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[G.R. No. L-10594. May 29, 1957.

PONCIANO PRIMERO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS and


SINFOROSO QUION, Respondents.

Tereso Ma. Montoya for Petitioner.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres, Nora G.
Notratis and Cayetano Santrico for respondent Court of Agrarian Relations.

Jesus M. Dator for respondent Sinforoso (Proso) Quion.

SYLLABUS

1. TENANCY; LEASE OF PROPERTY HELD IN TENANCY, EFFECT OF;


DISPOSSESSION OF TENANT OF LANDHOLDINGS, ONLY FOR CAUSES PROVIDED
BY LAW. — The dispossession of a tenant in an agricultural land can only be allowed for any of
the causes enumerated in Section 50 of the Tenancy Law. Lease of a holding to another person
who will convert it to a zacatal is not one of those causes; consequently, the lease of the land in
question does not extinguish the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, and the
lessee should assume the obligations of the former landholder in relation to his tenant.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TENANCY LAW IS REMEDIAL LEGISLATION; PROVISIONS DO NOT


IMPAIR RIGHT OF ALIENATION. — Republic Act 1199 is a remedial legislation
promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the exercise of the
police power of the State to promote the common weal. Its provisions do not impair the right of
the landowner to dispose or alienate his property or prohibit him to make such transfer or
alienation; they only provide that in case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the present case, the
tenancy relationship between the landowner and his tenant should be preserved in order to secure
the well-being of the tenant or protect him against unjustified dismissal from their landholdings.

Petitioner Ponciano Primero is the owner of a riceland situated in the barrio of San Juan, municipality of
Gen. Trias, province of Cavite, containing an area of 27,837 square meters, with Torrens title registered
in the Registry of Deeds for the province of Cavite, while respondent Sinforoso Quion is his tenant in
said land. Desiring to lease said riceland to one Porfirio Potente for the purpose of raising thereon
ZACATE (a species of grass for horses’ feed), on March 3, 1956, petitioner served a written notice
thereof to respondent and requested him to vacate the premises, but the latter refused to do so.
The controlling law on the case are sections 9, 49 and 50 of Republic Act No. 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy
Act of the Philippines), which read as follows:
obles.com.ph

"SEC. 9. Severance of Relationship. — The tenancy relationship is extinguished by the voluntary


surrender of the land by, or the death or incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his
immediate farm household may continue to work the land until the close of the agricultural year. The
expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties, and the sale or alienation of the land do
not of themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee shall
assume the rights and obligations of the former-landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of
the landholder, his heir or heirs shall likewise assume his rights and obligations.

"SEC. 49. Ejectment of Tenant. — Notwithstanding any agreement or provision of law as to the period,
in all cases where land devoted to any agricultural purpose is held under any system of tenancy, the
tenant shall not be dispossessed of his holdings except for any of the causes hereinafter enumerated
and only after the same has been proved before, and the dispossession is authorized by, the court.

"SEC. 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant. — Any of the following shall be a sufficient cause for
the dispossession of a tenant from his holdings: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw library

(a) The bona fide intention of the landholder to cultivate the land himself personally or through the
employment of farm machinery and implements: . . .

(b) When the tenant violates or fails to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or
any of the provisions of this Act: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply when the
tenant has substantially complied with the contract or with the provisions of this Act.

(c) The tenant’s failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the landholder’s share: Provided, however,
That this shall not apply when the tenant’s failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure.

(d) When the tenant uses the land for a purpose other than that specified by agreement of the parties.

(e) When a share-tenant fails to follow those proven farm practices which will contribute towards the
proper care of the land and increased agricultural production.

(f) When the tenant through negligence permits serious injury to the land which will impair its
productive capacity.

