E.
FOREST RESOURCES AND WATERSHED MANAGEMENT LAWS
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY v. MUÑOZ
G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968
PINAGCAMALIGAN INO-AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. v. PERALTA,
ET. AL.
G.R. L-25459, 28 June 1968 (Phil)
Digest Author: Suarez
Doctrines:
1. Titles that may be registered pursuant to Section 1829 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Only the following titles covering lands
containing timber, firewood and other minor forest products may be
registered under and pursuant to Section 1829 of the Revised
Administrative Code:
a. Administrative titles granted by the present Government, such
as homestead patent, free patent, and sales patent; and
b. Judicial titles, such as Torrens Title obtained under the Land
Registration Act (Act 496, as amended) or under the
Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended).
2. Validity of administrative rules and regulations. A rule shaped out by
jurisprudence is that when Congress authorizes the promulgation of
administrative rules and regulations to implement a given legislation,
all that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law
prescribes
3. Possession of forest lands cannot ripen into private ownership.
Possession of forest lands, however, long, cannot ripen into private
ownership
4. Effect of registration (or non-registration) of titles with the Bureau of
Forestry. To recapitulate registration of titles by the owners of private
woodlands with the Bureau of Forestry results in an exemption “from
the payment of forest products gathered therefrom for commercial or
industrial purposes”. If an owner fails to so register, he is obliged to
pay charges, as prescribed in Sections 264 and 265 of the Tax Code,
because “he still retain(s) his rights of ownership, among which are his
rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof (Art. 429, New Civil Code).” However,
as provided in Section 226 above-quoted, if an owner does not
register his title, but he desires to cut, gather and remove timber and
forest products from his land, he may “secure a license from the
Director of Forestry in accordance with the Forest Law regulations.” If
he does not, under the same Section 266, his cutting, gathering and
removing of forest products from public forests shall be subject to the
charges prescribed in such cases.” And this would bring into play Sec.
267, where, as heretofore quoted, the charges on forest products
“unlawfully cut and gathered in any public forest without license, or, if
under license, in violation of the terms thereof x x x shall be increased
by three hundred per centum.
Name of the parties: (and their respective role in the case):
Case 1 L-24796: Writ of Preliminary Injunction Case (To stop/nullify the order of
court allowing PIADECO to continue hauling logs already cut)
Petitioner: Director of Forestry
Respondent: Honorable Judge Emannuel Munoz
Case 2 L-25459: Prohibition and Injunction Case (PIADECO requests a ruling
that the government is “without authority and jurisdiction to stop logging
operations, construction of the roads, cutting, gathering and removing of
timber and other forest products”)
Petitioner: PIADECO
Respondent: Government (Department of National Defense, Armed Forces
etc.
Facts L-24796:
1. PIADECO claims to be owner of some 70k hectares of land. Evidence
of ownership are Titulo de Propiedad and Deed of Absolute Sale.
2. In December 4, 1963, PIADECO applied for registration, land w/ 10k
hectare, as private woodland. Granted (4.4. hectare only) with
Certificate of Private Woodland Registration. Certificate has 1-yr
expiration due: December 31, 1964.
3. In April 1964, Director of Forestry cancelled the said certificate for
violation of forestry rules and regulations for cutting trees within the
Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservation.
4. The cutting of trees in Angat and Marikina Watershed was pursuant to
PIADECO’s right of Way with NAWASA. This right of way was
subsequently revoked.
(A case to review the admin ruling was raised before the trial court.
The Government agency was in default and the trial court ruled in
favor of PIADECO.)
Ruling as to ownership (will be relevant later because SC pronounced
otherwise): even if Piadeco’s private woodland was unregistered, it
still retains its inherent “rights of ownership, among which are (its) rights
to the fruits of the land and to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof’, its only liability being the payment of
surcharges on the timber severed from the land.
5. PIADECO applied for renewel of The Certificate of Private Woodland
Registration before it was about to expire. Assistant Director denied
the application. Ruling: its Titulo de Propiedad 4136 was not registrable
 under Forestry Administrative Order No. 12–2 which took effect on
January 1, 1963.
6. Despite nonrenewal of certificate, PIADECO continued its (illegal)
logging and gained national attention.
7. Because of illegal logging operations, the Secretary of National
Defence thru the Armed Forces of the Philippines, impounded and
seized all logs that resulted from illegal logging.
8. PIADECO appeals before the lower court for a writ of execution
because the Government’s failure to appeal the case on Fact No. 4.
Writ of execution was granted. But regardless, the Government
refused to allow PIADECO to haul the illegally cut logs. REASON: Such
court judgement became functus officio, it can no longer be
executed by virtue of expiration of Certificate of Private Woodland
Registration.
Facts L-25459:
1. PIADECO requests from forestry official to grant it “AUTHORITY to cut,
gather and remove timber” from its alleged private woodland. At the
same time, it advised the Director of Forestry that “in the absence of
such authority or permit”, it “shall cut, gather and remove timber from
the said area subject to the payment of regular forest charge and
300% surcharge for unlawful cutting in accordance with the penal
provisions” of Section 266 of the Tax Code. (effectively saying: kung di
nyo kame bibigyan authority, tuloy pa rin kami sa pagputol ng puno;
bayaran na lang naming ‘yung penalty)
2. Acting Director J.L. Utleg notified the Task Force Commander, through
the Undersecretary of National Defense, that Piadeco “can conduct
logging operations within its private woodland, as it is a constitutional
right on its part to use and enjoy its own property and the fruits
thereof” but that whatever timber cut therefrom “should be subject to
the payment not only of the regular charges but also of the
surcharges imposed by Section 266” of the Tax. Code. (in short,
pumayag naman si Sir Utleg na sige, bayad na lang kayo penalty)
3. The army authorities refused to heed Utleg’s December 7, 1965 letter
and stood pat on its posture not to allow Piadeco to conduct logging
operations
Issues:
1. Is the land, evidenced by Titulo de Propriedad, registrable (and
renewable) under Revised Administrative Code and Forestry
Administrative Order 12-1, 12-2 – NO.
a. SUB ISSUE (Contention of PIADECO): Are the administrative
Order contravenes Section 1829 of the Administrative Code.
NO. Forestry administrative orders worked to repeal previous
administrative determinations.
2. Supposing the land is registrable, can PIADECO refuse cancellation of
certificate? – NO
3. Whether or not the pronoucement made by lower court in favor of
PIADECO remained with legal effect. NO
4. Whether or not the logs cut before the expiration of the contract be
allowed to be hauled. NO
Ruling:
1. Is the land registerable – No. In this case, it is undisputed that Piadeco’s
title which it sought to register was issued by the Spanish sovereignty—
Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136, dated April 25 or 29, 1894. It is
unmistakably not one of those enumerated in Section 7 aforesaid. It
should not have been allowed registration in the first place. Obviously,
registration thereof can never be renewed
a. Basis. Titles that may be registered.—Only the following titles
covering lands containing timber, firewood and other minor
forest products may be registered under and pursuant to
Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code
i. Administrative titles granted by the present
Government, such as homestead patent, free
patent, and sales patent; and
ii. Judicial titles, such as Torrens Title obtained under the
Land Registration Act (Act 496, as amended) or
under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as
amended).”
