DE OCAMPO v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE was an act of child abuse.
was an act of child abuse. Petitioner also alleged that it is the Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 147932; 25 January 2006
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Magdalena Dacarra (Magdalena) executed a sworn statement before the Women’s
Desk of the CPD Police Station in Batasan Hills, QC of an incident that happened on
4 December 1999 to her 9-year old son, Ronald. She narrated that Ronald arrived
home at around 6PM complaining about dizziness which was eventually followed by
vomiting. Ronald said that his teacher, petitioner Laila De Ocampo, banged hus head
against that of his classmate, Lorendo Orayan (Lorendo). Upon inspection, Magdalena
saw a woundless contusion in his head. He was then brought to an albularyo. The
following morning, Ronald was brought to the East Avenue Medical Center for x-ray.
The attending physician informed Magdalena that Ronald’s head had a fracture. He
died 4 days after. Lorendo also executed a sworn statement narrating how petitioner
banged his head against Ronald’s.
During the inquest proceedings on 14 December 1999, it was ruled that evidence
warrants the release of petitioner for further investigation of the charges against her.
The case is not proper for inquest as the incident complained of happened on
December 4. Further, it is found that the evidence was insufficient to support the
charge for homicide against her. There is no concrete evidence to show proof that the
alleged banging of the heads of the two minor victims could be the actual and
proximate cause of Ronald.
Subsequently the case was referred for preliminary investigation. Lorendo’s mother,
Erlinda Orayan (Erlinda) alleged that De Ocampo offered her P100,000 which she
initially accepted, for her and her son’s non-appearance at the preliminary
investigation. Erlinda presented the money to the investigating prosecutor. Jennilyn
Quirong, who witnessed the head-banging incident, and Melanie Lugales, who
claimed to be another victim of petitioner’s alleged cruel deeds, filed their sworn
statements with the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor.
In her counter-affidavit, De Ocampo invoked the disposition of the inquest prosecutor
finding insufficient evidence to support the charges against her. She assailed the
omission in Magdalena’s sworn statement about Ronald's head injury due to a
vehicular accident in November 1997. Petitioner pointed out the absence of
damage/injury on Lorendo as borne out by his medical certificate. She contended that
the head-banging incident was not the proximate cause of Ronald's death, but the
failed medical attention or medical negligence. Petitioner also alleged that Quirong
and Lugales have immature perception. Petitioner further asserted that the causes of
death stated in Ronald's Death Certificate are hearsay and inadmissible in the
preliminary investigation.
Ronald's Death Certificate shows the immediate cause of his death as Cardio
Pulmonary Arrest, the underlying cause as Cerebral Edema, and other significant
conditions contributing to death as Electrolyte imbalance and vomiting. The Autopsy
Report states the cause of death as Intracranial hemorrhage secondary to traumatic
injury of the head. The investigating prosecutor thus, issued a Resolution finding
probable cause against petitioner for the offenses charged.
In her appeal to the DOJ, petitioner contended that the investigating prosecutor
showed bias in favor of complainants Magdalena and Erlinda (complainants) for not
conducting a clarificatory hearing and unilaterally procuring the autopsy report. She
argued that the investigating prosecutor erred in concluding that her alleged act of
banging Ronald’s and Lorendo’s heads was the cause of Ronald's injury and that such
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the
which has jurisdiction over the case.
The DOJ Secretary upheld the investigating prosecutor's finding that Ronald's injury
was the direct and natural result of petitioner's act of banging Ronald’s and Lorendo’s
heads. The DOJ Secretary stated that petitioner never denied such act, making her
responsible for all its consequences even if the immediate cause of Ronald's death
was allegedly the failed medical attention or medical negligence. The DOJ Secretary
also held that assuming there was failure of medical attention or medical negligence,
these inefficient intervening causes did not break the relation of the felony committed
and the resulting injury. Thus, the claim that she is innocent as held by the inquest
prosecutor was rejected. According to the DOJ Secretary, the inquest prosecutor did
not dismiss the case. She merely recommended petitioner's release for further
investigation since the case was not proper for inquest and the evidence was then
insufficient.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner denied due process in the preliminary investigation for not conducting
a clarificatory hearing?
HELD:
No. A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary investigation. Rather
than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the investigating
officer as evidenced by the use of the term may in Section 3(e) of Rule 112. This
provision states:
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he
may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses,
during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the
right to examine or cross-examine.
In this case, the investigating prosecutor no longer conducted hearings after petitioner
submitted her counter-affidavit. This simply means that at that point the investigating
prosecutor believed that there were no more matters for clarification. It is only in
petitioner’s mind that some crucial points still exist and need clarification. In any event,
petitioner can raise these important matters during the trial proper.
Petitioner was not deprived of due process as well since both parties were accorded
equal rights in arguing their case and presenting their respective evidence during the
preliminary investigation. Due process is merely an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner
cannot successfully invoke denial of due process since she was given the opportunity
of a hearing. She even submitted her counter-affidavit to the investigating prosecutor.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits.
Its sole purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether the
respondent is probably guilty of the crime. It is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence. Hence, if the investigating prosecutor is
already satisfied that he can reasonably determine the existence of probable cause
based on the parties evidence thus presented, he may terminate the proceedings and
resolve the case.
People vs. Jalosjos (G.R. No. 132875-76)
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he
be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
first instance of a non-bailable offense.
Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the
sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their
representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the
duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his
constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be
defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official
or medical reasons.
Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want
their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House
of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his
mandate.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as
member of House of Representatives and to leave his cell.
Held:
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings
will virtually make him a free man.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters
elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do
so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings
for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes
of the correction system.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional
equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike
both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may
not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice
shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
People vs Jaime Jose y Gomez, et al.
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the
case cited. Xie xie!
People vs Jaime Jose y Gomez, et al.
G.R. No. L-28232
February 6, 1971
Facts:
On June 26, 1967, four (4) principal-accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., alias
“Boy”, Eduardo Aquino Alias “Eddie” and Rogelio Cañal; together with Wong Lay
Pueng, Silverio Guanzon and Jessie Guion as accomplices, conspired together,
confederated with and mutually helped one another, then and there, to willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design to forcibly abduct Magdalena “Maggie” de
la Riva, 25 years old and single, a movie actress by profession at the time of the
incident, where the four principal accused, by means of force and intimidation using a
deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will, and
brought her to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, and hence committed the crime of
Forcible Abduction with Rape.
Wherefore, the court finds that the accomplices Pueng, Guanzon and Guion, on the
ground that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against them,
the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the case
dismissed against them.
