Waypoint Issue 1

WAYPOINT
The magazine of the computer Harpoon community
Issue 1
December 2002
WAYPOINT
This issue is dedicated to the

men of the K-141 Kursk
On eternal patrol in the
Barents Sea
August 12, 2000
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is the monthly magazine of the computer Harpoon community, produced by the contribution of the
community members and freely distributed by the Harpoon Headquarters site (www.harpoonhq.com), the
premier Harpoon fan site on the net.
All the work submitted by contributors (articles, projects etc.) fully remains their intellectual property and
may be replicated/reproduced only under their explicit consent.
We continuously welcome and encourage input from the community – after all, it’s your magazine, and you
should be the ones to decide what gets presented. Ideas, suggestions, corrections, projects & articles of your
own, put your thoughts into words and email us at waypoint@harpoonhq.com. All emails are answered.
The Waypoint staff is in no official way associated with 360 Pacific, Interactive Magic, SpearSoft, AGSI,
UbiSoft or any other corporate entity related in any way to any of the computer Harpoon products.
STAFF
Dimitris V. Dranidis (Sunburn_GR@hotmail.com) - Lead Editor & Publisher, H2/3 material
Ragnar Emsoy (Emsoy@yahoo.com) – Editor, H2/3 material
Michael Mykytyn (myky9735@yahoo.com) – Editor, H2/3 material
ISSUE CONTRIBUTORS:
Kip Allen (kipallen@earthlink.net)
Craig Paffhausen (Pappystein@prodigy.net)
Lon Nordeen
Larry Brown
Dale Hiller (daleh@roadrunner.nf.net)
LEGAL NOTICES & DISCLAIMER

The Harpoon series of Board Games has been (c) Larry Bond and Chris Carlson under various editions since
1977 and is still in print and protected by Copyright.
Harpoon, Classic, Classic 97, II (Harpoon 2), and III (Harpoon 3) and all their registered trademarks are (c)
Advanced Gaming Systems Inc. 1988-2002. All worldwide rights reserved Harpoon Online is (c) AGSI and
Kesmai Corporation. Harpoon 4 is (c) UbiSoft 2002 - all worldwide rights reserved. The newer databases,
help files & supplementary material for H2/3 are produced with permission of AGSI for non-commercial
distribution by each developer who applied for and received acknowledgement by AGSI.
We assume no legal responsibility for the quality of the information contain herein or whatever damage
(direct or indirect) caused by the presented material. All military information on these pages is sourced from
declassified material found in books, magazines, web sites and mails from fellow Harpooners and military
enthusiasts. However, if we have used sensitive material or copyright-protected material of any type, please
let us know so that we can remove it. Any information that does not correspond with declassified info was
obtained through the imagination of the editors.
WAYPOINT
CONTENTS
FROM THE HQ................................................................................................. 3

THE VET’S PEN ............................................................................................... 5
NOTICEBOARD ............................................................................................... 8
THE DOCKS.................................................................................................... 12
IN DETAIL....................................................................................................... 15
Clash of the Titans (H3)
Clash of the Titans - An After-Action Report
TECHNICAL ................................................................................................... 23
The Infamous H2/3 Mission Editor (Part I)
Platform Audit: Tornado
JED SPECIAL.................................................................................................. 30
In Peril On the Sea
THE ART OF WAR ........................................................................................ 44
Kitting-up for Mud-moving
Managing the Chaos: The Postwar Evolution Of Naval C3 Systems
Slava-class cruisers for the PLAN?
PLATFORM PROFILE.................................................................................. 72
Sovremenny-class DDG
Harushio-class SSK
Akash SAM Battery
THE FAQs ........................................................................................................ 80
MAILBOX ........................................................................................................ 92
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FROM THE HQ
A year to remember
This year has been probably the most productive year in the history of our great hobby.
The Harpoon 2/3 crowd, Harpoon 97/2002 crowd, the paper rule crowd and soon to be
Harpoon 4 crowd have all had something to be proud of. We at the Harpoon Headquarters
would like to take a moment or two (or a page or two, as it is) to reflect on these
accomplishments.
Harpoon 3 was probably a pipe dream not more than three years ago but thanks to the H3
team (Jesse Spears, Don Gilman, and unnamed others) and the passion of the Harpoon
Community the dream has become a reality. The game is now rock-stable and screaming-
fast within the Windows environment, many bugs of old have been repaired, new features
are being added and the game is evolving into what we all wanted it to become. There are
many possibilities left to explore and all parties seem to be as enthusiastic as they were on
day one.
Harpoon 2002 was in a similar boat with Harpoon 3. Who would have expected an
evolution of this game? Thanks to the hard work and dedication of the Harpoon 2002
team and Don Gilman this has become a reality. The bugs of the past are now gone, the
capability of user created databases has been added, a new database in is the works and
many more exciting improvements are being planned and executed.
The Harpoon paper rules crowd has been at it since day one. It was from them that the
desire for a computer-based Harpoon game was born. Throughout the years, they have
played, enjoyed and evolved their hobby into what they wish of it. This year a new update
of the game was produced, as well as many exciting new supplements (including land
warfare). Games are played often and the players get the same joy they got from the game
since day one and this will surely carry on for many years to come.
The soon-to-be computer-Harpoon 4 crowd has much to be excited about. It has been a
long time but progress has seemingly been made. The developers of the game (past and
present) have had a rough ride but have managed to do the important thing and keep the
game alive. And recently they have come forward with many exciting revelations about
the upcoming game’s features and mechanics. So let’s support them in their endeavor as
far as it may go. They could well have dropped the game years ago if the were in it purely
for the bread, but something else has kept them at it. We suspect it’s the harpooner in each
and every one of them. So heads up and get ready to welcome the new ship into port.
Finally, it has been a great year for each and every one of us; regardless of what version
flavor we call ours. Who do we have to thank for this? The Admiralty? The game teams?
Well yes, but we also should thank the players. Why you may ask? Because you do the
one thing that keeps the game going which is playing the game. It is the greatest
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contribution you can make. So keep having fun with your game regardless of what it is
and surely we can have another good year next year.
Happy Holidays and Happy New Years! We hope you enjoy the first issue of this magazine.
The Harpoon HQ
For the Players by the Players
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THE VET’S PEN
Making history: The story of modern wargaming

By Kip Allen
Modern wargaming started in 1953. That was when Charles Roberts designed the first true
board wargame, “Tactics.” It featured a conflict between to hypothetical powers.
Cardboard pieces represented the units that were moved on a map with a grid of squared.
A die roll matched to a series of charts determined the outcome of battle.
Roberts realized he had tapped into a new market. In 1958, he founded the Avalon Hill
Co., which is the granddaddy of wargame companies.
Wargaming has been a major part of my life since my high school days in the early 1960s.
My gaming companions and I waited impatiently for whatever new game Avalon Hill
would release, which happened no more than once or twice a year. By 1963, “D-Day,”
“Bismarck” and “Stalingrad” occupied my weekends.
Almost as important as the games themselves, Avalon Hill published “The General,” a
magazine dedicated solely to the new hobby. One of the most important aspects of the
publication was its “Opponents Wanted” column. For the first time, wargamers across the
country were able to network and actually form a sense of community.
When I left for college in the turbulent ’60s, wargaming went with me. There, I found like-
minded spirits who enjoyed the intellectual challenge. Interestingly, the hobby seemed as
popular among the anti-war crowd as with the ROTC cadets. As an aside, the English
writer H.G. Wells, an avowed pacifist, was an avid miniature enthusiast. In fact, he wrote
one of the definitive books on miniature gaming, “Little Wars.” When asked how a pacifist
could enjoy such a pastime, he replied, “Lead soldiers to not bleed. Neither do they leave
widows and orphans.”
Still, there was something missing in the hobby. The games were just games, albeit
complex, they were not especially realistic. That started to change in 1966. That was the
year Avalon Hill contracted with a young writer named Jim Dunnigan to design for them.
Dunnigan soon produced “Jutland,” 1914” and “Panzerblitz.”
This game opened a new vista in the hobby. Dunnigan was a meticulous researcher. He
incorporated accurate terrain factors as combat multipliers, made accurate estimates of
historical units’ strength and performance and added logistics. In short, his designs were
not games — they were simulations. Dunnigan proved that actual or hypothetical military
situations could be accurately portrayed in a game format.
Dunnigan also had some ideas of his own. He believed that there was a market for
accurate, complex simulations; he believed the market could bear more than one or two
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releases annually and he believed that the gaming public wanted a publication that was
more than just a house organ, as the “General” had become. As a result, he started
Simulations Publications Inc in 1969 and took over publication of a gaming/history
magazine, Strategy & Tactics. His predictions proved correct and the subsequent decade
proved to be the “golden age” of wargaming.
Naturally, gamers such as myself became dedicated customers. In 1973, I moved to New
York City seeking fame and fortune as a broadcaster and writer. Neither happened and I
wound up with a lot of time on my hands. SPI was headquartered in Manhattan where I
was living. SPI asked opened its doors every Friday night to local gamers who would
playtest games in progress and prepare critiques for the designers and developers.
Naturally, I volunteered. I joined an eclectic group that included a legal aid layer, a nuclear
scientist, a micropalentologist and a bunch of pimply-faced kids who were united by our
hobby.
Several months later, Dunnigan offered me a job as a developer. I thought I had died and
gone to heaven. I worked on a dozen or so games and helped on the magazine until 1976.
I could name-drop and tell war stories about SPI until the proverbial cows came home.
Suffice it to say that those three years were among the most remarkable in my life. Never
before or since have I worked with such a group of talented, brilliant and dedicated people.
Frustrating and aggravating at times, but they were absolutely brilliant.
As I mentioned, Dunnigan was a fanatical researcher. He was always running surveys to

determine what our customers wanted and sought new ways to satisfy that desire. Perhaps
the most important discovery he made has a direct bearing on computer gaming, although
no one realized it at the time. That was that the vast majority of gamers played by
themselves. This is standard in computer gaming with today’s AI technology. At the time,
it was a revolutionary concept.
We had a computer at SPI, a big brute of a machine that was programmed with punch
cards. Bob Felice, one of our programmers, designed two in-house games, one a science
fiction wargame and the other a lunar lander. However, we could not see a commercial
application for them because most people didn’t have computers in the 1970s.
Yet, there were signs. One was in the neighborhood bar frequented by the SPI R&D staff
following our regular staff meeting every Friday. Besides the cold beer, great pastrami
sandwiches and collection of Irish music on the juke box, was a video device with a new
game called “Pong.” There was always a waiting line to play.
Another major development happened across the country. Rick Loomis founded a
company in 1970 called Flying Buffalo in Scottsdale, Ariz. Flying Buffalo ran a line of
computer-moderated play-by-mail games. For the first time, a computer was used directly
by players.
At about the same time, young visionaries such as Bill Gates and Steve Jobs were about to
start a revolution of their own. Cheap, easy-to-use home computers were the ideal
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platforms for the interaction of complex rules and situations. Throw in the Internet, and
gamers across the globe not only could communicate directly with each other but could
even play against each other in real time or by e-mail.
That bring gamers in general and ’Pooners in particular to the present.
What about the future? Your guess is as good as mine. What is certain is that there will be
more changes and exciting times are ahead.
-Kip Allen
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NOTICEBOARD
This section deals presents news of interest to the computer Harpoon community: everything from new
databases, new versions, new ideas expressed, to official press releases, to world events of relevance to
computer Harpoon. Have some news that you would like to spread around? Drop us a line
(waypoint@harpoonhq.com) and we’ll credit you with the piece of news reported.
We have received confirmation that Antony Perkins is now in charge of the WW2-
database project for H2/3. Delivering a realistic and functional dataset for this era has
never been easy due to the current limitations of the game engine, but Tony is dedicated to
the task and has shown a good deal of work so far. Anyone interested in giving him a hand
may contact him at the following address: udb@harpoonhq.com
There was recently a recurring problem with the direct-download version of Harpoon 3.
Many users have reported corrupted downloads which resulted in the compressed file not
extracting correctly, outputting various error messages on a console window. It would
appear that these problems were related to the relocation of the DDL source from NWS
(who no longer offer it) to SpearSoft. We advise everyone who had had similar problems
in the recent past to give it another try and inform us if any other problem occurs. Keep in
mind that the proper, non-corrupted downloaded file should be 85MB in size (for the PC
version).
The December issue of the Journal of Electronic Defence is out, and sports the
authoritative, high quality content that we’ve long come to recognise in JED. Some of our
picks for this month:
A thorough history and analysis of
Soviet/Russian MANPADS systems and the
threat they represent
Ruggedised computers for the modern tech-
aware infantryman
A primer on precision emitter-location
techniques
Update on the competition for the new Polish
fighter
Improved mobile SA-3s in use by Iraq?
The Australian UAV program
Plus loads of other interesting news and
articles.
A must resource for the serious pooner, both current and past issues of JED can be
accessed at www.jedonline.com. Browsing the material requires a free registration.
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Pop the champagnes! Steve Le Blanc’s scenario “Warthog Strike” constitutes the 100th
third-party DB2000-based scenario for H2/3 hosted in HHQ (not counting Klaus
Behrmann’s monster-scenarios) and thus marks an important milestone in the years-long
history of the site and the database itself. When asked to comment on the occasion, chief-
webmaster and DB2000 creator Ragnar Emsoy stated: “This occasion highlights our
ongoing commitment and dedication to serving the Harpoon community and making sure
users get the best support and content possible. With recent developments I am even more
optimistic for the future – I’ll bet you that we’ll reach the 1000th scenario way faster than
it took us to get here ☺”
Mark Kundiger from Ultimation (developers of Harpoon 4) has recently posted some
interesting information regarding this much-awaited addition to the Harpoon stable.
First, an interesting bit on the database format & structure. A user was enquiring on
whether the database format would be truly open and Mark responded:
"Open format database" is a code-phrase for "FoxPro". All the platform data is stored in DBF files, which
are presumably manipulatable by any database program.
The database editor is a separate Windows app that we've been using in development. It's not integrated to
the game, it's not going to get any attention from QA, and we may very well find out it reformats hard drives
when editing ships of the Latvian Navy. Hence the uncertainty over whether or not it will be included with
the game.”
Furthermore, he confirmed that the maps shipped wit the original version will indeed
cover the entire globe – although not in one chunk:
“Technically, it's a series of fairly large maps. Collectively, they cover most of the world. I'm pretty sure
parts of central Asia are missing. Scenarios are confined to one map.”
Go here: http://www.simhq.com/simhq3/sims/boards/bbs/Forum47/HTML/000059.html
for an example screenshot of a 360-deg polar map.
In addition, he provided a description of the abstracted ground-warfare model used for

amphibious operations:
“A note about the amphibious invasion/ground combat model:
Describing H4's combat model as simplistic relative to the paper rules would be an example of "spinning" it
in the most negative way. Larry Bond and Chris Carlson have written a very robust ground combat system,
but it was only completed a few months ago, and I don't honestly know if it's even available to the paper
rules players yet. Before the new system written, there was *no* ground combat at all.
H4's ground combat model is a tweaked-out version of the model used in Larry and Chris's WWII game,
Command at Sea, with some extra modern concepts thrown in. Ground combat works on an attrition model.
Units which might influence ships or aircraft (shore batteries, SAM sites) are treated as normal units on the
ground. All other ground units, down to the vehicle/platoon level, are invisibly scattered about the zone
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where the landing is going to take place. All units have a ground combat strength (GCS) rating, which is
summed to come up with the total GCS value for that side in the zone.
The game also keeps track of how much space troops and vehicles occupy. So, if an LPD is carrying its
allotment of troops, it's not going to carry more than its total capacity. When it comes time to start the
landing, the vehicles and troops are parcelled out to the smaller landing craft, and they begin making runs to
the beach, returning to the LPD, reloading, etc.
As troops arrive the attacking side builds up its GCS value in the zone, and the forces start to fight. GCS
strength can be modified by air strikes and naval gunfire support. The "dice" are rolled every thirty minutes.
The relative GCS strengths are compared to a big table, and both sides take losses, and the battle tends to
move towards a breakout (victory) or a stalled invasion (defeat). However, even a stalled invasion can be re-
started by transporting in more troops or by increasing fire support.
For reference, the new paper rules add multiple zones to the model, and forces can be ordered between
them, and interdicted. There are also rules also allow each commander to set their forces' posture (assault,
hasty defence, etc.)”
The full thread on this post can be found here:

http://www.simhq.com/simhq3/sims/boards/bbs/Forum47/HTML/000051.html
Harpoon 3 version 3.5.7 is finally out! And it sports a newly introduced feature and a first
for any Harpoon version, the ability to plot additional custom GIS-related information
on top of the standard map overlays. Examples of the usability of this feature abound:
Plotting road networks to facilitate logistics-interdiction air-ops, adding custom
descriptions to specific geographic areas, placing non-removable reference points on the
map, adding more detailed elevation-data overlays etc. Here is the release statement by the
developer Jesse Spears himself, as posted on the Yahoo H3 group
(http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Harpoon3/):
Version 3.5.7 is available for Mac and Windows. I actually uploaded it Sunday Morning, but it took me a
while to get everything settled with it (there was a corrupted file for the Windows direct download installer
which took a bit to get fixed).
The main feature added for version 3.5.7 is support for a GIS system (I forget what that stands for,
Geographic Information System? I'm know we have some people that are into it on this list, so I'll let them
correct me if I got it wrong ;).
The GIS support was added as part of a contract with the Australian Ministry of Defense. It's being released
in the commercial version with their permission (so thank Robert Carpenter if you like it, it's in the non-
military version because he said it could be there :).
I won't go into too much detail on how it works, and what format files need to be in, and where to put them.
The basics are that you put some GIS files (*.shp, *.dbf, and *.shx) into a folder with a scenario, and all of
them are read in automatically.
An example (with mostly random lines and points) is here:

http://harpoon3.com/download/ScenDataHarpoon.zip
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I know that some of the data in that one is wrong (the color field is named "GIS_OBJ_CO" when it should be
"GIS_COLOR", which is why most of the lines and points draw using the default color, which is the same as
the coast lines I think).
Also, the GIS data does not affect game play at all (at least not yet). It's for display purposes only, and
there's currently no way to turn it off (short of moving the scenario file to another folder, or moving the GIS
files somewhere else). I intend to add a hot key toggle to allow you to turn it on and off while playing the
game in an upcoming version (possibly 3.5.8).
Please don't ask for more info on it, I really don't know much about it other than what I've mentioned here.
Other than GIS code, there are some miscellaneous bug fixes that have been accumulating since version
3.5.6.
Finally, I'd like to thank the guys at HarpoonHQ for helping with the testing. They helped us track down
some tricky bugs that didn't show up on the various development machines. I know some of them will putting
the GIS features to good use :)
The new version can be downloaded at the usual place: enter SpearSoft’s H3 site
(www.harpoon3.com) and scroll-down on the announcement page until finding the three
executables (main program, scenario editor & DB-editor).
The Harpoon 3 Launcher utility, designed by Paolo Moneta, has reached version 2.0 and
is now available for download. This handy application allows users to edit all the default
configuration settings of the simulation without having to manually edit the harpoon3.ini
file. It also allows fast switching of databases and easy management of the option-files.
Extensive documentation and an easy setup round up this very useful app. Grab it at the
HarpoonHQ Utilities section (http://www.harpoonhq.com/utilities.htm)
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THE DOCKS
The Docks section lists new additions to the community: New scenarios, new utilities, new tools,
significantly new versions of existing material etc. Naturally, the focus of new additions is
scenarios. Think you can write-up a good summary or comment on any scenario you have given a
spin recently? Made the next Harpoon-related killer app? Tell us about it
(waypoint@harpoonhq.com) and share it with the community.
New World Order 2002-2012 – Part 4: Kashmir (H3)

By Klaus Behrmann
Pakistan, frustrated by the loss of her navy and

part of her airforce, and the Indian attempts to
gain advantage by moving full scale into
Kashmir, launches nuclear strikes against India,
followed up by conventional air strikes, and
India immediately retaliates.
Michael Mykytyn says: For all you monster-

scenario fans out there, Klaus has produced another classic. This massive and highly-
complex creation covers all facets of naval combat and is a prime example of what makes
Klaus the master of the monster-sized scenarios.
The Novaya Zemlya Installation (H3)

By Klaus Behrmann
Back in the days of the Cold War the US managed to erect a monitoring station on the
island of Novaya Zemlya. But with the Cold War coming to an end, it was decided to
secretly send in a SEAL team by submarine to demolish the station
Michael Mykytyn says: An excellent ASW scenario playable from both sides. An
excellent model of submarine operations in very hostile waters. A must for all sub nuts out
there and an excellent work night scenario.
The Wall : World War 1989 – Part 4: Polaris Hunters (H3)

By Klaus Behrmann
It is time for Warsaw Pact forces to open a

second front. However, prior to any real
commitment, the Soviet leadership would
like to sanitize the Eastern Mediterranean
from the threat of US SSBNs.
Michael Mykytyn says: An excellent anti

surface and antisubmarine warfare scenario
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created by the most prolific harpoon scenario writers there is. It is a challenge from either
side although the Soviet side is suggested (at least from this player).
Dimitris V. Dranidis says: Although the Moskva-class ASW helo-cruisers as well as the
majority of the Black Sea Fleet ASW forces were designed primary as anti-Regulus rather
than anti-Polaris measures, they can still be a worry against older NATO SSBNs as long as
the bulk of the 6th Fleet is not around. This scenario illustrates this point pretty well, and is
a good skill-honer to boot. Not to mention the quite unusual situation of Greeks and Turks
joining forces to protect & assist NATO SSBNs rather than their own territories. One to
take a good look at, for sure.
SIMEX (H3)
By Michael Mykytyn
This is a simulated Australian exercise. Fictional Southland has invaded Flinders Island
and you must drive them out using naval, air and brain-power.
Dimitris V. Dranidis says: A one-sided scenario where you must face an equivalent foe.
This scenario designed as an experiment with the Harpoon 3 side usage as well as giving
the player the flexibility to form his/her own groups and strategy to carry out their
assigned task.
World War III 1985 – North Cape, Part IV: Clash of the Titans (H3)
By Ragnar Emsoy
Day fourteen. Four carrier battle groups have safely

entered the Norwegian Sea and are making final
preparations for the first of a series of air strikes
against Soviet bases in northern Norway. In
response to NATO's move, several Backfire and
Badger regiments from the Soviet Strategic
Aviation have been hurriedly redeployed from the
central front to bases on the Kola Peninsula. The
stage is now set for a classic Cold War naval
encounter.
Michael Mykytyn says: This is perhaps the most ambitious harpoon scenario to date. It
covers a first engagement of Strike Force Atlantic vs. the Soviet Union. NATO must
perform a daring series of strikes and the Soviet Union must defend and destroy this
formidable group. Meticulously researched and tested this scenario will test the most
hardened harpoon player.
Dimitris V. Dranidis says: No comment…just read on to the “In Detail” article ☺
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Warthog Strike (H3)
By Stephen Leblanc
This scenario is based on events from the opening hours of operation Desert Storm,
when early warning radar sites along the frontier separating Saudi Arabia and Iraq
were destroyed.
Michael Mykytyn says: An excellent scenario for all birdmen out there. Covering
the initial strikes of the Gulf War you must careful conduct SEAD and ground
strikes on Iraqi radar installations. An excellent tutorial type scenario as well as
great for a work night.
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IN DETAIL
This is where a selected scenario or application gets under the microscope and is being analysed in
excruciating detail. Why it was made, how it was made, how the designer/developer did his homework (or
not), what innovations are there (if any), what past users have to say about the scenario/application, after-
action reports (if applicable), is it popular and why etc. etc. New creations as well as timeless classics may
apply. Any favourite scenario of yours that you’re willing to write an extensive review on? Write to us.
CLASH OF THE TITANS (H2/3)