Piadeco’s position is that such amendment contravenes said Section 1829,
which does not specify the titles that are registrable thereunder; and that it is
diametrically opposed to the Opinion of the Attorney General of October 15,
1919, which ruled that a royal title “issued in September, 1896, and inscribed in
the Registry of Property within a year after its issuance is valid, and therefore its
owner is entitled to the benefits” of Section 1829 aforesaid. Also cited are the
Opinion of the Secretary of the Interior of November 7, 1916, stating that
registration under Section 1829 is not subject to change and revocation unless
title is established in a different person by judicial declaration; the Opinion of
the Director of Forestry of January 8, 1925, which recognizes as registrable,
titles “such an informacion posesoria x x x, composicion con el estado and
purchase under the Spanish sovereignty” amongst others; and the Opinion of
the Collector of Internal Revenue of February 6, 1926, declaring imperfect
titles within the purview of Section 45 (a) of Act 2874, as also registrable.
True it is that the law, Section 1829, does not describe with particularity titles
that may be registered with the Bureau of Forestry. Concededly, too,
administrative authorities in the past considered as registrable, titles issued
during the Spanish regime. In fact, as late as 1962, Forestry Administrative
Order 12–1 was still in force, authorizing registration of such Spanish titles. But
when Forestry Administrative Order 12–2 came into effect on January 1, 1963,
that order should be deemed to have repealed all such previous
administrative determinations.
There should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12–2 has
the force and effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817,
Revised Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the
approval of the department head, to issue regulations “deemed expedient or
necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in
such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other
forest products for the future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the
forests and forest reserves, to the same end.” Forestry Administrative Order 12–
2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry. and approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an
administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law. A
rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorizes the
promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation, “[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction
with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.”
2. Supposing the land is registrable, can PIADECO refuse cancellation of
certificate? – NO. - Piadeco’s registration certificate should remain
cancelled. It could be stricken down anytime. It is a nullity. And,
notwithstanding the fact that said registration certificate had expired
and was not renewed, Piadeco had the temerity to continue
operations.
a. Basis. By Forestry Administrative Order 12–2, “[t]he Director of
Forestry may cancel a certificate of registration for any
violation of the provision of this Order or of the forest and
internal revenue laws and regulations or of the terms and
conditions embodied in the certificate, or when found that
the area is no longer covered with forest, or upon failure of
the landowner thereof, or of his representatives, to obey,
follow or implement instructions of the said Director of
Forestry.” To him, a condition expressly written into the
registration certificate was being violated. Piadeco was
found to be cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina
Watershed Reservations in direct contravention of a specific
prohibition in the certificate. And this, upon the basis of
positive and actual findings of qualified and competent
forestry officers.
3. Whether or not the pronouncement made by lower court in favor of
PIADECO remained with legal effect. NO – By its very terms, the
ceriticate expired on December 31, 1964.
a. Basis. “(b) Duration of the certificate.—The certificate of
registration issued under this Order shall be made to expire on
the last day of the 12th month from the date of its issuance.”
This regulation is not without rational basis. This Court had
occasion to say once that: “Land may be classified as forestry
or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the
timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow.
And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the
discovery of valuable minerals, land classified as agricultural
today may be differently classified tomorrow.” Forestry
Administrative Order 12–2 verily declares that certificates “are
renewable for as long as there are substantial amounts of
forestry in the area, upon filing of the necessary application
therefor” and that those “cancelled for causes may be
renewed upon submission of application for registration by
the owner and if the cause of cancellation is explained
satisfactorily.” If only for purposes of effective regulation,
annual registration of private woodlands cannot be
successfully assailed.
b. The court rendered the orders of the trial court to be null and
void.
4. Whether or not the logs cut before the expiration of the contract be
allowed to be hauled. NO. We cannot place our stamp of approval
on Piadeco’s claim that it should be permitted to remove from the
premises those logs that have already been cut before December 31,
1964, the expiry date of its registration certificate. We have already
said that its registration certificate is a nullity. Even if it is not, the facts
and the law will not support its plea. Worse, a factual assumption that
the logs were cut before that date, is meaningless in law. A contrary
view would easily lend itself to misuse and mischief. For, loopholes
could then be bored through which an unscrupulous logger may
crawl. Such that a holder of a registration certificate could be at
complete liberty to just cut and cut during the lifetime of that
certificate and leave the hauling for later, as he pleases, even long
after expiry thereof. This, we must say, should not be allowed to pass.
Court’s discussion on adherence to policy:
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public
policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written
much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing
need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and
reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of
any country’s natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that
absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of
adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry
up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish
disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to
function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed
away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that
wreak havoc and destruction to property—crops, livestock, houses and
highways—not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing
observations should be written down in a lumberman’s decalogue.
Because of the importance of forests to the nation, the State’s police power
has been wielded to regulate the use and occupancy of forests and forest
reserves.
To be sure, the validity of the exercise of police power in the name of the
general welfare cannot be seriously attacked. Our government has definite
instructions from the Constitution’s preamble to “promote the general
welfare.” Jurisprudence has time and again upheld the police power over
individual rights, because of the general welfare. Five decades ago, Mr.
Justice Malcolm made it clear that the “right of the individual is necessarily
subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good” and
that the “liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of public health,
or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the
police power.”52 Mr. Justice Laurel, about twenty years later, affirmed the
precept when he declared that “the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations” and that “[p]ersons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health,
and prosperity of the state.” Recently, we quoted from a leading American
case,54 which pronounced that “neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property
to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm,” and that, therefore, “[e]qually fundamental with the private right
is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.”
TAN v. THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
G.R. No. L- 24548, October 27, 1983
Digest Author: Santiago
Doctrines:
1. A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise
would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it
is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation”
2. The power of control of the Department Head over bureaus and
offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts of
subordinate officials. Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources has the authority to revoke,
on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of
Forestry.
Name of the parties:
Petitioner: Tan
Respondent: Bureau of Forestry,
Third person (Mortgagor, Assignor): Secretary of Agriculture
Facts: (Instead of using respondent and petitioner use the name please :))
- The Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding
a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales. This
land was turned over by US to Philippines.
- Tan submitted his application.
- President Garcia issued a directive to Bureau of Forestry to reject the bids.
The land was declared a forest reserve.
- Agriculture Secretary Fortich contested the declaration. According to him, it
would do more harm than of to the public interest. It would do more harm
than of to the public interest. To convert the area into a forest reserve
without an adequate forest protection force, would make of it a 'Free Zone
and Logging Paradise,' to the ever 'Problem Loggers' of Dinalupihan, Bataan
. . . an open target of timber smugglers, kaingineros and other forms of forest
vandals and despoilers. Hence, he recommended to award the area to a
reputable and responsible licensee who shall conduct logging operations
therein under the selective logging method and who and to employ a
sufficient number of forest guards to patrol and protect the forest
consecration and watershed protection
- The Bureau of Forestry had already conducted a public bidding to
determine the most qualified bidder to whom the area advertised should be
awarded.
- It was awarded to Tan.
- Gozon succeeded Cesar as secretary of agriculture; Feliciano succeeded
Gozon as secretary .(acting only)
- Gozon issued a memorandum revoking the authority delegated to Director
of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses. It was promulgated when
Feliciano succeeded.
- The date when the memorandum took effect and the date when Tan’s
ordinary license from Bernal, Director of Forestry was signed but without
approval of Secretary of Agriculture.
- Ravago Commercial Company (Ravago) and Jorge Lao Happick
appealed to Sectrary of Agriculture to cancel the ordinary of license for
being rregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and
regulations.
-
Contentions of the PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF (Tan):
- There is cause of action - as it was dismissed by CFI Manila for no cause of
action.