(g) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his immediate family or farm
household of a crime against the landholder or a member of his immediate family.
Under the foregoing clear provisions of law, we find that the agrarian court committed no reversible
error when it dismissed the petition, firstly, because under the aforequoted section 9 of Rep. Act 1199,
the contract of lease entered into by the petitioner and Porfirio Potente did not of itself extinguish the
relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondent, and the lessee Potente
should assume the obligations of the former landholder, the herein petitioner, in relation to his tenant,
the herein respondent; secondly, because under section 49, a tenant cannot be dispossessed of his
holding except for any of the causes enumerated in said section 50, and certainly the lease of the land
in question to Potente is not one of those causes for the dispossession of a tenant enumerated in
section 50 of the Tenancy Law quoted above. Consequently, we hold that under the provisions of law
governing the case, the petition under consideration is completely untenable, for once a tenancy
relationship is established, the tenant is entitled to security of tenure with right to continue working on
and cultivating the land until he is dispossessed of his holdings for just cause provided by law or the
tenancy relationship is legally terminated.

Petitioner contends, however, that sections 9 and 50 of Republic Act 1199 are unconstitutional and void
for they are against paragraph 1, section 1 of Article III — Bill of Rights of our Constitution. It is argued
that the petitioner has a perfect right to dispossess his tenant because he wants to lease his land to a
third person for the purpose of converting it into a ZACATAL and that "the lessee has a perfect right to
employ laborers of his own choice and to deny a lessee that right will be tantamount to a deprivation of
the right of the owner to lease his land for a better income, for no lessee will enter into a contract of
lease of a riceland to convert the same into a ZACATAL if he will be denied the freedom to employ a
tenant of his own choice." We find no merit in this contention. The provisions of law assailed as
unconstitutional do not impair the right of the landowner to dispose or alienate his property nor
prohibit him to make such transfer or alienation; they only provide that in case of transfer or in case of
lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy relationship between the landowner and his tenant should be
preserved in order to insure the well-being of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly
dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser of the land; in other words, the purpose of the law in
question is to maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land or afford them
protection against unjustified dismissal from their holdings. Republic Act 1199 is unquestionably a
remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the
exercise of the police power of the State to promote the common weal. It is a statute relating to public
subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights
and public welfare of the entire community affected by it.

G.R. No. 72282 July 24, 1989


ANACLETO DE JESUS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, SOCORRO CALIMBAS-MIACO,
GUILLERMO CALIMBAS-RODRIGUEZ and TIRSO CALIMBAS, respondents.

The pivotal issue posed by petitioner is whether or not he is an agricultural lessee or a civil law
lessee. It is of paramount importance in this case to appreciate the contradistinction between an
agricultural lessee whose security of tenure is guaranteed by the Tenancy Law (Sec. 5(b) R.A.
1199) and a civil law lessee whose right to work on the land expires in accordance with the
terms of the Lease Agreement.

On April 22, 1972, private respondents, as heirs of Spouses Eustacio Calimbas and Modesta
Paguio who in their lifetime were the registered owners of the land, entered into a civil law
contract of lease, with petitioner de Jesus and one Felicisima Rodriguez. This contract was to
be effective for 2-1/2 years starting January 1, 1972 to July 1, 1974.

Petitioner de Jesus and Felicisima Rodriguez formed a partnership over the fishpond with de
Jesus as the industrial partner and Rodriguez as the capitalist. Upon the expiration of the civil
law lease contract on July 1, 1974, Felicisima Rodriguez gave up the lease but petitioner de
Jesus refused to vacate the leased premises despite repeated demands.

According to the lower court, the fishpond is an agricultural land as held in the case of Tawatao
& del Rosario v. Garcia, et al., G.R. No. L-17649, July 31, 1963 .2 It further held that petitioner is
an agricultural lessee and not a civil law lessee, therefore jurisdiction over the dispute belongs
to the Court of Agrarian Relations and not to the Court of First Instance.

On the basis of stronger evidence, where petitioner himself admitted that he hired the services
of many people other than the members of his family to cultivate the land, respondent appellate
Court ruled that petitioner failed to qualify as an agricultural lessee under the doctrine laid down
in Gabriel v. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974) and as defined in Paragraph 2, Section 166,
Chapter XI of the Agricultural Land Reform Code .4 Moreover, he admitted that he cultivated an
adjacent fishpond of 11-1/2 hectares by employing other laborers, whereby he was more
correctly categorized as a business enterpreneur engaged in the fishpond industry.

We rule against petitioner.

