ERNESTO

B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, 3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS of the Constitution.
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs. Rulings:
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, 1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of
JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents. the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, 1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which
the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from
Facts: the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment
previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint 2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If
(first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication
have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution,
referendum.
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by 3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon,
Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official
insufficient in substance. within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed 2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
all the Members of the House of Representatives. officer within a one-year period.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme
Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
of one year.” General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute
valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by
the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article GONZALES vs COMELEC,
XI of the Constitution. G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967
 main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is — under R. B. H. No. 1 — the increase
FACTS: of the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and —
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions No. 1, 2 under R. B. H. No. 3 — the authority given to the members of Congress to run for delegates
and 3 – i.e. to increase the seats of the Lower House from 120 to 180; to convoke a to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge the duties of such
Constitutional Convention of 1971; and to amend the Constitution (Section 16, Article VI) so delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We — who constitute the minority —
they can become delegates themselves to the Convention. believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that said Act is,
accordingly, constitutional.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, One of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission of certain proposed
1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution constitutional amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular
proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the elections. Petitioners argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission
people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967. of the proposal to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the
Two cases were filed against this act of Congress: One an is original action for prohibition, election.
with preliminary injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, in L-28196, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer,
and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all HELD: Pursuant to Art 15 of the ’35 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this
citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Another one is by PHILCONSA, in L-28224, a provision to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election.
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non- The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to
profit and non-partisan organization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to
Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts from whatever do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
source. proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

ISSUE/S: **J Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate “Fair
Whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly — violates the submission, intelligent consent or rejection”. They should be able to compare the original
Constitution? proposition with the amended proposition
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?



HELD:
The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly —
violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial
review.

In the cases at bar, notwithstanding that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a
vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
voting separately, said resolutions are null and void because Members of Congress, which

approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to
propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen (based upon Section 5, Article VI,
of the Constitution, no apportionment has been made been made by Congress within three
(3) years since 1960. Thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its
Members became illegal; that Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de

facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen);

However, As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.


Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or
insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the
people on November 14, 1967, depends — in the view of those who concur in this opinion,
and who, insofar as this phase of the case, constitute the minority — upon whether the
provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly apprise the people of the gist, the
Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in
G.R No. 127325 whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with
March 19, 1997 respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to
be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735
excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
FACTS:
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws.
of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on
Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering
petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the
parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor initiative on national and local laws.
Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition
under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others: While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum
on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling amendments to the Constitution.
law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to
forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

ISSUE:

WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s
initiative.

WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if
so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.

WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct
of such initiative?

WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft
petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.

WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.

WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC.

HELD:

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND.
In re LAURETA Held: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO entire court.
LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R.
No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Court’s authority and duty under the
COURT, ET AL premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous
attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of
G.R. No. L-68635 the legal profession.
May 14, 1987
We re not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustre’s letters, nor with the
complaint filed with the tanodbayan. Atty Laureta repeated disparaging remarks such as
Facts: Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of “undue influence”, powerful influence” in his pleadings. This was bolstered by the report that
the her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that Laureta distributed copies of the complaint to the newspaper companies in envelopes
st
it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1 Division, that it bearing his name. He was also heard over the radio. Lastly, as Illustre’s lawyer, he had control
was railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics. of the proceedings.

Illustre also threatened in her letter that, “there is nothing final in this world. This case is far SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the government because
from finished by a long shot.” She threatened that she would call for a press conference. of separation of powers. The correctness of the SC decisions are conclusive upon other
branches of government.
Illustre’s letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It
was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the
Solgen and counsel for the opponents.

The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution
was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was
about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents
counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case.

Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more
threats to “expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice.”

True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging
the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen
Ordonez were also charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said
Minute Resolution.

Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press,
without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that
the Justices were charged with graft and corruption.

The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint.

Now, the SC is charging them with contempt.

They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not intend to
dishonor the court.

Issue: WON privacy of communication was violated


Demetria vs Alba expenditure of public moneys.”.As regards taxpayers’ suit, this Court enjoys that open
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987 discretion to entertain the same or not (Tan v Macapagal).
Justice Marcelo Fernan - Where the legislature or the executive branch acts beyond the scope of its
Procedure: prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the
other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence
FACTS of judicial power conferred by the Constitution “in one Supreme Court and in such
1.) Petitioners filed as concerned citizens of the country, as members of the National lower courts as may be established by law.”
Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with
general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital 2. YES. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, being repugnant to Section
interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs 16(5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is null and void.
2.) Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of - Paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: “The President shall have the authority to
Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the “Budget Reform Decree of 1977” on transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
the ff. grounds: agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
- It infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing the illegal transfer of public Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau,
moneys or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”
- It is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify the objectives and purposes - Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows: “No law shall be passed authorizing any
for which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker,
- It allows the President to override the safeguards, form and procedure prescribed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions
by the Constitution in approving appropriations may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
- it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers on the transfer of funds by the their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
President and the implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and the Treasurer appropriations.”
are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction - Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical. For flexibility in the use of public
- The threatened and continuing transfer of funds by the president and the funds, the Constitution provided a leeway in which the purpose and condition for
implementation thereof by the budget minister and the treasurer of the Philippines which funds may be transferred were specified.
are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction. - The constitution allows the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for
3.) Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners. the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation
He further contended that: of the government branch or constitutional body concerned
-The provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5), Art.VIII - Paragraph 1 of Section 44 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under
of the 1973 Constitution Section 16(5), and empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from
-Prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department, which are
to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter’s sphere of responsibility included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any
4.) On February 27, the Court required petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment. Petitioners department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
stated that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need to hold the resolution approved after its enactment, without regard to whether or not the funds to be
of the present case in abeyance. transferred are savings, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
5.) The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss setting forth as ground augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be made.
therefore, abrogation of Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom - It completely disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, amounting to
Constitution, which has allegedly rendered the petition moot and academic an undue delegation of legislative power

ISSUES
1. WON the case is justiciable.
2. WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is unconstitutional.

HELD
1. The case is justiciable. The court cited Ecelio Javier v. COMELEC where it said that: “This
Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext
that the case has become moot and academic.” - According to Pascual v Secretary of Public
Works, “... taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys
raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring


[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
Angara v. Electoral Commission, regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should
G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936 be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
LAUREL, J.: necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in
I. THE FACTS filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate
such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been
subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election

protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The
following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution
providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before
December 9, 1935.


Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner
sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his
motion.

II. THE ISSUE


Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]


NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding
the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.


The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua
against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National
Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of
the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the

Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging
of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by
the National Assembly. xxx.
Miranda Vs Aguirre
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999

FACTS: Case digest version 2
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an Facts:
independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago On 5 May 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela
in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically into an independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of
downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite. On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720, it changed the status of Santiago from an
law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite. independent component city to a component city. Petitioner, Jose Miranda, mayor of
Santiago assailed the constitutionality of RA 8528 due to lack of ratification through
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely plebiscite pursuant to Section 10 Article 10 of the Constitution. Petitioners also contend the
reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a component city. petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
It allegedly did not involve any “creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration
of boundaries of local government units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is Issue: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction on juticiable and political question.
unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued
that the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction. Decision: Petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ
of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar. said law.
The plea that the court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the
RULING: ground that it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over appeal especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines
said petition because it involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
only the court could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional. involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. To be sure, the cut between a
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political political and justiciable issue has been made by this Court in many cases.
units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the

mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3
other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be
heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC.
Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law
as unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instru-mentality of the Government.

LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC vs RAMOS Case Digest
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O. RAMOS, Secretary RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign
Department of Environment and Natural Resources; HORACIO RAMOS, Director, Mines and owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); RUBEN TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC
(PHILIPPINES) INC. Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that
G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004, En Banc (Carpio-Morales, J.) ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.‖ The same
rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. section also states that, ―the exploration and development and utilization of natural
Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution
of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation,
Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable
to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the
Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR 1987 Constitution.
Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40,
adopted on December 20, 1996. Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the
purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country‘s natural resource, for it
government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.
owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources
in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter. The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms of
assistance‖ in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and
In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company - sold its financial assistance.‖ The management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign
whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of
which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same.
The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals. The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the
rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-
consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts.
contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and technical agreements‖ in accordance
exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service
recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental
proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty law.
between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian
investments. The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages
the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign
ISSUES: contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these
fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources. contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a
―service contract‖ that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the
Philippine mineral resources. constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations
engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.
HELD:

When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions

that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.

Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to
merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development
and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.

Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract

The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since
the agreement itself is a service contract.

Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to
explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from

the contract area.‖ Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all
financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.

These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP
beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended

for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They
are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to
suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955 RATIO DECIDENTI:

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner, The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the
vs. form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented before the
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, respondents. court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to
determined the validity of executive and legislative action he must show that he has sustained
Manuel C. Briones, Vicente G. Sinco, Manuel V. Gallego and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.
common interest to all members of the public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon
a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial
for respondents.
authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to
the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of
statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the
FACTS: constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is
legitimate only in the last resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts No. controversy between litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to
2706 otherwise known as the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question
and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction” and was amended by Act No. to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be
3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not
act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse by officials entrusted
and property without due process of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such
Rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there has been no undue
Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and
constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers. memoranda issued by the Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official
documents was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore,
Section 1 of Act No. 2706 the court denied the petition for prohibition.

“It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of
efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish
adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given

in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have
authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the
efficiency of instruction given in the same,”

The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education
before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in support to
the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the
right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental
approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right On the other hand, the
defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters
presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the
constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act
and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the
court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no. 180

may be declared void and unconstitutional?

Mariano v COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano,
Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita
Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo
Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of
Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of
one of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-
election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies
may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet
to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except
Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this
futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.























Montesclaro vs Comelec
G.R. No.152295 July 09,2002

Facts: The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the Kabataang Barangay to Sangguniang
Kabataan and limited its membership to youths “at least 15 but no more than 21 years of
age.” On 18 February 2002, Antoniette VC Montesclaros demanded from COMELEC that SK
elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002. COMELEC Chairman Alfredo Benipayo wrote
to the House of Representatives and the Senate on 20 February 2002 inquiring on the status
of pending bills on SK and Barangay elections and expressed support to postpone the SK
election on November 2002. On 11 March 2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated
Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456, resetting the SK election to 15 July 2002 and lowered
the membership age to at least 15 but no more than 18 years of age. This was approved by
the Senate and House of Representative on 11 March and 13 March 2002 respectively and
signed by the President on 19 March 2002. The petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus
for temporary restraining order seeking the prevention of postponement of the SK election
and reduction of age requirement on 11 March 2002.

Issue: Whether or not the proposed bill is unconstitutional.

Decision: Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. This petition presents no actual justiciable
controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be
unconstitutional. Petitioner’s perayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed
bill does not present actual controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review
because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally
enforceable by the Court. Having no legal effect it violates no constitutional right or duty. At
the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164 was not yet enacted into law. After its
passage petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be
unconstitutional.





















Atlas Fertlizer vs SEC
G.R. No. 93100 June 19, 1997



Facts: Petitioner, Atlas Fertilizer engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and
prawn farms. Assailed Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law), as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained in
Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of
the Department of Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional. They contend that R.A. 6657, by
including the raising of fish and aquaculture operations including fishponds and prawn
ponds, treating them as in the same class or classification as agriculture or farming violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution and therefore void.

Issue: Whether or not RA 6657 is unconstitutional.

Decision: Petition dismissed. R.A. No. 7881 approved by Congress on 20 February 1995
expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. In
view of the foregoing, the question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions
has become moot and academic with the passage of R.A. No. 7881.





























Lacson Vs. Perez
357 SCRA 756 G.R. No. 147780
May 10, 2001

Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May
1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion
in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion”
were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas
corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless
arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate
court, wherein the information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial
until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with
impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were
issued against them.

Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold
departure orders allegedly effected by the same.

Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006,
accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have
declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular
warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of
persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant,
thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus
and prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has
adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary
investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a
warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise
the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention
should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not
prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither
assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any
intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and
void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’
prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that
no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas
corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not
subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier
adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf,
are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all
acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.




SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085 delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on
February 3, 2004 warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is
rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted valid warrantless arrest is present.
men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown
leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for
of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas
evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico
lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued. et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject
issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and
that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive

Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report
requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a
report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend
that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as
Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President
Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was
usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.
(4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens
the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of
rebellion.

Issue:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion.
The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution
executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out
the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the
Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of
proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of
the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals
have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil
Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since
the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
Pimentel vs Ermita The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad
G.R. 164978 interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before
the lapse of one year.
Facts: President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their
respective departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments, while Case Digest version 2
Congress is in their regular session. Facts:
Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria
appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective
previously appointed in an acting capacity. departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel
Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments, assert that “while together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al.
Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of the
position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of
having obtained its consent. Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should
Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting be designated in an acting capacity and not anyone else.
capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is
even while Congress is in session. empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an
EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the President’s power of appointment. Sections 16 and acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 read: Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. — The President shall exercise the power to appoint such to issue temporary designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary
officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws. designation shall not exceed one year.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. — (1) The President may temporarily During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.
perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in
him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.
duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy[.]
HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the
Issue: WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary
secretaries while Congress is in session. designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after the initial
appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad
Held: Yes. interim appointments – this also proves that the president was in good faith.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice
measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent is the president’s to make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust.
occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the She cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An
President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the
choice could assume office. President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office
must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a must necessarily have the President’s confidence. That person may or may not be the
department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee
choice even while Congress is in session. will also be the permanent appointee.
Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon acceptance. But Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that
ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting the president “may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any
appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus,
appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government
rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if
abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Joya, et al. vs. PCGG
GR No. 96541. August 24, 1993
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.