By Dimitris V. Dranidis
Ragnar Emsoy’s latest magnum opus is, perhaps, one of the most illustrative examples of
why so many people are so passionately involved with the entire Harpoon series. It is also
one of the largest and most complex scenarios ever crafted for Harpoon 2/3, rubbing
shoulders with the upcoming “Mayhem” and Klaus Behrmann’s usual monster-size
creations.
It is now Day 14 of the Third World War. Four US carrier battle groups have managed to
safely enter the Norwegian Sea and are making their final preparations for the first of a
series of air strikes against Soviet-occupied bases in northern Norway. In response to
NATO's move, several Backfire and Badger regiments from the Soviet Strategic Aviation
have been pulled from the Central Front (to SACEUR’s secret relief) and hurriedly
redeployed from the central front to AV-MF bases on the Kola Peninsula. The stage is now
set for a classic Cold War naval encounter.
Although the scenario concept is something we’ve seen quite a few times before (the
CVBG-vs.-Northern Fleet air/sub theme being an all-time favourite amongst Harpoon
designers), Ragnar deserves full credit for breaking new ground in several ways.
First of all, Clash of the Titans (COT) is not a stand-alone slugfest scenario but rather a
continuation of a previously established storyline – that of a Third World War suddenly
erupting in Central Europe in the fall of 1985. COT follows-up the previously released
scenario “Entering the Norwegian Sea” and takes place a full two weeks into this bloody
conflict, and that shows in what is brought to the table: both sides have already lost many
of their centrepiece assets and are now bringing forward reinforcements, second-rate
replacements or their last strategic reserves in a last attempt to overwhelm their adversary.
The fight has been going on all around them; aircraft are down for maintenance pushing
back the sortie schedules, ships steam with their fuel tanks and magazine stocks depleted
to some extend or another and land bases rush to resupply their ammo stocks just to be
able to sustain air operations for that extra bit longer. This stands in stark contrast to most
similar scenarios in which we have the cream of the crop from both sides in a shiny, “Day
One” fresh-from-the-factory form with all systems online and everyone ready to fight at
their prime. It constitutes an altogether more realistic depiction of actual wartime
operations.
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Furthermore, the detail and research effort put into the construction of the scenario is
evident once one goes behind the scenes to take a more detailed look at the OOBs of both
sides, as well as the pre-designed missions that essentially dictate the AI behaviour.
Ragnar has taken an extraordinary amount of time in ensuring that the AI-controlled
adversary Soviet forces act in a manner consistent with Soviet doctrine and tactics, and has
consulted many new sources on the subject. This includes references like Milan Vego’s
excellent book “Soviet Naval Tactics” as well as other established editions like Conways.
The result is a virtual Soviet adversary that is sure to give even the most battle-hardened
pooners a good run for their money.
Additionally, COT is one of the first scenarios to be designed with the custom loadout
times in mind. This revolutionary new feature, a first for any computer version of
Harpoon, is already supported by the DB-2000, will very soon be available as a simulation
option for Harpoon 3 and will permanently transform the way serious pooners plan and
conduct air operations. No longer will every aircraft have a standard 30-min turn-around
time. Attack sorties in particular may take many hours to prepare, as time must be allowed
for detailed briefing, aircraft preparation & maintenance, fuel and weapons loading etc.
The end result is a vastly reduced number of available aircraft sorties for a given scenario
duration. This of course means that the player can no longer hope to defeat the enemy by
simple repetitive attrition of the defences (particularly when playing with aircraft logistics
disabled). Instead, air operations and air strikes in particular will have to be carefully
managed and coordinated in order to achieve the objective of the sortie with the minimum
possible use of assets. Ragnar designed the scenario around the new loadout times and,
since currently they cannot be enforced by the game engine, he recommends that the
players take the time to familiarise with them and manually enforce them on themselves.
Of course this is only a temporary measure that will soon be a moot point once custom
loadout times are enabled by the game engine itself.
As a player experience, the scenario is nothing short of massive & overwhelming. Simply
coordinating the actions of four different carrier air-wings is a chore in itself, let alone
managing the ships. Some users will no doubt opt to gather their 4 carriers together in a
single group to ease the control of air ops and also increase mutual cover; however, higher
concentration leads to greater vulnerability to nuclear strikes and simplifies targeting for
the enemy forces. Users might initially get the impression that their concentrated airpower
is little short of invincible – after all, we are talking about nearly a hundred mighty F-14
fighter-interceptors and dozens of attack aircraft, plus lots of vital support platforms
including AWACS and jammer aircraft. However, the realities of prolonged wartime
operations in such a dangerous neighbourhood are quick to kick-in: many aircraft are down
for maintenance, some of them for only a limited time, others for so long that they are out
of the scenario duration altogether. Ammunition stocks have been recently filled-up by the
fleet UNREP-train but are still quite finite. A portion of the fighters have to be kept
airborne at all times in a protective arc ahead of the group, as a means of quick-reaction
against the inevitable AV-MF raid. Some others should be kept on the catapults ready to
launch to reinforce the airborne pickets once the raid alarm rings for real. That leaves a
much smaller number available for offensive counter-air operations, so picking the right
fights will be essential in order to preserve your forces. Soviet defences are thick and
multi-layered; apart from the numerous fighter screens, the SAM concentrations near the
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targets pose a significant threat. The SEAD assets on the carriers will definitely need to see
a good deal of action before the main strikers move in.
Compounding the difficulty of the mission are the quite tight time limits imposed. In many
Harpoon scenarios the time limits are either non-existent or too relaxed; the player can
take his time in planning and wait until “everything is perfect” to begin his attacks, or
maybe wait for the enemy attacks, deal with them with all his forces in place, and then
launch his own raids in full force without fear of further counterstrike. This is definitely
not one of those scenarios. You take your time, you lose – it’s that simple. The main
targets have to be hit as fast as possible, there is at best only one chance for a return raid
on each of the two target groups. And throughout the offensive operations the player has to
keep a eye (and standby forces) for the enemy bomber raid. This again is a deliberate
modelling of real-life timing constraints on any NATO group that would endeavour to
fight and survive on the Norwegian Sea.
This is not to say that the scenario is unwinnable. As Mike Mykytyn demonstrates in his
detailed AAR (below), it is quite possible to succeed – if careful planning and forethought
is applied. COT is sure to provide a challenging refreshing experience for many
experienced harpooners tired of the same old “bomb them until they glow” paradigm of
numerous similar scenarios. Combining meticulous background research, a killer
programmed-AI, a massive and detailed OOB, the innovation of more realistic turn-around
times and an overall “dark” feeling of urgency and danger thanks to the timing restraints,
Clash of the Titans easily qualifies as one of the classic scenarios for H2/3.
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WAYPOINT
CLASH OF THE TITANS – AN AFTER-ACTION REPORT
By Michael Mykytyn
I was apprehensive as this scenario hit my mailbox. Ragnar had been discussing this
scenario with us for a while and I knew he had done a good job with it. I had already had
the joy of the scenarios that precede this one in relevance, theme and sequence (Fighting
Withdrawal, Parthian Shot and Entering the Norwegian Sea) and had a general idea of
what I was in for. So, being ready to carry on the war as I had left it and thinking I had the
master plan, the scenario was a go.
The set up was fairly simple as I had four CVBG groups (flagged by America, Forrestal,
JFK, and Eisenhower) some ASW groups (one group flagged by Ark Royal and the other
straight ASW SAG) and a series of SAM traps set by destroyers and cruisers of the time.
My assigned targets were the captured Norwegian airfields of Bodo, Evenes, Andoya and
Bardufoss. I expected that all of these would be heavily defended by surface to air
missiles of all types of the time, I could expect some serious CAP to be flying over my
targets and that I could expect at least one good counterattack of some sorts (my guess at
the time was an antishipping missile attack launched via bomber as the prior scenario in
the battleset had dealt with the submarine threat).
Feeling that I had a grasp of the situation, I began to put my overall plan together. Seeing
that I had 2 major strikes to orchestrate (each strike would focus on two airbases at a time),
while having to fend off a major counterattack and having a relatively short time to
accomplish everything, it wasn’t an easy task. My initial plan was to launch a first wave
consisting of aircraft paired from the two carriers in the North toward the northern target
(Andoya) and aircraft paired form the two carriers in the South toward the southern target
(Bodo). I knew I had to conduct another raid, so I tasked about 3/4ths of the ready strike
aircraft to the missions (expecting to at least return the a quarter of the first raid to conduct
the second large strike on the remaining targets). Using the mission editor, I created strike
missions which included all packages (AAW, SEAD and strike) in large groups. This
would soon prove a disaster, but more on that later. My plan was to conduct the strikes,
recover, fend off against any attack during or after recovery and then launch a similar
strike with the remnants of the first raid as well as the unassigned aircraft I had in my
hangars. With a solid plan in hand and a bit of confidence, the scenario was launched.
My first strikes where a disaster and ultimately ended up with me restarting the scenario.
My first wave left the deck; this consisted of LGB-armed Intruders for strike, Shrike and
HARM-armed Corsairs for SEAD, Prowlers for Jamming and very few Tomcats for
escort. I had Tomcat’s up on CAP already screening the carrier groups and decided to
surge them forward ahead of the groups to engage air contacts that my Hawkeyes had been
reporting on. My aircraft numbers were something like thirty or forty aircraft tasked on
each target. I cranked the time compression up and let my attackers go. Soon after my
Tomcats began getting into strike range of the defending aircraft which turned out to be a
mix of Foxbats, Flagons, Fishbeds and Floggers. As my missiles left the rails the worries
started. They were the “A” variant of the Phoenix that was not designed to deal with the
smaller targets I was dealing with. I scored better than what I expected but still not enough
to guarantee safety. As I moved into Sparrow range (and the Soviets’ missile range) I
18
detected more Soviet AC leaving the deck. My Sparrows found more targets but so did
the Soviets. My forward screen being somewhat depleted, I tasked them back home, in
fear of not having enough AC to engage the coming storm. All I had in the air now was
several small groups of escorting Tomcats with the same missile compliment and some
EW defense from my Prowlers. My strike groups got in range several minutes later and
ground targets began cropping up. My Tomcat’s fought valiantly against the enemy
fighters and managed to widdle them down but a number of leakers got through, tearing up
my formations until they ran out of weapons. As my already battered groups went feet
dry, the nature of the ground contacts became apparent: SA-8s and SA-11s began filling
the air. My SEAD had some success but at a horrible price. My strike AC moved into
range only to be chopped up quickly. It was a disaster. Something like 60 or 70 AC
destroyed for only a couple of ground targets hit. Given that a follow-up would be
required on these first targets and I had very little strike aircraft left on the deck, it was
time to put up the white flag and rethink this. It’s nice to have a great tactical plan, but it’s
the operational stuff that can bury you. Lesson learned and time for some heavy thinking.
After several days of thinking it through and the help of some of the guys at the MIRC
chat room (thanks Chuck) I started working through some of the operational issues that
torched me on the first go. I reorganized how I was going to conduct the strikes (even put
it to paper, which I hadn’t done in years). I would now surge more Tomcats and launch
my strike groups as smaller separate specialized groups (Jamming, SEAD, Escort, and
Strike), with careful timing as to when they would arrive. I also planned to employ a little
recon with some various extra aircraft I had around the decks (notably the Skywarriors off
the CVs for ESM and Harriers off Ark Royal for eyeballs). This would turn out to be a
success for this first mission and ultimately success in the scenario. Here’s the story.
Attempt two started with a bang as my fighter screen crashed into Soviet interceptors out
of Norway. Missiles were exchanged again but I had enough up to do a sufficient job.
This allowed my escorting Tomcats to have enough firepower to engage the enemy
interceptors streaming off the deck with great effectiveness, clearing the way for the strike
groups. My Skywarriors began detecting surface to air missiles and my Harriers were able
to identify a few before my SEAD units began engaging. This was still a hairy affair as
the SA-11, SA-6 and SA-8 mobile SAMS are deadly. Attrition was heavy but I managed
to destroy all the assigned targets at these air bases, which was my objective.
Losses up to the end of this raid are as follows:
NATO Losses:11 Tomcats, 20 Intruders, 4 Prowlers, 13 Corsairs

Soviet Losses: 64 Floggers, 16 Flagons, 7 Foxbats, 8 Fishbeds, 9 SA-8B, 1 HQ SA-11, 1
HQ SA-8, 4 SA-11, 6 Revetments, 2 Ammo Dumps, 1 HQ SA-6, 16 Curls, and 4 Bear-D’s.
As my remaining aircraft began to stream back to home base, I began to get very nervous
as I felt something big was coming in my direction. I had just destroyed four Bear-Ds,
which meant that were looking for something. I began launching Tomcats and setting up
as strong as a screen I could make minus any escorts I would need for my final wave. I
was quickly rewarded as the right side of my screen began to fill with large formations of
aircraft. I’m not just talking about a large stream of AC (you know, the typical straight-
19
WAYPOINT
line attack) but a large wave evenly dispersed north to south on my tactical map. This was
the multi regimental attack I’d read about in Red Storm Rising and other such books. I can
honestly say for a second I was scared, call it “being in the zone” but I hadn’t dealt with an
attack like this in Harpoon before. Recomposing myself and looking at each clump of
contacts I noticed several slower large contacts as well some small contacts in high-speed
bands. This meant bombers as well as escorting fighters. Given that I hadn’t detected
them as soon as I expected, I assumed jamming as well. I quickly tasked my launched
Tomcats to engage at high speed. I also maid sure my picket ships were at passive until the
“right” moment. I felt confident and ready for action; however, Ragnar was not done with
me yet. As soon as my Tomcats were well on their way, I began to get a similar picture
coming from the North! I was weekly screened from that direction but did manage to get a
couple of Tomcat groups in that direction. It was now a matter of time and speed. Who
would reach whom first and would years of technological development designed
specifically to deal with this threat work? It did but not as well as expected.
The Northern-arrayed Regiments arrived in position to attack first and unleashed their
attack at my northern carriers. I managed to pick a couple aircraft off but not enough to be
effective. Missiles left the rails of these quickly (looking closer at some of these northern
groups they were not slower bombers but Backfires which began strikes on my pickets).
The Regiments to the east of me paid a horrible price but were able to unleash hordes of
missile in the direction of my Southern carriers. This was not good. Picture if you will,
being completely surrounded by incoming supersonic SSMs. Time seemed to pass slowly
as I watched my remaining aircraft try to engage them. Missiles left the launchers of my
escorts in large streams to some great effect, but it still wasn’t enough. My short-range
defenses engaged as well but it was still not enough. I had already begun launching strike
aircraft in a desperate attempt to preserve them, to keep them in the air until the storm
settled and them land them on the surviving decks. I flinched as the yellow stars of AShM
detonations began filling my formations. This was not going to be good and it wasn’t.
Losses up to the end of the Soviet Regimental Raid are as follows:
NATO Losses: 46 Tomcats, 20 Intruders, 38 Intruders, 8 Seaking, 8 Prowlers, 35

Corsairs, 4 Hawkeyes, 6 Seasprites, 4 Skywarriors, 20 Vikings, 2 Virginias, 1 J Daniels, 2
Farraguts, 2 Underwoods,1 Charles F Adams, 1 Spruance and finally….JFK and
Eisenhower
Soviet Losses: 112 Floggers, 16 Flagons, 22 Foxbats, 9 Fishbeds, 4 Bear D, 4 Badger D,
4 Badger J, 47 Badger G’s and 4 Backfire D’s, + all the mentioned in the prior loss
statement.
Soviet SSM fired: 48 Sandbox’s, 88 Kitchens, and 102 Kelts (yikes!)
The Soviets had dealt me their blow and now it was time to see how bad the damage was.
Fortunately I still had enough to move on. I still had two carriers (which now absolutely
had to receive no further damage to prevent a total loss of the scenario) and it looked like I
had enough just enough combat power to complete the scenario. So this was very good
however, I had no margin of error. The last strikes had to be done right, and I was intent on
20
making sure they were (given the loss of Ike and JFK). This is why these of the Second
Strike Fleet was sent north and I was going to finish what was started. I had a quick scare,
as at torpedo contact appeared near one of my remaining AAW picket ships. I fired an
ASROC and a torpedo in return, but had no intention of losing that asset so I ran it west
with no further contact experienced.
Looking over what I had left, which was a hodgepodge of aircraft off the four carriers, I
began to devise my final strike plan. This was complicated due to the heavy losses, a
strange aircraft mix and a short timetable. After a quick pen-and-paper session I crafted the
final wave to generally work as the first albeit with a strange order of battle. I felt the
Soviets had been worn down as well, but I wasn’t going in blind. I again committed
Harriers and Skywarriors to recon work that would be conducted along with the fighter
surge, well ahead of the strike group. My plan was ready and once again my strike aircraft
left the decks.
This was a very successful strike with all things considered, and it led to a scenario
victory. My fighter screen swarmed the beach knocking what relatively few Soviet aircraft
were left defending. My recon began its work only to find something that would shake my
confidence a bit, SA-4s. This was not good but I still had a lot of SEAD assets to work
with. So my fingers quickly danced across the keyboard as I unassigned the missions I had
scripted, and went to manual control of most aircraft. As my first SEAD began crossing
the beach they began releasing Shrikes at anything that came up. They were successful
thanks to the Prowlers I had kept close, and the path seemed clear for my strike groups to
complete their target list. They did successfully and I was rewarded with victory. It was a
great thing ☺
Total Scenario Losses and Expenditures:
NATO:
Losses: 47 Tomcats, 8 Sea King USN, 38 Intruders, 8 Prowlers, 49 Corsairs, 5 Hawkeyes,

20 Vikings, 4 Skywarriors, 2 Virginias, 2 Underwoods, 1 Spruance, JFK, IKE, 1 J.
Daniels, 2 Farraguts, 1 Charles F. Adams, and 6 Seasprites.
Expenditures: 354 Phoenixes, 126 Sparrow IIIs, 36 Sidewinders, 145 SM-2ER Blk I, 34
Sea Dart Mod I, 65 SM-2MR Blk II, 11 SM-1MR Blk V, 7 Seasparrow, 7 SM-1MR Blk IV,
25 GBU-10, 46 Shrike, 27 Harm, 19 MK 82, 16 Mk 84, 8 Walleyes, 4 GBU-12, lots of guns
of all types.
Soviets:
Losses: 112 Floggers, 53 Flagons, 23 Foxbats, 24 Fishbeds, 16 Curl, 7 Cubs, 4 Bears, 4

Badger J’s, 4 Badger D’s, 47 Badger G’s, 4 Backfire B’s, 9 SA-8, 4 SA-11, 8 SA-6A, 1 SA-
4, 1 SA-8 HQ, 1 SA-6 HQ, SA-11 HQ, 4 Ammo Dumps, 10 Revetments, and 2 Hangars.
Expenditures:
21
WAYPOINT
33 Acrid D, 33 Acrid C, 31 Aphid, 10 Anab A, 12 Anab B, 49 Apex D, 48 Apex C, 87
Gadfly, 50 Gainful, 113 Gecko, 15 Grail, 48 Ganef, 43 Ganef, 48 Sandbox, 88 Kitchen,
102 Kelts, 2 Uset-80 and numerous guns of all sorts.
Final Assessment of this Scenario:
From a player’s perspective, this is perhaps one of the most exciting scenarios I’ve played
in a long time. There has been a long line of excellent Kola strike based scenarios in the
past. However, this one seemed to up the bar. To witness a multi-regimental bomber raid
materialize all around you was exciting and horrific. It kind of brought back the feeling
you got reading through Red Storm Rising for the first time, or better yet when you
cranked up the first version of Harpoon you ever owned and that first vampire appeared on
your screen.
The strikes modeled in the game were excellent. All targets were heavily and intelligently
defended. You knew what was there, but also understood that you may not be able to
escape without loss which is wonderful in the sense of it forcing you to sit down and figure
out the best way to pull it off with minimal loss. I still question myself – is there
something more or different I could have done to do it better? That speaks a lot for a
scenario and why it will stay on my hard drive for some time to come.
From a scenario writer’s perspective, this was an education in the art. First of all,
Ragnar’s research was impeccable. His order of battle was accurate, challenging and
offered a great glimpse at what that battle would be about. His use of the AI was amazing.
I definitely wanted to know how he pulled off the Backfire raid. Looking in the editor I
was shocked by the amount of planning it must have taken to get it right. All courses were
manually laid for the bombers, which meant that he had to figure out the timings of
literally every aircraft in the raid. I was humbled and realized his dedication to getting it
right and giving the players the best model of what it is about. It is nice to be taken to
school once in awhile ☺.
This is truly a great scenario. There are other scenarios out there that others will surely
point to as being “the Kola Experience.” However, this is the evolution of things. The
players work with the game and build on past experience and new research. This is surely
a product of that process and one that you all should take a look at, if you can take it ☺.
22
TECHNICAL
Technical material….internal wargaming mechanics, database modifications, sensor & physics models, how-
to’s, hardware and related subjects. Think you know the perfect hardware setup to run any of the computer
Harpoon versions? Found a way to make H4 run on a Spectrum 48K in Windows-emulation mode? Want to
analyse some God-forgotten detail of the sensor or physics or damage models that you feel could use some
tweaking? In the mood of tutoring others about some facet of Harpoon that you have mastered over the
years? Go ahead and share your knowledge with the community.
THE INFAMOUS H2/3 MISSION EDITOR – PART I

Scripting the behavior of friendly and enemy AI-controlled units
By Michael Mykytyn
This is the first of a number of articles I have planned to discuss the art of scenario writing
for Harpoon 2/3. My hope is to perhaps shed some light on the game as well as spark new
interest in creating scenarios. I hope you enjoy the articles and contribute some of your
own as well.
This first article is on the infamous Mission Editor. This is perhaps the most valuable tool
for all scenario writers but unfortunately has a steep learning curve. I hope to flatten that
curve out a bit and perhaps shed some light on the behaviors it invokes. I also will include
several tips and tricks I have come across while exploring the art or writing scenarios. I do
hope this all is extremely helpful and please let me know if I miss anything or something is
in correct.
Finally, this article was written in late 2002 and the game is still in development. Jesse
Spears is still working hard to work out some of the pre-existing bugs and new bugs which
have come with the development of Harpoon 3. Some of these bugs exist in the mission
editor and may be worked out in the future. This article will be updated to reflect the
changes made by Jesse’s bug work.
Lesson: 1 Understanding the Mission Editor
What is the Mission Editor?
The Mission Editor was an interface the developers provided in the scenario editor to get
the AI to assign platforms to a range of behaviors. It is the principle tool the scenario
editor/player uses to get his/her job done. It is also one of the biggest mysteries of the
game.
Where is the Mission Editor?
23
WAYPOINT
The Mission editor is found under the basic tool bar provided in the
Editor/Game interface. You simply click the Mission selection and a
small menu opens up. In this menu are all the tools you need to create
your missions and all are intuitive. Some missions require reference
points or for you to select certain units. Please read the mission
descriptions below to explain what missions need what.
Opening up the mission editor
Player Usage of the Mission Editor:
This is kind of a “tomato or tomatoe” type issue. Some players use it and
some don’t. You must remember that the AI is constricted to the do what
the code tells it to do. So you may not get “what you would do” out of it.
I personally use it to handle some of the menial or routine/repetitive tasks
such as AEW patrols or ASW work. I micromanage the rest myself using
the normal toolbar. On occasion, I will assign a strike package through it
if conditions will allow, but this is only in a “lets see what will happen”
kind of situation.
Scenario Writer Usage of the Mission Editor:
This is a must for any scenario writer, to get the friendly & enemy AI to
do anything besides sitting there. Learning the usage of it opens up a new
world for the writer, giving him the tools to create a challenging and
realistic environment for the player. It is the only way to get the AI to
fight well and create a fun game for players to enjoy. I hope this article
assists in this process.
Lesson 2:Basic Operation of the Mission Editor:
Okay, I’m going to assume you learned how to get to the editor through
the preceding sections and you’ve read through the official
documentation, which should get you there and give some basic
knowledge of the mission editor. You now have the big gray Create
24
Mission Menu in front of you. How does this thing work? I’ll give you the crash course
section by section so we can move on to the good stuff.
Creating a new mission
First we will explore the "fill in" fields which are: Mission Name, Delay Time and
Variation. The Mission Name field is fairly intuitive, as you just need to fill in the mission
name. The developers did you give a hand by automatically filling it in with a generic
mission name. I tend to create my own as these mission names are so generic that I often
forget what each one is when looking at them. You will also notice a pair of menu items
that are named: Delay Time and Variation. These are key tools designed for dealing with
timing. Filling in these fields (Day, Hour, Second) gives you total control of when things
happen. The Delay Time fields are intuitive as you set the time when your mission shall
occur. Variation is a neat little feature allowing you to change your timing a little bit as
missions are undertaken. Most players recognize that the AI is a creature of habit and by
changing your 10 p.m. strike to 10:10 p.m. the next day may challenge the player’s
expectations a bit. Remember how that F-117 was said to have been shot down over
Serbia?
Next, we’ll look at the radio buttons and check boxes provided in the interface. They are
the mission selector radio buttons; the “Emissions” radio buttons; the “Edit Now” check
box and the “1/3 Rule” check box. The mission selector buttons are intuitive as you just
select the button of the mission you would like to create. The emissions control buttons
are intuitive as well, as you just select the emission status (passive, intermittent, active) of
each sensor type (radar, sonar, ECM). You simply select the button in each field.
Selecting the intermittent setting in this editor creates another set of steps that I will
explain later in detail.
The “1/3 Rule” check box activates a rule that allows you to divide your in-place assigned
forces by three. This is very valuable in auto-rotating your aircraft on repetitive patrol
25
WAYPOINT
missions (CAPs, ASW patrols etc.), something very boring to do manually. You probably
don’t want to have all 12 interceptors in your inventory in the air at once, for example; the
enemy will simply wait for them to land for refuel/rearm and then catch you with your
pants down. Instead, by checking the “1/3 Rule” box, only 4 will launch initially, then be
replaced by another 4 etc. This way you’ll always have at least 4 aircaft in the mission
area, another 4 getting there or returning, plus 4 in the base being turned-around. (Of
course, there are cases in which you do desire all your aircraft to launch at once, e.g.
strikes. In this case you simply leave the “1/3 Rule” box unchecked). This feature only
works for aircraft platforms.
Finally, the edit now check box. You check this box to bring you to the next menu to
activate your mission. You then click okay which will bring you to the next menu, the
“Edit Missions” Menu.
The “Edit Missions” menu