The Agricultural Land Reform Code was enacted by Congress to institute land reforms
in the Philippines. It was passed to establish owner-cultivatorship and the family size
farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture; to achieve a dignified existence for the small
farmers free from pernicious industrial restraints and practices; to make the small
farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens and a source of a
genuine strength in our democratic society. 6
In other words, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was enacted to help the small
farmers and to uplift their economic status by providing them a modest standard of living
sufficient to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter, education and other
basic necessities.

The law further protects the small farmer by conferring upon him security of tenure over
the landholding he is working on. The leasehold relation cannot be extinguished by the
mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract or by the sale, alienation or
transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. He can only be ejected by the Court
for cause.7 But with this benevolence is his obligation to work on the land by
himself or with the aid of his immediate farm household. By "immediate farm
household", the law means the members of the family of the lessee or lessor and
other persons who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him
in his activities. 8

Petitioner de Jesus contends that he is an agricultural lessee because a fishpond is an


agricultural land as held in the case of Tawatao v. Garcia, supra. While this is true, the
mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make him an agricultural
lessee. The law provides conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the
land being agricultural is only one of them. Among others, the law is explicit in requiring
the tenant and his immediate family to work the land. 9

Thus, petitioner also contends that he is the sole cultivator of the fishpond as supported
by the testimony of his former partner, Felicisima Rodriguez and as found by the trial
judge. But on review by the Court of Appeals these allegations gave way to a much
stronger evidence-the judicial admissions of petitioner himself, that he hired many
persons to help him cultivate the fishpond.

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner committed a palpable
mistake in making the above disclosures. Hence, absent the requisite of personal cultivation,
petitioner de Jesus cannot be considered an agricultural lessee. In the case of Evangelista v.
Court of Appeals, 12 this Court held that one cannot be said to be an agricultural lessee if he
has not personally or by his farm household cultivated the land in question.

DEFINITION OF AGRICULTURAL TENANCY

GERONIMO DE LOS REYES, petitioner,


vs.
GREGORIO ESPINELI, RUPERTO ALCANTARA, JORGE LOBREN, PEDRO AMANTE, MATEO GUTIERREZ,
ISIDRO RAMOS, SANTOS DANGUE, MIGUEL RAMOS, CORNELIO GARCIA, MARGARITO BELARMINO,
IRENEO BATRALO, SIMPLICIO CASTRO, VICENTE ANIVES, MIGUEL HERNANDEZ, EUGENIO DALISAY,
LEON LACSAMANA, and BELEN ALVAREZ, respondents.

"Agricultural tenancy" is the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to,
or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of
the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share
the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in
both.

"Share tenancy" exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production
wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or
several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land personally with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided
between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions.

"share tenant" is a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for
purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder."

We are here primarily interested in the basic differences between a farm employer-farm worker
relationship and an agricultural sharehold tenancy relationship. Both, of course, are leases, but there the
similarity ends. In the former, the lease is one of labor, with the agricultural laborer as the lessor of his
services, and the farm employer as the lessee thereof.14 In the latter, it is the landowner who is the
lessor, and the sharehold tenant is the lessee of agricultural land. As lessee he has possession of the
leased premises.15 But the relationship is more than a mere lease. It is a special kind of lease, the law
referring to it as a "joint undertaking."16 For this reason, not only the tenancy laws are applicable, but
also, in a suppletory way, the law on leases, the customs of the place and the civil code provisions on
partnership.17 The share tenant works for that joint venture. The agricultural laborer works for the farm
employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a
profit.18 On the other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His share is
necessarily dependent on the amount of the harvest.
Since the relationship between farm employer and agricultural laborer is that of employer and
employee, the decisive factor is the control exercised by the former over the latter. On the other hand,
the landholder has the "right to require the tenant to follow those proven farm practices which have
been found to contribute towards increased agricultural production and to use fertilizer of the kind or
kinds shown by proven farm practices to be adapted to the requirements of the land." This is but the
right of a partner to protect his interest, not the control exercised by an employer. If landholder and
tenant disagree as to farm practices, the former may not dismiss the latter. It is the court that shall
settle the conflict according to the best interests of both parties.

