malpractice. It appears that
herein complainant was respondent in Administrative Case No. 757 of this court upon a charge of unlawful
conversion of a judgment fund amounting to P195 pertaining to his client, Severina Paz Teodoro. This
charge, however, was dismissed by resolution of this court on July 10, 1936. Now the complainant comes
back against the herein respondent and charges him with having maliciously instigated the filing of the
complaint in the aforesaid Administrative Case No. 757.

We find that Administrative Case No. 757 was instituted in this court on March 18, 1936 and that respondent
Silverio Q. Cornejo intervened as counsel for the complainant therein on December 2, 1935. But long before
this dates, Severina Paz Teodoro and her son Feliciano Pateña had already been demanding from the
herein complainant the return of the amount alleged to be due them (Exhibit B and C). The last demand
letter (Exhibit C) was made on March 23, 1931, and its receipt acknowledged by the herein complainant in
the same month (Exhibit E). This letter demanded the payment of the remaining balance of P166.50 from
the sum which the herein complainant had collected and received as judgment fund of his erstwhile client
Severina Paz Teodoro, and also advised that upon his failure to remit the amount demanded, the matter
would be brought to the attention of this court. The complainant in Administrative Case No. 757, therefore,
already knew on March 23, 1931, long before the respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo entered the scene, where
to seek relief.

It should be observed, in this connection, that mutual bickerings and unjustifiable recrimination, between
brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this
court.

The complaint against the respondent is dismissed for lack of merit. So ordered.

[A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000]

MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D.

BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND
ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, respondents.

D E C I S IO N

VITUG, J.: JVITUG

Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically Canon 9
thereof, viz:

"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the
matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer
most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law."barth

Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and Associates
Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel,
and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA
Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon
City, charged that respondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on separate
occasions, without his knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his
clients in the aforementioned civil case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might
have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative
proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents was unbecoming of any
member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents had taken part in
the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the various Re-Admission Agreements complained
of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time with the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The
Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and
were executed for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case involving nine
students of AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the Student Disciplinary
Tribunal. The students, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F.
Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B.
Villareiz,, were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had caused to be published
some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member Student Disciplinary Tribunal was
immediately convened, and after a series of hearings, it found the students guilty of the use of indecent
language and unauthorized use of the student publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of
expulsion against the erring students.Jksm

The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President, gave rise to
the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997 before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-Admission
Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of some of the expelled students, to wit: Letter of
Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement
of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De
Leon for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC
President; letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission
Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 September 1997, of Cleo
Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC President; and letter of apology,
dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23
January 1997 with the AMACC President.

Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a Manifestation, dated 06
June 1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil case was pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of
the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation was
furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.

On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") passed Resolution
No. XIII-99-163, thus:

"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex 'A,' and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the case against
the other Respondents for they did not take part in the negotiation of the case."Chief

It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were formalized,
complainant was by then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the civil case. Respondent
Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the students were represented by counsel,
respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their parents without at the very
least communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil Case
No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable
violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague.
Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the administrative aspect of
the controversy is belied by the Manifestation [1] which, among other things, explicitly contained the following
stipulation; viz:

"1.......Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their
parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission Agreement with AMACC President,
AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER
COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to
terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings which they may have against
the AMACC arising from their previous dismissal. Esm

"x x x......x x x......x x x

"3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No.
Q-97-30549 will by filed them."
The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of Governors in
their findings; nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension would appear to be somewhat too
harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the explanation of respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt of this decision. The case
against the other respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member
of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, an

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 7045, September 05, 2016

THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA ASEOCHE REPRESENTED BY ITS FOUNDING PARTNER,
ATTY. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Complainant, v. ATTYS. RESTITUTO S. LAZARO AND RODEL R.
MORTA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

