Borjal v Court of Appeals 301 SCRA 1 January 14, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the incorporators of Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI), now
PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine Star, a daily newspaper. At the time the complaint was filed, petitioner
Borjal was its President while Soliven was (and still is) Publisher and Chairman of its Editorial Board. Among the
regular writers of The Philippine Star is Borjal who runs the column Jaywalker.

Private respondent Francisco Wenceslao, on the other hand, is a civil engineer, businessman, business consultant
and journalist by profession. In 1988 he served as a technical adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, then Chairman
of the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy.

During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988 undertaken by the House Sub-
Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended agreed to organize the First National Conference on Land
Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by the private sector in the transport industry and government agencies
concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis. More importantly, the objective of the
FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy for presentation to
Congress. The conference which, according to private respondent, was estimated to cost around P1,815,000.00
would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors such as government agencies, private organizations,
transport firms, and individual delegates or participants.2

On 28 February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was
elected Executive Director. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the support
of the conference.

Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his
column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without
naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned

Private respondent filed a complaint with the National Press Club (NPC) against petitioner Borjal for unethical conduct.
He accused petitioner Borjal of using his column as a form of leverage to obtain contracts for his public relations firm,
AA Borjal Associates.6 In turn, petitioner Borjal published a rejoinder to the challenge of private respondent not only
to protect his name and honor but also to refute the claim that he was using his column for character assassination. 7

Apparently not satisfied with his complaint with the NPC, private respondent filed a criminal case for libel against
petitioners Borjal and Soliven, among others. However, in a Resolution dated 7 August 1990, the Assistant Prosecutor
handling the case dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The dismissal was sustained by the
Department of Justice and later by the Office of the President.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo but reduced the amount of the monetary award to
P110,000.00 actual damages, P200,000.00 moral damages and P75,000.00 attorney's fees plus costs. In a 20-page
Decision promulgated 25 March 1996, the appellate court ruled inter alia that private respondent was sufficiently
identifiable, although not named, in the questioned articles

HELD:

In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be
named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it
must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. These requisites
have not been complied with in the case at bar. The element of identifiability was not met since it was Wenceslaso
who revealed he was the organizer of said conference and had he not done so the public would not have known.

The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press and that privileged communications
must be protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a
valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable
imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a
false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the
opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.

The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared objective of the conference, the composition
of its members and participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities
as being genuinely imbued with public interest. Respondent is also deemed to be a public figure and even otherwise
is involved in a public issue. The court held that freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and protected
with the reminder among media members to practice highest ethical standards in the exercise thereof.
 Cabellero vs Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
During Caballeros incumbency as municipal mayor in 1993, the Municipality of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte
conducted committee hearings on tax ordinance and seminar-workshop on budget, undertakings which required
the purchase of materials for use therefor and catering services for the meals and snacks of the participants. For
the purpose, a public bidding was held by the Committee on Awards, during which awards were made to the
lowest bidder, namely, Genty General Merchandise for the supply of materials, and GPs Food Catering Services
for the supply of meals and snacks. Both entities were admittedly owned and operated by the mayors wife,
Theresa Caballero.

Thereafter, a letter-complaint was filed by one Crisologo Decierdo before the Office of the Auditor in Roxas,
Zamboanga del Norte charging Mayor Caballero and his wife Theresa, Municipal Treasurer Semie Torres and
Municipal Accountant Nerita Cuento of violating Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The letter-complaint charged the municipal officials for allowing their offices to be
used as a tool to unlawfully secure benefits to favor the mayor and his wife in connection with the supply of
materials and meals by Theresa Caballeros businesses, i.e., GPs Food Catering Services and Genty General
Merchandise.

State Auditor Leonilo Morales of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte was tasked to investigate and determine whether
the complaint was meritorious as to warrant the filing of criminal and/or administrative case against Mayor
Caballero, et al. In his Report[3] dated June 16, 1995, Morales made the following findings:
1. The awarding of the winning bidder was made only after the bidders have complied
with all the terms and conditions stated in the Invitation to Bid/Call for Quotation and after
determining whose bid is most advantageous to the government;

2. In the opening and awarding of bids, Mayor Caballero did not sit as Chairman of the
Committee on Awards. The Committee on Awards, without the participation of Mayor
Caballero, awarded to GPs Food Catering Services the contract for meals and snacks as
the lowest bidder and as it offered, free of charge, its building space as convention hall for
the seminar/workshop; and to Genty General Merchandise for the supply of the materials
as the lowest bidder; and

3. After delivery of the goods and after their payment, when all transactions had been
completed, the four vouchers together with their supporting documents were forwarded to
Mayor Caballero for signature which he did only on November 9, 1993.
Accordingly, State Auditor Morales recommended in his Report the dismissal of the complaint against Mayor
Caballero, et al. for lack of sufficient basis.