Facts: Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of the PCGG, through the authority granted by then Pres.
Aquino, signed a Consignment Agreement allowing Christie’s of New York to auction off Old
th th
Masters Paintings and the 18 and 19 century silverware alleged to be part of the ill-gotten
wealth of Pres. Marcos, his relatives, and cronies, for and in behalf of RP. 35 petitioners in this
Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
and/or Restraining Order sought to enjoin PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale which
nevertheless proceeded on schedule. Petitioners claim that, as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and
artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the country’s artistic wealth
and that the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and the
people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art alleging that they have been deprived
of their right to public property without due process of law, they have the legal personality to
restrain the respondents who are acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic
creations as mandated by Sec. 14-18 of Art. XIV of the Constitution and RA 4846.

Issue: Whether the petition complies with the legal requisites for the Court to exercise its
power of judicial review over this case.

Held: NO.
Petitioners failed to show that they have the legal standing, i.e. a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that they have sustained or would sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged, because they are not the legal owners of the
artworks/silverwares or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned since such
artworks are in fact owned by the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, a non-profit,
non-stock corporation established to promote non-Philippine arts and the silverwares were in
fact gifts to the Marcos couple on their silver wedding anniversary. The mandamus suit cannot
prosper because what the petitioners seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is
constitutionally infirmed not because they are after the fulfilment of a positive duty required
of the respondent public officials which is the only ground for a writ of mandamus to be issued.
The taxpayers’ suit cannot prosper as well since the items in question were acquired from
private sources and not with public money.

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual controversy – one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other
similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic
when its purpose has become stale, such as this case. Since the purpose of this petition for
prohibition is to enjoin the respondents from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a
particular date which had long past, the issues raised have become moot and academic.
Nevertheless, the Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy
the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is
involved. However, there is no such justification in this petition.

Petition dismissed.


Agan vs PIATCO During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her speech, stated that she will not “honor
G.R. No. 155001. May 5, 2003 En Banc [Non-legislative power of Congress; Police Power; (PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branch’s legal offices have concluded (as) null and
Delegation of emergency powers] void.”


FACTS: ISSUE:
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the Whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected with public interest.
DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).

DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the RULING:
implementation of the project and submitted with its endorsement proposal to the NEDA, Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the Constitutional
which approved the project. provision on temporary government takeover and obligate the government to pay
“reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex.”
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of
an invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC’s unsolicited proposal, in
accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended. Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may,
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of People’s Air Cargo and Warehousing during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
(Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to interest.
the PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it was
incorporated into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc.
The above provision pertains to the right of the State in times of national emergency, and in
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its the exercise of its police power, to temporarily take over the operation of any business
objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO. affected with public interest. The duration of the emergency itself is the determining factor as
to how long the temporary takeover by the government would last. The temporary takeover
On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the “Concession Agreement for the by the government extends only to the operation of the business and not to the ownership
Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III” (1997 thereof. As such the government is not required to compensate the private entity-owner of
Concession Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and the said business as there is no transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The
maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and private entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just
other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession compensation for the use of the said business and its properties as the temporary takeover by
Agreement. The Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) the government is in exercise of its police power and not of its power of eminent domain.
years commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at the option of the
Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the concession
period, PIATCO shall transfer the development facility to MIAA. Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of
the times necessitate the government to “temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.” It is the welfare and
Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer interest of the public which is the paramount consideration in determining whether or not to
international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and temporarily take over a particular business. Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary
ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and takeover is exercising its police power. Police power is the “most essential, insistent, and
other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA. illimitable of powers.” Its exercise therefore must not be unreasonably hampered nor its
exercise be a source of obligation by the government in the absence of damage due to
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus, requiring the government to pay reasonable compensation
that they would lose their job upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a for the reasonable use of the property pursuant to the operation of the business contravenes
petition for prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the the Constitution.
legality of the various agreements.



CHREA vs.CHR 2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in
G.R. No. 155336 law, but in jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buñag, this Court ruled that
November 25, 2004 compensation, allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees
without the requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular
FACTS: In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to
Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It administer the compensation and position classification system of the national government.
provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC grants it the power to
Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. fix the compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of
A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office, by virtue of
Commission. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by the PPC is, nonetheless,
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to subject to the review of the DBM.
provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a (It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the
request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request. compensation structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC- dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter.
National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central Rather, the DBM’s function is merely to ensure that the action taken by the Board of
Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the Directors complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that PPC’s compensation
plantilla reclassification. system “conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758.” )
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in representation
of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the 3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and reversed the positions in government. This is consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same. SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation,
Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting
CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy. systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in
the management of government operations, administration of compensation and position
ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation
of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.
Budget and Management? Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading,
reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding
HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and its are hereby REVERSED and SET that such scheme lacks legal justification.
ASIDE. The ruling CSC-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR Resolutions, without Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed
the approval of the DBM are disallowed. reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval
thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it has
1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity
the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, provides that it
is the DBM that shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position 4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a
Classification System. constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the
Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the entire species of constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that
gamut of government offices, sans qualification. only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with
This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.
CA. The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of Government, the
superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public constitutional commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA, which are
affairs, as to administer the government of the state. granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is
silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be NOTES:
independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the 1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering that there
Commission on Audit. exists no official written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona fide
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The organization of its employees nor is there anything in the records to show that its president
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. has the authority to sue the CHR.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the On petitioner’s personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper
Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority, party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of
and a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may the act complained of. Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of
establish an independent economic and planning agency. respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR select few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of
is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR’s
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the Commission’s savings
consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which
is expressed puts an end to what is implied. the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and file, are derived.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took
essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than cognizance of the CHREA’s request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital
those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in Region Office. CHREA’s personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the CA when it passed
accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical
time to time.22 In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it is understood that it is only concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the
the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so
enjoy fiscal autonomy. would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal
Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a 2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of
constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership. “providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon
We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
the heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the positions,” the DBM, in the case under review, made a determination, after a thorough
special provision to formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but merely evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal
states its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal rationalization.
autonomy The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General Appropriations
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included Act FY 1998, which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly
in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat. provides that “no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the provided by law or directed by the President.” Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law
DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the authorizing the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the
same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on CHR. Anent CHR’s proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV,
its standpoint, thus- SG-28, and four positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to DBM denied the same as this would change the context from support to substantive without
reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of actual change in functions.
the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their This view of the DBM, as the law’s designated body to implement and administer a unified
respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government
absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily
and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. CA, we echoed the
Compensation Standardization Law. basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
Rep. Act No. 8522 “that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates,
allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws.”26



Automotive vs Romulo
G.R. No. 157509

Facts: Executive Order No. 292 was issued whereby the National Labor Relations Commission
became an agency attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for policy and
program coordination and for administrative supervision. On 02 March 1989, Article 213 of
the Labor Code was expressly amended by Republic Act No. 6715 declaring that the NLRC
was to be attached to the DOLE for program and policy coordination onlywhile the
administrative supervision was turned over to the NLRC Chairman. Executive Order No. 185
dated 10 March 2003 supervision of NLRC reverted to the Sec. of Labor and Employment.
Petitioners, composed of ten labor unions assailed the constitutionality of EO 185 for
allegedly revert the set-up prior to RA 6715 which only Congress can do. Solicitor General

contend that petitioners have no locus standi to assail the validity of E.O. No. 185, not even
in their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are exempt from paying taxes,
citing Sec. 30 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Even assuming that their individual members
are taxpayers, respondents maintain that a taxpayer suit will not prosper as E.O. No. 185
does not require additional appropriation for its implementation.

