G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918
His
JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
FISHER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this
litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the
employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity
of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the
pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is
located upon the line of the defendant railroad company;
and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the
city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied
by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the
company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in
question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from his
seat in the second class-car where he was riding and,
making, his exit through the door, took his position upon
the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with
his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the
San Mateo station there is a cement platform which
begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance
away from the company's office and extends along in front
of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length
of several coaches. As the train slowed down another
passenger, named Emilio Zuñiga, also an employee of
the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting
safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from
the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a
little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but
one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from
under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body
at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the
moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and
lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from
the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before
it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark
night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a
single light located some distance away, objects on the
platform where the accident occurred were difficult to
discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted
car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on
the platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in the fact
that it was the customary season for harvesting these
melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for
the shipment to the market. They were contained in
numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in
a row one upon another. The testimony shows that this
row of sacks was so placed of melons and the edge of
platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due
to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons
at the moment he stepped upon the platform.
statement that he failed to see these objects in the
darkness is readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an
unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries
which he had received were very serious. He was
therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city
of Manila where an examination was made and his arm
was amputated. The result of this operation was
unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to
another hospital where a second operation was
performed and the member was again amputated higher
up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the
plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of
medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in
connection with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover
damages of the defendant company, founding his action
upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the
defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the
platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace
to the security of passenger alighting from the company's
trains. At the hearing in the Court of First Instance, his
Honor, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as
above stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the
effect that, although negligence was attributable to the
defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons
were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and
from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed
to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was
therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was
accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company,
and the plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad
company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks
on the platform in the manner above stated; that their
presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from
the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective
legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It
necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable
for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is
barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In
resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these
conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of
the defendant company and the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal
liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and
that the obligation to respond for the damage which
plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of
that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to
exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its
liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in
legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the
negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the
Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise
of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903
of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex
contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations — or
to use the technical form of expression, that article relates
only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles
1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out this
distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its
decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093
Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa,
substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes
the source of an obligation between persons not formerly
connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an
accident in the performance of an obligation already
existing . . . ."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was
made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article
1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of
negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903
of the Civil Code] are applicable are understood
to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties
of the parties to one another. But where relations
already formed give rise to duties, whether
springing from contract or quasi-contract, then
breaches of those duties are subject to article
1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code.
(Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil.
Rep., 359 at 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability,
which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain cases
imposed upon employers with respect to damages
occasioned by the negligence of their employees to
persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not
based, as in the English Common Law, upon the principle
of respondeat superior — if it were, the master would be
liable in every case and unconditionally — but upon the
principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code,
which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or
negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making
good the damage caused. One who places a powerful
automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to
be ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is
himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him
liable for all the consequences of his imprudence. The
obligation to make good the damage arises at the very
instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the
scope of his employment causes the injury. The liability of
the master is personal and direct. But, if the master has
not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the
selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for
the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of
his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant
does not amount to a breach of the contract between the
master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in
the selection and control of the servant relieves the
master from liability for the latter's acts — on the contrary,
that proof shows that the responsibility has never existed.
As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from
extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary
act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere
negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
A master who exercises all possible care in the selection
of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications
they should possess for the discharge of the duties which
it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with
equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons
to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs
no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his
servants, even within the scope of their employment, such
third person suffer damage. True it is that under article
1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that
he has been negligent in the selection or direction of his
servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to
proof of due care and diligence in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical
provisions, as found in the Porto Rico Code, has held that
these articles are applicable to cases of extra-
contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20
Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its
decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30
Phil. rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the
theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to
respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of
his employee while acting within the scope of his
employment. The Court, after citing the last paragraph of
article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That
when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or employer either in
selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both;
and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and
not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be
rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court
that in selection and supervision he has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family,
the presumption is overcome and he is relieved
from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master
ultimately on his own negligence and not on that
of his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the
Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in
striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in
 relations with strangers, the negligence of the
servant in conclusively the negligence of the
master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect
that in case of extra-contractual culpa based upon
negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been
some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and
that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes
a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with the
authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p.
611) that the liability created by article 1903 is imposed
by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the
special relations of authority or superiority existing
between the person called upon to repair the damage and
the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers
for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or
agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages
which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based
upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in
their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the
utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve
the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-
contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation
has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual
duties which civilized society imposes upon it members,
or which arise from these relations, other than contractual,
of certain members of society to others, generally
embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of
each member of society constitute the measure of the
corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character,
which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other
members of society. The breach of these general duties
whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if
productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify
the injured party. The fundamental distinction between
obligations of this character and those which arise from
contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-
contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas
in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently
of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties
when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from
negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for
the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so
elected — whom such an obligation is imposed is morally
culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy,
to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral
culpability, so as to include responsibility for the
negligence of those person who acts or mission are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position
to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to
limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined
exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be
directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due
care in the selection and control of one's agents or
servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of
their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect
to the person made liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has
undertaken by contract to render service to another, is
wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates.
When the sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's
cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission,
the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the
negligence — if he does not his action fails. But when the
facts averred show a contractual undertaking by
defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that
plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is
not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings
whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or
to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his
servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its
nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a
recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of
extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should
assume the burden of proof of its existence, as
the only fact upon which his action is based; while
on the contrary, in a case of negligence which
presupposes the existence of a contractual
obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and
that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him
to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907
ed., p. 76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the
breach of a contract to show that the breach was due to
the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants,
even though such be in fact the actual cause of the
breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant
that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents
caused the breach of the contract would not constitute a
defense to the action. If the negligence of servants or
agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the
liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would
be that person acting through the medium of agents or
servants in the performance of their contracts, would be
in a better position than those acting in person. If one
delivers a valuable watch to watchmaker who contract to
repair it, and the bailee, by a personal negligent act
causes its destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would
it be logical to free him from his liability for the breach of
his contract, which involves the duty to exercise due care
in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was
his servant whose negligence caused the injury? If such
a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy
practically complete immunity from damages arising from
the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts
as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through
agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most
instances that reasonable care had been taken in
selection and direction of such servants. If one delivers
securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they
are lost by reason of the negligence of some clerk
employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to
permit the bank to relieve itself of liability for the breach of
its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of
the debt by proving that due care had been exercised in
the selection and direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of
an obligation, and culpa contractual as a mere incident to
the performance of a contract has frequently been
recognized by the supreme court of Spain. (Sentencias of
June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and December 13,
1896.) In the decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared
that plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that
defendant sought to avail himself of the provisions of
article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish
Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without any
pre-existing obligation, by fault or negligence,
such as those to which article 1902 of the Civil
Code relates, but of damages caused by the
defendant's failure to carry out the undertakings
imposed by the contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving
the liability of employers for damage done by the
negligent acts of their servants will show that in no case
has the court ever decided that the negligence of the
defendant's servants has been held to constitute a
defense to an action for damages for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the
court held that the owner of a carriage was not liable for
the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In
that case the court commented on the fact that no
evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the
defendant had been negligent in the employment of the
driver, or that he had any knowledge of his lack of skill or
carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's
Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215),
the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by
the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was
allowed to get adrift by the negligence of defendant's
servants in the course of the performance of a contract of
towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69)
that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a
contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we do not
think that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are
applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep.,
374), plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages for
the personal injuries caused by the negligence of
defendant's chauffeur while driving defendant's
automobile in which defendant was riding at the time. The
court found that the damages were caused by the
negligence of the driver of the automobile, but held that
the master was not liable, although he was present at the
time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are
continued for a length of time as to give the owner
a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct the driver to desist therefrom. . . . The act
complained of must be continued in the presence
of the owner for such length of time that the owner
by his acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his
own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and
Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is
true that the court rested its conclusion as to the liability
of the defendant upon article 1903, although the facts
disclosed that the injury complaint of by plaintiff
constituted a breach of the duty to him arising out of the
contract of transportation. The express ground of the
decision in this case was that article 1903, in dealing with
the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his
servants "makes the distinction between private
individuals and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the
law creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the
selection or direction of servants; and that in the particular
case the presumption of negligence had not been
overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case,
the court treated plaintiff's action as though founded in tort
rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of
carriage, and an examination of the pleadings and of the
briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact
discussed upon this theory. Viewed from the standpoint
of the defendant the practical result must have been the
same in any event. The proof disclosed beyond doubt that
the defendant's servant was grossly negligent and that his
negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It
also affirmatively appeared that defendant had been guilty
of negligence in its failure to exercise proper discretion in
the direction of the servant. Defendant was, therefore,
liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the
breach of the duty were to be regarded as
constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As
Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether
negligence occurs an incident in the course of the
performance of a contractual undertaking or its itself the
source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its
essential characteristics are identical. There is always an
act or omission productive of damage due to
carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant.
Consequently, when the court holds that a defendant is
liable in damages for having failed to exercise due care,
either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in the
selection and direction of his servants, the practical result
is identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not
to be inferred, because the court held in the Yamada case
that defendant was liable for the damages negligently
caused by its servants to a person to whom it was bound
by contract, and made reference to the fact that the
defendant was negligent in the selection and control of its
servants, that in such a case the court would have held
that it would have been a good defense to the action, if
presented squarely upon the theory of the breach of the
contract, for defendant to have proved that it did in fact
exercise care in the selection and control of the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by
directing the attention to the relative spheres of
contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field of
non- contractual obligation is much more broader than
that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the
whole extent of juridical human relations. These two
fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the
mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract
does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract under such conditions that
the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-
contractual obligation had no contract existed between
the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with
it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to
provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil
code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was
direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not
be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable
to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption
that even granting that the negligent conduct of its
servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was
a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe
means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct
and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was
his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the
train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under
the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the
Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused by
plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon
defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely
contributed to his injury, the damages should be
apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if
defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train
had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular
injury suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant
contends, and cites many authorities in support of the
contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to
alight from a moving train. We are not disposed to
subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form. We are of
the opinion that this proposition is too badly stated and is
at variance with the experience of every-day life. In this
particular instance, that the train was barely moving when
plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it
came to stop within six meters from the place where he
stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains
under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain
no injury where the company has kept its platform free
from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to
believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury
whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for
defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide
a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to
this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on
Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
The test by which to determine whether the
passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is
that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be
considered whether an ordinarily prudent person,
of the age, sex and condition of the passenger,
would have acted as the passenger acted under
the circumstances disclosed by the evidence.
This care has been defined to be, not the care
which may or should be used by the prudent man
generally, but the care which a man of ordinary
prudence would use under similar circumstances,
to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on
Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by
this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may
say that the test is this; Was there anything in the
circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he
alighted from the train which would have admonished a
person of average prudence that to get off the train under
the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the
plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his
failure so to desist was contributory
negligence.1awph!l.net
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact
from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he
stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly
the condition of the platform and while the train was yet
slowly moving. In considering the situation thus
presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff
was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction
which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the
platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by
reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its
passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the
plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some
circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform
was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was
dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure
upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a
duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any
possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in
the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them
adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform
was constructed upon a level higher than that of the passenger's contributory negligence, we are likewise in
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from full accord, namely, "An attempt to alight from a moving
the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting train is negligence per se." Adding these two points
passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus together, should be absolved from the complaint, and
reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping judgment affirmed.
off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of
cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable Johnson, J., concur.
and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the
plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get
off while the train was yet moving as the same act would
have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the
question of contributory negligence in performing such act
— that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently
or recklessly — the age, sex, and physical condition of the
passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the
safety of the passenger, and should be considered.
Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less
capable than men of alighting with safety under such
conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel
obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may
be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the
plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train
at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in
his mind with regard either to the length of the step which
he was required to take or the character of the platform
where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct
of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was
yet slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of
contributory negligence.

The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the

accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and
that the injuries he has suffered have permanently
disabled him from continuing that employment. Defendant
has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open
to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the
standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three
years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for
the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability
is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover
of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical
attention, hospital services, and other incidental
expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.

The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is

hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for
the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., dissenting:

With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full

accord, namely, "It may be admitted that had plaintiff
waited until the train had come to a full stop before
alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not
have occurred." With the general rule relative to a
G.R. No. 170141 April 22, 2008
JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. JESUS
SIMANGAN, respondent. REYES R.T., J.:
WHEN an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed
on a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of
carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to
expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If
he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for
breach of contract of carriage.1
The power to admit or not an alien into the country is a
sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even by
Japan Airlines (JAL).2
In this petition for review on certiorari,3 petitioner JAL
appeals the: (1) Decision4 dated May 31, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) ordering it to pay respondent Jesus
Simangan moral and exemplary damages; and (2)
Resolution5 of the same court dated September 28, 2005
denying JAL's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
In 1991, respondent Jesus Simangan decided to donate
a kidney to his ailing cousin, Loreto Simangan, in UCLA
School of Medicine in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
Upon request of UCLA, respondent undertook a series of
laboratory tests at the National Kidney Institute in Quezon
City to verify whether his blood and tissue type are
compatible with Loreto's.6 Fortunately, said tests proved
that respondent's blood and tissue type were well-
matched with Loreto's.7
Respondent needed to go to the United States to
complete his preliminary work-up and donation surgery.
Hence, to facilitate respondent's travel to the United
States, UCLA wrote a letter to the American Consulate in
Manila to arrange for his visa. In due time, respondent
was issued an emergency U.S. visa by the American
Embassy in Manila.8
Having obtained an emergency U.S. visa, respondent
purchased a round trip plane ticket from petitioner JAL for
US$1,485.00 and was issued the corresponding boarding
pass.9 He was scheduled to a particular flight bound for
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. via Narita, Japan.10
On July 29, 1992, the date of his flight, respondent went
to Ninoy Aquino International Airport in the company of
several relatives and friends.11 He was allowed to check-
in at JAL's counter.12 His plane ticket, boarding pass,
travel authority and personal articles were subjected to
rigid immigration and security routines.13 After passing
through said immigration and security procedures,
respondent was allowed by JAL to enter its airplane.14
While inside the airplane, JAL's airline crew suspected
respondent of carrying a falsified travel document and
imputed that he would only use the trip to the United
States as a pretext to stay and work in Japan.15 The
stewardess asked respondent to show his travel
documents. Shortly after, the stewardess along with a
Japanese and a Filipino haughtily ordered him to stand up
and leave the plane.16 Respondent protested, explaining
that he was issued a U.S. visa. Just to allow him to board
the plane, he pleaded with JAL to closely monitor his
movements when the aircraft stops over in Narita.17 His
pleas were ignored. He was then constrained to go out of
the plane.18In a nutshell, respondent was bumped off the
flight.
Respondent went to JAL's ground office and waited there
for three hours. Meanwhile, the plane took off and he was
left behind.19 Afterwards, he was informed that his travel
documents were, indeed, in order.20 Respondent was
refunded the cost of his plane ticket less the sum of
US$500.00 which was deducted by JAL.21 Subsequently,
respondent's U.S. visa was cancelled.22
Displeased by the turn of events, respondent filed an
action for damages against JAL with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Valenzuela City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 4195-V-93. He claimed he was not able to donate his
kidney to Loreto; and that he suffered terrible
embarrassment and mental anguish.23 He prayed that he
be awarded P3 million as moral damages, P1.5 million as
exemplary damages and P500,000.00 as attorney's
fees.24
JAL denied the material allegations of the complaint. It
argued, among others, that its failure to allow respondent
to fly on his scheduled departure was due to "a need for
his travel documents to be authenticated by the United
States Embassy"25 because no one from JAL's airport
staff had encountered a parole visa before.26 It posited
that the authentication required additional time; that
respondent was advised to take the flight the following
day, July 30, 1992. JAL alleged that respondent agreed
to be rebooked on July 30, 1992.27
JAL also lodged a counterclaim anchored on
respondent's alleged wrongful institution of the complaint.
It prayed for litigation expenses, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.28
On September 21, 2000, the RTC presided by Judge
Floro P. Alejo rendered its decision in favor of respondent
(plaintiff), disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
amount of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, the
amount of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages
and the amount of P250,000.00 as attorney's
fees, plus the cost of suit.29
The RTC explained:
 In summarily and insolently ordering the plaintiff
to disembark while the latter was already settled
in his assigned seat, the defendant violated the
contract of carriage; that when the plaintiff was
ordered out of the plane under the pretext that the
genuineness of his travel documents would be
verified it had caused him embarrassment and
besmirched reputation; and that when the plaintiff
was finally not allowed to take the flight, he
suffered more wounded feelings and social
humiliation for which the plaintiff was asking to be
awarded moral and exemplary damages as well
as attorney's fees.
The reason given by the defendant that what
prompted them to investigate the genuineness of
the travel documents of the plaintiff was that the
plaintiff was not then carrying a regular visa but
just a letter does not appear satisfactory. The
defendant is engaged in transporting passengers
by plane from country to country and is therefore
conversant with the travel documents. The
defendant should not be allowed to pretend, to
the prejudice of the plaintiff not to know that the
travel documents of the plaintiff are valid
documents to allow him entry in the United
States.
The foregoing act of the defendant in ordering the
plaintiff to deplane while already settled in his
assigned seat clearly demonstrated that the
defendant breached its contract of carriage with
the plaintiff as passenger in bad faith and as such
the plaintiff is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages as well as to an award of attorney's
fees.30
Disagreeing with the RTC judgment, JAL appealed to the
CA contending that it is not guilty of breach of contract of
carriage, hence, not liable for damages.31 It posited that it
is the one entitled to recover on its counterclaim.32
CA Ruling
In a Decision33 dated May 31, 2005, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC with modification in that it lowered the
amount of moral and exemplary damages and deleted the
award of attorney's fees. The fallo of the CA decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant
JAPAN AIR LINES is ordered to pay appellee
JESUS SIMANGAN the reduced sums, as
follows: Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) as moral damages, and Two
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00) as
exemplary damages. The award of attorney's
fees is hereby DELETED.34
The CA elucidated that since JAL issued to respondent a
round trip plane ticket for a lawful consideration, "there
arose a perfected contract between them."35 It found that
respondent was "haughtily ejected"36 by JAL and that "he
was certainly embarrassed and humiliated"37 when, in the
presence of other passengers, JAL's airline staff "shouted
at him to stand up and arrogantly asked him to produce
his travel papers, without the least courtesy every human
being is entitled to";38 and that "he was compelled to
deplane on the grounds that his papers were fake."39
The CA ratiocinated:
While the protection of passengers must take precedence
over convenience, the implementation of security
measures must be attended by basic courtesies.
In fact, breach of the contract of carriage creates
against the carrier a presumption of liability, by a
simple proof of injury, relieving the injured
passenger of the duty to establish the fault of the
carrier or of his employees; and placing on the
carrier the burden to prove that it was due to an
unforeseen event or to force majeure.
That appellee possessed bogus travel
documents and that he might stay illegally in
Japan are allegations without
substantiation. Also, appellant's attempt to
rebook appellee the following day was too late
and did not relieve it from liability. The damage
had been done. Besides, its belated theory of
novation, i.e., that appellant's original obligation
to carry appellee to Narita and Los Angeles on
July 29, 1992 was extinguished by novation when
appellant and appellant agreed that appellee will
instead take appellant's flight to Narita on the
following day, July 30, 1992, deserves little
attention. It is inappropriate at bar. Questions not
taken up during the trial cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.40 (Underscoring ours and
citations were omitted)
Citing Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines,41 the CA
declared that "(i)n contracts of common carriage,
inattention and lack of care on the part of the carrier
resulting in the failure of the passenger to be
accommodated in the class contracted for amounts to bad
faith or fraud which entitles the passengers to the award
of moral damages in accordance with Article 2220 of the
Civil Code."42
Nevertheless, the CA modified the damages awarded by
the RTC. It explained:
Fundamental in the law on damages is that one
injured by a breach of a contract, or by a wrongful
or negligent act or omission shall have a fair and
just compensation commensurate to the loss
sustained as consequence of the defendant's act.
Being discretionary on the court, the amount,
 however, should not be palpably and NOT ACT FRAUDULENTLY OR IN BAD
scandalously excessive. FAITH AS TO ENTITLE RESPONDENT
TO MORAL DAMAGES.
Here, the trial court's award of P1,000,000.00 as
moral damages appears to be overblown. No C. THE LAW DISTINGUISHES A
other proof of appellee's social standing, CONTRACTUAL BREACH EFFECTED
profession, financial capabilities was presented IN GOOD FAITH FROM ONE
except that he was single and a businessman. To ATTENDED BY BAD FAITH.
Us, the sum of 500,000.00 is just and fair. For,
moral damages are emphatically not intended to II.
enrich a complainant at the expense of the
defendant. They are awarded only to enable the
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
injured party to obtain means, diversion or ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT WAS
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral ENTITLED TO EXEMPLARY
suffering he has undergone, by reason of the
DAMAGES CONSIDERING THAT:
defendant's culpable action.
A. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ARE NOT
Moreover, the grant of P500,000.00 as RECOVERABLE IN BREACH OF
exemplary damages needs to be reduced to a CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE UNLESS
reasonable level. The award of exemplary
THE CARRIER IS GUILTY OF
damages is designed to permit the courts to
WANTON, FRAUDULENT, RECKLESS,
mould behavior that has socially deleterious
OPPRESSIVE OR MALEVOLENT
consequences and its imposition is required by
CONDUCT.
public policy to suppress the wanton acts of the
offender. Hence, the sum of P250,000.00 is
adequate under the circumstances. B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT JAL
WAS GUILTY OF BREACH, JAL DID
NOT ACT IN A WANTON
The award of P250,000.00 as attorney's fees FRAUDULENT, RECKLESS,
lacks factual basis. Appellee was definitely OPPRESSIVE OR MALEVOLENT
compelled to litigate in protecting his rights and in
MANNER AS TO ENTITLE
seeking relief from appellant's misdeeds. Yet, the
RESPONDENT TO EXEMPLARY
record is devoid of evidence to show the cost of
DAMAGES.
the services of his counsel and/or the actual
expenses incurred in prosecuting his
action.43(Citations were omitted) III.

