Margery Roana F.

Carreon
People v Alcazar
G.R. No. 186494 September 15, 2010

TOPIC: Credibility of a Child witness in a rape case

FACTS:
Roy Alcazar y Miranda was charged with raping AAA.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely: AAA, the private offended party; BBB, the mother of AAA;
CCC, the cousin of AAA; and Dr. Sarah Bongao Vasquez (Dr. Vasquez), the examining physician who conducted a
medical examination on AAA. AAA, BBB and CCC were likewise presented as rebuttal witnesses.
Roy was the lone witness for the defense. He denied having raped AAA and offered a different version of the case.
RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and rejected the defense of denial adduced by
appellant.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court gravely erred in convicting Roy of the crime charged notwithstanding the fact that his guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
Time and again, this Court has consistently HELD that in rape cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is
best addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect
because the judge had the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they were telling the truth
or not.
Generally, appellate courts will not interfere with the trial courts assessment in this regard, absent any indication or
showing that the trial court has overlooked some material FACTS of substance or value, or gravely abused its
discretion, which certainly is not the case here.

Macalinao vs. Ong, 477 SCRA 740

TOPIC: Use of photographs as evidence.

FACTS:
On April 1992, Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and 2 other truck helpers to deliver a heavy piece of machinery
to Sebastian’s manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan. While delivering, the Genetron’s Isuzu Elf truck driven by Ong
bumped the front portion of a private jeepney. Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers sustained
physical injuries as a consequence of the collision. Macalinao was brought to Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid
treatment then to Philippine Orthopedic Center then to Capitol Medical Center and lastly, to Philippine General
Hospital due to financial considerations. His body was paralyzed and immobilized from the neck down. He filed
against Ong and Sebastian. A criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries was instituted
but was not ensued. On November 7 1992, Macalinao died and was substituted by his parents.
The Court found Ong negligent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not physical evidence such as photographs may be sufficient to merit conviction and liability.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth which ranks
high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.
In this case, while there is a dearth of testimonial evidence to enlighten us about what actually happened,
photographs depicting the relative positions of the vehicles immediately after the accident took place do exist. It is
well established that photographs, when duly verified and shown by extrinsic evidence to be faithful representations
of the subject as of the time in question, are, in the discretion of the trial court, admissible in evidence as aids in
arriving at an understanding of the evidence, the situation or condition of objects or premises or the circumstances
of an accident.
According to American courts, photographs are admissible in evidence in motor vehicle accident cases when they
appear to have been accurately taken and are proved to be a faithful and clear representation of the subject, which
cannot itself be produced, and are of such nature as to throw light upon a disputed point. Before a photograph may
be admitted in evidence, however, its accuracy or correctness must be proved, and it must be authenticated or
verified first. In the case at bar, the photographer testified in open court and properly identified the pictures as the
ones he took at the scene of the accident.

Sison v People
FACTS:
This case involves the group of Marcos Loyalists and Coryistas.
Several informations were filed in court against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the
murder of Salcedo. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution
presented twelve witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the police
officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their testimonies, the prosecution likewise
presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs taken
during the mauling.
ISSUE:
WON the photographs are admissible in evidence.
HELD:
Yes. The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value
of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility
is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the
only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful
representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it
or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its
accuracy. 52Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who
can testify to its exactness and accuracy.
While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang
and Banculo Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification.

PEOPLE vs ADONES ABATAYO

GR No. 139456 July 7, 2004

TOPIC: Credibility of the lone eyewitness

FACTS:
Abatayo was charged with the crime of double murder against Dominador Basalan and Teofredo Basalan with the use
of a GI pipe. In convicting Abatayo, the trial court relied on the testimony of Apolonio and eyewitness Juanito Gutang
which were corroborated by the medical findings showing the nature and location of the wounds inflicted on the
victims. The court brushed aside as dubious and weak the denial and alibi interposed by Abatayo. According to the
court, such defenses could not prevail over the positive identification made by Gutang of Abatayo as the perpetrator
of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the eyewitness Gutang’s testimony is credible and sufficient.

HELD:
YES. The testimony the lone eyewitness Gutang is clear, straightforward, categorical and consistent without any tinge
of falsehood or sign of fabrication. No evil motive has been imputed against Gutang for testifying against Abatayo. In
such a situation, the rule is that where there is no evidence, and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the
prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not and his testimony is entitled to
full faith and credit.

It is well-established that the trial courts calibration of the credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed on appeal
since the said court is in a better position to decide the question, having itself heard and observed the demeanor of
the witnesses on the stand. Unless, it has plainly overlooked certain FACTS of substance and value which if considered
could alter and affect the result of the case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDWIN CABRERA

[ G.R. No. 190175, November 12, 2014 ]
FACTS: After receiving information from residents of Sitio Galaxy, Tangke, Talisay, Cebu and a report from a
confidential asset of the illegal drug activities of appellant, police officers conducted a buy-bust operation against
appellant. At about 4:30 p.m., poseur-buyer, together with the confidential asset, approached appellant who was
standing outside his house. PO1 Palconit gave appellant two marked P50.00 bills, while the latter handed to him two
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. Thereupon, PO1 Palconit made the pre-arranged signal by
touching his head with his right hand. His back-ups then rushed to the scene and simultaneously therewith PO1
Palconit arrested the appellant. He then put the markings "EC" on the two plastic sachets and brought the same to
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for forensic examination.
The chemistry report from the PNP Crime Laboratory later revealed that the white crystalline substance with a total
weight of 0.11 gram inside the two plastic sachets marked with "EC" tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is compliance with Section 21 of the implementing rules of RA 9165
HELD: With regard to the non-compliance by the police officers with Section 21 of the Implementing Rules of RA 9165
as alleged by appellant in his Supplemental Brief, particularly the lack of physical inventory of the seized specimen
and the non-taking of photograph thereof, the Court notes that appellant raised the same only in this appeal. The
records of the case is bereft of any showing that appellant objected before the RTC regarding the seizure and
safekeeping of the shabu seized from him on account of the failure of the police officers to maintain an unbroken
chain of custody of the said drugs. The only time that appellant questioned the chain of custody was before the CA
but not on the ground of lack of physical inventory or non-taking of photograph, but on the alleged gap between the
time of confiscation of the specimen and the time of its submission to the PNP Crime Laboratory. But even then, it
was already too late in the day for appellant to do so.