Issue: Whether or not the ten labour unions have legal standing to assail the constitutionality
of EO 185?

Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. For a citizen to have standing, he must
establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioners have not shown that they
have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
enactment of E.O. No. 185. As labor unions it cannot be said that E.O. No. 185 will prejudice
their rights and interests considering that the scope of the authority conferred upon the
Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the
decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS: FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24,
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, effective immediately upon their approval.
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, ISSUES:
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which
are not as to their publication;
ISSUE: Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable. HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
HELD: requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this other date, without its previous publication.
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to “Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to
would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of
be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity. effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he public of the content of the law.
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
and effect. called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is
drawn.






Chavez v. Pea and Amari resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
G.R. No. 133250
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
Fact: 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP). kind of alienable land of the public domain.

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with 4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111
developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2,
under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be than agricultural lands of the public domain.
funded and owned by PEA.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for
followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to
Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS. AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and

AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir
especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of
public domain (famously known as the “mother of all scams”).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary

injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from
implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s admin, PEA and
AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.

Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in
the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint
venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Held:

On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may
lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these
lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to
the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural

resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such
classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then
can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER vs.HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND Case digest version 2
TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS FACTS:
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the Land Transportation
G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994 Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released memoranda allowing provincial bus
operators to charge passengers rates within 15% above and below the official LTFRB rate for
FACTS : a period of one year. Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines applied for fare
Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then rate increase. This was opposed by the Philippine Consumer Foundation, Inc. and Perla
LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge Bautista as they were exorbitant and unreasonable.
passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a
period of one (1) year. ISSUE:
Whether or not the provincial bus operators have authority to reduce and increase fare rates
This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing, based on the order of the LTFRB
among others, that "The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent
for provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the HELD:
authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing rates
expanded fare range." of public services and the LTFRB is likewise vested with the same. Such delegation is
permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. The authority given
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range is illegal and invalid as it is
policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari
the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the protest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. A further delegation of power would
benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated
fares. to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change their
fares would lead to a chaotic situation and would leave the riding public at the mercy of
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward transport operators.
adjustment of bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a
fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and

minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without

having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.

HELD:
Yes.

x x x

Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public

Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the
existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No.

202 dated June 19, 1987. x x x However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are
the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a

common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.

IBP vs Zamora
G.R. No .141284

August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to

coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period

only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to
assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is

subject to judicial review.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional

provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or

not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on

the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of

judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of

an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest

opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy

clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets
for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility

patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the

deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to
the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot

be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the

police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of

law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

Exec Sec vs CA
G.R. No. 131719

Facts: Republic Act 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) took effect on

15 July 1995. Prior to its effectivity, Asian Recruitment Council Philippine CHaptr Inc (ARCO-

Phil) filed petition for declaratory relief. The alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is

unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal

footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between

recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties,

Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being

based on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause,

besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the

Constitution. In their answer to the petition, they contend that ARCO-Phil has no legal

standing, it being a non-stock, non-profit organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest

as petitioner in the action. It is service-oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to

represent are profit-oriented.

Issue: Whether or not ARCO-Phil has legal standing to assail RA 8042?

Decision: The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its

members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An

association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its

members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of

its constituents. However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for and in

behalf of unskilled workers. We note that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in

its petition.

Kilosbayan vs Guingona expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the
232 SCRA 110 exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which
the respondents tried to take advantage of.
FACTS: The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169 is indisputably clear. The PCSO cannot share its
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it
which grants it the authority to hold and conduct “charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and assign, transfer, or lease such franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of lease or
other similar activities,” the PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of
purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered
March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominisest anima scripti. The intention of
the Berjaya Group Berhad, “a multinational company and one of the ten largest public the party is the soul of the instrument.
companies in Malaysia,” “became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO.” As Undoubtedly, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood that any
an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with some arrangement between them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical, operations,
Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming and management aspects of the on-line lottery system while the PSCO would, primarily,
Management Corporation (PGMC), which “was intended to be the medium through which the provide the franchise. The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be.
technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered Woven therein are provisions which negate its title and betray the true intention of the parties
to PCSO.” to be in or to have a joint venture for a period of eight years in the operation and maintenance
Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease of the on-line lottery system.
Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. On 15 August 1993, PGMC submitted its We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in
bid to the PCSO. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid
the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the country’s on-line lottery system and that for being contrary to law. This conclusion renders unnecessary further discussion on the other
the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993 issues raised by the petitioners.
“for final clearance and approval by the Chief Executive.”
On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Fidel V. Ramos strongly
opposing the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical
considerations. Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the
statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that “only a court injunction can
stop Malacañang,” and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February
1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.
Petitioner claims that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens,
pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie
Webb and WigbertoTañada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as
members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens.
Senators Webb and Tañada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as
members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines. The public
respondents, meanwhile allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant
suit, citing the Court’s resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi
2. Whether or the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether
domestic or foreign.” is legal and valid.

HELD:
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The ramifications
of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people
even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive
effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is
ITF VS. COMELEC the integrity of elections:
G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004. 1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even participate in the bidding
2. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure to meet the mandatory
Facts: eligibility requirements
On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct a 3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract to MPC despite the
nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to issuance by the BAC of its Report, which formed the basis of the assailed Resolution, only on
pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim April 21, 2003 31
Mindanao (ARMM). 4. Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during the bidding process, there
were violations of the mandatory requirements of RA 8436 as well as those set forth in
On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization Comelec's own Request for Proposal on the automated election system IHaECA
program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its 5. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to conduct a re-bidding despite the failure of
Automated Election System; namely, Phase I — Voter Registration and Validation System; the bidders to pass the technical tests conducted by the Department of Science and
Phase II — Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III — Electronic Technology
Transmission. 6. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in the conduct of the bidding for the
automated counting machines
On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, After reviewing the slew of pleadings as well as the matters raised during the Oral Argument,
which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the Court deems it sufficient to focus discussion on the following major areas of concern that
the request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million. impinge on the issue of grave abuse of discretion:
A. Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of MPC as a bidder
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to B. Failure of the automated counting machines (ACMs) to pass the DOST technical tests
Bid". C. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken by Comelec and DOST after the award,
and their effect on the present controversy
On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo In view of the bidding process
M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. Unfortunately, the Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what manner and by what
They protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in standards or criteria the condition, performance and/or readiness of the machines were re-
the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted." Citing therein the evaluated and re-appraised and thereafter given the passing mark.
noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements (many of
which have been discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding. The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project involves not only the manufacturing of
the ACM hardware but also the development of three (3) types of software, which are
intended for use in the following:
Issue: 1. Evaluation of Technical Bids
Whether the bidding process was unconstitutional; 2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures
Whether the awarding of the contract was unconstitutional; 3. Election Day Use."
Whether the petitioner has standing; and
Whether the petition is premature. In short, Comelec claims that it evaluated the bids and made the decision to award the
Contract to the "winning" bidder partly on the basis of the operation of the ACMs running a
"base" software. That software was therefore nothing but a sample or "demo" software,
Held: which would not be the actual one that would be used on election day.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and VOID Comelec
Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the CAES to Mega Pacific What then was the point of conducting the bidding, when the software that was the
Consortium (MPC). Also declared null and void is the subject Contract executed between subject of the Contract was still to be created and could conceivably undergo innumerable
Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). 55 Comelec is further ORDERED to refrain from changes before being considered as being in final form?
implementing any other contract or agreement entered into with regard to this project.
In view of awarding of contract
Ratio: Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertaking with inexplicable haste, without The public bidding system designed by Comelec under its RFP (Request for Proposal for
adequately checking and observing mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. It the Automation of the 2004 Election) mandated the use of a two-envelope, two-stage
also accepted the proferred computer hardware and software even if, at the time of the system. A bidder's first envelope (Eligibility Envelope) was meant to establish its eligibility to
award, they had undeniably failed to pass eight critical requirements designed to safeguard bid and its qualifications and capacity to perform the contract if its bid was accepted, while
the second envelope would be the Bid Envelope itself. (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal documents such as articles of incorporation, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
business registrations, licenses and permits, mayor's permit, VAT certification, and so forth; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
technical documents containing documentary evidence to establish the track record of the (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
bidder and its technical and production capabilities to perform the contract; and financial (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
documents, including audited financial statements for the last three years, to establish the (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention."
bidder's financial capacity.