(Facts of this case are too descriptive. I’d rather not include much details on the scene
of the crime to protect the complainant’s repute).
Issue:
(a) What kind of rape was committed?
Held:
Undoubtedly, rape is that which is punishable by the penalty reclusion perpetua to
death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act 4111 which took
effect on June 20, 1964. Under the law, rape is committed by having canal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) by using force and
intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason and otherwise unconscious;
and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present. The
crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the rape is
committed the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of
the crimes committed, and the latter is the more serious; hence, pursuant to the
provision of Art 48 of the RPC, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum
period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In
this regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed.
However, said crime as attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a)
nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the
commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been
committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another; (c) ignominy, since
the appellants in ordering the complaint to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for
ten minutes before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make
the effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) the use of motor vehicle.
Of the three principal-appellants (Jose, Aquino and Cañal), none of them may claim
aggravating circumstances has been offset by the mitigating circumstance. Appellant
Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea
of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties
to be imposed, for the reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances
remaining.
Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the
court a quo for its confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof
is hereby ordered to deliver its possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance
Corporation in accordance with the judgment of the First Instance of Manila in Civil
Case No. 69993 thereof.
Before the actual promulgation of the decision, the Court received a formal
manifestation on the part of the Solicitor general to the effect that Rogelio Cañal, one
of the herein appellants, died in prison on December 28, 1970. As a result, the case is
dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, with
one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de officio.
Wherefore, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: Jaime G. Jose,
Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Eduardo P. Aquino are pronounced GUILTY of the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each and every one of them likewise
convicted of three (3) of the crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them
is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall jointly and severally,
indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a
total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth of the costs.
People vs Peralta, et al.
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the
case cited. Xie xie!
People vs Amadeo Peralta, et al.
G.R. No. L-19069
October 29, 1968
Facts:
On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, two known
warring gangs inside the New Bilibid Prison as “Sigue-Sigue” and “OXO” were
preparing to attend a mass at 7 a.m. However, a fight between the two rival gangs
caused a big commotion in the plaza where the prisoners were currently assembled.
The fight was quelled and those involved where led away to the investigation while the
rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their respective quarters.
In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, “OXO” members, Amadeo
Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and
Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two defendants charged therein with multiple
murder), are also convicts confined in the said prisons by virtue of final judgments.
They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with evident
premeditation and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed “Sigue-Sigue” sympathizers Jose Carriego,
Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in the same institution, by
hitting, stabbing, and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised weapons,
pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries
which directly caused their deaths.
Issues
(a) Whether of not conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple murder?
(b) Whether or not an aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the
commission of the crime?
Held:
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime
unless when the law specifically provides a penalty thereof as in treason, rebellion and
sedition. However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is
committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes a
pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Once an
express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation
in the commission of the crime/s perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because
in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
The collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The
concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a
patent display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal
enterprise they must be held solidarity liable. However, in order to hold an accused
guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he performed
an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the
actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators
by being present at the scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the
rest of the conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy.
Conspiracy alone, without execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law,
except in special instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, do not include
robbery.
Reverting now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended
the commission of the murders. To wit, although there is no direct evidence of
conspiracy, the court can safely say that there are several circumstances to show that
the crime committed by the accused was planned. First, all the deceased were
Tagalogs and members of sympathizers of “Sigue-Sigue” gang (OXO members were
from either Visayas or Mindanao), singled out and killed thereby, showing that their
killing has been planned. Second, the accused were all armed with improvised
weapons showing that they really prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused
accomplished the killing with team work precision going from one brigade to another
and attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for liquidation and
lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of the Carriego, Barbosa and
Cruz.
In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstances of quasi-recidivism,
as all of the six accused at the time of the commission of the offenses were serving
sentences in the New Bilibid Prison by virtue of convictions by final judgments that
penalty for each offense must be imposed in its maximum period, which is the mandate
of the first paragraph of article 160 of the RPC. Hence, severe penalty imposed on a
quasi-recidivist is justified because of the perversity and incorrigibility of the crime.
Accordingly, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta,
Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna
are each pronounced guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are
each sentenced to three death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally,
indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of P12,000; each
will pay one-sixth of the costs.
G.R. No. L-20183 June 30, 1966
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO BERDIDA Y INGUITO, ET AL., defendants.
EDUARDO BERDIDA Y INGUITO, LORETO SABERON Y CASAS, VICENTE
ABERAS Y CORDERO and JESUS FELICIA Y BALIDBID, defendants and
appellants.
At about 10 o'clock in the evening of 7 May 1960, Antonio Maravilla, Federico
Cañalete, Virgilio Haban and Pedrito Rapadas left the store of one Mang Terio at
Mabuhay Street, North Harbor, Tondo, Manila, and proceeded walking towards their
homes. They were met on their way by Eduardo Berdida, Antonio Louie, one Tiquio
and one aliasIfugao, who identified themselves as detectives, told them not to move,
and pointed sharp and long bolos to them.4Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete
raised their hands, but Pedrito Rapadas and Virgilio Haban were able to run away.
Antonio Louie then dealt a fist blow on Antonio Maravilla. After that, the group took
Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete along the rail tracks, telling them that they
had done something wrong. group tied the hands of Antonio Maravilla and Federico
Cañalete and was killed.
Issue : Won accused is guilty
Held: Anent the attempted murder case, no appeal therefrom was taken. The record
shows that defendants perfected no appeal from the judgment below. The present
automatic review is limited only to the murder case in which the death penalty was
imposed. It was only because of the joint trial that the record of the attempted murder
case was likewise elevated herein. Since no appeal was taken in the attempted
murder case, the judgment with respect thereto has become final. It therefore cannot
now be reviewed herein, as some of the appellants would ask. And defendants-
appellants, who are detained, should accordingly be deemed to have started serving
their respective sentence in said attempted murder case from the time the decision
of the trial court became final as to said case.
people vs glino
FACTS: While aboard a jeepney. the accused Glino blocked Virnìgia’s path while his
co-accused
Babes, who died later in prison, stabbed Virginia’s husband Domingo several times
which
resulted in Domingo’s death. Glino denies knowing Babes.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was conspiracy
HELD: Yes, there is conspiracy when Conspiracy exists when 2 or more persons
come to an
agreement concerning the Commission of a felony and decide to commit it. ¡t must
be shown to
exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself (Neither joint
nor
simultaneous act PER SE is sufficient proof of conspiracy).
Also, in conspiracy, who actually killed the victim is immaterial. The act of one is the
act
of all. Hence, it is not necessary that all participants deliver the fatal blow.