PEOPLE VS. QUINTOS, 740 SCRA 179, 2014

Witness Credibility

The accused was charged for raping an intellectually challenged girl. The Supreme Court convicted the accused and
ruled that a person commits rape when he sexually assaults another who does not consent or is incapable of giving
consent to a sexual act. Children, either in chronological or mental age, are incapable of giving consent to a sexual act.
FACTS:
Two information were filed against the accused Enrique Quintos for allegedly raping a 21-year old girl who is confrmed
to be intellectually disabled at the time the rape incident happened.
AAA testified that on several occasions, Quintos inserted his penis in her vagina despite her protests.
For his defense, Quintos claimed that he has romantic relationships with AAA and that the act of AAA accusing him of
rape is only a way of AAA to get back at him because he ended their relationship.
The RTC gave credence to the testimony of AAA and convicted Quintos for the crime charged. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition
ISSUE:
Whether Quintos is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
HELD:

Yes. The SC affirmed the decision of the CA. The observance of the witnesses’ demeanor during an oral direct
examination, cross-examination, and during the entire period that he or she is present during trial is indispensable
especially in rape cases because it helps establish the moral conviction that an accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.

G.R. No. 205487. November 12, 2014.*

ORION SAVINGS BANK, petitioner, vs. SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, respondent.

FACTS:
Respondent Suzuki, a Japanese national, met with Ms. Soneja to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot
allegedly owned by Kang, a Korean national and a Special Resident Retiree’s Visa (SRRV) holder. Soneja informed
Suzuki that Unit No. 536 is for sale and assured that the titles to the unit and the parking slot were clean. After a brief
negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce the price. Subsequently, Suzuki ISSUEd Kang a BPI Check for P100,000.00 as
reservation fee and P2,700,000.00 representing the remaining balance of the purchase price. Consequently a Deed
of Absolute Sale was executed. Suzuki took possession and commenced the renovation of the interior of the
condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties, which were then
allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal
demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents. Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting
Suzuki to verify the status of the properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds. Suzuki filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages against Kang and Orion. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of suzuki.
Orion sought a reconsideration and argued that The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void.
Under Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable law is korean la
HELD:
No. On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the
spouses.26 However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law.
The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a
foreign law.27 He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.28
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record.—The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.—Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while
issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven
as a fact.

ELLA M. BARTOLOME vs. ROSALIE B. MARANAN, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20,
IMUS, CAVITE
A.M. No. P-11-2979 November 18, 2014

TOPIC: Ephemeral Evidence

FACTS:
Ella M. Bartolome filed against Rosalie B. Maranan, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus,
Cavite, charging her with extortion, graft and corruption, gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a court
employee.
The complainant alleged that the respondent asked money from her in the amount of P200,000.00, which was later
reduced to P160,000.00, to facilitate the filing of her case for annulment of marriage.
In support of her allegations, the complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint, among others, the transcribed
electronic communications (text messages) between her and the respondent and a versatile compact disc (VCD)
containing the video taken during the entrapment operation conducted against the respondent.
In her defense, Maranan insisted that the present complaint against her is plain and simple harassment and a
vexatious suit by the complainant who either has a grudge against her or must have been used by another person
with a grudge against her.

ISSUE:
WON the conversation between Bartolome and Maranan thru text messages is admissible.
HELD:
YES. Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain conditions.
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions,
streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded
or retained.20
It may be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the communications or has personal knowledge
thereof.21
In the present case, we have no doubt regarding the probative value of the text messages as evidence in considering
the present case.
The complainant, who was the recipient of the text messages and who therefore has personal knowledge of these
text messages, identified the respondent as the sender through cellphone number 09175775982.
The respondent herself admitted that her conversations with the complainant had been thru SMS messaging and
thatthe cellphone number reflected in the complainant’s cellphone from which the text messages originated was hers.
She confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the entrapment operation the Imus Cavite Police conducted22
The complainant submitted two (2) copies of the VCD23 containing pictures taken during the entrapment conducted
by the Imus Cavite Police on November 11, 2009.24
Under Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or
transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified,
explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on
the accuracy thereof.
We viewed the VCD and the video showed the actual entrapment operation.