On 8 February 2006, the Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche (complainant), through its founding partner,
Atty. Francisco M. Chavez, filed a Complaint-Affidavit1 before this Court. Complainant sought the disbarment
of Attys. Restitute S. Lazaro and Rodel R. Morta (respondents) for violation of Canons 8 and 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. It was alleged that respondents falsely and maliciously accused complainant
and its lawyers of antedating a Petition for Review filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) on 10 October
2005.2chanrobleslaw

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

The circumstances, which led to the filing of this administrative complaint, occurred in connection with
Criminal Case No. Q-05-136678. The latter was a case for libel then pending against Eliseo F. Soriano
before Branch 218 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. 3 Complainant acted as the legal
counsel of Soriano in that case while respondents represented private complainant Michael M.
Sandoval.4chanrobleslaw

On 11 October 2005, lawyers from complainant law firm, led by Atty. Chavez, appeared before the RTC to
seek the cancellation of Soriano's scheduled arraignment. 5 During the hearing, Atty. Chavez informed the
RTC that a Petition for Review had been filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ) on 10 October 2005.
The Petition questioned the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City finding probable
cause to indict Soriano for libel.6 Atty. Chavez presented an extra copy of the Petition for Review before the
RTC, and explained that the main copy of the Petition stamped received by the DOJ was still with the office
messenger, who had personally filed the pleading the day before. 7 Citing the filing of the Petition for Review,
Atty. Chavez moved for the suspension of the arraignment for a period of 60 days pursuant to Rule 116,
Section 11 (c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.8 The RTC, however, denied the motion and
proceeded with Soriano's arraignment.9chanrobleslaw

The events that transpired during the arraignment led complainant to conclude that Presiding Judge Hilario
Laqui of Branch 218 was biased against its client. 10 Consequently, it filed a Motion for Inhibition on 18
October 2005 requesting Judge Laqui to voluntary inhibit himself from the case. 11chanrobleslaw
On 11 November 2005, respondents filed with the RTC a pleading entitled "A Vehement Opposition to the
Motion for Inhibition"12 (Vehement Opposition) to contradict complainant's motion. The following statements,
which have become the subject of the instant disbarment complaint, were contained in that
pleading:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A Vehement Opposition to the Motion for Inhibition

COMES NOW, private complainant, by and through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court
respectfully states:

1. Allegedly, the Presiding Judge exhibited bias, partiality, prejudice and has pre-judged the case
against the accused when he proceeded with the arraignment despite the pendency of a petition for
review filed with the Department of Justice.

2. They alleged that on October 10, 2005, or the day before the scheduled arraignment, they have
filed the petition.

3. They cited Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, where it is
provided that upon motion, the arraignment of the accused shall be suspended when a petition for
review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending.

4. We contemplated over this matter. If indeed the petition was duly filed with the DOJ on
October 10, 2005, why is it that the accused did not present a copy of the petition stamped
"received" by the DOJ? Why did he not make a manifestation that he forgot to bring a copy?
He could have easily convinced the Presiding Judge to suspend the arraignment upon a
promise that a copy thereof will be filed with the court in the afternoon of October 11, 2005
or even the following day.

5. Thus, we come to the conclusion that the accused was able to antedate the filing or mailing
of the petition.13 (Emphases supplied)

The allegation of antedating was reiterated by respondents in a Comment/Opposition to the Accused's

Motion for Reconsideration filed with the RTC on 6 December 2006:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
4. It is our conclusion that the accused and his lawyers were able to antedate the filing or mailing of
the petition. We cannot conclude otherwise, unless the accused and his battery of lawyers will admit that
on October 11, 2005 that they suddenly or temporarily became amnesiacs. They forgot that they filed the
Petition for Review the day before.14 (Emphasis supplied)
In the Complaint-Affidavit it filed with this Court, complainant vehemently denied the allegation of
antedating.15 As proof that the Petition for Review was personally filed with the DOJ on 10 October 2005,
complainant attached to its Complaint-Affidavit a copy of the Petition bearing the DOJ
stamp.16chanrobleslaw