The “Edit Mission” Menu is slightly intimidating at first look. Once you get the idea of
how it works however, it becomes very simple. You have three large black fields to work
with. From left to right they are Mission Name, Assigned Units and Unassigned Units.
You also have a large collection of buttons at the bottom as well as some radio buttons.
The large black fields work this way: You select your desired mission by clicking on its
name on the left column (it will be highlighted when you do), then look on the far right
hand for the listing of units to choose from. When you find the unit you would like to
assign you double click it and it will then move to the “Assigned Units” field. This is the
method to assigning a ship, submarine or a facility to a mission and you may assign more
than one. If you wish to assign an aircraft, you simple click the Add AC button. This will
bring up an inventory of your aircraft on a new menu. You then select the aircraft you
would like and follow that by selecting the number you would like to assign and click
“OK”. When you return you will see the aircraft you assigned listed
26
in the assigned units field in the assigned unit field and you are done.
The “Mission Sensor Settings” are there to allow you to change your EMCON status of the
mission if you choose to do so. Selecting the intermittent setting on any sensor will call a
small menu called Mission Sensor Intermittence. This is where you set up your timings
and variances for your sensor settings. I will include a small section strictly dealing with
this right below, as it is one of the bigger brain-busters in the game.
The rest of the buttons and radio buttons are fairly straightforward. They basically give
you the ability to go back and change anything you set in the prior mission, or delete the
mission altogether. When you are ready click okay and you have created a mission. You
can always return to this menu to edit mission by selecting the edit mission selection under
the Harpoon editor and game task bar at the top of your screen. Just remember to click the
actual mission you would like to change before enacting your changes as you may
inadvertently make changes to the first mission on the list.
Now, on to the aforementioned Mission Sensor Intermittence:
Harpoon 3 allows you to set your sensor settings to

intermittent. What this means is, you are able to
automatically shuffle between passive and active modes,
and set your own time intervals for each. This is
accomplished with the Mission Sensor Intermittence
Menu, which is found by clicking the INT Radio button
within the Edit Mission Menu.
The mission sensor
When you do so, you see a small menu open up with four
intermittence menu
values to fill in which are paired. The first two are: Active
Duration and Percent Variance and the second pair are:
Passive Duration and Percent Variance. The Active Duration field is where you put the
value for the number of minutes you would like this sensor to be active. The associated
Percent Variance is the percent value change you would like your active value to change
after each cycle. So if you entered 10 minutes active and a 20% variation. Your sensor
will go active for 8 to 12 minutes (2 is 20% of 10). The Passive Duration field and it’s
associated percent variance work the same way. You then click okay and you are
complete. Not to bad is it?
Part II of the Mission Editor tutorial will appear on the next issue of Waypoint. It will cover all the different
types of missions that can be assigned to units in H2/3, together with hints and tips for each of them. In the
meantime, have a go with the mission editor and Mike’s hints and above all, experiment ☺
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WAYPOINT
Platform Audit: TORNADO
By Craig Paffhausen
This is the first in a series of articles that will discuss in-depth different aircraft, their real
world weapon systems and how they are built in the Harpoon2/3 and Harpoon2002
Databases.
Panavia Tornado MRCA (Multi Role Combat Aircraft)
Aircraft History:
The Tornado was designed originally as a Low level

Terrain Following attack aircraft. Later after a
major modification (the fuselage was lengthened
and re-profiled) a bomber interceptor version was
created. The attack versions of the Tornado (the
IDS and the GR.1) used a special engine that was
developed for the purpose of a very low flying
aircraft at high speeds. The interceptor version
(ADV or F.2/F.3) has a modified version of these
engines that adds a little bit to the dismal high The GR.1/IDS strike variant of the
Tornado
altitude performance of the IDS versions. In the
late-1980s/ early-1990s the German and Italian air
forces ordered a new version of the IDS the ECR. The ECR was developed for anti radar
attack missions (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses or SEAD in US military lingo). The
ECR flies missions at a higher altitude than the normal IDS and thus was fitted with yet
another modified engine version.
What this means in the computer simulations:
First off, an audit of all Tornado versions in both the Harpoon 2002 database (the EC2000
DB to be exact) and that of the Database 2000 for Harpoon2/3 turned up an astonishing
fact… NONE of the different performance specifications were included in ANY database.
That means all planes were flying like they were the IDS ground attack variety. Worse still
is the fact that everyone assumes that the Tornado can fly at high Supersonic speeds at
altitude. Yet during in flight refueling they routinely have to “plug in the Afterburner” to
keep up with the in-flight refueling tankers! On further research it turns out the RB.199
engines tend to fall off rapidly in performance above 7000 meters (23,000 feet) above sea
level. This is because the RB.199 was developed for higher fuel efficiency at low altitudes
than normal jet engines for fighter aircraft. The Mk.104 version of the RB.199 has been
modified to give greater thrust at altitude but still precludes much more than Mach 1 above
the 7000-meter mark. This is very important because the best place for a bomber or missile
interceptor is at very high altitudes (in excess of 8000 meters).
28
What does all of this mean? It means that in both the DB2000 for Computer Harpoon2 and
Computer Harpoon3 and for the new database for Harpoon2002 (name to be announced in
the future) that the Tornado will loose a lot of high
altitude performance. No longer will players be able
to “turn tail and run” to outrun enemy Air-to-Air
Missiles (AAMs) launched at extreme ranges.
Other changes dictated by this recent revelation
include a complete change of the sensor suite on the
ADV variants of the Tornado. Lastly the Tornado
is still not capable of launching the AIM-120B
AMRAAM missile to it’s full effect. As it stands
The ADV (F.1/ F.3) version
right now the AMRAAM is no more effective than
the AIM-9M Missiles carried. This has been updated in both databases. All these changes
will be present in future editions of both databases. They are presented here for public
comment before the changes take place.
As the various dedicated scenario & database editors strive for a realistic database with
what information that is released to the public, they tend to break a lot of how people think
a platform should behave. Some of the things done are due to current limitations in the
game engine. Others on the other hand are due to the simple fact that is how the platform
acts in real life. However, no DB editor claims infallibility; please E-mail us if you think
we are erroneous on something. Common sense is always a good start, although some
tangible evidence/proof definitely helps (preferably more than one source).
Proposed changes to Tornado Family in H2/H3 databases: (These speeds are adjusted to
altitude)
RB.199 Mk102 engines 650kts above 7000 meters. 792kts at Sea level
(IDS/GR.x Variants)
RB.199 Mk103 engines are barely supersonic at 7000 meters Speed 650kts
Flank at 10000 meters speed is 481kts in Flank! Low/Vlow speed is 680Kts
Flank (F.2 ADV)
RB.199 Mk104 (F.3 ADV) Low/Vlow speed is 680kts Speed at 8500 meters is
680kts At 12000 meters is 515 kts
RB.199 Mk104+ (F.3 ADV) Low/Vlow speed is 682kts Speed at 8500 meters
is 700kts At 12000 meters is 540 kts
RB.199 Mk106 (Tornado ECR) Low/Vlow speed is 680Kts Flank. At 7000
meters Flank speed is 650kts. At 12000 meters is 520 Kts.
The Mk 104+ and the Mk 106 are the least fuel-efficient versions of this family
of engines.
Tornado F.3 looses AMRAAM capability until 2004 version IOCs. Until then
the Skyflash Super Temp Mod is carried.
ATA rating of all Tornados is reduced to 2.5/2 as per H4.1 data annex
29
WAYPOINT
JED SPECIAL
Every month, the Waypoint presents a selected article from the
renowned Journal of Electronic Defence, covering subjects relevant to
air and naval warfare. The appearance of these articles on Waypoint is
the result of an exclusive agreement between the HarpoonHQ staff and
JED, and is covered by the explicit consent of JED. All rights of the
original authors are reserved.
Surface combatants are facing more lethal

anti-ship missiles
Missiles have changed the nature of naval warfare.
Aircraft and small fast attack craft now have the same
lethal punch as large ships. Anti-ship missiles increase
the range of engagements and decrease the warning
time available for the defender. Today more than
seventy nations field sea- and land-launched anti-ship
missiles, and twenty nations possess air-launched
versions of these weapons. Anti-ship missiles arm warships, fast attack craft (FAC),
fighters, bombers, patrol aircraft, helicopters, submarines, and mobile costal-defense
batteries. Aircraft and helicopters armed with anti-ship missiles have demonstrated distinct
operational advantages over ship-, submarine-, and land-based systems since they allow
greater employment flexibility and superior sensor range. The largest percentage of the
successful ship strikes using missiles over the past five decades has come from aircraft.
These systems have been used in numerous conflicts and despite major investments in
naval missile defense systems, engagements to date have overwhelmingly favoured the
attacker. Dozens of warships and nearly 200 civilian vessels have been damaged or sunk
by anti-ship missiles during the past 30 years.
The Styx Surprise
On October 21, 1967, P-15s (Russian short-range tactical anti-ship missiles, a.k.a. Styx)
fired from Egyptian Komar fast attack craft hit and sank the Israeli destroyer Eliat with
considerable loss of life (see "First Person...Singular", JED April 2001.) Naval confidence
was severely shaken by this successful attack and suddenly the anti-ship missile threat
became the center of attention. The sinking of the Eliat was followed on May 13, 1970 by
the destruction of another Israeli vessel (Israel said it was a fishing boat; Egypt, a spy
ship), also with the P-15 anti-ship missiles. These attacks should not have come as a
surprise since Soviet ships and bombers had been armed with these weapons since the late
1950s. Styx-equipped Osa and Komar fast attack craft and Tu-16 jet bombers armed with
AS-5 Kelt anti-ship missiles were exported to many nations allied with the Soviet Union.
30
The People's Republic of China (PRC) produced copies of the Styx design and widely
exported them.
Subsequent employment of various versions of the Styx in combat has seen mixed results.
Reportedly 11 of 12 P-15s fired by missile boats of the Indian Navy during the 1971 Indo-
Pakistan War hit, sinking the Pakistani destroyer Kyber, a minesweeper, several cargo
ships, and damaging the destroyer Shah Jahan. These missiles were also reportedly used
with some success against Pakistani oil facilities. During a January 1974 engagement near
the Paracel Islands in the Pacific Ocean, PRC destroyers fired a number of HY-2 Styx
missiles, sinking the South Vietnamese minesweeper Nhut Tao and damaged the destroyer
escort Tran Khanh Duh .
However, none of the 50-plus Styx missiles launched by Arab fast attack craft during the
1973 Arab-Israeli war reportedly hit an Israeli vessel. Israeli missile boats armed with
shorter-ranged Gabriel anti-ship missiles reportedly used manouvering, electronic
countermeasures (ECM), and anti-aircraft fire to evade, decoy, and shoot down Styx
missiles, while closing in to strike with their own missiles and follow up with gunfire.
Israel claimed to have sunk a dozen Egyptian and Syrian vessels during three
engagements, but several neutral merchant vessels were also reportedly hit. Egyptian Air
Force Tu-16 bombers launched several AS-5 Kelt missiles during the 1973 conflict. None
of these hit Israeli ships, but they caused damage to an ammunition depot and a radar site.
The successful employment of Exocet anti-ship missiles during the 1982 Falkland
Islands/Malvinas conflict against Royal Navy vessels had a major impact on the course of
battle. Argentine Navy Super Etendards flew five attack missions, fired six Exocets, and
hit the HMS Sheffield with one missile and the Atlantic Conveyor with two. Both of these
ships were gutted by fires and later sank. An Exocet fired from a mobile land launcher hit
and damaged the HMS Glamorgan. The warhead that hit the Sheffield reportedly did not
explode, and it is thought that several other Argentine Exocets were decoyed by chaff or
fell short of their targets (see "EW in History: Sheffield Destroyed!" JED , March 2001).
The AM-39 Exocet air-launched missile allowed low-flying Super Etendards to attack
from beyond the range of ship-based radar and the short-range defenses of these ships. To
defend against attack, Royal Navy Sea Harriers flew regular combat air patrols with
direction from ship radars. A dozen bomb-carrying Argentine Daggers and five Skyhawks
fell to Sea Harriers, and many more were lost to gun and missile fire from ships. Not a
single Super Etendard was lost, again highlighting the survivability benefits for aircraft
using anti-ship missiles.
British helicopters were also involved in strike operations. Royal Navy Lynx helicopters
fired the 8-nm-range Sea Skua for the first time, sinking two Argentine patrol craft and
damaging another, while Wessex helicopters also damaged the submarine Santa Fe with
obsolete wire-guided AS-12 missiles.
During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, naval vessels and aircraft from both sides employed
anti-ship missiles. Iraqi missile boats armed with P-15s sank a number of Iranian naval
vessels, while Iraqi Air Force fighters and helicopters scored repeatedly with Exocet
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WAYPOINT
missiles. Iranian aircraft and naval vessels also sank Iraqi shipping vessels with Harpoon
and Sea Killer missiles and bombs.
An important but little known aspect of the Iran-Iraq conflict was the long-running "tanker
war," during which Iraqi and Iranian aircraft and naval vessels attacked some 600 oil
tankers and cargo ships. Lloyds of London has classified 286 separate anti-ship missile
attacks against 260 ships as they passed through the Straits of Hormuz and along the
Arabian Gulf. Iraqi Super Etendard, Mirage F1s (there are reports that Iraq also bought
several Falcon 50 business jets equipped with F1 radars and ECM systems and used these
aircraft in anti-ship strikes because of their greater range and capability to carry two
Exocets), and Super Frelon helicopters made the bulk of these attacks. Exocets were also
used with some success against oil facilities at Kharg Island. Iranian jets employed bombs
and rockets, while ships employed Italian-supplied Sea Killer missiles for attacks on
tankers supporting Iraq and the nations buying its oil. During eight years of attacks, more
than 150 ships suffered serious damage from missiles, and about 70 were put out of service
but less than twenty sank, were beached, or became an immediate total loss due to missile
attacks. Oil tankers and large cargo ships proved to be survivable due to their size and
strong construction. Some shipping companies reinforced engine rooms and crew spaces
with sand bags, water-filled compartments, and filled empty oil tanks with carbon
monoxide to reduce missile warhead damage and the danger of fire. Tanker captains also
hugged the shore to take advantage of Iranian air and sea cover and increase the possibility
that missiles fired at the tanker would transfer radar lock to radar returns from land rather
than that of the ship. Reportedly, sizable numbers of anti-ship missiles were decoyed by
radar returns from land or floating radar reflectors, and a number of Exocet missiles struck
their targets, but their warheads failed to explode.
In reaction to these attacks, the US and many western nations sent warships to the Arabian
Gulf to escort tankers through the region to ensure the flow of oil. On May 14, 1987, the
USS Stark was severely damaged, and 37 of her crew killed by two Exocet missiles fired
from Iraqi aircraft. This attack was successful even though the radar operators on the Stark
initially detected the Iraqi aircraft and warned them away via radio. The Stark was an
FFG-7 (O.H Perry) class frigate armed with a SM-1MR Standard surface to air missile
system, Phalanx radar-directed anti-missile gun, and chaff dispensers to decoy
approaching missiles, but these systems were not used in defense of the ship.
The Harpoon anti-ship missile was first used in combat during operations against Libyan
vessels on March 24-25, 1986. Missiles fired from A-6 bombers and the cruiser USS
Yorktown sank three Libyan fast attack craft. During operations in the Arabian Gulf on 18
April 1988 Harpoons were again fired from A-6s, a USN cruiser, and a frigate, sinking two
Iranian naval vessels.
The 1990-1992 Gulf War also saw effective use of anti-ship missiles. Helicopters of the
Royal Navy and Saudi Navy using Sea Skua and AS-15TT missiles destroyed a fleet of
Iraqi patrol boats and assault craft, which ventured into the Arabian Gulf. In January 1991,
a Harpoon fired from a Saudi Navy attack craft sank an Iraqi minelayer in the Arabian
Gulf.
32
Combat operations have demonstrated that a solid hit from an anti-ship missile will have a
serious impact on a warship. A missile hit will usually neutralize a warship even if it is not
sunk since fires and the disruption of combat systems and sensors will likely disable the
ship. Missile hits on oil tankers and large cargo ships have had mixed results: some caught
fire and were burned out but others suffered only minor damage.
While most readers will recall the shock of the destruction of the Israeli Eliat and the
British Sheffield by anti-ship missiles, these were not the first large warships to fall prey to
guided missiles. During World War II, German Luftwaffe bombers sank the defecting
Italian battleship Roma with FX-1400 (aka Fritz-X) radio-guided bombs, and more than a
dozen allied ships also fell prey to this and the similar H-293 guided bomb. In the Pacific
theater, the Americans employed the Bat, a radar-guided glide bomb, which sank a
Japanese destroyer in April 1945. However, the most effective anti-ship “guided missile”
of World War II was the Japanese kamikaze pilot. From October 1944 until the end of the
war, Japanese fighters, bombers, and their crews flew more than 3,000 kamikaze attacks,
sinking some 50 allied ships and damaging more than 300. Nearly 5,000 American and
British sailors were killed as a result of these attacks, while the Japanese lost some 2,300
aircraft and their crews. Japanese kamikaze lessons and tactics were studies by the Soviets
and included in their war-at-sea plans.
The Soviet Naval Challenge
The Soviet Union, unable to match the United States' and allied superiority in aircraft
carriers and surface combatants, turned to bombers, fast attack craft, submarines, and
coastal-defense batteries armed with anti-ship missiles to provide a solution to this naval
imbalance. In the late 1950s and
1960s, the Soviet Navy first
deployed missile-armed jet bombers,
surface ships, and submarines.
Russian first-generation anti-ship
missile systems included a special
class of "strategic" anti-ship missiles.
Most of these special-mission
systems had supersonic speed and
large warheads in order to overcome
limitations in the technology of
systems and sensors of the 1960s.
Air-launched systems included the The Artigliere-class frigate Bersagliere of the
turbo-jet powered KS-1 (NATO: AS- Italian Navy during a port call to Abu Dhabi in
1 Kennel), RSL-1 (NATO: AS-2 March 2001. The ship, classified by the Italians as
Kipper), and KSR-5 (NATO: AS-6 a fleet patrol ship, carries eight Otomat Teseo Mk
2 anti-ship missiles in four twin launchers. A twin
Kingfish), plus the rocket-propelled launcher is visible above and to the right of the
Kh-22 (NATO: AS-4) and KSR-11 gangway. Photo by Michael Puttré
(NATO: AS-5 Kelt). All of these
33
WAYPOINT
were relatively large missiles and were carried by Tu-16, Tu-95, and Tu-22 bombers of the
Soviet Naval Aviation Force.
Russian Echo II- and Juliet- class submarines and large Kresta and Kynda destroyers were
armed with the long-range P-6/7 (SS-N-3 Shaddock). Submarines had to surface to fire
these missiles, and they required external targeting. As large as fighter planes, the P-6/7,
KS-1, and RSL-1 missiles were slow to bring into action. However, these missiles had
radar, infrared homing sensors, or anti-radar seekers, and most were suspected of being
capable of carrying nuclear (or large high-explosive) warheads, which posed a threat to
American aircraft carriers and NATO naval fleets. Few of these systems were ever
exported, which highlights their sophistication and special-mission focus.
Compared to Western subsonic missiles, the large Russian supersonic missiles had the
advantage of long range and high speed, which compressed the defenders reaction time;
and diving or low-altitude attack trajectories, which were a challenge for terminal
defenses. However, large supersonic missiles such as the P-6 weighed 9,900 lbs. and were
33 feet long. This size limited their launch platforms to large aircraft, ships, and
submarines and reduced weapons load out. This type of missile costs much more to
design, build, and maintain than the Western Exocet or Harpoon. The supersonic speed
and medium altitude flight profile of the P-6/7 anti-ship missiles produced a large infrared
signature and allowed early detection by ship and airborne radars. Outside of the Soviet
Union and the PRC, most of the first- and second-generation anti-ship missiles developed
and fielded have been subsonic systems.
Supporting these "strategic" weapons, the Soviet Union deployed large numbers of tactical
anti-ship missiles on their destroyers, fast attack craft, and submarines. Ships were armed
with the P-15/20/21/22/27 (NATO: SS-N-2 Styx) and P-120 Malakhit (NATO: SS-N-9
Siren), which had high-explosive warheads. These missiles flew at high subsonic speeds,
with a range of 24-60nm, and were similar in performance to Western tactical anti-ship
missiles. In the late 1970s, the first Charlie-class submarines armed with the 43-nm-range
P-20L missile (NATO: SS-N-7 Starbright) entered service. These missiles caused quite a
shock since they could be launched while the sub was submerged.
At its peak in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet Union could field some 70 major
warships armed with 450 anti-ship missiles, 70 guided-missile submarines with more than
400 anti-ship missiles, and 250 bombers with 500 missiles. The Soviet Navy had an
offensive doctrine: if times of tension turned to hostilities, a surprise assault was planned
with sufficient numbers of missiles to overwhelm US defenses. Massed waves of bombers
firing missiles in concert with submarine and ship attacks were designed to swamp US
defenses in order to disable or destroy aircraft carriers. The Soviets studied the lessons of
the Japanese kamikazes and US defenses and were prepared to expend enough missiles
and suffer serious losses to accomplish their mission.
The US also pursued the concept of cruise missiles, and during the 1950s and 1960s, the
US Navy tested the submarine-launched Regulus, Regulus II, and Rigel, while the US Air
Force developed the Matador, Mace, Snark, and Navaho. However, these systems were
employed in a land-strike role using nuclear warheads and were soon replaced when more
34
efficient and faster ICBMs came on line. For tactical missions, these cruise missiles
suffered from a lack of accuracy and reliability and were in competition with the large US
Navy carrier-aviation force and USAF Tactical Air Command. However, improvements in
technology and tactical doctrine led to the development and deployment of the Harpoon
and an anti-ship version of the Tomahawk.
Threats from Many Quarters
Most Western navies opted for more compact, subsonic missiles with good lethality and
range but less impact on ships and aircraft than the Russian supersonic missiles. In the
1960s, the French had already been testing an anti-ship missile and, the resulting the
Exocet was rapidly brought into service. Similar systems such as the Norwegian Penguin,
US Harpoon, Israeli Gabriel, and Italian Otomat were fielded in large numbers during the
1960s-80s. These lethal missiles were deployed on a variety of ships ranging from small
patrol boats to battleships, and the Exocet and Harpoon could be fired from ships, aircraft,
submarines, and mobile truck launchers.
The Soviet P-15/20 Styx, Chinese HY-2,

French MM-38 Exocet, Norwegian
Penguin, Israeli Gabriel, US Harpoon Block
1, and Italian Otomat are examples of
widely deployed first-generation tactical
anti-ship missiles. The Styx, HY-2, Exocet,
Penguin, and Gabriel have rocket-
propulsion and a range of 20-30 nautical
miles, while the turbojet-propelled Otomat
and Harpoon could hit targets at a range of
A US Air Force F-16 fires a Penguin 3 anti-
more than 60 nautical miles. The Harpoon, ship missile. The first practical Western anti-
Otomat, Exocet, Styx/HY-2, and later ship missile, the Norwegian Penguin family is
versions of the Gabriel employ active radar widely used and carried by a variety of fixed-
seekers to detect and attack ship targets. wing aircraft, helicopters, and ships. In US
This provides all-weather capability and service, the missile is designated AGM-119.
US Air Force photo
good open-ocean performance. The first
versions of the Israeli Gabriel used semi-active radar guidance, while the Penguin and
some Styx/HY-2 variants have infrared seekers. These systems were designed for short-
range, point-to-point engagements in open waters. Warhead size for first-generation
Western anti-ship missiles ranged from the 225 lbs. of the Penguin to the Harpoon's 500
lbs., which though smaller than the 1,058 lbs. of the P-15/20 Styx, is still large enough to
produce significant damage for a mission kill. A small number of naval vessels around the
world were armed with smaller anti-ship missiles such as the 170-lb., 3.8nm-range SS.12
wire-guided system and the 760-lb., 13.5nm-range radar-guided Italian Sea Killer system.
A number of other missiles fielded during the 1970s and 1980s were designed to be fired
from aircraft against ship targets. The rocket-powered German MBB AS.34 Kormoran
armed the F-104 and Tornado. This 16nm-range missile had a radar seeker and a 364-lb.
warhead with a fragmentation pattern designed to be especially lethal to ships. Japanese
35
WAYPOINT
industry developed the ASM-1 (Type 80) rocket-propelled anti-ship missile, which is
carried by the F-1 light strike aircraft and the P-3C of the Japan Air Self Defense Force.
This missile has an active radar seeker and a 330-lb. warhead. Britain funded the
development of the turbojet-powered Sea Eagle to arm its Tornado and Sea Harriers in the
anti-ship role. More than 800 of these 60nm-range missiles were bought by the UK, India,
and Saudi Arabia but the system is now being retired.
Norway fielded an air-launched version of the

infrared-guided Penguin anti-ship missile for its
F-16A/B fighters, and an improved version of
this system has been sold to a number of
nations to arm SH-60 Seahawk naval
helicopters. Swedish Air Force Lansen and
Viggen strike aircraft were armed with the
rocket-powered RB 04, which had radar
guidance and a 600-lb. warhead. Israeli
Phantoms and Skyhawks were armed with the
The Russian Kh-35 Uran (NATO: SS-N-25 Gabriel Mk. 3, an active radar-seeking variant
Switchblade) is a medium-range anti-ship
missile that entered service in the early
of the Israeli-developed anti-ship missile.
1990s and that closely resembles the US Chinese Xian (Badger) jet bombers were armed
Harpoon (so much so that it was dubbed with 50nm-range CAS-1 Kraken anti-ship
"Harpoonski" in Western circles). Like missiles based on the Styx design, while
the Harpoon, it is deployable on a wide smaller Q-5 fighter-bombers carried YJ-1
variety of platforms, with ship- and air-
launched and coastal-defense versions
"Eagle Strike" missiles, which were similar to
available. Photo by Michael Puttré the French Exocet or Japanese AS-1 in
configuration and performance. The AGM-
65F/G Maverick air-to- ground missile has been fitted with a passive IR seeker and a 300-
lb. blast warhead with delay-option fuse for use against ship targets. The F/A-18 and P-3C
patrol aircraft can carry this 7.5nm-range missile.
A lightweight and relatively inexpensive class of anti-ship missiles was developed by