- VALIDITY of the license: The petitioner contends that only 1,756 hectares of
the said area contain commercial and operable forest; the authority given
to the Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license of not more
than 3,000 hectares does not state that the whole area should be
commercial and operable forest. It should be taken into consideration that
the 1,756 hectares containing commercial and operable forest must have
been distributed in the whole area of 6,420 hectares.
- EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES- he has exhausted all his
administrative remedies to no avail as respondents-appellees have failed,
 neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allow petitioner-appellant to
continue operation in the area covered by his timber license.
- ACTION AGAINST THE STATE - this case is not a suit against the State but an
application of a sound principle of law whereby administrative decisions or
actuations may be reviewed by the courts as a protection afforded the
citizens against oppression
Ruling of Lower Courts:
-Secretary of Agriculture and revoked the ordinary license and declared
without force and effect whatsoever from the issuance thereof.
- Motion was denied.
- Tan went to CFI - Manila petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary prohibitory injunction - denied by CFI - Manila (failure of the
petition to state a claim upon which relief could be granted)
- Another motion was denied.
Issue:
1. Whether Tan has cause of action to file the injunction in CFI. – NO.
2. Whether the Timber License is valid. – NO.
3. Whether the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies has been correctly
invoked. – NO.
4. Whether action against the state will prosper. – NO.
Ruling:
No cause of action:
- There was a hearing held already in the instant case wherein answers were
interposed and evidence introduced. In the course of the hearing,
petitioner-appellant had the opportunity to introduce evidence in support of
tile allegations iii his petition, which he readily availed of. Consequently, he is
estopped from invoking the rule that to determine the sufficiency of a cause
of action on a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint must
be considered.
- Even if there is cause of action, the evidence of the parties were presented
on the question of granting or denying petitioner-appellant's application for
a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court correctly applied said evidence
in the resolution of the motion to dismiss.
- sub-issue: Tan invoked the rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is
that the complaint states no cause of action, its sufficiency must be
determined only from the allegations in the complaint.
- "The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial
justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their
aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in
importance are made to override the ends of justice; the technical
rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of
a party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced”
- What more can be of greater importance than the interest of the
public at large, more particularly the welfare of the inhabitants of
Olongapo City and Zambales province, whose lives and properties
are directly and immediately imperilled by forest denudation.
- It is of public knowledge that watersheds serves as a defense against
soil erosion and guarantees the steady supply of water. As a matter of
general policy, the Philippine Constitution expressly mandated the
conservation and proper utilization of natural resources, which
includes the country's watershed. Watersheds in the Philippines had
been subjected to rampant abusive treatment due to various
unscientific and destructive land use practices. Once lush watersheds
were wantonly deforested due to uncontrolled timber cutting by
licensed concessionaries and illegal loggers.
- BASIS of the ruling: This is one reason why, in paragraph 27.of the rules
and regulations included in the ordinary timber license it is stated: The
terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the
discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be
made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require
Invalidity of the Timber License - VOID AB INITIO
- In general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963, the Director of
Forestry was authorized to grant a new ordinary timber license only where
the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of
public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420 hectares.
- It should be taken into consideration that the 1,756 hectares
containing commercial and operable forest must have been
distributed in the whole area of 6,420 hectares. Besides the license
states, 'Please see attached sketch and technical description,' gives
an area of 6,420 hectares and does not state what is the area
covered of commmercial and operable forest.
- At the time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry
had no more authority to grant any license. The license was signed by the
Acting Director of Forestry on December 19, 1963, and released to the
petitioner on January 6, 1964.
Non-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
- Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who
issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private
exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve.
The President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the
respondents-appellees.
- SUB ISSUE: Speedy disposition of cases: he was not denied. Petitioner-
appellant must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and
 adequate remedy. In the case at bar, petitioner- appellant's speedy and
adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the Philippines.
Action against the state will not prosper
- We find that petitioner-appellant's action is just an attempt to circumvent
the rule establishing State exemption from suits. He cannot use that principle
of law to profit at the expense and prejudice of the State and its citizens. The
promotion of public welfare and the protection of the inhabitants near the
public forest are property, rights and interest of the State. Accordingly, "the
rule establishing State exeraiption from suits may not be circumvented by
directing the action against the officers of the State instead of against the
State itself. In such cases the State's immunity may be validly invoked against
the action as long as it can be shown that the suit really affects the property,
rights, or interests of the State and not merely those of the officer nominally
made party defendant"
- Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of
Forestry acted in their capacity as officers of the State, representatives of the
sovereign authority discharging governmental powers. A private individual
cannot issue a timber license.
License as a grant.
- A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not
property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of
law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when public interests so
require.
- The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can
be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power
Jurisdiction and Authority of Secretary of Agriculture to remove the license of
Bureau of Forestry.
- The utilization and disposition of forest resources is directly under the control
and supervision of the Director of Forestry. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources has the authority to revoke, on valid grounds, timber
licenses issued by the Director of Forestry. There being supporting evidence,
the revocation of petitioner-appellant's timber license was a wise exercise of
the power of the respondent- appellee (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources) and therefore, valid.
Ratio:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS
HEREBY .AFFIRMED IN TOTO. COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT. SO
ORDERED.
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC. v. DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 79538, October 18, 1990
Digest Author: Cariño
Petitioners: Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc.
Respondents: Deputy Executive Secretary, Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, Director Of The Bureau Of Forest Development and Twin
Peaks Development and Realty Corporation
Doctrine:
Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are merely evidence of a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities; they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process clause.
Facts:
 On 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement (TLA) with the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR), represented by
then Sec. Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut,
collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified
portion of public forest land in the municipality of Maddela (Nueva
Vizcaya) from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990.
 However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development (Bureau), Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum
order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino
provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and 9
other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a
memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena.
 Petitioner then sent a letter to then Pres. Marcos seeking for
reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing its contributions to forest
conservation and alleging that it was not given the opportunity to be
heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operations. (No favorable
action was taken)
 Barely one year thereafter, approximately 1/2 of the area formerly
covered by petitioner’s TLA was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development
and Realty Corporation under a new TLA which was set to expire on July
31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas
Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license. The latter
entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed Pres.
Marcos.
 Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a
letter to the Office of the President, and another letter to Minister Ernesto
Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR), seeking: (1) the
reinstatement of its TLA; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued
to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public
bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the
issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs
found in the concession area. (MNR denied, as well at its motion for
reconsideration.)
 Petitioner subsequently appealed to the Office of the President. (The
Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit.)
 Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance
of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue: Whether the public respondents gravely abused their discretion in
cancelling petitioner’s timber license and by issuing to private respondents the
TLA No. 356. – NO.
Contention (Petitioners):
Public respondents gravely abused their discretion by cancelling their timber
license agreement in 1983 and by issuance of TLA No. 356 by the Bureau to
private respondents in 1984.
Ruling:
Public respondents did not gravely abuse their discretion when they cancelled
petitioner’s timber license and issued to private respondents the TLA No. 356.
 Under Sec. 3(ee) of PD 705 (only the section was cited in the case),
“permit” is a short-term privilege or authority granted by the State to a
person to utilize any limited forest resources or undertake a limited activity
with any forest land without any right of occupation and possession
therein. Accordingly, Sec. 20 of the same decree (only the section was
cited in the case), “License agreement, license, lease or permit. No
person may utilize, exploit, occupy, possess or conduct any activity within
any forest land, or establish and operate any wood-processing plant,
unless he has been authorized to do so under a license agreement, lease,
license, or permit.”
 Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can
hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded
by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause.
 Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious
problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the
judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that
the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a
private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on
the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For the Court
recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in
determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and
manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the
privilege of utilizing these resources.
 Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding
alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber license agreements to a
number of logging concessionaires. The grant of licenses or permits to
exploit the country's timber resources, if done in contravention of the
procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue influence
exerted on department officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical
exercise of the State's power to regulate the use and exploitation of forest
resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred
individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power. The
Court will not be a party to a flagrant mockery of the avowed public
policy of conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should
the appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of
discretion on the part of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with
respect to the implementation of this public policy, the Court will not
hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when invoked, in the exercise of
judicial powers under the Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII].
 WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.
Other Issues:
Judgments of Administrative Agencies
It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and
orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and
binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the
affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of
general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a
matter once determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive
jurisdiction.
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and
multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the
judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the
courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion
of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More
so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company
are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue
of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion
possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to be
taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who
should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources.
Laches (Certiorari)
The fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to
have the earlier administrative actions reviewed by the courts through a
petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. For although no specific time
frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless be done within a
"reasonable time". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for
certiorari is the "reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from
the commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of the
proceeding to annul the same". And failure to file the petition for certiorari
within a reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the
adverse legal consequences of laches.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has
either abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking
to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be
destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws aid those who are vigilant, not
those who sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus etnon dormientibus jura
subveniunt)
OPOSA v. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993
Digest Author: Tawantawan
PETITIONERS: OPOSA, et.al (minors represented and joined by their parents)
RESPONDENTS: FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR. (then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources) and ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, presiding RTC Judge.
DOCTRINES:
 “While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.”
 “The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among others, the judicious management
and conservation of the country's forests.”
 “Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary
government agency responsible for the the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the country's natural
resources...Thus, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.”
 “The Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be
invoked.”
FACTS:
 A complaint filed by the petitioners instituted as a taxpayers' class suit
alleging that they "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests
"against the damage of the deforestation to the plaintiff minor's
generation and to generations yet unborn.
 Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have
granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to
cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial
logging purposes.
 The defendant continued the operation of the TLAs.
Petitioner’s contentions:
 The continued allowance by Factoran of TLA to deforest the
remaining forest will work great damage and irreparable
injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their
successors who may never benefit from and enjoy the natural
resource treasure.
 The refusal to cancel the the TLAs is manifestly contrary to the
public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental
Policy, to the Constitutional policy of the State and to the
highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative
of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
 Invoking their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to protection by the State, it orders defendant,
his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to —
(a) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country;
(b) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
Defendant Factoran’s contention:
 The plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and;
Defendant Rosario’s contentions:
  the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.
2.
RTC’s Decision:
 Insufficient legal right involved as it lacks specific legal wrong
committed with vague assumptions and conclusions based
on unverified data
 To cancel all TLAs would amount to "impairment of contracts"
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to file the said
case. -YES
2. Whether the cancellation of the TLAs would constitute non-
impairment clause which is prohibited under the Constitution. -NO
RULINGS:
1. Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right —
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated
in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides: “The State shall protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.” While the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow
that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. In fact, these basic rights need not even be
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. The right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is self-executory and does not need an implementing
legislation.The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from
impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary
government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the
exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the
country's natural resources. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those
they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as
DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.
right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
NO because of the following reasons:
First, Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) provides for
an exception for the timber licence agreement which states that “. . .
when the national interest so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses
or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .” All licenses may thus
be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of
the Constitution.
Second, jurisprudence provides that the “Timber License Agreement”
is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be
validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights. Since timber
licenses are not contracts, it does not violate the non-impairment
clause.
Third, even assuming that the same are contracts, this does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the
non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Fourth, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still
violate the non-impairment clause as by its nature and purpose, such
as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police
power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health
and enhancing the general welfare. The constitutional guaranty of
non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of
the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must
yield to the police power of the State.

In a motion to dismiss based on the ground that a complaint fails to
state a cause of action, what is in question is the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint itself. The allegations and averments of
the petitioners claiming that the grant of the TLAs violated their right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is adequate enough to show
prima facie the claimed violation of rights. A denial or violation of that
Based on the foregoing, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
RATIO:
The instant Petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order of dismissing the
Civil Case is set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to
implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber
license agreements.
MUSTANG LUMBER v. CA
G.R. Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784, June 18, 1996
Digest Author: Dayao
Doctrine: In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning.
Name of the parties:
GR 104988 (Mustang Lumber Inc v CA) (FIRST CIVIL CASE)
Petitioner: Mustang Lumber, Inc.
Respondents: CA, Hon. Fulgencio Factoran (DENR Sec.), Atty..Vincent Robles
(Chief, Special Actions & Investigation Division (SAID), DENR)
GR 106424 (People v Dizon-Capulong) (CRIMINAL CASE)
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondents: Hon. Teresita Capulong (RTC Judge), Ri Chuy Po (Owner of
Mustang Lumber, Inc.)
GR 123784 (Mustang Lumber Inc. v CA) (SECOND CIVIL CASE)
Petitioner: Mustang Lumber, Inc.
Respondents: CA, Atty.Vincent Robles (Chief, Special Actions & Investigation
Division, DENR), Atty. Nestor Gapusan, Tirso Paria and Felipe Callorina, Jr.
The case involves two civil cases and one criminal case involving Mustang
Lumber, Inc., which is a domestic corporation with principal office at Juan
Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a lumberyard at Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. It was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD). Its permit expires on 25 September 1990.
Facts for the FIRST CIVIL CASE:
 On 1 April 1990, the SAID organized a team of foresters and
policemen to conduct a surveillance of Mustang’s lumberyard, acting
on information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs
was seen inside the lumberyard. They saw coming out from the
lumberyard Mustang's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber.
The team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded
them at the DENR compound since the driver could not produce the
required invoices and transport documents. The team was not able to
gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner, Ri
Chuy Po.
 On 3 April 1990, the team seized four truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and
approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa by virtue of a search warrant
issued by Valenzuela RTC Judge Osorio.
 On 4 April 1990, the team returned to Mustang’s lumberyard and
placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000
board feet because the Mustang failed to produce the required
documents (certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets,
delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber
to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin). Under an
administrative seizure, the owner retains the physical possession of the
seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by
the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing
them until further orders.
 On 10 April 1990, Mustang’s counsel requesting an extension
of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the required
documents because some of them were allegedly in the
Province of Quirino. Robles denied the motion on the ground
that the documents being required from the petitioner must
accompany the lumber or forest products placed under
seizure. On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted to DENR Sec.
Factoran a memorandum-report recommending the
suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber
Dealer's Permit of Mustang Lumber, Inc., confiscation of the
lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard and trucks, and
filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of
Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz for illegal possession of
narra and almaciga lumber and shorts.
 On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order
suspending immediately Mustang’s lumber-dealer permit and
directed Mustang to explain why its permit should not be
cancelled. On the same day, Mustang sent a letter stating it
has secured the required documents however nothing was
submitted.
 On 3 May 1990, Sec. Factoran issued an order confiscating the
311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and
sticks found inside the Mustang's lumberyard.
 On 17 September 1990, Mustang filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a restraining order or preliminary injunction
against Sec. Factoran and Atty. Robles.