In their Comment dated 4 May 2006,17 respondents alleged that the filing of the disbarment complaint
against them was a mere harassment tactic. As proof, they cited the non-inclusion of another signatory to
the Vehement Opposition, Public Prosecutor Nadine Jaban-Fama, as a respondent in the Complaint.18They
also contended that the statements they had made in their pleadings were covered by the doctrine of
privileged communication.19chanrobleslaw

In a Resolution dated 7 August 2006, the Court referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.20chanrobleslaw

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

In his Report and Recommendation dated 7 July 2008,21 Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco found
respondents guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We agree with the complainant that the accusation that they antedated the mailing of the DO.I petition is
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the duty of all lawyers to observe civility and
propriety in their pleadings. It was somewhat irresponsible for the respondents to make such an accusation
on the basis of pure speculation, considering that they had no proof to support their accusation and did not
even make any attempt to verify from the DO.I the date and the manner by which the said petition was filed.
Moreover, as held in Asa, we will have to disagree with the respondents argument on privileged
communication, the use of offensive language in pleadings filed in the course of judicial proceedings,
constitutes unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action.

xxxx

In Asa, the Supreme Court found Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo guilty of breach of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and admonished her to refrain from using offensive and improper language in
her pleadings. Considering that the respondents' accusation that the complainant and its lawyers antedated
the mailing of Bro. Eliseo Soriano's DOJ Petition is somewhat more serious than an allegation of wanting
additional attorney's fees for opening doors and serving coffee, we believe that the penalty of reprimand
would be proper in this case.

Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Attys. Restituto Lazaro
and Rodel Morta be reprimanded for using improper language in their pleadings with a warning that a
repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely. 22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 14 August 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-391, which adopted and
approved Commissioner Limpingco's Report and Recommendation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and for using improper language in their pleadings Atty. Restituto Lazaro and
Atty. Rodel Morta are REPRIMANDED with a Warning that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more
severely.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 14 November 2008, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 14 August
2008. They argued that the Complaint against them should have been dismissed on the following grounds:
(a) complainant's failure to implead the public prosecutor, who must be considered an indispensable party to
the case, since the pleading in question could not have been filed without her conformity; (b) as the subject
pleadings had been signed by the public prosecutor, their contents enjoyed the presumption of regularity
and legality, upon which respondents were entitled to rely; (c) respondents relied in good faith on the review,
supervision and direction of the public prosecutor in the filing of the pleading in question; and (d) the
statements in the pleading were covered by the doctrine of privileged communication.24 Respondents also
contended that Atty. Chavez should be disciplined for the derogatory statements made against them in the
pleadings he submitted during the IBP investigation.

Complainant filed a Comment/Opposition25cralawred to respondents' Motion for Reconsideration on 8

January 2009.

On 22 March 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-146 granting respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration and recommending the dismissal of the instant case on the basis of
complainant's failure to implead an indispensable party:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to GRANT Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, considering that complainant's non-
joinder of an indispensable party makes the presumption that Respondents acted according to regulations
and in good faith in the performance of their official duties. Thus, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-391 dated
August 14, 2008 is hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case against Respondents is hereby DISMISSED
with stern Warning to be more circumspect.
To date, this Court has not received any petition from complainant or any other interested party questioning
Resolution No. XXI-2014-146 of the IBP Board of Governors. However, pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court as amended by Bar Matter No. 1645,26 we must ultimately decide disciplinary
proceedings against members of the bar, regardless of the acts of the complainant. 27 This rule is consistent
with our obligation to preserve the purity of the legal profession and ensure the proper and honest
administration of justice.28 In accordance with this duty, we now pass upon the recommendation of the IBP.

OUR RULING

After a judicious examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to SET ASIDE Resolution No.
XXI-2014-146 of the IBP Board of Governors. Not only are the grounds cited as bases for the dismissal of
the complaint inapplicable to disbarment proceedings. We are also convinced that there is sufficient
justification to discipline respondents for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Non-joinder of a party is not a ground to dismiss a disciplinary proceeding.