In this case, the acts of Babes and Glino before, during, and after the killing of
Domingo
indicate joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiment. Virginia
narrated that
while Babes was stabbing Domingo. GIino blocked her path and prevented her from
helping. He
later joined Baloes in stabbing Domingo.
Hence. Glino is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000
Lessons Applicable: Attempted rape
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
• April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel
Pamintuan, went to the ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks
for her 2 children. There she met Primo Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr.,
brother of Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be
frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor.
• Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw
Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose
pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants
were down to his knees and his hands holding his penis with his right hand
• Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several
times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside who
she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting
Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to
chase the Campuhan who was apprehended. They called the barangay officials who
detained.
• Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel ‘s hymen was intact
• Campuhan: Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when
she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor.
• RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death
• Thus, subject to automatic review
ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape
HELD: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of
prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
• People v. De la Peña: labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated
• Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible
• Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration but her vocabulary is
yet as underdeveloped
• Corazon narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus
showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim
• the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the
child's own assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close
together and that she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about
what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray
ko!
• no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and
the victim
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJAMIN SORIA
G.R. No. 179031 ; 14 November 2012
PONENTE: Del Castillo
SUBJECT:Rape
FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution:
The victim, AAA, is the daughter of the accused. On February 26, 2000, AAA and her
siblings enjoyed the spaghetti their father brought home for merienda. After eating,
AAA went to the bedroom to rest. Thereafter, appellant also entered the room and
positioned himself on top of AAA, took off her clothes and inserted his penis into her
vagina. AAA felt intense painfrom her breast down to her vagina and thus told her
father that it was painful. At that point, appellant apologized to his daughter, stood up,
and left the room. The whole incident was witnessed by AAA’s brother, BBB. The pain
persisted until AAA’s vagina started to bleed. She thus told her aunt about it and they
proceeded to a hospital for treatment. Her mother was also immediately informed of
her ordeal. AAA was taken into the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
Version of the Defense:
Appellant admitted that he was at home on the day and time of AAA’s alleged rape but
denied committing the same. Instead, he claimed that the filing of the rape case
against him was instigated by his wife, whom he confronted about her illicit affair with
a man residing in their community. According to appellant, he could not have molested
AAA because he treated her well. In fact, he was the only one sending his children to
school since his wife already neglected them and seldom comes home.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a reasonable doubt
which would warrant his acquittal
HELD:
Rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or by sexual
assault. Rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is referred to as rape through sexual
intercourse. Carnal knowledge is the central element and it must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is
commonly known as rape by sexual assault. The perpetrator commits this kind of rape
by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
The RTC and the CA found the accused guilty of rape through sexual
intercourse but It is evident from the testimony of AAA that she was unsure whether it
was indeed appellant’s penis which touched her labia and entered her organ. AAA
stated that she only knew that it was the “bird” of her father which was inserted into
her vagina after being told by her brother BBB. Clearly, AAA has no personal
knowledge that it was appellant’s penis which touched her labia and inserted into her
vagina. Hence, it would be erroneous to conclude that there was penile contact based
solely on the declaration of AAA’s brother, BBB, which declaration was hearsay due
to BBB’s failure to testify.
The court however found it inconsequential that AAA could not specifically identify the
particular instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and
relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. Moreover, the
prosecution satisfactorily established that appellant accomplished the act of sexual
assault through his moral ascendancy and influence over “AAA” which substituted for
violence and intimidation. Thus, there is no doubt that appellant raped AAA by sexual
assault.
It is also improbable for appellant’s wife to have dared encourage their daughter AAA
to file the charges publicly expose the dishonor of the familyunless the rape was
indeed committed.
Accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape by sexual
assault and is also ordered to pay AAA civil indemnity and damages.
G.R. No. 207949 July 23, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO
GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON, Accused-
Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro (Roderick)
dropped his brother Edwin Navarro (Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in
Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he received a text message from another brother
who told him that Edwin had been kidnapped.2 Records show that three (3) men,
later identified as Armando, Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin
down the stairway of the gym and pushed him inside a dark green Toyota car with
plate number UKF 194.3 Upon receiving the message, Roderick immediately
reported the incident to the police. At around 10 o’clock in the morning of the same
day, he received a phone call from Edwin‟s kidnappers who threatened to kill Edwin
if he should report the matter to the police.4
The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who
demanded the payment of ransom money in the amount of ₱15,000,000.00.
Roderick told them he had no such money, as he only had ₱50,000.00. On May 19,
2003, after negotiations over the telephone, the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin
in exchange for the amount of ₱110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring
the money to Batangas and wait for their next call.5
At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to
Batangas to deliver the ransom money, the kidnappers called and instructed him to
open all the windows of the car he was driving and to turn on the hazard light when
he reaches the designated place. After a while, Roderick received another call
directing him to exit in Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5 until he arrives at the
Centennial Village. He was told to park beside the Libingan ng mga Bayani. After
several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car with plate number DEH 498 pulled up in front
of his vehicle where four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take a
mobile phone and upon uttering the word "alat," the men returned to their car and
drove away.6
Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin,
headed by SPO3 Romeo Caballero (SPO3 Caballero) and PO3 Nestor Acebuche
(PO3 Acebuche) of the Camp Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response
(PACER). During the course of the investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health
Is Wealth Gym, confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he was part of the plan to kidnap
Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped off Mariano, Renato, Armando and a
certain Virgilio7 Varona8 (Virgilio) on the condition that he will be given a share in the
ransom money. Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading
to their arrest on June 12, 2003. In the early morning of the following day or on June
13, 2003, the PACER team found the dead body of Edwin at Sitio Pugpugan Laurel,
Batangas, which Roderick identifie RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, sentencing each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. CA affirmed
Issue : whether or not accusedappellants are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention.
Held : yes
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been
made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer;
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
G.R. No. 201443 April 10, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BETTY SALVADOR y TABIOS, MONICO SALVADOR, MARCELO LLANORA, JR.
y BAYLON, ROBERT GONZALES y MANZANO, RICKY PEÑA y BORRES @
RICK, ROGER PESADO y PESADO @ GER, JOSE ADELANTAR y CAURTE,
LOWHEN ALMONTE y PACETE, JUBERT BANATAO y AGGULIN @ KOBET,
and MOREY DADAAN, Accused-Appellants
That on or about April 7, 2002 at around 7:30 in the evening, in the vicinity of the
Cainta Cockpit Arena, Cainta, Rizal, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with the use of firearms, threats and
intimidation did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take
away PINKY GONZALES y TABORA against her will; That in the process, she was
forced to board a Toyota Hi-Ace van which transported her, until finally she was
brought to an undisclosed location in Caloocan City where she was kept for six (6)
days; That she was finally rescued on April 12, 2002 by police operatives from the
Philippine National Police
Issue : WON ACCUSED IS GUILTY
HELD: Yes, no reasonable doubt is cast upon the complicity of the latter two in the
kidnapping. Further, Betty and Monico’s postulation that if they were indeed involved,
they should not have proceeded to the scene of the rescue operations and to the
police station, likewise deserves scant consideration. There is no established
doctrine to the effect that, in every instance, non-flight is an indication of
innocence.204 It is possible for the culprits to pursue unfamiliar schemes or strategies
to confuse the police authorities.