Western firms to arm naval helicopters to engage threatening fast attack craft and other
targets. This includes the British Sea Skua, French AS.15TT, and American Hellfire. The
first two employ radar guidance, while the Hellfire employs laser guidance. While the
range of these systems is only 4-10nm and the warheads are small (10-25lbs), these
systems have proved to be effective for their role of attacking small naval vessels. The
AS.12 wire-guided system, which armed Royal Navy helicopters, was also in this class of
weapons. The larger and more powerful 570-lb. Italian Marte Mk 2 is carried by
helicopters of the Italian Navy. This missile has a range of 12nm and an active radar
seeker for terminal guidance.
First-generation missiles such as the Exocet, Harpoon, Otomat, Penguin, and the Styx have
been upgraded to increase their overall performance through the addition of more
advanced seekers and propulsion systems. Improvements in fire-control, computer, seeker,
and guidance technology have allowed missiles to perform a wider variety of search
patterns, fly true sea-skimming profiles, and have greater off-axis capability. In addition,
36
guidance systems fielded in the late 1980s and 1990s also had improved ECCM
performance and adjustable sea skimming performance and gave the missiles better
capabilities to survive terminal defenses. More powerful rocket motors and upgraded fuel
have also added to missile ranges. Computer and display upgrades have also dramatically
improved missile mission planning, allowing military planners to employ more flexible
tactics and develop multi-missile target engagements.
The Harpoon and Exocet are the most widely deployed Western anti-ship missiles today,
with Russian and Chinese variants of the Styx (which are now reaching obsolescence) still
probably close in total numbers - but not for long. More than a dozen firms in the US, the
PRC, Russia, Asia, and Europe produce anti-ship missiles today.
During the 1980s, the US Navy bought more than 500 UGM/RGM-109B Tomahawk Anti-
Ship Missiles (TASM). The subsonic TASM had a Harpoon active radar seeker, an ESM
system for target detection, and a 1,000-lb. warhead. This anti-ship missile could be fired
from ships and submarines and had four times
the range and twice the warhead weight of the
Harpoon, which put it in the class of Russian
long-range anti-ship weapons. The TASM was
deployed, but after several years of service, it
was replaced by conventional Tomahawks as
the land-strike mission overcame war at sea as
the critical post-Cold War mission emphasis.
Technology Evolution
The Russian X-31 (NATO: AS-17
Krypton) air-launched anti-ship missile is
The Harpoon is a good example of the derived from the Kh-31P anti-radiation
evolution of modern anti-ship missiles. The missile. It has a booster-rocket motor and
incorporation of new technology has enhanced four solid-fuel ramjets attached around a
tactical capability and mission performance, cylindrical body, giving the missile
excellent speed - exceeding Mach 3.6 - and
allowing the system to grow to meet the threat. a maximum range 110 km. Photo by
Block 1, the initial version of the Harpoon, Michael Puttré
produced in 1979, was replaced in 1982 by the
1B version, which added a sea-skimming terminal-attack option. In 1984, the Block 1C
Harpoon was fielded, with a longer range due to improved fuel, waypoint capability to
allow the missile to fly around islands or other obstacles, and seeker ECCM
improvements. The longer Harpoon Block 1D, with greater fuel capacity and additional
range, was tested in 1991 but not fielded. The Harpoon Block 1G, introduced in 1995, has
an improved seeker and additional mission flexibility, including the ability to re-attack a
target if it was missed on the first pass. The latest version of the Harpoon is the Block II,
which includes a GPS/INS, allowing for the attack of both ship and land targets.
In 1990, the US Navy fielded the Stand Off Land Attack Missile (SLAM), which
combined the imaging-infrared seeker from the Maverick missile, datalink from the
Walleye glide bomb; and Harpoon airframe, engine, and warhead to create an air-
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WAYPOINT
launched, man-in-the-loop, precision-strike weapon effective against ships and land
targets.
The Exocet has also developed beyond the MM38 to the MM40 version, and the third
variant, the Block 2, is available today, with its longer range, a more capable seeker, and
reliability upgrades.
The Swedish RBS15 is a turbojet- powered anti-ship missile, which replaced the RB04 in
the air-to-surface role and is also available in ship and coastal defense variants. An
upgraded variant of the Otomat known as the Mk 2 was fielded with mid-course datalink
targeting capability. The Otomat Mk. 2 has been fielded in both ship- and coastal-defense
versions. The Chung Shan Institute of the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan) has
developed and fielded the Hsiung-Feng II anti-ship missile on ROC ships and aircraft.
This turbojet-powered missile has a range of some 80nm and dual-mode terminal guidance
with both active radar and an infrared seeker. Mitsubishi of Japan has developed an
upgraded version of the ASM-1 powered by a turbojet engine and with an imaging infrared
terminal seeker. Known as the Type 88, this 80nm-range missile arms ships and shore-
defense batteries. Obsolete PRC Styx-class missiles are being replaced by the rocket-
powered C-801, with a range of 22nm and the newer C-802 with turbojet power providing
a range of 65nm. PRC supersonic anti-ship missiles are also in development, including the
27nm-range C-101 with ramjet propulsion, and the larger C-301 with a range of 97nm.
Second-generation anti-ship missiles can tackle almost any open-ocean conflict scenario
where an adversary is in open battle formation while waypoints allow for engagements
near land or obstructions. However, even advanced second-generation anti-ship missiles
have some limitations in effectively engaging vessels close to land and cannot hit ships at
the pier nor threaten shore targets such as a Silkworm site, gun battery, or radar site.
Anti-ship missiles have added considerable firepower to modern aircraft, ships, and
submarines but have also added the burden of requiring some form of assistance to fire
missiles accurately. Without accurate targeting information aircraft, ship, and submarine
crews cannot take advantage of the range and firepower of their powerful anti-ship missile
capability. Limited by its sensor horizon, the average ship radar can detect ship targets at
ranges up to only 24nm. Sonar and EW sensors can detect ships at longer ranges but
usually can provide only bearing information. An additional source of range data is usually
necessary for effective missile firing. Aircraft radars and electronic detection systems
provide much greater range and flexibility for detection and are better able to classify the
target than are surface ships.
The Soviet Union and the US invested considerable sums into complex worldwide systems
to develop and field ocean-surveillance and naval command and control networks. Since
the side that fires first has the advantage, it has been important for naval commanders to
monitor the location of potential adversaries. Both the US and the USSR fielded satellite-,
ground-, and sea- based sensor networks to monitor the movement of the other's aircraft,
ships and submarines. These included active radar systems able to search for and monitor
ships through clouds; passive IR and EO systems; plus sonar and ESM systems that could
detect, classify, and locate radar or electronic emissions. Kasatka was the name of the
38
Soviet system. Satellite data is combined with information obtained from hundreds of
other sources (such as human intelligence, surveillance platforms, etc.) to form a general
picture of what is happening in important areas of the ocean.
Advances in computer and communications technology substantially reduced the

information-fusion challenge. Tactical information is shared among ships, aircraft,
submarines, and shore positions via datalinks to maintain up-to-the-minute information on
changing conditions.
Naval commanders can call on a number of systems to collect tactical intelligence useful
for targeting these missiles. US carrier battlegroups can access information from strategic
networks and from E-2C Hawkeye surveillance aircraft. USN S-3B Viking or Navy
fighters can evaluate air and surface contacts, while P-3 aircraft, ships, and submarines
monitor submarine or surface contacts. Helicopter-equipped ships with SH-60 Seahawks,
Lynx HAS3, or other advanced helicopters with their capable search radar, and datalinks
are also helpful in missile targeting. NATO carrier or surface-action groups can rely on
support from Royal Navy carriers, E-3 AWACS, or patrol aircraft for assistance.
Most first-generation anti-ship missiles are programmed at launch to employ inertial

guidance along a path toward the planned target and then switch on an active radar or
infrared sensor for terminal guidance. These were developed so that there was no
interaction necessary with the launch platform after firing in order to increase
independence and reduce vulnerability to jamming and deception. There are limitations on
the ability of a missile seeker to discriminate among targets, and this constraint limits the
tactical flexibility of these missiles. Careful targeting is required to reduce the possibility
of hitting the wrong target, such as a tanker, cargo ship, or less desirable warship in a
formation. Some anti-ship missiles (e.g., Soviet P-6/7 [SS-N-3], P-700 Granit [SS-N-19],
Italian Otomat Mk 2) can be redirected in flight via datalink to adjust for target movement.
The Soviets employed Tu-95RT Bear-D reconnaissance bombers and Ka-25RT Hormone
helicopters and the Italians AB.212 helicopters to provide radar and/or visual confirmation
of the target and mid-course guidance updates. While this improved missile-targeting
accuracy, these bombers and helicopters were vulnerable and their presence could alert the
defenses. The semi-active radar homing Israeli Gabriel 1, British Sea Skua, and radio-
command French AS-15TT have homing advantages, since they will only seek an
illuminated target. However, these systems are limited to radar/radio line of sight, and
target illumination must continue until impact; thus, the designating platforms are
similarly vulnerable.
Anti-Ship Missile Defense
Naval leaders around the world responded to the anti-ship missile threat in two ways:
improving their defenses against anti-ship missiles and fielding similar anti-ship missile
systems. The US monitored Soviet anti-ship missile investments, and the US Navy
responded with an in-depth defense concept and, later, deployment of the Harpoon. This
called for early warning planes to detect incoming bombers and direct USN fighters to
intercept and shoot down Soviet bombers before they could launch their missiles. US
39
WAYPOINT
carrier and land-based anti-submarine-
warfare (ASW) aircraft and ships were
assigned the task of destroying Soviet
submarines, while US aircraft and
ships blasted Soviet ships with
Harpoons, bombs, and gunfire. The US
Navy focused significant efforts on
destroying Soviet launch platforms
before a missile was fired to reduce the
challenge of defending against
incoming missiles. This concept made
sense against large over-the-horizon
anti-carrier missile systems carried on
The Multi-Ammunition Softkill System (MASS)
the Tu-16 Badger bombers, Juliet- and decoy launcher throws a pattern of dual-mode chaff
Echo-class submarines (which had to and flare rounds from a German K-130 corvette. It
surface to fire their missiles), or Kynda can accommodate up to 32 rounds of varying types.
and Kresta destroyers. The system deploys a tight decoy pattern close to the
ship and is intended to counter supersonic and late-
locking anti-ship missiles. Buck NT photo
Missiles that made it through the outer
ring of defenses were to be engaged by
short-range missiles and anti-aircraft fire. To counter the threat of cruise-missile attack,
new radars, infrared sensors, and EW-detection equipment were installed on naval vessels.
First-generation Soviet anti-ship missiles like the P-15/20 Styx travelled at high subsonic
speed (Mach 0.9) and flew about 300 feet above the sea to minimize detection. When
launched at a maximum range of some 24nm, the missile took less than five minutes to
reach its target. Activation of the P-15/20's terminal seeker could be detected by a
warship's EW suite and give an indication of the missile's approach if the launch was not
previously detected. However, this provided less than a minute of warning time before
impact.
Once an incoming missile was detected, it could be countered by deceiving its seeker
through a chaff screen and/or electronic jamming, or by shooting it down with gunfire or
missiles. Supersonic missiles like the Russian P-6 and RSL-1 missiles were fast (Mach
1.4) and had a range of more than 200 nautical miles, but they flew at medium altitude and
were good targets for fighters, as well as Talos, Terrier, and Tartar surface-to-air missiles.
For area defense, many NATO ships were armed with Tartar surface to air missile
systems, while the British had the Sea Slug and Sea Dart and the French the Masurca and
Tartar missile defenses.
Starting in the 1970s, naval vessels were equipped with self-defense suites including
missile-detection radars, countermeasures dispensers for chaff and infrared decoys, and
active jammers, plus terminal defensives like Phalanx, Goalkeeper, or Dardo guns and Sea
Sparrow, Sea Wolf, and Crotale anti- missile missiles. In addition, multi- purpose
helicopters were deployed on many warships for scouting, ASW, the detection and attack
of adversary ships, and targeting for anti-ship missiles. More recently, nations have turned
to improved surveillance, communications networks, and enhanced defenses to counter
faster and more lethal missile threats. This includes the export of Aegis radar technology
40
to nations like Japan and Spain and the fielding of improved radar and missile systems in
Europe. The US Navy and many other navies have made substantial investments ship self-
defense technology. For example, the US has funded cooperative-engagement systems to
detect and engage missiles and many new weapons, including the RAM, improved
Phalanx, Evolved Sea Sparrow, upgraded Standard, as well as a multitude of ECM and
decoy systems for improved ship self-defense.
The MBDA Polyphem missile is a multi-purpose weapon with a camera in

the nose that sends real time video to the operator and command guided
by means of a fiber-optic line, making it impervious to jamming. It is
designed for ground and naval combat at a range of between 30 and 60
km. The image at left shows a Lynx helicopter with four Polyphem
missiles on individual launch rails; the photo on the right is a mock-up of a
twin-rail configuration. MBDA image, photo by Michael Puttré
Targets in the Littorals
With the shift in focus today from open-ocean to littoral or coastal operations, navies are
calling for missile systems that can engage surface threats at sea, and small vessels in
coastal waters or even ships in port. In addition, future systems must be able to deal with
ever-increasing capabilities of deception systems and active defenses.
To meet evolving tactical challenges, missile producers are developing new systems to
improve the capabilities of current models in the littoral arena, and a new generation of
missiles with both subsonic and supersonic performance is in advanced development. The
Boeing Harpoon Block II has integrated a GPS receiver developed for the Joint Direct
Attack Munitions program with a modern inertial-navigation system to eliminate missile-
position uncertainty. This allows for smaller seeker search patterns and helps ensure that
the designated target is found and struck. The new guidance system also allows the
Harpoon Block II to attack vessels near the coast or at pier and to hit land targets with 10-
meter accuracy. This capability has been developed and tested with the cooperation of the
US Navy. The Harpoon Block II is now available as new-production missiles, as well as
retrofit kits for older Harpoons. Harpoon Block II has been purchased by several nations
and is being evaluated by the US Navy.
The Saab RBS 15 Mk 3 is also undergoing a major upgrade that will enhance the weapon's
anti-ship performance and add GPS, a dual-mode seeker, and a two-way datalink to
enhance littoral and land-attack performance. A major upgrade of similar proportions is
planned by Otobreda for its Otomat series. Known as the Teseo 3, this enhancement
41
WAYPOINT
includes a low- signature airframe and multi-mode electro-optical/radar seeker to allow for
littoral and land attack. The Kongsberg Aerospace NSM, developed in cooperation with
Aerospatiale, is a subsonic, turbojet-powered, low-observable missile intended for launch
from Norwegian frigates and fast attack craft. Designed as a replacement for the Penguin,
this 925-lb. missile will include GPS and an advanced infrared seeker for the attack of both
ship and land targets. Smaller new missiles with enhanced anti-ship performance are also
in development such as the MBDA Polyphem. This 10nm-range fibre-optically guided
missile can be fired from ships, land launchers, and submarines.
Air-launched anti-ship missiles in service today include the nuclear-armed supersonic Kh-
22 and Kh-26 missiles carried by Russian Tu-22M jet bombers, USAF B-52Hs armed with
a dozen Harpoons, and SH-60 and Lynx helicopters armed with Sea Skuas, Penguins and
Hellfires. Fighter-bombers such as the F-16, Tornado, F-4, Mirage F1, MiG-29, Su-27, the
F/A-18, and Super, Etendard constitute a serious threat to ships when carrying anti-ship
missiles, as demonstrated during the Falkland Island conflict and tanker war. Maritime-
patrol aircraft such as the P-3 Orion, Nimrod, Atlantic/Atlantique 2, S-3B Viking, F-27/F-
50 Enforcer, and other similar craft have the range, payload, and sensor systems to
effectively employ Exocet, Harpoon, and ASM-1 class anti-ship missiles. Iraqi Super
Frelon helicopters demonstrated their effectiveness with the Exocet during the Iran-Iraq
War. Similar large helicopters such as the Cougar, Super Puma, and Sea King can fire the
Exocet and other missiles.
For an air-launched weapon, the Russian

Zvezda Kh-31 is one of the most capable
missiles in service. This advanced Mach
2 rocket ramjet can be fired from MiG-
29 and Su-27 (and now, as a training
target, the F-4!) aircraft and has a range
of 25-35nm. Boeing and Zvezda have
teamed to provide the Kh-31 to the USN
as a supersonic target. Russia also has a
large number of other highly capable
airborne anti-ship missiles, including the
Raduga Kh-41 Moskit with a 130nm The first Boeing Harpoon Block II missile is fired
range and supersonic performance. from the USS Decatur , on June 7, 2001. Designed
for littoral operations, the Block II missiles
Many Western anti-ship missiles are incorporate GPS guidance Harpoon Block II
capable of being launched from aircraft, incorporates the inertial measuring unit from the
Boeing Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)
but of these, only a small number have program, and the mission computer and GPS
been fielded during the past decade. The receiver/antenna from the Boeing Standoff Land
Komoran 2, with an upgraded seeker and Attack Missile- Expanded Response (SLAM-ER),
a more lethal warhead, was fielded on enabling it to execute both anti-ship missions and
German Navy Tornado fighter-bombers coastal-target suppression. Boeing photo
during the 1990s. Some 737 US Navy
AGM-84E Stand Off Land Attack Missiles (SLAMs) have been fielded on the F/A-18 and
P-3. This interim weapon was employed on the F/A-18 during the Gulf War and used
operationally in Bosnia and Kosovo on P-3Cs against land targets but, the SLAM also has
42
capability to attack ships. A much-improved version of the system, known as the AGM-
84H SLAM- ER [Expanded Response], has entered service entry with the USN. With a
stand-off range of more than 150 km, an improved 500-lb. high-explosive warhead, GPS-
aided inertial navigation, and man-in-the-loop terminal guidance, the SLAM-ER is likely
to be the first choice weapon for the USN in littoral anti-ship operations. Development
testing included several successful firings against ships, and the SLAM-ER has been
successfully employed in combat against land targets.
Russia still fields the widest array of anti-ship missiles, with the 10,500-lb. P-500 Bazalt
(SS-N-12 Sandbox) and upgraded (15,400-lb.) P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck) still in
service on major naval combatants. These systems are replacements for the P-6/7
Shaddock strategic-class, anti-carrier weapons. They have a range of more than 300nm,
travel at Mach 2.5, and carry large high-explosive or nuclear warheads. Another advanced
Russian system is the supersonic Raduga 3M80 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn), which can hit
targets out to a range of 65nm and has a Mach-2 speed at low altitude. These weapons
were fielded in 1984 on the Sovremenny-class destroyers and also are carried by Udaloy
frigates and Tarantul-III attack craft. The Russians have also fielded the Novator 3M54E1
anti-ship missile, which resembles the Tomahawk TASM (but with a supersonic terminal
dash capability) and the 3M24 (Kh-35) Uran, the later being similar to the US Harpoon
and are replacing older version of the Styx and P-120 systems, as well as attracting export
sales to Algeria, India, and other nations.
For the longer term, the Aerospatiale Anti-Navire Futur (ANF) was expected to be the first
Western supersonic anti-ship missile, but this 100nm-range ramjet-powered replacement
for the Exocet has suffered funding problems following the withdrawal of Germany from
the program. The Russian firm NPO Mashinostroeniya has demonstrated the advanced
supersonic Yakhont (SS-N-26) missile with a solid-rocket booster and a liquid-fuel ramjet
with a range of more than 120nm as a replacement for the Moskit in air- and surface-
launch variants.
Anti-ship missiles have played an important role in naval strategy for more than five
decades and they are in service in all corners of the world on a variety of ship, submarine,
land, and airborne platforms. Today the trend is toward missiles with greater accuracy,
speed, and capability but also the performance to hit both land and ship targets. The USN
is evaluating a development program to field a 600nm-range hypersonic (Mach 3.5-7)
missile capable of launch from the aircraft, ships, and submarines by the year 2015. A
hypersonic system effective against land and sea targets and could have a dramatic impact
on the 21st-century battlefield.
Lon Nordeen has more than 20 years experience in business development and communications with
McDonnell Douglas and Boeing. He has also served on the staff of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics and is the author of Air Warfare in the Missile Age, Fighters Over Israel, Phoenix Over the
Nile, and more than 100 articles.
Larry Brown has more than 20 years of navy missile systems business development experience with both US
and international programs with McDonnell Douglas and Boeing. He recently retired from the US Navy
Reserve, where he was involved in C4I and Information Warfare issues.
43
WAYPOINT
THE ART OF WAR
The Harpoon series has always been about realistic strategy simulation: the application of real-life tactics,
plans and methods to defeat adversaries that are as closely modelled after their real-life counterparts (or
hypothetical OPFORs) as possible. In this section we include material relevant to the application of strategy
at all levels – from the trenches all the way up to high command. Subjects of technical nature, where they
relate to real-world events and strategies, are also covered here.
KITTING-UP FOR MUD-MOVING

Weaponeering for ground-attack air missions
Recently, we had a resurgence of posts on the Yahoo H3 group

(http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Harpoon3/) on the subject of appropriate air-ground
ordinance. The central question emerging is simple:
what are the most appropriate munitions to load on
aircraft that are going to perform a ground-attack
mission. The answer is not as straightforward, and
hinges on a multitude of factors. While experienced
pooners will by now probably have formed their
personal-preference stock of weapons, it is quite
easy for new players to get overwhelmed by the
variety of loadouts available. To this end, it is
useful to get back to the basics and examine the Mk-82 bombs being loaded on a B-52
prior to a strike mission
subject from the mission’s perspective. The
guidelines are H3-oriented, but can easily be
adapted to any other version or even other simulations.
The end mission
The end objective of a ground-attack sortie is, almost invariably, the destruction of one or
more land targets. As with all missions assigned to air assets, it is highly desirable that it
be carried out
In the shortest possible time
With minimum losses
With the lowest expenditures of munitions
Compromises
Ideally, the target will be located close to the base of air operations, will be fixed in
location, in clear weather and under no cover from natural or man-made camouflage, and
totally unprotected. Under these ideal conditions, the aircraft can simply load with
44
virtually any weapon loadout and have an easy time pounding the target to eventual
destruction. This however, is quite rarely the case.
As various restrictive factors begin entering the equation, the effective offensive payload
has to rub shoulders with other items essential to the mission:
Self-defence & SEAD equipment (both soft- and hard-kill) to deal with both
area-coverage and terminal anti-air defences guarding the target(s).
Fuel tanks, to increase the tactical strike radius
Additional external-mounted navigation & targeting sensors, to increase the
probability of correctly locating and attacking the target in bad weather
conditions or in adverse background environment
Air-to-air weaponry to deal with fighter patrols in the target area.
Other items essential to the successful prosecution of the mission.
All these items will usually occupy both pylon space and weight, drastically restricting the
available carriage options for the actual strike weapons.
It can of course be argued that these restrictions can be considerably relaxed by off-loading
some of the key mission necessities (navigation, fuel provision, self-defence etc.) to other
platforms, leaving the actual striker free to carry more of its actual bombload. The USAF
has long been a strong believer of this mindset, typically complementing its dedicated
strike assets with tankers, specialised EW aircraft, fighter escorts and frequently long-
range sensor platforms (AWACS/JSTARS etc.) in order to provide these necessities.
However, specialising the task of each airframe has its own problems.
To begin with, such specialised assets tend to be

very expensive and maintenance-intensive,
dragging the mission planning schedules to their
own readiness cycles, often prolonging the time at
which a fully-assembled strike package is ready to
launch. Furthermore, the reduced cross-redundancy
that naturally follows task-specialisation can lead
Targeting-data provided by external to “single point of failure” situations for the entire
platforms such as this E-8 JSTARS package. What if the fighter escorts are neutralised
aircraft can greatly facilitate the or even simply drawn-off by enemy opposition on
effective employment of weapons
the way in? What if the highly-sophisticated
navigation & sensor systems of the “pathfinder” aircraft simply break-down or are unable
to perform their task due to an external factor? What if the tanker gets shot down or is
forced to abort? What if the JSTARS misses a mobile SAM launcher that one of the
strikers is in better position to detect (but has its own radar switched-off, relying on
JSTARS instead)? Each of these trouble scenarios (and a gazillion variations of them) can
lead to the mission having to be aborted or, even worse, the offensive package suffering
unacceptable losses
As a result of this, many air forces are emphasizing the swing-role or "self-escorting"
capability on their strike assets. This includes the USN which, although very strong in
45
WAYPOINT
absolute numerical terms, suffers from having a limited number of air assets available at
any given time and thus has to make maximum use of them. This is a mindset faithfully
adhered to for decades in the Eastern block (although influenced there by other factors too,
technological as well as doctrinal), and it is now gaining increased acceptance in the West
as well. This can be clearly seen on the main features present on both new tactical aircraft
as well as upgraded versions of older designs:
Conformal fuel tanks for increased range without air-refuelling

