Torts And Damages Case Digest: Philippine Bank Of Commerce V. CA (1997) G.R. No.

97626 March 14, 1997

Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
 May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976: Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling
P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC
with Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC)
 They were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband,
Bienvenido Cotas
 Romeo Lipana never checked their monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on PBC
 Irene Yabut's modus operandi was to furnish 2 copies of deposit slip upon and both are always validated and stamped
by the teller Azucena Mabayad :
 original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number - retained by the bank
 duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank
 After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change
the account number to RMC's account number
 This went on in a span of more than 1 year without private respondent's knowledge
 Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from PBC the return of its money and later on filed in the
RTC
 RTC: PBC and Azucena Mabayad jointly and severally liable
 CA: affirmed with modification deleting awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees

ISSUE:
1. W/N applying the last clear chance, PBC's teller is negligent for failing to avoid the injury by not exercising the proper
validation procedure-YES
2. W/N there was contirbutory negligence by RMC - YES

HELD: 60-40 ratio. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the PBC

1. YES.
 The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the
PBC of responsibility
 The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information (Name of the account holder)
should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard.
 Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lack in selection
and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.
 Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-President, to the
effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were
validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures until 7 years later
 last clear chance/supervening negligence/discovered peril
 where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or
when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof
 antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or
bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
 Here, assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, yet it cannot be denied that PBC
bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully
observing their self-imposed validation procedure.
 Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected
of a good father of a family shall be required. In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more
 than that of a good father of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors,
banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care
2. YES.
 it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of
account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC
by its secretary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly
Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to
contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent
 Article 2179 of the New Civil Code
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of
due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded
 Sarkies Tours Philippines, Inc. v. CA, Elino Fortades, Marisol Fortades and FatimaMinerva Fortades
G.R. No. 108897 October 2, 1997

FACTS:

Fatima boarded Sarkies Tours’ bus in Manila on her way to Legazpi City. She had her 3pieces of luggage
containing all of her optometry review books, materials and equipment, trial lenses, trial contact lenses, passport
and visa, as well as her mother Marisol’s U.S. immigration (green) card, among other
important documents and personal belongings loaded in the bus’ luggage compartment. During a stopover at Daet,
it was discovered that only one bag remained in the open compartment. The others, including Fatima’s things, were missing
and might have dropped along the way.

Fatima filed an action against Sarkies Tours, claiming that the loss was due to its failure toobserve extraordinary
diligence in the care of her luggage and that Sarkies Tours dealtwith them in bad faith from the start

ISSUE:
WON Sarkies Tours is liable

HELD:
Yes. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
transported by them, and this liability lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the
possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the
carrier to the person who has a right to receive them, unless the loss is due to any of the excepted causes under Art.
1734. The cause of the loss was Sarkies Tours’ negligence in not ensuring that the doors of the baggage
compartment of its bus were securely fastened. As a result of this lack of care, almost all of the luggage was
lost, to the prejudice of the paying passengers
TABACALERA INSURANCE CO., PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE & ASSURANCE, INC., and NEW ZEALAND
INSURANCE CO., LTD., vs.NORTH FRONT SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 119197. May 16, 1997

Facts:

Sacks of grains were loaded on board a vessel owned by North Front Shipping (common carrier); the consignee: Republic
Floor Mills. The vessel was inspected by representatives of the shipper prior to the transport and was found fitting to
carry the cargo; it was also issued a Permit to Sail. The goods were successfully delivered but it was not immediately
unloaded by the consignee. There were a shortage of 23.666 metric tons and some of the merchandise was already moldy
and deteriorating. Hence, the consignee rejected all the cargo and demanded payment of damages from the common
carrier. Upon refusal, the insurance companies (petitioners) were obliged to pay. Petitioners now allege that there was
negligence on the part of the carrier. The trial court ruled that only ordinary diligence was required since the charter-party
agreement converted North Front Shipping into a private carrier.

Issues:

WON North Front Shipping is a common carrier. If indeed, did it fail to exercise the required diligence and thus should
be held liable?

Held:

North Front Shipping is a common carrier. Thus, it has the burden of proving that it observed extraordinary diligence in
order to avoid responsibility for the lost cargo.
The charter-party agreement between North Front Shipping Services, Inc., and Republic Flour Mills Corporation did not
in any way convert the common carrier into a private carrier. A “charter-party” is defined as a contract by which an entire
ship, or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time or usex x x

Having been in the service since 1968, the master of the vessel would have known at the outset that corn grains that were
farm wet and not properly dried would eventually deteriorate when stored in sealed and hot compartments as in hatches of
a ship. Equipped with this knowledge, the master of the vessel and his crew should have undertaken precautionary
measures to avoid or lessen the cargo’s possible deterioration as they were presumed knowledgeable about the nature of
such cargo.
But none of such measures was taken.
It did not even endeavor to establish that the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods was due to the following: (a)
flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (b) act of the public enemy in war, whether
international or civil; © act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (d) the character of the goods or defects in
the packing or in the containers; (e) order or act of competent public authority. This is a closed list. If the cause of
destruction, loss or deterioration is other than the enumerated circumstances, then the carrier is rightly liable therefor.

However, the destruction, loss or deterioration of the cargo cannot be attributed solely to the carrier. The consignee
Republic Flour Mills Corporation is guilty of contributory negligence. It was seasonably notified of the arrival of the
barge but did not immediately start the unloading operations.
 Dr. Victoria Batiquin, et. al vs Court of Appeals, et. Al
G.r. No. 118231 July 5, 1996

Facts:
Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private patient sometime before September
21, 1988. In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, along with other physicians and nurses, performed
a caesarean operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully delivered the latter’s baby. After leaving the hospital, Mrs.
Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so she
consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines. However, the pains still kept
recurring. She then consulted Dr.Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr Kho suggested that Mrs.Villegas submit to
another surgery. When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside,
an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece
of rubber material on the right side of the uterus, embedded on the ovarian cyst. The piece of rubber appeared to be a part
of a rubber glove. This was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered
by Mrs. Villegas. The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court, and Dr. Kho testified that she sent it
to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination. Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which mentioned the piece
of rubber is a Medical Certificate, a Progress Record, an Anaesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record, and a Physician's
Discharge Summary.

Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Batiquin is liable

Held:
Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes
that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates
what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due
care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and
not readily available.
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings of the
cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were bereft of
direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent
Villegas' body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside
from the cesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the
offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the
cesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of
negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving
behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.
The court reiterates its recognition of the vital role the medical profession plays in the lives of the people and State's
compelling interest to enact measures to protect the public from "the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. Indeed, a physician is bound
to serve the interest of his patients "with the greatest of solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill." Through
her tortious conduct, the petitioner endangered the life of Flotilde Villegas, in violation of her profession's rigid ethical
code and in contravention of the legal standards set forth for professionals, in the general and members of the medical
profession, in particular.
 Cruz vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 122445 November 18, 1997

Facts: On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali de Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the Perpetual
Help Clinic and General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at
around 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a
“Myoma” in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991. Rowena and her mother slept
in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1pm. According to
Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the windows and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the
attendant fora rag to wipe the window and floor with. Prior to the operation, Rowena tried to convince her mother to not
proceed with the operation and even asked petitioner for it to be postponed, however it still pushed through after the
petitioner told Lydia that operation must be done as scheduled. During the operation, the assisting doctor of the petitioner,
Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and asked that tagmet ampules be bought which was followed by another
instruction to buy a bag of blood. After the operation, when Lydia came out of the OR, another bag of blood was
requested to be bought, however, the same was not bought due to unavailability of type A from the blood bank.
Thereafter a person arrived to donate blood which was later transferred to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who
was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breathe apparently, the oxygen tank is empty, so her husband and petitioner’s
driver bought an oxygen. Later, without the knowledge of Lydia’s relatives,she was decided by the doctors to be
transferred to San Pablo District Hospital were she was supposed to be re-operated. After Lydia experienced shocks, she
died.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has been negligent which caused the death of Lydia Umali.

Held: Yes. Whether or not a physician has committed an “inexcusable lack of precaution” in the treatment of his patient
to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under
similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of
medical science. A doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He
therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a
condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to
establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician’s conduct in the treatment and care
falls below such standard. Further, in as much as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are
determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to
the conclusion as to causation.

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant’s negligence and for a
reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as causal
connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient.

In order that there may be recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought
must be legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct
and natural reference of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. For negligence, no matter what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the
proximate cause of the injury complained of and the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result
would have occurred.

The elements of reckless imprudence are:

1. That the offender does or fails to do an act;

2. That the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
3. That it be without malice;
4. That material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and
5. That there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment
or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and
place.

