LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND G.R. No.
171972 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has
PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ,
versus
TERESITA V. SALVADOR
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Agricultural tenancy is not presumed but must be proven by the person
alleging it.
This Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assails the August 24, 2005 Decision[2] and the February 20, 2006
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No.
86599. However, per Resolution[4] of this Court dated August 30, 2006, the
instant petition shall be treated as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the same Rules.
Factual Antecedents
On May 22, 2003, respondent Teresita V. Salvador filed a
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer,[5] docketed as Civil Case No. 330,
against petitioners Lucia (Lucia) and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and
daughter, respectively before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Dalaguete, Cebu.[6] Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a
parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-
27140[7] issued by virtue of Free Patent No. (VII-5) 2646 in the name of the
Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador;[8] that
petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her
predecessors-in-interest;[9] and that despite several verbal and written
demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land.[10]
In their Answer,[11] petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural
tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased husband, Serapio, entered
the subject land with the consent and permission of respondents
predecessors-in-interest, siblings Cristino and Sana Salvador, under the
agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote the property to agricultural
production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings.[12] Since there
is a tenancy relationship between the parties, petitioners argued that it is the
jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC.[13]
On July 10, 2003, the preliminary conference was terminated and
the parties were ordered to submit their respective position papers together
with the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence to support their
respective claims.[14]
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court
On September 10, 2003, the MTC promulgated a
Decision[15] finding the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship
between the parties, and thereby, dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the Decision read:
Based on the facts presented, it is established that
defendant Lucia Rodriguez and her husband Serapio
Rodriguez were instituted as agricultural tenants on the lot
in question by the original owner who was the predecessor-
in-interest of herein plaintiff Teresita Salvador. The consent
given by [the]original owner to constitute [defendants] as
agricultural tenants of subject landholdings binds plaintiff
who as successor-in-interest of the original owner Cristino
Salvador steps into the latters shoes acquiring not only his
rights but also his obligations towards the herein
defendants. In the instant case, the consent to tenurial
arrangement between the parties is inferred from the fact
that the plaintiff and her successors-in-interest had received
their share of the harvests of the property in dispute from
the defendants.
Moreover, dispossession of agricultural tenants can
only be ordered by the Court for causes expressly provided
under Sec. 36 of R.A. 3844. However, this Court has no
jurisdiction over detainer case involving agricultural
tenants as ejectment and dispossession of said tenants is
within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and Agricultural Board
 (DARAB). ([S]ee Sec. 1(1.4) DARAB 2003 Rules of
Procedure[.])
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
instant complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack
of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal, docketed as Civil Case No.
AV-1237, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Argao, Cebu, Branch
26.[17]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On January 12, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision[18] remanding
the case to
the MTC for preliminary hearing to determine whether tenancy relationship
exists between the parties.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration[19] arguing that the purpose of
a preliminary hearing was served by the parties submission of their
respective position papers and other supporting evidence.
On June 23, 2004, the RTC granted the reconsideration and
affirmed the MTC Decision dated September 10, 2003. The fallo of the
new Decision[20] reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
GRANTED. The Decision dated September 10, 2003 of
the Municipal Trial Court of Dalaguete, Cebu, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
[21]
IT IS SO DECIDED.
Respondent sought reconsideration[22] but it was denied by the RTC
in an Order[23] dated August 18, 2004.
Thus, respondent filed a Petition for Review[24] with the CA,
docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 86599.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered judgment in favor of
respondent. It ruled that no tenancy relationship exists between the parties
because petitioners failed to prove that respondent or her predecessors-in-
interest consented to the tenancy relationship.[25] The CA likewise gave no
probative value to the affidavits
of petitioners witnesses as it found their statements insufficient to establish
petitioners status as agricultural tenants.[26] If at all, the affidavits merely
showed that petitioners occupied the subject land with the consent of the
original owners.[27] And since petitioners are occupying the subject land by
mere tolerance, they are bound by an implied promise to vacate the same
upon demand by the respondent.[28] Failing to do so, petitioners are liable to
pay damages.[29] Thus, the CA disposed of the case in this manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us SETTING
ASIDE, as we hereby set aside, the decision rendered by
the RTC of Argao, Cebu on June 23, 2004 in Civil Case
No. AV-1237 and ORDERING the remand of this case to
the MTC of Dalaguete, Cebu for the purpose of
determining the amount of actual damages suffered by the
[respondent] by reason of the [petitioners] refusal and
failure to turn over to [respondent] the possession and
enjoyment of the land and, then, to make such award of
damages to the [respondent].
SO ORDERED.[30]
Issues
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I.
 WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS Our Ruling
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF The petition lacks merit.
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS- Agricultural tenancy
DEFENDANTS ARE NOT TENANTS OF relationship does not exist
THE SUBJECT LAND. in the instant case.

II.
WHETHER X X X SUCH RULING OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS HAS FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS
AND IS SUPPORTED WITH SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.[31]
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners contend that under Section 5[32] of Republic Act No.