In Resolution No. XXI-2014-146, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the instant case because of
complainant's purported failure to implead an indispensable party. Although this ground for dismissal was
not explained at length in its resolution, the IBP Board of Governors appeared to have given credence to the
argument proffered by respondents. They had argued that the public prosecutor was an indispensable party
to the proceeding, and that her non-joinder was a ground for the dismissal of the case. That ruling is patently
erroneous.

In previous cases, the Court has explained that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis.29 These proceedings are neither purely civil nor purely criminal, 30 but are rather investigations by
the Court into the conduct of its officers.31 Technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied, 32 but are
construed in a manner that allows us to determine whether lawyers are still fit to fulfill the duties and
exercise the privileges of their office.33chanrobleslaw

We cannot countenance the dismissal of the case against respondents merely because the public
prosecutor has not been joined as a party. We emphasize that in disbarment proceedings, the Court merely
calls upon members of the bar to account for their actuations as officers of the Court. 34Consequently, only
the lawyer who is the subject of the case is indispensable. No other party, not even a complainant, is
needed.35chanrobleslaw

In this case, respondents are only called upon to account for their own conduct. Specifically, their pleadings
contain the accusation that complainant antedated the filing of a petition before the DOJ. The fact that Public
Prosecutor Jaban-Fama also signified her conformity to the pleadings containing these statements is
irrelevant to the issue of whether respondents' conduct warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions.

Respondents cannot utilize the presumption of regularity accorded to acts of the public prosecutor
as a defense for their own misconduct.

Respondents cannot excuse their conduct by invoking the presumption of regularity accorded to official acts
of the public prosecutor. It must be emphasized that the act in question, i.e. the preparation of the pleadings
subject of the Complaint, was performed by respondents and not by the public prosecutor. Hence, any
impropriety in the contents of or the language used in these pleadings originated from respondents. The
mere fact that the public prosecutor signed the pleadings after they were prepared could not have cured any
impropriety contained therein. The presumption that the public prosecutor performed her duties regularly
and in accordance with law cannot shield respondents from liability for their own conduct.

The claim of respondents that they relied in good faith on the approval of the public prosecutor is likewise
untenable. As lawyers, they have a personal obligation to observe the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This obligation includes the duty to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their
professional colleagues, including opposing counsel. Respondents cannot disregard this solemn duty solely
on the basis of the signature of a public prosecutor and later seek to absolve themselves from liability by
pleading good faith.

Respondents violated Canons 8 and JO of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

There being no cause for the dismissal of the instant case, the Court now proceeds to determine whether
respondents have indeed violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

We note that the essential allegations of the Complaint-Affidavit have already been admitted by
respondents. In the Comment36 they submitted to this Court, they even reproduced the pertinent
portions37 of their pleadings that contained the allegations of antedating. Accordingly, the only question left
for us to resolve is whether their conduct violates the ethical code of the profession.

After a thorough evaluation of the pleadings filed by the parties and the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Limpingco, the Court finds respondents guilty of violating Canons 8 38 and 1039 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

This Court has repeatedly urged lawyers to utilize only respectful and temperate language in the preparation
of pleadings, in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. 40 Their arguments, whether written or oral,
should be gracious to both the court and the opposing counsel and should consist only of such words as
may be properly addressed by one honorable member of the bar to another. 41 In this case, respondents
twice accused complainant of antedating a petition it had filed with the DOJ without any proof whatsoever.
This allegation of impropriety undoubtedly brought complainant and its lawyers into disrepute. The
accusation also tended to mislead the courts, as it was made without hesitation notwithstanding the absence
of any evidentiary support. The Court cannot condone this irresponsible and unprofessional behavior.