The possible causes of hemorrhage during an operation are: 1.) the failure of the surgeon to tie or suture a cut blood
vessel; 2.) allowing a cut blood vessel to get out of control; 3.) the subsequent loosening of the tie or suture applied to a
cut blood vessel; and 4.)and a clotting defect known as DIC.
 Ramos vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 124354 December 29, 1999

Facts: Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was, until the afternoon of June 17, 1985 a 47-year old robust woman. Except for
occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by presence of a stone in her gall bladder, she was as
normal as any other woman. Married to Rogelio Ramos, an executive of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT), she has three children whose names are Rommel, Roy Roderick, and Ron Raymond. Because of the discomforts
somehow interfered with her normal ways, she sough professional advice. She was told to undergo an operation for the
removal of a stone in her gall bladder. She underwent series of examination which revealed that she was fit for the said
surgery. Through the intercession of a mutual friend, she and her husband met Dr. Osaka for the first time and she was
advised by Dr. Osaka to go under the operation called cholecystectomy and the same was agreed to be scheduled on June
17,1985 at 9:00am at the Delos Santos Medical Center. Rogelio asked Dr. Osaka to look for a good anesthesiologist to
which the latter agreed to. A day before the scheduled operation, she was admitted at the hospital and on the day of the
operation, Erlinda’s sister was with her insider the operating room. Dr. Osaka arrived at the hospital late, Dr. Guttierez,
the anesthesiologist, started to intubate Erlina when Herminda heard her say that intubating Erlinda is quite difficult and
there were complications. This prompt Dr. Osaka to order a call to another anesthesiologist, Dr. Caldron who successfully
intubated Erlina. The patient’s nails became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. After the
operation, Erlina was diagnosed to be suffering from diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage and that the petitioner alleged
that this was due to lack of oxygen supply to Erlinda’s brain which resulted from the intubation.

Issue: Whether or not the doctors and the hospital are liable for damages against petitioner for the result to Erlinda of the
said operation.

Held: Yes. The private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of
Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate case of her piteous condition.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa liquitor has been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically
follow that it apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to
show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa liquitor is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally
restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care
had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something
more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled
in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor can have no application in a suit
against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment.

Scientific studies point out that intubation problems are responsible for 1/3 of deaths and serious injuries associated with
anesthesia. Nevertheless, 98% or the vast majority of difficult intubation may be anticipated by performing a thorough
evaluation of the patient’s airway prior to the operation. As stated beforehand, respondent, Dra. Guttierez failed to
observe the proper pre-operative protocol which could have prevented this unfortunate incident. Had appropriate
diligence and reasonable care been used in the pre-operative evaluation, respondent physician could have been more
prepared to meet the contingency brought about by the perceived atomic variations in the patient’s neck and oral area;
defects which could have been easily overcome by a prior knowledge of those variations together with a change in
technique. In other words, an experienced anesthesiologist, adequately alerted by a thorough pre-operative evaluation,
would have had little difficulty going around the short neck and potruding teeth. Having failed to observe common
medical standards in pre-operative management and intubation, respondent Dra. Guttierez negligence resulted in cerebral
anoxia and eventual coma of Erlinda.
 G.R. No. 122445 November 18, 1997
DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI, respondents.

Doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good result. They
are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences. Furthermore they are not liable for honest mistakes of judgment . . . 1

The present case against petitioner is in the nature of a medical malpractice suit, which in simplest terms is the type of
claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has
caused bodily harm. 2 In this jurisdiction, however, such claims are most often brought as a civil action for damages under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, 3 and in some instances, as a criminal case under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code 4 with which the civil action for damages is impliedly instituted. It is via the latter type of action that the heirs of the
deceased sought redress for the petitioner's alleged imprudence and negligence in treating the deceased thereby causing
her death. The petitioner and one Dr. Lina Ercillo who was the attending anaesthesiologist during the operation of the deceased
were charged with "reckless imprudence and negligence resulting to (sic) homicide" in an information which reads:

That on or about March 23, 1991, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused above named, being then the attending anaesthesiologist and surgeon,
respectively, did then and there, in a negligence (sic), careless, imprudent, and incompetent manner, and failing to
supply or store sufficient provisions and facilities necessary to meet any and all exigencies apt to arise before, during
and/or after a surgical operation causing by such negligence, carelessness, imprudence, and incompetence, and
causing by such failure, including the lack of preparation and foresight needed to avert a tragedy, the untimely death
of said Lydia Umali on the day following said surgical operation. 5

Trial ensued after both the petitioner and Dr. Lina Ercillo pleaded not guilty to the above-mentioned charge. On March 4,
1994, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
is hereunder quoted as follows:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Dra. Lina Ercillo not guilty of the offense charged for
insufficiency of evidence while her co-accused Dra. Ninevetch Cruz is hereby held responsible for the death of
Lydia Umali on March 24, 1991, and therefore guilty under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and she is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 2 months and 1 day imprisonment of arresto mayor with costs. 6

The petitioner appealed her conviction to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which affirmed in toto the decision of the
MTCC 7 prompting the petitioner to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals but to no avail. Hence this
petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on October 24, 1995
affirming petitioner's conviction with modification that she is further directed to pay the heirs of Lydia Umali
P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death.8

In substance, the petition brought before this Court raises the issue of whether or not petitioner's conviction of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from an alleged medical malpractice, is supported by the
evidence on record.

First the antecedent facts.

On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help
Clinic and General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at
around 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day. 9 Prior to
10
March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a
hysterectomy operation on March 23,
11
1991. Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on
the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 12 According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the
window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor
with. 13 Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the
operation. 14 The following day, before her mother was wheeled into the operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if
the operation could be postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation. Lydia then
informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated on as scheduled. 15

Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband, her sister and two aunts waited outside the operating room while
Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to
buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out
again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood from the St. Gerald Blood Bank and the
same was brought by the attendant into the operating room. After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them
that the operation was finished. The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. Some thirty
minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other
relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there
was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later
transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath.
Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the
San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived. 16 But at
around 10:00 o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition
necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further
examined. 17 The transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other
relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San
Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance. 18

Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and
Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. 19 The attending physicians
summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District
Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was
already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed petitioner and Dr. Ercillo that there was nothing he could do to help save the
patient. 20 While the petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. 21 Thus, on March 24, 1991, at 3:00
o'clock in the morning, Lydia Umali was pronounced dead. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of
death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause. 22

In convicting the petitioner, the MTCC found the following circumstances as sufficient basis to conclude that she was
indeed negligent in the performance of the operation:

. . . , the clinic was untidy, there was lack of provision like blood and oxygen to prepare for any contingency that might
happen during the operation. The manner and the fact that the patient was brought to the San Pablo District Hospital
for reoperation indicates that there was something wrong in the manner in which Dra. Cruz conducted the operation.
There was no showing that before the operation, accused Dra. Cruz had conducted a cardio pulmonary clearance or
any typing of the blood of the patient. It was (sic) said in medical parlance that the "the abdomen of the person is a
temple of surprises" because you do not know the whole thing the moment it was open (sic) and surgeon must be
prepared for any eventuality thereof. The patient (sic) chart which is a public document was not presented because it is
only there that we could determine the condition of the patient before the surgery. The court also noticed in Exh. "F-1"
that the sister of the deceased wished to postpone the operation but the patient was prevailed upon by Dra. Cruz to proceed
with the surgery. The court finds that Lydia Umali died because of the negligence and carelessness of the surgeon Dra.
Ninevetch Cruz because of loss of blood during the operation of the deceased for evident unpreparedness and for lack of
skill, the reason why the patient was brought for operation at the San Pablo City District Hospital. As such, the surgeon
should answer for such negligence. With respect to Dra. Lina Ercillo, the anaesthesiologist, there is no evidence to indicate
that she should be held jointly liable with Dra. Cruz who actually did the operation. 23

The RTC reiterated the abovementioned findings of the MTCC and upheld the latter's declaration of "incompetency,
negligence and lack of foresight and skill of appellant (herein petitioner) in handling the subject patient before and after the
operation." 24 And likewise affirming the petitioner's conviction, the Court of Appeals echoed similar observations, thus:

. . . While we may grant that the untidiness and filthiness of the clinic may not by itself indicate negligence, it
nevertheless shows the absence of due care and supervision over her subordinate employees. Did this unsanitary
condition permeate the operating room? Were the surgical instruments properly sterilized? Could the conditions in the
OR have contributed to the infection of the patient? Only the petitioner could answer these, but she opted not to testify.
This could only give rise to the presumption that she has nothing good to testify on her defense. Anyway, the alleged
"unverified statement of the prosecution witness" remains unchallenged and unrebutted.

Likewise undisputed is the prosecution's version indicating the following facts: that the accused asked the patient's relatives
to buy Tagamet capsules while the operation was already in progress; that after an hour, they were also asked to buy type
"A" blood for the patient; that after the surgery, they were again asked to procure more type "A" blood, but such was not
anymore available from the source; that the oxygen given to the patient was empty; and that the son-in-law of the patient,
together with a driver of the petitioner, had to rush to the San Pablo City District Hospital to get the much-needed oxygen.
All these conclusively show that the petitioner had not prepared for any unforeseen circumstances before going into the first
surgery, which was not emergency in nature, but was elective or pre-scheduled; she had no ready antibiotics, no prepared
blood, properly typed and cross-matched, and no sufficient oxygen supply.