However, there is no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement, consortium
agreement, memorandum of agreement, or business plan executed among the members of
the purported consortium.So, it necessarily follows that, during the bidding process, Comelec
had no basis at all for determining that the alleged consortium really existed and was eligible
and qualified; and that the arrangements among the members were satisfactory and
sufficient to ensure delivery on the Contract and to protect the government's interest.

In view of standing
On the other hand, petitioners — suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters
and concerned citizens — respond that the issues central to this case are "of transcendental
importance and of national interest." Allegedly, Comelec's flawed bidding and questionable
award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the
failure of the electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression
of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of
government. Petitioners further argue that the award of any contract for automation
involves disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest
requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly.

Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of
"illegal disbursement of public funds," 22 or if public money is being "deflected to any
improper purpose"; 23 or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from "wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law."

In view of prematurity
The letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29, 2003 28 serves to
eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an actual written protest against the decision of the
poll body to award the Contract. The letter was signed by/for, inter alia, two of herein
petitioners: the Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its
president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol. Such letter-protest is sufficient
compliance with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies particularly because it
hews closely to the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184.

Paat v. Court of Appeals enumerates the instances when the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies may be disregarded, as follows:
"(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
Tolentino vs. COMELEC 2) WON the petition is MOOT
Jan 21 2004 3) WON the petitioner have locus standi

Parties: - Petitioners: Arturo Tolentino, Arturo Mojica Substantive Issue: WON a special election to fill a vacant 3-yr term Senate seat was validly
- Respondents: COMELEC, Ralph Recto, Gregorio Honasan held on May 14 2001, despite the lack of a “call” for such an election & for lack of notice from
- Ponente: Carpio COMELEC

Background: Ratio Decidendi
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside the COMELEC’s Resolutions which proclaimed The petition HAS NO MERIT.
official and final the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the May 14 2001 elections. Procedural Issues: 1) YES, the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction bec what the petitioners
are questioning here is the validity of the special election in wc Honasan was elected, NOT his
Facts of the Case right in the exercise of his office as Senator. His election is merely incidental to the petitioner’s
In Feb 2001, a Senate seat for a term expiring on June 30 2004 was vacated w/ the appointment case of action.
of then Sen. Guingona as VP of the PI. 2) Although the petition may be moot, it is no bar for the Court to decide on its resolution bec
the question of the validity of a special election is likely to be repeated
The Senate then adopted Resolution #84 wc: 1) certified the existence of a vacancy in the 3) YES, the Court shall be liberal in applying its rule of locus standi bec the issues raised are of
Senate & 2) called the COMELEC to fill up the said vacancy through a special election to be held transcendental significance & paramount importance to the people, for it involves the people’s
simultaneously w/ the regular election on May 14 2001, and 3) declared the senatorial right for suffrage.
th
candidate garnering the 13 highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term
of former Sen. Guingona. Accdg to the Senate, this Resolutn is for the “guidance” & Substantive Issue:
“implementatn” of the COMELEC, &that it had NO discretion to alter the said procedure. YES, a special election to fill a vacant 3-yr term Senate seat was validly held on May 14 2001.
Although COMELEC DID NOT COMPLY w/ the requirements of RA 6645, either strictly or
Nobody filed a certificate of candidacy to fill the position of senator to serve the unexpired 3yr substantially, it does NOT invalidate the special election. WHY?
term in the special electn. All the senatorial candidates filed the certificates of candidacy for
the 12 regular Senate seats w/ a 6yr term each. COMELEC distributed nationwide official A) Bec although no calls for special election were made by COMELEC, Sec 2 of RA 6645, as
documents (eg Voter Info Sheet, List of Candidates, Sample Ballot). The List of Candidates DID amended by RA 7166 already provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special
NOT provide 2 different categories of Senate seats to be voted, namely the 12 regular 6-year election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously w/ the next succeeding regular
term seats & the single 3-year term seat. Nor did the ballots provide a separate space for the election. The law already charges the voters w/ knowledge of this statutory notice &
candidate to be voted in the special election & instead provided 13 spaces for 13 senatorial COMELEC’s failure to give additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election,
seats. much less invalidate it.
B) Moreover, there is no proof that the COMELEC’s failure to give a formal notice of the Office
Without any COMELEC resolution/notice on the time, place & manner of the special election, to be filled & the manner of determining the winner in the special election actually misled
the special election was held on the scheduled May 14 2001 regular elections. voters & thereby changed the results of the election. After all, the voters can be duly notified
through other sources such as media reports & election propaganda during the campaign.
A single canvassing of votes for a single list of senatorial candidates was also done. C) Our election laws DO NOT require that a separate documentation or canvassing of votes be
made for a special election. COMELEC acted w/in its constitutional powers when it chose to
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the special election was conducted for violating the abandon the precedents of the 1951 &1955 special elections & instead adopted the Senate’s
th
precedents set by the 1951 & 1955 special elections, both of wc were held simultaneously & Resolution 84 wc shall award to the senatorial candidate garnering the 13 highest number of
yet distinctly w/ the regular general elections. votes, the unexpired Senate term of Sen. Guingona. The Court shall not interfere.
note: the Senate (through Roco’s suggestion), in Resolution 84 felt that giving the 3year term
th
Thus, they pray that the Court declare that 1) NO special elections were held & that 2) to the candidate w/ the 13 highest number of votes was being practical & economical)
th
Comelec’s Resolutions that proclaim the Senatorial candidate who obtained the 13 highest # In fine, the Court is loathe to annul elections despite certain irregularities unless it is
of votes as a duly elected be declared NULL&VOID impossible to distinguish wc laws are lawful & wc are not. This is to acknowledge the fact
that suffrage is one form of people’s direct participation in government, & it is thus
Issue/s indispensable in a democratic society like ours.
Procedural Issues: 1) WON the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter bec ***REMINDER to COMELEC*** : the Court however, reminded the COMELEC to not take
respondents say it is a quo warranto proceeding (a proceeding wc determines the right of a chances anymore in future elections. COMELEC reminded to next time, comply strictly w/ all
public officer in the exercise of his office & to oust him from it if his claim is not well-founded), the requirements of the law regarding both regular & special elections.
where only the Senate Electoral Tribunal can serve as judge.
Appendix: separate & distinct certificates of candidacy, c) tallying & canvassing were separated for the
regular&special elections.
1) Puno’s Dissenting Opinion (joined by Davide, Vitug, Ynares-Santiage & Tinga)
The electorate should have been informed of the time, place & manner of conduct of the May
14 2001 special election for the single senatorial seat for the unexpired term of VP Guingona.
The cases of Tolentino, UNIDO, Blo Umpar Adiong & Hassan all deepened the doctrine that a
meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage in a genuinely free, orderly&honest election is
predicated upon an informed electorate. The cases of Bince & Benito also teach us that correct
ascertainment of the will of the people is equally necessary. In not allowing the voter to
separately indicate the candidate he voted for the 3yr senatorial term, the voter was deprived
of his right to make an informed judgment based on his own reasons&valuations. Thus, his
true will in the special election was not ascertained.