PEOPLE VS BALDOGO G.R. No. 129106-07 FACTS: The accused Gonzalo
Baldogo and Edgar Bermas who were both serving time for the crime Murder at the
Iwahig Penal Colony, were employed as domestic helpers by Julio Camacho Sr. One
evening while their master was away, they killed his son Jorge and kidnapped his
daughter Julie whom they took to the mountains and detained her for more than five
days, contrary to law and attended by the aggravating circumstance of Recidivism.
Upon arraignment, the accused Baldogo pleaded not guilty. Bermas on the other
hand died before he could be arraigned.
ISSUE(S)/DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED: The burden of proof lies in the
prosecution to prove the aggravating circumstance of quasirecidivism by the same
quantum of evidence as the crime itself.
RULING: The prosecution adduced in evidence merely the excerpt of the prison
record of accused-appellant showing that he was convicted of Homicide by the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City with a penalty which he was serving at the Iwahig
Penal Colony. The excerpt of the prison record is not the best evidence under
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, to prove the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and to prove that said judgment had become final
and executor. Said excerpt is merely secondary or substitutionary evidence which is
inadmissible, absent proof that the original of the judgment had been lost or
destroyed or that the same cannot be produced without the fault of the prosecution.
Therefore the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism cannot be appreciated in
this case
RENATO BALEROS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 138033,
February 22, 2006)
SEPTEMBER 10, 2016 / RUSSELL JAY
Subject: Criminal Law 1- Attempted Felony
Laws Applicable: RPC Art. 6
Ponente: Justice Cansio Garcia
Doctrine: Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or
preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense.
FACTS: In early morning of December 1991, Renato Baleros went to the dormitory
room of Martina Lourdes T. Albano (Malou), palced himselp on top of her, and
pressed a hankerchief soaked in chloroform. Malou struggled to free herself in the
hands of Baleros and succeeded by grabbing his sexual organ and squeezing it.
Malou went straight to Marvilou and said “”may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan
ako”.
The morning after, the police said to the tenants of the dormitory to grab the things
that are theirs. The room was left with an unclaimed bag which Christian, one of the
tenants, knew right away that was Renato’s. Among the contents of the bag was a
hankerchief with a volatile substance.
They later found out that Renato was a suitor of Malou which she rejected a week
ago.
RTC found Renato guilty of attempted rape. CA further affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: WON Renato is guilty of attempted rape.
RULING: NO. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a
man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the
following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under
twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned
article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal
knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is
whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth
while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating
the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no
attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what
reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his
immediate intention, is anybody’s guess.
Assailed decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted rape.
Petitioner, however, is adjudged GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly
sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the
accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
G.R. No. 110097; December 22, 1997
FACTS:
Appellant Arnulfo Astorga appealed the court’s decision on Criminal Case No. 8243
wherein appellant was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code or the kidnap and detention of a minor.
Astorga insisted that the inconsistencies and the contradictions of the prosecution’s
witnesses should be deemed incredible and that the delay in the filing of the
accusation weakened the case. Furthermore, Astorga claimed that he had no motive
to kidnap the 8-year-old Yvonne Traya which should’ve been apparent and proven
upon conviction. Ultimately, Astorga claimed that the court erred in convicting him
despite the fact that he had not detained nor locked Yvonne up which is an important
element in kidnapping.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the prosecution’s witnesses were credible.
2.) Whether or not the lack of motive by the appellant is significant in the court’s
decision.
3.) Whether or not it was kidnapping or coercion.
RULING:
1.) The delay in the making of the criminal accusation does not necessarily weaken
the credibility of the witnesses especially if it had been satisfactorily explained. In the
case, one week was reasonable since the victim was a resident in Binaungan and
that the case was filed in Tagum, Davao.
2.) The court found it irrelevant to identify the motive since motive is not an element
of the crime. Motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the
culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Besides, the appellant himself
admitted having taken Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School.
3.) The court agreed with the appellant’s contention. The evidence does not show
that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her.
Appellant’s forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be
an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no “lock
up”. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code. Rather, the felony committed was grave coercion under
Article 286 of the same code.
SALVADOR MARZALADO vs. People
G.R. No. 152997. November 10, 2004
Facts: Cristina N. Albano was the lessee of a unit in the house owned by the mother
of the petitioner. His mother filed an ejectment case against Albano. Judgment was
rendered against Albano, who was ordered to vacate the leased premises and to pay
the unpaid rentals. Albano appealed to the RTC.
During the pendency of the appeal, the electricity supply of the unit was cut off due to
non-payment of bills. As a result, Albano transferred her children to her father’s house,
four houses away, leaving a maid to sleep in the unit. Albano claims that she noticed
that the lead pipe she used to hang clothes to dry was missing. When she returned
the following day she discovered the padlock of the main door changed, preventing
her from entering the premises. She went to see petitioner but he was not around. On
the next day she again returned to her unit. She peeked through the window jalousies
and saw that the place was already empty. She immediately reported the matter to
the barangay officials, who in turn, advised her to go to the police. Thereafter, she
filed a complaint for grave coercion, qualified trespass to dwelling and theft against
petitioner. 10 days after, Albano tried to see the accused, but again failed. This time
she noticed that the roofing of her unit had been removed and the main door locked
from the inside. She was informed that the petitioner and his female companion took
her lead pipe and also took her personal belongings which brought inside his house.
Albano filed a suit for trespass to dwelling with the MeTC against
Marzalado, Jr.. witness named Raniedo, the owner of the house fronting Albano’s unit,
testified that he saw the petitioner, take a lead pipe and hand it to a woman waiting at
the terrace of Marzalado, Jr.’s house. He further testified that the next when he was
relaxing in front of his house, he heard noises coming from Albano’s apartment. There
he saw Marzalado, Jr., forcibly open the door of the unit, bring out the belongings of
Albano, and take these to his own house.