That the statements conveyed the perception by respondents of the events that transpired during the
scheduled arraignment and their "truthful belief regarding a perceived irregularity" in the filing of the Petition
is not an excuse. As this Court emphasized in Re: Supreme Court Resolution Dated 28 April 2003 in G.R.
Nos. 145817 & 145822:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their cause in a
motion for inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or even wrongdoing
against other members of the legal profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justness of the cause with which they are charged. 42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondents' defense of absolute privilege is likewise untenable. Indulging in offensive personalities in the
course of judicial proceedings constitutes unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if the
publication thereof is privileged.43 While lawyers may enjoy immunity from civil and criminal liability for
privileged statements made in their pleadings, they remain subject to this Court's supervisory and
disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of their duty as members of the legal
profession.44chanrobleslaw

We believe, though, that the use of intemperate and abusive language does not merit the ultimate penalty of
disbarment.45 Nonetheless, respondents should be disciplined for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and sternly warned that the Court will deal with future similar conduct more
severely.46chanrobleslaw

A final note. We find it necessary to remind the IBP of its duty to judiciously investigate and evaluate each
and every disciplinary action referred to it by this Court. In making its recommendations, the IBP should bear
in mind the purpose of disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar — to maintain the integrity of the
legal profession for the sake of public interest. Needless to state, the Court will not look with favor upon a
recommendation based entirely on technical and procedural grounds.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 22 March 2014 issued by the IBP Board of
Governors is hereby SET ASIDE. Attys. Restituto Lazaro and Rodel Morta are hereby ADMONISHED to
use only respectful and temperate language in the preparation of pleadings and to be more circumspect in
dealing with their professional colleagues. They are likewise STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

C. PREVENTING UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO
TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN
MUNING respondents.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.

Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in this
petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of
the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a non-
lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case.

The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs.
Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29
March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino
Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for
the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22
November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants
Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of
attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the
Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by
Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.

The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through
Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the
complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.

On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for
professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:

Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%

Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%

Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in
the present petition.

Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but his
motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion
contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and considered the motion for
reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for review. 2 The case was
considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief.3

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,4 that an agreement providing for the division of
attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is
condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of
attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.

The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —

In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be
required to be represented by legal counsel ...

is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial
Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —

it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross
examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of
evidence.

thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the
bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a
party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For
Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —

Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled

to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, ...

imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such
a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning
is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or
with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal
work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications
and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.

On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:

But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not
licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the
great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for legal services cannot be
recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the
jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5

No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he

has been duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time. 6

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; 7 that acting as an attorney
with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, 8 and the
law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of law; 9 and that if
were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in
case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not
amenable to disciplinary measures. 10

And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-
lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to
recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees should
suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial
Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special
jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU,
alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union members Entila and
Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the present petition that was
subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as
co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is permitted to
institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was organized "for the
promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is
disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section
6, Republic Act 875, which provides:
 Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order of
the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,

since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of
Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their
appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious situation
demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to
that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in
the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally
engaged in the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the
backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects.
Costs against respondent Muning.

[A.C. No. 1261. December 29, 1983.]

TAN TEK BENG, Complainant, v. TIMOTEO A. DAVID, Respondent.

Basilio Lanoria for complainant.

Timoteo A. David for and in his own behalf.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; MEMBER OF THE BAR; SOLICITING CASES AT LAW FOR THE PURPOSE OF GAIN;
CONSTITUTES MALPRACTICE. — Where in the agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half
of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal
directly with the clients, the Court held that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to
malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers" (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any
malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning
to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, amending Sec. 21 of Act No. 190). That meaning is in consonance
with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. "The lawyer may not seek
or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097
cited in In re Tagorda, 33 Phil. 37, 42).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; CAUSE FOR CENSURE. — The commercialization of law
practice is condemned in certain canons of professional ethics adopted by the American Bar Association.
"Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or
which is unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743). We censure lawyer David for
having entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement. We discountenance his conduct, not
because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know legal ethics) but because David should have
known better.