3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, tenancy
may be constituted by agreement of the parties either orally or in writing,
expressly or impliedly.[33] In this case, there was an implied consent to
constitute a tenancy relationship as respondent and her predecessors-in-
interest allowed petitioners to cultivate the land and share the harvest with
the landowners for more than 40 years.[34]
Petitioners further argue that the CA erred in disregarding the
affidavits executed by their witnesses as these are sufficient to prove the
existence of a tenancy relationship.[35] Petitioners claim that their witnesses
had personal knowledge of the cultivation and the sharing of harvest.[36]
Respondents Arguments
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that petitioners are not
agricultural tenants because mere cultivation of an agricultural land does
not make the tiller an agricultural tenant.[37]Respondent insists that her
predecessors-in-interest merely tolerated petitioners occupation of the
subject land.[38]
Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are
present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3)
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest
is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.[39]
In this case, to prove that an agricultural tenancy relationship exists
between the parties, petitioners submitted as evidence the affidavits of
petitioner Lucia and their neighbors. In her affidavit,[40] petitioner Lucia
declared that she and her late husband occupied the subject land with the
consent and permission of the original owners and that their agreement was
that she and her late husband would cultivate the subject land, devote it to
agricultural production, share the harvest with the landowners on a 50-50
basis, and at the same time watch over the land. Witness Alejandro Arias
attested in his affidavit[41] that petitioner Lucia and her husband, Serapio,
have been cultivating the subject land since 1960; that after the demise of
Serapio, petitioner Lucia and her children continued to cultivate the subject
land; and that when respondents predecessors-in-interest were still alive, he
would often see them and respondent get some of the harvest.The
affidavit[42] of witness Conseso Muoz stated, in essence, that petitioner
Lucia has been in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject
property since 1960 and that the harvest was divided into two parts, for the
landowner and for petitioner Lucia.
The statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not
sufficient to prove the existence of an agricultural tenancy.

As correctly found by the CA, the element of consent is

lacking.[43] Except for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia, no other evidence
was submitted to show that respondents predecessors-in-interest consented sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and
to a tenancy relationship with petitioners. Self-serving statements, however, occupation of the property, and not the damages which [she] may have
will not suffice to prove consent of the landowner; independent evidence is suffered but which have no direct relation to [her] loss of material
necessary.[44] possession.[49]

Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing of
harvest. The affidavits of petitioners neighbors declaring that respondent
and her predecessors-in-interest received their share in the harvest are not
sufficient. Petitioners should have presented receipts or any other evidence
to show that there was sharing of harvest[45] and that there was an agreed
system of sharing between them and the landowners.[46]
As we have often said, mere occupation or cultivation of an
agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an agricultural
tenant.[47] It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural
tenant to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural
tenancy.[48]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 24,
2005 Decision and the February 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 86599 are AFFIRMED. This case is
ordered REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of Dalaguete, Cebu, to
determine the amount of damages suffered by respondent by reason of the
refusal and failure of petitioners to turn over the possession of the subject
land, with utmost dispatch consistent with the above disquisition.
SO ORDERED.

In the instant case, petitioners failed to prove consent and sharing of

harvest between the parties. Consequently, their defense of agricultural
tenancy must fail. The MTC has jurisdiction over the instant case. No error
can therefore be attributed to the CA in reversing and setting aside the
dismissal of respondents complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly,
the remand of the case to the MTC for the determination of the amount of
damages due respondent is proper.

Respondent is entitled to
the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation
for the use and
occupation of the subject
land.

We must, however, clarify that the only damage that can be

recovered [by respondent] is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. The reason
for this is that [in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases], the only issue
raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages
which could be recovered are those which the [respondent] could have
JUAN GALOPE - versus –
CRESENCIA BUGARIN, represented by
CELSO RABANG
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioner Juan Galope appeals the Decision[1] dated September 26,
2008 and Resolution[2] dated December 12, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97143. The CA ruled that there is
no tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondent Cresencia
Bugarin.
The facts and antecedent proceedings are as follows:
Respondent owns a parcel of land located in Sto. Domingo, Nueva
Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-
229582.[3] Petitioner farms the land.[4]
In Barangay Case No. 99-6, respondent complained that she lent the
land to petitioner in 1992 without an agreement, that what she
receives in return from petitioner is insignificant, and that she wants
to recover the land to farm it on her own. Petitioner countered that
respondent cannot recover the land yet for he had been farming it for
a long time and that he pays rent ranging from P4,000 to P6,000 or
15 cavans of palay per harvest. The case was not settled.[5]
Represented by Celso Rabang, respondent filed a petition for
recovery of possession, ejectment and payment of rentals before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
docketed as DARAB Case No. 9378. Rabang claimed that
respondent lent the land to petitioner in 1991 and that the latter gave
nothing in return as a sign of gratitude or monetary consideration for
the use of the land. Rabang also claimed that petitioner mortgaged
the land to Jose Allingag who allegedly possesses the land.[6]
After due proceedings, the Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the
petition and ruled that petitioner is a tenant entitled to security of
tenure. The Adjudicator said substantial evidence prove the tenancy
relationship between petitioner and respondent. The Adjudicator
noted the certification of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
that petitioner is the registered farmer of the land; that Barangay
Tanods said that petitioner is the tenant of the land; that Jose
Allingag affirmed petitioners possession and cultivation of the land;
that Allingag also stated that petitioner hired him only as farm helper;
and that respondents own witness, Cesar Andres, said that petitioner
is a farmer of the land.[7]
On appeal, the DARAB disagreed with the Adjudicator and ruled that
petitioner is not a de jure tenant. The DARAB ordered petitioner to
pay rentals and vacate the land, and the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer to assist in computing the rentals.