Greater number of stores pylons. Typically the extra pylons are not cleared for
heavy attack stores and are instead used for self-defence weapons (A2A/SEAD)
& electronic systems.
Increased presence of on-board integrated self-protection suites, including
active jamming and decoy systems.
It is interesting to note that most of these features result in a (sometimes significant)

decrease of the platforms' outright flight performance, unless a significant propulsion
uprate is included in the improvement package. It may thus be assumed that the majority
of operators are prepared to accept a relative degradation of a mission profile's tangible
"numerical specs" (speed & tactical radius at specified altitude, manouvering ability with
specified warload etc.) in order to increase the ability of their assets to survive and
accomplish the mission.
Lots of pebbles or one big rock?
A question that can be the source of intense debate is whether the specified offensive load
should be spread on a large number of munitions of relatively small warhead size, or
instead concentrated on a few heavy-hitters. While testosterone-fuelled natural aggression
would instinctively point to the latter option, the case is not so clear-cut. The employment
of multiple weapons on a single target will generally yield a higher probability of at least
some of them impacting successfully, whereas a single weapon will force a one-shot, hit-
or-miss operation. This means that there is less risk of
mission failure (as a result of a weapon miss) when
multiple smaller weapons are employed. More weapons
also means a larger number of available aimpoints,
useful in a target-rich environment (e.g. a large airbase A definite heavy-hitter: a Kh-22
(AS-4) missile as carried under a
or port complex). Tu-22M bomber
On the other hand however, there are quite a few cases in which the nature of the target
will mean that heavy-hitting weapons have to be employed. Heavily armoured targets for
instance (armoured ships, hardened aircraft shelters etc.) may effortlessly absorb the
damage caused by small weapons and require a direct hit by a heavy warhead (or
preferably a penetrating one) in order to receive any substantial damage. Furthermore, one
or a few heavy weapons can be released on a single one-pass attack, whereas multiple
smaller munitions are usually difficult to ripple-fire (ROF limitations) all at once and have
to be released in multiple successive passes, which increases the vulnerability of the parent
aircraft to the enemy's defences.
46
Warhead characteristics
The various warheads of the different anti-surface weapons serve different needs with
respect to the nature of the targets. For example, against numerous independent small
targets (e.g. tanks or other vehicles) it would be desirable to employ cluster munitions
rather than single HE warheads. Alternatively, an area-effect weapon such as a FAE bomb
(or a nuclear weapon) might be employed in a similar situation. Runways are another
interesting case. Special penetrating weapons such as the Durandal bomb or the Russian
BetAB-series or the Czech Phobos system are most effective in this case. Other typical
land-targets such as bridges, bunkers, oil tank farms and buildings can be effectively
targeted with a wide range of weapons, including the most common HE warheads.
Enemy defences
Another important consideration is the nature of enemy defences that will be encountered
during the strike mission. The neutralisation of these defences is going to require
additional weapons and other systems to deal with them. Ideally, these systems hould be of
the same type with the ones used for the strike itself (for example, air-to-surface missiles
or cluster bombs to destroy SAM launchers) in order to provide the strike commander with
the maximum in-flight flexibility for shifting the employment of these weapons depending
on how the tactical situation unfolds. However, this is rarely the case, for several reasons:
The weapons most effective for the neutralisation of enemy defences are often
specialised items quite different from the ones used for the main strike itself
(e.g. air-to-air missiles or passive anti-radiation missiles)
If the primary strike weapons require closing with (or overflying) the target
area, as for example in the case of LGBs, the employment of similar weapons
against enemy defences would dictate for the strikers (or their SEAD escorts) a
significant and unnecessary increase of exposure (=vulnerability) for them.
In the case where the primary strike weapons are long-range stand-off weapons
(typically of a huge price tag, and thus of limited availability), it is difficult to
justify the employment of such weapons for each and every type of target in the
mission, as this would imply an inefficient expenditure of weapons. Although
this normally not a consideration for a typical H2/3 scenario, campaign-style
scenarios can really stretch the weapon resources and thus increase the
importance of this point. (Of course, an alternative strategy is to employ the
most capable weapons on the defences themselves, and then use the remainder
on the primary targets).
47
WAYPOINT
The presence of high-end SAM systems such as the Patriot or the SA-10
can greatly complicate mission planning and weaponeering
considerations
Thus the need arises to devote a portion of the overall package’s stores capacity to
defence-suppression weapons. If enemy fighter activity is expected, and the strikers are not
swing-role then friendly fighters will have to be attached to the package. Otherwise, the
defensive armament will have to share pylon space with the business-load on the strikers
themselves. The exact type & quantity of defensive systems and weapons will be dictated
by the capability level of the expected defences – it is one thing to strike a barracks
complex guarded by a SA-2 battery and maybe the occasional export MiG-23, and quite
another to attack the Severomorsk fleet support facilities, fending off waves of MiG-31s
and Su-27s and jousting with multiple SA-10 sites. In the latter case, the strike-payload
may well comprise a very small percentage of the total warload carried.
Weather
The prevailing weather patterns over the target area can also have a large impact on the
weapons selected as well as on their delivery profile. Optically-delivered munitions
(including those delivered in HUD-assistance modes e.g. CCIP/DTOS etc.) face severe
restrictions in employment during nighttimes and/or in bad weather. Unguided free-fall
weapons (iron bombs, cluster canisters etc.) can be delivered “blindly” during such
circumstances using radar as a director (e.g. in CCRP mode). This delivery profile
however is usually less accurate than optical HUD-assisted delivery. (H2/3 factors-in the
presence of such bombing-aiding systems as “computing bombsight” or “advanced
bombsight”, in order to model the inclusion of such components in real-life platforms).
The employment of laser-guided weapons such as the US Paveway series is also

significantly hindered in environments of severe humidity (including heavy storms) or in
the presence of clouds, and also increases the vulnerability of the aircraft by forcing it to
remain on the general target area until impact. Stand-off weapons that implement an EO or
IR seeker for terminal guidance (such as the AGM-84E SLAM or the Kh-59/AS-13) face
similar difficulties. Radar-guided weapons face no such difficulties but are of course
actively emitting, which increases their vulnerability to detection and destruction. Satellite-
guided (GPS, GLONASS, Galileo etc.) munitions are close to the ideal in this respect, as
they can be guided to their targets under any weather conditions and fully autonomously –
48
however they can fall victim to GPS-jammers depending on the enemy’s level of
technological sophistication.
Own inventory considerations
A good rule of thumb in both real-life and the Harpoon simulation is that the more capable
a weapon is, the fewer of them you will have at your disposal. This means that it is very
important to manage these few silver bullets in a responsible manner. One often has to
think not only in terms of the immediate mission at hand, but also of any necessary
subsequent follow-up attacks either on the same target or in others (and also of other
missions, yet unplanned but coming down the
road). This becomes particularly important in
longer-duration scenarios which revolve around the
repetitive use of airpower against strongly-
defended targets, where the prospect of extended
offensive air-ops looms (it becomes even more
critical in campaign-style scenarios where logistics
alone can win or lose the fight).
A fairly popular method is to use the few high-tech

weapons as force-multipliers, employing them
against critical nodes in the enemy defences,
hopefully opening-up gaps through which less
sophisticated weapon systems can afterwards be The AGM-130 stand-off weapon (shown
here hung under an F-15E), was widely
successfully employed. This concept was employed employed in the Kosovo air campaign.
to its full extent in Desert Storm: although PGMs Its direct ancestor, the GBU-15 glide
and stand-off weapons (including cruise missiles) bomb, was used in small numbers in
in that conflict were used relatively sparingly and Desert Storm.
in much smaller numbers than conventional
unguided munitions, their disrupting effect allowed the latter weapons to be employed with
high effectiveness. The effect of relaxed inventory restrictions can be clearly observed in
the Kosovo air operations – here, a near-decade of PGM-stockpiling (combined with an
emphatic political directive for minimal friendly casualties at all costs) allowed for a much
more liberal use of advanced weapons even against targets of relatively low significance.
The advent of low-cost, precision or near-precision guidance kits for air-delivered

munitions, such as the JDAM kit for HE-unitary bombs or the WCMD adaptation for
cluster munitions, is likely to accelerate this trend of increased use of PGMs on the full
spectrum of air-strike missions and across the full range of potential targets.
For most air forces however, the stockpile situation remains similar to that of NATO in the
70s/80s: an abundance of low-tech weapons that cannot be employed effectively unless
enemy defences are first significantly reduced, and a small cache of advanced weapons &
systems whose employment is hoped to achieve exactly that effect. Therefore the tactics &
doctrine developed over these periods and extensively demonstrated during the second Gulf
War remain relevant to a large extent.
49
WAYPOINT
In conclusion…?
All that is fine and dandy, I hear you say, but it doesn’t directly answer the central question.
What do I hit this bridge with? What do I use against tanks? Or against bunkers, or ships?
Currently, the mechanics of all computer versions of Harpoon treat damage-modelling to

land facilities with a significant degree of abstraction. Although land units can be granted
few or many damage points in order to represent the amount of damage they can absorb
before being destroyed, and although there is the further modifier of four different armor
protection levels, that is that. There is no differentiation between, say an unarmored 1000-
DP bridge and an unarmored 1000-DP bunker: the same weapon may be used on both with
the same exact results of DP-attrition. Flight-sim users may cringe at the thought, being
accustomed to endless arguments about, say, whether a GBU-24B/B or a GBU-27 is more
effective against a Type-X bridge and so on, but when one considers the scale at which
Harpoon models air operations (actions involving entire TVDs and/or fleets are not
uncommon), the necessity of some abstraction and simplification becomes apparent.
On the other hand, Harpoon models accurately many other parameters and factors that help
determine the most suitable munition type for a given mission. These are some of the
considerations that the wise player will take into account when planning:
What is the weather in the target area like? Is the weapon under consideration capable of
effective guidance on the target under the current weather? How is the weather and the
general visibility (day/night?) going to affect the ability of the attack aircraft to locate the
target?
Is the target location fixed/predetermined or does a pre-strike reconnaissance have to be
performed? If the target is a mobile platform then many stand-off weapons will be
useless (cruise missiles until very recently, for example). If an active target search has to
be performed just before the strike things can get quite tricky. Is the selected weapon
going to provide sufficient targeting flexibility for such a case? (e.g. lock-on-after-launch
capability)
Is the weapon powerful enough for the selected target? Is it suitable to the target’s
nature? Damage-modelling simplifications aside, H2/3 does a good job at
differentiating between the various warhead effects and the results of extra target armor.
Sprinkling cluster munitions on an underground bunker, for instance, is probably not
going to be on much effect – a hard-target penetrating bomb or missile (or a nuke) is in
order. Likewise, a cluster of tanks is a rather poor choice for a single LGB. Light- and
medium-caliber guns may have minimal effect against heavy or special armor,
necessitating the use of heavy-caliber projectiles (or fast missiles).
What stands between your forces and the target(s)? Does the primary strike weapon
have the necessary range to avoid the worst of the defensive fire, or are additional
defence-suppression weapons/systems in order? What are the capabilities of the enemy
SAMs? Can they shoot down your stand-off weapons in-flight or can you just lob them
and forget them? What about fighters? Are you going to avoid them, confront them or
relegate them to others?
50
What are the release parameters for the weapon in question? Does it have an
unacceptably high minimum-release altitude that is going to ruin your by-the-book
NOE ingress at the last moment? What about speed parameters? Does your high-speed
bomb-truck have to slow-down in order to employ it? (Not good!)
Is the target worth the weapon(s) you are considering? Are you going to use a half-
million dollar Harpoon on a $1-billion cruiser or against a $20-grand gunboat? A
$40.000 LGB is a good investment for a $30-million parked aircraft, but very inefficient
for a $10.000 truck. Wasting precious munitions on cheap targets is a good way to run
out of them when you really need them.
What are the restrictions posed to your aircraft after weapons release? Are the weapons
launch-and-leave (unguided, GPS-guided etc.) or do they require you to “stick around”
until impact (LGBs etc.)? What effects will that have on the survivability of your
assets? Are they going to be massacred by AAA or SR-SAMs while waiting for their
payloads to hit? What alternatives are there?
What about fuel? What is the ingress and egress profile? How much of the time are the
aircraft going to spend in low-altitude or, worse, in afterburner? What about surprises?
If an unexpected fighter group shows up, do all assets have enough fuel to either stay
and fight or run like hell? A tanker or diversion airstrip can relax this issue a lot, but
without it you need to plan for extra fuel tanks.
Obviously, the subject of weapon selection cannot be discussed in isolation, but rather has
to be integrated into the greater subject of mission planning. This is exactly the course
taken by real-life air force mission-planning systems around the world and thus, it is only
natural that a similar procedure be followed in Harpoon. Once the big picture of the mission
becomes clear, and with a bit of basic knowledge on weapons abilities and limitations (and
logistics issues etc.), the choice should become significantly clearer.
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WAYPOINT
MANAGING THE CHAOS: THE POSTWAR EVOLUTION OF NAVAL C3
SYSTEMS
The three main schools of thought on the development of effective combat,
command & control systems for naval forces
It is hard to comprehend the need for the presence of computerized, highly automated
combat, command and control (C3) systems aboard naval vessels, before first
understanding the very need for any such systems in the first place, and the factors that
shaped their evolution and progression.
The traditional naval duties of warships have been two: Sea Control (essentially to permit
the free usage of sea lanes by friendly naval assets, in both peacetime and wartime), Sea
Denial (to disrupt the enemy’s ability to conduct effective Sea Control operations during
wartime). Some claim land-intervention to be an additional duty; while this in the past was
executed mainly by Sea Control (ensuring that men and goods/supplies reached their
destinations intact) and limited shore bombardment, the advent of shipborne long-range
deep-strike weapons (such as cruise missiles) has enabled it to grow in a completely
separate branch of its own.
All these key missions dictate that the ships must go in harm’s way, probably engaging
enemy units. In its environment, the warship faces multi-dimensional threats, with attacks
coming from under the sea, from the surface and from the air. From the period between the
world wars, the sheer volume of data generated by shipborne sensors started surpassing and
overwhelming the abilities of the staff to handle the incoming threats. Without integrated
C3 systems, the capability of naval commanders to assess, evaluate and exploit (or simply
defend against) the tactical situation as it is presented to them is considerably compromised.
Why computers in the loop?
In the First World War, the naval commanders usually had a buffer time of several hours
available to them, from initial enemy unit detection to engagement, to plan their moves and
strategies. Orders and situation reports were exchanged between naval units without
significant time pressure, often even in the midst of the battle. In the Second World War,
with the aircraft emerging as the key weapon over land and sea, this available reaction time
shrunk to several minutes. Even with that constraint, more often than not, important tactical
and operational-level thinking had to be interrupted by the tedious and time consuming (but
concurrently essential in order to provide a cleat tactical picture) manual processes of data
fusion, deconfliction and integration. Even after an idea for action was dropped on the
table, lots of complex calculations often had to follow to test its feasibility under real-world
data (endurance of ships or aircraft, ranges of weapons, fire co-ordination etc.). With the
then current technology, it was the best at hand.
In the projected Third World War scenarios, the reaction time to any advanced was
estimated at being mere seconds. The situation has not altered until today. Be it an enemy
52
surface group being revealed either directly or by third parties’ sensors, a swarm of sea-
skimming anti-ship missiles incoming fast, or a submarine appearing and disappearing on
sonar scopes, the need to quickly identify the situation and control it, being one step ahead
instead of behind it, is paramount. This is where the speed and automation offered by
computing systems falls into place. The aim here is to analyze the different perceptions
followed by the American, European and Russian naval forces in the Cold-War era (with
appropriate examples of their philosophies) and examine the future of these trends in the
realities and challenges of the coming decades.
It is worthwhile here to emphasize a point: The discrimination between combat systems and
command & control systems is very thin and ambiguous in modern ship designs. This is a
direct result of the need for integration of all previously independent activities taking part
aboard a warship, from combat to maintenance to damage control to everyday activities.
For this reason, these systems are hereby collectively referred to as C3.
The American Model
Shortly before the end of WW2, the US Navy was in the process of rapid re-organization in
the closing phase of a long struggle in the Pacific, with the lessons of recent battles still
fresh in mind. Of particular notice was the effectiveness with which massive Japanese air
attacks were able to overwhelm the formidable air defenses of US carrier groups, Kamikaze
squadrons being the deadliest of all. There was a clear need to improve the command
capabilities of capital ships and any of their subordinate units, including aircraft.
It was in this context that the idea of a “battle-center” inside a ship was created, a central
point of censor data fusion and weapon control (including air assets). This was aptly termed
as the Combat Information Center (CIC). This is not to say that the concept was
immediately formerly implemented: in ships under construction, the process of establishing
a CIC usually fairly casual: a normal compartment would be reserved for it and then the
original operators were given carte-blanche to manage the layout according to their varied
personal preferences and prejudices. It goes without saying that this often created utter
chaos between ships with totally different (and thus incompatible) CICs. Nevertheless, the
concept was to prove its worth in subsequent battles towards the end of the war, especially
in night fights when electronic sensor data was the dominant form of information available.
By the end of the war, the technological base had largely matured, and CICs had begun
settling on standardized forms. A natural progression was steadily followed during the 50s,
leading to an almost complete standardization of systems and procedures for these now
accepted systems. However, by the late-50s, the hitherto manual procedures normally
followed in CICs had been overtaken by the emergence of threats allowing even less
reaction time, such as the massive re-arming of Soviet Naval Aviation bombers with long-
range anti-ship missiles. The initial stopgap measure was to automate the CIC using the
best computer technology available at that time. The now-standard NTDS (Navy Tactical
Data System) had its birth at this era, while the Royal navy went on its own way with ADA
(Action Data Automation). These systems were initially nothing more than computerized
53
WAYPOINT
track-keepers, with raw sensor data being fed into a computer, which itself drove an analog
display system. The computers themselves did not process the track data, and all tactical
decisions were still at the hands of CIC officers. Subsequently, the tracks generated were
treated as standard computer files, permitting the automated calculations needed to produce
intercept vectors for missiles and aircraft.
The next step from these early computerized systems was the provision of the ability to
transfer target data, and subsequently the whole tactical picture, between ships. This
concept had its roots on the Kamikaze experience of the Pacific War, where the USN
regularly deployed radar-picket ships well ahead of the protected assets with good results.
The establishment of effective data links would allow the automation of the (hitherto
manual) procedure of target track data exchange between ships, to allow for a vastly
improved reaction time and better asset coordination. Thus the first data-link systems were
introduced, Link-11 being the defacto standard for decades (and still in widespread use
today). A descendant of it, Link14, was devised for use by ships without an integrated C3
system.
Naturally, somebody figured that the data-link compatibility factor would be less of a
headache if there existed a level of commonality between the C3 systems of different
NATO navies. This led to the wide distribution of the NTDS within NATO, forming the
basis of most variants existent in European navies, such as the French SENIT, the Italian
SADOC and the German AGIS, PALIS and SATIR systems (interestingly enough, the
British had already separated themselves from this procedure by sticking to ADA, although
it did natively support the Link-11).
A fusion of the core elements of
NTDS with ADA brought about the
Dutch SEWACO family of C3
systems.
The big, BIG machine back there
A common denominator in all the

aforementioned systems along their
evolutionary path, was the fact that
they were strictly centralized. A The basic layout of the CIC in the Perry-class frigate shows
central computer mainframe handled clearly the US tendency to concentrate all the major sub-
all the data traffic and processing systems of the C3 system in a limited area, often in a single
room.
duties, and that was that. To a large
extent, this reflected the legacy of
mainframe development, ever since the Colossus and ENIAC went operational. Partially,
this was purely a matter of technical and economic conservatism: The sheer size of the US
fleet meant that any radical developments in command and control facilities would result in
enormous expenses, because the changes in system architecture would have to be spread
across the fleet if compatibility was to be ensured (the technological base was not yet
mature enough to allow for a gradual phasing-in of the system). For the US requirements
(and indeed, those of most Europeans until the late 70s), the centralized nature of NTDS
54
worked, and worked well, thus reducing the incentive for radical innovations. Instead, the
basic combat management philosophy of the NTDS’s early incarnations was progressively
refined with more powerful computing sets, and further enhanced with automatic data entry
facilities. This evolutionary series culminated in some highly effective C3 systems,
including the impressive Aegis system.
Aegis is a fully automated complex integrating the sensor, computer and weapon systems
of its installed ship in order to coordinate not only the parent ship's functions, but of the
entire task force that the ship is leading. The core of the system (Mk7 Mod3 Baseline 1 & 2
configuration) is comprised of 16 UYK-7 mainframes, 1 UYK-19 server and 11 UYK-20
minicomputers (all provided by Unisys). The computing modules are grouped together
physically to form a unified main processing unit, interfacing through 4 Hughes AN/UYA-
4 color displays and 4 additional PT-525 smaller displays with a capacity of displaying up
to 128 target tracks (this is an artificial limit to avoid system saturation; it can be raised in
combat). In automatic mode, the computers receive full control authority not only of the
ship's own sensor (particularly the massive and highly-accurate SPY-1 phased-array radar)
and weapon systems, but also of any other nearby ship whose systems have been
subordinated to Aegis control (provided that the other ship hosts a suitable NTDS or
compatible system). The system structure is fully compatible with previously existing
NTDS protocols and can flawlessly exchange data with NTDS-equipped ships through
Link-11 and Link-16 (JTIDS) datalink networks. In the evolved Baseline 3 & 4
configurations, more advanced UYK-43/44 mainframes are used, offering significantly
greater processing output. The UYQ-21 display system is also being retrofitted for
improved display volume and quality. Overall, the Aegis system offers the capability to
effectively co-ordinate the defense of an entire task force against massive air and missile
attacks while in fully-automatic operating mode, by integrating a clear picture. In semi-
automatic or manual mode, it provides unprecedented tactical awareness to the group
commander for decision support. This capability was amply demonstrated in Beirut in 1983
and the 2nd Gulf War in 1991, when the system provided a clarity and volume of tactical
situation data never before achieved.
The European Viewpoint
For quite a while after the end of WWII, the US was the sole supplier of naval vessels to
European navies who were struggling to restructure – as was almost anyone else in Europe
at that time. Furthermore, the formation of the NATO alliance seemed to advance the idea
of a truly unified system of strategies and the systems designed and procured to serve them
(although, as mentioned, several decisions, as the British adoption of ADA, had already
shaped a different perspective of priorities). The US, having the greatest contribution to
NATO resources, was naturally spreading its own methodology of standardization in
military hardware, and this inevitably included naval C3 systems. However, progressively
over the decades, serious deviations in the European thinking began to emerge. One of the
most fundamental differences was identified in the degree of system automation, a chasm
that exists to a strong degree up to today, and a point that warrants some closer
examination.
55
WAYPOINT
A European assessment (with which US analysts profoundly disagree) is that US radar &
C3 designers attempt to automate all possible functions, on the basic assumption that
human judgment cannot be trusted. European practice, on the other hand, has long been to
retain a considerable proportion of human influence within the decision loop, on the
grounds that machines lack the inherent flexibility and decision-making capability
necessary for proper performance. This European assessment, while sound in principle,
fails to recognize that the US problem lies not in whether judgment can be trusted, but in
handling the massive number of potential targets. The US Navy, at least during the Cold
War, was faced with controlling a multi-dimensional battle stretching out to over 200-
300nm, probably incorporating friendly and neutral contacts. In contrast, the European
battle horizon until recently rarely exceeded 50nm (limited by the range of onboard
missiles) and encompasses a much smaller number of potential targets. (Friedman, 1993)
This debate was recently illustrated on some of the Royal Navy’s criticisms of the Aegis
system following operations during the 1991 Gulf War. British officers who have visited
US Aegis-equipped ships believe that the system denies the radar operators access to raw
(unprocessed) radar data and places far too much reliance on the processing capability of
the system. Aegis provides operators with the facility to select the rules for handling data,
including changing the scan program and blanking some targets to avoid system overload.
One problem here is that there is a tendency to forget the rules adopted and to confuse
synthetic video (which is much clearer and easier to understand) with raw reality. This
point was driven home in the so-called ‘Cessna incident’, in which a light aircraft was
detected by conventional 2-D radar but not by Aegis, because the existing velocity filter
rules washed the contact out. Such levels of automation were for a long time unaffordable
by European navies, and only the rapidly declining cost of computer power is bringing
them into widespread availability.
This debate, however, among with a score of other lesser points of disagreement, has acted
merely as a front for the far more fundamental disagreement regarding the C3 system’s
basic architecture. As already seen, the US has at least until very recently stood favorably
for centralized systems. The European perspective, on the other hand, places an ever-
increasing emphasis on de-centralized & distributed systems. Systems, in other words, that
delegate the various functions of a modern C3 system into several terminals instead of
concentrating them into a single unit.
Why distributed?
To someone familiar with the US practice of centralizing a ship’s command systems into a
single main unit, this would appear to be making perfect sense, under the light of necessary
conservatism and evolutionary rather than revolutionary path already mentioned. However,
the idea of “all the eggs in one basket” does include inherent weaknesses. N. Friedman
(Navies in the Nuclear Age, 1993) comments on the shortcomings of this method:
“[...] even as the processing capacity requirement is resolved by natural technology