When JAL's motion for reconsideration was denied, it ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENT
resorted to the petition at bar. WAS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
AWARD OF P750,000 IN DAMAGES WAS
Issues
EXCESSIVEAND UNPRECEDENTED.

JAL poses the following issues -

IV.

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT FINDING FOR JAL ON
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ITS COUNTERCLAIM.44 (Underscoring Ours)
ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT WAS
ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES, Basically, there are three (3) issues to resolve here: (1)
CONSIDERING THAT:
whether or not JAL is guilty of contract of carriage; (2)
whether or not respondent is entitled to moral and
A. JAL WAS NOT GUILTY OF BREACH exemplary damages; and (3) whether or not JAL is
OF CONTRACT. entitled to its counterclaim for damages.

B. MORAL DAMAGES MAY BE Our Ruling

AWARDED IN BREACH OF
CONTRACT CASES ONLY WHEN THE This Court is not a trier of facts.
BREACH IS ATTENDED BY FRAUD OR
BAD FAITH.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT JAL Chiefly, the issues are factual. The RTC findings of facts
WAS GUILTY OF BREACH, JAL DID were affirmed by the CA. The CA also gave its nod to the
reasoning of the RTC except as to the awards of
damages, which were reduced, and that of attorney's
fees, which was deleted.
We are not a trier of facts. We generally rely upon, and
are bound by, the conclusions on this matter of the lower
courts, which are better equipped and have better
opportunity to assess the evidence first-hand, including
the testimony of the witnesses.45
We have repeatedly held that the findings of fact of the
CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on
appeal to the Supreme Court provided they are based on
substantial evidence.46 We have no jurisdiction, as a rule,
to reverse their findings.47 Among the exceptions to this
rule are: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (b)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (c) where there is grave abuse of
discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; (f) when the CA, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee.48
The said exceptions, which are being invoked by JAL, are
not found here. There is no indication that the findings of
the CA are contrary to the evidence on record or that vital
testimonies of JAL's witnesses were disregarded. Neither
did the CA commit misapprehension of facts nor did it fail
to consider relevant facts. Likewise, there was no grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts or mistaken
and absurd inferences.
We thus sustain the coherent facts as established by the
courts below, there being no sufficient showing that the
said courts committed reversible error in reaching their
conclusions.
JAL is guilty of breach of
contract of carriage.
That respondent purchased a round trip plane ticket from
JAL and was issued the corresponding boarding pass is
uncontroverted.49 His plane ticket, boarding pass, travel
authority and personal articles were subjected to rigid
immigration and security procedure.50 After passing
through said immigration and security procedure, he was
allowed by JAL to enter its airplane to fly to Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. via Narita, Japan.51 Concisely, there
was a contract of carriage between JAL and respondent.
Nevertheless, JAL made respondent get off the plane on
his scheduled departure on July 29, 1992. He was not
allowed by JAL to fly. JAL thus failed to comply with its
obligation under the contract of carriage.
JAL justifies its action by arguing that there was "a need
to verify the authenticity of respondent's travel
document."52 It alleged that no one from its airport staff
had encountered a parole visa before.53 It further
contended that respondent agreed to fly the next day so
that it could first verify his travel document, hence, there
was novation.54 It maintained that it was not guilty of
breach of contract of carriage as respondent was not able
to travel to the United States due to his own voluntary
desistance.55
We cannot agree. JAL did not allow respondent to fly. It
informed respondent that there was a need to first check
the authenticity of his travel documents with the U.S.
Embassy.56 As admitted by JAL, "the flight could not wait
for Mr. Simangan because it was ready to depart."57
Since JAL definitely declared that the flight could not wait
for respondent, it gave respondent no choice but to be left
behind. The latter was unceremoniously bumped off
despite his protestations and valid travel documents and
notwithstanding his contract of carriage with JAL.
Damage had already been done when respondent was
offered to fly the next day on July 30, 1992. Said offer did
not cure JAL's default.
Considering that respondent was forced to get out of the
plane and left behind against his will, he could not have
freely consented to be rebooked the next day. In short, he
did not agree to the alleged novation. Since novation
implies a waiver of the right the creditor had before the
novation, such waiver must be express.58 It cannot be
supposed, without clear proof, that respondent had
willingly done away with his right to fly on July 29, 1992.
Moreover, the reason behind the bumping off incident, as
found by the RTC and CA, was that JAL personnel
imputed that respondent would only use the trip to the
United States as a pretext to stay and work in Japan.59
Apart from the fact that respondent's plane ticket,
boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles
already passed the rigid immigration and security
routines,60 JAL, as a common carrier, ought to know the
kind of valid travel documents respondent carried. As
provided in Article 1755 of the New Civil Code: "A
common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely
as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances."61 Thus, We find
untenable JAL's defense of "verification of respondent's
documents" in its breach of contract of carriage.
It bears repeating that the power to admit or not an alien
into the country is a sovereign act which cannot be
interfered with even by JAL.62
In an action for breach of contract of carriage, all that is
required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of such
contract and its non-performance by the carrier through
the latter's failure to carry the passenger safely to his
destination.63Respondent has complied with these twin
requisites.
Respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees plus legal interest.
With reference to moral damages, JAL alleged that they
are not recoverable in actions ex contractu except only
when the breach is attended by fraud or bad faith. It is
contended that it did not act fraudulently or in bad faith
towards respondent, hence, it may not be held liable for
moral damages.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in
actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract
for it is not one of the items enumerated under Article
2219 of the Civil Code.64 As an exception, such damages
are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results
in the death of a passenger, as provided in Article 1764,
in relation to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in
the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith,
as provided in Article 2220.65
The acts committed by JAL against respondent amounts
to bad faith. As found by the RTC, JAL breached its
contract of carriage with respondent in bad faith. JAL
personnel summarily and insolently ordered respondent
to disembark while the latter was already settled in his
assigned seat. He was ordered out of the plane under the
alleged reason that the genuineness of his travel
documents should be verified.
These findings of facts were upheld by the CA, to wit:
x x x he was haughtily ejected by appellant. He
was certainly embarrassed and humiliated when,
in the presence of other passengers, the
appellant's airline staff shouted at him to stand up
and arrogantly asked him to produce his travel
papers, without the least courtesy every human
being is entitled to. Then, he was compelled to
deplane on the grounds that his papers were
fake. His protestation of having been issued a
U.S. visa coupled with his plea to appellant to
closely monitor his movements when the aircraft
stops over in Narita, were ignored. Worse, he
was made to wait for many hours at the office of
appellant only to be told later that he has valid
travel documents.66 (Underscoring ours)
Clearly, JAL is liable for moral damages. It is firmly settled
that moral damages are recoverable in suits predicated
on breach of a contract of carriage where it is proved that
the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, as in this case.
Inattention to and lack of care for the interests of its
passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration,
particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith
which entitles the passenger to an award of moral
damages. What the law considers as bad faith which may
furnish the ground for an award of moral damages would
be bad faith in securing the contract and in the execution
thereof, as well as in the enforcement of its terms, or any
other kind of deceit.67
JAL is also liable for exemplary damages as its above-
mentioned acts constitute wanton, oppressive and
malevolent acts against respondent. Exemplary
damages, which are awarded by way of example or
correction for the public good, may be recovered in
contractual obligations, as in this case, if defendant acted
in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.68
Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to
permit the courts to reshape behaviour that is socially
deleterious in its consequence by creating negative
incentives or deterrents against such behaviour. In
requiring compliance with the standard of extraordinary
diligence, a standard which is, in fact, that of the highest
possible degree of diligence, from common carriers and
in creating a presumption of negligence against them, the
law seeks to compel them to control their employees, to
tame their reckless instincts and to force them to take
adequate care of human beings and their property.69
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees could
give ground for an action for damages. Passengers have
a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration and
are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees.70
The assessment of P500,000.00 as moral damages
and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages in respondent's
favor is, in Our view, reasonable and realistic. This award
is reasonably sufficient to indemnify him for the
humiliation and embarrassment he suffered. This also
serves as an example to discourage the repetition of
similar oppressive acts.
With respect to attorney's fees, they may be awarded
when defendant's act or omission has compelled plaintiff
to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect
his interest.71 The Court, in Construction Development
Corporation of the Philippines v. Estrella,72 citing Traders
Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. National
Labor Relations Commission,73 elucidated thus:
There are two commonly accepted concepts of
attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and
extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an
attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation
paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services
he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this
compensation is the fact of his employment by
and his agreement with the client.
In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee
is an indemnity for damages ordered by the
court to be paid by the losing party in a
litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases
provided by law where such award can be made,
such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil
Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to
 the client, unless they have agreed that the
award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof.74
It was therefore erroneous for the CA to delete the award
of attorney's fees on the ground that the record is devoid
of evidence to show the cost of the services of
respondent's counsel. The amount is actually
discretionary upon the Court so long as it passes the test
of reasonableness. They may be recovered as actual or
compensatory damages when exemplary damages are
awarded and whenever the court deems it just and
equitable,75 as in this case.
Considering the factual backdrop of this case, attorney's
fees in the amount of P200,000.00 is reasonably modest.
The above liabilities of JAL in the total amount
of P800,000.00 earn legal interest pursuant to the Court's
ruling in Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines v. Estrella,76 citing Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,77 to wit:
Regarding the imposition of legal interest at the
rate of 6% from the time of the filing of the
complaint, we held in Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, that when an obligation,
regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is
breached, the contravenor can be held liable for
payment of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, subject to the following
rules, to wit -
1. When the obligation is breached, and it
consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e.,
a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due
should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself
earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate
of interest shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on
the amount of damages awarded may be
imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate
of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be
adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages
except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established
with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin
to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when
such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from the date
the judgment of the court is made (at which
time the quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case,
be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a
sum of money becomes final and executory,
the rate of legal interest, whether the case
falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above,
shall be 12% per annum from such finality
until its satisfaction, this interim period being
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.78 (Emphasis supplied
and citations omitted)
Accordingly, in addition to the said total amount
of P800,000.00, JAL is liable to pay respondent legal
interest. Pursuant to the above ruling of the Court, the
legal interest is 6% and it shall be reckoned from
September 21, 2000 when the RTC rendered its
judgment. From the time this Decision becomes final and
executory, the interest rate shall be 12% until its
satisfaction.
JAL is not entitled to its counterclaim for damages.
The counterclaim of JAL in its Answer79 is a compulsory
counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees arising
from the filing of the complaint. There is no mention of any
other counter claims.
This compulsory counterclaim of JAL arising from the
filing of the complaint may not be granted inasmuch as
the complaint against it is obviously not malicious or
unfounded. It was filed by respondent precisely to claim
his right to damages against JAL. Well-settled is the rule
that the commencement of an action does not per
se make the action wrongful and subject the action to
damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate.80
We reiterate case law that if damages result from a party's
exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria.81 Lawful
acts give rise to no injury. Walang perhuwisyong
maaring idulot ang paggamit sa sariling karapatan.
During the trial, however, JAL presented a witness who
testified that JAL suffered further damages. Allegedly,
respondent caused the publications of his subject
complaint against JAL in the newspaper for which JAL
suffered damages.82
Although these additional damages allegedly suffered by
JAL were not incorporated in its Answer as they arose
subsequent to its filing, JAL's witness was able to testify
on the same before the RTC.83 Hence, although these
issues were not raised by the pleadings, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings.
As provided in Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,
"(w)hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with
the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings."
Nevertheless, JAL's counterclaim cannot be granted.
JAL is a common carrier. JAL's business is mainly with
the traveling public. It invites people to avail themselves
of the comforts and advantages it offers.84 Since JAL
deals with the public, its bumping off of respondent
without a valid reason naturally drew public attention and
generated a public issue.
The publications involved matters about which the public
has the right to be informed because they relate to a
public issue. This public issue or concern is a legitimate
topic of a public comment that may be validly published.
Assuming that respondent, indeed, caused the
publication of his complaint, he may not be held liable for
damages for it. The constitutional guarantee of freedom
of the speech and of the press includes fair commentaries
on matters of public interest. This is explained by the
Court in Borjal v. Court of Appeals,85 to wit:
public person in his public capacity or to a public official
may be actionable. To be considered malicious, the
libelous statements must be shown to have been written
or published with the knowledge that they are false or in
reckless disregard of whether they are false or not.88
Considering that the published articles involve matters of
public interest and that its expressed opinion is not
malicious but based on established facts, the imputations
against JAL are not actionable. Therefore, JAL may not
claim damages for them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Japan Airlines is
ordered to pay respondent Jesus Simangan the following:
(1) P500,000.00 as moral damages; (2) P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and (3) P200,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
The total amount adjudged shall earn legal interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the date of judgment of the
Regional Trial Court on September 21, 2000 until the
finality of this Decision. From the time this Decision
becomes final and executory, the unpaid amount, if any,
shall earn legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum until
its satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.