 RTC held that the warrantless search and seizure held on 1 April 1990
was one of the exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is
justified. As to the seizure on 4 April 1990, RTC ruled that it was a
continuation of that made the previous day and was still pursuant to
the search warrant issued by Judge Osorio; and although the search
warrant did not specify almaciga, etc., their seizure was valid
because officer is not required to ignore contrabands observed
during conduct of search. RTC however set aside Sec. Factoran’s 3
May 1990 order because of Judge Osorio’s search warrant. CA
affirmed RTC’s decision.
Contentions of Mustang:
1. Seizure on 1 April 1990 was made without any search and seizure
order by a judge
2. Sec. Factoran’s 23 April 1990 order lacked prior notice and hearing
3. Sec. Factoran’s 3 May 1990 order violated Section 2, Article III of
Constitution
Facts for SECOND CIVIL CASE:
 On 17 September 1990, a team of DENR agents went to Mustang’s
principal office in response to reports that several violations of PD 705,
The Revised Forestry Code were committed, and upon instructions of
Atty. Robles of SAID. The team caught the Mustang operating as a
lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer permit had already been
suspended on 23 April 1990.
 The team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep loaded with
lumber, and upon investigation, learned that the loaded lumber was
to be delivered to Mustang's customer, which was reflected at the
sales invoice covering the transaction. The team introduced
themselves to Ms. Chua, caretaker and wife of Mustang's president
and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then out of town.
They were able to take photos of the stockpiles, equipment, and the
transport vehicles loaded with lumber. They seized approximately
20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the
premises by issuing a receipt therefor.
 RTC dismissed Mustang’s petition for certiorari and prohibition
because (a) Mustang did not exhaust administrative remedies (b) its
license was still under suspension so it cannot sell lumber (c) valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to PD 705, Sections 68-A & 80.
CA affirmed RTC’s decision (relying on the definition of “lumber” by
Webster and emphasized that a forest officer can seize forest product
pursuant to PD 705).
Facts for CRIMINAL CASE:
 Atty. Robles filed with the DOJ a complaint against Ri Chuy Po (Mustang’s
President & General Manager) for violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705, as
amended by EO 277, s. 1987. Investigating prosecutor Claro Arellano
handed down a resolution recommending that information be filed
against Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of lumber consisting of almaciga
and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of
Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. DENR Usec.
Silvestre Bello approved such resolution, which led to the filing of
information on 5 June 1991 against Ri Chuy Po for violation of Sec. 68 of
PD 705.
 Mustang moved to quash and/or suspend proceedings arguing:
1. Information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber,
as opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the
purview of the said section, the same may not be used in
evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal
seizure
2. The FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals,
which involves the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial
question.
 Respondent RTC judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted motion to quash
and dismissed the case on the ground that "possession of lumber without
the legal documents required by forest laws and regulations is not a
crime.”
CRIMINAL CASE
ISSUE: W/N the facts averred in the information in the Criminal Case validly
charge a violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO 277?
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. Punished then in this section are (1)
the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products
from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possession
of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations. Indeed, the word lumber does not
appear in Section 68.
A cursory reading of the information leads to an infallible conclusion
that lumber is not solely its subject matter. What are alleged to be in the
possession of the Ri Chuy Po, without the required legal documents, are
truckloads of (1) almaciga and lauan; and (2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. The
almaciga and lauan are not described as lumber. They cannot refer to the
lumber in no. (2) because they are separated by the words approximately
200,000 bd. ft. with the conjunction and, and not with the preposition of. They
must then be raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under Section
3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
SEC. 3. Definitions.
(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top,
resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest
growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated
water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geological
resources in forest lands.
Even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein fall within
the ambit of the said section; hence the information validly charges an
offense.
The Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said section because
lumber is included in the term timber. The Revised Forestry Code contains no
definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest
products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of Processing plant;
which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other
 forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-
board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common
usage. In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases
used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning. Insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents
is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction
between raw or processed timber. Hence, respondent Valenzuela RTC Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the
motion to quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the
said case.
FIRST CIVIL CASE
ISSUE: W/N search and seizure was valid?
Yes. Court finds Mustang’s petition without merit. RTC and CA correctly held
that search was conducted on a moving vehicle, which can be lawfully done
without a search warrant. Searching of a moving vehicle is one of the five
doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no search
or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
personally determining the existence of probable cause. Court also affirms
RTC and CA’s rulings that the search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the
search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued
on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days.
SECOND CIVIL CASE
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s motion?
NO. The CA correctly dismissed the Mustang's appeal from the judgment of
the trial court. Mustang never disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's license
or permit had been suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The
suspension was never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to
25 September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or
otherwise dispose of lumber.
PROVINCE OF RIZAL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 129546, December 13, 2005
Digest Author: Barredo
Petitioners: Province of Rizal, Municipality of San Mateo, Pintong Bocaue
Multipurpose Cooperative, Concerned Citizens of Rizal, Inc., Rolando E.
Villacorte, Bernardo Hidalgo, Ananias Ebuenga, Vilma T. Montajes, Federico
Munar, Jr., Rolando Beas, Sr., et al., and Kilosbayan, Inc.
Respondents: Executive Secretary, Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, Laguna Lake Development Authority, Secretary of Public Works
and Highways, Secretary of Budget and Management, Metro Manila
Development Authority and the Honorable Court of Appeals.
DOCTRINE: Laws pertaining to the protection of the environment were not
drafted in a vacuum. Congress passed these laws fully aware of the perilous
state of both our economic and natural wealth. It was precisely to minimize
the adverse impact humanity’s actions on all aspects of the natural world, at
the same time maintaining and ensuring an environment under which man
and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other,
that these legal safeguards were put in place. They should thus not be so
lightly cast aside in the face of what is easy and expedient.
APPLICABLE LAWS:
P.D. No. 705 – Revised Forestry Code
P.D. No. 1586 – (Establishing an) Environmental Impact Statement
System
P.D. No. 2146 – Proclaiming Certain Areas and Types of Projects as
Environmentally Critical and Within the Scope of the Environmental
Impact Statement System Established Under Presidential Decree No.
1586.
National Water Crisis Act
FACTS:
● Respondents entered into a MOA wherein the DENR agrees to
immediately allow the utilization by the Metropolitan Manila
Commission (now MMDA) of its land property located at Pintong
Bocaue in San Mateo, Rizal as a sanitary landfill site.
● The Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo wrote to MMDA pointing out
that it had recently passed a Resolution banning the creation of
dumpsites for Metro Manila garbage within its jurisdiction and that
operations of the San Mateo Landfill Dumpsite should be suspended.
No action was taken.
● The subject land also turns out to be part of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation Area, and is arable and agricultural in nature.
● Forest officers of the Forest Engineering and Infrastructure Unit of the
Community Environment and Natural Resource Office of the DENR-IV
submitted a Memorandum on the ongoing dumping site operation
saying that “such illegal dumping site operation inside (the)
Watershed Reservation is in violation of P.D. 705, otherwise known as
the Revised Forestry Code” and recommended that the dumpsite
“must totally be stopped and discouraged without any political
intervention and delay in order to save our healthy ecosystems found
therein, to avoid much destruction…”
● CENRO submitted another report saying that the garbage dumping
operations are still on going, the dumpsite is without the concurrence
of the Provincial Governor of Rizal Province and without any permit
from DENR who has functional jurisdiction over the watershed
reservation, and families in the surrounding areas will adversely be
affected by the dumping operations including their sources of
 domestic water supply.
● Despite the Investigation Reports and recommendations submitted,
DENR Environmental Management Bureau, through Undersecretary
for Environment and Research Celso R. Roque, granted MMDA an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the operation of 2 ½
hectares garbage dumpsite.
o ECC: requirement of P.D. No. 1586 (Establishing an
Environmental Impact Statement System)
▪ Section 4. No persons, partnership or corporation
shall undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without first
securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate.