Moreover, there are a lot of questions that keep nagging Us. Was the patient given any cardio-pulmonary clearance, or
at least a clearance by an internist, which are standard requirements before a patient is subjected to surgery. Did the
petitioner determine as part of the pre-operative evaluation, the bleeding parameters of the patient, such as bleeding
time and clotting time? There is no showing that these were done. The petitioner just appears to have been in a hurry
to perform the operation, even as the family wanted a postponement to April 6, 1991. Obviously, she did not prepare
the patient; neither did she get the family's consent to the operation. Moreover, she did not prepare a medical chart
with instructions for the patient's care. If she did all these, proof thereof should have been offered. But there is none.
Indeed, these are overwhelming evidence of recklessness and imprudence. 25

This Court, however, holds differently and finds the foregoing circumstances insufficient to sustain a judgment of
conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The elements of reckless
imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
(3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree
of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be
determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical
science. 26 In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pascasio, et al., 27 this Court stated that in accepting a case,
a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the
same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the
same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is
in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the
profession but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. 28 Further, inasmuch as the
causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been
recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. 29

Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence of any expert testimony on the matter of the
standard of care employed by other physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar operations. The prosecution's
expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) only testified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the
standard of care that petitioner should have exercised.

All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the facilities of the clinic and its untidiness; the lack of provisions such as
blood, oxygen, and certain medicines; the failure to subject the patient to a cardio-pulmonary test prior to the operation;
the omission of any form of blood typing before transfusion; and even the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo
Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the petitioner. But while it may be true that the circumstances pointed
out by the courts below seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless imprudence on the part of the surgeon, this conclusion
is still best arrived at not through the educated surmises nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the
unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses. For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of
skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. 30 The deference of
courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical
skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. 31 Expert testimony should have been
offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care
employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. It must be remembered that when the
qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes
the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is
sufficiently established. 32 This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench.

Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic; the lack of provisions; the failure
to conduct pre-operation tests on the patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the
reoperation performed on her by the petitioner do indicate, even without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly
imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused
petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property
was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a
reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal
connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient. 33 In Chan Lugay v. St. Luke's Hospital, Inc., 34 where the
attending physician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainant's wife and newborn baby, this Court held that:

In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the "injury for which recovery is
sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the
injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes." In other words,
the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, "negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot
create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of ." And "the proximate cause of
an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." 35 (Emphasis supplied.)

Dr. Arizala who conducted an autopsy on the body of the deceased summarized his findings as follows:

Atty. Cachero:
Q. You mentioned about your Autopsy Report which has been marked as Exh. "A-1-b". There appears here a signature above
the typewritten name Floresto Arizala, Jr., whose signature is that?
A. That is my signature, sir.
Q. Do you affirm the truth of all the contents of Exh. "A-1-b"?
A. Only as to the autopsy report no. 91-09, the time and place and everything after the post mortem findings, sir.
Q. You mentioned on your "Post Mortem Findings" about surgical incision, 14:0 cm., infraumbilical area, anterior abdominal
area, midline, will you please explain that in your own language?
A. There was incision wound (sic) the area just below the navel, sir.
Q. And the last paragraph of the postmortem findings which I read: Uterus, pear-shaped and pale measuring 7.5 x 5.5 x 5.0 cm.
with some surface nodulation of the fundic area posteriorly. Cut-section shows diffusely pale myometrium with areas of streak
induration. The ovaries and adnexal structures are missing with the raw surfaces patched with clotted blood. Surgical sutures
were noted on the operative site.
Intestines and mesenteries are pale with blood clots noted between the mesentric folds.

Hemoperitoneum: 300 s.s.,

right paracolic gutter,
50 c.c., left paracolic gutter
200 c.c., mesentric area,
100 c.c., right pelvic gutter
stomach empty.

Other visceral organs, pale.,

will you please explain that on (sic) your own language or in ordinary. . . . . . . . . . . .
A. There was a uterus which was not attached to the adnexal structures namely ovaries which were not present and also sign of
previous surgical operation and there were (sic) clotted blood, sir.
Q. How about the ovaries and adnexal structures?
A. They are missing, sir.
Q. You mean to say there are no ovaries?
A. During that time there are no ovaries, sir.
Q. And there were likewise sign of surgical sutures?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How about the intestines and mesenteries are place (sic) with blood clots noted between the mesenteric folds, will you please
explain on (sic) this?
A. In the peritoneal cavity, they are mostly perritonial blood . . . . . . . .
Q. And what could have caused this blood?
A. Well, ordinarily blood is found inside the blood vessel. Blood were (sic) outside as a result of the injuries which destroyed
the integrity of the vessel allowing blood to sip (sic) out, sir.
Q. By the nature of the postmortem findings indicated in Exh. A-1-B, can you tell the court the cause of death?
A. Yes, sir. The cause of death is: Gross findings are compatible with hemorrhagic shock.
Q. Can you tell the us what could have caused this hemorrhagic shock?
A. Well hemorrhagic shock is the result of blood loss.
Q. What could have the effect of that loss of blood?
A. Unattended hemorrhage, sir. 36 (Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing was corroborated by Dr. Nieto Salvador:

Q. And were you able to determine the cause of death by virtue of the examination of the specimen submitted by Dr. Arizala?
A. Without knowledge of the autopsy findings it would be difficult for me to determine the cause of death, sir.
Q. Have you also examined the post mortem of Dr. Arizala?
A. Yes, sir, and by virtue of the autopsy report in connection with your pathology report.
Q. What could have caused the death of the victim?
A. This pathologic examination are (sic) compatible with the person who died, sir.
Q. Will you explain to us the meaning of hemorrhagic compatible?
A. It means that a person died of blood loss. Meaning a person died of non-replacement of blood and so the victim before she
died there was shock of diminish of blood of the circulation. She died most probably before the actual complete blood loss, sir.
Court: Is it possible doctor that the loss of the blood was due on (sic) operation?
A. Based on my pathologist finding, sir.
Q. What could have caused this loss of blood?
A. Many, sir. A patient who have undergone surgery. Another may be a blood vessel may be cut while on operation and this
cause (sic) bleeding, or may be set in the course of operation, or may be (sic) he died after the operation. Of course there are
other cause (sic).
Atty. Cachero:
Q. Especially so doctor when there was no blood replacement?
A. Yes, sir. 37 (Emphasis supplied.)

The testimonies of both doctors establish hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death. However, as likewise
testified to by the expert witnesses in open court, hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock during surgery may be caused by several
different factors. Thus, Dr. Salvador's elaboration on the matter:

Atty. Pascual:
Q. Doctor, among the causes of hemorrhage that you mentioned you said that it could be at the moment of operation when one
losses (sic) control of the presence, is that correct? During the operation there is lost (sic) of control of the cut vessel?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Or there is a failure to ligate a vessel of considerable size?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Or even if the vessel were ligated the knot may have slipped later on?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you also mentioned that it may be possible also to some clotting defect, is that correct?
A. May be (sic). 38 (Emphasis supplied).
Defense witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro also gave the following expert opinion:
Q. Doctor even a patient after an operations (sic) would suffer hemorrage what would be the possible causes of such
hemorrage (sic)?
A. Among those would be what we call Intravascular Coagulation and this is the reason for the bleeding, sir, which cannot be
prevented by anyone, it will happen to anyone, anytime and to any persons (sic), sir.
COURT:
What do you think of the cause of the bleeding, the cutting or the operations done in the body?
A. Not related to this one, the bleeding here is not related to any cutting or operation that I (sic) have done.
Q. Aside from the DIC what could another causes (sic) that could be the cause for the hemorrhage or bleeding in a patient by an
operations (sic)?
A. In general sir, if there was an operations (sic) and it is possible that the ligature in the suture was (sic) become (sic) loose, it
is (sic) becomes loose if proven..
xxx xxx xxx
Q. If the person who performed an autopsy does not find any untight (sic) clot (sic) blood vessel or any suture that become (sic)
loose the cause of the bleeding could not be attributed to the fault of the subject?
A. Definitely, sir. 39 (Emphasis supplied.)