To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of

public interest are privileged and constitute a
valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The
doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly
made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public person in
his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable
imputation to a public official may be actionable,
it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition. If the
comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the
opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it
might reasonably be inferred from the
facts.86 (Citations omitted and underscoring ours)

Even though JAL is not a public official, the rule on

privileged commentaries on matters of public interest
applies to it. The privilege applies not only to public
officials but extends to a great variety of subjects, and
includes matters of public concern, public men, and
candidates for office.87

Hence, pursuant to the Borjal case, there must be an

actual malice in order that a discreditable imputation to a
G.R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC.
(RCPI). petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO
DIONELA, respondents. PARAS, J.:
Before Us, is a Petition for Review by certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, modifying the decision
of the trial court in a civil case for recovery of damages
against petitioner corporation by reducing the award to
private respondent Loreto Dionela of moral damages from
P40,000 to Pl5,000, and attorney's fees from P3,000 to
P2,000.
The basis of the complaint against the defendant
corporation is a telegram sent through its Manila Office to
the offended party, Loreto Dionela, reading as follows:
176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID
MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO
DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY
WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER
LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE
ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER
115 PM
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG
DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG
PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO
(p. 19, Annex "A")
Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the
defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not only
wounded his feelings but also caused him undue
embarrassment and affected adversely his business as
well because other people have come to know of said
defamatory words. Defendant corporation as a defense,
alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a private
joke between the sending and receiving operators and
that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff
and therefore did not form part of the telegram and that
the Tagalog words are not defamatory. The telegram sent
through its facilities was received in its station at Legaspi
City. Nobody other than the operator manned the teletype
machine which automatically receives telegrams being
transmitted. The said telegram was detached from the
machine and placed inside a sealed envelope and
delivered to plaintiff, obviously as is. The additional words
in Tagalog were never noticed and were included in the
telegram when delivered.
The trial court in finding for the plaintiff ruled as follows:
There is no question that the additional words in
Tagalog are libelous. They clearly impute a vice or
defect of the plaintiff. Whether or not they were
intended for the plaintiff, the effect on the plaintiff is
the same. Any person reading the additional words in
Tagalog will naturally think that they refer to the
addressee, the plaintiff. There is no indication from
the face of the telegram that the additional words in
Tagalog were sent as a private joke between the
operators of the defendant.
The defendant is sued directly not as an employer.
The business of the defendant is to transmit
telegrams. It will open the door to frauds and allow the
defendant to act with impunity if it can escape liability
by the simple expedient of showing that its employees
acted beyond the scope of their assigned tasks.
The liability of the defendant is predicated not only on
Article 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but on
the following articles of said Code:
ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully
or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
There is sufficient publication of the libelous Tagalog
words. The office file of the defendant containing
copies of telegrams received are open and held
together only by a metal fastener. Moreover, they are
open to view and inspection by third parties.
It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to damages and
attorney's fees. The plaintiff is a businessman. The
libelous Tagalog words must have affected his
business and social standing in the community. The
Court fixes the amount of P40,000.00 as the
reasonable amount of moral damages and the
amount of P3,000.00 as attorney's fee which the
defendant should pay the plaintiff. (pp. 15-16, Record
on Appeal)
The respondent appellate court in its assailed decision
confirming the aforegoing findings of the lower court
stated:
The proximate cause, therefore, resulting in injury
to appellee, was the failure of the appellant to take
the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the
occurrence of the humiliating incident now
complained of. The company had not imposed any
safeguard against such eventualities and this void
in its operating procedure does not speak well of its
concern for their clientele's interests. Negligence
here is very patent. This negligence is imputable to
appellant and not to its employees.
 The claim that there was no publication of the
libelous words in Tagalog is also without merit. The
fact that a carbon copy of the telegram was filed
among other telegrams and left to hang for the
public to see, open for inspection by a third party is
sufficient publication. It would have been otherwise
perhaps had the telegram been placed and kept in
a secured place where no one may have had a
chance to read it without appellee's permission.
The additional Tagalog words at the bottom of the
telegram are, as correctly found by the lower court,
libelous per se, and from which malice may be
presumed in the absence of any showing of good
intention and justifiable motive on the part of the
appellant. The law implies damages in this instance
(Quemel vs. Court of Appeals, L-22794, January
16, 1968; 22 SCRA 44). The award of P40,000.00
as moral damages is hereby reduced to P15,000.00
and for attorney's fees the amount of P2,000.00 is
awarded. (pp. 22-23, record)
After a motion for reconsideration was denied by the
appellate court, petitioner came to Us with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that
Petitioner-employer should answer directly and
primarily for the civil liability arising from the criminal
act of its employee.
II
Code (supra). As well as on respondent's breach of
contract thru the negligence of its own employees. 1
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of receiving and transmitting messages.
Everytime a person transmits a message through the
facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon
receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes
to transmit the message accurately. There is no question
that in the case at bar, libelous matters were included in
the message transmitted, without the consent or
knowledge of the sender. There is a clear case of breach
of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and
libelous matters in the message sent to the private
respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only
through its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in
receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the
petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly
for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner's
business is to deprive the general public availing of the
services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate
remedy. In most cases, negligence must be proved in
order that plaintiff may recover. However, since
negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases,
we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the
thing speaks for itself), by considering the presence of
facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the
appellate court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay, and Gutierrez, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that

there was sufficient publication of the alleged libelous
telegram in question, as contemplated by law on libel.

III

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that

the liability of petitioner-company-employer is
predicated on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code,
Articles on Human Relations.

IV

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in awarding

Atty's. fees. (p. 4, Record)

Petitioner's contentions do not merit our consideration.