Nedlloyd Lijnen B.V. Rotterdam vs. Glow Laks Enterprises, Ltd., 740 SCRA 592
TOPIC: Foreign Law must be proved and alleged.
FACTS:
Petitioner Nedlloyd is a foreign corporation, doing business in the Philippines thru its local ship agent, co-petitioner.
Respondent Glow Laks Enterprises,Ltd., is likewise a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of Hong
Kong with no license to do business in the Philippines. On Sept. 1987, respondent loaded on board M/S Scandutch,
owned by Petitioner, at the Port of Manila a total 343 cartoons of garments, to Colon, Panama via Hongkong. By an
unfortunate turn of events, however, unauthorized persons managed to forge the covering bills of lading and on the
basis of the falsified documents, the ports authority released the goods. Hence this formal claim with Nedlloyd.
The RTC dismissed the case against Petitioner. It ruled that Panama law was duly proven during the trial and pursuant
to the said statute, carriers of goods destined to any Panama port of entry have to discharge their loads into the
custody of Panama Ports Authority to make effective government collection of port dues, customs duties and taxes.
The subsequent withdrawal effected by unauthorized persons on the strength of falsified bills of lading does not
constitute misdelivery arising from the fault of the common carrier. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Panamian Laws were duly proved as ruled by the RTC.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the Panamanian laws, particularly Law 42 and its Implementing Order
No. 7, were not duly proven in accordance with Rules of Evidence and as such, it cannot govern the rights and
obligations of the parties in the case at bar. While a photocopy of the Gaceta Official of the Republica de Panama No.
17.596, the Spanish text of Law 42 which is the foreign statute relied upon by the court a quoto relieve the common
carrier from liability, was presented as evidence during the trial of the case below, the same however was not
accompanied by the required attestation and certification.

Ombudsman v Caberoy
FACTS:
Caberoy is the principal of Ramon Avanceña National High School (RANHS) in Arevalo, Iloilo City. She was charged with
Oppression and Violation of Section 3(e) and (f) ofRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act"by Angeles O. Tuares (Tuares) for allegedly withholding her salary for the month of June 2002.
She withHELD the salary of Tuares until the latter complied with the requisite clearance and Performance Appraisal
Sheet for Teachers (PAST). She was found guilty and meted out a penalty of dismissal from service.
ISSUE:
WON the Ombudsman is correct.
HELD:
Finally, on the contention that the findings and conclusions of the respondent Ombudsman is considered conclusive
and deserve respect and finality is true only when the same is based on substantial evidence. As discussed above, the
action taken by petitioner in withholding the salaries of private respondent was clearly justified. It was a measure
taken by a superior against a subordinate who ignored the basic tenets of law by not submitting the required
documents to support payment of her salary and proportional vacation pay for the aforesaid period. x x x.
x x x [I]n this case before us, the records is bereft of substantial evidence to support respondent Ombudsman’s findings
and conclusion that petitioner committed oppressive acts against private respondent and violated Sections 3(e) and
(f) of RA 3019. On the contrary and as earlier discussed, respondent Ombudsman found and concluded that private
respondent was paid her June salary albeit late. Hence, it cannot be gainsaid that the act of respondent Ombudsman
in concluding that petitioner is guilty as charged despite absence of substantial evidence to support the same is totally
unfounded and is therefore, tantamount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of discretion. x x
x. (Citations omitted)

PEOPLE vs LEONARDO CATAYTAY

GR No. 196315 October 22, 2014
TOPIC: Child witness and mental incapacity
FACTS:
Cataytay was charged with the crime of rape against a 19-year old with a mental age of a minor. The FACTS show that
the mother of the victim left the victim in their house. Thirty minutes later, her neighbor brought her to the barangay
outpost where she found her daughter who told her that she was raped. In a Psychological Evaluation Report from
the DSWD, it stated that the victim has the mental capacity of an eight-year old child. Cataytay interposed alibi and
denial as his defense. He further questions the credibility of the victim’s mother testimony concerning the details of
the commission of the crime and that the victim can be easily influenced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the victim’s mother is credible.
HELD:
YES. Despite lacking certain details concerning the manner in which the victim was allegedly raped, the trial court
took into consideration the mental incapacity of the victim and qualifying her to be a child witness. The trial court
found her testimony to be credible and convincing. The victim’s mental condition may have prevented her from
delving into the specifics of the assault in her testimony almost three years later, unlike the way she narrated the
same when she was asked
at the barangay outpost merely minutes after the incident. However, as ruled in a litany of cases, when a woman,
more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to prove that rape was
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth.

PEOPLE v. VILLALBA
FACTS: Accused-appellants were charged with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of
superior strength, one Maximilian Casona y Lacroix with the use of an ice pick. The prosecution presented the
testimonies of three persons who witnessed the stabbing incident: Maximillian's widow Josephine, Homer, and
Frederick. The prosecution also called to the witness stand the physicians who attended to Maximillian before his
death, namely, cardiologist Dr. Gonzales and surgeon Dr. Urag. RTC promulgated its Judgment convicting accused-
appellants as charged. The trial court found that the prosecution had duly established the essential elements of
murder, and rejected the uncorroborated claim of self-defense of accused-appellant Arnel and defenses of denial and
alibi of accused-appellant Randy. Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision affirming the conviction of accused-
appellants for murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution has established the quantum of evidence required in the case.
HELD:
No. The prosecution likewise failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt any of the alleged circumstances which would
qualify the killing of Maximillian to murder. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal
act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating
that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. As the Court already discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, the events leading to the stabbing of Maximillian by accused-appellant Arnel happened swiftly and
unexpectedly, with accused-appellant Arnel instantaneously and spontaneously stabbing Maximillian with a barbecue
stick he found in the area. Accused-appellant Arnel clearly had no opportunity for cool thought and reflection prior to
stabbing Maximillian.

MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP. VS. MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP., 739 SCRA 432, November 10, 2014
Best Evidence Rule; Documentary Evidence

FACTS:
MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy equipment from Monark Equipment Corporation (Monark).
When MCMP failed to pay rental fees despite demand, Monark then filed a suit for a sum of money.
MCMP alleged in defense that the complaint was premature as Monark has refused to give a detailed breakdown of
its claims. MCMP further averred that it had an agreement with Monark that it would not be charged for the whole
time that the leased equipment was in its possession but rather only for the actual time that the equipment was used
although still on the project site. MCMP, however, admitted that this agreement was not contained in the Contract.
RTC ruled in favor of Monark. The CA affirmed the decision.
MCMP challenges the HELD of the CA arguing that the appellate court should have disallowed the presentation of
secondary evidence to prove the existence of the Contract, following the Best Evidence Rule. MCMP specifically argues
that based on the testimony of Peregrino, Monark did not diligently search for the original copy of the Contract as
evidenced by the fact that: 1) the actual custodian of the document was not presented; 2) the alleged loss was not
even reported to management or the police; and 3) Monark only searched for the original copy of the document for
the purposes of the instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether the contention is correct.
HELD:
No. In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, the Court set down the requirements before a party may
present secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original document whenever the original copy has been lost:
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove
the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the
reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and
contents.

In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are present. Both the CA and the RTC gave
credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of Monark has been lost and that
diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail. Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has
been repeatedly HELD by this Court, “findings of FACTS and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best
left to the trial court.”12Hence, the Court will respect the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of Peregrino.

MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by Monark is not the contract that they entered into. Yet, it
has failed to present a copy of the Contract even despite the request of the trial court for it to produce its copy of the
Contract.13 Normal business practice dictates that MCMP should have asked for and retained a copy of their
agreement. Thus, MCMP’s failure to present the same and even explain its failure, not only justifies the presentation
by Monark of secondary evidence in accordance with Section 6 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, but it also gives rise
to the disputable presumption adverse to MCMP under Section 3(e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that “evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.”

G.R. No. 175410. November 12, 2014.*

SMI-ED PHILIPPINES TECHNOLOGY, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

FACTS:
SMI-ED is a PEZA-registered corporation authorized “to engage in the business of manufacturing ultra high-density
microprocessor unit package," filed a claim for tax refund. The BIR did not act on SMI-Ed Philippines’ claim, which
prompted the latter to file a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals. The Court of Tax Appeals denied SMI-
Ed Philippines’ claim for refund because fiscal incentives given to PEZA-registered enterprises may be availed only by
PEZA-registered enterprises that had already commenced operations. Since SMI-Ed Philippines had not commenced
operations, it was not entitled to the incentives of either the income tax holiday or the 5% preferential tax rate. Hence
the present petition arguing that the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to make an assessment since its
jurisdiction, with respect to the decisions of respondent, is merely appellate.34 Moreover, the power to make
assessment had already prescribed under Section 203 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 since the return
for the erroneous payment was filed on September 13, 2000. This is more than three (3) years from the last day
prescribed by law for the filing of the return.35
Petitioner also argued that the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc erroneously subjected petitioner’s machineries to 6%
capital gains tax.36 Section 27(D)(5) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 is clear that the 6% capital gains
tax on
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to its claim.
HELD:
No. Rule 131, Section 3(ff) of the Rules of Court provides for the presumption that the law has been obeyed unless
contradicted or overcome by other evidence, thus:
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions.—The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
....
(ff) That the law has been obeyed.
The BIR did not make a deficiency assessment for this declaration. Neither did the BIR dispute this statement in its
pleadings filed before this court. There is, therefore, no reason to doubt the truth that petitioner indeed suffered a
net loss in 2000. Since petitioner had not started its operations, it was also not subject to the minimum corporate
income tax of 2% on gross income.70 Therefore, petitioner is not liable for any income tax.
In an action for the refund of taxes allegedly erroneously paid, the Court of Tax Appeals may determine whether there
are taxes that should have been paid in lieu of the taxes paid. Determining the proper category of tax that should have
been paid is not an assessment. It is incidental to determining whether there should be a refund.
A Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)-registered corporation that has never commenced operations may not
avail the tax incentives and preferential rates given to PEZA-registered enterprises. Such corporation is subject to
ordinary tax rates under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997.
EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. HERMINIA F. SAMSON-BICO AND ELY B. FLESTADO
G.R. No. 191090, October 13, 2014

TOPIC: Judicial Admissions

FACTS:
Juan and Irenea were siblings who became co-owners of the subject property which they inherited from their parents.
When the both died, the heirs of Juan and Irenea became co-owners of the property.
The heirs of Juan, without the consent of respondents, the heirs of Irenea, executed in favor of EDC a Deed of Absolute
Sale covering the subject property.
This prompted respondents to file the Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Tax Declaration No. 00-BI-030-3512
and Reconveyance of Possession with Damages.
In their answer, the heirs of Juan categorically admitted, as well as during the hearing the existence of co-ownership.
Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that the heirs of Juan, as co-owners, could only alienate or
convey to EDC their one-half portion of the subject property which may be allotted to them in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. Thus, the sale will affect only their share but not those of the other co-owners who
did not consent to the sale.
EDC pursued this petition and insist that respondents failed to prove co-ownership presumably to validate in its
entirety the Deed of Absolute Sale it entered into with the heirs of Juan.
ISSUE:
WON the respondents failed to prove the existence of co-ownership
HELD:
NO. Herminia has successfully established her successional rights over the subject property through her clear
testimony and admitted by the opposing counsel.
The Court took into consideration the admissions made by the heirs of Juan in their Answer to the Complaint filed by
respondents before the trial court.
A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations
or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.
The Answer submitted by the heirs of Juan, as well as the testimony of Juan constitute judicial admissions.
Well-settled is the rule that a judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it.
He cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to, or inconsistent with his pleadings.
Acts or FACTS admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.24

People vs. Estonilo, Sr., 738 SCRA 204

TOPICS: 1.) First hand impression of the trial court as to witnesses.

2.) Defense of alibi.