▪ Proclamation No. 2146 – designates all areas
declared by law as national parks, watershed
reserves, wildlife preserves, and sanctuaries as
Environmentally Critical Areas
● Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) sent a letter to the MMDA
conveying their opposition on the choice of the sites for solid waste
disposal inside the watershed of Laguna Lake as its environmental
management program to upgrade the water quality of the lake in
order to make it suitable as a source of domestic water supply regards
dumpsites as incompatible within the watershed because of the
heavy pollution.
● The issued ECC was later suspended by Undersecretary Roque as it
was ascertained that ground slumping and erosion have resulted from
improper development of the site, and the water supplies in the
surrounding areas have been contaminated.
● Despite the objections and recommendations raised by private
citizens and public officials of the affected areas, the Office of the
President signed and issued Proclamation No. 635 which set aside
parts of the Marikina Watershed Reservation for use as a sanitary
landfill and similar waste disposal applications.
o Contentions of MMDA:
▪ There’s no better alternative so the project simply has
to be pursued in the best interest of the greater
majority of the population.
▪ The sanitary landfill projects are now on their 5th year
of implementation and the amount of effort and
money already invested in the project by the
government cannot easily be disregarded.
▪ There is no place within the jurisdiction of Metro
Manila with an area big enough to accommodate
the waste disposal requirements.
▪ It was determined to be far from the main water
containment area for it to pose any immediate
danger of contaminating the underground water.
▪ Relocating the site would not be easy and is
impracticable.
● Petitioners filed before the CA a civil action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ
of preliminary injunction. CA denied the petition for lack of cause of
action.
● Petitioners appealed contending that the effects of El Niño would be
aggravated by the relentless destruction of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation.
● The continued expansion of the dumpsite by the MMDA caused the
people of Antipolo to stage a rally and barricade the Marcos
Highway to stop the dump trucks from reaching the site for five
successive days.
● All the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared their
full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they would
oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.
● MMDA agreed to abandon the dumpsite after six months and
President Joseph E. Estrada issued a Memorandum ordering the
closure of the dumpsite on 31 December 2000.
● On 11 January 2001, President Estrada directed DILG and MMDA to
reopen the San Mateo dumpsite “in view of the emergency situation
of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila.”
● Petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Restraining Order and the SC
issued the TRO.
● Meanwhile, Republic Act No. 9003 (The Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act of 2000) was signed into law by President Estrada.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the San Mateo landfill should be permanently closed. – YES.
2. Whether the MOA entered into by the Presidential Committee on
Flagship Programs and Projects and the MMDA with the Provincial
Government of Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo, and the City of
Antipolo is enough guarantee for the permanent closure of the
dumpsite. – NO.
3. Whether there are laws in place that guarantee the permanent closure
of the dumpsite. – YES.
RULING+RATIO:
1st issue:
The San Mateo Landfill should remain permanently closed. This is indeed a final
resolution of this controversy for two reasons:
a. The San Mateo site has adversely affected its environs.
i. Investigation Reports of CENRO – DENR IV stated that:
1. the sources of domestic water supply of over one thousand families
would be adversely affected by the dumping operations
2. the use of the areas as dumping site greatly affected the ecological
balance and environmental factors of the community
 ii. Heavy pollution and risk of disease generated by dumpsites rendered
the location of a dumpsite within the Marikina Watershed Reservation
incompatible with its program of upgrading the water quality of the
Laguna Lake. (LLDA Report)
iii. The leachate treatment plant eroded twice contaminating the nearby
creeks that were sources of potable water for the residents. The
contaminated water was found to flow to the Wawa Dam and Boso-
boso River, which in turn empties into Laguna de Bay.
b. Sources of water should always be protected.
i. Primordial importance of watershed areas: “The most important
product of a watershed is water, which is one of the most important
human necessities. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate
supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that
not only damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of
watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be
answered now.”
ii. Proclamation No. 63, which aimed to avert the garbage crisis, was
passed three (3) months after Congress had enacted the National
Water Crisis Act to adopt urgent and effective measures to address the
nationwide water crisis which adversely affects the health and well-
being of the population, food production, and industrialization process.
One of the issues the law sought to address was the protection and
conservation of watersheds.
While respondents were blandly declaring that the reason for the creation of
the Marikina Watershed Reservation, i.e., to protect Marikina River as the
source of water supply of the City of Manila, no longer exists, the rest of the
country was gripped by a shortage of potable water so serious, it necessitated
its own legislation. Respondents’ actions in the face of such grave
environmental consequences defy all logic. The petitioners rightly noted that
instead of providing solutions, they have, with unmitigated callousness,
worsened the problem.
2nd issue:
The MOA and even the rallies and barricades organized by the people of
Antipolo do not guarantee the dumpsite’s permanent closure.
In the present case, the Presidential Committee on Flagship Programs and
Projects and the MMDA entered into a MOA with the Provincial Government
of Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo, and the City of Antipolo, whereby the
latter agreed to an extension for the use of the dumpsite until it would be
permanently closed; however, despite this agreement, President Estrada
directed DILG and MMDA to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite in view of the
emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a
critical and imminent health and sanitation epidemic. If not for the TRO issued
by the Supreme Court, President Estrada’s instructions would have been
lawfully carried out as the freedom of contract is not absolute as observed in
Oposa v. Factoran.
3rd issue:
Waste disposal is regulated by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of
2000.
The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000 was enacted pursuant
to the state’s policy of adopting a systematic, comprehensive and ecological
solid waste management system which shall ensure the protection of public
health and environment, and utilize environmentally sound methods that
maximize the utilization of valuable resources and encourage resource
conservation and recovery. It requires the adherence to a Local Government
Solid Waste Management Plan with regard to the collection and final disposal
of solid wastes.
Mandate: formulation of a National Solid Waste Management Framework
i. method and procedure for the phaseout and the eventual
closure within eighteen months from effectivity of the Act in case
of existing open dumps and/or sanitary landfills located within an
aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed area
ii. any landfills subsequently developed must comply with the
minimum requirements laid down in Section 40, specifically that
the site selected must be consistent with the overall land use plan
of the local government unit, and that the site must be located in
an area where the landfills operation will not detrimentally affect
environmentally sensitive resources such as aquifers,
groundwater reservoirs or watershed areas
Petition granted. CA Decision is reversed and set aside. Proclamation No. 635
is deemed illegal and the TRO is made permanent.
ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.
G.R. No. 162243. November 29, 2006.
HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, petitioner, vs. PICOP RESOURCES, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 164516. November 29, 2006.
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted
by HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, respondent.
G.R. No. 171875. November 29, 2006.
THE HON. ANGELO T. REYES (formerly Hon. Elisea G. Gozun), in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
petitioner, vs. PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF THE PHILIPPINES (PICOP),
respondent.
Digest Author: Daguinod
Doctrine: Licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the country’s forests
cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government regardless
of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.
The prior approval of local government units affected by the proposed
conversion of a TLA into an IFMA is necessary before any project or program
can be implemented by the government authorities that may cause depletion
of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland or forest cover, and
extinction of animal or plant species.
Overview:
In G.R. No. 162243, then Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez, who was later successively substituted
by subsequent DENR Secretaries Elisea G. Gozun and Angelo T. Reyes, assails
the 19 February 2004 Decision insofar as it granted the Petition for Mandamus.