The DARAB found no tenancy relationship between the parties and
stressed that the elements of consent and sharing are not present. The
DARAB noted petitioners failure to prove his payment of rentals by
appropriate receipts, and said that the affidavits of Allingag, Rolando
Alejo and Angelito dela Cruz are self-serving and are not concrete
proof to rebut the allegation of nonpayment of rentals. The DARAB
added that respondents intention to lend her land to petitioner cannot
be taken as implied tenancy for such lending was without
consideration.[8]
Petitioner appealed, but the CA affirmed DARABs ruling that no
tenancy relationship exists; that the elements of consent and sharing
are not present; that respondents act of lending her land without
consideration cannot be taken as implied tenancy; and that no
receipts prove petitioners payment of rentals.[9]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition. Petitioner alleges that
the CA erred
[I.]
x x x IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF
THE DARAB AND IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
 THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PETITIONER THAT HE IS INDEED A TENANT[;]
[II.]
x x x IN RELYING MAINLY ON THE ABSENCE
OF RECEIPTS OF THE PAYMENTS OF LEASE
RENTALS IN DECLARING THE ABSENCE OF
CONSENT AND SHARING TO ESTABLISH A
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENT[; AND]
[III.]
x x x WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE PETITIONER
HAS NOT DISCHARGED THE BURDEN [OF]
PROVING BY WAY OF SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE HIS ALLEGATIONS OF TENANCY
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RESPONDENT.[10]
The main issue to be resolved is whether there exists a tenancy
relationship between the parties.
Petitioner submits that substantial evidence proves the tenancy
relationship between him and respondent. Specifically, he points out
that (1) his possession of the land is undisputed; (2) the DAR
certified that he is the registered farmer of the land; and (3) receipts
prove his payment of irrigation fees. On the absence of receipts as
proof of rental payments, he urges us to take judicial notice of an
alleged practice in the provinces that payments between relatives are
not supported by receipts. He also calls our attention to the affidavits
of Jose Allingag, Rolando Alejo and Angelito dela Cruz attesting that
he pays 15 cavans of palay to respondent.[11]
In her comment, respondent says that no new issues and substantial
matters are raised in the petition. She thus prays that we deny the
petition for lack of merit.[12]
We find the petition impressed with merit and we hold that the CA
and DARAB erred in ruling that there is no tenancy relationship
between the parties.
The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1)
the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2)
the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.[13]
The CA and DARAB ruling that there is no sharing of harvest is
based on the absence of receipts to show petitioners payment of
rentals. We are constrained to reverse them on this point. The matter
of rental receipts is not an issue given respondents admission that she
receives rentals from petitioner. To recall, respondents complaint
in Barangay Case No. 99-6 was that the rental or the amount she
receives from petitioner is not much.[14] This fact is evident on the
record[15] of said case which is signed by respondent and was even
attached as Annex D of her DARAB petition. Consequently, we are
thus unable to agree with DARABs ruling that the affidavits[16] of
witnesses that petitioner pays 15 cavans of palay or the equivalent
thereof in pesos as rent are not concrete proof to rebut the allegation
of nonpayment of rentals. Indeed, respondents admission confirms
their statement that rentals are in fact being paid. Such admission
belies the claim of respondents representative, Celso Rabang, that
petitioner paid nothing for the use of the land.
Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement, respondents
act of allowing the petitioner to cultivate her land and receiving
rentals therefor indubitably show her consent to an unwritten tenancy
agreement. An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by
the explicit provisions of a written contract alone.[17] Section 5[18] of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural
Land Reform Code, recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation
may exist upon an oral agreement.
Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are
present. Respondent is the landowner; petitioner is her tenant. The
subject matter of their relationship is agricultural land, a farm
land.[19] They mutually agreed to the cultivation of the land by
petitioner and share in the harvest. The purpose of their relationship
is clearly to bring about agricultural production. After the harvest,
petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or its equivalent in
cash. Respondents motion[20] to supervise harvesting and threshing,
processes in palay farming, further confirms the purpose of their
agreement. Lastly, petitioners personal cultivation of the land[21] is
conceded by respondent who likewise never denied the fact that they
share in the harvest.
Petitioners status as a de jure tenant having been established, we now
address the issue of whether there is a valid ground to eject petitioner
from the land.