According to both doctors, the possible causes of hemorrhage during an operation are: (1) the failure of the surgeon to tie or
suture a cut blood vessel; (2) allowing a cut blood vessel to get out of control; (3) the subsequent loosening of the tie or suture
applied to a cut blood vessel; and (4) and a clotting defect known as DIC. It is significant to state at this juncture that the
autopsy conducted by Dr. Arizala on the body of Lydia did not reveal any untied or unsutured cut blood vessel nor was there
any indication that the tie or suture of a cut blood vessel had become loose thereby causing the hemorrhage. 40 Hence the
following pertinent portion of Dr. Arizala's testimony:

Q: Doctor, in examining these structures did you know whether these were sutured ligature or plain ligature
A: Ligature, sir.
Q: We will explain that later on. Did you recall if the cut structures were tied by first suturing it and then tying a knot or the tie
was merely placed around the cut structure and tied?
A: I cannot recall, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, you cannot recall because you did not even bothered (sic) to examine, is that correct?
A: Well, I bothered enough to know that they were sutured, sir.
Q: So, therefore, Doctor, you would not know whether any of the cut structures were not sutured or tied neither were you able
to determine whether any loose suture was found in the peritoneal cavity?
A: I could not recall any loose sutured (sic), sir. 41

On the other hand, the findings of all three doctors do not preclude the probability that DIC caused the hemorrhage and
consequently, Lydia's death. DIC which is a clotting defect creates a serious bleeding tendency and when massive DIC occurs
as a complication of surgery leaving raw surface, major hemorrhage occurs. 42 And as testified to by defense witness, Dr. Bu C.
Castro, hemorrhage due to DIC "cannot be prevented, it will happen to anyone, anytime." 43 He testified further:

Q. Now, under that circumstance one of the possibility as you mentioned in (sic) DIC?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you mentioned that this cannot be prevented?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you even predict if it really happen (sic)?
A. Possible, sir.
Q. Are there any specific findings of autopsy that will tell you whether this patient suffered among such things as DIC?
A. Well, I did reserve because of the condition of the patient.
Q. Now, Doctor you said that you went through the record of the deceased Lydia Umali looking for the chart, the operated (sic)
records, the post mortem findings on the histophanic (sic) examination based on your examination of record, doctor, can you
more or less says (sic) what part are (sic) concerned could have been the caused (sic) of death of this Lydia Umali?
A. As far as the medical record is concern (sic) the caused (sic) of death is dessimulated (sic) Intra Vascular Coagulation or the
DIC which resulted to hemorrhage or bleedings, sir.
Q. Doctor based on your findings then there is knowing (sic) the doctor would say whether the doctor her (sic) has been (sic)
fault?
ATTY. MALVEDA:
We will moved (sic) to strike out the (sic) based on finding they just read the chart as well as the other record.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
Precisely based on this examination.
ATTY. MALVEDA:
Not finding, there was no finding made.
COURT:
He is only reading the record.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
Yes, sir.
A. No, sir, there is no fault on the part of the surgeon, sir. 44

This Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense witnesses that
substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC which, as attested to by
an expert witness, cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or negligence. The probability that Lydia's death was
caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable doubt as to the
petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. While we condole with
the family of Lydia Umali, our hands are bound by the dictates of justice and fair dealing which hold inviolable the right
of an accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, this Court finds the
petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability. 45

The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and limb. For insufficiency of evidence this Court was not
able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner
carried out her duties. A precious life has been lost and the circumstances leading thereto exacerbated the grief of those
left behind. The heirs of the deceased continue to feel the loss of their mother up to the present time 46 and this Court is
aware that no amount of compassion and commiseration nor words of bereavement can suffice to assuage the sorrow felt
for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are
proper in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide but is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lydia Umali the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil liability, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as
moral damages, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.
 Philippine National Bank vs Court of Appeals et al
83 SCRA 237 – Business Organization – Corporation Law – Corporation’s Liability for Negligence
Rita Tapnio owes PNB an amount of P2,000.00. The amount is secured by her sugar crops about to be harvested
including her export quota allocation worth 1,000 piculs. The said export quota was later dealt by Tapnio to a certain
Jacobo Tuazon at P2.50 per picul or a total of P2,500. Since the subject of the deal is mortgaged with PNB, the latter has
to approve it. The branch manager of PNB recommended that the price should be at P2.80 per picul which was the
prevailing minimum amount allowable. Tapnio and Tuazon agreed to the said amount. And so the bank manager
recommended the agreement to the vice president of PNB. The vice president in turn recommended it to the board of
directors of PNB.
However, the Board of Directors wanted to raise the price to P3.00 per picul. This Tuazon does not want hence he backed
out from the agreement. This resulted to Tapnio not being able to realize profit and at the same time rendered her unable
to pay her P2,000.00 crop loan which would have been covered by her agreement with Tuazon.
Eventually, Tapnio was sued by her other creditors and Tapnio filed a third party complaint against PNB where she
alleged that her failure to pay her debts was because of PNB’s negligence and unreasonableness.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tapnio is correct.
HELD: Yes. In this type of transaction, time is of the essence considering that Tapnio’s sugar quota for said year needs to
be utilized ASAP otherwise her allotment may be assigned to someone else, and if she can’t use it, she won’t be able to
export her crops. It is unreasonable for PNB’s board of directors to disallow the agreement between Tapnio and Tuazon
because of the mere difference of 0.20 in the agreed price rate. What makes it more unreasonable is the fact that the P2.80
was recommended both by the bank manager and PNB’s VP yet it was disapproved by the board. Further, the P2.80 per
picul rate is the minimum allowable rate pursuant to prevailing market trends that time. This unreasonable stand reflects
PNB’s lack of the reasonable degree of care and vigilance in attending to the matter. PNB is therefore negligent.
A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for torts, because “generally speaking, the rules
governing the liability of a principal or master for a tort committed by an agent or servant are the same whether the
principal or master be a natural person or a corporation, and whether the servant or agent be a natural or artificial person.
All of the authorities agree that a principal or master is liable for every tort which it expressly directs or authorizes, and
this is just as true of a corporation as of a natural person, a corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act is
committed by an officer or agent under express direction or authority from the stockholders or members acting as a body,
or, generally, from the directors as the governing body.”
 Elcano vs Hill
77 SCRA 100 – May 26, 1977
Torts and Damages – Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but
Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his
dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his
son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his
son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate
civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor child”, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to
Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent
of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian.” Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision,
Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.
 Dulay vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 220

Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the “Big
Bang Sa Alabang,” Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the
said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon
Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and
private respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. Respondent Superguard filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that
Torzuela’s act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was
committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code. Superguard further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-
offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the respondent argued that petitioners’ filing of the
complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the
employer’s subsidiary liability. Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the
ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of
action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Respondent
judge declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Torzuela’ s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176
of the New Civil Code;
(2) Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed; and
(3) Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.

Held:
(1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts
committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.

(2) No. The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death. It is
not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also
consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil
action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted, however, that
Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant
in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.

(3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a
prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that
they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
 Phoenix Construction v. IAC

Facts:
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home
from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when
he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or
early warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of
the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some
physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and
Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondent’s own
negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial
court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.

Issue:
Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondent’s own
negligence

Held:
We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during
the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass
during that night. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even
before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he
(being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe that the
petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio, i.e.,
that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient
way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split
seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show
that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per
se an act of reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above
is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that
night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was
parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.

Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the
legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent
manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The
collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck
driver's negligence.

The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have
already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition
which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation
is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing
the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly
since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before.
Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily
affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is
now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where
the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some
new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition"
which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition"
was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this
risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point
of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause.

The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important
part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable
intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts
are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the
defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a
street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is
run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the
highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into
it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate
and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The common law
notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent
provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.
Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in
a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery
by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence - the
plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative location in the
continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the
relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the
negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of
living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-
position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.

We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a
20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private
respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who
shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and
costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from
Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the
respondent appellate court.
 JOVITO N. QUISABA vs. STA. INES-MELALE VENEER & PLYWOOD, INC.
G.R. No. L-38088
August 30, 1974

FACTS: Quisaba was an internal auditor of SIMVP for 18 years. On January 1973, SIMVP VP Robert Hyde instructed
him to purchase logs for the company’s plant, but Quisaba, he refused to do so, saying that such task is inconsistent with
his position. The next day, Hyde informed Quisaba of his temporary relief as internal auditor so that he could carry out
the instructions given. Hyde warned him that failure to comply would be considered a ground for his dismissal.

Quisaba responded with a plea for fairness and mercy as he would be without a job during an economic crisis and that he
was demoted from a position of dignity to a servile and menial job.

Quisaba filed a complaint for moral damages, exemplary damages, termination pay and attorney’s fees against SIMVP
and its VP Robert Hyde. Quisaba was NOT asking for backwages nor reinstatement. Quisaba alleged that due to
SIMVP’s acts, he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and
social humiliation.

SIMVP moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the CFI, asserting that the proper forum is
the NLRC. Quisaba opposed this, and he informed the court that an NLRC representative said that NLRC has no
jurisdiction over claims or suits for damages arising out of employee-employer relationship. Nonetheless, CFI granted the
motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint involves an employee-employer relation.

ISSUE: WON there was an oppressive dismissal?

HELD: YES.

RATIO: The “right” of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right
was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, as the complaint
alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or
labor against the other, and article 21, which makes a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral
damages, is provided in article 2219, no. 10.

This case is concerned with a civil (not a labor) dispute, as it has to do with an alleged violation of Quisaba’s rights as a
member of society, and it does not involve an existing employee-employer relation.

Civil law consists of that mass of precepts that determine or regulate the relations that exist between members of a society
for the protection of private interests.

Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute “matters involving employee-employer relations,”
Quisaba’s complaint is grounded on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal, not on his
dismissal per se, as he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages.

The “right” of SIMVP to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and
the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, then SIMVP violated the following:
NCC 1701 – prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other

NCC 21– makes a person liable for damages if he willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.