evolution, there is a more fundamental problem with the concept. Even the best-designed,
56
best-equipped and best-crewed ships get hit. Off the coast of Vietnam the USS Worden, a
guided-missile cruiser, was mistaken by an F-4 fighter for an enemy [surface-to-air
missile] site. A single [anti-radar missile] was fired by the F-4. The missile worked
perfectly while the cruiser, detecting the missile but assuming it was aimed at a hostile
target, took no defensive measures. The resulting explosion shattered the ship’s electronic
installations and wrecked the CIC, leaving the cruiser dead in the water and defenseless.
Fifteen years later, HMS Broadsword, engaged in operations off the Falkland Islands, was
strafed by an Argentine [fighter]. A single 30mm shell struck the bridge. With unerring
precision, it severed the ship’s main databus, again effectively knocking out every single
electronic system on the ship. […]”
These examples depict all too clearly that the centralized structure, while technically
simpler and more attractive from a system engineer’s point of view, was nevertheless a
gamble in a tactical situation where post-battle damage survivability and continuity of
operations was a high consideration. Especially for the European navies, whose fleets
usually lacked the sophisticated air-defense systems necessary to ensure a high ratio of
successful intercepts of incoming attacks (and thus, were much more probable to receive at
least partial damage to their units), the prospect of their capital units being taken out of the
battle by a single “cheap shot” was not a particularly welcomed one. Additionally, there is a
finite limit to the processing power that can be stored in a single unit. The distribution of
functions and data over a large number of sub-units would increase significantly the overall
processing capability of the integrated C3 system.
A further consideration weighed in favor of such an architecture was the foreseen

equipment upgrades. While a warship has an expected hull-life of 25 to 40 years, it is safe
to project that her weapons and sensors will become obsolete and in need of replacement at
least once during this period. The centralized computer C3 system concept, with its inherent
inflexibility, results in a change intolerance that makes even minor changes to the weapon
and sensor suite an expensive and potentially difficult task.
Chips anyone?
With computing power being expensive and scarce, however, the Europeans had no choice
but to make do with what the American thinking had to offer. Following the centralized
architecture seemed as the only practical solution for more than a couple of decades. That
being said though, the mindset and wish for something different was still there, waiting a
chance to manifest itself.
This opportunity came in the late 70s, when the computing revolution showed its first signs.
Practical computer systems became available to the mass market. Prices began taking the
rollercoaster ride. For the first time, purchasing a number of computer units and connecting
them was not an option confined into richly-funded research projects. It was now possible
to dispense with the central computer entirely, and design a truly modular system in which
each operator terminal or console would have its normal individual responsibilities. The
data could now be shared, transferred, or re-routed via one or more databuses as the tactical
situation dictated. The result of these new developments was a radical departure in C3
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WAYPOINT
system design. The very nature of the modular architecture made upgrades and module
replacements much easier. Battle damage can only now degrade the effectiveness of the C3
system, and often not even that: The reconfigurability of modern systems means that, for
example, ‘it is the work of a few seconds to re-assign the navigational console on the
bridge to take over the functions of the anti-air console burning in the CIC (in recent
equipment, this is done by simply inserting the appropriate authorization card into a slot)’
(Friedman, 1993).
The various subsystems are either connected by main databuses or, if they are in reasonably
close proximity, further integrated into small Ethernet-based Local Area Networks (LANs).
In these, the equipment forming the LANs is linked by cheap data exchange interfaces,
while the LAN central hubs themselves feed the main databuses. The ever-decreasing cost
of electronics has enabled the installation of over0reudant databus and LAN connection
routes, increasing the system’s tolerance to battle damage considerable. The whole
architecture could easily be compared to a spider’s web, as the destruction of a single node
does not affect the integrity of the whole system.
The introduction and adoption of distributed architecture has been matched by considerable
improvements in the databuses available. The latest generation, for instance, includes fiber-
optics cabling instead of the traditional copper wiring. Apart from providing much
improved data transfer rates and saving considerable weight, this results in increased safety
as it eliminates the fire and toxicity problems inherent in the insulation material used for
copper wiring. A good example of this generation is represented in the Dutch SEWACO
VII system. This uses 3 separate high-capacity databuses for voice, data and video
communications.
The STACOS-FD system of the MEKO-200TN Track IIA class frigate represents a clear
manifestation of the trend towards fully-distributed systems explained above: The core of
the system lies on 8 Signaal MOC multifunction console stations equipped with 20in high-
resolution CRT screens. These are connected through multiple redundant SigMA network
servers equipped with multiple Sun SPARC 12,5MIPS-capable microprocessors. The
network formed by this architecture is governed solely by the software, which is written in
ADA MIL STD-1815A language. Some of the servers are stand-alone units, whereas the
rest are integrated into the consoles themselves. All the network sub-systems are connected
through a double-bus Ethernet IEEE 802.3 LAN, supported by a double video-distribution
bus. This network also trades data with systems outside the core command system, such as
the weapon system modules and the DAIL combat information bus. It also supports
standard NATO Link-11/14/16 connections. Overall, the STACOS-FD is fully capable of
performing:
Multiple sensor data fusion and integration into a coherent tactical display
Threat assessment and prioritization, automatic multiple target engagement
Task force operations support
Combat management support
Tactical navigation (including GPS support)
Tactical air-asset control
Systems simulation
58
The Russian perspective
Post-war, and indeed until the mid-sixties, the Soviet Navy was primarily a coastal defense
force. Not needing blue-water fleets because of the absence of any vital overseas interests
or established colonies, and concurrently threatened directly by the massive numbers of
post-WWII US and British aircraft carriers (most of which represented a nuclear-capable
threat to the homeland), Soviet naval assets were expected to accomplish a very specific
wartime task: destroy any enemy strategic naval assets that would be within striking range
of the USSR.
As long as the West naval threat towards the Soviet homeland remained in the form of
nuclear bombers launched from carriers, the procedure was relatively simple and
straightforward: Enemy units would be initially detected by a massive early warning and
direction-finding network designated Krug (which included picket listening posts in Cuba,
Vietnam and elsewhere). They would then be localized by large maritime patrol aircraft,
and subsequently attacked by overwhelming amounts of missiles (possibly nuclear-armed)
launched from surface vessels, bombers and submarines. All friendly assets were to be
controlled and coordinated by shore command centres, which were also the receivers and
relays of the information provided by the pickets. These command centres utilized the first
practical Soviet computer complexes, literally behemoths in size and maintenance
requirements. The short distance between these centres and their subordinate forces at sea,
as well as the fact that their targets were easy to track once initially detected, placed little
burden on this type of command infrastructure. It also implied that air cover was available
at short notice and in large numbers, eliminating the need for costly aircraft carriers.
However, the basic parameters on which this system was designed and operating, started
to change from the early sixties, leading to the need for re-organisation.
Ocean: The playground of the big boys
From the early sixties, the US Navy commenced the regular deployment of ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs). Britain and France were soon to follow. The striking range (and
destructive power) of the missiles was, from the start, much greater than any carrier strike-
planner could ever dream of, and constantly expanding. From the opposite perspective, this
implied that in order to credibly secure the homeland from enemy naval strike, the Soviet
Navy had to dominate an ever-increasing battlespace, with a shift of emphasis on
underwater combat (thought the carrier threat was retained). The short-term solution was
the introduction of anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters and submarines of improved
range, speed (including nuclear-powered) and weaponry, but these were all stopgaps
without strong surface presence. The Soviet Navy had to firmly enter the oceans.
This, naturally, was easier said than done. Whole classes of surface ships, initially
constructed to carry heavy anti-ship missiles and not much else, had to be redesigned and
re-equipped, both in order to accomplish their new mission and to have a reasonable chance
of survival outside friendly air cover. More importantly, the new target was much more
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WAYPOINT
elusive, and its first sign of presence could very well be the last. Fast data integration
between friendly assets was no longer a luxury, but a necessity.
Several approaches were taken to this end. On tactical level, hunter-killer groups comprised
of surface units and aircraft were created. Their sensor data of an initial sub contact would
be transmitted to a shore command center, and processed and fused there. The center was
then to provide the group with an estimated position of the sub. The coordination of fire
from team members was left to a specially designed data-link (NATO codename Fig Jar).
On fleet level, for the first time, some limited degree of co-ordination and command was
handed over to surface flagships (the Kara-class cruisers), with the partial transfer of
previously shore-based command sub-systems on them. The ships that accepted them
needed to be specially re-designed with lots of available space, increased available
electrical power and other modifications. Most probably, it was the power limitation that, in
this phase, precluded the full transfer of command authority from shore to sea (although
political intricacies among High Command members cannot be overlooked).
The transition phase took part for the most of the 60s, and left the impression of a well-
balanced Soviet Navy coming out on blue waters, with powerful new units and a revised
command structure to exploit their potential. Complete revision of this attitude, however,
was not far away.
Okean-70: Time for changes….
Okean, commenced at the summer of 1970, was the codename for the first major world-
wide naval exercise conducted by the rebuilt Soviet Navy. It was meant to be a clear
manifestation of the USSR’s will and capability to challenge the hitherto established naval
supremacy. From the Western perspective, it was exactly that. From the (then classified)
Russian point of view, it was a coordination disaster. The shore command concept worked
well for the 50’s environment, but the 70’s (let alone the foreseeable future’s) comms and
data traffic simply overwhelmed it. The sub-systems installed on flagships performed
somewhat better, being closer to their subordinate units, but the fleet-level control was a
fictional notion. In simulated engagement procedures, naval units were often neutralized
before even receiving their orders to engage the enemy. The surface combat control was
bad enough, but the anti-submarine section was something else. Soviet sub commanders
(simulating western subs) wreaked simulated havoc upon their hunters with frustrating
ease.
Heads rolled with equal ease, as the post-exercise review revealed the transfer of command
and control to flagships to be an overriding requirement. The electrical power and space
requirements of the new proposed systems were to exceed anything previously installed on
any Soviet combatant, as was the level of local control. New pawns were added into the
naval chess board, such as satellites and early warning sea-floor-based sensor networks.
These would tax the new command architecture even more. There emerged a clear need to
create a system based on a totally new philosophy, with great abundance of expandability
and robustness, and to place in into a new class of flagships designed from the keel up to
house them. The established discrimination of the navy’s primary focuses (anti-carrier and
60
anti-SSBN) meant that separate systems with separate command authorities would be
installed in different ship classes. These ships needed to be extremely heavily protected,
and their true purpose should be concealed, if possible, presenting them as simply powerful
combatants instead of the crucial fleet nerve centers they would be.
By pure coincidence, a new class of four heavy anti-sub cruisers (the Kiev-class) was
commencing construction when these important decisions were taken. They were quickly
assigned to the anti-sub group flagship role, and additional defensive electronic and weapon
systems were added. In accordance with the disguise principle (and to keep away any
surface vessels that might interfere with the sub-hunting operations), they were fitted with
the offensive capability of a surface-strike cruiser. On the other hand, the surface warfare
flagship was literally drawn around the new system. The four Kirov-class battlecruisers
were clearly in a class of their own, and attracted considerable Western attention (ranging
from respect to outright panic) when the lead ship entered service in the early 80s (several
years after the Kiev) after a protracted development period, no doubt owing to the
complexity of the new command system. The traditional problems of space, weight and
power supply were addressed with a no-compromise philosophy. 28,000 tons of
displacement provided amble internal space, while two nuclear reactors (coupled with oil-
fired steam boilers for increased speed) provided unlimited electrical power. In this case,
concealing the ship’s mission was verging on the impossible, so the designers were left free
to fill available space with extremely powerful offensive batteries, potent anti-sub facilities
(that, as an off-set, enabled them to easily complement the Kievs in sub hunts) and
ridiculously dense defensive arrays, totaling literally dozens of electronic sensors and
hundreds of guns and missiles.
The transition phase essentially was completed in 1983, when the 2 major Russian fleets
had at their disposal at least one anti-carrier and one anti-SSBN flagship each. By this time,
the new system had been recognized as offering substantially greater flexibility and
allowing all involved assets in an operation to exploit their individual sensor and weapon
capabilities. The two command systems were retained in service throughout the 80s and
after the Cold War, and with the present economic difficulties facing the Russian armed
forces, it is highly unlikely that they are to be substituted in the foreseeable future.
The C3 system of the Kirov-class battlecruisers can be regarded as a classic representative

of this mindset. Open-mouthed as the Russians are about their marketable military systems
nowadays, it is understandable that vital components of their war-fighting effectiveness are
still closely guarded and covered, to a much greater degree, by a shroud of secrecy.
Nevertheless, information important to comprehend the radically different nature and
doctrine of this system has been made available.
It is known, for instance, that multiple redundant systems comprise the internal command
network of the ship. The degree of redundancy is much greater than in either US or
European systems (it is estimated that at least 4 super-computers are placed in each
flagship, whereas even one of them is adequate for handling the data traffic even under
intense conditions). This is partly because the distribution of duties between the command
modules is not as great as in the European methodology. For example, a navigation console
can undertake certain other functions normally assigned to other stations, but not all of
61
WAYPOINT
them. This leads to a minimum required number of stations operative if the system is to
remain 100% effective after expected battle damage. Furthermore, the Russians are far
more cautious of the catastrophic effects of battle damage or malfunctions on the system,
and place the modules at far greater separation. The power-distribution problems usually
associated with such a practice are easily offset by the availability of nuclear power. This
also lifts the usual restrictions of power-sharing between command, propulsion, weapon
and electronic warfare systems (and provides power that enables the ships' main radar-
jamming modules to emit with power lethal to humans at 50ft!!!). As far as external
communications and control is concerned, all 4 units have extensive (again redundant)
datalinks with the shore-based Krug stations for initial target location data. A special
satellite data link (code-named "Punch Bowl") is used to receive targeting information from
the EORSAT and RORSAT-series satellites, while the Z-346 datalink is used to
communicate with the ships' own heavy cruise missiles while they're in flight. This allows
the launch of the missiles as soon as the target's general location is established, with
updates or even steering commands transmitted to the missiles on the fly for targeting
refinements or re-prioritization. The same datalink is used for information exchange with
maritime surveillance aircraft. The "Fig Jar" datalink is maintained, and a new control
system has been established for the co-ordination of the anti-air capabilities of the whole
task force leaded by the battlecruiser (conceptually similar to the Aegis system in that
respect). Overall, the system represents the typical Russian philosophy of a robust, highly
protected system that can support the Russian Navy's operations for prolonged periods after
hostilities have initiated.
The Future
As shown, the post-war development of naval C3 systems can be likened to 3 parallel axes:
the idea of centralized computers, the distributed architecture, and the philosophy of the
unique command center, either on land or afloat. More than a decade after the end of the
Cold War, the world’s navies still find themselves in the awkward process of adapting to
the post-Cold War environment and finding new missions, with different priorities and,
quite significantly, with sharply reduced budget funds available.
Most navies experienced a tremendous downsizing during the 90s, similar in size to the one
enforced after the first World War. Financial realities now dictate that only a fraction of the
naval unit swill be still available at sea. This, in turn, means that each naval force’s units
that are actually at sea, are going to become virtually invaluable assets. The military, and
perhaps more importantly, the political cost of even a single naval unit lost in combat is
going to become unacceptable. C3 systems must be able to function with an even higher
degree of battle-damage survivability, and posses even greater computing capabilities to
offer more complete defensive options.
Furthermore, the change of geo-political realities dictates a drastic shift in the naval
engagement environment. Most major naval powers have predicted since the early 90s that
the next major naval engagements are going to take place in littoral environments, and
combat experience so far has given merit to these views. This places a much greater
emphasis on quick reaction; the vast oceanic environment that allowed a clear horizon for
62
early detection of most incoming threats is simply not going to be present in such
confrontations. Naval forces must be able to monitor areas richly populated with islands,
mountain ridges, and a host of other radar-blocking obstacles. The range of options
available for defence must include response to asymmetric or non-conventional attacks, like
the raft-bombing of the USS Cole.
This threat environment will make instant data exchange between properly positioned units
even more vital. Extremely fast reactions will be needed to counter incoming air threats that
will make extensive use of terrain masking to minimize their exposure. The wide-spread
proliferation of advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, most of which are able to avoid early
detection by skimming the sea surface, must also been taken into account. This
environment issues the demand for highly integrated C3 systems, which, even if operating
normally under heavy human influence, should also have the capability to switch to full-
automatic mode (much like the current operational mode of the Aegis system) in order to
engage such threats in time.
Complex hydrographic conditions, which are found in shallow coastal areas, are also bound
to offer sub-surface forces a much greater ability to inflict casualties on friendly assets than
in open oceans; anti-submarine warfare is probably going to receive an even greater degree
of priority.
All these converging needs inevitably lead to the natural question of which
architecture/philosophy is to dominate future C3. During the 80s and 90s, the distributed
architecture managed to gain an impressive momentum. The naval community (outside the
US) has fully embraced its offered advantages, and consider it as the driving force behind
the definition of a sensors & weapons fit for any given warship design proposal. How far
this point has gone is illustrated by the fact that future Royal Navy construction
programmes are likely to have the C3 system integrator as the prime contractor, rather than
the shipyard actually building the ship.
The US Navy, on the other hand, has generally lagged behind in following this avalanche of
trends. One reason for that has already mentioned, being the sheer vastness and cost of a
potential program to re-equip its fleets with such systems1. Moreover, the European C3-
system industry attributes this reluctance to the US emphasis on strictly integrating the
operations of a large group of ships, rather than also integrating the activities within each
vessel. US perceptions naturally differ. They emphasize the undeniable fact that the
distributed architecture uses the system’s computing power inefficiently, meaning that the
potential power of the systems is much lower than the actual need for day-to-day, and even
combat use. This however, is a price gladly accepted by the Europeans which, having
experienced the problems caused by having inadequate power in a C3-system, they now
ensure the existence of a massive excess of processing capability in their architecture2. The
1
This is not to say that the USN is not actively experimenting with active units to
improve the integration of their C3 systems: the “Smart Ship” initiative on the cruiser
Yorktown is an obvious example. Others include the provision for greater electronics
integration is newly-constructed units.
2
An interesting example of this is the RN’s Outfit DNA Command Management
System, which uses less than 30% of its available computing power.
63
WAYPOINT
true reason for US reluctance seems to be the harsh fact that distributed systems are much
more expensive than their centralized equivalents. While acceptable for the small number
of units in European navies, this is a strong headache for the USN’s size.
The Russian model, on the other hand, being tailor-made on a specific doctrine shaped
under very special conditions, and indeed perceptions, is hardly applicable in the future
environment. It would not come as a surprise if the Russian Navy’s replacements for the
Kirov-class, in the long-term, embrace the European perspective, at least as far as the C3-
systems are concerned. That would make sense both from the perspective of a rapidly
shrinking Russian Navy, and from the longer-term inclination of Russian technology
towards European, rather than US standards. It is already noteworthy that already numerous
Russian defence development programs have begun making extensive use of European
electronics technology, carefully avoiding anything that is subject to US restrictions.
In the context of the future naval environment, the importance of effective C3-systems
simply cannot be over-emphasized. It is now fully understood in western military circles,
that the next major war is going to be won and lost not so much in the front lines, but much
more in front of electronic displays. With that in mind, the need for these displays to be the
naval commander’s most critical and most helpful tool, becomes instantly comprehensible.
64
SLAVA CLASS CRUISERS FOR THE CHINESE NAVY?

By Dale Hillier
Several weeks ago, among an IRC discussion, the

topic came up of Chinese Naval purchases. It was
presented to the channel that the PLAN may be
purchasing a Slava-class cruiser. After further
discussion, a rough idea for the cruiser was
formed. This article assumes that the fiscal option
doesn’t change and that the current political
rapport between the PRC and the Russian
Republic continues.
General description
We will start with the vessels themselves. The following data is compiled from the Haze
Gray & Underway web site (http://www.hazegray.org/) and from A.D. Baker’s excellent
resource ‘Combat Fleets of the World’.
The Slava class Guided Missile Cruiser depicts that term in every aspect. It was designed
in the mid- to late-1970’s as an apparent counterpart to the Kirov-class BCGN. Soviet
doctrine emphasized the use of these ships as a dual-role surface combatant with significant
ASuW and AAW capability. The ships of this class are 186 meters long with a beam of
20.8 meters and a draft of 6.25 meters. The standard displacement is 9380 tons.
Like all modern Soviet combatants, most of the ship’s systems are very diverse and
redundant. The main offensive battery consists of 16 P-500/4K80 Bazalt (NATO: SS-N-12
Sandbox) surface-to-surface cruise missiles. This missile is an improved derivative of the
SS-N-3 family and carries a 1000-kg HE warhead but can also carry a nuclear warhead.
The missile cruises at altitudes between 50 and 5000 meters at a maximum (high-alt) speed
of 3000 kph (Mach 2.5, 833 m/sec). This missile, designed in the mid 1960’s was accepted
into service in 1975. It was also used by Echo II class SSNs and Kiev class carriers.3
The primary defensive system consists of 64 S-300F (NATO: SA-N-6 Grumble) surface to
air missiles in 8 Rif-type VLS launchers. This missile is the naval variant of the of the SA-
10 area defense missile. It was conceived as a family of three systems, strategic air
defense, tactical air defense, and fleet air defense. The weapon was designed specifically to
counter high-speed threats such as the U.S. SRAM, as well as low-altitude and VLO
targets.
3
The missile version carried by Slava has been suggested to have an improved guidance seeker, presumably
benefiting from the new seeker development programs for the SS-N-19 and SS-N-22 SSMs (Peter
Grinning’s H4 forms give this missile a Gen-3 radar seeker instead of the standard Gen-2 version).
65
WAYPOINT
Point defense for the Slava-class cruisers is accomplished by two systems. The Osa-M
(NATO: SA-N-4 Gecko) point defense missile, roughly equivalent to the U.S. Sea Sparrow
system and by the AK-630 CWIS. The AK-630 mounts a 30mm; six barreled gatling gun
that has an effective ROF of 1000 rounds per minute with a rated barrel life of 8000 rounds.
ASW systems consist of 2 sets of quintuple launchers for 21 inch torpedoes and 2 Smerch-
2 (NATO: RBU-6000) systems each carrying 12 ASW rockets with a range of 6 km.
The class also mounts a twin-barrel 130mm AK-130 Lev gun mounting. This weapon can
fire a 34-kg shell to an effective range of about 20-km.
Active sensor systems

consist of one MR-
800 Voskhod
(NATO: Top Pair) S-
Band and one MR-
700 Fregat (NATO:
Top Steer) L-Band.
Both of these are 3-D General layout of the Slava class
radar sets. Surface
search and navigation accomplished by 3 MR-212/201 Vaygach-U (NATO: Palm Frond)
systems. This combination of sensors gives the Slava class a detection capability out to
approximately 500 km for air targets and a surface search detection capability out to an
estimated 135-km. It should be noted that both the Top Pair and Top Steer are usually
associate with each other with one accompanying the other on Soviet ships of the time. It
was also standard Soviet practice to carry several Palm Frond radars.
Unusually for a Soviet design, there appears to be a lack of redundancy with regards to the
fire-control systems. The S-300F SAMs are controlled by the Volna (NATO: Top Dome)
radar. This X-Band system uses a 4-m diameter dish that is fixed in elevation. Just below
the dish is a smaller dish apparently used for a track-via-missile system with three smaller
radomes below that which could also be part of this or another datalink system. Top Dome
is credited with being able to track 6 targets but only if they reside in a 60 degree cone. This
is the only FCR for the S-300 Fort system and its azimuth restriction is considered a
significant tactical drawback in dealing with multi-axis saturation attacks. Furthermore,
should the radar be damaged then there would be no other directors for the S-300 system,
forcing the ship to rely exclusively on her point defense systems.
The main battery of SS-N-12 missiles is usually targeted by an Argon-1164 (NATO: Front
Door-C) radar used to track and pass telemetry information to the SSMs while in flight4.
This radar is fixed in azimuth on the forward mast of the ship.
4
Passive ESM-based targeting can also be employed, using the Rum-Tub ESM (see below) or external
sources.
66
The SA-N-4 system uses the MPZ-301 Osa (NATO: Pop Group) radar set. This operates
slightly above the X-Band range and is considered similar to the U.S. Mk92 system. It has
a reported maximum range of 25 km. There is one radar for each of the Osa-M mounts.
Fire control for the main gun mount is accomplished by a MR-184 (NATO: Kite Screech
B) radar while the AK-630 systems share 3 MR-123 Vympel (NATO: Bass Tilt) systems.
Apparently, each radar controls two guns. This again would be standard for Soviet
warships where the practice is to assign two warheads/weapons to each target. Soviet
practice of the era also called for optical backups for the AK-630 systems but no
information has been available on whether the ship is equipped with any generation of
Soviet optical directors (Kolonka, Squeeze Box, Tee Plinth, or Tin Man). Although it is
known that Slava class ships carry the Tee Plinth, it is unknown if these are used for fire
control.
The hull-mounted sonar of the ship is the MG-335 Platina (NATO: Bull Horn) with a direct
path range of up to 6000 meters and a CZ range of up to 30 km. All vessels of the class
also carry the Polinom (NATO: Horse Tail) VDS with an instrumented (best-case
theoretical) range of up to 120 km.
Electronic warfare is an area that the Soviets traditionally took very seriously and their
several classes of capital warships have very diverse and redundant systems. The
integrated EW suite on the Slava class is called Kol’cho and consists of 8 MR-401
Gurzhor-A and -B (NATO: Side Globe) ECM systems, 4 MR-404 Ograda (NATO: Rum
Tub) ESM receivers, 2 Bell Crown, 2 Bell Push, and perhaps several other Bell-series
systems.
Side Globe is a very powerful jammer set, able to deal with 2 radars at once. Reportedly
the radiation of these systems, when active, is lethal to humans out to 50 ft. They are
associated with the Bell-series systems in this regard. Rum Tub are long range ESM sets
that use radar ducting to provide the SS-N-12 missiles with targeting information. The
vessel also has two trainable and twelve fixed decoy launchers.
The ship's power plant is of a COGOG arrangement with two M-70 cruise turbines and four
M8KF boost turbines for a total of 110,000 SHP. Crew complement consists of 62 officers,
64 non-commissioned officers, and 355 enlisted (although these ships have operated with as
few as 38 officers).
Procurement options
There are two routes that the PRC can go. One is highly restrictive but gives them a ship in
the short term. The other gives them what they want but will take significantly longer.
We’ll start with the first - vessel purchase.
Vessel purchase has several advantages in the short term. Firstly, they gain an already
completed ship that has a powerful suite. All they require is a trained crew, which would
take considerable time in any case. The second advantage to buying a ship is that it would
67
WAYPOINT
provide the PLAN with a vessel capable of denying (possibly even controlling) a larger
area of water than is currently possible.
The disadvantage of vessel purchase is that the