Respondent, as landowner/agricultural lessor, has the burden to prove
the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of petitioner, the
tenant/agricultural lessee.[22] This rule proceeds from the principle
that a tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to a
security of tenure.[23] The tenant can only be ejected from the
agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law.[24]
Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844 enumerates these grounds, to wit:
SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding;
Exceptions. Notwithstanding any agreement as to the
period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural
lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession
of his landholding except when his dispossession has
been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is
final and executory if after due hearing it is shown
that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his
immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if
suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or
school site or other useful non-agricultural
purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall
be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to
five years rental on his landholding in addition to his
rights under Sections [25] and [34], except when the
land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor is not
more than five hectares, in which case instead of
disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled
to an advance notice of at least one agricultural year
before ejectment proceedings are filed against
him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not
cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to
substantially carry out such conversion within one
year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be
presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant
shall have the right to demand possession of the land
and recover damages for any loss incurred by him
because of said dispossession;
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially
comply with any of the terms and conditions of the
contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless
his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force
majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the
landholding for a purpose other than what had been
previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm
practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section
[29];
(5) The land or other substantial permanent
improvement thereon is substantially damaged or
destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through
the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;
 (6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease
rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-
payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to
the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a
fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a
ground for dispossession, although the obligation to
pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby
extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his
landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of
Section [27].
Through Rabang, respondent alleged (1) nonpayment of any
consideration, (2) lack of tenancy relationship, (3) petitioner
mortgaged the land to Allingag who allegedly possesses the land, and
(4) she will manage/cultivate the land.[25] None of these grounds were
proven by the respondent.
As aforesaid, respondent herself admitted petitioners payment of
rentals. We also found that a tenancy relationship exists between the
parties.
On the supposed mortgage, Allingag himself denied it in his
affidavit.[26] No such a deed of mortgage was submitted in
evidence. Rabangs claim is based on a hearsay statement of Cesar
Andres that he came to know the mortgage from residents of the
place where the land is located.[27]
That Allingag possesses the land is also based on Andress hearsay
statement. On the contrary, Allingag stated in his affidavit that he is
merely petitioners farm helper.[28] We have held that the employment
of farm laborers to perform some aspects of work does not preclude
the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship, provided that
an agricultural lessee does not leave the entire process of cultivation
in the hands of hired helpers. Indeed, while the law explicitly
requires the agricultural lessee and his immediate family to work on
the land, we have nevertheless declared that the hiring of farm
laborers by the tenant on a temporary, occasional, or emergency basis
does not negate the existence of the element of personal cultivation
essential in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold relationship.[29] There
is no showing that petitioner has left the entire process of cultivating
the land to Allingag. In fact, respondent has admitted that petitioner
still farms the land.[30]
On respondents claim that she will cultivate the land, it is no longer a
valid ground to eject petitioner. The original provision of Section 36
(1) of R.A. No. 3844 has been removed from the statute
books[31] after its amendment by Section 7 of R.A. No.
6389[32] on September 10, 1971, to wit:
SEC. 7. Section 36 (1) of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department
head upon recommendation of the National Planning
Commission to be suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided,
That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the
average of the gross harvests on his landholding
during the last five preceding calendar years.
Since respondent failed to prove nonpayment of rentals, petitioner
may not be ejected from the landholding. We emphasize, however,
that as long as the tenancy relationship subsists, petitioner must
continue paying rentals. For the law provides that nonpayment of
lease rental, if proven, is a valid ground to dispossess him of
respondents land.Henceforth, petitioner should see to it that his rental
payments are properly covered by receipts.
Finally, the records show that Allingag, petitioners co-respondent in
DARAB Case No. 9378, did not join petitioners appeal to the CA. If
Allingag did not file a separate appeal, the DARAB decision had
become final as to him. We cannot grant him any relief.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the
Decision dated September 26, 2008 and Resolution dated December
12, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97143.
The petition filed by respondent Cresencia Bugarin in DARAB Case
No. 9378 is hereby DISMISSED insofar as petitioner Juan Galope is
concerned.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition[1] for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision[2] dated April 12, 2005 which reversed the
Decision[3]

JOAQUIN SOLIMAN, LAZARO G.R. No. 169589 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
ALMARIO, ISIDRO ALMARIO, (DARAB) dated January 15, 2004 and reinstated the
BALDOMERO ALMARIO, Present: Decision[4] of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
DEMETRIO SOLIMAN, (PARAD) of San Fernando, Pampanga dated August 16,
ROMEO ABARIN, YNARES-
SANTIAGO, J., 1995.
ERNESTO TAPANG and
CRISOSTOMO ABARIN, Chairperson,
Petitioners, CHICO-NAZARIO, The Facts
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and The respondents recount the antecedents, as follows:
- versus - PERALTA, JJ.