The action for damages was filed in the lower court
directly against respondent corporation not as an
employer subsidiarily liable under the provisions of Article
1161 of the New Civil Code in relation to Art. 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. The cause of action of the private
respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil
G.R. No. 98695 January 27, 1993
JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C.
SYQUIA, CARLOS C. SYQUIA and ANTHONY C.
SYQUIA, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK
CEMETERY, INC., respondents. CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Herein petitioners, Juan J. Syquia and Corazon C.
Syquia, Carlota C. Syquia, Carlos C. Syquia, and Anthony
Syquia, were the parents and siblings, respectively, of the
deceased Vicente Juan Syquia. On March 5, 1979, they
filed a complaint1 in the then Court of First Instance
against herein private respondent, Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of damages arising from
breach of contract and/or quasi-delict. The trial court
dismissed the complaint.
The antecedent facts, as gathered by the respondent
Court, are as follows:
On March 5, 1979, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and
Anthony all surnamed Syquia, plaintiff-appellants
herein, filed a complaint for damages against
defendant-appellee, Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc.
The complaint alleged among others, that pursuant to
a Deed of Sale (Contract No. 6885) dated August 27,
1969 and Interment Order No. 7106 dated July 21,
1978 executed between plaintiff-appellant Juan J.
Syquia and defendant-appellee, the former, father of
deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and
instructed defendant-appellee to inter the remains of
deceased in the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery in
the morning of July 25, 1978 conformably and in
accordance with defendant-appellant's (sic) interment
procedures; that on September 4, 1978, preparatory
to transferring the said remains to a newly purchased
family plot also at the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of
the deceased was removed from its niche
underground with the assistance of certain
employees of defendant-appellant (sic); that as the
concrete vault was being raised to the surface,
plaintiffs-appellants discovered that the concrete
vault had a hole approximately three (3) inches in
diameter near the bottom of one of the walls closing
out the width of the vault on one end and that for a
certain length of time (one hour, more or less), water
drained out of the hole; that because of the aforesaid
discovery, plaintiffs-appellants became agitated and
upset with concern that the water which had collected
inside the vault might have risen as it in fact did rise,
to the level of the coffin and flooded the same as well
as the remains of the deceased with ill effects thereto;
that pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal
Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila on September 14,
1978, plaintiffs-appellants with the assistance of
licensed morticians and certain personnel of
defendant-appellant (sic) caused the opening of the
concrete vault on September 15, 1978; that upon
opening the vault, the following became apparent to
the plaintiffs-appellants: (a) the interior walls of the
concrete vault showed evidence of total flooding; (b)
the coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and silt
causing the wooden parts to warp and separate and
to crack the viewing glass panel located directly
above the head and torso of the deceased; (c) the
entire lining of the coffin, the clothing of the deceased,
and the exposed parts of the deceased's remains
were damaged and soiled by the action of the water
and silt and were also coated with filth.
Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by
the defendant-appellee of its obligation to deliver a
defect-free concrete vault designed to protect the
remains of the deceased and the coffin against the
elements which resulted in the desecration of
deceased's grave and in the alternative, because of
defendant-appellee's gross negligence conformably
to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code in failing to seal
the concrete vault, the complaint prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering defendant-appellee to
pay plaintiffs-appellants P30,000.00 for actual
damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages,
exemplary damages in the amount determined by the
court, 20% of defendant-appellee's total liability as
attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation and costs
of suit.2
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the
contract between the parties did not guarantee that the
cement vault would be waterproof; that there could be no
quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any
fault or negligence, and because there was a pre-existing
contractual relation between the Syquias and defendant
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.. The trial court also
noted that the father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the
gravesite despite knowing that said area had to be
constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass green
and that water would eventually seep through the vault.
The trial court also accepted the explanation given by
defendant for boring a hole at the bottom side of the vault:
"The hole had to be bored through the concrete vault
because if it has no hole the vault will (sic) float and the
grave would be filled with water and the digging would
caved (sic) in the earth, the earth would caved (sic) in the
(sic) fill up the grave."3
From this judgment, the Syquias appealed. They alleged
that the trial court erred in holding that the contract
allowed the flooding of the vault; that there was no
desecration; that the boring of the hole was justifiable; and
in not awarding damages.
The Court of Appeals in the Decision4 dated December 7,
1990 however, affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated April 25, 1991.5
Unsatisfied with the respondent Court's decision, the
Syquias filed the instant petition. They allege herein that
the Court of Appeals committed the following errors when
it:
1. held that the contract and the Rules
and Resolutions of private respondent
allowed the flooding of the vault and the
entrance thereto of filth and silt;
2. held that the act of boring a hole was
justifiable and corollarily, when it held
that no act of desecration was
committed;
3. overlooked and refused to consider
relevant, undisputed facts, such as those
which have been stipulated upon by the
parties, testified to by private
respondent's witnesses, and admitted in
the answer, which could have justified a
different conclusion;
4. held that there was no tort because of
a pre-existing contract and the absence
of fault/negligence; and
5. did not award the P25,000.00 actual
damages which was agreed upon by the
parties, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees.
At the bottom of the entire proceedings is the act of boring
a hole by private respondent on the vault of the deceased
kin of the bereaved petitioners. The latter allege that such
act was either a breach of private respondent's
contractual obligation to provide a sealed vault, or, in the
alternative, a negligent act which constituted a quasi-
delict. Nonetheless, petitioners claim that whatever kind
of negligence private respondent has committed, the
latter is liable for desecrating the grave of petitioners'
dead.
In the instant case, We are called upon to determine
whether the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,
breached its contract with petitioners; or, alternatively,
whether private respondent was guilty of a tort.
We understand the feelings of petitioners and empathize
with them. Unfortunately, however, We are more inclined
to answer the foregoing questions in the negative. There
is not enough ground, both in fact and in law, to justify a
reversal of the decision of the respondent Court and to
uphold the pleas of the petitioners.
With respect to herein petitioners' averment that private
respondent has committed culpa aquiliana, the Court of
Appeals found no negligent act on the part of private
respondent to justify an award of damages against it.
Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa
aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the
respondent's Court finding that there was no negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict . . . . (Emphasis
supplied).
In this case, it has been established that the
Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery,
Inc., entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale
and Certificate of Perpetual Care"6 on August 27,
1969. That agreement governed the relations of
the parties and defined their respective rights and
obligations. Hence, had there been actual
negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for
a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but
for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170
of the Civil Code, to wit:
Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in
any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages.
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. bound itself to
provide the concrete box to be send in the interment. Rule
17 of the Rules and Regulations of private respondent
provides that:
Rule 17. Every earth interment shall be
made enclosed in a concrete box, or in
an outer wall of stone, brick or concrete,
the actual installment of which shall be
made by the employees of the
Association.7
Pursuant to this above-mentioned Rule, a concrete vault
was provided on July 27, 1978, the day before the
interment, and was, on the same day, installed by private
respondent's employees in the grave which was dug
earlier. After the burial, the vault was covered by a cement
lid.
Petitioners however claim that private respondent
breached its contract with them as the latter held out in
the brochure it distributed that the . . . lot may hold single
or double internment (sic) underground
in sealed concrete vault."8 Petitioners claim that the vault
provided by private respondent was not sealed, that is,
not waterproof. Consequently, water seeped through the
cement enclosure and damaged everything inside it.
We do not agree. There was no stipulation in the Deed of
Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the Rules
and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery,
Inc. that the vault would be waterproof. Private
respondent's witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel, explained
that the term "sealed" meant "closed."9 On the other hand,
the word "seal" is defined as . . . any of various closures
or fastenings . . . that cannot be opened without rupture
and that serve as a check against tampering or
unauthorized opening." 10 The meaning that has been
given by private respondent to the word conforms with the
cited dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also quite clear
that "sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". Well
settled is the rule that when the terms of the contract are
clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the
stipulation shall control. 11 Contracts should be
interpreted according to their literal meaning and should
not be interpreted beyond their obvious intendment. 12 As
ruled by the respondent Court:
When plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia affixed his
signature to the Deed of Sale (Exhibit "A") and the
attached Rules and Regulations (Exhibit "1"), it can
be assumed that he has accepted defendant-
appellee's undertaking to merely provide a concrete
vault. He can not now claim that said concrete vault
must in addition, also be waterproofed (sic). It is basic
that the parties are bound by the terms of their
contract, which is the law between them (Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. 178 SCRA 739). Where there is
nothing in the contract which is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy,
the validity of the contract must be sustained (Phil.
American Insurance Co. vs. Judge Pineda, 175
SCRA 416). Consonant with this ruling, a contracting
party cannot incur a liability more than what is
expressly specified in his undertaking. It cannot be
extended by implication, beyond the terms of the
contract (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, supra). And as a rule of evidence,
where the terms of an agreement are reduced to
writing, the document itself, being constituted by the
parties as the expositor of their intentions, is the only
instrument of evidence in respect of that agreement
which the law will recognize, so long as its (sic) exists
for the purpose of evidence (Starkie, Ev., pp. 648,
655, Kasheenath vs. Chundy, 5 W.R. 68 cited in
Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in the Phil. p. 153,
1973 Ed.). And if the terms of the contract are clear
and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control (Santos vs. CA, et al., G. R.
No. 83664, Nov. 13, 1989; Prudential Bank & Trust
Co. vs. Community Builders Co., Inc., 165 SCRA 285;
Balatero vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 530). 13
We hold, therefore, that private respondent did not breach
the tenor of its obligation to the Syquias. While this may
be so, can private respondent be liable for culpa
aquiliana for boring the hole on the vault? It cannot be
denied that the hole made possible the entry of more
water and soil than was natural had there been no hole.
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of the time and of the place." 14 In the absence of
stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the
diligence to be observed in the performance of the
obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a
family.
The circumstances surrounding the commission of the
assailed act — boring of the hole — negate the allegation
of negligence. The reason for the act was explained by
Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who said that:
Q It has been established in this particular case that
a certain Vicente Juan Syquia was interred on July
25, 1978 at the Parañaque Cemetery of the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., will you please tell the
Hon. Court what or whether you have participation in
connection with said internment (sic)?
A A day before Juan (sic) Syquia was buried our
personnel dug a grave. After digging the next morning
a vault was taken and placed in the grave and when
the vault was placed on the grave a hole was placed
on the vault so that water could come into the vault
because it was raining heavily then because the vault
has no hole the vault will float and the grave would be
filled with water and the digging would caved (sic) in
and the earth, the earth would (sic) caved in and fill
up the grave. 15 (Emphasis ours)
Except for the foreman's opinion that the concrete vault
may float should there be a heavy rainfall, from the above-
mentioned explanation, private respondent has exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the
accumulation of water inside the vault which would have
resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave filling
the same with earth.
Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of
private respondent, We find no reason to award damages
in favor of petitioners.
In the light of the foregoing facts, and construed in the
language of the applicable laws and jurisprudence, We
are constrained to AFFIRM in toto the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated December 7, 1990.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS A.
LUNA and CLARITA S. LUNA, respondents. VITUG, J.:
Some time in October 1986, private respondent Luis A.
Luna applied for, and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD
issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company
("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. Upon his request, the bank
also issued a supplemental card to private respondent
Clarita S. Luna.
In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was
forthwith informed. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita
submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the
bank's internal security procedures and policy would
appear to be to meanwhile so record the lost card, along
with the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled
Card" in its master file.
On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for
a close friend, a Filipino-American, and another guest at
the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercontinental
Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his
FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly
had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit
Card Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis
was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13.
Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.
In a letter, dated 11 October 1988, private respondent
Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the
payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a vice-president
of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies to Luis. In his
letter, dated 03 November 1988, Festejo, in part, said:
In cases when a card is reported to our office as
lost, FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary
action to avert its unauthorized use (such as
tagging the card as hotlisted), as it is always our
intention to protect our cardholders.
An investigation of your case however, revealed
that FAREASTCARD failed to inform you about
its security policy. Furthermore, an overzealous
employee of the Bank's Credit Card Department
did not consider the possibility that it may have
been you who was presenting the card at that
time (for which reason, the unfortunate incident
occurred). 1
Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia
Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that private
respondents were "very valued clients" of FEBTC. William
Anthony King, Food and Beverage Manager of the
Intercontinental Hotel, wrote back to say that the
credibility of private respondent had never been "in
question." A copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo.
Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on
05 December 1988, filed a complaint for damages with
the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.
On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing
factual settings, rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to
pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages;
(b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00
attorney's fees.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court with this
petition for review.
There is merit in this appeal.
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered
where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith
or with malice in the breach of the contract. 2 The Civil
Code provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal
ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. (Emphasis supplied)
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple,
negligence.3 Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage,
moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a
passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed4 )
of the common carrier.5
Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to
personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation.
Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate
court, however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate
intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private
respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing
to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as
to amount to malice or bad faith.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional
design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of
negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill
will.6
We are not unaware of the previous rulings of this Court,
such as in American Express International,
Inc., vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (167 SCRA 209)
and Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court (206 SCRA 408), sanctioning the application of
Article 21, in relation to Article 2217 and Article 22197 of
the Civil Code to a contractual breach similar to the case
at bench. Article 21 states:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed,
contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even
if we are to assume that the provision could properly
relate to a breach of contract, its application can be
warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his
contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate
a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud
or bad faith. Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere
declaration of a general principle in human relations that
clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific
provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the
grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when
the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.
Mr. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in his ponencia in Fores
vs. Miranda8 explained with great clarity the
predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in
contractual relations; we quote:
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to
the respondent, the same must be discarded. We
have repeatedly ruled (Cachero vs. Manila Yellow
Taxicab Co. Inc., 101 Phil. 523; 54 Off. Gaz., [26],
6599; Necesito, et al. vs. Paras, 104 Phil., 75; 56
Off. Gaz., [23] 4023), that moral damages are not
recoverable in damage actions predicated on a
breach of the contract of transportation, in view of
Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code,
which provide as follows:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be
recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 2220. Wilful injury to property may be a
legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly
due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.
By contrasting the provisions of these two articles
it immediately becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of
transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud
(dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious
conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral
damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be
considered included in the descriptive term
"analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only
because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the
damages that are caused contractual breach, but
because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176
of the Code expressly excludes the cases where
there is a "preexisitng contractual relations
between the parties."
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
The exception to the basic rule of damages now
under consideration is a mishap resulting in the
death of a passenger, in which case Article 1764
makes the common carrier expressly subject to
the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the spouse,
descendants and ascendants of the deceased
passenger to "demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased"
(Necesito vs. Paras, 104 Phil. 84, Resolution on
motion to reconsider, September 11, 1958). But
the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the
more evident that where the injured passenger
does not die, moral damages are not recoverable
unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of
malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the
mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does
not per se constitute or justify an inference of
malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and
in the case at bar there is no other evidence of
such malice to support the award of moral
damages by the Court of Appeals. To award
moral damages for breach of contract, therefore,
without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of
the defendant, as required by Art. 2220, would be
to violate the clear provisions of the law, and
constitute unwarranted judicial legislation.
xxx xxx xxx
The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice
in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing
and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too
fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-
 1172); their consequences being clearly
differentiated by the Code.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts,
the damages for which the obligor who acted
in good faith is liable shall be those that are
the natural and probable consequences of
the breach of the obligation, and which the
parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the
obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton
attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for
all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation.
It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory
provision to the contrary, that this difference was
in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220
they limited recovery of moral damages to
breaches of contract in bad faith. It is true that
negligence may be occasionally so gross as to
amount to malice; but the fact must be shown in
evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to be
lightly inferred from a mere finding that the
contract was breached through negligence of the
carrier's employees.
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule
that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a
contract that might thereby permit the application of
applicable principles on tort9 even where there is a pre-
existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant
(Phil. Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 143;
Singson vs. Bank of Phil. Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air
France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155). This doctrine,
unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case
for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission
complained of would constitute an actionable tort
independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-
delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract)
can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing
contract between two parties, an act or omission can
nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact
that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the
application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here,
private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on
their contractual relationship; without such agreement,
the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held
to stand as a separate cause of action or as an
independent actionable tort.
The Court finds, therefore, the award of moral damages
made by the court a quo, affirmed by the appellate court,
to be inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis.
Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to
serve as an example or as correction for the public good
in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages (Art. 2229, Civil
Code; see Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport System,
148 SCRA 440; Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways,
16 SCRA 431). In criminal offenses, exemplary damages
are imposed when the crime is committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code).
In quasi-delicts, such damages are granted if the
defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross
negligence as to approximate malice (See Art. 2231, Civil
Code; CLLC E.G. Gochangco Workers Union vs. NLRC,
161 SCRA 655; Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs.
CA, 176 SCRA 778). In contracts and quasi-contracts, the
court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is
found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil Code;
PNB vs. Gen. Acceptance and Finance Corp., 161 SCRA
449).
Given the above premises and the factual circumstances
here obtaining, it would also be just as arduous to sustain
the exemplary damages granted by the courts below
(see De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 166).
Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps
inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private
respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure
of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil
Code providing thusly:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered
by him.
Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the
court deems such recovery to be just and equitable (Art.
2208, Civil Code). We see no issue of sound discretion on
the part of the appellate court in allowing the award
thereof by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is given due course.
The appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the
award of moral and exemplary damages to private
respondents; in its stead, petitioner is ordered to pay
private respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of P5,000.00
by way of nominal damages. In all other respects, the
appealed decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156109 November 18, 2004
KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and
Represented by ARMANDO REGINO, petitioner,
vs.
PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A. GAMUROT and
ELISSA BALADAD, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Upon enrolment, students and their school enter upon a
reciprocal contract. The students agree to abide by the
standards of academic performance and codes of
conduct, issued usually in the form of manuals that are
distributed to the enrollees at the start of the school term.
Further, the school informs them of the itemized fees they
are expected to pay. Consequently, it cannot, after the
enrolment of a student, vary the terms of the contract. It
cannot require fees other than those it specified upon
enrolment.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule
45,1 seeking to nullify the July 12, 20022 and the
November 22, 20023 Orders of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan (Branch 48) in Civil
Case No. U-7541. The decretal portion of the first assailed
Order reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the instant
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action."4
The second challenged Order denied petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year
computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan
Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in
a poor family, Regino went to college mainly through the
financial support of her relatives. During the second
semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic
and statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle A.
Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign
dubbed the "Rave Party and Dance Revolution," the
proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the
school's tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was
required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each.
The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing
students who purchased tickets with additional points in
their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied
the opportunity to take the final examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from
attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused
to pay for the tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002,
the scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and
statistics, her teachers -- Respondents Rachelle A.
