LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. ASSO.
OF LDB executory unless appealed to the Commission …” Hence, while
EMPLOYEES and GARCIA
G.R. No. 120319
October 6, 1995
FACTS: From a submission agreement of the LDB and the
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE)
arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:
Whether or not the company has violated the CBA provision and
the MOA on promotion.
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their
respective Position Papers. Atty. Garcia, in her capacity as
Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE’s Position Paper ; LDB,
on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a
letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As
of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB.
Without LDB’s Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator
rendered a decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not
adhered to the CBA provision nor the MOA on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set
aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit
her from enforcing the same.
ISSUE: WON a voluntary arbiter’s decision is appealable to the
CA and not the SC
HELD: the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of
Appeals.
YES
The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a
panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the
original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate
jurisdiction of the NLRC for that matter. The “(d)ecision,
awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor
arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal
from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary
arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the SC itself on a
petition for certiorari, in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator
with the NLRC or the CA. In the view of the Court, this is
illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.
In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled
premise that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial
agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court
ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of
parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a
court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this
Court ruled that “a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her
functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.” Under these rulings, it
follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in
a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but
independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions
are not appealable to the latter.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902,
provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of RTC s and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this
Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of
voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-
judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and the panel
are comprehended within the concept of a “quasi-judicial
instrumentality.”
An “instrumentality” is anything used as a means or
agency. Thus, the terms governmental “agency” or
“instrumentality” are synonymous in the sense that either of
them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a
certain government act or function is performed. The word
“instrumentality,” with respect to a state, contemplates an
authority to which the state delegates governmental power for
the performance of a state function. An individual person, like
an administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the
settling of an estate, in the same manner that a sub-agent
appointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the
court, and a trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an
instrumentality of the state.
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function
pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the
provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore,
within the contemplation of the term “instrumentality” in the
aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and
powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him
within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial
instrumentality as contemplated therein.
It will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation
Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No.
1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for
the appealability of its decisions to the CA under the foregoing
rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No.
7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. A fortiori, the decision or
award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should
likewise be appealable to the CA, in line with the procedure
outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like
those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions
enumerated therein.
In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law,
arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court
specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the
RTC for the province or city in which one of the parties resides
or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall
have jurisdiction.
In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary
arbitrator with that of the RTC. Consequently, in a petition
for certiorari from that award or decision, the CA must be
deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the SC. As a matter
of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of
Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs. CA and MARIA CRISTINA
FERTILIZER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 102976
October 25, 1995
FACTS: Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by P.D. No.
272 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and
steel industry in the Philippines. The list of powers and
functions of the ISA included the following: xx
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. – The authority shall have the
following powers and functions: xx
(j) to initiate expropriation of land required for basic iron and steel
facilities for subsequent resale and/or lease to the companies involved if
it is shown that such use of the State’s power is necessary to
implement the construction of capacity which is needed for the
attainment of the objectives of the Authority; xx
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned
subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is
itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government,
embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other
things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City.
Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proc. No. 2239
was issued by the President of the Philippines withdrawing from
sale or settlement a large tract of public located in Iligan City,
and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of
NSC.
Since certain portions of the public land subject matter
Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by a non-operational
chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (“MCFC”), Letter of Instruction
(LOI), No. 1277, was issued directing the NSC to “negotiate with
the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the
compensation of MCFC’s present occupancy rights on the
subject land.” LOI No. 1277 also directed that should NSC and
private respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a
period of sixty (60) days from the date of LOI No. 1277, petitioner
ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272
and to initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of
occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to the
subject public land as well as the plant itself and related facilities
and to cede the same to the NSC.
Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did
fail. Accordingly ISA commenced eminent domain proceedings
against MCFC in the RTC of Iligan City, praying that it be placed
in possession of the property involved upon depositing in court
representing ten percent (10%) of the declared market values of
that property.
A writ of possession was issued by the trial court in favor of ISA.
ISA in turn placed NSC in possession and control of the land
occupied by MCFC’s fertilizer plant installation.
The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing,
however, the statutory existence of petitioner ISA expired. MCFC
then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid
judgment could be rendered against ISA which had ceased to be
a juridical person. Petitioner ISA filed its opposition to this
motion.
The trial court granted MCFC’s motion to dismiss and did
dismiss the case. The dismissal was anchored on the provision of
the Rules of Court stating that “only natural or juridical persons
or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil case.”
Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration which the trial court
denied.
ISA went on appeal to the CA, which affirmed the order of
dismissal of the trial court. At the same time, however, the Court
of Appeals held that it was premature for the trial court to have
ruled that the expropriation suit was not for a public purpose,
considering that the parties had not yet rested their respective
cases.
Hence this Petition for Review.
ISSUE: WON the RP is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view
of the expiration of ISA’s term.
HELD: The Decision of the CA to the extent that it affirmed the
trial court’s order dismissing the expropriation proceedings, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED
to the court a quo which shall allow the substitution of the RPfor
petitioner ISA
YES
Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court specifies who may be
parties to a civil action:
Sec. 1. Who May Be Parties. – Only natural or juridical persons
or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
Examination of the statute which created petitioner ISA shows
that ISA falls under category (b) above. P.D. No. 272, as already
noted, contains express authorization to ISA to commence
expropriation proceedings like those here involved. It should
also be noted that the enabling statute of ISA expressly
authorized it to enter into certain kinds of contracts “for and in
behalf of the Government” in the following terms: xx
(i) to negotiate, and when necessary, to enter into contracts for and in
behalf of the government, for the bulk purchase of materials,
supplies or services for any sectors in the industry, and to
maintain inventories of such materials in order to insure a
continuous and adequate supply thereof and thereby reduce
operating costs of such sector; xxx
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes
normally associated with juridical personality. There is,
however, no provision in P.D. No. 272 recognizing ISA as
possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality
separate and distinct from that of the Government.
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or
delegate of the RP. The Republic itself is a body corporate and
juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and
attributes which are compendiously described as “legal
personality.” The relevant definitions are found in the
Administrative Code of 1987:
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. – Unless the specific words of the
text, or the context as a whole, or a particular statute, require a
different meaning:
(1) Government of the RPrefers to the corporate governmental
entity through which the functions of government are exercised
throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary
appears from the context, the various arms through which
political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether
pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local
government.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the
Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation,
or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and
government-owned or controlled corporations.
xxx xxx xxx
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the
powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities
of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the RP, in
the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other
disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of
such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified
successor agency or instrumentality of the RP.
When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the
consequences of such expiry must be looked for, in the first
instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of
supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code.
Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions,
assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into
GRP and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special
statutory provision having been shown to have mandated
succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the
Republic.
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the RP and not
the NSC, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the
properties involved should the condemnation suit be eventually
successful.
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the RP is entitled to
be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as party-
plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired.
Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA’s statutory term did
not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent
domain proceedings.
In E.B. Marcha, the Court also stressed that to require the
Republic to commence all over again another proceeding, as the
trial court and CA had required, was to generate unwarranted
delay and create needless repetition of proceedings:
Solid Homes v Teresita Payawal
Facts:On August 31, 1982 Teresita Payawal filed a complaint against
Solid Homes Inc., before the RegionalTrial Court alleging that they
contracted to sell her subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9,
1975.Subsequently Solid Homes Inc. executed a deed of sale but
failed to deliver the correspondingcertificate title despite of repeated
demands by Payawal because defendant had mortgaged
the propertyin bad faith to a financing company.Thereafter, Solid
Homes Inc moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction this being rested in the National Housing
Authority under PD no. 597. The motion wasdenied, hence, the
petition to reverse said decision of the Court of Appeals in sustaining
the jurisdictionof the Regional Trial Court was submitted by Solid
Homes Inc. to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
W/N NHA has jurisdiction to try the case and the competence to
award damages
HELD:
SC held that NHA (now HLURB) has jurisdiction.
In case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter
must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. It is obvious
that the general law in this case is BP 129 and PD 1344 the special
law.
On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this
is part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by PD 1344 to hear
and decide “claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.”
As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has
become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to
help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the
particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems
thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from
the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the
increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in
what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the
government.
Statues conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be
liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties
in accordance with the legislative purpose.
CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, INC. v. IGNACIO
G.R. No. 164789 | August 27, 2009
FACTS
CGA entered into a Contract to Sell a subdivision lot with the respondents
–the registered owners and developers of a housing subdivision, Villa Priscilla.
The price was payable in instalments at an extended period of 5 years. CGA
religiously paid the monthly installments until it was discovered that the title
covering the subject property was actually part of two consolidated lots that
the respondents had acquired from his former tenant
-beneficiaries whose subject property had been placed under PD 27’s Operation Land
Transfer. According to CGA, Imperial applied for the retention of five hectares of her land
under Republic Act No. 6657, which the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
granted. CGA filed a complaint against the respondents before the RTC; and claimed
that the respondents fraudulently concealed the fact that the subject property was part
of a property under litigation. CGA sought for the rescission of contract
Ignacio filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the case and claimed that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the HLURB since it involved the sale of a subdivision lot. CGA opposed the
motion to dismiss, claiming that the action is for rescission of contract, not
specific performance, and is not among the actions within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
ISSUE
Which of the two – the regular court or the HLURB –has exclusive jurisdiction
over CGA’s action for rescission and damages.
HELD
The Court affirmed the decision of the CA in finding that HLURB has exclusive
jurisdiction over CGA’s action for rescission and damages. Based on the
allegations, the main thrust of the CGA complaint is clear — to compel the
respondents to refund the payments already made for the subject property
because the respondents were selling a property that they apparently did
not own. Since the respondents cannot comply with their obligations under
the contract, i.e., to deliver the property free from all liens and
encumbrances, CGA is entitled to rescind the contract and get a refund of
the payments already made. The cause of action falls under the actions
contemplated by Paragraph (b), Section 1 of PD No. 1344, which reads: SEC.
1.In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No.
957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of the following nature:
xxx xxx xxx
B.Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman; The surge in the real estate business in the country
brought with it an increasing number of cases between subdivision
owners/developers and lot buyers on the issue of the extent of the HLURB’s
exclusive jurisdiction.
The provisions of PD 957 were intended to encompass all questions
regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The intention was aimed at
providing for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all
parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the enforcement
of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take
recourse. The business of developing subdivisions and corporations being
imbued with public interest and welfare, any question arising from the
exercise of that prerogative should be brought to the HLURB which has the
technical knowhow on the matter. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB
must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of
private parties under such contracts. This ancillary power is no longer a
uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by the regular courts. Regardless
of whether the rescission of contract is based on Article 1191 or 1381 of the
Civil Code, the fact remains that what CGA principally wants is a refund of
all payments it already made to the respondents. This intent, amply
articulated in its complaint, places its action within the ambit of the HLURB's
exclusive jurisdiction and outside the reach of the regular courts.
Accordingly, CGA has to file its complaint before the HLURB, the body with
the proper jurisdiction.
DADUBO v CSC
FACTS
Petitioner Lolita Dadubo, Senior Accts Analyst and Rosario Cidro, Cash Supervisor of
the DBP were administratively charged with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. In the morning of August 13, 1987 Erlinda Veloso authorized
representative of the Tius, presented an undated withdrawal slip for 60K. This was
encahsed. After banking hours, a 2nd withdrawal slip, also for 60 K, was presented by
a Feliciano Bugtas Jr. also an employee of the Tius. Veloso did not know about this.
No posting of this amount was actually made because the passbook was not
presented. While the withdrawal slip was dated 8/13, all other supporting docs were
dated 8/14 this being a withdrawal after banking hours.
The ff day, prior to the payment of the 2nd withdrawal, Veloso presented another
undated withdrawal slip for 60 K, which was handed to Dadubo. Cidro paid Veloso the
amount corresponding to the 2nd 60K, on the thought that it was such 2nd withdrawal
that Velosos was trying to collect. It turned out that the 3rd 60K, that was handed to
Dadubo was not paid by the bank to Veloso. Dadubo and Cidro were then found
guilty by the DBP of dishonesty and embezzlement of bank funds, due to the
unposted withdrawal of 60K. Dadubo was dismissed from service. This was because
of petitioner’s action in changing the entry date in the ledger in the course of her
reconciliation which she was advised not to do. MSPB affirmed CSC reversed and
reduced Dadubo’s penalty to merely 6 mo suspension. However, upon MR of the
DBP, the CSC reversed its own decision and affirmed the earlier findings of the DBP
as to Dadubo’s guilt. However, such resolution did not state clearly and distinctly the
facts and law on which it was based.
ISSUE
W/N the petitioner was deprived of due process when she was not sufficiently
informed of the charges against her.
HELD
NO. While the rules governing judicial trials should be observed as much as possible
their strict observance is not indispensable in administrative cases. The standard of
due process that must be met in admin tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as
the element of fairness is not ignored.
The petitioner had several opportunities to be heard and to present evidence that she
was not guilty of embezzlement but only of failure to comply with the tellering
procedure. Appreciation of the evidence submitted by the parties was the prerogative
of the admin body, subject to reversal only upon a clear showing of arbitrariness. It is
true that petitioner was charged with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
bank and not specifically with embezzlement. Nevertheless, the allegations and the
evidence presented sufficiently proved her guilt of embezzlement. The constitutional
requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law upon which the
decision is based applies only to courts of justice and not to administrative bodies like
the CSC.
consider and weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically vested in
them by law. it is a well-settled doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not
interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies and their expertise unless there is a clear
showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when
they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may
amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.