FACTS: Information was filed charging the accused of killing one Floro Casas. Trial ensued and the prosecution
presented several witnesses. The defense tried to discredit the witnesses by confronting them with FACTS of pending
criminal cases filed against them. Meanwhile, they relied on the defenses of denial and alibi.
The RTC found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. It gave credence to the
eyewitness account of Antipolo and the corroborating testimony of Serapion, who were both present at the school
grounds during the shooting incident. The RTC found accused-appellants Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey to have
ordered their co-accused to kill Floro based on the testimony of Servando, who was present when the group planned
to kill Floro. Thus, the RTC concluded that Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. is a principal by inducement. And accused-appellant
Rey conspired with his father. In sum, the prosecution was able to establish conspiracy and evident premeditation
among all the accused-appellants.
The accused appealed prayed for the reversal of the judgment of conviction in the criminal case on the ground that
some of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses constitute circumstantial evidence, and that the prosecution
was not able to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether or not the twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by the accused-appellants be accepted.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses
on the witness stand and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its first-hand impressions
as a witness testifies before it. It is, thus, no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of
witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of
witnesses as they testify.
This Court had nevertheless carefully scrutinized the records but found no indication that the trial and the appellate
courts overlooked or failed to appreciate FACTS that, if considered, would change the outcome of this case. The trial
court and the appellate court did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
particularly of Antipolo who was an eyewitness to the crime.
Antipolo’s testimony did not suffer from any serious and material inconsistency that could possibly detract from his
credibility. From his direct and straightforward testimony, there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprits.
As to the second ISSUE, the Court ruled in the negative. The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by the accused-
appellants must fail in light of the positive identification made by Antipolo and Serapion. Alibi and denial are inherently
weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the
identity of the accused as in this case. It is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony
Further, it has been HELD that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility
of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed; the accused must
demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate
vicinity when the crime was committed. Here, the accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted
requirements

Andres v. PNB
FACTS:
This case involves a 4,634-square-meter parcel of land in Nueva Ecija mortgaged to respondent Philippine National
Bank (PNB). PNB later foreclosed the property and consolidated title in its name.
Onofre Andres, claiming ownership over the property, filed on November 13, 1996 a complaint for cancellation of
title, reconveyance of property and damages against PNB, among others.
The complaint alleged that on November 8, 1994, Onofre Andres’ nephew Reynaldo Andres was in collusion with his
mother, Lydia Echaus-Andres, in executing a falsified document denominated as “Self-Adjudication of Sole Heir.” This
stated that Reynaldo Andres was the sole heir of his father, Roman Andres, who died on October 12, 1968, and his
mother who died on December 15, 1969.21 However, his mother was then still alive and his father, Roman Andres,
died only on May 29, 1990.22cha
PNB denied the material allegations in the complaint. It argued that it conducted an investigation on the
property. The title presented to PNB by Reynaldo Andres and his wife was clear and free from adverse
claims.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In his reply, Onofre Andres countered that the extrajudicial partition with sale executed on July 1, 1965 was fictitious,
thus, void.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Onofre Andres argued that (1) this was not published in a newspaper of general circulation; (2) it was executed only
to accommodate the request of Roman Andres and his wife who wanted to mortgage the property; (3) three of the
legitimate heirs of the late Victor and Filomena Andres, who were then still living, namely, Sixto, Ofelia, and Araceli,
did not participate in its execution; and (4) there was no consideration for the alleged
sale.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ISSUE:
whether a valid title in favor of PNB can be derived from these void titles.
HELD:
While it is settled that a simulated deed of sale is null and void and therefore, does not convey any right that could
ripen into a valid title, it has been equally ruled that, for reasons of public policy, the subsequent nullification of title
to a property is not a ground to annul the contractual right which may have been derived by a purchaser, mortgagee
or other transferee who acted in good faith. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The doctrine protecting mortgagees and innocent purchasers in good faith emanates from the social interest
embedded in the legal concept granting indefeasibility of titles. The burden of discovery of invalid transactions
relating to the property covered by a title appearing regular on its face is shifted from the third party relying on the
title to the co-owners or the predecessors of the title holder. Between the third party and the co-owners, it will be
the latter that will be more intimately knowledgeable about the status of the property and its history. The costs of
discovery of the basis of invalidity, thus, are better borne by them because it would naturally be lower. A reverse
presumption will only increase costs for the economy, delay transactions, and, thus, achieve a less optimal welfare
level for the entire society.hanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Second, the two-year period under Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court had lapsed and petitioner heirs did not
allege if any heir or creditor of Roman Andres and his wife had invoked their right under this provision. In any event,
Rule 74, Section 4 does not apply to Onofre Andres who never alleged being an excluded heir or unpaid creditor of
his brother Roman Andres and Roman’s wife.

REMIGIO ESPIRITU vs LUTGARDA TORRES DEL ROSARIO

GR No. 204964 October 15, 2014

TOPIC: Presumption of regularity of the acts of public officer

FACTS:
In 2000, respondent del Rosario filed an application for exemption with the DAR seeking to exempt Lot Nos. 854 and
855 from the CARP coverage which was granted citing DOJ Opinion No. 44 s. 1990 stating that lands classified as non-
agricultural before the enactment of CARP are beyond its coverage. The farmers in respondent’s landholdings led by
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order arguing that the landholdings were classified as agricultural
and not industrial. The DAR gave due course and granted the motion thereby revoking the earlier order. It also denied
the motion for reconsideration of del Rosario. Del Rosario filed a notice of appeal before the Office of the
President. Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite rendered the decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. Del Rosario
filed a petition for review before the CA, arguing that the decision of Gaite was void since he had been appointed to
the SEC two months prior to the rendering of the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Deputy Secretary Gaite’s decision is presumed valid, effective and binding.