Gamurot and Elissa Baladad -- allegedly disallowed her
from taking the tests. According to petitioner, Gamurot
made her sit out her logic class while her classmates were
taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after
announcing to the entire class that she was not permitting
petitioner and another student to take their statistics
examinations for failing to pay for their tickets, allegedly
ejected them from the classroom. Petitioner's pleas
ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who
unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance with
PCST's policy.
On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a
Complaint5 for damages against PCST, Gamurot and
Baladad. In her Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as
nominal damages; P500,000 as moral damages; at least
P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual
damages; plus the costs of litigation and attorney's fees.
On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss6 on the ground of petitioner's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. According to respondents, the
question raised involved the determination of the wisdom
of an administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case
should have been initiated before the proper
administrative body, the Commission of Higher Education
(CHED).
In her Comment to respondents' Motion, petitioner argued
that prior exhaustion of administrative remedies was
unnecessary, because her action was not administrative
in nature, but one purely for damages arising from
respondents' breach of the laws on human relations. As
such, jurisdiction lay with the courts.
On July 12, 2002, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for
lack of cause of action.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In granting respondents' Motion to Dismiss, the trial court
noted that the instant controversy involved a higher
institution of learning, two of its faculty members and one
of its students. It added that Section 54 of the Education
Act of 1982 vested in the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) the supervision and regulation of
tertiary schools. Thus, it ruled that the CHED, not the
courts, had jurisdiction over the controversy.7
In its dispositive portion, the assailed Order dismissed the
Complaint for "lack of cause of action" without, however,
explaining this ground.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present Petition on pure
questions of law.8
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues
for our consideration:
"Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies applies in a civil action
exclusively for damages based on violation of the
human relation provisions of the Civil Code, filed
by a student against her former school.
"Whether or not there is a need for prior
declaration of invalidity of a certain school
administrative policy by the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED) before a former
student can successfully maintain an action
exclusively for damages in regular courts.
"Whether or not the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) has exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions for damages based upon
violation of the Civil Code provisions on human
relations filed by a student against the school."9
All of the foregoing point to one issue -- whether the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable. The Court, however, sees a second issue
which, though not expressly raised by petitioner, was
impliedly contained in her Petition: whether the Complaint
stated sufficient cause(s) of action.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on
petitioner's alleged failure to exhaust administrative
remedies before resorting to the RTC. According to them,
the determination of the controversy hinge on the validity,
the wisdom and the propriety of PCST's academic policy.
Thus, the Complaint should have been lodged in the
CHED, the administrative body tasked under Republic Act
No. 7722 to implement the state policy to "protect, foster
and promote the right of all citizens to affordable quality
education at all levels and to take appropriate steps to
ensure that education is accessible to all."10
Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no relevance to
the present case since she is praying for damages, a
remedy beyond the domain of the CHED and well within
the jurisdiction of the courts.11
Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies has no bearing on the present
case. In Factoran Jr. v. CA,12 the Court had occasion to
elucidate on the rationale behind this doctrine:
"The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law,
comity, and convenience, should not entertain
suits unless the available administrative
remedies have first been resorted to and the
proper authorities have been given the
appropriate opportunity to act and correct their
alleged errors, if any, committed in the
administrative forum. x x x.13 "
Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of
PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her
final examinations; she was already enrolled in another
educational institution. A reversal of the acts complained
of would not adequately redress her grievances; under
the circumstances, the consequences of respondents'
acts could no longer be undone or rectified.
Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable when there is competence on the part of the
administrative body to act upon the matter complained
of.14 Administrative agencies are not courts; they are
neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed
judicial tribunals.15 Specifically, the CHED does not have
the power to award damages.16 Hence, petitioner could
not have commenced her case before the Commission.
Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one
of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well
within the jurisdiction of the trial court.17 Petitioner's action
for damages inevitably calls for the application and the
interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within
the jurisdiction of the courts.18
Second Issue:
Cause of Action
Sufficient Causes of Action Stated in the Allegations
in the Complaint
As a rule, every complaint must sufficiently allege a cause
of action; failure to do so warrants its dismissal.19 A
complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if,
admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the
plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.
Assuming the facts that are alleged to be true, the court
should be able to render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer in the complaint.20
A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits the truth of the alleged facts. In their
Motion to Dismiss, respondents did not dispute any of
petitioner's allegations, and they admitted that "x x x the
crux of plaintiff's cause of action is the determination of
whether or not the assessment of P100 per ticket is
excessive or oppressive."21 They thereby premised their
prayer for dismissal on the Complaint's alleged failure to
state a cause of action. Thus, a reexamination of the
Complaint is in order.
The Complaint contains the following factual allegations:
"10. In the second week of February 2002,
defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot, in connivance
with PCST, forced plaintiff and her classmates to
buy or take two tickets each, x x x;
"11. Plaintiff and many of her classmates
objected to the forced distribution and selling of
tickets to them but the said defendant warned
them that if they refused [to] take or pay the price
of the two tickets they would not be allowed at all
to take the final examinations;
"12. As if to add insult to injury, defendant
Rachelle A. Gamurot bribed students with
additional fifty points or so in their test score in
her subject just to unjustly influence and compel
them into taking the tickets;
"13. Despite the students' refusal, they were
forced to take the tickets because [of] defendant
Rachelle A. Gamurot's coercion and act of
intimidation, but still many of them including the
plaintiff did not attend the dance party imposed
upon them by defendants PCST and Rachelle A.
Gamurot;
"14. Plaintiff was not able to pay the price of her
own two tickets because aside form the fact that
she could not afford to pay them it is also against
her religious practice as a member of a certain
religious congregation to be attending dance
parties and celebrations;
"15. On March 14, 2002, before defendant
Rachelle A. Gamurot gave her class its final
examination in the subject 'Logic' she warned that
students who had not paid the tickets would not
be allowed to participate in the examination, for
which threat and intimidation many students were
eventually forced to make payments:
"16. Because plaintiff could not afford to pay,
defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot inhumanly made
plaintiff sit out the class but the defendant did not
allow her to take her final examination in 'Logic;'
"17. On March 15, 2002 just before the giving of
the final examination in the subject 'Statistics,'
defendant Elissa Baladad, in connivance with
defendants Rachelle A. Gamurot and PCST,
announced in the classroom that she was not
allowing plaintiff and another student to take the
examination for their failure and refusal to pay the
price of the tickets, and thenceforth she ejected
plaintiff and the other student from the classroom;
"18. Plaintiff pleaded for a chance to take the
examination but all defendants could say was that
the prohibition to give the examinations to non-
paying students was an administrative decision;
"19. Plaintiff has already paid her tuition fees and
other obligations in the school;
"20. That the above-cited incident was not a first
since PCST also did another forced distribution of
tickets to its students in the first semester of
school year 2001-2002; x x x " 22
The foregoing allegations show two causes of action; first,
breach of contract; and second, liability for tort.
Reciprocity of the
School-Student Contract
In Alcuaz v. PSBA,23 the Court characterized the
relationship between the school and the student as a
contract, in which "a student, once admitted by the school
is considered enrolled for one semester."24 Two years
later, in Non v. Dames II,25 the Court modified the
"termination of contract theory" in Alcuaz by holding that
the contractual relationship between the school and the
student is not only semestral in duration, but for the entire
period the latter are expected to complete it."26 Except for
the variance in the period during which the contractual
relationship is considered to subsist, both Alcuaz and Non
were unanimous in characterizing the school-student
relationship as contractual in nature.
The school-student relationship is also reciprocal. Thus, it
has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all
contracts of such kind -- it gives rise to bilateral or
reciprocal rights and obligations. The school undertakes
to provide students with education sufficient to enable
them to pursue higher education or a profession. On the
other hand, the students agree to abide by the academic
requirements of the school and to observe its rules and
regulations.27
The terms of the school-student contract are defined at
the moment of its inception -- upon enrolment of the
student. Standards of academic performance and the
code of behavior and discipline are usually set forth in
manuals distributed to new students at the start of every
school year. Further, schools inform prospective
enrollees the amount of fees and the terms of payment.
In practice, students are normally required to make a
down payment upon enrollment, with the balance to be
paid before every preliminary, midterm and final
examination. Their failure to pay their financial obligation
is regarded as a valid ground for the school to deny them
the opportunity to take these examinations.
The foregoing practice does not merely ensure
compliance with financial obligations; it also underlines
the importance of major examinations. Failure to take a
major examination is usually fatal to the students'
promotion to the next grade or to graduation. Examination
results form a significant basis for their final grades.
These tests are usually a primary and an indispensable
requisite to their elevation to the next educational level
and, ultimately, to their completion of a course.
Education is not a measurable commodity. It is not
possible to determine who is "better educated" than
another. Nevertheless, a student's grades are an
accepted approximation of what would otherwise be an
intangible product of countless hours of study. The
importance of grades cannot be discounted in a setting
where education is generally the gate pass to
employment opportunities and better life; such grades are
often the means by which a prospective employer
measures whether a job applicant has acquired the
necessary tools or skills for a particular profession or
trade.
Thus, students expect that upon their payment of tuition
fees, satisfaction of the set academic standards,
completion of academic requirements and observance of
school rules and regulations, the school would reward
them by recognizing their "completion" of the course
enrolled in.
The obligation on the part of the school has been
established in Magtibay v. Garcia,28 Licup v. University of
San Carlos29 and Ateneo de Manila University v.
Garcia,30 in which the Court held that, barring any violation
of the rules on the part of the students, an institution of
higher learning has a contractual obligation to afford its
students a fair opportunity to complete the course they
seek to pursue.
We recognize the need of a school to fund its facilities and
to meet astronomical operating costs; this is a reality in
running it. Crystal v. Cebu International School31 upheld
the imposition by respondent school of a "land purchase
deposit" in the amount of P50,000 per student to be used
for the "purchase of a piece of land and for the
construction of new buildings and other facilities x x x
which the school would transfer [to] and occupy after the
expiration of its lease contract over its present site."
The amount was refundable after the student graduated
or left the school. After noting that the imposition of the
fee was made only after prior consultation and approval
by the parents of the students, the Court held that the
school committed no actionable wrong in refusing to admit
the children of the petitioners therein for their failure to pay
the "land purchase deposit" and the 2.5 percent monthly
surcharge thereon.
In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-
raising measure belatedly, in the middle of the semester.
It exacted the dance party fee as a condition for the
students' taking the final examinations, and ultimately for
its recognition of their ability to finish a course. The fee,
however, was not part of the school-student contract
entered into at the start of the school year. Hence, it could
not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the
enrollees.
Such contract is by no means an ordinary one. In Non, we
stressed that the school-student contract "is imbued with
public interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State of
supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions."32 Sections 5 (1) and (3) of Article XIV of the
1987 Constitution provide:
"The State shall protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education at all levels and
shall take appropriate steps to make such
declaration accessible to all.
"Every student has a right to select a profession
or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic
requirements."
The same state policy resonates in Section 9(2) of BP
232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982:
"Section 9. Rights of Students in School. – In
addition to other rights, and subject to the
limitations prescribed by law and regulations,
students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the
following rights:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The right to freely choose their field of
study subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to
graduation, except in cases of academic
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary
regulations."
Liability for Tort
In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private
respondents "inhumanly punish students x x x by reason
only of their poverty, religious practice or lowly station in
life, which inculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt,
disgrace and unworthiness;"33 as a result of such
punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any of her
subjects for the second semester of that school year and
had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of
respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation,
mental agony and "demoralization of unimaginable
proportions" in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the
Civil Code. These provisions of the law state thus:
"Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."
 "Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
"Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action
for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's
residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private
life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be
alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on
account of his beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect, or other
personal condition."
Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not
otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution,
however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an
existing contract with its students, since the act that
violated the contract may also be a tort. We ruled thus in
PSBA vs. CA,34 from which we quote:
"x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code]
shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts
or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not
prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a
contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso (124 Phil.
722), the private respondent was awarded
damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a
first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is
noted, however, that the Court referred to the
petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort,
not one arising form a contract of carriage. In
effect, Air France is authority for the view that
liability from tort may exist even if there is a
contract, for the act that breaks the contract may
be also a tort. x x x This view was not all that
revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this
Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco v.
Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher
elucidated thus: 'x x x. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the contract
under such conditions that the same act which
constitutes a breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed between the
parties.'
"Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter
of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly
Article 21 x x x."35
Academic Freedom
In their Memorandum, respondents harp on their right to
"academic freedom." We are not impressed. According to
present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses
the independence of an academic institution to determine
for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3)
how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to
study.36In Garcia v. the Faculty Admission Committee,
Loyola School of Theology,37 the Court upheld the
respondent therein when it denied a female student's
admission to theological studies in a seminary for
prospective priests. The Court defined the freedom of an
academic institution thus: "to decide for itself aims and
objectives and how best to attain them x x x free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint."38
In Tangonan v. Paño,39 the Court upheld, in the name of
academic freedom, the right of the school to refuse
readmission of a nursing student who had been enrolled
on probation, and who had failed her nursing subjects.
These instances notwithstanding, the Court has
emphasized that once a school has, in the name of
academic freedom, set its standards, these should be
meticulously observed and should not be used to
discriminate against certain students.40 After accepting
them upon enrollment, the school cannot renege on its
contractual obligation on grounds other than those made
known to, and accepted by, students at the start of the
school year.
In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges
sufficient causes of action against respondents, and that
it should not have been summarily dismissed. Needless
to say, the Court is not holding respondents liable for the
acts complained of. That will have to be ruled upon in due
course by the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
assailed Orders REVERSED. The trial court is
DIRECTED to reinstate the Complaint and, with all
deliberate speed, to continue the proceedings in Civil
Case No. U-7541. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74041 July 29, 1987; THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO LIGON y
TRIAS and FERNANDO GABAT y the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. He
ALMERA, accused, FERNANDO GABAT y immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up
ALMERA, accused-appellant. YAP, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XX, rendered on February 17,
1986, convicting the accused-appellant, Fernando Gabat,
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales y
Ortiz, a ,Seventeen-year old working student who was
earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly
robbed of Es cigarette box containing cigarettes worth
P300.00 more or less.1
Only Fernando Gabat was arrested and brought to trial
and convicted. The other accused, Rogelio Ligon, was
never apprehended and is still at large.
The fatal incident happened on a Sunday, October 23,
1983 at about 6:10 p.m. The accused, Fernando Gabat,
was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his
father, Antonio Gabat, and driven by the other accused,
Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi was coming from Espana
Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. Fernando
Gabat was seated beside the driver, in the front seat by
the window on the right side of the Kombi. At the
intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street
before turning left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto
Avenue, the Kombi had to stop as the traffic light was red.
While waiting for the traffic light to change, Fernando
Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor, Jose Rosales y Ortiz
(Rosales for short) to buy some cigarettes from him.
Rosales approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two
sticks of cigarettes. While this transaction was occurring,
the traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi driven by
Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. As to what
precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the
crucial moment, and immediately thereafter, is the subject
of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense.
It is not controverted, however, that as the Kombi
continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales clung to the
window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell
down on the pavement. Rosales was rushed by some
bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital, where he
was treated for multiple physical injuries and was confined
thereat until his death on October 30, 1983.
Following close behind the Kombi at the time of the
incident was a taxicab driven by Prudencio Castillo. He
was behind the Kombi, at a distance of about three
meters, travelling on the same lane in a slightly oblique
position ("a little bit to the right").2 As the Kombi did not
stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near the
foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped
towards Roxas Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the
driver stop. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal
monument, Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two
persons in it. He sought their assistance in chasing the
Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao."3 The two men
in the jeep joined the chase and at the intersection of Vito
Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able to overtake
right behind it. The two men on board the jeep turned out
to be police officers, Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao and
Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the driver,
Rogelio Ligon, and his companion, Fernando Gabat, to
alight from the Kombi. It was found out that there was a
third person inside the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias
who was sleeping at the rear seat.4The three were all
brought by the police officers to the Western Police
District and turned over to Pfc. Fernan Payuan. The
taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, also went along with
them. The written statements of Castillo and Rodolfo
Primicias were taken by the traffic investigator, Pfc.
Fernan Payuan.5 Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident
Report, dated October 23, 1983.6 Fernando Gabat and
Rodolfo Primicias were released early morning the
following day, but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned
over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation.
Investigating Fiscal Alfredo Cantos, filed an information in
court against Rogelio Ligon dated December 6, 1983
charging him with Homicide thru Reckless
Imprudence.7 Six months later, however, or on June 28,
1984, Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information
against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery
with Homicide.8 He filed the latter information on the basis
of a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo 9 and a
joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo Castil,
cigarette vendors, who allegedly witnessed the incident
on October 23, 1983.10These affidavits were already
prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on
January 17, 1984.
On October 31, 1983, an autopsy was conducted by the
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Dr. Orlando V. Salvador, who stated in his
autopsy report that the cause of death of Rosales was
"pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral, secondary to traumatic
injuries of the head."11
The prosecution tried to establish, through the sole
testimony of the taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, that
Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and
pried loose the latter's hand from the window of the
Kombi, resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the
pavement. In its decision, the trial court summarized the
testimony of Castillo as follows: At about 6:00 o'clock in
the evening of October 23, 1983, Castillo was then driving
his taxicab along Lerma Street near Far Eastern
University, and at the intersection of Lerma and Quezon
Boulevard, the traffic light changed from green to red. The
vehicular traffic stopped and Prudencio Castillo's taxi was
right behind a Volkswagen Kombi. While waiting for the
traffic light to change to green, Castillo Idly watched the
Volkswagen Kombi and saw Gabat, the passenger sitting
beside the driver, signal to a cigarette vendor. The
cigarette vendor, Rosales, approached the right side of
the Kombi. While Rosales was handing the cigarettes to
Gabat, the traffic light suddenly changed to green. When
the Kombi moved forward, Gabat suddenly grabbed the
cigarette box held by Rosales. Taken aback, Jose
Rosales ran beside the Kombi and was able to hold on to
the windowsill of the right front door with his right hand.
While Rosales was clinging to the windowsill, with both
feet off the ground, the Kombi continued to speed towards
the C.M. Recto underpass. Castillo, who was closely
following the Kombi, then saw Gabat forcibly remove the
hand of Rosales from the windowsill and the latter fell face
down on Quezon Boulevard near the Recto underpass.12
The version of the defense, on the other hand, was
summarized by the court as follows: On the date and time
in question, Fernando Gabat, 31 years old, an
underwriter, was on board the Volkswagen Kombi driven
by Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi had to stop at the
intersection of Lerma Street and Quezon Boulevard when
the traffic light turned red. Fernando Gabat, who wanted
to buy cigarettes, called a cigarette vendor who
approached the right side of the Kombi. Gabat bought two
sticks of cigarettes and handed to the cigarette vendor,
Rosales, a P5.00 bill. In order to change the P5.00 big,
Rosales placed his cigarette box containing assorted
cigarettes on the windowsill of the front door of the Kombi
between the arm of Gabat and the window frame.
Suddenly, the traffic light changed from red to green and
Rogelio Ligon moved the vehicle forward, heedless of the
transaction between Gabat and the cigarette vendor. As
the vehicle sped onward, the cigarette box which was
squeezed between the right arm of Gabat and the window
frame fell inside the Kombi. Rosales then ran beside the
vehicle and clung to the windowsill of the moving vehicle.
Gabat testified that when he saw the cigarette vendor
clinging on the side of the front door, he told Ligon to veer
to the right in order that Rosales could get off at the
sidewalk. However, Gabat declared, that Ligon said that
it could not be done because of the moving vehicular
traffic. Then, while the vehicle slowed down and Ligon
was maneuvering to the right in an attempt to go toward
the sidewalk, Rosales lost his grip on the window frame
and fell to the pavement of Quezon Boulevard. Gabat
allegedly shouted at Ligon to stop but Ligon replied that
they should go on to Las Pinas and report the incident to
the parents of Gabat, and later they would come back to
the scene of the incident. However, while the Kombi was
speeding along Dewey Boulevard, it was blocked by the
taxi of Prudencio Castillo and a jeep driven by policemen.
Gabat and Ligon were brought to police headquarters, but
neither of them executed any written statement.13
The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's
version, stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat
forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales
because, otherwise, there could be no reason for the
latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window.
The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat
forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales
from the windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter
could not have fallen down, having already been able to
balance himself on the stepboard.
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible
the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed
the cigarette box on the windowsill of the Kombi, holding
it with his left hand, while he was trying to get from his
pocket the change for the 5-peso bill of Gabat. The court
said that it is of common knowledge that cigarette vendors
plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their
cigarette box; no vendor lets go of his precious box of
cigarettes in order to change a peso bin given by a
customer.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court are accorded
great respect and are not disturbed on appeal, unless it is
shows that the findings are not supported by the
evidence, or the court failed to consider certain material
facts and circumstances in its evaluation of the evidence.
In the case at bar, a careful review of the record shows