The property subject of this case is situated at Cabalantian,

PAMPANGA SUGAR Bacolor, Pampanga, with an area of ten (10) hectares, more
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY or less, previously covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(PASUDECO), INC. and GERRY Promulgated: (TCT) No. 70829-R (subject property) and formerly owned
RODRIGUEZ, by one Dalmacio Sicat (Dalmacio).
Respondents.
June 16, 2009
On December 2, 1969, Dalmacio offered to sell the subject
property to respondent Pampanga Sugar Development
Company (PASUDECO), a domestic corporation engaged
in sugar milling, to be used as a housing complex for
PASUDECO's laborers and employees. The land was
offered for sale at the price of P8.00 per square meter.[5] On
January 26, 1970, Dalmacio reduced the price to P5.00 per
square meter.[6] In a meeting held on April 15, 1970, the
Board of Directors of PASUDECO issued Board
Resolution No. 057[7]authorizing the purchase of the
subject property at P4.00 per square meter.
[8]
On May 22, 1970, Dalmacio and his tenants jointly filed
a Petition[9] with the then Court of Agrarian Relations
(CAR), San Fernando, Pampanga, seeking approval of the
voluntary surrender of the subject property with payment of
disturbance compensation. On the same date, the
CAR rendered
a Decision,[10] approving the voluntary surrender of the
subject property by the tenants to Dalmacio, thus,
terminating their tenancy relationship effective May 21,
1970, the date when the parties entered into the agreement.
On May 22, 1970, a Deed[11] of Sale with Mortgage was
executed between Dalmacio and PASUDECO. Thereafter,
the documents needed for the conversion of the land to
residential purposes were prepared, such as the subdivision
layout with specifications as to the size of each lot;
topographic survey; monumenting of all corners of the
subdivision lots; and approval of the plan including the
technical description of the land. No trespassing signs were
also installed around the premises. Thus, on May 31, 1974,
TCT Nos. 110325-R,[12] 110326-R[13] and 110327-
R[14] were registered in favor of PASUDECO. However,
due to financial setbacks suffered after the imposition of
Martial Law in 1972, PASUDECO deferred the
construction of the housing project. PASUDECO averred
that no person was authorized to occupy and/or cultivate
the subject property.
On the other hand, the petitioners have a totally different
version.
Petitioners Joaquin Soliman, Lazaro Almario, Isidro
Almario, Baldomero Almario, Demetrio Soliman, Romeo
Abarin, Ernesto Tapang and Crisostomo Abarin
(petitioners) claimed that, sometime in November 1970,
they started working on the subject property with a
corresponding area of tillage, as certified to by the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) on
December 6, 1989, to wit: (1) Lazaro Almario with an area
of 1.65 hectares;[15] (2) Demetrio Soliman with an area of
1.70 hectares;[16] (3) Crisostomo Abarin with an area of
1.10 hectares;[17] (4) Baldomero Almario with an area of
1.5 hectares;[18] (5) Isidro Almario with an area of 1.5
hectares;[19] (6) Romeo Abarin with an area of 0.400
hectare;[20] and (7) Ernesto Tapang with an area of .6500
hectare.[21] A Certification[22] dated December 28, 1989 was
also issued by the Samahang Nayon in favor of petitioner
Joaquin Soliman with respect to the remaining area of 1.5
hectares. Likewise, on December 28, 1989, the Barangay
Chairperson of Macabacle, Bacolor, Pampanga, certified
that the eight (8) petitioners had been the actual tenant-
tillers of the subject property from 1970 up to the
present,[23] and that petitioner Baldomero Almario
(Baldomero) was issued Certificate of Land Transfer
(CLT) No. 0-043466[24] with an area of 3.2185 hectares on
July 22, 1981.
The Ocular Inspection and the Investigation
[25]
Report issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) on March 13, 1990 showed that since 1970,
petitioners cultivated the subject property, allegedly
managed by the late respondent Gerry Rodriguez (Gerry),
manager of PASUDECO from 1970-1991. Petitioners
alleged that in 1970, Gerry made one Ciriaco Almario
(Ciriaco) his overseer/caretaker, tasked to collect lease
rentals from petitioners. In turn, Ciriaco remitted the rentals
to Gerry. On May 14, 1990, Ciriaco certified that
petitioners were the actual tenant-tillers
[26]
of the subject property. Moreover,
petitioners deposited their alleged rentals with the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in San Fernando, Pampanga,
as land amortizations, in varying amounts, from 1989
to 1993, as shown by the official receipts issued by
LBP.[27] Thus, petitioners averred that from 1970 up to
1990 or for a period of almost twenty (20) years, they had
been in actual and peaceful possession and cultivation of
the subject property.
The real controversy arose when PASUDECO decided to
pursue the development of the property into a housing
project for its employees in the latter part of April 1990. On
May 14, 1990, petitioners filed a Complaint[28] for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with a Prayer for the
issuance of a Preliminary Injunction against Gerry before
the PARAD to restrain him from harassing and molesting
petitioners in their respective landholdings. Petitioners
alleged that Gerry, together with armed men, entered the
property and destroyed some of their crops. Traversing the
complaint, Gerry raised as one of his defenses the fact that
PASUDECO was the owner of the subject property. Thus,
on November 26, 1990, petitioners filed their Amended
Complaint[29] impleading PASUDECO as a party-
defendant. Meanwhile, PASUDECO asserted that
petitioners were not tenants but merely interlopers,
usurpers and/or intruders into the subject property.