The crucial factors are that the tenant must have physical possession of the land for the purpose
of production23 and he must personally cultivate the land. If the tenant does not cultivate the land
personally he cannot be considered a tenant even if he is so designated in the written agreement
of the parties.24

"Cultivation" is not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the land. It includes the various
phrases of farm labor described and provided by law, the maintenance, repair and weeding of
dikes, paddies and irrigation canals in the holding. Moreover, it covers attending to the care of
the growing plants.25 Where the parties agreed that they would "operate a citrus nursery upon the
condition that they would divide the budded citrus in the proportion of 1/3 share of respondents
and 2/3 as share of petitioner," and that the "petitioner would furnish all the necessary seedlings
and seeds, as well as the technical know-how in the care, cultivation, budding and balling of the
budded citrus, while respondents would furnish the land necessary for the nursery, the farm labor
that may be needed to plant and cultivate, and all the chemicals, fertilizers, and bud tapes that
may be necessary for such cultivation," then "the tenancy agreement entered into between the
parties has relation to the possession of agricultural land to be devoted to the production of
agricultural products thru the labor of one of the parties, and as such comes within the purview of
the term 'agricultural tenancy' as defined in section 3 of Republic Act No. 1199 as amended."

Therefore, the parties to the contract understood, in sum and substance, that the respondents were
to "cultivate" the land. Whether the latter had been remiss in the performance of their contractual
obligations, does not affect the nature of the contract which the appellate court analyzed and
found to be that of share tenancy. It is the principal features and stipulations which determine the
true essence of a contract.33 Considering then that the respondents are duty bound to cultivate
their respective holdings (of which they have possession), and that they share in the harvest, the
Court of Appeals' conclusion must be upheld. This, especially in the light of the facts that the
respondents raise secondary crops and have their homes in their respective holdings.

The petitioner having entered into a share tenancy contract with the respondents, it certainly
cannot be seriously claimed that the relationship of landlord and tenant is unjustifiably being
imposed on him without due process of law. It was the petitioner himself who voluntarily entered
the relationship, and, therefore, should shoulder the consequences thereof, one of which is that
the tenants must be given, as they are entitled to, a 30% share in the produce.34

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

G.R. No. L-27797 August 26, 1974

TRINIDAD GABRIEL, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, defendant-appellant.
In order that leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may exist, the following requisites must concur.

1. That the land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;

2. That the land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate farm household;

3. That the land must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household;

4. That the land belongs to another; and

5. That the use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both.

G.R. No. 86186 May 8, 1992

RAFAEL GELOS, petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO ALZONA, respondents.

Balagtas P. Ilagan for petitioner.

Emil Capulong, Jr., for private respondent.

It is noted that the agreement provides that "ang Ikalawang Panig (meaning Gelos) ay may ibig na magpaupa sa paggawa sa halagang
P5.00 sa bawa't araw, walong oras na trabaho" (The Second Party desires to lease his services at the rate of P5.00 per day, eight hours of
work) and that "Ipinatatanto ng Ikalawang Panig na siya ay hindi kasama sa bukid kundi upahan lamang na binabayaran sa bawa't araw ng
kanyang paggawa sa bukid na nabanggit.'' (The Second Party makes it known that he is not a farm tenant but only a hired laborer who is
paid for every day of work on the said farm.)

These stipulations clearly indicate that the parties did not enter into a tenancy agreement but only a contract of employment. The agreement
is a lease of services, not of the land in dispute. This intention is quite consistent with the undisputed fact that three days before that
agreement was concluded, the former tenant of the land, Leocadio Punongbayan, had executed an instrument in which he voluntarily
surrendered his tenancy rights to the private respondent. 5 It also clearly demonstrates that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, Alzona
intended to cultivate the land himself instead of placing it again under tenancy.

