You are on page 1of 14

How the west has lost the world https://www.ft.

com/content/2069f2fa-9060-11e6-8df8-d3778b55a923

It was only the day before yesterday that the rich democracies imagined a post-cold war
global order fashioned in their own image. Now they are running away from the world
(http://next.ft.com/content/804537f6-83d2-11e6-8897-2359a58ac7a5).

There were to be three pillars to the new order. As a benign hegemon, the US would
underwrite the international peace and advance the spread of liberal democracy. Europe
would export its model of postmodern integration to its near neighbourhood and beyond
— remember those predictions that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations would
soon be like the EU? A declining Russia would join China and the rising powers of the east
and south in recognising their national advantage in becoming stakeholders in a western-
designed system.

That was then. The US is still by a margin the pre-eminent power but, whether Hillary
Clinton or Donald Trump (https://www.ft.com/us-election-2016) wins the presidency in
November, the domestic political impulse is to pull back from the world.

Europe is too busy filling the cracks in its own project to pay heed to what is happening
elsewhere. Engulfed by crises — the eurozone, migration and most recently Brexit

1 de 3 14/10/2016 11:10
How the west has lost the world https://www.ft.com/content/2069f2fa-9060-11e6-8df8-d3778b55a923

(https://www.ft.com/topics/themes/Brexit) — it is a continent that has lost the capacity


to think strategically. Meanwhile, China and Russia have no inclination to accept rules
written by the US.

What happened? The war in Iraq, intended to demonstrate the reach of American power,
instead delineated its limitations. The global financial crash of 2007-08 cruelly exposed
the weaknesses of liberal capitalism.

Europe’s integrationist dreams were shattered by the consequent eurozone shock. China
grew a lot faster than anyone had expected, accelerating the redistribution of power in the
global system.

The common thread now is nationalism. In the US this takes the form of “America-first” —
some say, belligerent — isolationism. For Vladimir Putin, armed revanchism is about all
he has left: Russia is weak in all the dimensions of power except the military. Europe, with
its populism (https://www.ft.com/topics/themes/Political_Populism) and pocket-sized
authoritarians such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban, is unlearning the lessons of its history.
China wants to expunge the memory of 100 years of humiliation. You could say they are
all Westphalians now.

I was reminded of the gulf of misunderstanding and mistrust at a gathering this week in
Beijing. The annual Xiangshan security forum (http://www.xiangshanforum.cn/) is the
place where China’s military and political elites speak to the world. It is a fascinating event
for a westerner — a place where the voices of Europeans and Americans have to compete
for time at the podium with those of such nations as Timor-Leste, Cambodia, Mongolia
and, of course, China’s ally of convenience, Russia.

The chosen theme for 2016 was the search for a “new model of international relations
(https://www.ft.com/topics/themes/Global_politics)”. The subliminal message was that
the west should recognise that the old order has passed and it is time to engage with China
in co-designing its replacement.

Western talk of adapting the existing system to accommodate Beijing failed to recognise
that what is required is something entirely new. Above all, the US, as the status quo
outsider in east Asia, should adjust to the new realities. The alliance system of the second
half of the 20th century does not fit the geopolitical realities of China’s rise.

Apart from some sharp words about Beijing’s resolve to protect its claims and interests in
the South China sea, the language of the hosts was mollifying. China seeks positive sum
co-operation and is determined to avoid the “Thucydides trap
(http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-
war-thucydides-trap/406756/)” of a clash between an established and rising power. But
the new order cannot look like the old.

Like what then? You catch talk in the background about a new concert of great powers,
modelled on the work of Metternich at the 19th-century Congress of Vienna. Or perhaps a

2 de 3 14/10/2016 11:10
How the west has lost the world https://www.ft.com/content/2069f2fa-9060-11e6-8df8-d3778b55a923

series of regional power balances with the US and China at the apex? A less sanguine view
is that order will simply be replaced by half-organised disorder.

There yet is another school of thought — call it


realism, pragmatism or, more realistically,
fatalism — that says there is simply nothing to be
done. Later, if not sooner, this multipolar world
will find a new equilibrium. Let nations sort out
their own problems and conflicts, proponents of
Populism has become a wrecking this view argue. A new balance will eventually
force by appealing to the decent emerge.
but downcast The snag is that eventually may be too late. The
Middle East is burning and Russia wants to
upturn the post-cold war settlement in Europe,
but the really dangerous great power flashpoints are in east Asia. Add North Korea’s
nuclear programme to regional rivalry in the East and South China seas and it is not hard
to see US-China competition turning to confrontation and worse.

The world is at a hinge point. The post-cold war settlement, organised around
unchallenged US power, western-designed global institutions and multilateral rules and
norms, has been eroded. The rule of power is chafing against the rule of law, nationalism
against internationalism.

Some think that the simple fact of economic interdependence will save the day — conflict
would throw up only losers. But the dynamic can operate in the other direction. It is no
accident that the International Monetary Fund’s latest annual report cites political risk as
the biggest threat to the world economy. The liberal economic system depends above all
on global security order.

philip.stephens@ft.com (mailto:philip.stephens@ft.com)

Print a single copy of this article for personal use. Contact us if you wish to print more to
distribute to others. © The Financial Times Ltd.

Managers would prefer to engage with rather Attractions grow for start-ups and venture
than dump suppliers of unhealthy food capital

3 de 3 14/10/2016 11:10
Destined for War: Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides... http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states...

TheAtlantic.com uses cookies to enhance your experience when visiting the website and to serve you with
Accept cookies
advertisements that might interest you. By continuing to use this site, you agree to our use of cookies.
Find out more here.

1 de 12 14/10/2016 11:12
Destined for War: Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides... http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states...

2 de 12 14/10/2016 11:12
Destined for War: Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides... http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states...

3 de 12 14/10/2016 11:12
Destined for War: Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides... http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states...

4 de 12 14/10/2016 11:12
Destined for War: Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides... http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states...

5 de 12 14/10/2016 11:12
Destined for War: Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides... http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states...

6 de 12 14/10/2016 11:12
Destined for War: Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides... http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states...

7 de 12 14/10/2016 11:12
Destined for War: Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides... http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states...

8 de 12 14/10/2016 11:12
Destined for War: Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides... http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states...

9 de 12 14/10/2016 11:12
Destined for War: Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides... http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states...

10 de 12 14/10/2016 11:12
Destined for War: Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides... http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states...

From The Web Ads by Revcontent

11 de 12 14/10/2016 11:12

You might also like