DISPOSITION: The order of September 18, 1973 is set aside, and this case is hereby ordered remanded to the court a quo
for further proceedings in accordance with law. Costs against the private respondents.
 Jose Cangco vs Manila Railroad Co.
30 Phil 768 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Distinction of Liability of Employers Under Article 2180 and Their
Liability for Breach of Contract
On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee of the latter and he
was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from
his seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which was still slightly
moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This
caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious
injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as a
defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not
wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people are doing
so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so
risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He
was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place
was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under Article 2180 and their liability for
breach of contract [of carriage]:
XXXXXXX
NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the servant,
he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by
the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful
intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by
contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-
contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or in
itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.
Vinculum Juris: (def) It means “an obligation of law”, or the right of the obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court of
law.
 Manila Railroad vs La Compania Transatlantica

Facts:
Two locomotive boilers owned by The Manila Railroad Company arrived at Manila via the Steamship Alicante owned
by Compañia Trasatlantica de Barcelona. The equipment of the ship for discharging heavy cargo was not sufficiently
strong to handle these boilers, so the Steamship Company had to procure assistance from The Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Company (hereafter called the Atlantic Company). The service to be performed by the Atlantic Company consisted in
bringing its floating crane alongside the Alicante, lifting the boilers out of the ship's hold, and transferring them to a
barge which would be placed ready to receive them.
While the boiler was being hoisted, it was not properly done as the rivet near the head of the boiler was caught under
the edge of the hatch. The weight on the crane was thus increased by a strain estimated at fifteen tons with the result
that the cable of the sling parted and the boiler fell to the bottom of the ship's hold. (natagak ang boiler unya nakaduha
pa jud xa natagak)
The boiler was badly damaged that it had to be reshipped to England where it was rebuilt, and afterwards was returned
to Manila. The Railroad Company's damage by reason of the cost of repairs, expenses, and loss of the use of the boiler
proved to be P22,343.29; and as to the amount of the damage so resulting there is practically no dispute. To recover
these damages the present action was instituted by the Railroad Company against the Steamship Company who in turn
caused the Atlantic Company to be brought in as a codefendant, and insisted that whatever liability existed should be
fixed upon the Atlantic Company as an independent contractor who had undertaken to discharge the boilers and had
become responsible for such damage as had been done.
The judge of the Court of First Instance gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the Atlantic Company, but
absolved the Steamship Company from the complaint.

Issue:
(1) Is the Steamship Company liable to the plaintiff by reason of having delivered the boiler in question in a damaged
condition? (2) Is the Atlantic Company liable to be made to respond to the steamship company for the amount the latter
may be required to pay to the plaintiff for the damage done ? (3) Is the Atlantic Company directly liable to the plaintiff,
as the trial court held?