In G.R. No. 164516, PICOP assails the same Decision insofar as it deleted the
imposition of damages against then Secretary Alvarez.
In G.R. No. 171875, assailing the 16 December 2004 Amended Decision of the
Court of Appeals lifting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction that enjoined the
enforcement of the 11 October 2002 Decision and 10 February 2003 Orders of
the RTC.
Facts:
- In 1952, Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. (BBLCI), the predecessor of Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines (Picop) was granted Timber
License Agreement (TLA) No. 43. The Agreement covered an area of
75,545 hectares in Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley,
and Davao Oriental.
- The late President Ferdinand E. Marcos allegedly issued, sometime in
1969, a Presidential Warranty confirming that TLA No. 43 “definitely
establishes the boundary lines of [BBLCI’s] concession area.” Upon its
expiry in 1977, this Agreement -- as amended -- was renewed for
another 25 years, to “terminate on April 25, 2002
- On December 23, 1999, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) promulgated DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No.
99-53 or the “Regulations Governing the Integrated Forest
Management Program (IFMP
- In a letter dated August 28 2000, Picop signified its intention to convert
TLA No. 43 into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA),
pursuant to DAO No. 99-53
- During the performance evaluation of Picop, the DENR found that
respondent had violated the rules and regulations governing TLA No.
43. Some of these violations were the non-submission of a five-year
forest protection plan and a seven- year reforestation plan;
nonpayment of overdue forest and other charges in the total amount
of P167,592,440.90 as of August 30, 2002; and failure to secure a
clearance from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP), considering the presence of indigenous peoples in the area,
as well as a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claims covering part of
the area.
- Meanwhile, Picop received from the DENR secretary a letter, which
reads thus:
25 October 2001
MR. TEODORO G. BERNARDINO
President
PICOP Resources Incorporated
2nd Flr, Moredel Building
2280 Pasong Tamo Extension Makati City
Dear Mr. Bernardino:
Consistent with our attached Memorandum to Her Excellency, the
President, dated 17 October 2001 and in response to your Letter of
Intent dated 25 February 2001, we wish to inform you that, pursuant to
DENR Administrative Order No. 99–53, we have cleared the
conversion of PICOP’s Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 to
Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) effective from the
expiration of said TLA on April 26, 2002.
In this regard, you are hereby requested to designate PICOP’s
representative(s) to discuss with the DENR Team, created under
Special Order No. 2001–638, the conditions and details of the said
IFMA, including the production sharing agreement between PICOP
and the government.
For your information and guidance.
Very truly yours, (sgd)
HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ
Secretary
- By virtue of this letter, Picop claimed that “the TLA has been
converted.” The DENR believed, however, that respondent’s
application for an IFMA should undergo the process as provided in
DAO No. 99-53. Thus, petitioner required Picop to submit the following
to the DENR
1. Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation issued
on 12 August 2002 that extended PICOP’s corporate term for
another fifty (50) years;
2. Proof of Payment of forest charges;
3. Proof of Payment of Reforestation Deposit;
4. Response to social issues, particularly clearance from the NCIP;
and
5. Map showing reforestation activities on an annual basis.
 - Upon evaluation of the documents subsequently submitted, the DENR
noted as follows:
a. PICOP did not submit the required NCIP clearance;
b. The proof of payments for forest charges covers only the
production period from 1 July 2001 to 21 September 2001;
c. The proof of payment of reforestation deposits covers only the
period from the first quarter of CY 1999 to the second quarter of
CY 2001;
d. The map of the areas planted through supplemental planting and
social forestry is not sufficient compliance per Performance
Evaluation Team’s 11 July 2001 report on PICOP’s performance on
its TLA No. 43, pursuant to Section 6.6 of DAO 79-87; and
e. PICOP failed to respond completely to all the social issues raised.
- Insisting that the conversion of its TLA No. 43 had been completed,
Picop filed a Petition for Mandamus (“mandamus case”) against then
DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City. The RTC granted the Petition in its October 11,
2002 Decision, which was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).
- Meanwhile, on November 25, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 297, “Excluding a Certain Area from
the Operation of Proclamation No. 369 Dated February 27, 1931, and
Declaring the Same as Mineral Reservation and as Environmentally
Critical Area.” The excluded area consisted of about 8,100 hectares
of respondent’s TLA No. 43
- On January 21, 2003, Picop filed a Petition for the Declaration of
Nullity of the aforesaid presidential proclamation, as well as of the
implementing order, DAO No. 2002-35 (“nullity case”). Initially, the RTC
issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining respondents in
that case from implementing the questioned issuances. Subsequently,
however, it dismissed Picop’s Petition for not stating a cause of action.
On reconsideration, it set for hearing respondent’s application for
preliminary injunction.
- Thus, these consolidated Petitions have been brought before the
Court, assailing (1) the grant of a writ of mandamus to compel the
DENR to issue an IFMA in favor of Picop; (2) the immediate execution
of the writ; and (3) the non-dismissal of the nullity case.
Issues:
1. Whether the mandamus case should be dismissed, because it lacked
a cause of action and its subject matter pertained to the exclusive
administrative domain of the DENR secretary? - NO
2. Whether the presidential warranty was a contract, by virtue of which
Picop acquired a vested right over its forest concession area? –NO
3. Whether Picop had complied with all the administrative and statutory
requirements entitling it to an IFMA conversion? - NO
4. Whether it was proper to determine the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 297? - NO
Ruling:
1. Whether Outright Dismissal Was Proper
The Petition filed before the trial court was one for mandamus with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction, with
damages. Specifically, the Petition sought to compel the DENR secretary to (1)
sign, execute and deliver the IFMA documents to Picop; (2) issue the
corresponding IFMA number assignment; and (3) approve respondent’s
harvesting of timber from the area of TLA No. 43. Petitioner contended that
these acts related to the licensing, regulation and management of forest
resources, a task that belonged exclusively to the exclusive administrative
domain of the DENR.
Picop, however, alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DENR
secretary. Thus, it behooved the Court to determine whether the department
head had indeed gravely abused his discretion. An outright dismissal of the
case would have prevented the Court’s resolution of the issue.
For the same reason, the Petition could not be dismissed outright on the
ground of lack of cause of action. A motion to dismiss on that basis would
hypothetically admit the truth of the allegations in the Complaint. In ruling
upon the DENR secretary’s Motion to Dismiss, the allegation of respondent that
it had a contract with the government should thus be hypothetically
admitted. Necessarily, petitioner’s argument that there was no such contract
should be considered in the trial of the case.
Petitioner countered that he had not yet exercised his exclusive jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case -- either to approve or to disapprove
Picop’s application for IFMA conversion. Hence, he argued that respondent’s
immediate resort to the trial court was precipitate, in violation of the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies could be disregarded when there were circumstances indicating
the urgency of judicial intervention. In this case, it cited the employment by
Picop of a sizeable number of workers and respondent’s payment of millions in
taxes to the government.
The issue of whether there was indeed an urgency of judicial intervention (as
to warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus despite the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DENR) was ultimately connected to the truth of Picop’s
assertions, which were hypothetically admitted in the Motion to Dismiss filed by
the DENR. In other words, the issue still boiled down to whether petitioner had
committed grave abuse of discretion in not executing the IFMA documents
and in not approving respondent’s harvesting of timber from the area of TLA
No. 43. Hence, the mandamus case could not have been subjected to
outright dismissal.
Another issue raised by the DENR concerned Section 1 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 605 which, according to the CA, had been partly repealed by
Republic Act 8975.