HELD:
YES. Gaite, being a public officer, his acts enjoy the presumption of regularity. The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failire to perform a duty. The presumption, however,
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the
presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.

Respondent has not presented evidence showing that the decision was rendered ultra vires, other than her allegation
that Gaite had already been appointed to another office. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence on the
contrary, the decision is conclusively presumed to have been rendered in the regular course of business.

BARRIDO v. NONATO
FACTS: In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were
able to acquire a property. their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there
was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the
latter refused. Thus, Nonato filed a complaint for partition of property. Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense,
that the subject property had already been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved
for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable
of pecuniary estimation.
ISSUE: Whether the deed of sale alleged is binding and therefore, the property is no longer in the owned by the
spouses.
HELD: No. Aside from the title to the property still being registered in the names of the former spouses, said document
of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document
remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public document, making it inadmissible in evidence unless
properly authenticated. Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution and authenticity. In fact, she merely
annexed said Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by
Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.

AGILE MARITIME RESOURCES, INC. VS. SIADOR, 737 SCRA 360

Burden of Evidence

FACTS:
Since the seafarer’s heir has initially discharged his burden of proof, the employer, in order to avoid liability, must
similarly establish their defense. If the employer is able to establish its defense by substantial evidence, the burden
now rests on the seafarer’s heir to overcome the employer’s defense. In other words, the burden of evidence now
shifts to the seafarer’s heirs.
Dennis Siador was an ordinary seaman on board the vessel LNG Aries. Apolinario Siador, Dennis’ father, was claiming
death benefits from Pronav Ship Management, Inc. and its local manning agent, Agile Maritime Resources (Agile) for
claiming that Dennis fell from the vessel and died in the high seas. The latter’s body was never recovered.
Apolinario claims that Dennis was suffering with mental disability days prior to the incident finding solace on portion
of crewmembers’ statements that Dennis was telling them some strange things about the future, Jesus, Angels, some
visions/predictions that he have and that his writings will be guided by Jesus. Thus, his act of jumping overboard
cannot be considered as willful.
Agile interposed the defense that Dennis willfully took his life by jumping overboard. A life ring was immediately
thrown into the water by the vessel’s crew, but Rolando Moreno, the fitter, saw Dennis floating on his back and making
no efforts to swim towards the life ring.
Under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA - SEC), the
employer is not liable for the compensation if the death is directly attributable to the seafarer. Both the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC dismissed the complaint finding that substantial evidence exists to support that Dennis, saddled by
heavy personal and psychological problems, took his own life by jumping overboard.

The Court of Appeals reversed NLRC’s decision finding the latter gravely abused its discretion in holding that
substantial evidence exists to support its conclusion that Dennis willfully took his life.

ISSUE:
Was Agile able to prove by substantial evidence that Dennis willfully took his life by jumping overboard thus shifting
the burden on Siador to prove by substantial evidence that Dennis was insane at the time of incident?

HELD:
Yes. As a claimant for death benefits, Apolinario has the burden of proving that the seafarer’s death (1) is work-related;
and (2) happened during the term of the employment contract. Unarguably, Apolinario has discharged this burden of
proof. Since Apolinario has initially discharged his burden of proof, Agile, et. al., in order to avoid liability, must similarly
establish their defense. If they are able to establish their defense by substantial evidence, the burden now rests on
Apolinario to overcome the employer’s defense. In other words, the burden of evidence now shifts to the seafarer’s
heirs.

Whether it is the employer or the seafarer, the quantum of proof necessary to discharge their respective burdens is
substantial evidence, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
By holding that willfulness “could not be presumed” from Dennis’ act of jumping overboard, we observe that the
Court of Appeals (CA) cluttered its appreciation of the evidence, contrary to the rules on the burden of proof and the
burden of evidence that must be observed since the ISSUE before the CA was not the intrinsic correctness of the
National Labor Relations Commission’s (NLRC’s) HELD but the existence of grave abuse of discretion.

Since the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) requires the
employer to prove not only that the death is directly attributable to the seafarer himself but also that the seafarer
willfully caused his death, evidence of insanity or mental sickness may be presented to negate the requirement of
willfulness as a matter of counter-defense.

Apolinario’s complaint must be dismissed not because of doubt but because of the insufficiency of his evidence to
support his claim of insanity.

G.R. No. 192150. October 1, 2014.*

FEDERICO SABAY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:
Godofredo and Jervie filed a complaint against the petitioner before the barangay.8 The parties agreed to settle the
complaint based on the recommendation of the building inspector and reflected their agreement in their Kasunduang
Pag-aayos9 (Kasunduan) dated June 20, 2001. The Kasunduan, however, was not implemented because the building
inspector failed to make the promised recommendation to resolve the boundary dispute between the parties.10 Thus,
the Office of the Barangay Captain ISSUEd a Certificate to File an Action. The petitioner was accordingly charged before
the MTC with the crime of Physical Injuries. The petitioner denied the charge and claimed that he had simply acted
in self-defense and To defend himself, he got a stone and threw it at Godofredo. They further argued that mtc has no
jurisdiction over the criminal cases in view of the alleged inadmissibility of the Certification to File Action;
The RTC ruled against petitioner and found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of Slight Physical
Injuries which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Won the Certification to File Action is admissible.

HELD:
Yes. The Certification to File an Action is Admissible
Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides that the court cannot consider any evidence that has not
been formally offered.19 Formal offer means that the offering party shall inform the court of the purpose of
introducing its exhibits into evidence, to assist the court in HELD on their admissibility in case the adverse party
objects.20 Without a formal offer of evidence, courts cannot take notice of this evidence even if this has been
previously marked and identified.
This rule, however, admits of an exception. The Court, in the appropriate cases, has relaxed the formal-offer rule and
allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted.