Ruling:
The accident is to be attributed to the failure of Leyden (foreman) to exercise the degree of care which an ordinarily
competent and prudent person would have exhibited under the circumstances which then confronted him. This conclusion of
fact cannot be refuted; and, indeed, no attempt is here made by the appellant to reverse this finding of the trial court.
It will be observed that a contractual relation existed between the Railroad Company and the Steamship Company; and the
duties of the latter with respect to the carrying and delivery of the boilers are to be discovered by considering the terms and
legal effect of that contract. A contractual relation also existed between the Steamship Company and the Atlantic
Company; and the duties owing by the latter to the former with respect to the lifting and the transferring of the boilers are
likewise to be discovered by considering the terms and legal effect of the contract between these parties. On the other hand,
no contractual relation existed directly between the Railroad Company and the Atlantic Company.
Under the contract for transportation from England to Manila, the Steamship Company is liable to the plaintiff for the
injury done to the boiler while it was being discharged from the ship under articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, for
the consequences of the omission of the care necessary to the proper performance of its obligation. The contract to
transport and deliver at the port of Manila a locomotive boiler, which was received by it in proper condition, is not
complied with by delivery at the port of destination of a mass of iron the utility of which had been destroyed.
The Steamship Company cannot escape liability by reason of the fact that it employed a competent independent
contractor to discharge the boilers..
Defenses of Atlantic
Atlantic contends that by the terms of the engagement in accordance with which the Atlantic Company agreed to render
the service, all risk incident to the discharge of the boilers was assumed by the Steamship Company; and secondly, that
the Atlantic Company should be absolved under the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, inasmuch as it had
used due care in the selection of the employee whose negligent act caused the damage in question.
At the hearing, the president of the Atlantic company said that the agreement was that their company would not assume
responsibility for any damage.
The Atlantic Company offered in evidence a number of letters which had been written by it at different times, extending
over a period of years, in response to inquiries made by other firms and persons in Manila concerning the terms upon
which the Atlantic Company would make heavy lifts. The company recognized its duty to exercise due supervisory
care; and the exemption from liability, whatever may have been its precise words, had reference to disasters which
might result from some inherent hidden defect in the lifting apparatus or other unforeseen occurrence not directly
attributable to negligence of the company in the lifting operations. Neither party could have supposed for a moment that
it was intended to absolve the Atlantic Company from its duty to use due care in the work.
The court said that if the exemption should be understood in the sense which counsel for the Atlantic Company now
insists it should bear, that is, as an absolute exemption from all responsibility for negligence, it is evident that the
agreement was a most inequitable and unfair one, and hence it is one that the Steamship Company can not be lightly
assumed to have made. Understood in that sense it is the equivalent of licensing the Atlantic Company to perform its
tasks in any manner and fashion that it might please, and to hold it harmless from the consequences.
There may have been in the minds of the officials of the Atlantic Company an idea that the promise to use due care in
the lifting operations was not accompanied by a legal obligation, such promise being intended merely for its moral
effect as an assurance to the steamship company that the latter might rely upon the competence and diligence of the
employees of the Atlantic Company to accomplish the work in a proper way. The contract can not be permitted to
operate in this one-sided manner. The two features of the engagement, namely, the promise to use due care and the
exemption from liability for damage should be so construed as to give some legal effect to both. The result is, as already
indicated, that the Atlantic Company was bound by its undertaking to use due care and that the exemption was intended
to cover accidents due to hidden defects in the apparatus or other unforeseeable occurrences not having their origin in
the immediate personal negligence of the party in charge of the operations.
W/N Atlantic should be absolved
We now proceed to consider the contention that the Atlantic Company should be absolved from liability to the
Steamship Company under the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, which declares that the liability there
referred to shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage. Even when Atlantic used proper care in the selection of Leyden, the obligation of the
Atlantic Company was created by contract, and article 1903 is not applicable to negligence arising in the course
of the performance of a contractual obligation. Article 1903 is exclusively concerned with cases where the
negligence arises in the absence of agreement.
In discussing the liability of the Steamship Company to the plaintiff Railroad Company we have already shown that a
party is bound to the full performance of his contractual engagements under articles 1101 et seq. of the Civil Code,
and other special provisions of the Code relative to contractual obligations; and if he falls short of complete
performance by reason of his own negligence or that of any person to whom he may commit the work, he is liable for
the damages resulting therefrom.. It is desirable, however, in this connection, to bring out somewhat more fully the
distinction between negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation (culpa contractual) and negligence
considered as an independent source of obligation between parties not previously bound (culpa aquiliana).
Justice Tracey, the author of the opinion from which we have quoted, proceeds to observe that Manresa, in commenting
on articles 1102 and 1104, has described these two species of negligence as contractual and extra-contractual, the latter
being the culpa aquiliana of the Roman law. "This terminology is unreservedly accepted by Sanchez Roman (Derecho
Civil, fourth section, chapter XI, article II, No. 12), and the principle stated is supported by decisions of the supreme
court of Spain, among them those of November 20, 1896 (80 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 151), and June 27, 1894
(75 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 182.)"
The principle that negligence in the performance of a contract is not governed by article 1903 of the Civil Code but
rather by article 1104 of the same Code was directly applied by this court in the case of Baer Senior & Co.'s
Successors vs. Compañia Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215); and the same idea has been impliedly if not expressly
recognized in other cases (N. T. Hashim & Co. vs. Rocha & Co., 18 Phil. Rep., 315; Tan Chiong Sian vs. Inchausti &
Co., 22 Phil. Rep., 152).
What has been said suffices in our opinion to demonstrate that the Atlantic Company is liable to the Steamship
Company for the damages brought upon the latter by the failure of the Atlantic Company to use due care in
discharging the boiler, regardless of the fact that the damage was caused by the negligence of an employee who
was qualified for the work and who had been chosen by the Atlantic Company with due care.
Can the Atlantic Company be held directly liable to the Railroad Company?
Having regard then to the bare fact that the Atlantic Company undertook to remove the boiler from the ship's hold and
for this purpose took the property into its power and control, there arose a duty to the owner to use due care in the
performance of that service and to avoid damaging the property in the course of such operation. This duty was
obviously in existence before the negligent act was done which resulted in damage, and said negligent act may, if we
still ignore the existence of the express contract, be considered as an act done in violation of this duty.
The duty thus to use due care is an implied obligation, of a quasi contractual nature, since it is created by
implication of law in the absence of express agreement. The conception of liability with which we are here
confronted is somewhat similar to that which is revealed in the case of the depositary, or commodatary, whose legal
duty with respect to the property committed to their care is defined by law even in the absence of express contract; and
it can not be doubted that a person who takes possession of the property of another for the purpose of moving or
conveying it from one place to another, or for the purpose of performing any other service in connection therewith
(locatio operis faciendi), owes to the owner a positive duty to refrain from damaging it, to the same extent as if an
agreement for the performance of such service had been expressly made with the owner. The obligation here is really a
species of contract le, and it has its source and explanation in the vital fact that the active party has taken upon himself
to do something with or to the property and has taken it into his power and control for the purpose of performing such
service. (Compare art. 1889, Civil Code.)
In the passage which we have already quoted from the decision in the Rakes case this Court recognized the fact that the
violation of a quasi contractual duty is subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the Civil Code and not within the
purview of article 1903. Manresa also, in the paragraph reproduced above, is of the opinion that negligence, considered
as a substantive and independent source of liability, does not include cases where the parties are previously bound by
any other obligation. Again, it is instructive in this connection to refer to the contents of article 1103 of the Civil Code,
where it is declared that the liability proceeding from negligence is demandable in the fulfillment of all kinds of
obligations. These words evidently comprehend both forms of positive obligations, whether arising from express
contract or from implied contract (quasi contract).
In this connection it is instructive to recall the celebrated case of Coggs vs. Bernard (2 Ld. Raym, 909), decided in the
court of the King's Bench of England in the year 1703. The action was brought by the owner of certain casks of brandy
to recover damages from a person who had undertaken to transport them from one place to another. It was alleged that
in so doing the defendant so negligently and improvidently put them down that one of the casks was staved and the
brandy lost. The complaint did not allege that the defendant was a common carrier or that he was to be paid for his
services. It was therefore considered that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to support an action for breach of
any express contract. This made it necessary for the court to go back to fundamental principles and to place liability on
the ground of a violation of the legal duty incident to the mere fact of carriage. Said Powell, J.: "An action indeed will
not lie for not doing the thing, for want of a sufficient consideration; but yet if the bailee will take the goods into his
custody, he shall be answerable for them; for the taking of the goods into his custody is his own act." So Gould, J.: " . . .
any man that undertakes to carry goods is liable to an action, be he a common carrier or whatever he is, if through his
neglect they are lost or come to any damage: . . .." Behind these expressions was an unbroken line of ancient English
precedents holding persons liable for damage inflicted by reason of a misfeasance in carrying out an undertaking. The
principle determined by the court in the case cited is expressed in the syllabus in these words: "If a man undertakes to
carry goods safely and securely, he is responsible for any damage they may sustain in the carriage through his neglect,
though he was not a common carrier and was to have nothing for the carriage." Though not stated in so many words,
this decision recognizes that from the mere fact that a person takes the property of another into his possession and
control there arises an obligation in the nature of an assumpsit that he will use due care with respect thereto. This must
be considered a principle of universal jurisprudence, for it is consonant with justice and common sense and as we have
already seen harmonizes with the doctrine above deduced from the provisions of the Civil Code.
The conclusion must therefore be that if there had been no contract of any sort between the Atlantic Company and the
Steamship Company, an action could have been maintained by the Railroad Company, as owner, against the Atlantic
Company to recover the damages sustained by the former. Such damages would have been demandable under article 1103 of
the Civil Code and the action would not have been subject to the qualification expressed in the last paragraph of article 1903.
The circumstance that a contract was made between the Atlantic Company and the Steamship Company introduces,
however, an important, and in our opinion, controlling factor into this branch of the case. It cannot be denied that the
Steamship Company had possession of this boiler in the capacity of carrier and that, as such, it was authorized to make
a contract with the Atlantic Company to discharge the same from the ship. Indeed, it appears in evidence that even
before the contract of affreightment was made the Railroad Company was informed that it would be necessary for the
Steamship Company to procure the services of some contractor in the port of Manila to effect the discharge, as the
ship's tackle was inadequate to handle heavy cargo. It is therefore to be assumed that the Railroad Company had in fact
assented to the employment of a contractor to perform this service.
Now, it cannot be admitted that a person who contracts to do a service like that rendered by the Atlantic Company in
this case incurs a double responsibility upon entering upon performance, namely, a responsibility to the party with
whom he contracted, and another entirely different responsibility to the owner, based on an implied contract. The two
liabilities can not in our opinion coexist. It is a general rule that an implied contract never arises where an express
contract has been made.
If double responsibility existed in such a case as this, it would result that a person who had limited his liability by
express stipulation might find himself liable to the owner without regard to the limitation which he had seen fit to
impose by contract. There appears to be no possibility of reconciling the conflict that would be developed in attempting
to give effect to those inconsistent liabilities. The contract which was in fact made, in our opinion, determines not only
the character and extent of the liability of the Atlantic Company but also the person or entity by whom the obligation is
exigible. It is of course quite clear that if the Atlantic Company had refused to carry out its agreement to discharge the
cargo, the plaintiff could not have enforced specific performance and could not have recovered damages for non-
performance. (Art. 1257, Civil Code; Donaldson, Sim & Co. vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 2 Phil. Rep., 766; Uy Tam and Uy
Yet vs. Leonard, 30 Phil. Rep., 471.) In view of the preceding discussion it is equally obvious that, for lack of privity
with the contract, the Railroad Company can have no right of action to recover damages from the Atlantic Company for
the wrongful act which constituted the violation of said contract. The rights of the plaintiff can only be made effective
through the Compañia Trasatlantica de Barcelona with whom the contract of affreightment was made.
The judgment entered in the Court of First Instance must, therefore, be reversed not only with respect to the judgment
entered in favor of the plaintiff directly against the Atlantic Company but also with respect to the absolution of the
Steamship Company and the further failure of the court to enter judgment in favor of the latter against the Atlantic
Company. The Compañia Trasatlantica de Barcelona should be and is hereby adjudged to pay to the Manila Railroad
Company the sum of twenty two thousand three hundred forty three pesos and twenty nine centavos (P22,343.29), with
interest from May 11, 1914, until paid; and when this judgment is satisfied, the Compañia Trasatlantica de
Barcelona is declared to be entitled to recover the same amount from the Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company, against
whom judgment is to this end hereby rendered in favor of the Compañia Trasatlantica de Barcelona. No express
adjudication of costs of either instance will be made. So ordered.
||| (Manila Railroad Co. v. La Compa, G.R. No. 11318, [October 26, 1918], 38 PHIL 875-901)
 M.H. Rakes vs The Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company
7 Phil. 359 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Kinds of Fault
M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, they were working in the
company’s yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars (karitons?); each car carrying the opposite ends of
the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were no
side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The track where the cars move were also
weakened by a previous typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantic’s foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the
same were left unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the track, and
while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to
be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for damages ($2,500).
Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their workers to be walking only
before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side guards to protect them in case the rails
would slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks
repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to work.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.
HELD: Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was another employee who
swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in continuing to work is not of a gross
nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred
from the fact that he was on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from
standing near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages though; the Supreme
Court instead reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos.
In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are:

1. Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between two persons not
formerly bound by any other obligation; may be also considered as a real source of an independent obligation (extra-
contractual or culpa aquiliana).
2. Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed to exist without the other, and which
increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation (contractual or culpa contractual).
 G.R. No. L-30642 (April 30, 1985)
Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation

FACTS:
Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died
as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased claimed their benefits
pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also petitioned
before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages, pointing out in the complaint 'gross and brazen
negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees
working underground'. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed
benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between availing themselves of the worker’s right under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral
and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail
themselves cumulatively of both actions.

RULING:
The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such
may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that
Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under
the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence,
they would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for
compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it
was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However,
should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
 David Taylor vs Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company
16 Phil. 18 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Element – Quasi Delicts
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able to learn some principles of
mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dad’s office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also
employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day – all said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30
blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in
opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries to
his companion and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed to children, they are liable for
damages due to the company’s negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was
guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps which they used for the power
plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection between the company’s negligence
and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps
as he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the
explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the
average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty
days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take
care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he
was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other
explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or
a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap,
show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that
the explosion might be dangerous.
“The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he cannot
demand reparation therefor from another.”
 Barredo vs Garcia and Almario
Torts and Damages – Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes

At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a “kalesa” thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino
Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit.
Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo – the owner of the
taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the
selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate
civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia
is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious
because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven
that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions
already before he hired him – something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a
separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages
arising from a criminal act (his driver’s negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee (Article
1903).
 FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V. C.A. & LUISA. LUNA
G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995

FACTS:

Private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a Fareast card issued by petitioner FEBTC.

Clarita informed FEBTC that she lost her credit card. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of
loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal security procedures and policy would be torecord the lost card, along with
the principal card, as a "HotCard" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.

Luis then tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend. When he presented his fareast card to pay for the lunch, the card
was not honored, forcing him to pay in cash the bill. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.

Private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a
vice-president of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies, admitting that they have failed to inform Luis about its
security policy.

Private respondents then filed a complaint for damages in the RTC, which rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay
private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled of moral damages.