On his defense, he accused Albano of deliberately leaving the faucet open causing it
to flood on the floor. The MeTC handed a judgment finding the accused Salvador
Mar[z]alado, Jr. “GUILTY” beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trespass To Dwelling
under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code. Marzalado appealed the decision to the
RTC. RTC affirmed the MeTC’s decision. The CA also affirmed the decision. Defense
said that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decisions of the MTC and the RTC
because the incident happened on Nov. 3 and not Nov. 2 and so there is a
misapprehension of facts and that his entry in the premises is fully justified because
he was assisted by their brgy. Secretary and 2 brgy. tanods.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of qualified trespass to dwelling
Ruling: The decision of the CA is reversed and that the accused is hereby acquitted.
The Court states that the exact date when the alleged trespass occurred
is not an essential element of the offense of trespass. It is sufficient that the Complaint
or Information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as
possible to the date of its actual commission. However, the Supreme Court further
stated that as certified by Barangay Lupon Secretary the unit rented by Albano was
“forcibly opened by the owner because of the strong water pressure coming out of the
faucet… even Albano herself admitted, she and her children already left the unit when
the electricity supply was cut off. Hence, nobody was left to attend to the unit, except
during some nights when Albano’s maid slept in the unit. Clearly, Marzalado, Jr., acted
for the justified purpose of avoiding further flooding and damage to his mother’s
property caused by the open faucet. No criminal intent could be clearly imputed to
petitioner for the remedial action he had taken. There was an exigency that had to be
addressed to avoid damage to the leased unit. There is nothing culpable concerning
Marzalado, Jr.’s judgment call to enter the unit and turn off the faucet instead of closing
the inlet valve as suggested by the OSG. The Court also stated that in a situation of
ambiguity, where the act of the accused permits of two possible signification, one
culpable and another innocent, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the
accused.
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529 March 28, 1969
ROSAURO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley
Point, Cavite City, whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon
of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged
in front of the main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They
carried placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss
con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin";
"Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia di
quida rin bo chiquiting;" and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called
up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point
was in charge of preserving harmonious relations between personnel of the naval
station and the civilian population of Cavite City. Capt. McAllister requested Col.
Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col.
Monzon went to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura
upon learning that the demonstration was not directed against the naval station but
against Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused
the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested to
them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that they would
like the people in the station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They
assured him, however, that they did not intend to use violence, as "they just wanted
to blow off steam."
At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station. When he
learned about the demonstration he became apprehensive about his safety, so he
sought Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his
brother, and another person in going out of the station, using his (Monzon's) car for
the purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon purpose slowed down to accommodate the
request of Reyes. He told Hallare to take a good look at the demonstrators and at the
placards they were carrying. When the demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted,
"Mabuhay si Agustin." Then they boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One jeep
overtook passed the car while the other to led behind. After Hallare and his
companions had alighted in front of his residence at 967 Burgos St., Cavite City, Col.
Monzon sped away.
The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence
after having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at
the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-door,
he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin
lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left
the premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the
other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.lâwphi1.ñet
ISSUE: WON accused is guilty with grave threats and grave oral defamation
HELD: NO
we find that all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 1
of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged therein
namely: (1) that the offender threatened another person with the infliction upon his
person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat
was not subject to a condition. Hence, petitioner could have been convicted
thereunder. It is to be noted that under the aforementioned provision the particular
manner in which the threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such
that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and essence of the
crime as charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution
that the accused threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the petitioner to
undergo any material change or modification in his defense. Contrary to his claim,
made with the concurrence of the Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed after
the amendment to the danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282, which
provides for a different penalty, since there was no allegation in the amended
information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In our view the deletion
of the word "orally" was effected in order to make the information conformable to the
evidence to be presented during the trial. It was merely a formal amendment which in
no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin,
putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often
employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is
seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the
virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats
voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more
emphatic
petitioner is acquitted
Doctrine: Special complex crime - where the law provides a single penalty for two or
more component offenses. Nature of Case: PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. V. TALUSAN
G.R. No. 179187, July 14, 2009 Appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. Appellant:
RENATO TALUSAN Nature of Case: Special complex crime of kidnapping with rape
Brief: The accused Renato Talusan conspired and confederated together with one
ELJOY SALONGA and kidnapped, AAA, a SIX (6) year old, minor, which lasted for
eight (8) days, and inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA for several instances
thereby subjecting her to sexual abuse. Dispositive: The Court ruled that the
appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape. Facts: In the early morning of January 14, 2004, as AAA was
on her way to school, appellant, who was sitting by a tree in Las Pias, pulled her
aside and cajoled her into joining him by telling her that they would go to Jollibee.
AAA obliged as she knew appellant to be a fellow attendee of Sunday Bible classes.
Appellant brought AAA, however, to a house in Imus, Cavite occupied by one El Joy
Salonga and two unidentified individuals to whom he introduced her as his daughter.
AAA was thereafter under appellants control and custody for eight days during which
he abused her by inserting his finger inside her vagina on a daily basis before
breakfast, despite her resistance. AAA having failed to return home by noon of
January 14, 2004, her stepfather BBB went to her school to inquire. With the help of
a neighbor and a former co-worker of the appellant, the latter was apprehended. The
initial medico-legal examination revealed the following: Findings: - Hymen: Deep
fresh 3 & 9oclock position - Vestibule congested Conclusion: - Subject compatible
with recent loss of virginity - There are no ext. signs of application of any form of
trauma Hence, the filing of the Information for kidnapping with rape. Issue of the
Case: Whether or not the trial court has fault in convicting the appellant on the basis
of an improvident plea of guilt - NO Actions of the Court: Regional Trial Court (RTC) -
The trial court in its Decision of June 7, 2004 found the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt by his voluntary and spontaneous plea of guilty, while the
Presiding Judge does not believe in the imposition of death penalty as a form of
punishment, nevertheless, in obedience to the law which is his duty to uphold, this
Court finds the accused, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt for the special complex
crime of KIDNAPPING with RAPE and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH. The accused is hereby ordered to pay the victim AAA, the
amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and an additional amount of
P50,000.00 by way of moral damages which by case law is automatically awarded to
rape victims without need of proof. The case was forwarded to this SC on automatic
review due to the death penalty imposed. However, the SC referred the case to the
Court of Appeals by Resolution of November 22, 2005 for intermediate disposition.
