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Gabor BERKOVICS - Zoltan KRAJNC

THE BEGINNING OF RADARS IN HUNGARY


Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training, University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary

Abstract: The article reviews of the beginning of radars in Hungary. It gives a general picture of the time
between the two World Wars in Hungary, what happened in the country related to this topic. After that
the authors analysed the development process of building of radar capabilities in Hungary for WWII
including the domestic development and imported systems.

Keywords: community, intercultural context, communication

Introduction Royal Army was a good example during


WW2.
A well- functioning, integrated radar The Hungarian Army entered WW2 with
system is too important and specific to be serious deficiencies. There were two basic
considered simply one of the subordinate reasons for that. On the one hand, the
elements of the C41SR system. decisions of the Trianon Peace Agreement,
Undoubtedly, it belongs to the major signed after the lost Great War, caused about
components of the air defence systems, both 10-15 years of impediment in the
in our days and in the times of its early-day development of the armament, on the other
appearance. Radars became the most hand, the economic position of the country
important devices of air reconnaissance could not allow the appearance of a modern
during WW2. At those times, however, they army. It is an exaggeration to say that the
constituted a part of different observation country had to fight its battles on the
and reporting services. technical level of the previous wars. But it
Their importance became obvious from was obvious that it struggled with serious
their very first use. They managed to lack of equipment. These factors soon came
alleviate the drawbacks of the traditional into light during military maneuvers. In our
reconnaissance means (eyes, ears, article we are going to describe problems
binoculars, listening devices) significantly. arising in the reconnaissance of enemy
They possessed much better qualities, aircraft and in their military solutions.
although not without problems, for target
detection that did not depend on the season, The time between the two World Wars
time of the day and the flight altitude, for the in Hungary
timely access of information for the fighter
control, as well as for the air defence missile The Trianon agreement did not prohibit
firing. the formation of the observation and report
The development of radars, their system for Hungary, only the active military
production, and their use in battles wasn’t forces connected with it, as well as the use
limited only to superpowers, and definitely of air defence artillery and air force. In
not only to the British system, highly 1920, the Hungarian commanding staff had
advertised both in literature and films. already started dealing with the question of
Besides German, American and Russian air defence, as well as with that of
locator technology, „smaller” states were reconnaissance and warning.
also able to show results. The Hungarian The country was divided into seven
„Royal military districts” and district
commands (1. Budapest, 2. Székesfehérvér, on the 4th and later on the 9th of September.
3. Szombathely, 4. Kaposvár and after the In the case of the first one, due to the
end of the Serbian occupation, Pécs, 5. reduced readiness, the air defence system
Szeged, 6. Debrecen, 7. Miskolc) The Air proved unreliable. It was clear that the
Defence district was established in the same expected activities and the defence against
areas in 1922 and later, in 1924, the seven them needed a new device: the RADAR.
Air defence areas appeared (I-VII) The Hungarian observation and report
The main rules of the observation and system was fully established by the middle
reporting services were established as of 1943. All air defence centres of the 15th
follows: Air Defence Area were operational. In 1944
• Gap-free, many-lined battle the exchange of information between all
formation centres and their subunits was automatic.
• „Coverage” of the country’s entire Their staff was comprised of 550
territory observation and reporting sentries (some of
• Combination and deployment of the them existed only on „paper” or with
mobile and immobile sentinels according to deficiency of special and signal equipment.)
their tasks There was a mobile signal division on
• Necessary grouping of the forces and readiness with 32 signal sentries, basically
equipment to strengthen the effectiveness of for supplement of immobile sentries.
air force and air defence By the beginning of 1940’s the
• Conditions and readiness proper for completion of air defence tasks became
the military, not depending on the time of more and more difficult. Due to this fact the
the year or day effectiveness of the observation and report
• Timeliness, both in reconnaissance system, established earlier, became reduced.
and information, precision (place of service, There was a need to get the information as
number of items, flight direction, altitude, precisely and early as possible.