PLAN is acquiring a vessel that is over twenty
years old, and is familiar to Western Navies in
capability & technical specs. The purchased
vessel also has several tactical drawbacks that
would cause significant problems in the event that
the vessel is attacked. First is the single fire-
control radar for the ships S-300F SAM system.
Datalinks and FCR channels aside, if the Volna
radar were to be damaged by either an anti-ship
Side-view of the SS-N-12 launchers
missile or anti-radar missile, then the ship would
have no method of guidance for her SAMs. A second factor is the opulent officer’s
accommodations and its accompanying large amount of flammable materials (including
solid wood interiors) that would be present. Compounding these problems is an apparent
lack of damage control facilities (including fire-fighting) on the vessel. Historically, more
ships have been lost through fire than by actual conventional warfare methods5.
Finally, given the poor fiscal state of the Russian armed forces, any vessel the PLAN has
purchase is possible to have some unresolved maintenance deficiencies that will require
attention. These could range from simple touch-up welding to major hull plate replacement
to any number of possible defects.
Building a vessel from scratch, by modifying the Slava design, would give the PRC the
flexibility of designing the ship their way.
The biggest handicap to the design is its single fire control radar for the S-300F system.
Should the radar take an ARM hit or be part of some collateral damage from ASM or bomb
hit, then the system would be useless. If there is another S-300F-equipped ship with a
functioning radar nearby, then it's possible that the Slava could continue firing SAMs into
the basket controlled via datalinks and the FCR on the other ship. The obvious solution
here is to install another Top Dome (or Tombstone in the case of SA-N-6C) but the current
layout of the ship leaves only two spots for the second FCR. On the forecastle (where there
are two AK-630 mounts) or above the bridge, where the MR-184 GFCR is currently.
Still another solution could be the substitution of the Top Steer 3D radar for the
Tombstone. How this would degrade the ship’s overall search capabilities are unknown.
My sources states that the two 3D radars compliment each other but there is no information
on how the loss of the shorter range radar
(Top Steer) would change this.
5
For instance, the loss of the Royal Navy destroyer HMS Sheffield during the FalklandsWar was not due to
the impact of an Argentine Exocet missile (which may or may not have exploded in any case) but rather the
ship was rendered un-inhabitable due to the fires that raged through the ship, despite the best efforts of her
crew to save her.
68
Another item is the issue surrounding the P-500 missiles. As mentioned, these are cruise
missiles derived from the SS-N-3 family and require OTH targeting and mid-course
guidance to fully exploit their considerable range. Currently the PLAN operates Link-W
with similar aspects to some French combat direction systems that may or may not be
compatible with the P-500 guidance system. While OTH may be possible with the
purchase of extra technology, the PLAN is probably better off using another missile system
that doesn't require OTH or MCG. One option would be the use of the SS-N-27 Klub
family of missiles in either a VLS launcher or an angled launcher. The missiles’ ideal
position would be the massive angled strut-frameworks where the P-500 mounts are
currently placed. If the SS-N-27 family proved unsuitable, another option would be the
more conventional SS-N-25 Switchblade (similar in appearance & characteristics to the
Harpoon missile). The Klub family would give the ship a greater multi-role flexibility than
the Switchblade, but with that capability comes a higher cost in sensors and training
(something that the PLAN is traditionally deficient at). Klub also has an ASW variant
(much like the cancelled ASWSOW/Sea Lance project) which would require extended
training and could delay the IOC of the ship further.
The use of Klub or the SS-N-25 would also remove the requirement for the Argon-1164
radar system, providing with an ideal position for the MR-184 radar position. The
Tombstone radar can then be placed above the bridge where the MR-184 was formerly
placed.
Another issue is the myriad of datalinks that

the ship could contain. It is generally
presumed that Slava class CGs would act as
flagships for any PLAN SAG that would
put to sea. Modern combat requires some
form of secure data transfer, and the Soviet
practice was to use flagships as receivers
and the subordinate vessels as collectors of
data with the flagship processing the data
and issuing orders. The use of datalinks for
OTH and MCG is, again, something that A view from the bow. The AK-130 gun mount
and the foremost SS-N-12 launcher pairs are
the PLAN has never used. I note that long clearly visible. Notice also the fire-control
range datalinks is something that the PLAN director on top of the bridge
can do without. Given the current strategic
situation, the PLAN will probably NOT be able to retain anything but local air superiority
for any specific length of time. This being due to the preponderance of modern fighters in
the SEA area (Malaysia has MiG-29s, Indonesia has a few F-16s, Vietnam has Su-27s
AND MiG-29s, while Taiwan has Mirage 2000 and F-16s). Maybe in several more
generations can the PLAN can use datalinks as a true blue water navy, but at present it
would be doubtful if they could get the necessary forces to bear. Secure tactical datalinks
(up to about 100 nm) would probably allow them greater flexibility for the current order of
battle.
69
WAYPOINT
Another Soviet practice was to build warship classes tailored to specific tasks, hence the
Udaloy and Sovremenny classes. Only lately have modern Russian designs pushed away
from this trend. This is mainly due to the fiscal realities (you can sell more multi-role ships
instead single role classes). However even large capital Soviet surface ships had some
ASW capability. This being mainly in heavy torpedoes, RBU series launchers, and in some
cases, stand off missiles like the SS-N-14 or the newer SS-N-29 (which are similar to
ASROC but apparently have an anti-ship role as well). The use of the Klub family of
missiles would augment the Slava's twin quintuple torpedo mounts, and her RBU-6000
launchers.
On smaller PRC destroyers, the typical torpedo tubes are conventional triple tube mounts
carrying PRC designed Yu-series torpedoes. Italian-made A-244 torpedoes have also been
acquired for use. The purchase of two Sovremenny class destroyers, each with two
mountings for 21-inch torpedoes gives the PLAN a larger punch for both ASW and ASuW
operations.
Finally, it would be a mistake to consider that the PRC would design and build such a ship
without having a land attack capability. One needs only to think of the precedent set by the
combat effectiveness of the TLAM to realize this. Again, Klub comes into play here with
it's 3M-14 land attack variant. The nice thing about the removal of the massive SS-N-12
missile launchers would be all that empty deck space, ready to be used for either VLS or
above-decks angled launchers. Klub is significantly smaller and lighter than the monstrous
SS-N-12 so there would be a considerable weight saving in replacing the entire system
(alternatively, a much larger missile load could be embarked, with a resultant increase in
firepower).
As previously noted, the Slava is reported to have very opulent officers’ accommodations
while at the same time being deficient in damage control. A scratch-build using modified
Russian plans would give the PLAN the ability to do away with these deficiencies and
possibility give space for a VLS elsewhere.
As for other systems, SA-N-4 can be replaced by SA-N-9, while AK-630 can be replaced
by CADS-N-1 mountings. There is a weight gain here but it would be more than
compensated by the alteration of interior design, and the removal of the P-500 launchers.
ESM and ECM can pretty much remain the same except where it may be more practical to
use more modern or home-grown PRC systems. Side Globe ECM systems are supposed to
be very powerful while Rum Tub can provide ELINT and OTH targeting if it becomes
necessary. Replacement of the PK series decoy launchers would be a minor exercise.
Lastly, the power plant can use Ukraine gas turbines. It will be noted that the PRC is the
Ukraine’s major trading partner.
This then is a summary review of the possible modifications:

Replace Top Dome with Tomb Stone, and place a second Tomb Stone above
the bridge.
Delete the Argon-1164 radar and replace it with the MR-184 GFCR.
70
Replace P-500 system with the lighter and more flexible SS-N-27 Klub
system, in either angled above-deck launchers or in VLS.
Replace AK-630 with CADS-N-1 and SA-N-4 with SA-N-9.
Totally redesign interior of this with respect to officer’s accommodations and
damage control systems and by removal of long range data-links, other OTH
and MCG related gear.
Keep larger ECM and ESM systems while modernizing the tactical systems
like Bell Series, etc.
Replace active decoys if more modern systems available.
Retain ASW systems and sensors.
Keep gas turbine powerplant.
Lastly, any space not used can be either used to carry extra fuel, or converted to storage
space (for either ammo, stores, or crew quarters).
Taking into account the weights involved (an estimation at best), such a ship could possibly
displace less than 11,000 tons full load. Even given the same dimensions as the Russian
Slava's.
However, time will tell. It always does.
71
WAYPOINT
PLATFORM PROFILE
In Harpoon’s wargaming terms, a platform is every self-contained military unit: a ship, an aircraft, a
submarine, a land unit etc. Platforms are the core of Harpoon, as their strengths and weaknesses, properly
exploited, may well determine the outcome of any given scenario. This section deals with such platforms, as
they are modelled and represented in various versions of computer Harpoon. See an error in the data? Have
a favorite platform that you want to introduce to fellow users? Think you can write-up a platform profile as
good as (or better than) the ones you see here? Send your corrections, suggestions, comments & drafts to
waypoint@harpoonhq.com
BKR Sovremenny (Project 956/956A)

DDG-136 Hangzhou
By Michael Mykytyn
General
Russian Designation: Project 956
Sarych
Users: Soviet Union, Russia, Peoples

Republic of China
Roles & Mission:

Soviet Union/Russia: The Sovremenny-class was originally conceived as a follow-
on to the highly successful Kashin-class, with generally the same emphasis on
ASuW and AAW operations at the detriment of ASW ability. These ships were
expected to act as supplementary AAW escorts in CVBGs/SAGs comprised of
other more important capital units, as well as undertake independent operations
leading smaller surface units. Available in increasing numbers from 1980-82, with
priority deliveries to the Northern Fleet. Nowadays, at least one Sovremenny can be
found in every major Russian/Soviet deployment since their integration into the
fleets.
China: The currently two Chinese Sovremennys represent the most powerful and
capable combatants within the PLAN. They would certainly be tasked as surface
warfare group leaders and represent the first steps toward an effective blue water
capability. In the event of war with any regional and global rivals they would be the
principle players, acting as both flagship and anti-air protectors of the groups they
are leading.
Strengths: This class has a fearsome anti-surface punch with their eight SS-N-22 Sunburn
anti-ship missiles. They also have a useful anti-air warfare capability in the form of two
SA-N-7 launchers and six Front-Dome directors enabling the simultaneous engagement of
at least 6 targets. AAW ability has been further enhanced in the modified 956A ships with
the adoption of the improved SA-N-12 system. The excellent dual 130mm guns make
them dangerous surface-duel adversaries even after the missile exchange, as well as useful
72
fire-support platforms for amphibious operations. Their electronic & sensor fit is fairly
modern although offset by the lack of an integrated combat system.
Weaknesses: The Sovremenny is severely lacking in ASW systems. They only employ a
short-ranged hull mounted sonar without any towed arrays or VDS systems. Unless
carefully screened by more ASW-capable assets, they can be easy prey to enemy subs.
Soviet/Russian standard practice is to pair them with Kresta-II or Kara-class cruisers,
Udaloy-class destroyers and/or Krivak class frigates for this purpose. China presumably
would task Luda destroyers or Qindao frigates in a similar role.
Game Stats:
Maximum Speed: 32 knots
Displacement: 6600 Tons
Damage Points: 159 DP
Length: 156 meters
Crew: 296
Aviation: 1 helo (KA-27 and variants)
Equipment - Baseline 956 version (USSR 1980) – DB2000 v6.1.9

Radars
Type & Quantity Max Range Abilities Notes
Bandstand (1) 140nm Surface Search, Air Main multi-purpose sensor
Search, Range on class and primary means
Information, Bearing of targeting the SS-N-22
Information, IFF missiles
Information
Bass Tilt: 1970/ 30mm 5nm Surface Search, Range Fire-control for the point-
Fire Contol (2) Information, Bearing defence guns
Information
Front Dome (6) 55nm Surface Search, Air Fire-control for the SAM
Search, Range systems.
Information, Bearing
Information, Altitude
Information
Kite Screech B (1) 30nm Surface Search, Air Fire-control for the main
Search, Range guns
Information
Palm Frond: 1980's 25nm Surface Search, Range Navigation radar
(3) Information, Bearing
Information
Top Plate (1) 310nm Surface Search, Air Primary air-search sensor
Search, Range
Information, IFF
Identification
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IR/EO Sensors
Squeeze Box (1) 10nm Surface Search, Air Search, Back-up optical sensor
Bearing Information, IFF
Information, Classification
Electronic Warfare
Football ECM (4) N/A Electronic Counter Measures Primary jamming system
Football ESM (4) 400nm Surface Search, Air Search, Very useful for EMCON-
Bearing Information, restrictive ops and
Classification passive-targeting of
SSMs.
Half Cup (6) 12nm Surface Search, Air Search,
Bearing Information
Sonars
Whale Tongue (1) 8nm Sub Search, Range Information, Active-only,
Bearing Information medium/high-frequency
Bull Horn: 1980/MG 6nm Sub Search, Range Information, Active-passive,

332 Titan (1) Bearing Information medium/high-frequency
Mounts
Type & Quantity ROF Capacity Weapons (service date)
(2) 533mm Quad TT 5 4 USET-80 (1980)
1980's/ASW/USET-80 53-65WH (1968)
53-65WH (1969)
53-68N Nuclear (1969?)
SET-53N (1964)
SET-53 (1958)
SET-65M (1972)
SET-65 (1965)
(2) AK-130 130/70mm Twin:1980 2 90 AK-130 Twin Frag
AK-130 Twin HE
AK-130 Twin RAP
(4) AK-630 4 10 AK-630 30mm Burst
(8) Decoy Rocket Launcher (10 1 10 Flare
Tubes) Chaff
(2) Decoy Rocket Launcher (2 1 2 Flare
Tubes) Chaff
(2) RBU 6000 1 1 RBU 6000 (ASW)
RBU 6000 (Anti-Torp)
(2) SA-N-7 Launcher 13 22 SA-N-7 Gadfly
(2) SS-N-22 Quad Launcher:1980 3 4 SS-N-22 Sunburn (3M80)
SS-N-22 (Nuclear)
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Versions (H3 – DB2000)

956 (1980): As described.
956 (1991): No differences in outfit.
956A (1992): Substantial

modifications:
o Two SA-N-12 launchers (each

ROF 12, Capacity 24, weapon
SA-N-12 Grizzly) replace two
SA-N-7 launchers
o SS-N-22 Quad launchers can
now fire the extended-range SS-N-22M (3M82)
956 (2000): As 956A (1992), but new weapon for 533mm TTs: TU-2.
956A (2000): As 956A (1992), but new weapon for 533mm TTs: TU-2.
DDG-136 Hangzhou: The Chinese export version. As 956A (1992), but the
533mm TTs use only the export SET-65E (1967) torpedo – they use none of
the Soviet/Russian-service weapons.
Current Service
Russia - Northern Fleet:

956:
Bezuprechnyy (1983-present)
Gremyashchy (ex Vieduzczy, 1988-present)
Rastoropny (1989-present)
956A:
Bezuderzhny (1991-present)
Besstrashny (1994-present)
Russia - Baltic Fleet:

956A:
Bespokoiny (1992-
Present)
Nastoychivy (ex
Moskowski
Komsomolets,1993-
present)
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Russia - Pacific Fleet:

956:
Osmotritel'nyy (1984-present)
Boyevoy (1986-present)
Burny (1988-present)
Bystry (1989-present)
Bezboyaznenny (1990-present)
Russia - Laid Up/Decom/Incomplete:

956:
Otchayanny (1982-mid nineties)
Otlichnny (1983-1994 used as hulk)
Stoyky (1987-mid nineties)
Okrylenny (1987-mid nineties)
Sovremenny (1980 in overhaul since 1998)
956A:
Sobrazitelny (ex Vnushitelniy, 1997, completed as storage barge)
Buliny (Incomplete)
China/East China Seas Fleet:

DDG 136 Hangzhou:
Hangzhou (ex Let Rossiyykomy,ex Vazhny, 1999-present)
Fu Zhou (ex Alexander Nevsky, ex Vdumchivy, 2000-present)
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SS-583 Harushio
By Michael Mykytyn
General
Users: Japan
Roles & Mission: The Harushio is one of

the best diesel submarines in the world
today. The typical role of this class
covers the range of diesel submarine
missions but is primarily used as a patrol
submarine tasked with monitoring
Japanese waters and keeping an eye on
the Russian Pacific Fleet, and the Chinese and North Korean fleets.
Strengths: Given the excellent sensor suite and ranged weapons the Harushio is an
excellent anti shipping platform. It also has a fair anti submarine warfare capability and
can successfully engage all known submarines with a good probability of success.
Weaknesses: Like most diesel submarines the Harushio has a limited endurance, depth and
speed so great care must be taken to manage this asset. The submarine should not be
tasked to “chase” any particular target but should be tasked to lie in wait ready to ambush
a passing foe.
Game Stats:
Maximum Speed: 20knts
Displacement: 2450 Tons
Damage Points: 46DP
Length: 77 Meters
Crew: 74
Max Depth: 350 Meters
Equipment: SS 583 Harushio

DB2000 v6.1.9
Radars
ZPS-6 (1) 60nm Surface Search, Range Primary surface search
Information, Bearing radar.
Information
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Electronic Warfare
ZLR-3-6 (1) 100nm Surface Search, Air ESM Sensor
Search, Bearing
Information
Sonars
Type and Quantity Max Range Abilities Notes
ZQR-1 69nm Sub Search, Bearing Towed Array
Information
ZQQ-5 3nm Sub Search, Range Active Only Sonar,
Information, Bearing medium-high frequency
Information
Mounts
Type and Quantity ROF Capacity Weapons (Service Date)
(6) 533mm TT 5 1 G-11 Type 80
G-12 Type 89
UGM-84D Harpoon IC
(2) Signal Ejectors 1 2 Ensonification Bubbler
White Noise Decoy
Current Service
Japan-Kure
o SS 583 Harushio (1990-present)
o SS 584 Natsushio (1991-present)
o SS 585 Hayashio (1992-present)
o SS 586 Arashio (1993-present)
o SS 588 Fuyushio (1995-present)
Japan-Yokosuka
o SS 587 Wakashio (1994-present)
o SS 589 Asashio (1997-2000, AIP trial submarine)
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Akash SAM
By Michael Mykytyn
Users: India
Roles & Mission: A medium range (25 nm),

mobile, theater-defense surface-to-air
missile which is currently replacing the
aging SA-6 Guideline missile system (from
which it is derived) in Indian service.
Mounted on a BMP chassis and paired with
the Rajendra array, this system can engage
low to high altitude targets. Development
continues on the system to eventually reach
an extended range and anti ballistic missile capability. Expect this system to be
deployed in forward areas, to provide defense of ground forces and area coverage.
Strengths: The Akash in its current configuration is an excellent platform against the
capabilities of India’s current rivals (Pakistan, China). It also fills important gaps within
the Indian air defence system. It retains the tactical mobility of the old SA-6, and the
Rajendra 3D phased-array radar provides it with much better engagement abilities than the
old Straight Flush. Its future configuration will give India a limited defence against theater
ballistic missile threats.
Weaknesses: The Akash is highly vulnerable to

any modern anti-radiation missiles when not
working in conjunction with other Indian air
defense systems. While being perfectly capable
against the current set of regional rivals, this
system still suffers from the shortcomings of the
SA-6 missile and is thus lacking in ability
against modern systems. It remains to be seen if
the planned upgrades will come to fruition.
Equipment: Akash SAM Battery (2001) - DB2000 v6.1.9

Radars
Rajendra 50nm Air Search, Range Information, 3D Phased Array
Bearing Information, Altitude Surveillance /
Information, IFF Information Engagement Radar
Mounts
Type & Quanity ROF Capacity Weapon (Service Date)
Akash 3-rail TEL 2 3 Akash SAM (2001)
Text information and pictures provided by Bharat Rhakshak the Consortium of Indian Military Web Sites at:
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MISSILES/Akash.html
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THE FAQs
For every computer program there are certain questions that are being asked again and again, and a
complex simulation like the Harpoon series is no exception. Here we keep the most often asked questions
about all computer versions along with the best answers we have for them at the moment. It is a good idea to
check for updates in this sections as our collective knowledge for the internals of the programs increases.
Have an oft-quoted question that you don’t see being answered here? Ask us (waypoint@harpoonhq.com),
and we’ll post it as soon as we have an answer for it.
Harpoon 2 / Harpoon 3
FAQ prepared by Ragnar Emsoy & Dimitris V. Dranidis
General
Which version of the simulator should I get? Harpoon II or Harpoon 3? What does
Harpoon 3 offer except from Windows-compatibility?
Harpoon 3 is the latest, most realistic, accurate and detailed version in the Harpoon series
of air/naval warfare simulators. Detailed information and screen shots on the various
versions of computer Harpoon can be found on the What is Harpoon page.
Harpoon 3 offers much more than simply full Windows compatibility. Performance
increases of up to 500%-1000% have been recorded. Scenarios that would either crawl
(too much stuff happening on screen) or crash altogether (memory limits) now run like a
breeze. In addition, a mile-long list of bugs have been fixed and more are fixed with each
successive exe release. New versions have also added new features such as a detailed after-
action log, fully-working nuclear weapons, true thermal layer (which the AI subs use
deviously), fully-working terrain-following, custom GIS overlays and many others.
Harpoon 3 is a continuous work in progress and we would not be surprised to see features
in it that we’ve not dared imagine until now.
Where can I obtain a copy of Harpoon 3?
To purchase the full version of Harpoon 3 go to this page.
Is there a demo for Harpoon 3?
The Harpoon 3 demo for both Windows (Windows 95 / 98 / ME, NT 4.0, Windows 2000,
Windows XP) and Mac (OS and OSX) can be downloaded here.
Okay, I ordered the direct-download version. Now what?
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If you are using the Windows version, check this page:

http://www.harpoon3.com/thankyouwin.html. It has detailed instructions on what you
should do to ensure a smooth installation and registration. Mac users should have a look
here: http://www.harpoon3.com/thankyou.html
I ordered the CD version. Anything I can do while waiting for the CD?
The instructions on the page linked above apply to you too. The huge zip file included on
the CD (which should have the name “Install Harpoon 3” or similar) is identical to the
direct-download file. Follow the same instructions and you should be fine.
What’s the deal with this weird lok-kee system?
It’s actually quite simple, if you follow some simple steps carefully. Take a look at this
page for a detailed explanation of the procedure and how to do it right:
http://www.harpoon3.com/lok_and_kee.html
What are the system requirements for Harpoon 3?
The simulator will work on Windows 95/98/ME, NT 4.0, Windows 2000 and Windows
XP. Minimum requirements:
- 486DX2, 50 MHz processor.
- 190 MB hard drive space.
- Minimum RAM is whatever your version of Windows requires.
- DirectX version 3.
- Video card capable of running Windows at 800 x 600 x 256 colors.
Is there a Mac version?
Yes. The simulator will run on any PowerMac running System 7.1 or later, including
iMacs, G3s, G4s, and also older PowerMacs and PowerPC clones. Minimum
requirements:
- 16 MB of Physical RAM
- QuickTime (requires 3.0 or later)
- 100MB of hard drive space
What is the performance like?
The faster your computer is, the better. For PC we recommend any Intel or AMD
processor running at 300MHz or faster, and 64MB of RAM. Playing larger and more
complicated scenarios Harpoon 3 will require a faster CPU and more memory to keep up.
Most scenarios play very well on a 1GHz Thunderbird, and run like a breeze on AMD
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WAYPOINT
XP1600+. If you want to run at higher resolutions up to 1200x1024 it will require a better
video card. For Mac, Harpoon 3 will run fairly well on a PPC 601, runs great on a G3, and
screams on a G4.
Are there any known incompatibilities?
None in Windows. Harpoon3 and Mac PowerWindows don't work together. "G3/G4
Profiler" doesn't get along with Harpoon3 either, and should be disabled before playing.
I am running a scenario from the CD, together with the DB-2000, and there are
problems/crashes. Why?
IMPORTANT!!! The DB2000 will work ONLY with scenarios downloaded from the
HarpoonHQ. It will NOT work with any scenarios not written for the DB2000. The
changes and additions in the new database will cause conflicts and crashes if you try to use
it with scenarios found on the CD or elsewhere on the web (Harpooner Scenario
Warehouse, Dr. Who’s Harpoon page etc). Also, every time we release a major database
revision we regularly update the scenarios to reflect the new information. So when you
download a new scenario please take the time to download the most recent DB version as
well.
Is there a printed manual for Harpoon 3 included with the CD?
No. But the manuals can be downloaded in printer-friendly Acrobat Reader and MS-Word
formats on the HarpoonHQ, in the Utilities section.
Is there a scenario editor manual for Harpoon 3?
Yes, see above.
Which battlesets are included on the Harpoon 3 CD?
The following battlesets are included:

- Tutorial
- Global Conflicts 1
- WestPac
- ColdWar
- Regional Conflicts 1
- Regional Conflicts 2
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DB2000-related
So, what is this DB2000 I’ve been hearing about?
Quite simply, the DB2000 is the most accurate, detailed and realistic dataset available for
any version of computer Harpoon at the moment. In short, it rocks ☺. Describing the
features of the dataset would easily eat up the entire space of this magazine. A summary of
the database mechanics and features is available here:
http://www.harpoonhq.com/harpoon2/db2000/features.html
Where do I find scenarios for this database? The original CD database may not be
hyper-accurate, but gives me plenty of scenarios to play with!
All the H2/3 scenarios available for download at the HHQ are DB2000-certified. Your
choice of DB2000-certified scenarios is as great and varied as of those on the CD: we have
updated about 50 of the original (CD) scenarios to work with the DB2000 (and also fixed
the AI and corrected the OOB), and also created another 100 normal-sized ones from
scratch. Then throw-in Klaus’ 30 monster-sized scenarios (guaranteed to give you a
migraine☺) and you begin to see that the DB2000 is well-stocked with the scenarios to
boot. Furthermore, the stock CD scenarios are finite and numbered (nobody is developing
scenarios for the original H2AE database anymore – and good riddance!), while the
DB2000-compatible scenarios keep on coming ☺. You can download them from the
Harpoon II and Harpoon 3 scenario download page.
How can I use the DB2000 database and scenarios in Harpoon 3?
Details on how to set up the database and load new scenarios can be found here.
What about DB2000 database & scenario inconsistencies?
All scenarios posted on the Harpoon II and Harpoon 3 scenario download page at any
given time are 100% certified for the latest version of the DB2000 database. The HHQ
webmasters keep track of all database changes and update the scenarios when needed. So
you do not have to worry about database-scenario inconsistencies as long as you always
make sure to use the LATEST database and scenario from the web. The DB2000 database
and scenarios are constantly updated and improved, and for example the latest database
may not necessarily work with a scenario downloaded two months ago, and vice versa.
When are you guys going to finish converting the rest of the older scenarios from the
Harpoon3 CD to DB2000? Is it not just a matter of re-loading them into the new
database?
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WAYPOINT
Not all scenarios are being converted; typically the first converted are the “classic" ones
from each of the original battlesets. There are many scenarios that one just revisits "one
more time" again and again for some reason or another (the Cold War-themed Atlantic-
convoy rounds or CVBG-vs-Kola slugfests being a good example), and these naturally
have priority in being made DB2000-compatible.
Rebuilding a scenario that was made with a different database is not all that simple. First
of all, we have to check for unit-reference inconsistencies. For example an US Navy Aegis
cruiser in the old database may be a Russian Sovremenny destroyer in the DB2000, and
the F/A-18 Hornets may end up being armed with a simple MiG-23 ground-attack loadout
instead of the intended AMRAAM air-to-air loadout. Next, we have to make sure that
every single ship, sub and land facility has its magazine rebuilt, we have to make sure the
weapon/sensor changes have been "understood" by the scenario, etc.etc.etc. And that's just
the "technical integrity" part. After that, we have to make sure that the changes haven't
unbalanced the scenario. If we have given side Blue a new super-weapon, for instance, we
somehow have to beef-up Red side and/or rewrite the scenario orders to compensate. And
of course we have to keep a "realism check" at hand (don't want to stuff 200 fighters in a
CVN accidentally...). So yeah, it's a long and unthankful process.
But our long-term goal is to rebuild the majority of the 110 scenarios with the DB2000.
We have converted 50 so far, you can download them on the Harpoon II and Harpoon 3
scenario download page.
Harpoon 3 won't work with the latest DB2000 version. What is wrong?
IMPORTANT!!! The DB2000 will work ONLY with scenarios downloaded from the
HarpoonHQ. It will NOT work with any scenarios not written for the DB2000. The
changes and additions in the new database will cause conflicts and crashes if you try to use
it with scenarios found on the CD or elsewhere on the web (Harpooner Scenario
Warehouse, Dr. Who’s Harpoon page etc). Also, every time we release a major database
revision we regularly update the scenarios to reflect the new information. So when you
download a new scenario please take the time to download the most recent DB version as
well.
There is an error in the database or in a scenario. What should I do?
Please e-mail us right away. On a normal day the problem will be fixed within 24 hours.
Please do not make the correction yourself and send the updated scenario to us. The
DB2000 database and scenarios are constantly updated, and the new files you send to us
will most likely be outdated by the time they arrive in our mailbox. Thanks.
A platform is missing from the database. How can I add it?
There are two ways.
84
1. Send us all the info you got on the platform and we will add it as quickly as
possible
2. You make the platform yourself in Jon Reimer's Harpoon 3 Database Builder,
export it to a HCF (Harpoon Component File) and e-mail it to us. We'd appreciate if you
mail us in advance about any platforms you are planning to make, as they may already
exist in the database under a different name. To keep the database as small as possible, we
only add platforms that you are planning to use in a new scenario.
Why does the database appear to have multiple entries for the same platform?
The DB2000 has multiple database entries for the same platform to represent all operators,
main versions, subversions and weapon configurations over time. If you access the dataset
through the scenario editor or one of the DB editors, you will see that most units have a '|'
letter at the end of their name followed by a comment or note which describes each entry.
The comment holds information about the service entry year, operator/country, weapon
upgrades, and so on. Harpoon 3 has been programmed to ignore everything written after
the '|' letter, and this extra information will only be displayed in the database editor and
scenario editor (for the benefit of the scenario/database designers), and not during actual
gameplay. For example, the unit named "F-14D Tomcat|1998/LANTIRN" will only appear
as "F-14D Tomcat" during gameplay. The "CG 52 Bunker Hill|2000/SM-2IIIB" will
appear as "CG 52 Bunker Hill". The “invisible” comment suggests this is the year 2000
version of the cruiser and uses the SM-2 Block IIIB missile as it's primary weapon.
Why are some variables like waypoints and terminal trajectory in the database never
set?
The released version of Harpoon II (which is Harpoon 3's predecessor) is not even a
shadow of what it was originally planned to be. The simulator was supposed to have an
even more advanced ECM/ESM + radar simulation, waypoints and terminal trajectory for
weapons etc etc etc. But the original Harpoon II developers ran out of time and money and
all these features were eventually left out. And since neither Harpoon II nor Harpoon 3
currently supports these fields, we have never bothered to fill them in. However, Jesse's
Harpoon 3 project is aimed at implementing most if not all of these features eventually,
and in that case the database will definitely support them.
Why no TASM (Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile) after 1991?
The nuclear (TLAM-N) and anti-ship (TASM) variants of the Tomahawk were withdrawn
in the early 1990s as the Cold War came to an end. TASM was withdrawn because there
was no longer any chance of blue-water engagements against a navy with large, high-value
targets like the Soviets, and many of the missiles have been converted to land attack. The
TLAM-N was withdrawn as per a 1991 agreement with Russia to not deploy nuclear
weapons at sea (other than strategic ballistic missiles).
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WAYPOINT
Why are later S-3 Viking variants not carrying ASW weapons?
The Viking's ASW role was removed in 1999. US aircraft carriers now deploy with four to
six S-3 Vikings; some for the tanker role, and two aircraft dedicated to ASuW armed with
iron bombs, Harpoons and Mavericks. The ASW mission is undertaken by Seahawks and
Orions.
How does Stealth work with F-117A, B-2A etc?
Stealth and low-observable aircraft and ships in the database have smaller radar, visual and
IR signatures than other units. The F-117 is not all that difficult to detect with AEGIS and
other high-end air-search radar systems, and detection ranges approaching 40nm is not
uncommon. So you need to use active ECM if you want them to live through an attack on
a heavily defended target. The F-22 has a similar RCS (Radar Cross Section) in real life.
But in the DB2000 we've also taken into account the fact that the F-22 will use Active
Stealth (similar to Rafale’s Spectra active-cancellation system) in addition to passive
stealth, and the end result is a significantly smaller signature than that of the F-117.
Finally, there is the B-2 bomber which, thanks to its “cost-not-a-factor” stealth treatment,
is extremely difficult to detect even with the use of advanced sensors.
What is the best way to employ the ITALD, TALD loadouts?
The TALD and ITALD are just extra targets for SAM and radar sites, so just fire them
along with other ASMs or ahead of your strike aircraft. The hotkey to fire air-launched
decoys is Ctrl + F1 (the same key is also used for BOL-attacks). The AI cannot use
decoys.
How can I deploy SEALs from SSNs?
All SpecOps submarines in the DB2000 carry SEAL teams. The SEALs work the same
way bombs do, and are deployed using the Attack menu. A limitation with this
implementation is that they cannot be retrieved afterwards.
Why do many guns have such a low PoK against aerial targets?
Anti-ship cruise missiles are extremely difficult to shoot down. And even if destroyed in
mid-air, the missile may still cause serious damage if the warhead detonates at ranges
closer than 500m from the target, or if the ship is hit by debris from a disabled missile. In
the Falklands War, only one of six Exocet missiles fired at British ships was shot down,
and this kill is not even 100% certain. PoK (Probability of Kill) in Harpoon 3 is calculated
for a burst of fire - this can be either just one round (for larger guns) or up to several
hundred (for Mk15, AK-630 etc) - and the chances of hitting a target within a given
amount of time. We are also taking into account limitations in the Harpoon 3 game engine.
86
There is no separate range figure against aerial targets and we're forced to use the max
anti-surface range. This gives the defender a 1/3 to 1/2 longer range than in real life, and
we have reduced the PoK to compensate for this.
Why do certain aircraft only have two speed settings?
The reason is that when an aircraft like the F-22, Tu-22M, MiG-25 and MiG-31 has
varying cruise speed (i.e. a high-Mach cruise speed that increases with altitude), the AI has
difficulties determining bingo fuel levels, and will run the aircraft out of fuel if using full
and reheat throttle settings. Therefore, you can not use other speed settings than cruise and
loiter.
Sonar range circles are very small compared with the original database, in some
cases they are only 1nm in diameter. Why?
The DB2000 database has a completely redesigned sonar model, details can be found here.
In addition, Harpoon 3 uses a pretty weird formula for calculating the sonar range circles.
So the circles in the simulator are not actual sonar ranges, and it therefore recommended to
play with sonar range circles OFF.
How do I kill the fast MiG-25 and MiG-31 interceptors?
When you decide to go after a group of MiG-25 or MiG-31 interceptors, it is important

that your fighters fly as high and as fast as possible. Due to the way Harpoon 3 calculates
firing parameters and no-escape zones, the AIM-54A Phoenix has for example a launch
range of only about 40nm against these speeding targets. If your own fighters are traveling
at Mach 1.5, the enemy air-to-air missiles will have a reduced effective range too, about
25nm for the AA-6 and 40nm for the AA-9. If your fighters are flying at lower speeds you
give the enemy a big advantage as he can launch his missiles at longer ranges, in most
cases before you can.
How can I take a closer look at the DB2000 database?
To view the database you should use Jon Reimer's Harpoon 2 and Harpoon 3 Database
Builder, which can be downloaded here. This is a fast and easy-to-use database editor that
has lots of really great built-in aids and features. You need MS Access to open the editor.
Access is a program included in the Microsoft Office Suite (which includes Word, Excel,
Access, Outlook, PowerPoint, Publisher, and FrontPage).The database editor that comes
with Harpoon 3 is based on that for Harpoon II Admirals Edition, and is FULL of serious
bugs, errors and shortcomings, and we do not recommend you to use this tool.
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Playing tips & misc. support
For a mile-long list of hints & tips to get the most out of Harpoon 2 and Harpoon 3, visit
this page. The Yahoo H3 group (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Harpoon3/) is the single
best place for answering any questions you might have on playing H2/3. The Waypoint
staff as well as the rest of the HarpoonHQ webmasters, along with a community of
myriads, are ready to answer any sort of question and provide all the support you may
need. “No question is stupid, no call for help is lame” is our motto.
Harpoon Classic 97 & 2002

FAQ prepared by Bruce Fenster, HC2002 Lead Tester & Assistant HULL
moderator
What is Harpoon Classic 2002?
Harpoon Classic 2002 is the result of a 15 month (and counting ☺), all volunteer effort by
members of the Harpoon Community to improve the playability of the very popular
Harpoon Classic 97 Naval Simulation Game.
To refine HC97 and make it “the game we always wanted”, an open solicitation went out
to the Harpoon Community in August 2001. Dozens of suggestions and feature requests by
players the world over soon trickled in.
Next came the job of prioritizing the player feedback and delving deep into the source
code to determine what could be accomplished in a reasonable period of time. A game
plan soon emerged with three major goals:
1) Improving the AI, particularly in the areas of submarine and aerial warfare. We’ve had
nice feedback from numerous Harpoon players regarding HC2002’s aggressive new AI.
2) Resolving as many player-reported bugs as possible. The list was long, and while we
didn’t get them all, most are now history and the rest are in the cross hairs. More on bugs
in the upcoming issue as well.
3) Updating and correcting platform values, i.e., overhauling the database. This was never
anticipated when Harpoon Classic first appeared. The fact that it’s happening now speaks
volumes to the dedication of the lead members in the HC2002 Development team.
By November 2001, the programming of HC2002 was well underway. The challenge, of
course, was not to break anything while revamping the AI and squashing HC97’s bugs.
The game engine executable file (Winharp32.exe) was revised and tested countless times
88
to achieve goals 1 and 2 above. Finally, in September 2002, the development team made
the first public release of HC2002, 13 months after work had first begun on the project.
To date, there have been over 3,000 downloads of the two free Demo versions! Hundreds
more have purchased the HC97 Game Engine Upgrade, and many others have signaled
their intention to wait for the stand-alone HC2002 CD-ROM.
As of this writing, CD-ROM release is just around the corner. When ready, it will include
a new Platform Database (currently in Beta testing), and, for the first time ever in the
Harpoon Classic series, a Platform Editor. This feature will enable players to modify
existing platforms and to create new ones as well. The Scenario Editor has also been
revised to accommodate the new Platform Editor, and the HC2002 Game Engine will
likewise reside on the CD-ROM, eliminating the need for players to have a working
version of HC97 in order to enjoy HC2002.
http://www.advancedgaming.biz/newweb/Products/hc2002.htm is a good place to start for

additional information on HC2002. There you’ll find some background information as
well as links for purchasing HC2002, installing it, and an HC2002 FAQ page.
http://www.foto.infi.net/~edladner/ and http://www.harpoonhq.com/ are also great
Harpoon sites in general and good places to find scenarios specifically created for HC2002
that take advantage of the AI and game engine improvements.
Also, the Harpoon Users League List at http://www.teuton.org/mailman/listinfo/hull is a

moderated discussion list for players of all versions of Harpoon and an excellent source of
information on HC2002’s continued development. And finally, there is #Harpoon on IRC,
a moderated chat that usually has someone in it available to discuss the latest Harpoon
developments.
Harpoon 4
FAQ prepared by Dimitris V. Dranidis
When is Harpoon 4 coming out?
Latest word on the street is spring-2003.
Why has it taken so long?!?
1) All good things in life take time ☺

2) The product has had a difficult birth, and has gone through a number of changes in
development teams, owners etc. etc. Things appear to have calmed down in the latest
months, which has renewed our confidence in the current developers (Ultimation)
delivering a solid product.
89
WAYPOINT
Quoting from Ultimation’s website:

“Harpoon4's development history is a convoluted and harrowing tale, unsuitable for small
children or pregnant women. Some day, if you buy us some drinks, we might regale you
with it.
Right now, we're working as fast as we can to make Harpoon4 live up to the high
expectations that all have for it. At the current moment, the unfinished Harpoon4 code
poses a small but statistically significant threat of erasing all the data on your computer.
Therefore, we think it is best not to ship the game quite yet.”
What are the projected system requirements for Harpoon 4?
Quoting from Ultimation’s website:
“These are the tentative, projected, minimum system requirements for Harpoon4:
-Pentium II 266 or higher
-64MB RAM
-3d accelerator w/ 8MB RAM
-300-1200MB HD space
-Windows 95/98/2000
-CD-ROM drive
And the recommended specs:
-600MHz+ CPU
-128MB RAM
-3D Accelerator w/ 16MB+ of RAM (i.e. NVIDIA GeForce, 3dfx Voodoo4 or Voodoo5)”
Will H4 support multi-player?
Yes, 2-player mode is planned.
Will a scenario editor be included?
Yes, it is planned to ship the product with a built-in scenario editor.
Does H4 use fixed maps like Harpoon Classic/97/2002 or user-defined maps like
H2/3? What parts of the world are covered?
Harpoon 4 will probably have fixed maps like Harpoon Classic. The maps appear to be
much larger than those of HC, however, so large-scale scenarios should not be a problem.
No single map will cover the entire world (as is possible in H2/3), but the sum of the maps
will include the entire globe.
90
Will it possible to modify the database like in H2/3 or in HC2002?
Yes, although the DB-editor will be a standalone Windows app that will not be thoroughly
QA-tested and thus may be prone to bugs, crashes, dataset corruption etc. The database
itself, however, will probably be based on a set of DBF files (Fox Pro) so it can be
manipulated by 3rd-party community tools.
Since H4 will use 3D graphics like Fleet Command, will it be possible to modify the
existing 3D models or add new ones?
Probably not, at least in the original release. It will be possible however to associate new
platforms with existing 3D models.
Questions not yet answered here…
This interview on WarGamer has quite a few material that classifies as FAQ-grade stuff.
Have a look there if you have a H4 question not answered here. The official H4 forums at
Ubisoft’s site are also a good source:
http://forums.ubi.com/messages/overview.asp?name=Harpoon_GD&page=1
91
WAYPOINT
MAILBOX
24 hours a day, 7 days a week and around the globe, the Harpoon community exchanges questions, answers,
clarifications, suggestions and other material for discussion. Out of this ocean of inter-community talk we
pick out the most useful, most original and most informative questions and answers and reprint them here for
the benefit of all. Think we have left out something important/interesting/beneficial? Tell us
(waypoint@harpoonhq.com) and we’ll gladly include it.
[…] Just wanted to say, I am really glad you are making Harpoon 4 (if you are still making
it). I wrote you an email about mid 1997 pretty much expressing the same thing.
IF you are still going to make it a reality, imagine how it will kick ass on the newest
generation of computers and video cards. It will really be some sim to have.
I remember playing Harpoon Deluxe for Windows and I would set up waypoints and
resources and what not and leave the computer for work. Ten hours later the sim would
still be waging the war - it was amazing to see how it all went by reading the pop ups and
seeing the damage. And that was only one facet of the fun.
Are nukes still going to be an option, as planned?
Yours,
[anonymous]
This has sometimes been a matter of confusion…the HarpoonHQ is NOT developing any
version of computer Harpoon, at least for the time being ;-). You can ask any H4-related
questions directly to the developers at Ubisoft’s official H4 forums.
[…] Where can I download DB-2000 for Harpoon 3?

Thanks,
[anonymous]
You can get it at: http://www.harpoonhq.com . All you have to do is download the DB and
unzip it
into your database folder. Just note that it will replace the current DB you've got in there
so if you still want it, back it up:) Also, the scenarios have to be compatible with the DB.
The one's that came on the disk are not. However, you've got 100 (currently) to chose
from at the site and these include many of the original scenarios rebuilt to work with the
DB2K.
Hello! You run a great website!
I was a fan of the original Harpoon when it came out (I still have the 5.25" disks!). I
recently came across a "Harpoon Classic" CD for Windows (by Alliance Interactive
Software?). I'm running the game on an XP system and it works fine. However, in the
Designer Series III MEDC battleset, most of the subs start the scenarios weapon-less. I
haven't noticed this problem with any of the other battlesets. Have you come across this
problem before and do you know of a patch to fix it?
[anonymous]
92
Firstly, we will tell you are very lucky ! The Harpoon Classic (or HC, for short) version
you describe is a rare find these days. Can we ask where you found it?
There was another version in the "Classic" format, called Harpoon Classic 97 (or HC97),
which is also hard to find.
Then, there is the latest "Classic" version, called Harpoon Classic 2002 (or HC2002),
which was recently released in Autumn 2002. It is currently available only as a download
upgrade for HC97, but once the ongoing work on the database/scenario editor is
complete, you should be able to order the
whole game on a CD.
You should be able to find all the information and patches you need for HC at the
following link: http://www.foto.infi.net/~edladner/. IIRC, there were a couple of patches
for HC, but I do not remember if either of them fixes the problem you describe. Try it, and
let us know. Good luck, and happy harpooning!
I bought the game (Harpoon 3) online a while ago and received several files and then
installed them. everything works fine. I have one question - is there a scenario editor
included with the new game? There was one with the older versions and it was fun to
change platforms to see the results. Any help would be appreciated.
[anonymous]
Sure is. Look for the scenedit.exe file in your Harpoon directory. When Jesse releases
upgrades to his site at http://www.harpoonhq.com you will see both executables available
for download.
93

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Waypoint Issue 1

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WAYPOINT

The magazine of the computer Harpoon community

This issue is dedicated to the

LEGAL NOTICES & DISCLAIMER

FROM THE HQ................................................................................................. 3

THE VET’S PEN

Making history: The story of modern wargaming

As I mentioned, Dunnigan was a fanatical researcher. He was always running surveys to

That bring gamers in general and ’Pooners in particular to the present.

In addition, he provided a description of the abstracted ground-warfare model used for

“A note about the amphibious invasion/ground combat model:

The full thread on this post can be found here:

An example (with mostly random lines and points) is here:

New World Order 2002-2012 – Part 4: Kashmir (H3)

Pakistan, frustrated by the loss of her navy and

Michael Mykytyn says: For all you monster-

The Novaya Zemlya Installation (H3)

The Wall : World War 1989 – Part 4: Polaris Hunters (H3)

It is time for Warsaw Pact forces to open a

Michael Mykytyn says: An excellent anti

Day fourteen. Four carrier battle groups have safely

Dimitris V. Dranidis says: No comment…just read on to the “In Detail” article ☺

CLASH OF THE TITANS (H2/3)

Losses up to the end of this raid are as follows:

NATO Losses:11 Tomcats, 20 Intruders, 4 Prowlers, 13 Corsairs

Losses up to the end of the Soviet Regimental Raid are as follows:

NATO Losses: 46 Tomcats, 20 Intruders, 38 Intruders, 8 Seaking, 8 Prowlers, 35

Total Scenario Losses and Expenditures:

Losses: 47 Tomcats, 8 Sea King USN, 38 Intruders, 8 Prowlers, 49 Corsairs, 5 Hawkeyes,

Losses: 112 Floggers, 53 Flagons, 23 Foxbats, 24 Fishbeds, 16 Curl, 7 Cubs, 4 Bears, 4

Final Assessment of this Scenario:

THE INFAMOUS H2/3 MISSION EDITOR – PART I

Lesson: 1 Understanding the Mission Editor

What is the Mission Editor?

Where is the Mission Editor?

Opening up the mission editor

Player Usage of the Mission Editor:

Scenario Writer Usage of the Mission Editor:

Lesson 2:Basic Operation of the Mission Editor:

Creating a new mission

The “Edit Missions” menu

Now, on to the aforementioned Mission Sensor Intermittence:

Harpoon 3 allows you to set your sensor settings to

Panavia Tornado MRCA (Multi Role Combat Aircraft)

The Tornado was designed originally as a Low level

What this means in the computer simulations:

Surface combatants are facing more lethal

The Styx Surprise

The Soviet Naval Challenge

Threats from Many Quarters

The Soviet P-15/20 Styx, Chinese HY-2,

Norway fielded an air-launched version of the

A lightweight and relatively inexpensive class of anti-ship missiles was developed by

Advances in computer and communications technology substantially reduced the

Most first-generation anti-ship missiles are programmed at launch to employ inertial

Anti-Ship Missile Defense

The MBDA Polyphem missile is a multi-purpose weapon with a camera in

Targets in the Littorals

For an air-launched weapon, the Russian

KITTING-UP FOR MUD-MOVING

Recently, we had a resurgence of posts on the Yahoo H3 group

The end mission

To begin with, such specialised assets tend to be

Conformal fuel tanks for increased range without air-refuelling