It is the ponencia’s argument that RA 6645, as amended by RA 7166 already provides that in
case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held
simultaneously w/ the next succeeding regular election. However, this is NOT the intention of
the said laws, for they still require that the COMELEC issue an official notice of call of special
elections. Likewise, neither RA 6645 nor RA 7166 contemplates the integration of the special
election into the regular election whereby candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for
the regular elections also automatically stand as candidates in the special election. The
Omnibus Election Code is clear that a candidate can run for only 1 position in an election.

The ponencia likewise cites the Duquette case to lend support to its thesis that statutory notice
suffices. In Duquette, it was held that in the absence of an official notice of the special election
mandated by law to be held simultaneously w/ the regular election, there should be actual
notice of the electorate, as proven by the voting of a significant percentage of the electorate.
In the case at bar however, the number of votes cast for the special election cannot be
ascertained as the ballot did not indicate separately the votes for special election. Thus, there
is neither official notice nor proof of actual notice.

The Senate’s observation that the procedure for the special election that it adopted would be
lost costly for the govt as the ballots need not be printed separately does not justify the
manner of the May 14 2001 special election. We cannot bargain the electorate’s fundamental
right to vote intelligently w/ of the coin of convenience. Besides, even w/ the Senate
th
observation, the regular ballot had to be modified anyway, to include a 13 space.

Reliance on RA 6645 as amended by RA 7166 is ERRONEOUS, for under it, it is the COMELEC
and NOT the Senate wc is supposed to call & hold special elections in case of vacancy. The
Senate has NO POWER to impose on the COMELEC the procedure for the special election.

In fine, the ponencia’s ruling will not only be a step back in time but also constitute a fall in the
nation’s rise to democracy. Free elections does not only mean that the voter is not physically
restrained from going to the polling booth but also that the voter is unrestrained by the
bondage of ignorance.

2) 1951 & 1955 elections: In the 1951 & 1955 elections, wc were supposed to serve as models
for special elections: a) a separate space was provided in the official ballot for senatorial
candidates running for the 2yr term, b) candidates for the single Senate term of 2 yrs filed

Ople v Torres No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic
G.R. No. 127685. services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to
July 23, 1998. get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as
daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his
Facts: privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a duty cannot stand.
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for In view of standing
the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is
erosion. possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O.
No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment
and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government
agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O.
order enjoining its implementation. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules
yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves
have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as
Issue: Petitioner contends: January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.
SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF
THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. In view of the need for Legislative Act
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE. and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A policy.
SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders
as determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform
Held: standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end,
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
void for being unconstitutional. SO ORDERED. appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
Ratio: promulgated in administrative orders."
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative
Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence,
Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system
policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier- of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino
gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of
Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their
confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed.

 misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider
In view of right to privacy that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to seeks to prevent.
show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in
security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his
totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law
services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the was enacted to promote morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the
issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in service.
clear and present danger.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely
agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined
whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions.
purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification
Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for development
planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but for
the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308.
Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to
store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual
through his PRN .

His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it be
in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his
transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities,
reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN,
the better the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the
electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government
purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert
invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to
resist.

Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the
information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the
access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an
intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose,
or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No.
308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people
will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards
in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel
by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-
incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and
evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and
People vs Vera Rulings:
G.R. No. L-45685
65 Phil 56 1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and
November 16, 1937 unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this
reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on
how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial
Facts:
boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration doctrine of the non delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected
and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as
and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial
awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those
was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging
that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of
power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial
that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline
provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides
absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. 2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights
Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The
provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative
power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the
Issues:
example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a
1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This
means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to
Discussions: enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated
in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to
or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason
force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative
guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.
Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which
enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act,
the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the
Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various
provincial boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The

classification of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the
law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class.

Estrada v Sandiganbayan SE CRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS
G.R. No. 148560. CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
November 19, 2001.

Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder
Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the
RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore
makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of Ratio:
constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;
(b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it In view of vagueness and ambiguity
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define
Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of
to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act,
which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF THE ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co- technical or special legal meaning to those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers — who
accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers — to use statutory phraseology in
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire BY HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or Combination — the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To
TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or Series — a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE spatial and temporal succession.
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A
combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS. Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination"
and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for
RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of
CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES, enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to
THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there
(P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As
THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action
or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him,
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall
Issue: R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or
I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void
INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be
IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT THE stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD AND TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN MALA IN certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude,
as petitioner seems to suggest. 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for
him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and Echegaray 38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by
on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. In view of presumption of innocence
At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is essentially judicial. To declare
what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or has been is
In view of due process judicial. Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be expected to spell out with mathematical
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the precision how the law should be interpreted under any and all given situations. The
Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond application of the law will depend on the facts and circumstances as adduced by evidence
reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only which will then be considered, weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the
proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The constitutionally mandated function of the courts to interpret, construe and apply the law as
running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal would give flesh and blood to the true meaning of legislative enactments.
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State A construction should be rejected if it gives to the language used in a statute a meaning
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted and that tends to
accused is entitled to an acquittal. defeat the ends that are sought to be attained by its enactment. Viewed broadly, "plunder
involves not just plain thievery but economic depredation which affects not just private
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts parties or personal interests but the nation as a whole." Invariably, plunder partakes of the
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an nature of "a crime against national interest which must be stopped, and if possible, stopped
amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act permanently."
alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.
In view of estoppel
Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080. The
In view of mens rea case at bar has been subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in herein. The fact that one of petitioner's counsels was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and
se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion — . . . petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a Senator would not in any put him
Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be in estoppel to question its constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact,
proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges not of law. Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice.
that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges To hold that petitioner is estopped from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he
guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. had earlier voted for its passage would result in injustice not only to him, but to all others
who may be held liable under this statute.
[With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services
to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates
to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the What is RICO
people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effect and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is a United States federal law that
repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug provides for extended criminal penalties and a civil cause of action for acts performed as part
offenses involving government official, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must of an ongoing criminal organization. RICO was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized
not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society. Indeed, it would be Crime Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, enacted October 15, 1970). RICO is
absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations codified as Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968. While its
of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without intended use was to prosecute the Mafia as well as others who were actively engaged in
regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts. organized crime, its application has been more widespread.