Trial on the merits ensued. In the process, the PARAD
conducted an ocular inspection and found that the subject
property was planted with palay measuring one (1) foot
high. There were also several dikes or pilapil dividing the
subject property. The PARAD also observed that there was
a big sign installed therein, reading Future Site of
PASUDECO Employees Housing Project.[30]
The PARAD's Ruling
On August 16, 1995, the PARAD dismissed petitioners'
complaint and denied their application for the writ of
preliminary injunction. The PARAD held that petitioners
had not shown direct and convincing proof that they were
tenants of the subject property. Petitioners could not show
any receipt proving payment of lease rentals either to
PASUDECO or Gerry. In addition to the absence of
sharing, the PARAD ruled that there was no consent given
by PASUDECO in order to create a tenancy relationship in
favor of the petitioners.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the
DARAB on September 7, 1995 on the following grounds:
(a) that the PARAD abused its discretion by ignoring or
disregarding evidence which, if considered, would result in
a decision favorable to the petitioners; and (b) that there
were errors in the findings of fact from which equally
erroneous conclusions were drawn, which, if not corrected
on appeal, would cause grave and irreparable damage or
injury to the petitioners.
While the case was pending resolution before the DARAB,
the subject property was devastated by lahar due to the
eruption of Mount Pinatubo sometime in October 1995. As
a result, the farming activities on the subject property
ceased. Shortly thereafter, PASUDECO fenced the subject
property and placed additional signs thereon, indicating
that the same was private property.[31] At present, the
subject property is unoccupied and uncultivated.[32]
The DARAB's Ruling
On January 15, 2004, the DARAB rendered its Decision in
favor of the petitioners, reversing the findings and
conclusions of the PARAD. The DARAB held that,
without the approval of the conversion application filed by
PASUDECO, it could not be substantiated that the subject
property was indeed residential property intended for
housing purposes. Because of this, and the fact that
petitioners tilled the subject property for almost twenty (20)
years, the same remained agricultural in character.
Moreover, the DARAB held that, contrary to the findings
of the PARAD, the elements of consent and sharing were
present in this case. The DARAB, citing Section 5 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844,[33]ratiocinated that
petitioners entered the subject property in 1970 upon the
request of Ciriaco who, with the consent of Gerry as
manager of PASUDECO, was authorized to look for
people to cultivate the subject property. Petitioners
cultivated the same and shared their harvests with
PASUDECO, received by Gerry through Ciriaco. Later on,
when Gerry refused to accept their lease rentals, petitioners
deposited the money with LBP. The DARAB opined that
these pieces of evidence established the fact of consent and
sharing. While express consent was not given, the fact that
Gerry accepted the lease rentals for a considerable number
of years signified an implied consent which, in turn, bound
PASUDECO.
PASUDECO filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34] which
was, however, denied by the DARAB in its
Resolution[35] dated May 21, 2004. Thus, PASUDECO
went to the CA for recourse.[36] However, some of the
records were found missing, as certified by the DARAB on
June 22, 2004.[37]
The CA's Ruling
On April 12, 2005, the CA reversed the DARAB's ruling
and reinstated the PARAD's decision. The CA held that,
while the subject property was agricultural, there was no
tenancy relationship between the parties, express or
implied. The CA concurred in the findings of the PARAD
and found no credible evidence to support the contention
that petitioners were de jure tenants inasmuch as the
elements of consent and sharing were absent. Citing these
Court's rulings in Hilario v. Intermediate Appellate
Court[38] and Bernas v. Court of Appeals,[39] the CA
reiterated that tenancy is not merely a factual relationship
but also a legal relationship; hence, the fact that
PASUDECO, being the owner of the subject property, was
uninvolved in and oblivious to petitioners' cultivation
thereof, tenancy relations did not exist. Thus, the CA
concluded that in the absence of any tenancy relationship
between the parties, the case was outside the jurisdiction of
the DARAB.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration,[40] which
was denied by the CA in its Resolution[41] dated August 3,
2005.
Hence, the instant Petition assigning the following errors:
I. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate the facts of the case when it
ruled that the occupation of the
petitioners of the subject lot was without
the consent of the respondents, express
or implied.
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
applying the principles laid down in the
cases of Hilario v. [Intermediate
Appellate Court]and Bernas v. Court of
Appeals and [in] consequently ruling that
there is no tenancy relation between the
parties.
III. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate the provision[s] of Section
5[,] Republic Act No. 3844 which
provides for the establishment of
agricultural leasehold relation by mere
operation of law.
IV. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred
when it ruled that the instant case [does]
not fall under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication [Board].[42]
This submission boils down to the sole issue of whether
petitioners are de jure tenants of the subject property.