that certain material facts and circumstances had been
overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account,
would alter the result of the case in that they would
introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would
entitle the accused to acquittal.
While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a
disinterested witness with no motive, according to the
court a quo, "other than to see that justice be done," his
testimony, even if not tainted with bias, is not entirely free
from doubt because his observation of the event could
have been faulty or mistaken. The taxicab which Castillo
was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in
which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo at the
trial.14Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the
rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagen Kombi is on the
upper portion, occupying approximately one-third (1/3) of
the rear end of the vehicle, thus making it visually difficult
for Castillo to observe clearly what transpired inside the
Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated. These
are circumstances which must be taken into consideration
in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to what exactly
happened between Gabat and the cigarette vendor during
that crucial moment before the latter fell down. As the
taxicab was right behind the Kombi, following it at a
distance of about three meters, Castillo's line of vision
was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His
testimony that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from
Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the
windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable
doubt, specially considering that this occurrence
happened in just a matter of seconds, and both vehicles
during that time were moving fast in the traffic.
We find it significant that in his statement given to the
police that very evening,15 Castillo did not mention that he
saw Gabat forcibly prying off the hand of Rosales from the
windowsill of the Kombi, although the police report
prepared by the investigating officer, Pfc. Fermin M.
Payuan, on the same date, stated that when the traffic
signal changed to green and the driver stepped on the
gas, the cigarette box of the cigarette vendor (Rosales)
was grabbed by the passenger Gabat and "instantly the
former clung to the door and was dragged at a distance
while at the same time the latter punched the vendor's
arm until the same (sic) fell to the pavement," thus
showing that during the police investigation Castillo must
have given a statement to the police which indicated that
Gabat did something to cause Rosales to fall from the
Kombi.16 It was by way of a supplementary affidavit
prepared by the lawyer of the complainant and sworn to
by Castillo before the Assistant City Fiscal on January 17,
1984 that this vital detail was added. This supplementary
affidavit was made the basis for filing another information
charging both Gabat and the driver with the crime of
Robbery with Homicide.
Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not
convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the
accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. In our view, the quantum of proof
necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a
crime as robbery with homicide has not been met in this
case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable
doubt.
However, it does not follow that a person who is not
criminally liable is also free from civil
liability.1avvphi1 While the guilt of the accused in a
criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is
required in a civil action for damages.17 The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist.18
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil
Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from
civil liability for the same act or omission, has been
explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a
criminal case also releases him from civil liability is
one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal
system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to
a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the
guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil
liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking
leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.
Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of
the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and
distinct from each other. One affects the social order
and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the
other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so
different from each other that article 1813 of the
present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may
be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a
crime; but the public action for the imposition of the
legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is
just and proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense
should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for
the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party,
why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of
every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the
wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the
adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct
a serious defect in our law. It will close up an
inexhaustible source of injustice a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable
persons injured or wronged. 19
In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of
evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from which
the civil liability of Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial
court's evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution
and defense witnesses at the trial and applying the
quantum of proof required in civil cases, we find that a
preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his
act and omission with fault and negligence caused
damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the
damage done. Gabat's wilfull act of calling Rosales, the
cigarette vendor, to the middle of a busy street to buy two
sticks of cigarettes set the chain of events which led to the
death of Rosales. Through fault and negligence, Gabat
(1) failed to prevent the driver from moving forward while
the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales
while the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle,
and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver to stop.
Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the driver's act of speeding
away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured
victim. These proven facts taken together are firm bases
for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code20 for the
damage done to Rosales.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered acquitting the
appellant Gabat for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
However, he is hereby held civilly liable for his acts and
omissions, there being fault or negligence, and sentenced
to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz in the
amount of P15.000.00 for the latter's death, P1,733.35 for
hospital and medical expenses, and P4,100.00 for funeral
expenses. The alleged loss of income amounting to
P20,000.00, not being supported by sufficient evidence,
is DENIED. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75357 November 27, 1987
RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION and/or RUFO
MAURICIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PARAS, J :
Illustre Cabiliza was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of the 5th Judicial Region, Branch II, Legaspi City
with homicide and damage to property through reckless
imprudence, in an information which reads-
That on or about the 20th day of September, 1979,
in the city of Legaspi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the driver of an Izusu
dump truck, bearing Plate No. WD-224 T Philippines
"79, belonging to and owned by RUFO MAURICIO
CONSTRUCTIONS, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drive, operate and
manage the said vehicle in a reckless and imprudent
manner without taking the necessary precaution to
prevent and/or avoid accident to persons and/or
damage to property, and without regard to traffic
rules and regulations, causing as a result of his
carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle that
he was driving to sideswipe and hit a Colt Gallant
with Plate No. AC -206 S Pilipinas "79, driven and
owned by the late JUDGE ARSENIO SOLIDUM,
thereby inflicting injuries upon the said Judge
Arsenio Solidum which directly caused his untimely
death, and further causing damage to the said Colt
Gallant in the amount of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency to the
damage and prejudice of the late Judge Arsenio
Solidum and/or his family, and likewise causing
damage to the house owned by PABLO NAVARRA,
to the damage and prejudice of the said Pablo
Navarro.
After arraignment and trial on the merits, Cabiliza was
convicted of the crime charged in a Decision dated
October 12, 1983, the dispositive portion of which reads
—
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Illustre
Cabiliza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide and damage to property thru reckless
imprudence and hereby sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4)
months, as minimum to six (6) years, as maximum
of prision correccional to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Judge Arsenio G. Solidum, the sum of
P115,723.05 as actual and compensatory damages,
Pl,447,200.00 for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased; P200,000.00 as moral damages; and
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the
costs. (Rollo, p. 75)
The aforesaid judgment was promulgated on November
9, 1983. On November 11, 1983, Cabiliza filed a Notice of
Appeal. But he did not live to pursue his appeal as he died
on January 5, 1984. A notice of death dated February 4,
1984 was filed by his counsel Atty. Eustaquio S. Beltran.
In the same notice of death, Atty. Beltran manifested the
intention of Rufo Mauricio, as employer of Cabiliza to
proceed with the case on appeal pursuant to his right as
employer who is subsidiarily liable.
On March 5, 1984, the lower court issued an Order
requiring the heirs of Cabiliza to appear and to substitute
him as appellant with respect to the civil aspect of the
case.
On motion of the heirs of the victim, the lower court in its
order dated August 23, 1984 ordered the issuance of a
writ of execution and accordingly on the same date, the
Branch Clerk of Court issued a writ.
The writ of execution was however returned unsatisfied
per Sheriff's return of service dated September 3, 1984,
because Cabiliza was found insolvent. A certificate of
insolvency was issued by the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cagayan and by the Municipal Assessor of
Claveria Cagayan where Cabiliza appears to be a
permanent resident.
On September 3, 1984, the victim's widow, Mrs. Aurora
Solidum, filed a motion for the issuance of a subsidiary
writ of execution to be enforced against the employer of
Cabiliza, Rufo Mauricio and/or Rufo Mauricio
Construction Co., which was granted by the court in its
order dated September 6, 1984. A subsidiary writ of
execution was issued by the Clerk of Court also on
September 6, 1984.
On September 12, 1984, Rufo Mauricio thru his counsel
Atty. Beltran filed a motion to quash the subsidiary writ of
execution. Resolution of this motion was held in
abeyance.
Meanwhile, Rufo Mauricio, as the employer of Cabiliza
pursued the latter's appeal before the Intermediate
Appellate Court (AC-G.R. No. 01829). He interposed the
following assignment of errors —
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE ACCUSED WAS GROSSLY
NEGLIGENT AND IMPRUDENT IN TRYING TO
OVERTAKE ANOTHER TRUCK WHEN THERE
WAS AN ON COMING CAR FROM THE OPPOSITE
DIRECTION;
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
CONCLUDING THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
 OF THE COLLISION RESULTING IN DEATH OF
JUDGE ARSENIO SOLIDUM AND DAMAGE TO
HIS CAR, WAS DUE TO THE LATTER'S GROSS
NEGLIGENCE AND IMPRUDENCE IN INVADING
THE PROPER LANE OF THE ISUZU DUMP
TRUCK OWNED BY RUFO MAURICIO
CONSTRUCTION;
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE
TOTAL OF P 1,782,923.05 DAMAGES IN FAVOR
OF THE COMPLAIN ANTS;
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DISMISSING THE INFORMATION AGAINST THE
ACCUSED UPON PROOF OF HIS DEATH AND IN
NOT RELEASING THE EMPLOYER RUFO
MAURICIO CONSTRUCTIONS AND/OR RUFO
MAURICIO FROM LIABILITY;
V and relied on conjectures and surmises that depicted
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
APPELLANT RUFO MAURICIO AND/OR RUFO
MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION A DAY IN COURT
TO RESIST THE DAMAGES BEING CLAIMED BY
THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM.
On April 8, 1986, the Intermediate Appellate Court
promulgated its now assailed Decision, 1 the pertinent
portion of which reads —
We find that the proper amount of damages for loss
of earnings based on Life expectancy of the
deceased is Pl,082,223.84. In this respect, the trial
court's findings is modified. The Judgment appealed
from is affirmed in all other aspects.
WHEREFORE, with the afore-mentioned
modifications, the appealed Judgment is AFFIRMED.
(Rollo, p. 86)
Rufo Mauricio filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution of the
Intermediate Appellate Court dated July 18, 1986.
The said Decision and Resolution are the subject of the
present petition. Petitioner contends that —
1. The dismissal of the criminal case against the
accused employee wipes out not only the employee's
primary civil liability, but also his employer's subsidiary
liability for such criminal negligence, because:
a. The criminal case is based on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code wherein criminal liability and
the exemption of criminal liability implies
exemption from civil liability arising from crime.
b. The civil liability of the employer petitioner is
based, if any, on quasi-delict, since the accused
was exempted from criminal liability.
2. Exemplary damages cannot be imposed upon an
employer who at the time of the alleged incident was
not present nor inside the vehicle involved in the
accident.
3. The petitioner employer cannot be condemned (to
pay) an exhorbitant amount of damages to the tune of
P1,417,946.89, without giving him opportunity to
cross examine the witness supporting such claim and
affording him opportunity to adduce evidence to resist
the claim, because that would be deprivation of
property without due process of law, repugnant to the
Freedom Constitution.
4. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court
misapplied the facts contrary to the physical evidence
a different picture of the accident when the evidence
shows that it was the victim who was negligent at the
time of the accident. (Rollo, pp. 18-19)
The first contention of petitioner that the death of the
accused-employee wipes out not only the employee's
primary civil liability but also his employer's subsidiary
liability is without merit. The death of the accused during
the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of
conviction (rendered against him by the lower court)
became final and executory extinguished his criminal
liability meaning his obligation to serve the imprisonment
imposed and his pecuniary liability for fines, but not his
civil liability should the liability or obligation arise (not from
a crime, for here, no crime was committed, the accused
not having been convicted by final judgment, and
therefore still regarded as innocent) but from a quasi-
delict (See Arts. 2176 and 2177, Civil Code), as in this
case. The liability of the employer here would not be
subsidiary but solidary with his driver (unless said
employer can prove there was no negligence on his part
at all, that is, if he can prove due diligence in the selection
and supervision of his driver). (See 8th par. of Art. 2180,
Art. 2194, Civil Code; also People vs. Navoa, 132 SCRA
412; People vs. Tirol, 102 SCRA 558; People vs.
Sandaydiego 82 SCRA 120).
Inasmuch as the employer (petitioner herein) was not a
party in the criminal case, and to grant him his day in court
for the purpose of cross-examining the prosecution
witnesses on their testimonies on the driver's alleged
negligence and the amount of damages to which the heirs
of the victim are entitled, as well as to introduce any
evidence or witnesses he may care to present in his
defense, the hearing on the motion to quash the
subsidiary writ of execution must be reopened precisely
for the purpose adverted to hereinabove.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the
appellate court is hereby SET ASIDE, and this case is
REMANDED to the trial court for the hearing adverted to
in the next preceding paragraph.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in
behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH,
BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed
DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division,
HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court National
Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD
INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and
SUPERGUARD SECURITY
CORPORATION, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1991
in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed the order of the
Regional Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-
1751, and its resolution dated November 17, 1991
denying herein, petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno
Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big
Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a
result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on
duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon
Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the
deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in
behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an
action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein
private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security
Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security
Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges the following:
1. . . .
Defendants SAFEGUARD
INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO.,
INC., (Defendant Safeguard) and
SUPERGUARD SECURITY
CORPORATION (Defendant
Superguard) are corporations duly
organized and existing in accordance
with Philippine laws, with offices at 10th
Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc.,
Plaza Santa Cruz, Manila. They are
impleaded as alternative defendants for,
while the former appears to be the
employer of defendant BENIGNO
TORZUELA (defendant TORZUELA),
the latter impliedly acknowledged
responsibility for the acts of defendant
TORZUELA by extending its sympathies
to plaintiffs.
Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of
legal age, an employee of defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or defendant
SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the
incident complained of, was under their
control and supervision. . . .
3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00
a.m., defendant TORZUELA, while he
was on duty as security guard at the "Big
Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shot and killed
NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38 caliber
revolver belonging to defendant
SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD
(per Police Report dated January 7,
1989, copy attached as Annex A);
4. The incident resulting in the death of
NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the
concurring negligence of the defendants.
Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and
reckless discharge of the firearm issued
to him by defendant SAFEGUARD
and/or SUPERGUARD was the
immediate and proximate cause of the
injury, while the negligence of defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD
consists in its having failed to exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family
in the supervision and control of its
employee to avoid the injury.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The said Civil
Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided by
respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint
does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD
claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond
the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of
shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the
civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, which states:
 Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of
a felony. — Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a
complaint for damages based on negligence under Article
2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by
petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article
2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private
respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint
is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela
in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the
employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying
that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that
defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees (Rollo, p.
96).
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause
of action against the private respondents is based on their
liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any
business or an industry.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative
defendants is allowed under Rule 3, Section 13 of the
Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of private
respondents as alternative defendants in the complaint is
justified by the following: the Initial Investigation Report
prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that Torzuela is
an employee of SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts,
SUPERGUARD extended its sympathies to petitioners
(Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989
charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 89-1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an
order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and
SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The
respondent judge held that the complaint did not state
facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict
since it does not mention any negligence on the part of
Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same
was done in the performance of his duties. Respondent
judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring
negligence of the defendants (private respondents
herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence
are mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent
judge also declared that the complaint was one for
damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles
100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished
from those arising from, quasi-delict. The dispositive
portion of the order dated April 13, 1989 states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in
view of the material and ultimate facts
alleged in the verified complaint and in
accordance with the applicable law on
the matter as well as precedents laid
down by the Supreme Court, the
complaint against the alternative
defendants Superguard Security
Corporation and Safeguard Investigation
and Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic)
it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p. 110)
The above order was affirmed by the respondent court
and petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof was
denied.
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and
insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of
negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and
voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]).
Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting
Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code, private respondents are primarily liable
for their negligence either in the selection or supervision
of their employees. This liability is independent of the
employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is
distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the
employer may therefore proceed independently of the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioners submit that the question of
whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent
SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better
resolved after trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of
shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:
 Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud,
and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court which provides:
Rule 111. . . . .
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed
independently — In the cases provided
for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action which has been
reserved may be brought by the offended
party, shall proceed independently of the
criminal action, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been
held to include consummated, frustrated and attempted
homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior
conviction is unnecessary since the civil action can
proceed independently of the criminal action. On the other
hand, it is the private respondents' argument that since
the act was not committed with negligence, the petitioners
have no cause of action under Articles 2116 and 2177 of
the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in
Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed with
deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of
shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely
personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not
have been part of his duties as security guard. And since
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts done
within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the
private respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted
for homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon Dulay.
Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action , reserves his
right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of
indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32,
33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil
action before the prosecution in the criminal action
presents evidence is even far better than a compliance
with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]).
This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this
case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil
action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict
and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended
by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the nature
of the petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts
alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of
action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The
purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to
be determined not by the claim of the party filing the
action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De
Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243
[1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present
case would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are
invoking their right to recover damages against the private
respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury
caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing
Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties
is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no
justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the
Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence.
Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers
not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the
definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this
Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault
or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal
in character; whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
 separate civil action against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may
be punishable by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]),
wherein the Court held:
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault
or negligence," covers not only acts
criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is prosecuted or found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is
actually also charged criminally), to
recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary.
[citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472]
(Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in
the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and should be read
as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with
negligence as defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the absence of more substantial reasons, this
Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the coverage
of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New
Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed
pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193
[1983]), and that the actions for damages allowed
thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical
injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to
include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965);
Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the
crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal
Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also
consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide
(Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the
Marcia case (supra), it was held that no independent civil
action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the
result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however,
that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged
with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the
defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless
imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based
on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is
subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and that they
are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope
of his duties as a security guard. It having been
established that the instant action is not ex-delicto,
petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the
private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part
of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA
792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but
also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was
therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss
petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make
allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private
respondents.
With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand
states a sufficient cause of action, the general rule is that
the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon
the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause
of action exist if the following elements are present,
namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2)
an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages
(Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]);
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, 218
SCRA 118 [1993])