activities) To make the reconnaissance system
• Organisation of unified, centralised more effective and to keep its operability
leadership, based on integrated organisation was practically impossible without a newer,
and possibilities more modern device. The modern air
• Based on the district and the setting, defence practically „demanded„ the radio
from the proper level, information and alarm wireless location system. To perform the
of the population and the military tasks well it was necessary to introduce
organisations them to the domestic air defence and its
• Cooperation between the military units. The classic problem areas of air
units with similar functions, as well as with defence came into light again, such as the
the civilian defence forces. question of early reconnaissance provision,
the warning system, the continuous,
The Hungarian radar system in WW2 minimally late information, the activation of
forces and equipment, their timely
After Hungary joined the war in 1941 it deployment, the optimal division of
soon became evident that the observation resources for a successful battle.
and reporting services didn’t meet the By this time radiolocation and radars had
requirements. On March 31, 1942 a reduced a significant past, since Heinrich Hertz
air defence readiness was ordered in the proved in 1886 that electromagnetic waves
country, because it was observed that the reflect from electrically conducted materials.
front line moved from the borders and The research and experiments conducted
Soviet air attacks were not expected. It by the Germans intensified from 1935. The
didn’t prove to be the right decision, since problems of radiolocation and hence the
there was an air attack against the country establishment of the „radar” was in the
highlight of interest among researchers. In of the institute reported to the Chief of Staff
1937 the „Gema” factory manufactured the and the Minister of Defence. He
FREYA device with its range of 35-40 recommended domestic production,
kilometres. From 1938 the „Telefunken” independently from Germany. The Minister
company started experiments with of Defence, following his personal
WÜRZBURG radar family and later they discussion with Dr. Bay, asked him to work
started their production. out the theory of radar technology for the
In Hungary experiments went on from Hungarian army and to perform the basic
the 30’s. In the labs of the Tungsram dr. Bay experiments. So the military leadership
Zoltán (1900-1992) (3. Dr. Bay Zoltán was accepted the proposals and they provided
one of the prominent members of the 150000 pengő (Hungarian currency of that
Hungarian science. Before the age of 30, he time) for the project. This money was
became a teacher of theoretical physics in distributed among the members of the team
Germany. In the University of Szeged he which consisted of eight engineers, a
worked as a professor of theoretical physics physics teacher and about ten technicians,
until 1936 when he was invited to be the led by Dr. Bay. So there were enough
leader of the Tungsram laboratory. After the finances for the Hungarian far- distance
World War he became even more famous in reconnaissance locator program. (It was
the international scientific life with his based on FREYA type, its design,
experiments, such as the measurement of production and its name was first VIKTOR,
distance between the earth and the moon by then SAS. ) The manufacturing of the radar
microwave technology, etc.) soon started. The production of four pieces
There was no production of independent was planned and the Ministry of Defence
locator yet, so Hungary needed German provided 400 000 pengős. Genius professor
import and support. Bay and his team did an excellent job.
For effective air defence Germany Though they had to work with triode
manufactured locators for four different transmitting valves- they were familiar with
types of tasks, for the air attack warnings, the magnetron and klystron theory- but there
for the fire of the air defence artillery, for was not enough time and money for the
fighters fire and as equipment for aircraft domestic production. Even with these
(night fighters). We were interested in the obstacles they managed to produce excellent
whole spectrum of the system, because a devices. The practical work was performed
unified system of domestic air defence could by dr. Istvánffy Edvin, the director of
not function with the lack of any elements. It STANDARD and his team.