HELD:
NO. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or
with malice in the breach of the contract.

Concededly, the bank was negligent for failing to inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in the findings of
the trial court and the appellate court can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to
private respondents. The failure to inform Luis is not considered to be so gross that it would amount to malice or bad
faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliguity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill-will.

Article 21 of the Code contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. In relation to a breach of contract, its application can
be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree
of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a
general principle in human relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of
the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad
faith.

The decision is modified by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents; in its stead,
petitioner is ordered to pay nominal damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code.
 CARPIO v. DOROJA
180 SCRA 11 (1989)
Paras, J. / alo

SUBJECT MATTER: Civil Liability > Persons civilly liable

CASE SUMMARY:

Ramirez hit Carpio accidentally while driving a vehicle owned by his employer, Toribio. The lower and appellate courts
found him guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to less serious physical injuries and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment and to pay civil liabilities. Ramirez is incapable of paying the liability, so Carpio filed a petition for a
subsidiary writ of execution to enforce the subsidiary liability of Toribio. The lower court denied this motion on the
ground that no subsidiary penalty was imposed by the appellate court. However, the SC ruled that the subsidiary liability
of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the driver where the award was given. No
separate proceedings are needed to enforce the subsidiary liability of Toralba.

DOCTRINES:

 In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it
should be shown:

(1) That the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry

(2) That the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties

(3) That he is insolvent


FACTS:

 Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney
owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street.
 As a consequence, Carpio suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the medico-legal certificate and
sustained injuries which required medical attention for a period of 3 months.
 An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was filed against Ramirez
with the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV.
 On January 14, 1987, the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was accordingly convicted
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries under an amended information
punishable under Art. 365 of the RPC.
 Ramirez was sentenced to suffer to suffer the penalty of One (1) month and One (1) day to Two (2) months of
Arresto Mayor in its minimum period. The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the complainant the amount
of P45.00 representing the value of the 1/2 can of tomatoes lost; the amount of P200.00 which complainant paid
to the Zamboanga General Hospital, to pay complainant the amount of Pl,500.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the
cost of this suit.
 The accused filed an application for probation.
 Accused's counsel moved that the court summon the owner of the vehicle to afford the latter a day in court, on
the ground that the accused is not only indigent but also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil liability that
may be imposed upon him by the court.
 The private prosecutor, however, did not move for the appearance of Toribio.
 The civil aspect of the decision was appealed by the private prosecutor to the Regional Trial Court Branch XVI,
appellant praying for moral damages in the amount of P 10,000.00, compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and
attorney's fees of P 5,000.00.
 The appellate court, on January 20, 1988, modified the trial court's decision, granting the appellant moral
damages in the amount of P 5,000.00, while affirming all other civil liabilities.
 A writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly served upon the accused but was, however, returned
unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused as shown by the sheriff’s return.
 The complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary liability of the owner-
operator of the vehicle.
 This was denied by the trial court on two grounds, namely:
o The decision of the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Toribio
o The nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not “culpa-contractual."
 Petitioner contends that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same proceeding
and a separate action is no longer necessary in order to avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that said
employer was not made a party in the criminal action. (citing Pajarito v. Seneris)
 Respondent argues that the owner-operator cannot be validly held subsidiarily liable since:
o The matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal
o Contrary to the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, the injuries sustained by the complainant did not arise from the
so-called "culpa-contractual" but from "culpa-aquiliana"
o The judgments of appellate courts may not be altered, modified, or changed by the court of origin
o Said owner was never made a party to the criminal proceedings.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the
driver where the award was given (YES)

HOLDING:

1. YES. The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads thus:

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding
article shall apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it
should be shown:

(1) That the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry

(2) That the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties

(3) That he is insolvent

The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal
action. All these requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's
conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these
requirements.

DISPOSITIVE: The order of respondent court disallowing the motion for subsidiary writ of execution is hereby
SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the
alleged owner-operator of the passenger jitney. Costs against private respondent.
 LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, PETITIONERS, VS. MARJORIE NAVIDAD,
HEIRS OF THE LATE NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the
EDSA LRT station after purchasing a “token” (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the
platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A
misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was
adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on
the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming
in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.

On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a
complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro
Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-
claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence
in the selection and supervision of its security guards.

The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of
carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after
paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor.

Ruling:
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy,
is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. The Civil Code, governing
the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
“Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

“Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.”
“Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts
of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of
the orders of the common carriers.

“This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees.”

“Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of
a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.”

The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or
wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the
common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176
and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s
liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made
liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one
might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on
the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same
act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the
Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches
the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source
of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by
tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
 Air France vs Rafael Carrascoso
Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Negligence – Malfeasance – Quasi-Delict
Remedial Law – Evidence – Hearsay Rule – Res Gestae – Startling Event
In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso
was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane
manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a “better right” than him. Carrascoso
protested but when things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was
transferred to the plane’s tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for the
embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to
take the tourist class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who told him that he noted
in the plane’s journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded damages in favor of
Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of a first class ticket to
Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the
true intent between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding the note made by the purser because the
said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was not presented in court is admissible in
evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first
class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth “after he was already, seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger is
not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous
act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed
upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The subject of inquiry is not the
entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule.
Such testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in
this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook
was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus
escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
 CORLISS vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.
CORLISS vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.

Facts: Plaintiff´s husband was driving a jeep close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balobago, Angeles, Pampanga
on February 21, 1957. Defendant´s train was passing by and blew it´s siren. Plaintiff´s husband slowed down his jeep but
did not make a full stop. The jeep collided with the locomotive engine of the train. Plaintiff´s husband was injured and
died asa a result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for the death of her husband.

Issue: WON the plaintiff can recover damages.

Ruling: Complaint Dismissed

Ratio: ¨ A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does not
exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon the apperance of a
train, is guilty of crominal negligence, providing a collission occurs and injury results.¨ The accident was caused by the
negligence of plaintiff´s husband and she was not allowed to recover.
 Torts And Damages Case Digest: Valenzuela V. CA (1996)

G.R.No. 115024 February 7, 1996

Lessons Applicable:

 Calculation of Risk (Torts and Damages)

 Factors in Determining Amount (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
 June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue towards the direction of Manila, Ma.
Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her
emergency lights and seeked help
 She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon
 While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires, she was suddenly hit by another
Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who was intoxicated and she slammed accross his windshield and fell to the
ground
 She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was amputated and was replaced with an artificial
one.
 Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000 (aritificial leg)]
 RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander
Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840 actual
damages, P37,500 unrealized profits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant 3 weeks after
the accident on June 24, 1990, P20,000 a month as unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August,
1990 until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in 2 Beauty salons, P1,000,000 in
moral damages, P50,000, as exemplary damages, P60,000, as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
 CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved Li's employer
 Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated
 Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene of the accident: Valenzuela’s
car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk and Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a drizzle
(NOT heavy rain)

ISSUE:
1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO
3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.

HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision

1. NO
 If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery road, he could have avoided hitting
the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at the proper time and distance
 it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming
car since there is plenty of space for both cars, since Valenzuela car was running at the right lane going towards
Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao
2. NO.
 Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection
 emergency rule
 an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his
own negligence
 She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or alley where she
would likely find no one to help her
 She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if
needed
 she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car
3. YES.
 Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant (must be in the course
of business), but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees
 Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the
performance of the latter‘s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
 situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their employees of
managerial rank or their representatives.
 Moreover, Li’s claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident because he was coming from a
social visit with an officemate in Parañaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court below. It
was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his officemate’s place, the same could give rise to
speculation that he and his officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to discuss
sales and other work related strategies.
 Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li
4. YES.
 As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount of
P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and
psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the
early morning hours of the accident.
 the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and
adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo through the years. The replacements,
changes, and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these
adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.
 Amado Picart vs Frank Smith, Jr.

37 Phil 809 – Civil Law Torts and Damages – Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
In December 1912, Amado Picart was riding his horse and while they were on a 75 meter long bridge, he saw Frank
Smith Jr.’s car approaching. Smith blew his horn thrice while he was still at a distance away because Picart and his horse
were on Smith’s lane. But Picart did not move his horse to the other lane, instead he moved his horse closer to the railing.
Smith continued driving towards Picart without slowing down and when he was already so near the horse he swerved to
the other lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body across the bridge; the horse struck the car and its limb got
broken. Picart suffered injuries which required several days of medical attention while the horse eventually died.
ISSUE: Whether or not Smith is negligent.
HELD: Yes. And so was Picart for planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But Smith’s negligence succeeded that
of Picart. Smith saw at a distance when he blew his horn that Picart and his horse did not move to the other lane so he
should have steered his car to the other lane at that point instead of swerving at the last minute. He therefore had the last
clear chance to avoid the unfortunate incident. When Smith’s car has approached the horse at such proximity it left no
chance for Picart extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert injury. Picart can therefore recover damages
from Smith but such should be proportioned by reason of his contributory negligence
 Mandarin Villa, Inc. vs. CA and Clodualdo de Jesus
G.R. No. 119850. 20 June 1996.