 Our Ruling
The instant Petition is bereft of merit.
Tenants are defined as persons who in themselves and with
the aid available from within their immediate farm
households cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder under
the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both
under the leasehold tenancy system.[43]
Based on the foregoing definition of a tenant, entrenched in
jurisprudence are the following essential elements of
tenancy: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship
is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship
is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and
tenant or agricultural lessee.[44] The presence of all these
elements must be proved by substantial evidence. Unless a
person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is
not entitled to security of tenure and is not covered by the
Land Reform Program of the Government under existing
tenancy laws.[45] Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed.
Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to
security of tenure.[46]
Pertinent are Sections 4 and 5 of Republic Act No. 3844 as
amended, which provide:
SEC. 4. Abolition of Agricultural Share
Tenancy. Agricultural share tenancy, as herein
defined, is hereby declared to be contrary to
public policy and shall be
abolished: Provided, That existing share
tenancy contracts may continue in force and
effect in any region or locality, to be governed
in the meantime by the pertinent provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and
ninety-nine, as amended, until the end of the
agricultural year when the National Land
Reform Council proclaims that all the
government machineries and agencies in that
region or locality relating to leasehold
envisioned in this Code are operating, unless
such contracts provide for a shorter period or
the tenant sooner exercises his option to elect
the leasehold system: Provided, further, That in
order not to jeopardize international
commitments, lands devoted to crops covered
by marketing allotments shall be made the
subject of a separate proclamation that adequate
provisions, such as the organization of
cooperatives, marketing agreements, or other
similar workable arrangements, have been
made to insure efficient management on all
matters requiring synchronization of the
agricultural with the processing phases of such
crops: Provided, furthermore, That where the
agricultural share tenancy contract has ceased
 to be operative by virtue of this Code, or where
such a tenancy contract has been entered into in
violation of the provisions of this Code and is,
therefore, null and void, and the tenant
continues in possession of the land for
cultivation, there shall be presumed to exist a
leasehold relationship under the provisions of
this Code, without prejudice to the right of the
landowner and the former tenant to enter into
any other lawful contract in relation to the land
formerly under tenancy contract, as long as in
the interim the security of tenure of the former
tenant under Republic Act Numbered Eleven
hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, and as
provided in this Code, is not
impaired: Provided, finally, That if a lawful lea
sehold tenancy contract was entered into prior
to the effectivity of this Code, the rights and
obligations arising therefrom shall continue to
subsist until modified by the parties in
accordance with the provisions of this Code.
SEC. 5. Establishment of Agricultural
Leasehold Relation. The agricultural leasehold
relation shall be established by operation of law
in accordance with Section four of this Code
and, in other cases, either orally or in writing,
expressly or impliedly.
The pronouncement of the DARAB that there is, in this
case, tenancy by operation of law under Section 5 of R.A.
No. 3844 is not correct. In Reyes v. Reyes,[47] we held:
Under R.A. 3844, two modes are provided for
in the establishment of an agricultural leasehold
relation: (1) by operation of law in accordance
with Section 4 of the said act; or (2) by oral or
written agreement, either express or implied.
By operation of law simply means the
abolition of the agricultural share tenancy
system and the conversion of share tenancy
relations into leasehold relations. The other
method is the agricultural leasehold contract,
which may either be oral or in writing.
Rather, consistent with the parties' assertions, what we
have here is an alleged case of tenancy by implied
consent. As such, crucial for the creation of tenancy
relations would be the existence of two of the essential
elements, namely, consent and sharing and/or payment of
lease rentals.
After a meticulous review of the records, we find that the
elements of consent and sharing and/or payment of lease
rentals are absent in this case.
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent
of the true and lawful landholder who is either the owner,
lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the property, and
not through the acts of the supposed landholder who has no
right to the property subject of the tenancy. To rule
otherwise would allow collusion among the unscrupulous
to the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder.[48] As
duly found by the PARAD and the CA, Gerry was not
authorized to enter into a tenancy relationship with the
petitioners. In fact, there is no proof that he, indeed, entered
into one. Other than their bare assertions, petitioners rely
on the certification of Ciriaco who, likewise, failed to
substantiate his claim that Gerry authorized him to select
individuals and install them as tenants of the subject
property. Absent substantial evidence showing Ciriaco's
authority from PASUDECO, or even from Gerry, to give
consent to the creation of a tenancy relationship, his actions
could not give rise to an implied tenancy.[49]
Likewise, the alleged sharing and/or payment of lease
rentals was not substantiated other than by the deposit-
payments with the LBP, which petitioners characterized as
amortizations. We cannot close our eyes to the absence of
any proof of payment prior to the deposit-payments with
LBP. Not a single receipt was ever issued by Gerry, duly
acknowledging payment of these rentals from Ciriaco who,
allegedly, personally collected the same from the
petitioners. Notably, the fact of working on another's
landholding, standing alone, does not raise a presumption
of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Substantial
evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot
be satisfied by a mere scintilla of evidence; there must be
concrete evidence on record adequate to prove the element
of sharing. Thus, to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or
any other credible evidence must be presented, because
self-serving statements are inadequate.[50]
The certifications attesting to petitioners' alleged status
as de jure tenants are insufficient. In a given locality, the
certification issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or
an authorized representative, like the MARO or the BARC,
concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy
relationship between the contending parties, is considered
merely preliminary or provisional, hence, such certification
does not bind the judiciary.[51]
The onus rests on the petitioners to prove their affirmative
allegation of tenancy, which they failed to discharge with
substantial evidence. Simply put, he who makes an
affirmative allegation of an issue has the burden of proving
the same, and in the case of the plaintiff in a civil case, the
burden of proof never parts. The same rule applies to
administrative cases. In fact, if the complainant, upon
whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails
to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he
bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to
prove his exception or defense.[52]
Petitioners' assertion that they were allowed to cultivate the
subject property without opposition, does not mean that
PASUDECO impliedly recognized the existence of a
leasehold relation. Occupancy and continued possession of
the land will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant,
because the principal factor in determining whether a
tenancy relationship exists is intent.[53] This much we said
in VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,[54] where we held that:
 Indeed, a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed. There must be evidence to prove this
allegation. The principal factor in determining
whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.