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against lawyer Timoteo A. David
(admitted to the bar in 1945) for not giving Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer (alleged missionary of the Seventh
Day Adventists), one-half of the attorney’s fees received by David from the clients supplied by Tan Tek
Beng. Their agreement reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"December 3, 1970

"Mr. Tan Tek Beng

"Manila

"Dear Mr. Tan:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In compliance with your request, I am now putting into writing our agreement which must be followed in
connection with the accounts that you will entrust to me for collection. Our terms and conditions shall be as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. On all commission or attorney’s fees that we shall receive from our clients by virtue of the collection that
we shall be able to effect on their accounts, we shall divide fifty-fifty. Likewise you are entitled to
commission, 50/50 from domestic, inheritance and commercial from our said clients or in any criminal cases
where they are involved.

"2. I shall not deal directly with our clients without your consent.

"3. You shall take care of collecting our fees as well as advances for expenses for the cases referred to us
by our clients and careful in safeguarding our interest.

"4. It is understood that legal expenses that we shall recover from the debtors shall be turned over to our
clients. Other clients who directly or indirectly have been approached or related (sic) to you as a result of
your labor are your clients.

"I hereby pledge in the name of God, our Heavenly Father, that I will be sincere, honest and fair with you in
connection with our transactions with our clients. Likewise you must be sincere, honest and fair with me.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) Illegible

TIMOTEO A. DAVID

"P.S.

I will be responsible for all documents entrusted me by our clients.

(Sgd.) Initial

"CONFORME to the above and likewise will reciprocate my sincerity to Atty. David as stated in the last
paragraph of this letter.

(Sgd.) Tan Tek Beng

MR. TAN TEK BENG"

The foregoing was a reiteration of an agreement dated August 5, 1969. Note that in said agreement lawyer
David not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent but
he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients.

The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last. There were mutual accusations of
doublecross. For allegedly not living up to the agreement, Tan Tek Beng in 1973 denounced David to
Presidential Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora, to the Office of Civil Relations at Camp Crame and to this Court.
He did not file any civil action to enforce the agreement.

In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership was composed of himself as manager, Tan Tek
Beng as assistant manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president and financier. When Jacinto became ill
and the costs of office maintenance mounted, David suggested that Tan Tek Beng should also invest some
money or shoulder a part of the business expenses but Tan Tek Beng refused.chanrobles.com : virtual law
library

This case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were
scheduled from 1974 to 1981. It was proposed that respondent should submit a stipulation of facts but that
did not materialize because the scheduled hearings were not held due to the nonavailability of Tan Tek
Beng and his counsel.

On September 16, 1977 Tan Tek Beng died at the Philippine Union Colleges Compound, Baesa, Caloocan
City but it was only in the manifestation of his counsel dated August 10, 1981 that the Solicitor General’s
Office was informed of that fact. A report on this case dated March 21, 1983 was submitted by the Solicitor
General to this Court.

We hold that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers" Sec. 27,
Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed
by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828,
amending sec. 21 of Act No. 190).

That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a
business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would
be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme v. Bualan, 58
Phil. 422; Arce v. Philippine National Bank, 62 Phil. 569). The commercialization of law practice is
condemned in certain canons of professional ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"34. Division of Fees. — No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based
upon a division of service or responsibility."cralaw virtua1aw library

"35. Intermediaries. — The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any law
agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer’s responsibilities and
qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in
the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer’s relation to his client should be personal, and the responsibility
should be direct to the client. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

"38. Compensation, Commissions and Rebates. — A lawyer should accept no compensation, commissions,
rebates or other advantages from others without the knowledge and consent of his client after full
disclosure." (Appendix, Malcolm, Legal Ethics).

We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement. We
discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know legal ethics)
but because David should have known better.chanrobles law library

"Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or
which is unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743).

WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice. A copy of this decision should be
attached to his record in the Bar Confidant’s office.

SO ORDERED.