Facts: In the evening of 19 Oct 1989, private respondent de Jesus hosted a dinner for his friends at the peririoner’s
restaurant, the Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village in Mandaluyong City. After dinner, the waiter handed to de Jesus the bill
amounting to P2,658.50. De Jesus offered his BANKARD credit card to the waiter for payment. Minutes later, the waiter
returned and audibly informed that said credit card had expired. De Jesus demonstrated that the card had yet to expire on
Sept 1990, as embossed on its face. De Jesus approached the cashier who again dishonored such card. De Jesus offered
his BPI express credit card instead and this was accepted, honored and verified. The trial court and CA held petitioner to
be negligent.

Issues: WON petitioner was negligent; If negligent, WON such negligence was the proximate cause of private
respondent’s damage.

Ruling: Petition dismissed. The test for determining the existence of negligence in a case may be stated as follows: did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. In the case at bar, the Point of Sale
Guidelines which outlined the steps that petitioner must follow under the circumstances reveals that whenever the words
CARD EXPIRED flashes on screen, petitioner should check card’s expiry date as embossed in the card itself. If
unexpired, petitioner should honor the card. Clearly, it has not yet expired in 19 Oct 1989 when the same was dishonored
by petitioner. Hence, petitioner did not use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have
used in the same situation and as such, petitioner is guilty of negligence.
The humiliation and embarrassment of private respondent was brought about by the fact of dishonor by petitioner of
private respondent’s valid BANKARD. Hence, petitioner’s negligence is the proximate cause of private respondent’s
damage.
 ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 82465 February 25, 1991

FACTS:
 Ferdinand Castillo, a 13-year-old freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School (SFHS) wanted
to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. However, his parents, Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia
Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow him.
 He was only allowed to bring food (adobo) to the teachers for the picnic. However, the teachers persuaded him to
go with them to the beach.
 During the picnic, a teacher was apparently drowning. Some students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue,
but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He was brought to Mt. Cannel General Hospital but
was pronounced dead on arrival.
 Ferdinand’s parents filed a case for damages against SFHS and the teachers.
 The CA declared that the teachers failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to guard against
the foreseen harm. Also, SFHS and principal Benjamin Illumin was declared jointly and solidarily liable with the
teachers for the death of Ferdinand, under Art 2180.

ISSUE:
 WON the school SFHS, principal and teachers were liable for the death of Ferdinand? – NO.

HELD:
 NO. petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence.
 It is the rule in Art 2180 that the negligence of the employees in causing the injury or damage gives rise to a
presumption of negligence on the part of SFHS and its principal; and while this presumption is not conclusive, it
may be overthrown only by clear and convincing proof that the owner and/or manager (SFHS and principal)
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and/or supervision of the employee
or employees causing the injury or damage (in this case, the defendants-teachers).
 Art 2180, par. 4 provides:
 “The obligation imposed by Art 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible.”
 “Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.”

 SC found that CA committed an error in applying Art 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering SFHS liable for the
death of respondent's son.
 SC found that the teachers are neither guilty of their own negligence nor guilty of the negligence of those under
them. Consequently they cannot be held liable for damages of any kind.
 At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim Ferdinand, allowed their son to
join the excursion. The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing where
it will be held, is a sign of consent for his son to join the same.
 In the case at bar, the teachers were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened
outside the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were
holding a purely private affair, a picnic. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, because
this picnic is not a school-sanctioned activity or an extra-curricular activity. Mere knowledge by the principal of
the planning of the picnic by the students and teachers does not in any way show acquiescence or consent to the
holding of the same.
 It was shown that Connie Arquio, the class adviser of I-C, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
a. Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez (who conducted first aid on Ferdinand) and Luisito Vinas who
are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming.
b. Even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that the teachers brought life savers in case of
emergency.
c. The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the
child.
 Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, the teachers are not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no
moral damages can be assessed against them.
 “Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission.”
 While it is true that Ferdinand’s parents did give their consent to their son to join the picnic, this does not mean
that the school and teachers were already relieved of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good father
of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that they
had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.
 As for Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, the two teachers who came to the picnic late and after the drowning because
they previously conducted entrance examinations in said school, they had no participation in the alleged
negligence. Accordingly, they must be absolved from any liability.
 Mr. and Mrs. Ong vs Metropolitan Water District
104 Phil 397 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Due Diligence as a Defense – Last Clear Chance; when not applied
On July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong (14 years old) and his two brothers went to the swimming pool operated by
Metropolitan Water District (MWD). After paying the entrance fee, the three proceeded to the small pool.
The swimming pools of MWD are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid
medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a
conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. MWD employs six
lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency.
These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time on
duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with
oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in case of emergency.
Later, Dominador told his brothers that he’ll just be going to the locker room to drink a bottle of Coke. No one saw him
returned. Later, the elder Ong noticed someone at the bottom of the big pool and notified the lifeguard in attendant
(Manuel Abaño), who immediately dove into the water. The body was later identified as Dominador’s. He was attempted
to be revived multiple times but of no avail.
The parents of Ong sued MWD averring that MWD was negligent in selecting its employees. During trial, the elder
brother of Ong and one other testified that Abaño was reading a magazine and was chatting with a security guard when
the incident happened and that he was called a third time before he responded. Plaintiff further alleged that even assuming
that there was no negligence on the part of MWD, it is still liable under the doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” for having
the last opportunity to save the Dominador, its employees failed to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not MWD is liable for the death of Dominador Ong.
HELD: No. As established by the facts, MWD was not negligent in selecting its employees as all of them were duly
certified. MWD was not negligent in managing the pools as there were proper safety measures and
precautions/regulations that were placed all over the pools. Hence, due diligence is appreciated as a complete and proper
defense in this case. Further, the testimony in court by the elder Ong and the other witness was belied by the statements
they have given to the investigators when they said that the lifeguard immediately dove into the water when he was called
about the boy at the bottom of the pool.
The doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” is of no application here. It was not established as to how Dominador was able to go
to the big pool. He went to the locker and thereafter no one saw him returned not until his body was retrieved from the
bottom of the big pool. The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously (how can the lifeguard act instantaneously in dissuading Dominador from going to the big pool if he did
not see him go there), and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or
should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to
have contributed to the injury.
 FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 130150; October, 1998

FACTS:
M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila and
was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino, who was assigned by the Appellant
Manila Pilots' Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe berthing, boarded the vessel at the quarantine
anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a
briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine
anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking
maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped.
When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the
orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor
did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew
members. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was
then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor
did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be
dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier as well as the
vessel.

ISSUES:
(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused by the vessel to the
pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?;
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the concurrent negligence of the master of
the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?

HELD:
(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation of the ship, and
his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He becomes the master pro hac vice and should
give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is
employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to
decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is
deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the navigation even in localities where
pilotage is compulsory. It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws
have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed
under local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot
vessels seeking to enter or depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation. Upon assuming such
office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of care and diligence required
of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which
his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is not held to the highest possible degree
of skill and care, but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually
shown by an expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care. In this
case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the performance
of their duties. As pilot, he should have made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly followed.

(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible for the allision. The
master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony
makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire docking
procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are
not personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a
compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions
of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the
vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause
of the injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. But the liability of the
ship in rem does not release the pilot from the consequences of his own negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of
responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their liability is limited
or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of
the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel
and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent
management or navigation.
Case No. 19 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
plaintiff-appellee, vs.
PEDRO RAMIREZ,
defendant-appellant.G.R. No. L-24084 November 3, 1925
Nature:
Petition for Review

Facts:
The defendant, along with Victoriano Ranga, the deceased, and Agustin Menor, wereinvited by one Bartolome
Quiaoit to hunt in the mount Balitok of the municipality of NuevaEra, Province of Ilocos Norte. The three
proceeded to hunt, leaving Quiaoit in a hutapproximately 1 kilometer from the scene of the crime. Upon arrival
on said mount Balitok,defendant, who was then carrying the shotgun of Quiaoit and a lantern, happened to hunt
adeer, and thereafter told his companions to stay there, watch over the prey, while he wasgoing away looking for
another; that being far away from his companions, he seemed to haveseen with his lantern
something like the eyes of a deer about fifty meters from him and thenhe shot it. But much to his surprise,
on approaching what he thought was a deer, it proved tobe his companion, Victoriano Ranga.

Issue:
Is the defendant criminally liable, and if so, did he act with malice?

Ruling:
Wherefore the penalty of one year and one day of
prision correccional
, with theaccessories prescribed by the law, must be imposed upon him, and with modification, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with the costs against the appellant.So ordered.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court ruled that although there was no malice on the part of thedefendant, he is still criminally
liable for homicide through reckless imprudence. Thedefendant, knowing that he had two companions,
should have exercised all the necessarydiligence to avoid every undesirable accident. Furthermore, the act
of offering to the motherof the deceased a carabaos and a horse by way of indemnity, indicates on the one hand
thatthe defendant admitted the commission of the crime, on the other it shows that he performedthat act without
criminal intent and only through a real imprudence