was probable that the expected activities- the In December 1942, with the leadership
worsening threat of air attacks against of Major General Hellebronth Vilmos, a
Hungary- would increase the importance of group of Hungarian specialists travelled to
the night time fighter activities and the Germany to study locators. The Chief of the
necessity of the effectiveness of the air Air Force reported the following after his
defence artillery. It was also connected with discussions with General Milch:
this problem that the population would be There were two basic types mentioned
alarmed and informed at the right time. which were necessary to deploy:
The Hungarian Royal Military Institute Search locator „FREYA”
wanted to introduce domestic production (reconnaissance range 120-300 kms )
and design. In the summer of 1942 the Air defence fire delivery locator „ little
institute proposed to start the experiments. WÜRZBURG„ or „WÜRZBURG-
Naturally, the institute didn’t refrain from DORA„ (working range about 30 kms)
foreign procurements, but they were Fighter detection locator „the big
considered supplementary until self-supply WÜRZBURG„ or „WÜRRBURG- RIESE„
was established. In September the director (reconnaissance range 40-75kms)
Fighter instrument „LICHTENSTEIN„ delivery locators. Naturally it did not satisfy
(recce range about 3 kms) the needs of the Hungarian Command and
the needs of other specialists. So a decision
General Hellebronth, besides was made that an independent design and
immediate Hungarian needs (1 piece of production should be introduced. The work
FREYA, 2 pieces WÜRZBURG – RIESE of the Bay team was considered very
and 4 pieces of WÜRZBURG- DORA) successful, especially with the search and
announced our further requests, which were distance recce locators. The development of
4 pieces of FREYA, 8 pieces of the other three types was also necessary. So
WÜRZBURG-RIESE and 30 pieces they decided to strengthen this area as well.
WÜRZBURG-DORA, together with the On the 5th of May, 1943 the Minister of
possibility to participate in the production of Defence tasked Dr. Jáky to lead the
locators and their parts. Mainly, the establishment and the production of the
Hungarian industry would be capable to Hungarian locator. He was subordinated
produce transmission valves and electric directly to the Deputy Minister of Defence.
parts. He was also tasked with involvement of the
With the leadership of Colonel Dr. Jáky country’s radio industry and electric
József, there was a a two-day visit at the „ engineering in the task. The Bay group’s
Luftwaffen – befelfa- haber – Mitte „ firm. deadline of experiments and development
His report was not too optimistic. His task was the end of 1943 and the mass
was to study the German radio measuring production was to start in the following year.
system, its production, and also to choose He got a definite task to involve, if
the necessary types for us, and he gave a necessary, other industries, such as the
more detailed description of the examined heavy industry and the precision mechanics
locators. The Colonel mentioned in his industry in his work, following agreements
report that the answers he got to his with the MoD. He was also responsible for
questions were often evasive or exaggerated the development, establishment of the signal
or too general. As it turned out later, the network of the locator system, as well as
parameters of the devices were quite supervision and coordination of electronics
different from those that the Germans gave. that remained from the German import. He
More or less, they gave the data found in was also responsible for the supervision of
table number 1. the project’s finances. His tasks and
These numbers were corrected later. The authority was widespread, but the
other task of Jáky and his group, besides complexity and the importance of the task
requesting equipment from General required it. This choice of the person for that
Hellenbronth, was to ask for equipment for task proved to be perfect. Choosing Jáky
domestic training. They were established provided an excellent organiser, a leader
earlier as 2 pieces of search, 2 pieces of air who had independent concepts, great
defence fire delivery and 8-10 pieces fighter knowledge for the development of the
detection locators. Hungarian locator system.
It was obvious that the Hungarian The Bay group prepared the plans for the
requests seemed exaggerated for the Hungarian FREYA and its production
Germans who needed all their locators due started in the same year. Experiments with
to the intensifying allied bombings, but if we locators for air defence artillery and fighters
wanted to obtain an effective recce system, continued. It was necessary since as it
we really needed to get serious quantity of turned out, we couldn’t expect any supplies
those. from abroad.
By the beginning of 1943 the On the 12th of February the German air
Reichslufwehr Ministry accepted an order defence attaché in Budapest informed the
for 1 search, 2 fighter detection and 4 fire 5th division of the MoD that by April 3 the
Germans will deliver 3 air defence artillery deadline of the establishment was the middle
locators, and by May one search and 2 of 1944. The MoD accepted the proposal to
fighter detection locators for the Hungarian pay the loan in parts until the end of 1945.
army. There was also an agreement about They introduced the present state of the
the training of the necessary staff. In the 1st production and the expected outcome.