D. SOLICITATION AND ADVERTISING

March 23, 1929

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela,
admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano,
which, in translation, reads as follows:

LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela

(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of
land as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can
make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind
of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well
as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela.
He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home
municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our
induction into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month.
Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or
recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular.
You can come to my house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of
suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.

I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here
in Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on
the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary
public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal
profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any
week day, I assure you that you can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform
you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales
and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays.

I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the
belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be
disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case
and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I
will have my residence here in Echague.

I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of
your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and
to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality
have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration
of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only
three pesos for every registration.

Yours respectfully,
 (Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.

The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the
instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at
the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."

The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the
Code of Ethics provide:

27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but
must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple
business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is
not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally
unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real
estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering
retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner
of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and
all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.

28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional for a

lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship
or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is
indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and
inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with
claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as
clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly,
those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen,
court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise
of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the
ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession
devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any
practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at
the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment.
Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the
instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is
not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain
employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909],
53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It
is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against
the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation
and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be
distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands
convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining
duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with
whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that
the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our
attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission
of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating,
circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the
impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a
similar mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring
attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which
have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be
taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B.
Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month
from April 1, 1929,

Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

Separate Opinions

OSTRAND, J., dissenting:

I dissent. Under the circumstances of the case a reprimand would have been sufficient punishment.

A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor.
Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence
and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide
himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said
advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason
thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of
his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of
justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most
worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the period of
one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That
case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were
more elaborate and insistent.

Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion
and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672

Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 4, 2009

x-----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law

Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional

services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients [2] to

transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance [3] and expeditious collection

on their claims.[4] To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text

messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit [5] of James Gregorio attesting that

Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize

respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents

calling card:[6]

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said

calling card.[7]

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[8]

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, [9] found that

respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 [10] and other

canons[11] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against

soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of

the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning

that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended

penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants professional

practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the

said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a

lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY
TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT
OF FACTS.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business;

lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. [13] To allow a lawyer to

advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics

estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of

the bar is called.[14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT

DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid

agents or brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. [16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
 RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST,
ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,

personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) [17] as a measure to protect the community from

barratry and champerty.[18]

Complainant presented substantial evidence [19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same

persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited

legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the

mandatory hearing.

Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed

to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more favorable

result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and

Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not

steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or

reduced fees for his services.[20] Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers

in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos

connection to his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal

practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule

16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
 The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the

interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for

transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling

for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his

judgment may not be adversely affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is

handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the

client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the

case or an additional stake in its outcome. [23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider

his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest

in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause. [24]

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice [25] which calls for the exercise of the

Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating

contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. [26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we

adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to

uphold the nobility of the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending

money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the

wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a

well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and

conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable

law lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
 (c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly

used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to

finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby

taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded

the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial

evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and

directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and

Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt

of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall

be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court

of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court

Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

CONCEPT OF BARRATRY AND CHEMPERTOUS CONTRACTS

RULE 1.03

Barratry or “Maintenance”
Inciting or stirring up quarrels, litigation or groundless lawsuits

Examples:
(1) Volunteering advice to bring lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it
his duty to do so
(2) Hunting up defects in titles or other causes of action in order to be employed to bring suit or breed
litigation

Ambulance Chasing
Accident - site solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by laymen employed by an attorney for the
purpose or by the attorney himself.
(a) Supports perjury, the defrauding of innocent persons by judgments, upon manufactured causes of
actions and the defrauding of injured persons having proper causes of action but ignorant of legal rights and
court procedure.

A law yer may be disciplined in his professional and private capacity. The filing of multiple complaints
reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His conduct of vindictiveness a decidedly
undesirable trait especially when one resorts to us ing the court not to secure justice but merely to exact
revenge warrants his dismissal from the judiciary. [ Saburnido v. Madrono, (2001 ) ]

Champertous Contract
One where the lawyer stipulates with his client the prosecution of the case that he will bear all the expenses
for the recovery of things or property being claimed, and the latter pays only upon successful litigation. Void
for being against public policy.