Court of Appeals (CA) - In May 25, 2007, the decision dated 07 June 2004 of the
RTC, Branch 199, Las Pinas City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION by the
CA. Appellant Renato Talusan y Panganiban is sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
conformably with R.A. No. 9346, without eligibility for parole and is ordered to
indemnify the AAA the following: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (b)
P50,000.00 as moral damages. Supreme Court (SC) - Affirmed the decision of May
25, 2007 of the CA with modification. Supreme Court Ruling: In the present case,
even without the plea of guilty of the appellant, the evidence presented by the
prosecution supports his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime
of kidnapping with rape under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659. Thus in People v. Larraaga the Court held: Where the law
provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is
called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the
Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3)
kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide,
and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must
necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that
would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier
mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by
adding thereto this provision: When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of
the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special
complex crime. WHEREFORE, the Decision of May 25, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the separate awards of civil indemnity and
moral damages are increased from P50,000 to P75,000. In all other respects, the
Decision is AFFIRMED
G.R. No. 198012, April 22, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANGEL MATEO Y JACINTO
AND VICENTA LAPIZ Y MEDINA, Accused-Appellants.
Sometime during the period from January to March 1998, the five private
complainants, namely, Abe] E. Balane (Abel), Emilio A. Cariaga (Emilio), Victorio D.
Flordeliza (Victorio), Manuel Oledan (Manuel) and Virgiiio N. Concepcion (Virgiiio),
met appellants on separate occasions at Plaza Ferguzon, Malate, Manila to apply for
overseas employment. Appellant Mateo, representing himself to have a tie-up with
some Japanese firms, promised them employment in Japan as conversion
mechanics, welders, or fitters for a fee. Appellants also promised that they could
facilitate private complainants' employment as direct hires and assured their
departure within three weeks. However, after the private complainants paid the
required fees ranging from P18,555.00 to P25,000.00, appellants failed to secure
any overseas employment for them. Appellants likewise failed to return private
complainants' money. This prompted Manuel to go to the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) where he was issued a Certification3 stating that
appellants are not licensed to recruit applicants for overseas employment.
Thereupon, the private complainants filed their Complaint and executed their
respective affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI referred
the charges to the Department of Justice which subsequently found probable cause
against appellants for large scale illegal recruitment and estafa4 and accordingly filed
the corresponding Informations5 for the same before the RTC of Manila.
For their defense, appellants proffered denials. Mateo claimed that he is a legitimate
car importer and not a recruiter. Lapiz, on the other hand, denied knowing any of the
private complainants whom she claimed to have met for the first time at the
Prosecutor's Office.
RTC AND CA CONVITED THE ACCUTSED
ISSUE : won ACCUSED IS GUILTY
Held: YES
The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements: (1) the
person charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA
8042; (2) accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment of workers; and, (3) accused committed the same against three or more
persons individually or as a group.13 These elements are obtaining in this case. First,
the RTC found appellants to have undertaken a recruitment activity when they
promised private complainants employment in Japan for a fee. This factual finding
was affirmed by the CA. "The time-tested doctrine is that the matter of assigning
values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed
by the trial judge."14 And when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon the Supreme
Court.15 Second, the Certification issued by the POEA unmistakably reveals that
appellants neither have a license nor authority to recruit workers for overseas
employment. Notably, appellants never assailed this Certification. Third, it was
established that there were five complainants. Clearly, the existence of the offense of
illegal recruitment in large scale was duly proved by the prosecution.
G.R. No. 199208, July 30, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.
FACTS : from December 1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with
handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI.1
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals
from the funds of WPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal
benefit.2 Cahilig would prepare disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the
WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds from one of
WPESLAI’s bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other bank account. The
withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as
WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferring funds from one bank account to
another was said to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not
actually transfer the funds. Instead, she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI
ledger that a deposit was made into her account and then she would fill out a
withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital contribution.
RTC and CA convicted the accused of crime of qualified theft
Issue : WON accused is guilty?
HELD : YES Qualified Theft

Article 310, in relation to Article 308, of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of
Qualified Theft:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding
articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if
the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or
fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. - Theft is committed by any person who, with intent
to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the
local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall
remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall
hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm
products.
Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are
as follows:
Taking of personal property;
That the said property belongs to another;
That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
That it be done without the owner’s consent;
That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,
nor of force upon things;
That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.8
It is clear that all the elements of Qualified Theft are present in these cases.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her
position. Her intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately
executed scheme to commit the theft.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, “must be the result of
the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the
appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence
between them which the appellant abused.”9
Cahilig’s position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it
involves “handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing” money from WPESLAI’s
depositors and other funds of the association. Cahilig’s responsibilities as WPESLAI
cashier required prudence and vigilance over the money entrusted into her care.
Magsumbol vs People
G.R. No. 207175
November 26, 2014
Facts:
Around 11:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 1, 2002, Caringal, the
overseer of a one-hectare unregistered parcel of land located in Candelaria, Quezon
and co-owned by Menandro, saw the four accused, along with seven others, cutting
down the coconut trees on the said property. On February 3, 2002, Menandro and
Caringal reported the incident to the police. Thereafter, the two, accompanied by
SPO1 Manalo, went to the coconut plantation and discovered that about thirty-three
(33) coconut trees had been cut down.
On the other hand, according to Atanacio, he authorized his brothers-in-
law, Magsino and Magsumbol, to cut down the coconut trees within the boundary of
his property, which was adjacent to the land co-owned by Menandro. In addition, Brgy.
Captain Arguelles also said that Magsumbol, Magsino, Ramirez, and Inanoria came
to his office seeking permission to cut down the coconut trees planted on the land of
Atanacio.
Petitioner Magsumbol and his co-accused, was convicted of the crime of
theft.
Issue:
Whether or not malice and intent to gain, as elements of the crime of theft,
are present in the case at hand.
Ruling:
No. Malice and intent are not present in the case at hand.
In view of the conflicting claims and considering the meager evidence on
hand, the Court cannot determine with certainty the owner of the 33 felled coconut
trees. The uncertainty of the exact location of the coconut trees negates the presence
of the criminal intent to gain.
At any rate, granting arguendo that the said coconut trees were within
Menandro’s land, no malice or criminal intent could be rightfully attributed to
Magsumbol and his co-accused. The RTC and the CA overlooked one important point
in the present case, to wit: Magsumbol and his co-accused went to Barangay Kinatihan
I, Candelaria, Quezon, to cut down the coconut trees belonging to Atanacio upon the
latter’s instruction.
The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol
and his co-accused even sought prior permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut
down the coconut trees which was done openly and during broad daylight effectively
negated malice and criminal intent on their part. It defies reason that the accused
would still approach the barangay captain if their real intention was to steal the coconut
trees of Menandro.