DOMADO DISOMIMBA SULTAN v. ATTY. CASAN MACABANDING

A.C. No. 7919, October 08, 2014

TOPIC: Expert witness

FACTS:
Sultan ran for the position of Mayor for the Municipality of Buadipuso Buntong, Lanao del Sur in 2007.
After filing his COC with the COMELEC, an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy for Municipal Mayor3
(Affidavit of Withdrawal) was notarized and submitted by Atty. Macabanding to the COMELEC, withdrawing Sultan’s
candidacy without the his knowledge or authorization.
When the complainant learned of this, he wrote a letter4 and submitted an Affidavit5 to Mamangcoday Colangcag
(Colangcag), Acting Election Officer of the COMELEC in Buadipuso Buntong, Lanao del Sur alleging that he neither
executed the Affidavit of Withdrawal nor authorized anybody to prepare a document to withdraw his COC. He asked
that the withdrawal be ignored and that his name be retained on the list of candidates.
Sultan also filed a criminal complaint with the Prosecutor’s Office of Marawi City against Abdulmojib Moti Mariano
(Mariano) who was another candidate for the mayoralty position, the respondent, and Colangcag for Falsification of
Public Documents.
Subsequently, the NBI transmitted its Questioned Documents Report No. 428-9079 to the COMELEC en banc, stating
that the signature in the Affidavit of Withdrawal and the specimen signatures of the complainant were not written by
one and the same person.10cralaw
NBI’s findings: Laboratory and scientific comparative examination of the specimens submitted, under stereoscopic
microscope and magnifying lenses, with the aid of photographic enlargements (Comparison charts), reveal that there
exist fundamental, significant differences in writing characteristics/habits between the questioned signature
“DOMADO DISOMIMBA” (written in Arabic characters/alphabet), on one hand, and the sample specimen signatures
“DOMADO DISOMIMBA” (written in Arabic characters/alphabet), on the other hand, such as
in:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
- Structural pattern of characters/elements
- Direction of strokes
- Proportion characteristics
- Other minute identifying details
Thereafter, Sultan filed the present administrative complaint against the respondent with prayer for his disbarment.
The respondent maintained that the NBI officer who examined the complainant’s signature is not an expert in Arabic
language and thus, could not give an expert opinion regarding a signature written in Arabic language.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Macabanding should be HELD administratively liable based on the examination of the NBI officer despite
not being expert in Arabic language

HELD:
YES. a handwriting expert does not have to be a linguist at the same time.
To be credible, a handwriting expert need not be familiar with the language used in the document subject of his
examination.
The nature of his examination involves the study and comparison of strokes, the depth and pressure points of the
alleged forgery, as compared to the specimen or original handwriting or signatures.
BPI Express Card Corporation vs. Armovit, 737 SCRA 542

TOPIC: Parol Evidence Rule.

FACTS: Ma. Antonia R. Armovit treated her British friends to lunch at a restaurant. She handed to the waiter her BPI
Express Credit Card to settle the bill but to her astonishment, the waiter returned and informed that her card had
been cancelled upon verification with the BPI Express Credit (BPI). Armovit called BPI and the latter told her that her
credit card had been summarily cancelled for failure to pay her outstanding obligations. She denied having defaulted
on her payments and demanded for compensation for the shame and embarrassment she suffered. BPI claimed that
it send Armovit a telegraphic message requesting her to pay her arrears for three consecutive months. As she did not
comply with the request, it temporarily suspended her credit card with due notice to her. BPI further claimed that
Armovit failed to submit the required application form in order to reactivate her credit card privileges. Later on,
Armovit received a telegraphic message from BPI apologizing forits error of inadvertently including her credit card in
Caution List sent to its affiliated merchants. Armovit sued BPI for damages insisting that she had been a credit
cardholder in good standing, and that she did not have any unpaid bills at the time of the incident. RTC ordered in
favor of Armovit. BPI appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposed duty of BPI to submit the new application form in order to enable Armovit to reactivate
the credit card would contravene the Parol Evidence Rule.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. Indeed, there was no agreement between the parties to add the submission of the
new application form as the means to reactivate the credit card. When she did not promptly settle her outstanding
balance, BPI Express Credit sent a message on March 19, 1992 demanding payment with the warning that her failure
to pay would force it to temporarily suspend her credit card effective March 31, 1992. It then sent another demand
letter dated March 31, 1992 requesting her to settle her obligation in order to lift the suspension of her credit card
and prevent its cancellation. In April 1992, she paid her obligation. In the context of the contemporaneous and
subsequent acts of the parties, the only condition for the reinstatement of her credit card was the payment of her
outstanding obligation. Had it intended otherwise, BPI Express Credit would have surely informed her of the additional
requirement in its letters of March 19, 1992 and March 31, 1992. That it did not do so confirmed that they did not
agree on having her submit the new application form as the condition to reactivate her credit card.