A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate
farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the
produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in
money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. (Emphasis supplied)

For this relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is
consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental. In
the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter thereon, cannot qualify as a de jure
tenant. 11

On the other hand, the indications of an employer-employee relationship are: 1) the selection and engagement of the employee; 2) the
payment of wages; 3) the power of dismissal; and 4) the power to control the employee's
conduct –– although the latter is the most important element. 12

G.R. No. 108941, July 6, 2000


Reynaldo Bejasa and Erlinda Bejasa
vs CA, Isabel Candelaria and Jamie Dinglasan
Ponente: Pardo

Facts:
This case involves two parcels of land located in Oriental
Mindoro owned by Isabel Candelaria. October 1974, Candelaria
entered into a 3-year lease agreement with Pio Malabanan wherein
Malabanan agreed to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to
purchase calamansi, and other seedlings, to attend and care for
whatever plants thereon exist, to make the necessary harvest of
fruits.

Malabanan, later hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to


clear it. On May 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a 6-year
usufruct over the land. 1983, Malabanan died. Candelaria
constituted Jaime Dinglasan as her attorney-in-fact, having
powers of administration over the land.

October 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract with


Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife with a 1-year term. On December
1984, Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent in consideration of an
"pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a term of 1 year.

After the 1 year period, Victoria demanded for Bejasas to


vacate, but Bejasas continued to stay and did not give any
consideration for its use, be in rent or share. Candelarian
again entered with a 3-year lease agreement with Dinglasans, and
made Jaime her attorney-in-fact again. Jaime then filed a
complaint before Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) seeking for ejectment of Bejasas. COSLAP dismissed the
complaint.

Jaime then filed it with RTC for recovery of possession; the


case was referred to DAR. DAR certified that ht e case was not
proper for trial before the civil courts. Trial court dismissed
the complaint of Jaime including the leasehold claim of Bejasas.
Bejasas then filed a complaint for confirmation of leasehold and
recovery of damages against Candelaria and Jaime.

RTC favored the Bejasas. On appeal, CA reversed the decision


saying that (1) there was no tenant relationship, (2) Bejasas
are mere overseers and not as permanent tenants, (3) the pakyaw
contract have expired, (4) sharing of profits was not proven,
(5) the element of personal cultivation was not proven.

Issue: Whether there is tenancy in favor of Bejasas.

Ruling:

There is no tenancy relationship. There was no proof of shared


harvests. Between Candelaria (as owner) and the Bejasas, there
is no relationship. Candelaria never gave her consent. As to the
authority of Dinglasans, they had authority to bind the owner in
a tenancy agreement, but there is no proof of such presented.

ANASTACIO VICTORIO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AND


DOMINADOR FERNANDEZ, respondents

We affirm.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent among the parties; (4) the purpose
is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvest. All
these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties

In the case under review, the first, third, and fourth requisites were absent in the agreement,
leading to the conclusion that no tenancy relationship existed between petitioner and private
respondent. The record is bereft of any evidence showing that Dominador Fernandez consented
to having petitioner Anastacio Victorio as his tenant in the fishpond subject of the controversy.
Later, what was agreed upon was for petitioner Victorio to continue leasing the subject premises
under the terms and conditions of the original lease. Petitioners right to the fishpond emanated
from the lease contract between his father and private respondents father wherein petitioners
father was designated as lessee and not as a tenant. Petitioner can not, therefore, be more than a
lessee like his father because the spring cannot rise higher than its source. Secondly, there was no
stipulation regarding the sharing of the harvest, whether explicitly or implicitly. One of the
essential requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship is sharing by the landowner and
tenant of the produce, and no proof of this fact has been shown in this case. What the parties
agreed upon, as established by the evidence, was for petitioner to pay private respondent a yearly
lease rental, with an advance payment of 3 years rental. This is not the case obtaining in a
tenancy relationship where the parties share in the produce of the land as this falls due, or as it
becomes available, during harvest time. It is also significant to note that, as shown by the
evidentiary record, private respondent and his father, as lessor, bore all the expenses for the
repair and improvement of the dikes whenever the fishpond was destroyed due to floods and
other natural calamities.

All of the above are hallmarks of a civil law lease contract and, as correctly found by both the
appellate court and the regional trial court, they belie the existence of a tenancy relationship
between petitioner and private respondent. We find no reason to deviate from these findings,
correct and founded as they are on the law and evidence on record.

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