To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA
In view of facial challenge must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. There are three
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad distinct considerations for the vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to ensure
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen that individuals are properly warned ex ante of the criminal consequences of their conduct.
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as This "fair notice" rationale was articulated in United States v. Harriss: The constitutional
a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which
that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.' he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem While the dictum that laws be clear and definite does not require Congress to spell out
effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason with mathematical certainty the standards to which an individual must conform his conduct,
alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. it is necessary that statutes provide reasonable standards to guide prospective conduct. And
In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. where a statute imposes criminal sanctions, the standard of certainty is higher. The penalty
imposable on the person found guilty of violating R.A. No. 7080 is reclusion perpetua to
death. Given such penalty, the standard of clarity and definiteness required of R.A. No. 7080
In view of burden of proof (accused) according to PANGANIBAN, J. is unarguably higher than that of other laws.
In sum, the law must be proven to be clearly and unequivocally repugnant to the
Constitution before this Court may declare its unconstitutionality. To strike down the law, It has been incorrectly suggested that petitioner cannot mount a "facial challenge" to the
there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute allows to Plunder Law, and that "facial" or "on its face" challenges seek the total invalidation of a
be done. 40 To justify the nullification of the law, there must be a clear, unequivocal breach statute. Fr. Bernas, for his part, pointed to several problematical portions of the law that
of the Constitution; not a doubtful, argumentative implication. 41 Of some terms in the law were left unclarified. He posed the question: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if
which are easily clarified by judicial construction, petitioner has, at best, managed merely to the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" The
point out alleged ambiguities. Far from establishing, by clear and unmistakable terms, any meanings of "combination" and "series" as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not clear.
patent and glaring conflict with the Constitution, the constitutional challenge to the Anti-
Plunder law must fail. For just as the accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence in To quote Fr. Bernas again: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements
the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt, so must a law be accorded the presumption that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" Because of this, it
of constitutionality without the same requisite quantum of proof. is easier to convict for plunder and sentence the accused to death than to convict him for
each of the component crimes otherwise punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other
Petitioner now concludes that the Anti-Plunder Law "eliminates proof of each and every laws which are bailable offenses. The resultant absurdity strikes at the very heart if the
component criminal act of plunder by the accused and limits itself to establishing just the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
pattern of over or criminal acts indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy."
The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being inherently wrongful and
All told, the above explanation is in consonance with what is often perceived to be the immoral, are patently mala in se, even if punished by a special law and accordingly, criminal
reality with respect to the crime of plunder — that "the actual extent of the crime may not, intent must clearly be established together with the other elements of the crime; otherwise,
in its breadth and entirety, be discovered, by reason of the 'stealth and secrecy' in which it is no crime is committed. By eliminating mens rea, R.A. 7080 does not require the prosecution
committed and the involvement of 'so many persons here and abroad and [the fact that it] to prove beyond reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder and imposes a
touches so many states and territorial units."' lesser burden of proof on the prosecution, thus paying the way for the imposition of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on the accused, in plain violation of the due process
"The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or argumentative
implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an ambiguous law as R.A. No. 7080 would put
clear beyond a reasonable doubt. 'The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality . . . on the balance the life and liberty of the accused against whom all the resources of the State
To doubt is to sustain.' are arrayed. It could be used as a tool against political enemies and a weapon of hate and
revenge by whoever wields the levers of power.

In view of burden of proof (State) according to KAPUNAN, J.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the In view of due process according to YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. A It is an ancient maxim in law that in times of frenzy and excitement, when the desire to do
criminal statute should not be so vague and uncertain that "men of common intelligence justice is tarnished by anger and vengeance, there is always the danger that vital protections
accorded an accused may be taken away. penal law is vague, any particularity in the information will come from the prosecutor. The
prosecution takes over the role of Congress.
Substantive due process dictates that there should be no arbitrariness, unreasonableness
or ambiguity in any law which deprives a person of his life or liberty. The trial and other
procedures leading to conviction may be fair and proper. But if the law itself is not In view of vagueness according to SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
reasonable legislation, due process is violated. Thus, an accused may not be sentenced to As a basic premise, we have to accept that even a person accused of a crime possesses
suffer the lethal injection or life imprisonment for an offense understood only after judicial inviolable rights founded on the Constitution which even the welfare of the society as a
construction takes over where Congress left off, and interpretation supplies its meaning. whole cannot override. The rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution are not subject to
political bargaining or to the calculus of social interest. Thus, no matter how socially-relevant
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the the purpose of a law is, it must be nullified if it tramples upon the basic rights of the accused.
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Substantive due process requires that a criminal statute should not be vague and uncertain. When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the
More explicitly — That the terms of a penal statute. . . must be sufficiently explicit to inform prosecution to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused, the legislature, in
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to penalties, is effect, rendered the enumerated "criminal acts" under Section 1 (d) merely as means and not
a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the as essential elements of plunder. This is constitutionally infirmed and repugnant to the basic
settled rules of law. And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in idea of justice and fair play. As a matter of due process, the prosecution is required to prove
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process. defendant is charged. The State may not specify a lesser burden of proof for an element of a
crime. 8 With more reason, it should not be allowed to go around the principle by
In its early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose to characterizing an essential element of plunder merely as a "means" of committing the crime.
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved by For the result is the reduction of the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected accused beyond reasonable doubt.
freedoms. 9
A statute, especially one involving criminal prosecution, must be definite to be valid. A In short, all that R.A. No. 7080 requires is that each Justice must be convinced of the
statute is vague or overbroad, in violation of the due process clause, where its language does existence of a "combination or series." As to which criminal acts constitute a combination or
not convey sufficiently definite warning to the average person as to the prohibited conduct. series, the Justices need not be in full agreement. Surely, this would cover-up a wide
A statute is unconstitutionally vague if people of common intelligence must necessarily guess disagreement among them about just what the accused actually did or did not do. Stated
at its meaning. differently, even if the Justices are not unified in their determination on what criminal acts
were actually committed by the accused, which need not be proved under the law, still, they
In malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal Code, the criminal intent is an could convict him of plunder.
important element of the criminal acts. Under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are
committed. Equally disagreeable is the provision of the Plunder Law which does away with The Special Prosecution Division Panel defines it as "at least three of the acts enumerated
the requirement that each and every component of the criminal act of plunder be proved under Section 1(d) thereof." 33 But it can very well be interpreted as only one act repeated
and instead limits itself to proving only a pattern of overt acts indicative of the unlawful at least three times. And the Office of the Solicitor General, invoking the deliberations of the
scheme or conspiracy. 18 In effect, the law seeks to penalize the accused only on the basis of House of Representatives, contends differently. It defines the term series as a "repetition" or
a proven scheme or conspiracy, and does away with the rights of the accused insofar as the pertaining to "two or more."
component crimes are concerned. In other words, R.A. No. 7080 circumvents the obligation
of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the A statute which is so vague as to permit the infliction of capital punishment on acts
crime of plunder, because the law requires merely proof of a pattern of overt acts showing already punished with lesser penalties by clearly formulated law is unconstitutional. The
an unlawful scheme or conspiracy. vagueness cannot be cured by judicial construction.