Lianga Bay Logging, Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987

Facts: The parties are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are
adjacent to each other. Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are
adjacent to each other, they have a common boundary. Reports of encroachment
by both parties on each other†™s concessions triggered a survey to establish
the common boundary of the respective concession areas and was held that the
claim of Ago Timber Corporation runs counter to the intentions of the Office
granting the Timber License Agreement to Lianga Bay Logging. Ago Timber
appealed to Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and set aside the
appealed decision of the Director of Forestry and ruled in favor of Ago. Lianga
Bay Logging elevated the case to office of President and ruling of Agriculture and
Natural Resources was affirmed. On Motion for Recon, decision was reversed
and reinstated decision of Director of Forestry. A civil action was instituted by
Ago Timber to determine the correct boundary line of license timber areas. TRO
was set in place. Lianga brought the case to SC on certiorari.

Issue: WON respondent court has jurisdiction over the administrative case

Held: Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by

respondent Ago, asking for the determination anew of the correct boundary line
of its licensed timber area, for the same issue had already been determined by
the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Office of the President, administrative officials under whose jurisdictions the
matter properly belongs. Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code vests
in the Bureau of Forestry, the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation,
protection, management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all
public forests and forest reserves and over the granting of licenses for game and
fish, and for the taking of forest products, including stone and earth therefrom.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as department head, may
repeal or modify the decision of the Director of Forestry when advisable in the
public interests, whose decision is in turn appealable to the Office of the
President. For the respondent court to consider and weigh again the evidence
already presented and passed upon by said officials would be to allow it to
substitute its judgment for that of said officials who are in a better position to