Contingent Contract
It is an agreement in which the lawyer’s fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the
action, is made to depend upon the success in the effort to enforce or defend the client’s right. It is a valid
agreement. It is different from a champertous contract in that the lawyer does not undertake to shoulder the
expenses of the litigation.

E. THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

January 9, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972,
with the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in
Administrative Case No. 5262 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its
[the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the
Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon
as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar,
after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local
Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were
orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted,3 and all parties were thereafter
granted leave to file written memoranda.4

Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of
the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.

In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of
Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the
advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.

In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of
the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as
follows:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall
see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds
in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the
annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and
contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar
integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the
rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration
Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite.
There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to
integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.

The following are the pertinent issues:

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will
suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of
its Report, thus:

Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law
and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so:
the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a
national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an
officer of the court.

Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of
Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own
organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession,
pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court.

The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and conduct;

(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice
and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish
information relating thereto;

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and
make reports and recommendations thereon; and

(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:

(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;

(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting
officers;

(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of
incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum,
from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its
integrity, impartiality and independence;

(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;

(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or position;

(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;

(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference
services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;

(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of
our provinces;

(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys
in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;

(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;

(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the
importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino
lawyer; and
 (14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the
lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.

Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its
power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an
inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new
power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the
Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional — hinges on the
effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of
speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.

The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration
pages 44 to 49 of its Report:

Constitutionality of Bar Integration

Judicial Pronouncements.

In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the
Courts have upheld their constitutionality.

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

— Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.

— The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed
with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the
court.

— Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that
the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.

— These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there
can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate
effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be
required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar
conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of
court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.

1. Freedom of Association.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his

constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined
but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend
or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues.

Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in
reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of
group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.

The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational
and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service
available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program — the lawyers.

Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal
profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and
control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes
the authority to integrate the Bar.

2. Regulatory Fee.

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court
levies a tax.

A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of
a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an
incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be
possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the
concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to
impose such an exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does
not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of
the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result
from his required payment of annual dues.

3. Freedom of Speech.

A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner
he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.

For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member
is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.

Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in
the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for
the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.

The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech"
issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that
have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus
extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end
condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has
never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of
Government.
 4. Fair to All Lawyers.

Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the
requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a
new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will
receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public
responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past.
Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court,
because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration takes
effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not
retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.

To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time
— requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and
disadvantages of Bar integration.

In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has yielded
the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and
ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities
of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6)
avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more
cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and
responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary consequences
are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.

Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government authority will
dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective
lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.

It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed
to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In
all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen;
on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness,
energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.

How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the
Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the
matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who
have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while
only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total
of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions
and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local
Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual
lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission,
12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per
cent) are non-committal.5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration
at this time.

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
"perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached
COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the
IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the
Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the
IBP, which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall
promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever
action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the
removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action
taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to
above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees
due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to
submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and
necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however,
objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in
accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section
24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-
Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the
Court Rule, which reads:
 SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court
Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be

known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names
now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court.
...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void
and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably
and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define
the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court,
entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that
case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9,
1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced
in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data
contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of
the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share
in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest
and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because
a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the
courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the
administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest,
the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the
interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression
"affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs.
New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules
of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar
through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing
the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973,
were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the
demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property
and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim
goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but
liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs.
Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom,
and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article
X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it
shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and
looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court
with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of
the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic
to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the
common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself
to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his
concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel
a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to
provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is a ready a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost
of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program — the lawyers.9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of
the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent
acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that
the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives
and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether
the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to
practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of
the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void
as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as
such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer
from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act
of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate,
indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power
which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the
duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon
a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility,
to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and
to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the
power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court
the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to
remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A.
Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.