Tenancy is not a purely
factual relationship dependent on what the
alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a
legal relationship. As we ruled in Chico v.
Court of Appeals[347 SCRA 35 (2000)]:
"Each of the elements hereinbefore mentioned
is essential to create a de jure leasehold or
tenancy relationship between the parties. This
de jure relationship, in turn, is the terra
firma for a security of tenure between the
landlord and the tenant. The leasehold
relationship is not brought about by a mere
congruence of facts but, being a legal
relationship, the mutual will of the parties to
that relationship should be primordial."
Thus, the intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and
their written agreements, provided these are
complied with and are not contrary to law, are
even more important.
Thus, we agree with the following findings of the CA:
First, there is no credible evidence to show that
the alleged caretaker, Ciriaco Almario, was
designated by PASUDECO or its manager,
Gerry Rodriguez, to facilitate the cultivation of
the property. There is likewise no evidence to
suggest that the respondents ever dealt directly
with and acted upon the instruction of
PASUDECO with respect to the cultivation of
the property.
Second, it is indeed inconceivable, as petitioner
claims, for the respondents to allow petitioners
to work on the property considering that before
its purchase, the prior owner, Dalmacio Sicat,
sought for the voluntary surrender of the
landholding agreement with the previous
tenants of the property so that the same can be
sold to PASUDECO free from tenancy. This
proves to be true considering that it is
undisputed that the subject property was
offered for sale by Dalmacio Sicat to the
petitioner in order for the latter to build its low
cost housing project thereon.
Third, the certifications issued by Isidro S.
Almario as BARC Chairman of Agdiman,
Bacolor, Pampanga to the effect that
respondents were actually cultivating he subject
property deserves scant consideration. Said
certifications can easily be considered as self-
serving since the issuing officer is himself one
of the respondents who claimed to be tenants of
the subject property and it is quite natural for
him not to declare anything which is adverse to
his interest. The same scant consideration can
also be accorded to the certification issued by
the Barangay Captain of Macabacle, Bacolor,
Pampanga, As it was held in Esquivel v. Reyes [
G.R. No. 152957, September 8, 2003, 410
SCRA 404 ]. Obviously, the barangay captain Finally, the long period of petitioners' alleged cultivation of
or the mayor whose attestation appears on the the subject property cannot give rise to equitable
document was not the proper authority to make
estoppel. It should be remembered that estoppel in pais, or
such
determination. Even certifications issued by ad equitable estoppel arises when one, by his acts,
ministrative agencies and/or officials representations or admissions or by his silence when he
concerning the presence or the absence of a ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable
tenancy relationship are merely preliminary or negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist
provisional and are not binding on the courts. and the other rightfully relies and acts on such beliefs so
that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny
xxxx the existence of such facts. The real office of the equitable
norm of estoppel is limited to supplying deficiency in the
Not a single piece of traceable evidence was
shown by respondents when and how much are law, but it should not supplant positive law. The elements
the rental payments that they supposedly paid for the existence of a tenancy relationship are explicit in the
before 1988. In fact, they neither mentioned the law and these elements cannot be done away with by
terms and conditions of their oral tenancy conjectures.[56]
agreement, i.e. kind of agricultural crops to be
planted, if indeed it existed; nor did they WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the
mention that such payments were made in the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No.
form of harvest sharing equivalent to a certain
percentage agreed upon by the parties. While 84405 dated April 15, 2005 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
there were indeed payments made with the
Land Bank of the Philippines in varying SO ORDERED.
amounts starting 1988 and thereafter, it cannot
be ignored that such payments were
precipitated only by PASUDECOs resistance of
respondents presence in the subject
property. Thus, we concede to the Adjudicator
a quos finding that said payment was made
only as afterthought.[55]