This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the

complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the
part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that
the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot
Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the
shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that
either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was
Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. This
does not operate however, to establish that the
defendants below are liable. Whether or not the shooting
was actually reckless and wanton or attended by
negligence and whether it was actually done within the
scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private
respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed
to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; and
whether the defendants are actually liable, are questions
which can be better resolved after trial on the merits
where each party can present evidence to prove their
respective allegations and defenses. In determining
whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to
support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that
the complaint does not have to establish or allege the
facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the
outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits
of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If
the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis
by which the complaint can be maintained, the same
should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that
may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v.
CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank &
Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663
[1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause
of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief
does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain
(Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the
petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights under
the law, it would be more just to allow them to present
evidence of such injury.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for

review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court
dated April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the
Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. This decision
is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119255 April 9, 2003
[G.R. No. 150793. November 19, 2004]
FRANCIS CHUA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and LYDIA C. HAO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner assails the Decision,[1] dated June 14,
2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57070,
affirming the Order, dated October 5, 1999, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19. The
RTC reversed the Order, dated April 26, 1999, of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 22.
Also challenged by herein petitioner is the
CA Resolution,[2] dated November 20, 2001, denying his
Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On February 28, 1996, private respondent Lydia
Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation, filed a
complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of Manila
charging Francis Chua and his wife, Elsa Chua, of four
counts of falsification of public documents pursuant to
Article 172[3] in relation to Article 171[4] of the Revised
Penal Code. The charge reads:
That on or about May 13, 1994, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, being then a private individual,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
acts of falsification upon a public document, to wit: the said
accused prepared, certified, and falsified the Minutes of the
Annual Stockholders meeting of the Board of Directors of the
Siena Realty Corporation, duly notarized before a Notary
Public, Atty. Juanito G. Garcia and entered in his Notarial
Registry as Doc No. 109, Page 22, Book No. IV and Series of
1994, and therefore, a public document, by making or causing
it to appear in said Minutes of the Annual Stockholders Meeting
that one LYDIA HAO CHUA was present and has participated
in said proceedings, when in truth and in fact, as the said
accused fully well knew that said Lydia C. Hao was never
present during the Annual Stockholders Meeting held on April
30, 1994 and neither has participated in the proceedings thereof
to the prejudice of public interest and in violation of public faith
and destruction of truth as therein proclaimed.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Thereafter, the City Prosecutor filed the Information
docketed as Criminal Case No. 285721 [6] for falsification
of public document, before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila, Branch 22, against Francis Chua but
dismissed the accusation against Elsa Chua.
Herein petitioner, Francis Chua, was arraigned and
trial ensued thereafter.
During the trial in the MeTC, private prosecutors Atty.
Evelyn Sua-Kho and Atty. Ariel Bruno Rivera appeared as
private prosecutors and presented Hao as their first
witness.
After Haos testimony, Chua moved to exclude
complainants counsels as private prosecutors in the case
on the ground that Hao failed to allege and prove any civil
liability in the case.
In an Order, dated April 26, 1999, the MeTC granted
Chuas motion and ordered the complainants counsels to
be excluded from actively prosecuting Criminal Case No.
285721. Hao moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, Hao filed a petition for certiorari docketed as
SCA No. 99-94846,[7] entitled Lydia C. Hao, in her own
behalf and for the benefit of Siena Realty Corporation v.
Francis Chua, and the Honorable Hipolito dela Vega,
Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 19.
The RTC gave due course to the petition and on
October 5, 1999, the RTC in an order reversed the MeTC
Order. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent
Court is ordered to allow the intervention of the private
prosecutors in behalf of petitioner Lydia C. Hao in the
prosecution of the civil aspect of Crim. Case No. 285721,
before Br. 22 [MeTC], Manila, allowing Attys. Evelyn Sua-
Kho and Ariel Bruno Rivera to actively participate in the
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Chua moved for reconsideration which was denied.
Dissatisfied, Chua filed before the Court of Appeals
a petition for certiorari. The petition alleged that the lower
court acted with grave abuse of discretion in: (1) refusing
to consider material facts; (2) allowing Siena Realty
Corporation to be impleaded as co-petitioner in SCA No.
99-94846 although it was not a party to the criminal
complaint in Criminal Case No. 285721; and (3)
effectively amending the information against the accused
in violation of his constitutional rights.
On June 14, 2001, the appellate court promulgated
its assailed Decision denying the petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED. The Order, dated
October 5, 1999 as well as the Order, dated December 3, 1999,
are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner had argued before the Court of Appeals
that respondent had no authority whatsoever to bring a
suit in behalf of the Corporation since there was no Board
Resolution authorizing her to file the suit.
For her part, respondent Hao claimed that the suit
was brought under the concept of a derivative suit.
Respondent maintained that when the directors or
trustees refused to file a suit even when there was a
demand from stockholders, a derivative suit was allowed.
 The Court of Appeals held that the action was indeed
a derivative suit, for it alleged that petitioner falsified
documents pertaining to projects of the corporation and
made it appear that the petitioner was a stockholder and
a director of the corporation. According to the appellate
court, the corporation was a necessary party to the
petition filed with the RTC and even if private respondent
filed the criminal case, her act should not divest the
Corporation of its right to be a party and present its own
claim for damages.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied in a Resolution dated November 20, 2001.
Hence, this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals
committed reversible errors:
I. IN RULING THAT LYDIA HAOS FILING OF
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 285721 WAS IN THE
NATURE OF A DERIVATIVE SUIT
II. IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF JUDGE
DAGUNA THAT SIENA REALTY WAS A
PROPER PETITIONER IN SCA NO. [99-
94846]
III. IN UPHOLDING JUDGE DAGUNAS
DECISION ALLOWING LYDIA HAOS
COUNSEL TO CONTINUE AS PRIVATE
PROSECUTORS IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
285721
IV. IN [OMITTING] TO CONSIDER AND RULE
UPON THE ISSUE THAT JUDGE DAGUNA
ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING THE
PETITION IN SCA NO. [99-94846] FOR
BEING A SHAM PLEADING.[10]
The pertinent issues in this petition are the following:
(1) Is the criminal complaint in the nature of a derivative
suit? (2) Is Siena Realty Corporation a proper petitioner in
SCA No. 99-94846? and (3) Should private prosecutors
be allowed to actively participate in the trial of Criminal
Case No. 285721.
On the first issue, petitioner claims that the Court of
Appeals erred when (1) it sustained the lower court in
giving due course to respondents petition in SCA No. 99-
94846 despite the fact that the Corporation was not the
private complainant in Criminal Case No. 285721, and (2)
when it ruled that Criminal Case No. 285721 was in the
nature of a derivative suit.
Petitioner avers that a derivative suit is by nature
peculiar only to intra-corporate proceedings and cannot
be made part of a criminal action. He cites the case
of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. v. Salas,[11] where
the court said that an appeal on the civil aspect of a
criminal case cannot be treated as a derivative suit.
Petitioner asserts that in this case, the civil aspect of a
criminal case cannot be treated as a derivative suit,
considering that Siena Realty Corporation was not the
private complainant.
Petitioner misapprehends our ruling in Western
Institute. In that case, we said:
Here, however, the case is not a derivative suit but is merely an
appeal on the civil aspect of Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and
37098 filed with the RTC of Iloilo for estafa and falsification of
public document. Among the basic requirements for a
derivative suit to prosper is that the minority shareholder who
is suing for and on behalf of the corporation must allege in his
complaint before the proper forum that he is suing on a
derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all
other shareholders similarly situated who wish to join. . . .This
was not complied with by the petitioners either in their
complaint before the court a quo nor in the instant petition
which, in part, merely states that this is a petition for review
on certiorari on pure questions of law to set aside a portion of
the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098
since the trial courts judgment of acquittal failed to impose civil
liability against the private respondents. By no amount of equity
considerations, if at all deserved, can a mere appeal on the civil
aspect of a criminal case be treated as a derivative suit.[12]
Moreover, in Western Institute, we said that a mere
appeal in the civil aspect cannot be treated as a derivative
suit because the appeal lacked the basic requirement that
it must be alleged in the complaint that the shareholder is
suing on a derivative cause of action for and in behalf of
the corporation and other shareholders who wish to join.
Under Section 36[13] of the Corporation Code, read in
relation to Section 23,[14] where a corporation is an injured
party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of directors
or trustees.[15]An individual stockholder is permitted to
institute a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation
wherein he holds stocks in order to protect or vindicate
corporate rights, whenever the officials of the corporation
refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold the
control of the corporation. In such actions, the suing
stockholder is regarded as a nominal party, with the
corporation as the real party in interest.[16]
A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to
enforce a corporate cause of action. The corporation is a
necessary party to the suit. And the relief which is granted
is a judgment against a third person in favor of the
corporation. Similarly, if a corporation has a defense to an
action against it and is not asserting it, a stockholder may
intervene and defend on behalf of the corporation.[17]
Under the Revised Penal Code, every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[18] When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.[19]
In Criminal Case No. 285721, the complaint was
instituted by respondent against petitioner for falsifying
corporate documents whose subject concerns corporate
projects of Siena Realty Corporation. Clearly, Siena
Realty Corporation is an offended party. Hence, Siena
Realty Corporation has a cause of action. And the civil
case for the corporate cause of action is deemed
instituted in the criminal action.
However, the board of directors of the corporation in
this case did not institute the action against petitioner.
Private respondent was the one who instituted the action.
Private respondent asserts that she filed a derivative suit
in behalf of the corporation. This assertion is inaccurate.
Not every suit filed in behalf of the corporation is a
derivative suit. For a derivative suit to prosper, it is
required that the minority stockholder suing for and on
behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint that
he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the
corporation and all other stockholders similarly situated
who may wish to join him in the suit.[20] It is a
condition sine qua non that the corporation be impleaded
as a party because not only is the corporation an
indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it
must be served with process. The judgment must be
made binding upon the corporation in order that the
corporation may get the benefit of the suit and may not
bring subsequent suit against the same defendants for the
same cause of action. In other words, the corporation
must be joined as party because it is its cause of action
that is being litigated and because judgment must be
a res adjudicata against it.[21]
In the criminal complaint filed by herein respondent,
nowhere is it stated that she is filing the same in behalf
and for the benefit of the corporation. Thus, the criminal
complaint including the civil aspect thereof could not be
deemed in the nature of a derivative suit.
We turn now to the second issue, is the corporation
a proper party in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65
before the RTC? Note that the case was titled Lydia C.
Hao, in her own behalf and for the benefit of Siena Realty
Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the Honorable Hipolito
dela Vega, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila. Petitioner before us now claims that the
corporation is not a private complainant in Criminal Case
No. 285721, and thus cannot be included as appellant in
SCA No. 99-94846.
Petitioner invokes the case of Ciudad Real & Devt.
Corporation v. Court of Appeals.[22] In Ciudad Real, it was
ruled that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it upheld the standing of Magdiwang
Realty Corporation as a party to the petition for certiorari,
even though it was not a party-in-interest in the civil case
before the lower court.
In the present case, respondent claims that the
complaint was filed by her not only in her personal
capacity, but likewise for the benefit of the corporation.
Additionally, she avers that she has exhausted all
remedies available to her before she instituted the case,
not only to claim damages for herself but also to recover
the damages caused to the company.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure,[23] when a trial court commits a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
person aggrieved can file a special civil action for
certiorari. The aggrieved parties in such a case are the
State and the private offended party or complainant.[24]
In a string of cases, we consistently ruled that only a
party-in-interest or those aggrieved may file certiorari
cases. It is settled that the offended parties in criminal
cases have sufficient interest and personality as
person(s) aggrieved to file special civil action of
prohibition and certiorari.[25]
In Ciudad Real, cited by petitioner, we held that the
appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when
it sanctioned the standing of a corporation to join said
petition for certiorari, despite the finality of the trial courts
denial of its Motion for Intervention and the subsequent
Motion to Substitute and/or Join as Party/Plaintiff.
Note, however, that in Pastor, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals[26] we held that if aggrieved, even a non-party
may institute a petition for certiorari. In that case,
petitioner was the holder in her own right of three mining
claims and could file a petition for certiorari, the fastest
and most feasible remedy since she could not intervene
in the probate of her father-in-laws estate.[27]
In the instant case, we find that the recourse of the
complainant to the respondent Court of Appeals was
proper. The petition was brought in her own name and in
behalf of the Corporation. Although, the corporation was
not a complainant in the criminal action, the subject of the
falsification was the corporations project and the falsified
documents were corporate documents. Therefore, the
corporation is a proper party in the petition for certiorari
because the proceedings in the criminal case directly and
adversely affected the corporation.
We turn now to the third issue. Did the Court of
Appeals and the lower court err in allowing private
prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of Criminal
Case No. 285721?
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v.
Gallardo,[28] holding that where from the nature of the
offense or where the law defining and punishing the
offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the
offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the
offense.
Petitioners contention lacks merit. Generally, the
basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental
postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly
liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two
entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the
political entity called the State whose law he has violated;
and (2) the individual member of the society whose
person, right, honor, chastity or property has been
actually or directly injured or damaged by the same
punishable act or omission. An act or omission is
felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to
civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because
it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise
to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral
duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his own act or omission,
whether done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity
which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Costs against
of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the petitioner.
crime.[29] The civil action involves the civil liability arising
from the offense charged which includes restitution, SO ORDERED.
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.[30]
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery
of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant
to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel
in the prosecution of the offense.[31] Rule 111(a) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, [w]hen a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor
did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor
institute the civil action for damages arising from the
offense charged. Thus, we find that the private
prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal
action.
Petitioner avers, however, that respondents
testimony in the inferior court did not establish nor prove
any damages personally sustained by her as a result of
petitioners alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds
that since no personal damages were proven therein,
then the participation of her counsel as private
prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the civil
aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without
basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal
action, evidence should be taken of the damages claimed
and the court should determine who are the persons
entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from
the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings
if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged
or does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil
action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no
waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be
allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.[32]
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor
a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a
separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be
allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil
liability arising from the offense committed, and the
private offended party has the right to intervene through
the private prosecutors.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision, dated June 14, 2001, and the Resolution, dated
November 20, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 57070, affirming the Order, dated October 5,
1999, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
19, are AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the private prosecutors
are hereby allowed to intervene in behalf of private
respondent Lydia Hao in the prosecution of the civil
aspect of Criminal Case No. 285721 before Branch 22, of
G.R. No. 163753 January 15, 2014
DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS,
M.D., Petitioner, vs. HANZ CALAPIZ, REPRESENTED
BY HIS PARENTS, HILARIO CALAPIZ, JR. and
HERLITA CALAPIZ,Respondent.; BERSAMIN, J.:
The acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean
his absolution from civil liability.
The Case
In this appeal, an accused desires the reversal of the
decision promulgated on February 20, 2003,1 whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered
on August 6, 1999 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 13, in Oroquieta City ordering him to pay moral
damages despite his acquittal of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries charged
against him.2
Antecedents
On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and
Herlita Calapiz brought their 8-year-old son, Hanz Calapiz
(Hanz), to the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital,
Oroquieta City, for an emergency appendectomy. Hanz
was attended to by the petitioner, who suggested to the
parents that Hanz also undergo circumcision at no added
cost to spare him the pain. With the parents’ consent, the
petitioner performed the coronal type of circumcision on
Hanz after his appendectomy. On the following day, Hanz
complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters.
His testicles were swollen. The parents noticed that the
child urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly
removed the catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the
abnormality as normal. On January 30, 1995, Hanz was
discharged from the hospital over his parents’
protestations, and was directed to continue taking
antibiotics.
On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a hospital
because of the abscess formation between the base and
the shaft of his penis. Presuming that the ulceration was
brought about by Hanz’s appendicitis, the petitioner
referred him to Dr. Henry Go, an urologist, who diagnosed
the boy to have a damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz
underwent cystostomy, and thereafter was operated on
three times to repair his damaged urethra.
When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and
reconstructed, Hanz’s parents brought a criminal charge
against the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to
serious physical injuries. On April 17, 1997, the
information3 was filed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
of Oroquieta City (MTCC), to which the latter pleaded not
guilty on May 22, 1998.4 Under the order of April 30, 1999,
the case was transferred to the RTC pursuant to Supreme
Court Circular No. 11-99.5
At the trial, the Prosecution presented several witnesses,
including Dr. Rufino Agudera as an expert witness and as
the physician who had operated on Hanz twice to repair
the damaged urethra. Dr. Agudera testified that Hanz had
been diagnosed to have urethral stricture and cavernosal
injury left secondary to trauma that had necessitated the
conduct of two operations to strengthen and to lengthen
the urethra. Although satisfactorily explaining that the
injury to the urethra had been caused by trauma, Dr.
Agudera could not determine the kind of trauma that had
caused the injury.
In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge. He
contended that at the time of his examination of Hanz on
January 16, 1995, he had found an accumulation of pus
at the vicinity of the appendix two to three inches from the
penis that had required immediate surgical operation; that
after performing the appendectomy, he had circumcised
Hanz with his parents’ consent by using a congo
instrument, thereby debunking the parents’ claim that
their child had been cauterized; that he had then cleared
Hanz on January 27, 1995 once his fever had subsided;
that he had found no complications when Hanz returned
for his follow up check-up on February 2, 1995; and that
the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of
the penis had been brought about by Hanz’s burst
appendicitis.
Ruling of the RTC
In its decision rendered on August 6, 1999,6 the RTC
acquitted the petitioner of the crime charged for
insufficiency of the evidence. It held that the Prosecution’s
evidence did not show the required standard of care to be
observed by other members of the medical profession
under similar circumstances. Nonetheless, the RTC ruled
that the petitioner was liable for moral damages because
there was a preponderance of evidence showing that
Hanz had received the injurious trauma from his
circumcision by the petitioner. The decision disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, this court
renders judgment acquitting the accused, Dr.
Encarnacion Lumantas, of reckless imprudence resulting
in serious physical injuries, but ordering him to pay Hanz
Calapiz ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC,7 sustaining the
award of moral damages. It opined that even if the
petitioner had been acquitted of the crime charged, the
acquittal did not necessarily mean that he had not
incurred civil liability considering that the Prosecution had
preponderantly established the sufferings of Hanz as the
result of the circumcision.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA
denied the motion on April 28, 2004.8
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioner’s civil
liability despite his acquittal of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit.
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.9 Nevertheless, the acquittal of
an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. Court of
Appeals,10the Court elucidates on the two kinds of
acquittal recognized by our law as well as on the different
effects of acquittal on the civil liability of the accused, viz:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different
effects on the civil liability of the accused.1âwphi1 First is
an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of. This instance
closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been
found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is
out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may
be instituted must be based on grounds other than the
delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has
not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from
civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal,
the judgment shall state "whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist."11
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of
an accused does not prevent a judgment from still being
rendered against him on the civil aspect of the criminal
case unless the court finds and declares that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Although it found the Prosecution’s evidence insufficient
to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner
for the crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining
and adjudging his civil liability for the same act
complained of based on mere preponderance of
evidence.12 In this connection, the Court reminds that the
acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not require
that the complainant’s recovery of civil liability should be
through the institution of a separate civil action for that
purpose.13
The petitioner’s contention that he could not be held civilly
liable because there was no proof of his negligence
deserves scant consideration. The failure of the
Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence with moral
certainty did not forbid a finding against him that there was
preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him
civilly liable.14With the RTC and the CA both finding that
Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma from the hands
of the petitioner on the occasion of or incidental to the
circumcision, and that the trauma could have been
avoided, the Court must concur with their uniform
findings. In that regard, the Court need not analyze and
weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings
a quo. The Court, by virtue of its not being a trier of facts,
should now accord the highest respect to the factual
findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA in the
absence of a clear showing by the petitioner that such
findings were tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or
palpable error.
Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his
body.1âwphi1 Although we have long advocated the view
that any physical injury, like the loss or diminution of the
use of any part of one’s body, is not equatable to a
pecuniary loss, and is not susceptible of exact monetary
estimation, civil damages should be assessed once that
integrity has been violated. The assessment is but an
imperfect estimation of the true value of one’s body. The
usual practice is to award moral damages for the physical
injuries sustained.15 In Hanz’s case, the undesirable
outcome of the circumcision performed by the petitioner
forced the young child to endure several other procedures
on his penis in order to repair his damaged urethra.
Surely, his physical and moral sufferings properly
warranted the amount of ₱50,000.00 awarded as moral
damages.
Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered the injury.
Interest of 6% per annum should then be imposed on the
award as a sincere means of adjusting the value of the
award to a level that is not only reasonable but just and
commensurate. Unless we make the adjustment in the
permissible manner by prescribing legal interest on the
award, his sufferings would be unduly compounded. For
that purpose, the reckoning of interest should be from the
filing of the criminal information on April 17, 1997, the
making of the judicial demand for the liability of the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on February 20, 2003, with the modification
that legal interest of 6% per annum to start from April 17,
1997 is imposed on the award of:₱50,000.00 as moral
damages; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of
suit. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005]
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C.
SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA
LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA
SANTOS and LEONARDO
FERRER, petitioners, vs. HON. NORMANDIE
B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M
SIBAYAN, and VIRON TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q.
RONDARIS,
President/Chairman, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] dated
March 1, 2002, petitioners assail the Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January
9, 2002, respectively dismissing their petition for certiorari
and denying their motion for reconsideration, arising from
the dismissal of their complaint to recover civil indemnity
for the death and physical injuries of their kin.
The following facts are matters of record.
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M.
Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple
Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision
between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by
Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed
the lives of the vans driver and three (3) of its passengers,
including a two-month old baby, and caused physical
injuries to five (5) of the vans passengers. After trial,
Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
However, as there was a reservation to file a separate civil
action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the
municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated on
December 17, 1998.[2]
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their
reservation to file a separate civil action.[3] They cited
therein the judgment convicting Sibayan.
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds of improper service of summons, prescription
and laches, and defective certification of non-forum
shopping. It also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q.
Rondaris as defendant in view of the separate personality
of Viron Transit from its officers.[4]
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss
contending, among others, that the right to file a separate
action in this case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned
from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As
there was no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan,
the complaint which was filed barely two (2) years thence
was clearly filed within the prescriptive period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the
principal ground that the cause of action had already
prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based
on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners cause of action
to be, prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of the
cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that
petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil action,
the complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of
prescription.[5]
Improper service of summons was likewise cited as
a ground for dismissal of the complaint as summons was
served through a certain Jessica Ubalde of the legal
department without mentioning her designation or
position.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing
out yet again that the complaint is not based on quasi
delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the
criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the
finality of the judgment.[6] The trial court denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration reiterating that petitioners
cause of action was based on quasi delictand had
prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code because
the complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the
vehicular accident.[7] As regards the improper service of
summons, the trial court reconsidered its ruling that the
complaint ought to be dismissed on this ground.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals which dismissed the same for error in the
choice or mode of appeal.[8] The appellate court also
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration reasoning
that even if the respondent trial court judge committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of
dismissal, certiorari is still not the permissible remedy as
appeal was available to petitioners and they failed to
allege that the petition was brought within the recognized
exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu of
appeal.[9]
In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid
application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute
for appeal will result in a judicial rejection of an existing
obligation arising from the criminal liability of private
respondents. Petitioners insist that the liability sought to
be enforced in the complaint arose ex delicto and is not
based on quasi delict. The trial court allegedly committed
grave abuse of discretion when it insisted that the cause
of action invoked by petitioners is based on quasi
delict and concluded that the action had prescribed. Since
the action is based on the criminal liability of private
respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality
of the judgment of conviction.
Assuming that their petition with the appellate court
was procedurally flawed, petitioners implore the Court to
exempt this case from the rigid operation of the rules as
they allegedly have a legitimate grievance to
vindicate, i.e., damages for the deaths and physical
injuries caused by private respondents for which no civil
liability had been adjudged by reason of their reservation
of the right to file a separate civil action.
In their Comment[10] dated June 13, 2002, private
respondents insist that the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground of prescription was in order. They point out
that the averments in the complaint make out a cause of
action for quasi delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive period of four (4)
years should be reckoned from the time the accident took
place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability
cannot be enforced since Sibayan was not ordered to pay
damages in the criminal case. It is Viron Transits
contention that the subsidiary liability of the employer
contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
presupposes a situation where the civil aspect of the case
was instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to
file a separate civil case was made.
Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse
to the Court of Appeals via certiorari was improper as
petitioners should have appealed the adverse order of the
trial court. Moreover, they point out several other
procedural lapses allegedly committed by petitioners,
such as lack of certification against forum-shopping; lack
of duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed
order of the trial court; and non-indication of the full names
and addresses of petitioners in the petition.
Petitioners filed a Reply[11] dated September 14,
2002, while private respondents filed a Rejoinder[12] dated
October 14, 2002, both in reiteration of their arguments.
We grant the petition.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. [13] Such
civil liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the
damage caused and indemnification of consequential
damages.[14] When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, subject to three notable
exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly waives
the right to recover damages from the
accused; second, when the offended party reserves his
right to have the civil damages determined in a separate
action in order to take full control and direction of the
prosecution of his cause; and third, when the injured party
actually exercises the right to maintain a private suit
against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the
filing of the criminal case.
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended in 1988, which governed the
institution of the criminal action, as well as the reservation
of the right to file a separate civil action. Section 1, Rule
111 thereof states:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others.
The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any
of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil
actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances affording
the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability
against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate
or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such action as
provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than
actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon filing thereof in court for trial.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their
right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime
committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the
municipal circuit trial court, in its decision convicting
Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the