I agree with petitioner's concern over the danger that the trial court may allow the In fine, I can only stress that the one on trial here is not Mr. Estrada, but R.A. No. 7080.
specifications of details in an information to validate a statute inherently void for vagueness. The issue before this Court is not the guilt or innocence of the accused, but the
An information cannot rise higher than the statute upon which it is based. Not even the constitutionality of the law. I vote to grant the petition, not because I favor Mr. Estrada, but
construction by the Sandiganbayan of a vague or ambiguous provision can supply the missing because I look beyond today and I see that this law can pose a serious threat to the life,
ingredients of the Plunder Law. The right of an accused to be informed of the nature and liberty and property of anyone who may come under its unconstitutional provisions. As a
cause of the accusation against him is most often exemplified in the care with which a member of this Court, my duty is to see to it that the law conforms to the Constitution and
complaint or information should be drafted. However, the clarity and particularity required no other. I simply cannot, in good conscience, fortify a law that is patently unconstitutional.
of an information should also be present in the law upon which the charges are based. If the
Umali vs. Guingona, (d) Whether or not in the light of the ombudsman resolution dismissing the charges against
305 SCRA 533 (1999) petitioner, there is still basis for petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in
Topic: Earliest Opportunity administrative order no. 152
The administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the
Brief Summary: The case is a case filed for the dismissal of the petition for Certiorari criminal case. Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation
Prohibition and Injunction brought by petitioner against the respondents. It was on October conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the ombudsman.
27, 1993 when Osmundo Umali was appointed as Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Note: The petition is dismissible because the issues raised by the petitioner does not
Revenue by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos. The late President received a memorandum alleging against constitute any valid legal basis for overturning the findings and conclusions by the Court of
the petitioner in violation of internal revenue laws during the incumbency as Regional Appeals. However considering antecedent facts and circumstances, the Court has decided to
Director. On October 6, 1994, President Ramos issued an Administrative Order No. 152 consider the dismissal and because the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is
dismissing the petitioner from service with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits provided no longer interested in pursuing the case. Finally the Solicitor General has no more basis to
by law. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but the Office of the President denied the enact Administrative Order No. 152.
motion for reconsideration. December 1, 1994, a petition is brought to the regional Trial
Court of Makati pertaining to Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction of Administrative Order Dispositive:
No. 152. Wherefore, in light of the foregoing effective and substantive supervening events, and in the
exercise of its equity powers, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition Accordingly
Issues: Administrative order no 152 is considered LIFTED and petitioner can be allowed to retire with
(a) Whether or not administrative order no. 152 violated the petitioner's right to security of full benefits No pronouncement as to costs.
tenure
(b) Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process in the issuance of administrative
order no. 152
(c) Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted government agency and whether the petitioner
can raise the issue of its constitutionality belated in its motion for reconsideration of the trial
court's decision
(d) Whether or not in the light of the ombudsman resolution dismissing the charges against
petitioner, there is still basis for petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in
administrative order no. 152

Ruling:
(a) Whether or not administrative order no. 152 violated the petitioner's right to security of
tenure
NO. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security
of tenure. The petitioner claimed that as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal revenue he
is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure however it is anemic of evidentiary support.
But it was fatal that he wasn't able to provide sufficient evidence on this matter.
(b) Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process in the issuance of administrative
order no. 152
NO. The Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three issues to be sure, petitioner was
not denied the right to due processes before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner
filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violations of internal revenue
laws and regulations and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body.
(c) Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted government agency and whether the petitioner
can raise the issue of its constitutionality belated in its motion for reconsideration of the trial
court's decision
The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It is too late to raise the said issue
for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below


Arceta vs. Mangrobang regard to counsel’s spirited advocacy in both cases, the Court was unable to agree that the
GR 152895, said requisites have been adequately met. Nor does the Court find the constitutional question
15 June 2004 raised to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy below. Every law has in its favor
the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
Facts: unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or
The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating Batas argumentative. The Court examined the contentions of Arceta and Dy carefully; but they still
Pambansa 22 in an Information (Criminal Case 1599-CR), alleging in an Information that on or have to persuade us that BP 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision of
about 16 September 1998, Arceta issued a Regional Bank check worth P740,000 (postdated 21 the Constitution. Even the thesis of Dy that the present economic and financial crisis should be
December 1998) to Oscar R. Castro payable in CASH, well-knowing that at the time of issue she a basis to declare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant
did have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment, and despite receipt consideration. As stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that there exists a most
of notice of such dishonor, Arceta failed to pay said payee with the face amount of said check compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the financial system and any practice
or to make arrangement for full payment thereof within 5 banking days after receiving notice. tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be deterred, to prevent
Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the Information quashed on havoc in the trading and financial communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial
the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional. She reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine courts may be burdened immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to
still in place, such a move would be an exercise in futility for it was highly unlikely that the trial the alleged invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets in lower
court would grant her motion and thus go against prevailing jurisprudence. On 21 October courts lies elsewhere.
2002, Arceta was arraigned and pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. However, she manifested
that her arraignment should be without prejudice to the present petition or to any other
actions she would take to suspend proceedings in the trial court. Arceta [GR 152895] then filed
the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for a temporary restraining
order, assailing the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22). On the other hand,
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge sheet against Gloria S. Dy for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (MeTC of Caloocan City, Criminal Case 212183), alleging
in the Information that on or about the month of January 2000, Dy issued Prudential Bank
Check 0000329230 in the amount of P2,500,000.00 dated 19 January 2000 in favor of Anita
Chua well knowing at the time of issue that she has no sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check was
subsequently dishonored for the reason “ACCOUNT CLOSED” and with intent to defraud failed
and still fails to pay the said complainant the amount of P2,500,000.00 despite receipt of notice
from the drawee bank that said check has been dishonored and had not been paid. Like Arceta,
Dy made no move to dismiss the charges against her on the ground that BP 22 was
unconstitutional. Dy likewise believed that any move on her part to quash the indictment or
to dismiss the charges on said ground would fail in view of the Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed
a petition with the Supreme Court invoking its power of judicial review to have the said law
voided for Constitutional infirmity.

Issue: Whether the Court should render BP22 unconstitutional due to the present economic
and financial crisis, else due to the undue burden made upon the MeTC by bouncing checks
cases.

Held:

When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine
that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial
review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the
very lis mota of the case. Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume
jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due