People v. Macabando (Arson) FACTS: At 4:00pm on December 21, 2001, appellant
broke bottles on the road holding G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even
(“manabla ko”). Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house. At 6:35 pm,
Cornelio saw smoke coming from appellant’s house. He got a pail of water, and
poured its contents into the fire. Eric Quilantang, a neighbor, ran to the barangay
headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house,
the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere;
the appellant then fired 3 shots in the air. The appellant also told the people around
that whoever would put out the fire would be killed. Appellant’s Defense: He admitted
that he felt angry because one of his radio cassettes for sale had been stolen. He
appellant claimed that he went to sleep after looking for his missing radio cassette,
and that the fire had already started when he woke up. He denied making a threat to
burn his house and maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the
gunshots came from the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the
New Year celebration. The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of
destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC. The RTC found him guilty and
sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed. ISSUE:
W/N he was guilty? Yes. HELD: The following circumstances constitute an unbroken
chain of circumstantial events that leads to an unavoidable conclusion that the
appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his house. The combination of these
circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that the appellant set fire to
his house. We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his
neighbors from putting out the fire in his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if
he had nothing to do with the crime. The first impulse of an individual whose house is
on fire is to save his loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature,
reason and natural order of things for a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put
out the fire in his burning property. By carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire, the
appellant showed his determination to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to
note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire which, to
our mind, showed deliberate planning and preparedness on his part to flee the raging
fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that he was asleep inside his house when
the fire broke out, and that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the
appellant’s indifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the
people who tried to put out the fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning
house, belied his claim of innocence. ISSUE: What is the crime he is guilty of? Arson
under PD 1613. HELD: Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures,
both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories
and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group
of persons. PD 1613 governs simple arson. Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The
penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the
property burned is any of the following: 2. Any inhabited house or dwelling; P.D. No.
1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless
of size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659. This law punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that
constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and national
security implications than destructive arson. The elements of simple arson under
Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have
been proven. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house,
and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were
established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which
the trial and appellate courts found credible and convincing, and through the report of
the Bureau of Fire Protection which stated that damaged houses were residential,
and that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the certification from the City Social
Welfare and Development Department likewise indicated that the burned houses
were used as dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story
house was used as a residence. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised
Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national
security implications than Destructive Arson. Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D.
No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua. The court also applied the ISL sentencing accused to I 0 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 16 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum

ERNESTO PIDELI v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 163437, 13 February 2008, Third Division, (Reyes, R.T.,J.)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Placido Cancio (Placido) and Wilson Pideli (Wilson) were partners and
subcontractors in a rip rapping and spillway project at Benguet. Petitioner Ernesto
Pideli extended his credit limit with the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware
(MTFSH) to Placido and Wilson for their purchase of construction materials. After the
release of the final payment to Wilson and Placido, they calculated their expenses
and realized a net income of P130, 000.00. This was fully entrusted to the custody of
Pideli for the settlement of their account with MTFHS. Pideli was instructed that the
balance should be delivered to Wilson and Placido. The two, however, did not
anymore receive anything from Pideli. They were informed that nothing was left from
the proceeds after the settlement of their account. A criminal complaint was filed
against him and the Regional Trial Court found Pideli guilty of the crime of theft. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pideli is guilty of theft or estafa
HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
The elements of theft are as follows:
1. That there be taking of personal property;
2. That said property belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation
of persons or force upon things.
There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner received the final
payment due the partners Placido and Wilson under the pretext of paying off their
obligation with the MTFSH. Under the terms of their agreement, petitioner was to
account for the remaining balance of the said funds and give each of the partners
their respective shares. He, however, failed to give private complainant Placido what
was due him under the construction contract.
In an effort to exculpate himself, petitioner posits that he cannot be held liable for
theft of the unaccounted funds. The monies subject matter of the complaint pertain to
the partnership. As an agent of partner Wilson, intent to gain cannot be imputed
against petitioner.
Although there is misappropriation of funds here, petitioner was correctly found guilty
of theft. As early as U.S. v. De Vera, the Court has consistently ruled that not all
misappropriation is estafa.
The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken
while in estafa the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or
benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the
property. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto
possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he
has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes
embezzlement or estafa.
R. No. 163705 July 30, 2007
NOMER OCAMPO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
On 22 May 1996, petitioner Nomer Ocampo, Elmer Miranda, and Danilo Cruz were
charged with the crime of robbery with physical injuries. The Information reads:
That on or about the 14th day of November 1995, at around 8:15 o’clock in the
evening, in Barangay San Nicolas I, Municipality of Magalang, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent of gain and by means of force and intimidation grab one Rommel Q. Misayah
by the neck and armed with a bladed weapon attack the latter, inflicting upon him
physical injuries which required and did require medical attendance, and on the
occasion thereof, accused in furtherance of their intent to gain did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away with them the following,
to wit:
a) One (1) Icom radio . . . ₱4,500.00
b) Two (2) T-shirts . . . 350.00
c) A pair of maong pants . . . 345.00
d) A clutch bag . . . 150.00
e) Cash . . . 29,000.00
with a total value of THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
FORTY FIVE (₱34,345.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, belonging to
and owned by the said Rommel Q. Misayah, to the damage and
prejudice of the owner, in the afore-said [sic] amount.
RTC and CA both convicted the accused
Issue: Won accused is guilty?
HELD; YES
The variance in the assigned nomenclatures may give rise to the false impression
that robbery with physical injuries under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code is
distinct from robbery with intimidation as well as robbery with violence against
persons. The title or heading of Article 294 reads "Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons." Said heading is clearly the general nomenclature given to all
five (5) types of robbery enumerated
thereunder.26 Paragraphs 2 to 5 cover robbery with physical injuries.27 Paragraph 5,
in particular, defines what is known as simple robbery. Simple robbery involves only
slight or less serious physical injuries.28 For conviction under this paragraph, the
injury inflicted should not fall within the categories provided for in paragraphs 1 to 4
of Article 294. Thus, over and above the dichotomy of the terms employed, it is
certain and beyond dispute that the three accused were tried for the crime under
Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code.
People vs Regala
G.R. No. 130508
April 5, 2000
Criminal Case Digest
Facts:
On the night of September 11, 1995, at Barangay Bangon in Aroroy, Masbate, then
16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her grandmother, Counselo Arevalo, were
sleeping, when appellant Armando Regala and his two other companions entered
the former’s house.
Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen and went to the
room of the victims and poked at 8-inch gun on them, one after the other, and
hogtied both of them. Armando raped Nerissa in bed while her grandmother was
hogtied on the floor. Later, she saw her grandmother’s aparador being opened where
two rings, two wrist watches, and money were taken from the aparador. After raping
her in bed, Nerissa saw accused-appellant counting the money taken from the
aparador. Thereafter, she was brought to the kitchen, still hogtied and was raped
again by the accused.