latters civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction
and their reservation to file a separate civil action made in
the criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the
institution of the complaint, they seek to recover private
respondents civil liability arising from crime.
Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations
in the complaint, the trial court dismissed the same,
declaring that petitioners cause of action was based
on quasi delict and should have been brought within four
(4) years from the time the cause of action
accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the
allegations therein are consistent with petitioners claim
that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising
from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence
on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not
necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause
of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the
time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex
quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of
negligence, the offended party has the choice between an
action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the
Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under
the Civil Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may
give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31
of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and
34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to
file an action independent and distinct from the criminal
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.[15] Either of these
liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to
the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription
against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages
in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had
already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue
the remaining avenue opened for them by their
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex
delicto. This is so because the prescription of the
action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an
action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
especially as the latter action had been expressly
reserved.
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus
Company[16] was decided upon a similar set of facts.
Therein, the driver of La Mallorca Bus Company was
charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to
property. The plaintiff made an express reservation for the
filing of a separate civil action. The driver was convicted
which conviction was affirmed by this Court. Later, plaintiff
filed a separate civil action for damages based on quasi
delict which was ordered dismissed by the trial court upon
finding that the action was instituted more than six (6)
years from the date of the accident and thus, had already
prescribed. Subsequently, plaintiff instituted another
action, this time based on the subsidiary liability of the bus
company. The trial court dismissed the action holding that
the dismissal of the earlier civil case operated as a bar to
the filing of the action to enforce the bus companys
subsidiary liability.
We held that the dismissal of the action based
on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a
conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime
was in the discharge of the duties of the employees. This
is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of
the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even
after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the
employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have
dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but
instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to
be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners
allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to
dismiss[17] and motion for reconsideration[18] of the order
of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil
liability arising from crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation
or institution of a separate civil action waives the other
civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the
avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants
arising out of the same act or omission of the
offender.[19] However, since the stale action for damages
based on quasi delict should be considered waived, there
is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits
against private respondents as the only recourse
available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This
interpretation is also consistent with the bar against
double recovery for obvious reasons.
Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners
should have appealed the order of dismissal of the trial
court instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals. Such procedural misstep, however, should be
exempted from the strict application of the rules in order
to promote their fundamental objective of securing
substantial justice.[20] We are loathe to deprive petitioners
of the indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by
a final judgment of conviction based solely on a
technicality. It is our duty to prevent such an injustice.[21]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
SETTING ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002,
respectively dismissing the present action and denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration, as well as the
orders of the lower court dated February 26, 2001 and
July 16, 2001. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158995 September 26, 2006
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO
GABOR, Vice-President and General
Manager, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in
her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, and SPS.
FLORENTINO and THERESA
VALLEJERA, respondents.
GARCIA, J.:
The antecedent facts may be briefly stated as follows:
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son
of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa
Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the
petitioners and driven at the time by their employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result
of the accident.
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787, entitled People of
the Philippines v. Vincent Norman Yeneza.
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the
accused driver committed suicide, evidently bothered by
conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC,
in its order of September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal
case.
On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the
spouses Vallejera filed a complaint3 for damages against
the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver,
basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 99-
10845, the complaint was raffled to Branch 43 of the
court.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,4 the
petitioners as defendants denied liability for the death of
the Vallejeras' 7-year old son, claiming that they had
exercised the required due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees, including the deceased
driver. They thus prayed in their Answer for the dismissal
of the complaint for lack of cause of action on the part of
the Vallejera couple.
During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners insisted that
their dismissal prayer be resolved. Hence, the trial court
required them to file within ten days a memorandum of
authorities supportive of their position.
Instead, however, of the required memorandum of
authorities, the defendant petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is basically
a "claim for subsidiary liability against an employer" under
the provision of Article 1035 of the Revised Penal Code.
Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first
be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a
condition sine qua non to hold them liable. Ergo, since the
driver died during the pendency of the criminal action,
the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was
not fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on the
part of the plaintiffs. They further argue that since the
plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute a separate
action for damages when the criminal case was filed, the
damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted with
the criminal action. which was already dismissed.
In an Order dated September 4, 2001,6 the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set the
case for pre-trial. With their motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the same court in its subsequent
order7 of September 26, 2001, the petitioners then went
on certiorari to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in
refusing to dismiss the basic complaint for damages in
Civil Case No. 99-10845.
In the herein assailed decision8 dated April 25, 2003, the
CA denied the petition and upheld the trial court. Partly
says the CA in its challenged issuance:
It is clear that the complaint neither represents
nor implies that the responsibility charged was
the petitioner's subsidiary liability under Art.
103, Revised Penal Code. As pointed out [by the
trial court] in the Order of September 4, 2001,
the complaint does not even allege the basic
elements for such a liability, like the conviction of
the accused employee and his insolvency. Truly
enough, a civil action to enforce subsidiary
liability separate and distinct from the criminal
action is even unnecessary.
xxx xxx xxx
Specifically, Civil Case No. 99-10845 exacts
responsibility for fault or negligence under Art.
2176, Civil Code, which is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under
the Revised Penal Code. Verily, therefore, the
liability under Art. 2180, Civil Code, is direct and
immediate, and not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee or prior
showing of the latter's insolvency. (Underscoring
in the original.)
In time, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration but
their motion was denied by the CA in its resolution9 of July
10, 2003. Hence, the petitioners' present recourse on
their submission that the appellate court committed
reversible error in upholding the trial court's denial of their
motion to dismiss.
We DENY.
As the Court sees it, the sole issue for resolution is
whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action in Civil
Case No. 99-10845 is founded on Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, as maintained by the petitioners, or
derived from Article 218010 of the Civil Code, as ruled by
the two courts below.
It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of the
complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845. That
complaint alleged, inter alia, as follows:
3. That defendant [LG Food Corporation] is the
registered owner of a Ford Fiera Van with Plate
No. NMS 881 and employer sometime February
of 1996 of one Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer,
a salesman of said corporation;
4. That sometime February 26, 1996 at around
2:00 P.M. at Rosario St., Bacolod City, the minor
son of said plaintiffs [now respondents], Charles
Vallejera, 7 years old, was hit and bumped by
above-described vehicle then driven by said
employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;
5. That the mishap was due to the gross fault and
negligence of defendant's employee, who drove
said vehicle, recklessly, negligently and at a high
speed without regard to traffic condition and
safety of other road users and likewise to the fault
and negligence of the owner employer, herein
defendants LG Food Corporation who failed to
exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of his employee, Vincent Norman
Yeneza y Ferrer;
6. That as a result of said incident, plaintiffs' son
suffered multiple body injuries which led to his
untimely demise on that very day;
7. That a criminal case was filed against the
defendant's employee, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 67787, (earlier filed as Crim. Case No.
96-17570 before RTC) before MTC-Branch III,
entitled "People v. Yeneza" for "Reckless
Imprudence resulting to Homicide," but the same
was dismissed because pending litigation, then
remorse-stricken [accused] committed suicide;
xxx xxx xxx
8. That the injuries and complications as well as
the resultant death suffered by the late minor
Charles Vallejera were due to the negligence and
imprudence of defendant's employee;
9. That defendant LG Foods Corporation is
civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of
its employee since it failed to exercise the
necessary diligence required of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision
of his employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y
Ferrer which diligence if exercised, would
have prevented said incident. (Bracketed
words and emphasis ours.)
Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even
remotely, that the herein petitioners are being made to
account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code. As correctly pointed out by the
trial court in its order of September 4, 2001 denying the
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, the complaint did not even
aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an
employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
such as the prior conviction of the driver in the criminal
case filed against him nor his insolvency.
Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that
plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant petitioners for
damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however, from
the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was their
choice of remedy against the petitioners. To stress, the
plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and
negligence on the part of the driver and the failure of the
petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees. The
spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly
liable for the negligence/imprudence of their driver since
they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of
a good father of the family in the selection and supervision
of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could
have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the
death of their 7-year old son.
Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
defines cause of action as the "act or omission by which
a party violates the right of another." Such act or omission
gives rise to an obligation which may come from law,
contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts.11
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another
may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of
the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto;12 and 2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising
from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g.,
culpa contractual or obligations arising from law;13 the
intentional torts;14 and culpa aquiliana15); or (b) where the
injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action.16 Either
of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against
the offender.17
Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have
a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability
arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa
aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code.
If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the
plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act
of its employee, subject to the employer's defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. On
the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal,
the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only
upon proof of prior conviction of its employee.18
Article 116119 of the Civil Code provides that civil
obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be
governed by penal laws subject to the provision of Article
217720 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2,
Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of
this Book, regulating damages. Plainly, Article 2177
provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may
choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of
arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly
from quasi-delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who
makes known his cause of action in his initiatory pleading
or complaint,21 and not with the defendant who can not
ask for the dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action or
lack of it based on the defendant's perception that the
plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the
employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of insolvency of such employee.22
Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of
the couple's minor son was caused by the negligent act of
the petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners themselves
were civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for
failing "to exercise the necessary diligence required of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision
of [their] employee, the driver, which diligence, if
exercised, would have prevented said accident."
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the
petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, they would have alleged that the guilt of the driver
had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that such
accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability
of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the
damage done by their employee (driver) based on the
principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly
liable.23 Since there was no conviction in the criminal case
against the driver, precisely because death intervened
prior to the termination of the criminal proceedings, the
spouses' recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners
for their direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict.
Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, in their
Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim,24 repeatedly
made mention of Article 2180 of the Civil Code and
anchored their defense on their allegation that "they had
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of [their] employees." The Court views this defense as an
admission that indeed the petitioners acknowledged the
private respondents' cause of action as one for quasi-
delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit
brought under Article 2176 - Civil Code to recover
damages primarily from the petitioners as employers
responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to Article
2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages
caused by his employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former is not engaged in any business or industry.
Citing Maniago v. CA,25 petitioner would argue that Civil
Case No. 99-10845 should have been dismissed for
failure of the respondent spouses to make a reservation
to institute a separate civil action for damages when the
criminal case against the driver was filed.
The argument is specious.
To start with, the petitioners' reliance on Maniago is
obviously misplaced. There, the civil case was filed while
the criminal case against the employee was still pending.
Here, the criminal case against the employee driver was
prematurely terminated due to his death. Precisely, Civil
Case No. 99-10845 was filed by the respondent spouses
because no remedy can be obtained by them against the
petitioners with the dismissal of the criminal case against
their driver during the pendency thereof.
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a
separate civil action for damages was made when the
criminal case was filed is of no moment for the simple
reason that the criminal case was dismissed without any
pronouncement having been made therein. In reality,
therefor, it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of
in the first place. And for the petitioners to insist for the
conviction of their driver as a condition sine qua non to
hold them liable for damages is to ask for the impossible.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED for
lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013; RAFAEL JOSE-
CONSING, JR., Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent. BERSAMIN, J.:
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the
defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to
stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of
the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is
because the result of the independent civil action is
irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
Antecedents
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his
mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz) various loans
totaling ₱18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital).
The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage
constituted on a parcel of land (property) covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite registered
under the name of de la Cruz.2 In accordance with its
option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital
agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a total
consideration of ₱21,221,500.00. Payment was effected
by off-setting the amounts due to
Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and
Consing in the amount of ₱18,000,000.00 and paying an
additional amount of ₱3,145,946.50. The other half of the
property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus
Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital.3
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the
property, they learned that the title to the property was
really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and
Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the property had
been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599
held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.4
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total
amount of ₱41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had
been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but
the latter ignored the demands.5
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the
Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Pasig civil case)
for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital
from proceeding against him for the collection of the
₱41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a
mere agent of his mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint
for estafa through falsification of public document against
Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor’s
Office.6
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC
in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of
a sum of money and damages, with an application for a
writ of preliminary attachment (Makati civil case).7
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an
information for estafa through falsification of public
document in the RTC in Makati City (Criminal Case No.
00-120), which was assigned to Branch 60 (Makati
criminal case).8
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his
arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the ground of
existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of
the Pasig and Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001,
Consing reiterated his motion for deferment of his
arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency of
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the CA. On November 19,
2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion.9
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order
suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case
on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question,
and on March 18, 2001, the RTC denied the Prosecution’s
motion for reconsideration.10
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of
the RTC in the Makati criminal case via petition for
certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252).
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252,11 dismissing the petition for
certiorari and upholding the RTC’s questioned orders,
explaining:
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the
Cavite and Makati criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig
case, i.e. whether or not private respondent may be held
liable in the questioned transaction, will determine the
guilt or innocence of private respondent Consing in both
the Cavite and Makati criminal cases.
The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case,
Makati criminal case, Makati civil case and Cavite criminal
case show that: (1) the parties are identical; (2) the
transactions in controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer
Certificate of Titles (TCT) involved are identical; (4) the
questioned Deeds of Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the
dates in question are identical; and (6) the issue of private
respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions is
identical in all the proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised in the
Pasig civil case identical to or intimately related to the
criminal cases in Cavite and Makati. The similarities also
extend to the parties in the cases and the TCT and Deed
of Sale/ Mortgage involved in the questioned transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension of the
arraignment of private respondent in the Makati case, in
view of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, where Unicapital was not
a party thereto, did so pursuant to its mandatory power to
take judicial notice of an official act of another judicial
authority. It was also a better legal tack to prevent
multiplicity of action, to which our legal system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP
No. 63712 may be validly invoked to suspend private
respondent’s arraignment in the Makati City criminal case,
notwithstanding the fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was
an offshoot, merely, in the Cavite criminal case.12
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders
commenced its own suit for damages against Consing
(Civil Case No. 99-95381) in the RTC in Manila (Manila
civil case).13
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through
falsification of public document was filed against Consing
and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 7668-00 and assigned to Branch 21
(Cavite criminal case). Consing filed a motion to defer the
arraignment on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question, i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil
cases. On January 27, 2000, however, the RTC handling
the Cavite criminal case denied Consing’s motion. Later
on, it also denied his motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, Consing commenced in the CA a special civil
action for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712), seeking
to enjoin his arraignment and trial in the Cavite criminal
case. The CA granted the TRO on March 19, 2001, and
later promulgated its decision on May 31, 2001, granting
Consing’ petition for certiorari and setting aside the
January 27, 2000 order of the RTC, and permanently
enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the arraignment
and trial until the Pasig and Manila civil cases had been
finally decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in
this Court (G.R. No. 148193), praying for the reversal of
the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA. On January 16,
2003, the Court granted the petition for review in G.R. No.
148193, and reversed and set aside the May 31, 2001
decision of the CA,14 viz:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that
would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil
Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive
Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely
acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while
in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for
Damages and Attachment, the question is whether
respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and
to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the
disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an
agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of
the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from
criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held
liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence,
the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No.
SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or
innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for
estafa through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBI’s right to be paid damages
and the purchase price of the lot in question will not be
determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the
criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return
of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto
follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa
through falsification of public document. Stated
differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI
should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will
not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the
criminal case where his guilt may still be established
under penal laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil
and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused in a
criminal case for violation of Article 319 of the Revised
Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on
personal property in favor of another party without
consent of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the
offended party filed a civil case for termination of
management contract, one of the causes of action of
which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel
mortgage while the previous chattel mortgage was still
valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the
arraignment and trial of the criminal case be held in
abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a
prejudicial question, the resolution of which was
necessary before the criminal proceedings could
proceed. The trial court denied the suspension of the
criminal case on the ground that no prejudicial question
exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled
that:
… the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil
case on the eleventh cause of action based on the
fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage
the defendant executed in favor of the said CMS Estate,
Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his D-6 "Caterpillar"
Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was "free from all liens
and encumbrances" will not determine the criminal liability
of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 for
violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised
Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of
argument, a prejudicial question is involved in this case,
the fact remains that both the crime charged in the
information in the criminal case and the eleventh cause of
action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence both
the civil and criminal cases could proceed independently
of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Code
which provides: "In cases of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (j) That,
therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the
orders referred to in the instant petition was not made with
"grave abuse of discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages
and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud
committed by respondent and his mother in selling the
disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as
a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the
criminal case at bar.15
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved
for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the CA,
citing the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the effect
that the Pasig and Manila civil cases did not present a
prejudicial question that justified the suspension of the
proceedings in the Cavite criminal case, and claiming that
under the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig and Makati
civil cases did not raise a prejudicial question that would
cause the suspension of the Makati criminal case.
In his opposition to the State’s motion for reconsideration,
Consing contended that the ruling in G.R. No. 148193
was not binding because G.R. No. 148193 involved Plus
Builders, which was different from Unicapital, the
complainant in the Makati criminal case. He added that
the decision in G.R. No. 148193 did not yet become final
and executory, and could still be reversed at any time, and
thus should not control as a precedent to be relied upon;
and that he had acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for
his mother, and should not be held personally liable under
a contract that had involved property belonging to his
mother as his principal.
On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision,
reversing itself. It relied upon the ruling in G.R. No.
148193, and held thusly:
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at bench.
The transactions in controversy, the documents involved;
the issue of the respondent’s culpability for the questioned
transactions are all identical in all the proceedings; and it
deals with the same parties with the exception of private
complainant Unicapital.
However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-G.R. SP
No. 63712, People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Jose
Consing, Jr. (G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003) held
that "Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and
attachment on account of alleged fraud committed by
respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to
Plus Builders, Inc. is an independent civil action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as
a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the
criminal case at bar." In view of the aforementioned
decision of the Supreme Court, We are thus amending
Our May 20, 2003 decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 26, 2001 and
March 18, 2002 issued by the respondent Judge are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge
is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Criminal
Case No. 00-120 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.16
Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,17 but the CA
denied the motion through the second assailed resolution
of December 11, 2003.18
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Petitioner reiterates his contention that the decision in
G.R. No. 148193 was not controlling in relation to C.A.-
G.R. No. 71252, which involved Plus Builders, not
Unicapital, the complainant in Criminal Case No. 00-120.
He posits that in arriving at its amended decision, the CA
did not consider the pendency of the Makati civil case
(Civil Case No. 99-1418), which raised a prejudicial
question, considering that the resolution of such civil
action would include the issue of whether he had falsified
a certificate of title or had willfully defrauded Unicapital,
the resolution of either of which would determine his guilt
or innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-120.
In its comment,19 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
counters that Unicapital brought the Makati civil case as
an independent civil action intended to exact civil liability
separately from Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a manner
fully authorized under Section 1(a) and Section 2, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court.20 It argues that the CA correctly
took cognizance of the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, holding
in its challenged amended decision that the Makati civil
case, just like the Manila civil case, was an independent
civil action instituted by virtue of Article 33 of the Civil
Code; that the Makati civil case did not raise a prejudicial
question that justified the suspension of Criminal Case
No. 00-120; and that as finally settled in G.R. No. 148193,
the Pasig civil case did not also raise any prejudicial
question, because the sole issue thereat was whether
Consing, as the mere agent of his mother, had any
obligation or liability toward Unicapital.
In his reply,21 Consing submits that the Pasig civil case
that he filed and Unicapital’s Makati civil case were not
intended to delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-
120, nor to pre-empt such resolution; and that such civil
cases could be validly considered determinative of
whether a prejudicial question existed to warrant the
suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120.
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the
existence of a prejudicial question that warranted the
suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal
case?
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely meritless.
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm
holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to the effect that
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be
suspended because the Makati civil case was an
independent civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised
no prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to do
considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the
similarity between his case with Plus Builders and his
case with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case
reveals that the action was predicated on fraud. This was
apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint
to the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a
"wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in
offering as security and later object of sale, a property
which they do not own, and foisting to the public a
spurious title."22 As such, the action was one that could
proceed independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states as
follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation,
fraud and physical injuries may be independently
instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and
does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify
the suspension of a criminal case.23 This was precisely
the Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil
and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
xxxx
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages
and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud
committed by respondent and his mother in selling the
disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as
a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the
criminal case at bar.24
Contrary to Consing’s stance, it was not improper for the
CA to apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his case with
Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases
involved different complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and
Unicapital), the civil actions Plus Builders and Unicapital
had separately instituted against him were undeniably of
similar mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud, and
were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly,
the Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending
the resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital had
filed.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of
Consing’s being a mere agent of his mother who should
not be criminally liable for having so acted due to the
property involved having belonged to his mother as
principal has also been settled in G.R. No. 148193, to wit:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that
would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil
Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive
Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely
acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while
in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for
Damages and Attachment, the question is whether
respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and
to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the
disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an
agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of
the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from
criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held
liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence,
the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No.
SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or
innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for
estafa through falsification of public document.25 (Words
in parentheses supplied; bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended
decision promulgated on August 18, 2003; and ORDERS
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.