phase the acquired or manufactured locators In May and in the beginning of June
were to be used as follows: Colonel Jaky reported to the Commanding
Budapest would get 4 FREYAs, Balaton Staff about the work he had done in his field
3, Miskolc 3 Győr 3 , Lispe 1, Szolnok 3 of responsibility. The group led by Dr. Bay
pieces. showed serious results both in preparation in
For night time fighter missions 5 fighter manufacturing and in experimenting. On the
cells which need 5 FREYAs and 10 one hand, with the construction their
WÜRZBURG-FRIESEs production was based on well- known ideas,
For air defence batteries are 45 on the other hand, their production
WÜRZBURG-DORAs. introduced their own independent
In the course of the following procedures that were based on their
developments the entire territory of the experiments, which caught the attention of
country was to be covered with 27-30 the Germans, too. So, for example the
FREYAs and they would also provide recce reconnaissance range of the SAS was longer
across the borders as well as deployment of than that of the FREYA. On the roof of the
further 16 fighter cells ( with 1 FREYA and building of the Egyesult Izzo they created a
2 WÜRZBURG-Rs per cell). For the new research laboratory and they managed
expected air defence batteries further 20 to achieve significant results in the
WÜTZBURG-Ds were planned. development of cathode ray valves. The
In May the Germans gave the productions of both the transmission and
Hungarians 3 WÜRZBURG-Ds for the air reception valves were at a stage of starting
defence artillery and further 2 in November. their mass production. The productions of
The system of locator qualification was the Hungarian designed locators were quick.
prepared, and it was proposed to start the The „general arraignment” drawing of the
team trial of the three devices that arrived in BORBALA artillery locator was ready.
the spring at the air defence district in Colonel Jaky tasked the GANZ and the
Budapest. GAMMA with the mechanical construction.
The STANDARD Company had already He thought it possible that the Hungarian
mentioned to the MoD that with their industry would be able to produce one piece
existing capacity they would not be able to for the beginning of the next year. The work
to manufacture the necessary devices by on the fighter guidance locator BAGOLY
1944/1945. The order of the MoD provided was also going well. The BAGOLY and the
6 million pengos for 1944 and 10 million for BORBALA were different only in their
1945. There was a need for a new factory mechanical build-up, their electric set-up
block and they asked for a loan of about 4 was almost the same. The biggest difference
million pengos from the defence cabinet. was in the size of the parabola mirror. Jaky
The factory was planned to be built in the also tasked other Hungarian firms with
surroundings of Budapest or some other big mechanical work of the fighter guidance
industrial city. As a necessity for the locator. This task was given to the WAGON
production, about a thousand workers were and GEPGYAR in Gyor and the MAVAG.
hired. The 17/B department of the MoD, In his opinion the experimental production
following the discussions with Colonel Dr. could have started in August- September.
Jaky in November decided to provide the Out of the 4 search, distance recce locators
hall of the bus garage in Kelenfold, together that were ordered at the end of 1942 1 piece
with 2 million pengos as a loan. The was produced by the 1st of July. It was
considered an experimental one and they recce and an artillery system in the country.
wanted to modify the 3 devices during the As a first step he proposed to establish 8
undergoing production based on their SAS and FREYAs. He recommended
findings. The SAS was capable for 60 kms installing the search locators in pairs, since a
of recce distance, but Jaky thought that the device of this type was able to search in 225
distance could be extended to 100 kms and degree radius. So they would be capable to
even further. As it turned out later, his do circular recce from all positions, in the
prognosis was correct. He expected the next directions of danger even overfolding could
device to be ready by September and the 4th be provided. The establishment of a position
one by the end of the year. was quite expensive, it cost about 1 and a
The Gneral Staff insisted to start the half million pengos. In perspective he
design work on the Hungarian radar TURUL planned to establish a system that would
to be fitted into fighters. It was done in the provide extension of the radio location field
PHILIPS factory, but mainly only in theory. over 100 kms, out of the borders of the
In the report it was also mentioned that if country. Besides the search devices he
they get the necessary support, mainly for recommended to deploy 2-2 pieces of
factory capacities, then the mass production BAGOLY and WURZBURG-Rs because
could be started in the second half of the from technical point they did not cost extra (
year. It is true that Colonel Jaky also 10 000 pengos ). He also planned the first
emphasized that the Hungarian factories, not phase of the deployment of the artillery fire
only the STANDARD but also the industrial delivery locators. He recommended
units producing mechanical and electric deploying 4 locator bases for the Budapest
elements, needed to be developed. He air defence fire system, 2 for Gyor, 2 to
considered that very important because in Veszprem, 2 to Szolnok, 2 to Miskolc and 2
his opinion the Germans established the to Lipse. He also worked out the
prices of locators as unrealistically high. organisation of the night time fighter
Eventually he informed the General guidance system. He needed further 18
Staff about the possibilities of the Hungarian plants. For the effective reconnaissance, fire
production (in case his suggestions were delivery and fighter location he needed 40
accepted) about the expected and necessary air defence radio measuring (LRB ) devices.