However, despite Morales findings and recommendation, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao proceeded
with the investigation of the same complaint, and, in a resolution dated October 14, 1997, Graft Investigation
Officer Corazon A. Arancon found a prima facie case for violation of Section 3(h) of RA No. 3019[4] and
recommended the filing of the corresponding information against Mayor Caballero, et al. The resolution was
approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto.

Thereafter, four (4) informations,[5] all for violation of Section 3(h) of RA No. 3019, were filed against the herein
petitioners and one Semie Torres before the Sandiganbayan
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the four informations on the ground that the facts charged therein do not
constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(h) of RA No. 3019. But Sandiganbayan, thru its Third Division,
denied the petitioners motion to quash

ISSUE:
WON the facts alleged constitute a violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act

HELD: NO.
Under settled jurisprudence,[14] the following elements need to be
proven in order to constitute a violation of Section 3(h) of RA No. 3019:

1. The accused is a public officer;

2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract,

or transaction; and
 3. He either (a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such
interest, or (b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by any law.
there was no statement in the said informations that Mayor Caballero actually intervened in awarding the contract
in favor of his wifes businesses, which is an element necessary to constitute a violation of Section 3(h) of RA
No. 3019. It is essential that the information states the ultimate facts needed to constitute the offense charged,
so that the accused may be properly apprised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [15]
What is more, the undisputed facts of this case would demonstrate that Mayor Caballero did not unlawfully
intervene in his official capacity in connection with the awards to his wife.

In a nutshell, the procedure for the procurement of government supplies and materials can be summarized as
follows: the end-user agency or department draws a purchase request for the supplies and materials; an
invitation to bid is announced; the bidding and award to the lowest bidder will be conducted by the Committee
on Awards; purchase order will then be executed in favor of the winning bidder; the supplies and materials will
be delivered to the end-user agency or department; inspection of the delivered supplies will be made by the
requisitioning officer; and DVs will be executed for payment of the supplies and materials.

As can be gleaned from the records, Mayor Caballero had nary any participation from the drawing of the
purchase request to the awarding of the contracts to the lowest bidder by the Awards Committee. Quite the
contrary, the records reveal that after learning that his wifes business entities were among those invited to bid,
Mayor Caballero inhibited himself in all the proceedings of the Committee on Awards even if he is, by law, the
chairman thereof. It can thus be concluded that the decision by the Awards Committee on who will be the winning
bidder was made through its members own determination and volition and without any intervention on the part
of the mayor.

To our mind, such act of the mayor in inhibiting himself from taking part in the Committees proceedings clearly
shows that he had never intended to influence or pressure the members of the Committee on Awards to favor
his wifes bid. When the Committee eventually awarded the contracts to Theresa Caballero, it was only because
the Committee found her bid to be the lowest and the most advantageous to the government, and not because
she is the mayors wife or because the mayor had a pecuniary interest in it. True enough, GPs Catering Services
even offered its building space free of charge for use by the participants in the seminar-workshop. Indeed, the
advantage to the government was two-fold: one, for the lowest price quotation for the supply of meals; and the
other, for the free use of the building space as convention hall for the entire duration of the seminar-workshop.
With such advantage to the government, it is only logical and appropriate for Mayor Caballero to approve the
awards. Even then, his approval of the awards in favor of his wifes business establishments came after the
decision had already been reached by the Committee on Awards, thus he cannot be said to have influenced the
same. It is, therefore, safe to say that the mayor did not intervene in the transactions as the contracts therefor
were awarded by the Committee without his participation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the December 8, 1998 resolution of the respondent
Sandiganbayan denying petitioners Motion to Quash, as reiterated in its subsequent resolution of February 12,
1999, is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. 24366-69 are DISMISSED.
 Ivler vs Hon. Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline
L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out
the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal
Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC
the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking
S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later,
the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion
remained unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No.
2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

HELD:

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s
unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v.
Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of
a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for
"reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed
earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior
conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense.

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence,
the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal
negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act,
not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does
not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not
be split into different crimes and prosecutions.