He was convicted in the lower court but accused-appellant appealed his criminal
case at the Regional Trial Court in Masbate. He questioned the sufficiency of the
prosecution’s evidence in identifying him as one of the perpetrators of the crime
charged. And based on medico-legal, Dr. Conchita Ulanday, a health officer of
Aroroy, testified herself that the complaining witness “either” voluntarily submitted to
a sexual act or was forced into one.
Issue:
(a) Whether additional rape committed in a crime of robbery be considered as an
aggravating circumstance?
Held:
On cross-examination, both Nerissa Tagala and Consuelo Arevalo, separately
testified that they saw the face of Regala, despite of no electricity at the commission
of the crime, because he used a flashlight and took off the mask he was wearing,
and thus, they remembered him wearing an earring of his left ear, which he was still
wearing at the time of the police line-up inside the police station.
The trial court held that contradiction referred to a minor detail, cannot detract from
the fact, that both Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified the accused-appellant.
As correctly pointed out by the appellee, the victim was a 16-year old barrio lass, not
exposed to the ways of the world and was not shown to have any ill-motive to falsely
implicate accused-appellant, who was a stranger. Hence, Dr. Ulanday’s testimony
does not support the contention of accused-appellant that the victim voluntarily
submitted to sexual advances of Regala.
The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was already in
force. Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, now provides,
under paragraph 1 thereof: (1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for
any reason of or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.
In this case, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should not
be considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial
court is proper. The judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, where the victim is entitled to
an additional award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
G.R. No. 77368 October 5, 1993
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 93, AND SPOUSES DANILO A. ALCANTARA AND
ISABELITA ESGUERRA-ALCANTARA, respondents.
On 09 September 1985, robbery was committed in Quezon City in the house of Jose
L. Obillos, Sr., where various pieces of precious jewelry alleged to be worth millions
of pesos were taken. an information, dated 22 October 1985, for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law," was also
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 42433, against herein respondent spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and
Isabelita Esguerra-Alcantara, from whose possession the jewelries stolen were
recovered in Antipolo, Rizal
Issue : Accused filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
Held: Denied
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain,
by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything.7 "Fencing", upon the other hand, is the act of any person who, with intent to
gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal,
sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article,
item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.8
The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The law on
fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to
commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of
robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act of
fencing in order that it can be consummated. True, the object property in fencing
must have been previously taken by means of either robbery or theft but the place
where the robbery or theft occurs is inconsequential. It may not be suggested, for
instance, that, in the crime of bigamy which presupposes a prior subsisting marriage
of an accused, the case should thereby be triable likewise at the place where the
prior marriage has been contracted.9
We are not unaware of a number of instances 10 when the Court would allow a
change of venue in criminal cases "whenever the interest of justice and truth so
demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the
court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and
impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice." 11 Here, however, we do not see
the attendance of such compelling circumstances, nor are we prepared to state that
the lower court gravely abused its discretion in its questioned orders.
People vs. Puno (Crim1)
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias
"Beloy," and Enrique Amurao y Puno, alias "Enry," accused-appellants
En Banc
Regalado, February 17, 1993
Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific
intent
Facts:
January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the
personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao
purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop
in Araneta Ave, QC
He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an
emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his place
When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into
her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving
After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man,
accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver
Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get
money" from her
Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused
But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs.
Sarmiento to issue a check for P100,000
Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check
Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind
and turned the car again towards Pampanga
According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other
side of the superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress
had blood because according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured
when she jumped out of the car
The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that
according to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs.
Sarmiento to step out of the car
He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his
employer had gotten a ride
He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the
highway
Issue:
Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged
Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD
No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
Holding:
No.
No.
Ratio:
There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or
at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the
extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty
In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders
This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention
Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our
country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then
existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of
outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the origin of the law on highway
robbery)
PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by
outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways and
not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim
The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually
operating on a highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case
This is not justified by the accused's intention
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2
months or prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused
to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)
[G.R. No. 138470. April 1, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARTEMIO GARCIA y CRUZ, JR.
and REGALADO BERNABE yORBE, accused.
REGALADO BERNABE y ORBE, appellant.
This is an appeal from the decision[1] dated March 10, 1999 of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 830-M-98, finding
Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe y Orbe guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Carnapping with Homicide and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On June 3, 1998, Artemio Garcia, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe were charged
with the crime of Carnapping with Homicide as defined in Republic Act No. 6539. The
Information against them reads:
That on or about the 21st day of December, 1996, in the municipality of San Rafael,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping with each
other, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
by means of violence and intimidation, forcibly take from the driver Wilfredo Elis a
brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX with Plate No. UJL-761 owned by Fernando Ignacio;
That during the commission of the offense, or by reason thereof, the said accused,
armed with bladed weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, did
then and there, with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab Wilfredo Elis in different parts of his body causing mortal wounds which
directly resulted in his death.
Issue: Won accused is guilty
Held: yes
A careful examination of the evidence presented shows that all the elements
of carnapping were proved in this case.
Unlawful taking is the taking of a vehicle without the consent of the owner, or
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things;
it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing,
even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.[18]
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the nature of the appellants
possession of the Tamaraw FX was initially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful killing
of the deceased for the purpose of taking the vehicle radically transformed the
character of said possession into an unlawful one. Cortez categorically stated that
during his first visit to the Moncada Police Station where appellant and his co-accused
were detained, the two separately admitted to him that they killed the deceased when
the latter refused to join their plan to sell the vehicle. Their confession, having been
freely and voluntarily given to Cortez, a private individual, is admissible against the
appellant.[19] Thus, the duration of the lease of the Tamaraw FX, whether for an
indefinite period as contended by the defense, or only for 4 days, as claimed by the
prosecution, has no bearing on the culpability of the appellant. It does not matter
whether the unlawful taking occurred within the period of the lease. What is decisive
here is the purpose of appellant and his co-accused in killing the victim. Such is the
vital point on which the crime and the nature thereof is to be determined. To reiterate,
the prosecution was able to establish that appellant and his co-accused stabbed the
victim to death because he refused to join them in their plan to appropriate the
vehicle. This undoubtedly satisfied the element of unlawful taking through violence,
rendering appellant liable for the crime charged.
Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed by appellant constituted
the crime of carnapping even if the deceased was the driver of the vehicle and not the
owner. The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property through
intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the
personal property be the owner thereof. What is simply required is that the property
taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the property by the person
dispossessed suffices. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from
another against the latter's will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro,
unlawful taking of a property belonging to another is imputable to the offender. [20]