German delivery, as well as the expenses in In September 1943 the second modified
connection with the locators in the following version of the SAS locator was ready at
2 and half years. STANDARD. On the 2nd of November
The expected expenses were very high, Jaky reported to the General Staff that there
though. For 1943 it meant about 13 and half were 2 Hungarian- produced search locators
million pengos with all equipment, supplies, available. One of them was deployed at
with the locator premises, and by 1944 72 Janos Mountain. The locator was
million, by 1945 57 million pengos. experimental, further devices would be
Unfortunately, in spite of the existence of modified on its basis. It was also used for
the designs and the intentions for the training purposes at home. The place of
production there were no finances and deployment was not a proper one, so Jaky
production capacity. And as it soon turned recommended Sari to be the next place.
out there was no sufficient time, either. From there SAS was capable to lead the 3
By August Col. Jaky prepared the WURZBURG-Ds of the fire systems in
network for instalment of the search and Budapest. The Sari plant was ready by
artillery locators for the entire territory of December and started its work on the 20th.
the country, which he coordinated with the The second domestically produced locator
Commander of the Air Defence and he was designed for night time fighter
presented the plan to the General Staff. In detection. There was an argument about
his opinion it was necessary to establish a where to deploy the device. They
recommended Csorvanyos, then Felsoerdo, domestically produced SAS), 5
but the General Staff did not support these WURZBURG-DORA air defence artillery
locations. Then Terecske and Jaszkiser came fire delivery (all German products) and 2
up as a solution, so taking into consideration WURZBURG- RIESE fighter guidance
the aspect of time the decision was made for (also German ) locators. One piece of the
the second location. That locator and the search locators was planned to be used for
plant started to work in the beginning of long-distance recce, 2 for fighter guidance, 1
1944. The SAS worked perfectly and in for air defence artillery fire delivery. So the
good conditions it was able to detect targets army had a system of devices that could
in the range of even 500 kms. By the end of have provided the basis for the
the year the „air defence radio measurement establishment of the modern air defence. But
artillery/ fighter” plant was in working order the chance was lost due to the events of the
(its device was the FREYA from German war and partially, of the German occupation.
import) in Dunapentele. Colonel Jaky On the 23rd of November both General
proposed a „fly in „ of the locator and its Zoltan Harmos and Colonel Jaky asked for
deployment from the 1st of December. the extension of the work of the Bay team
The signal network of the plant was also until the 31st of December 1944. In their
arranged. According to the decision of the opinion, at least one more year was
General Staff the locator in Dunapentele was neccessary to continue and end the research,
also used for long-distance recce, its trials and planning. As a result, General
„switching on „ was allowed only in Harmos said the following: „ of the 3 locator
exceptional situations. For fighter guidance types we would have our own by 1944”. So
the 2 available WURZBURG-Rs were the industrial capacity is capable to satisfy
deployed in the same district. In December the need for the production of 300 locators.
the Germans gave the next 2 FREYAs to In his opinion it was impossible to rely on
Hungary. the German import, since they delivered
But by the end of 1943 the plants only in only 6 radars so far. Besides, he also
Sari and Dunapentele had worked. In emphasized that the devices planned and
October Colonel Jaky ordered an produced by the Bay team, such as the
establishment of a furtherLRB/V plant near transmitting valve, the reinforcing valve,
Jaszkiser. He wanted to deploy there the diode, the low performance vibration valve,
SAS, the second Hungarian search and long- cathode ray valve were excellent.