Re: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER
26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014

TOPIC: Substantial evidence in administrative proceedings

FACTS:
When the Pork Barrel Scam broke the news in 2013, incriminating evidence surfaced implicating Associate Justice of
the Sandiganbayan Gregory Ong. Multiple sworn statements and verbal testimonies of Marina Sula pointed out that
Ong had visited the office of Janet Lim Napoles. A phot published by Rapple showed Senator Jinggoy Estrada, Napoles
and Ong together in a party. Ong explained himself in a letter to CJ Sereno that he did not attend any event hosted
by Napoles during or after she had a case (Kevlar case) in the Sandiganbayan in which she was acquitted. Sereno then
requested the court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio over members of the judiciary and members
of the legal profession. Ong filed a comment saying that the testimony of Sula was merely hearsay. Justice Sandoval
evaluated and concluded that the testimonies of Benhur Luy and Marina Sula, because they were only denied and in
no way challenged or refuted by Ong via adverse testimony, were not lies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies of Luy and Sula were merely hearsays.
HELD:
NO. It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by
reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. The rule which
concedes due respect and even finality to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal
cases applies a fortiori to administrative cases. In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is
required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that
respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or
even preponderant. The testimonies of Luy and Sula, considering that they were employees of Napoles privy to her
daily business and personal activities and that she occasionally updated them on developments regarding the case,
were able to provide substantial evidence.

Barut v. People
FACTS: Petitioner Emeritu C. Barut, a guard of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), was tried for
and found guilty of homicide by the Regional Trial Court, in Muntinlupa City. He was sentenced of imprisonment and
to inndemnify the heirs of Vincent Ucag. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of Barut through
its decision Hence, Barut now seeks the review of his conviction by petition for review on certiorari. Barut adverts to
the extra-judicial sworn statement that Villas gave, in which he declared not having seen Barut fire a gun. Barut
contends that this declaration definitely contradicted Villas’ court testimony
ISSUE:
Whether the testimony of Villas could be admissible as an evidence in favor of Barut.
HELD:
No. Pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the RTC as the trial court could consideronly the evidence
that had been formally offered; towards that end, the offering party must specify the purpose for which the evidence
was being offered. The rule would ensure the right of the adverse party to due process of law, for, otherwise, the
adverse party would not be put in the position to timely object to the evidence, as well as to properly counter the
impact of evidence not formally offered.
The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits
in the records cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or documents not offered at the hearing of the case.
The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial court can be considered is relaxed where two requisites
concur, namely: one, the evidence was duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and, two, the evidence was
incorporated inthe records of the case. Furthermore, the rule has no application where the court takes judicial notice
of adjudicative FACTS pursuant to Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the court relies on judicial
admissions or draws inferences from such judicial admissions within the context of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court; or where the trial court, in judging the demeanor of witnesses, determines their credibility even without the
offer of the demeanor as evidence.

BOGNOT VS. RRI LENDING CORP., 736 SCRA 357

Burden of Proof; Best Evidence Rule

FACTS:
Leonardo Bognot executed a promissory note in favor of RRI Lending Corporation, with Rolando Bognot, his brother
as a co-maker, for a loan they obtained in the amount of Php500,000.00, secured by a post-dated check. Eventually,
the loan was renewed several times on a monthly basis by the siblings until Rolando’s wife, Julieta Bognot, renewed
the said loan and got the loan documents for the Bognot siblings’ signatures but she never returned them. Despite
repeated demands, the loan was left unpaid. The petitioner, then, pleaded that he had paid the loan but failed to
prove it.
ISSUE
Whether the Bognot siblings’ obligation was extinguished by novation through substitution of debtors.
HELD:
No, there is no novation to talk about since to legally effect a novation, the original debtor must expressly released
from the obligation and the new debtor assumes his place. The renewal of the loan made by Mrs. Bognot is not in
effect, a substitution since she merely renewed the original loan by executing a new promissory note and check.
Nevertheless, the respondent never agreed to the substitution which is essential to validly substitute the old debtor.

On the nature of the petitioner’s liability, we rule however, that the CA erred in holding the petitioner solidarily liable
with Rolando. In this case, both the RTC and the CA found the petitioner solidarily liable with Rolando based on
Promissory Note No. 97-035 dated June 30, 1997. Under the promissory note, the Bognot Siblings defined the
parameters of their obligation as follows:

“FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/WE, jointly and severally, promise to pay to READY RESOURCES INVESTORS RRI LENDING
CORPO. or Order, its office at Parañaque, M.M. the principal sum of Five Hundred Thousand PESOS (P500,000.00),
Philippine Currency, with interest thereon at the rate of Five percent (5%) per month/annum, payable in One
Installment (01) equal daily/weekly/semi-monthly/monthly of PESOS Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00),
first installment to become due on June 30, 1997. x x x”44 (Emphasis Ours)

Although the phrase “jointly and severally” in the promissory note clearly and unmistakably provided for the solidary
liability of the parties, we note and stress that the promissory note is merely a photocopy of the original, which was
never produced.

Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible
other than the original document itself except in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
Jurisprudence tells us that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; the burden rests on the defendant
to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove nonpayment.

G.R. No. 198314. September 24, 2014.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICHARD GUINTO y SAN ANDRES, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
RTC found Guinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 Dangerous Drugs Act. Likewise, it affirmed the testimonies of the police officers on the conducted buy-bust
operation and the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties as against the claim of unsubstantiated
denial of Guinto. The defense interposed denial and argued that there were evident inconsistencies, which when put
together, erodes the presumption of regularity of performance of duty. We find several inconsistencies on points
material to the credibility of the buy-bust operation. Among those are the inconsistencies on the prearranged signal,
length of time the police officers spent in waiting for the accused and the exact time of the arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty as charged.
HELD:
No. Acquitted. One of the means used by the Court in determining the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is the
objective test. Following this test, in order to establish the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct
of buy-bust operation, prosecution must be able to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation
In People v. Unisa, 658 SCRA 305 (2011), this Court HELD that “in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drug
Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill motive on the part of the police
officers.” In case of conflict between the presumption of regularity of police officers and the presumption of innocence
of the accused, the latter must prevail as the law imposes upon the prosecution the highest degree of proof of
evidence to sustain conviction.