Republic Act 8975 was not intended to set forth in full all laws concerning the
prohibition on temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and
preliminary mandatory injunctions. This law prohibited lower courts from issuing
such orders in connection with the implementation of government
infrastructure projects. On the other hand, PD 605 prohibited the issuance of
these orders in any case involving licenses, concessions and the like, in
connection with the natural resources of the Philippines. When the licenses,
concessions and the like also entailed government infrastructure projects,
however, the provisions of Republic Act 8975 were deemed to apply. Thus, PD
605 was modified in this sense.
In Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito, the Court held that the prohibition in PD 605
“pertains to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion
in technical cases, because to allow courts to judge these matters could
disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. But on issues
definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts are
not prevented by Presidential Decree No. 605 from exercising their power to
restrain or prohibit administrative acts.”
While there were indeed questions of fact in the present Petitions, the
overriding controversy involved was one of law: whether the Presidential
Warranty issued by former President Marcos was a contract within the purview
of the Constitution’s Non- Impairment Clause. Accordingly, the prohibition in
PD 605 against the issuance of preliminary injunction in cases involving permits
for the exploitation of natural resources was inapplicable to this case.
Moreover, as the Court held in Republic v. statutes such as PD 605, PD 1818
and Republic Act 8975 merely proscribed the issuance of temporary
restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction. They could not, under pain of violating the Constitution,
deprive the courts of authority to take cognizance of issues raised in the
principal action, as long as that action and the relief sought were within their
jurisdiction.
2. Whether the Presidential Warranty Was a Contract
The Court had consistently held that licenses concerning the harvesting of
timber in the country’s forests could not be considered contracts that would
bind the government regardless of changes in policy and the demands of
public interest and welfare.
Thus, the argument that the Presidential Warranty was a contract because
there were mutual considerations taken into account consisting of investments
on Picop’s part was considered preposterous. All licensees put up investments
in pursuing their businesses. To construe these investments as consideration in a
contract would be to stealthily render ineffective the settled jurisprudence
that “a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the
licensee or permittee, and is not a property in the constitutional sense, as to
which the constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts may
extend.” Neither should a circumvention of the doctrine be allowed by
terming the permit a “warranty.”
3. Whether Picop Had Complied with the Requirements for the
Conversion of TLA No. 43 into an IFMA
Under DAO No. 99-53, the following are the requisites for the automatic
conversion of a TLA into an IFMA:
1. The TLA holder had signified its intent to convert its TLA into an IFMA
prior to the expiration of its TLA
2. Proper evaluation was conducted on the application, and
3. The TLA holder has satisfactorily performed and complied with the
terms and conditions of the TLA and the pertinent rules and
regulations
Upon close scrutiny of the evidence on record, the Court observed that Picop
had failed to comply with the above requirements. As stated earlier, the
Performance Evaluation Team tasked to review the application of respondent
found that it had violated existing DENR rules and regulations.
On the statutory requirement of procuring a clearance from the NCIP, the
Court of Appeals held that Picop did not need to comply. According to the
CA, respondent had acquired property rights over the TLA No. 43 areas, as the
latter was in exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession and
occupation of the areas from 1952 up to the present.
This ruling defied the settled jurisprudence mentioned earlier, including that of
Oposa and Tan, which held that “[a] license is merely a permit or privilege to
do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
right; x x x.”
Section 59 of Republic Act 8371 is clear and unambiguous:
SEC. 59. Certification Precondition. – All departments and other governmental
agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or
granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-
sharing agreement, without prior certification from the NCIP that the area
affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. x x x.
Ancestral domains remain as such, even when possession or occupation of
the area has been interrupted by causes provided under the law, such as
voluntary dealings entered into by the government and private individuals or
corporations. Therefore, the issuance of TLA No. 43 in 1952 did not cause the
indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples to lose their possession
or occupation of the area covered by TLA No. 43.
Furthermore, under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code, the
prior approval of local government units affected by the proposed conversion
of a TLA into an IFMA was necessary before any project or program could be
implemented by government authorities in a way that would cause
“depletion of non- renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland or forest
cover, and extinction of animal or plant species.”
Finally, the DENR’s factual findings that PICOP had not yet complied with the
requirements for the conversion should be accorded great respect, if not
finality, by the courts, because of the agency’s special knowledge and
expertise over matters falling under its jurisdiction. The finality of the DENR’s
findings of fact, supported as they were by substantial evidence, could be
overcome only by a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
3.5 Whether There Had Already Been a Conversion of TLA No. 43 into an
IFMA
Former DENR Secretary Alvarez’s October 25, 2001 letter merely gave he
clearance for the conversion of Picop’s TLA into an IFMA. He did not, by any could rightfully grow weary if the persistent noncompliance continued. The
stretch of imagination, grant the conversion itself. The letter was clear that the judicial policy of nurturing prosperity would be better served by granting
“conversion” could not have been final, since the conditions and details still concessions to those who would abide by the law.
had to be discussed.
Likewise, then DENR Secretary Alvarez’s April 26, 2002 letter approving Picop’s DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Transition Development and Management Plan (TDMP) could not be WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 162243 is GRANTED. The Decision of the
considered as an approval of Picop’s application for IFMA conversion. The Court of Appeals insofar as it affirmed the RTC Decision granting the Petition
letter itself stated that respondent’s application was still pending approval, as for Mandamus filed by Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP)
petitioner had yet to “submit/comply with all the necessary requisites for final is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition in G.R. No. 164516 seeking the
conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA.” reversal of the same Decision insofar as it nullified the award of damages in
4. Whether It Was Proper to Determine the Constitutionality of favor of PICOP is DENIED for lack of merit. The Petition in G.R. No. 171875,
Proclamation No. 297 assailing the lifting of the Preliminary Injunction in favor of the Secretary of
Settled is the rule that the Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality, Environment and Natural Resources is DISMISSED on the ground of mootness.
unless it is the very lis mota. A court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless the parties
raise that question. But even when it is raised, if the record also presents some
other ground upon which the court may base its judgment, the latter course
would be adopted, and the constitutional question left for consideration until
it becomes unavoidable.
The constitutional question presented by Picop was not the very lis mota in the
consolidated cases, as the preceding discussions very well gave the Court
adequate grounds to resolve the controversy.
In sum, the DENR secretary adequately proved that Picop had failed to
comply with the administrative and statutory requirements for the conversion
of TLA No. 43 into an IFMA. On the other hand, as respondent was not yet
entitled to the conversion, petitioner was correct in withholding that course of
action and could not be held liable for damages.
In closing, the Court noted that the noncompliance of Picop with the
requirements for the conversion of the latter’s TLA was so glaring. The
noncompliance of respondent almost amounted to a reluctance to uphold
the law, just because of its sizeable investments in its business, a fact it
repeatedly stressed in its pleadings. In applying the judicial policy of nurturing
prosperity, the Court took into consideration the long-term effects of the
judicial evaluations involved, particularly to our nation’s greatest wealth -- our
vast natural resources.
Picop was fortunate to have been awarded an enormous concession area,
and thus a huge chunk of the benefits of the country’s natural resources.
Attached to this fortune was the responsibility to comply with the laws and
regulations implementing the stated legislative policies of environmental
preservation and benefit distribution.
These laws and regulations should not be ignored. The courts should not
condone their blatant disregard by those who believe they are above the
law, simply because of their sizeable investments and significant numbers of
employees.
The present respondent had only itself to blame for the withholding of the
conversion of its TLA. But while another chance to comply with the foregoing
requirements was conferred on the DENR secretary by the Court’s disposition,