distance recce locator for fighter guidance. The reason for the extension request was
The production of the Hungarian that there were still a lot of unsolved
BORBALA was also in process at matters. These were the problems in
STANDARD but the production of the 3 disturbance protection, the friendly aircraft
locators stopped with the German detection system and the wave ranged
occupation. But according to the devices. He emphasized the unique credits
experiments the locators performed their of Dr. Bay and since the professor did not
tasks perfectly, with great mobility, since accept any payment, not even money for his
their equipment was mounted on the 36M expenses, he proposed to give him an award.
air defence cannon. The radars built into From the 2nd half of 1943 the Germans
fighters and aircraft were only in the phase started to plan the deployment of many
of design or in the beginning of production. recce and fighter detection locators to
In 1943 the entire domestic air defence Hungary, but for their own purposes. The
observation and warning system got under Hungarian recommendation for common use
the authority of „Air Defence Forces of these devices was probably not accepted.
Command”. By the end of the year the air After the German occupation on the 19th
defence had - though not all devices were of March, the Bay team was involved, after
deployed - 4 search (two of which were working on the development of the
Hungarian locator, in the preparation for the processing and forwarding of the above-
mass production of a universal German mentioned elements. Continuous
military microwave valve. Colonel Jaky modernisation is necessary in this area as
Jozsef, the genius organiser, lost his life well.
during the air attacks against Hungary.
The Hungarian civilian and military References
leaders tried to supply the Hungarian Dr. Barczy Zoltán: A magyar légvédelmi
military with proper equipment according to
tüzérség 1943-ban a radar bevezetése idején,
the given circumstances and opportunities.
This proved to be successful. It was only in Hadtörténeti Közlemények, 1977/2 222-241.
the middle of the next decade that Hungary oldal
and its army had the chance to obtain Dr. Barczy Zoltán: A magyar légvédelmi
excellent equipment like this. tüzérség fejlődése a Horthy korszakban,
Conclusion Tanulmánygyűjtemény, Hadtörténeti
It would also be useful in our days if the Levéltár
„small states „ paid more attention to this Bay Zoltán: Az élet erősebb, Debrecen–
system of organisation and equipment so
Budapest, 1990.
effective for security. Even though there is
little chance for a traditional war in Europe, Bay Zoltán: Válogatott tanulmányok,
but the events of 9/11 demonstrated that Gondolat, Budapest, 1988.
there are new dimensions of air threats. Bekker Cajus: Augen durch Nacht und
Hungary and the Hungarian defence Nebel (Die Radar-story), Oldenburg, 1958.
forces must have the following systems for M. Szabó Miklós: A magyar királyi honvéd
the proper security and defence: légierő a második világháborúban, Zrínyi
1. A basic radar system that
Kiadó, Budapest, 1987.
continuously provides the minimally needed
coverage. This can be achieved by the Móra László: Radar harcászati alkalmazása,
deployment and usage of 3 high Honvéd, 1947/6 21-33. oldal
performance NATO radars. Nagyváradi Sándor–M. Szabó Miklós–
2. A mobile radar system. With its help Winkler László: Fejezetek a Magyar
it would be possible to extend the radio katonai repülés történetéből, Műszaki
location area in a given direction, with given
könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1986.
requirements.
Pataky Iván–Rozsos László–Sárhidai
3. The most critical part of the system
Gyula: Légiháború Magyarország felett, Zrínyi
is the lack of air reconnaissance. The
Hungarian Defence Forces do not possess kiadó, 1992.
their own satellite system; there are no Sifter László: Magyar radarkészülékek,
AWACS, not even „balloon” radar. The Honvéd 1948/1. 48-49. oldal
fulfilment of these necessities is not Dr. Varga József: A légvédelmi tüzérség
expected in the near future. története a kezdetektől a második
4. The database of the civilian air traffic világháború végéig, Magyar Honvédség
control has been used but the recce of the air
Légvédelmi Rakéta- és Tüzérfőnökség
combat equipment cannot be based on a
secondary system whose identification kiadványa, 1996.
capability, disturbance defence is highly
limited from the military point of view, not
to mention the fixed location (Korishegy,
Puspokladany, Ferihegy )
5. The HDF has the command point and
the system necessary for the data collection,

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