ALFONSO C. DACUMOS v. SANDIGANBAYAN LINDA CADIAO-PALACIOS vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 95000, Apr 16, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner is a revenue examiner of the BIR. He offered to settle the tax
liability of R. Revilla Interiors amounting to P73,307.31 by pulling out its
assessment papers from the office of the BIR Commissioner and
procuring a tax clearance. For such service, he would require a fee of
P35,000.00 which was later reduced to P30,000.00. Samia, the
manager of the firm, pretended to go along with him but reported the
matter to NBI which arranged an entrapment.
An entrapment operation ensued on October 28, 1986, near the Rizal
Cafe in Makati. Samia, meeting with the petitioner there, told him he
had only P1,000.00 but he would deliver P9,000.00 to him that same
evening at his residence and pay the balance of P20,000.00 in
November. The petitioner wrote his address on the back of a receipt,
which he gave Samia. Samia tendered the white envelope containing
P1,000.00 previously dusted with fluorescent powder, but the
petitioner accepted it only when they had left the eatery and he was
nearing his car outside. He put the envelope in his pocket. The NBI
agents closed in, identified themselves, and placed him under
arrest. The petitioner's reaction was to draw out the envelope and
throw it on the ground. One of the agents retrieved it. At the NBI
headquarters, the petitioner's hands were found positive for
fluorescent powder, as so were the envelope itself and the bills inside.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is liable for direct bribery?
HELD:
Yes. His charge that he was "framed" because Samia resented his
refusal to be bribed is not convincing. It is belied by his proven
acts. The implausibility of his promises does not mean they were not
made or that they did not appear to be credible, coming as they did
from one with his long experience in the BIR and appeared to know his
way around. The Court finds it especially remarkable that he met Samia
at a private place instead of his office at the BIR, considering that they
were supposed to be discussing official business and it was Samia who
he says was requesting his assistance.
While protesting his innocence, the petitioner has failed to rebut the
evidence of the prosecution that has sufficiently established his guilt
and shifted the burden of proof to him. He has not discharged that
burden by just contending that the decision is based on "speculations,
conjectures and assumptions" and that the conclusions drawn
therefrom are "mistaken, absurd and fallacious." The thrust of his
defense is that the respondent court should have believed him instead
of the People, but he has not convinced us that the trial court has
erred. In short, he has failed to prove, in this petition
for certiorari where only questions of law may be raised, that he is
entitled to a reversal of his conviction.
The petitioner seems to be suggesting in the conclusion to his petition
that judgment was rendered against him because he happens to be a
tax collector, whom he says "history, even from Biblical times, depicts
... as the most unpopular and vilified adjunct of any society." The plea
does not persuade. It suffices to observe that he was convicted not
because he is a tax collector but because he accepted a bribe.
G.R. No. 168544 March 31, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was the mayor of the Municipality of Culasi, Province of
Antique from July 1998 to June 2001. During her administration, there
were infrastructure projects that were initiated during the incumbency
of her predecessor, then Mayor Alpas, which remained partially unpaid.
These included the Janlagasi Diversion Dam, San Luis Diversion Dam,
Caridad-Bagacay Road, and San Juan-Tumao Road which were
contracted by L.S. Gamotin Construction (L.S. Gamotin) with a total
project cost of ₱2 million. For the said projects, the municipality owed
the contractor ₱791,047.00.
Relative to the aforesaid projects, petitioner, together with
Venturanza, then the Municipal Security Officer, was indicted in an
Information for violation of Section 3(b), R.A. No. 3019. The information
states that the accused Mayor is the approving authority of contracts
involving the Municipality and she demanded money from Grace
Superficial of L.S. Gamotin Construction, which undertook the
construction of government projects which amounted to TWO MILLION
PESOS (₱2,000,000.00).
On April 16, 2002, both accused voluntarily surrendered and, upon
motion, posted a reduced bail bond of ₱15,000.00 each. They were
subsequently arraigned wherein they both pleaded "Not Guilty." Trial
thereafter ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented its sole witness—the private
complainant herself, Grace M. Superficial (Superficial). She alleges that
on behalf of L.S. Gamotin, she (Superficial) took charge of the collection
of the unpaid billings of the municipality. Prior to the full payment of
the municipality’s obligation, petitioner demanded money from her,
under threat that the final payment would not be released unless she
complied. Acceding to petitioner’s demand, she gave the former’s
husband ₱15,000.00. Sometime in January 1999, petitioner demanded
from Superficial the full payment of her total "kickback" which should
be 10% of the project cost. Superficial thus proposed that she would
deliver a check in lieu of cash, to which petitioner agreed.
On January 25, 1999, petitioner gave to Neil Superficial, then an
incumbent councilor and the husband of private complainant, three
checks representing the final payment for the construction projects.
The following day, Venturanza picked up the check promised by
Superficial as payment for the 10% "kickback." In accordance with
petitioner’s instruction, the check was made payable to Venturanza in
the amount of ₱162,400.00. The check was encashed by Venturanza at
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), San Jose, Antique Branch, which
is about 90-100 kilometers away from Culasi; and the amount was
received by Venturanza.12 It was Venturanza also who deposited the
three checks, representing the full payment of the project, to the
account of Superficial.131avvphi1
Emmanuel Palacios likewise denied having received ₱15,000.00 from
Superficial. He claimed that he was financially stable, being a Forester;
the manager of a 200-hectare agricultural land and of a medium piggery
establishment; and the owner of a residential house valued at no less
than ₱6 million, a parcel of land and other properties.22 He also claimed
that the institution of the criminal case was ill-motivated as Neil
Superficial, in fact, initiated a complaint against him for frustrated
murder.23
Sandiganbayan: convicted both accused of the crime charged.
The Sandiganbayan concluded that the following circumstances
established the guilt of both petitioner and Venturanza: 1) that the
municipality had outstanding obligations with L.S. Gamotin for the
construction of several public works that were completed in 1998; 2)
that petitioner was the person authorized to effect the payment of said
obligations which, in fact, she did; 3) that Venturanza was a trusted
employee of petitioner as he was in charge of the security of the
municipal buildings and personnel as well as the adjoining offices; 4)
that Venturanza received the three LBP checks representing the full
payment to L.S. Gamotin and the LBP check bearing the amount of
₱162,400.00; 5) that Venturanza went to San Jose, Antique on January
26, 1999 to deposit the three checks and encashed the ₱162,400.00
check; 6) that Venturanza did not receive the above amount by virtue
of a loan agreement with Superficial because there was no evidence to
prove it; 7) that Venturanza used the vehicle of the municipality to
encash the check in San Jose, Antique; and 8) that the amount of
₱15,000.00 initially given to Emmanuel Palacios and the ₱162,400.00
appearing on the check corresponded to the 10% of the total project
cost after deducting the 10% VAT and ₱10,000.00 Engineering
Supervision Fee.27
In arriving at this conclusion, the Sandiganbayan gave credence to the
testimony of the lone witness for the prosecution. It added that
contrary to the claim of the defense, no ill motive could be attributed
to her in testifying against petitioner and Venturanza. This is especially
true in the case of the latter, as she was related to him. In finding both
accused guilty, the Sandiganbayan concluded that, together, they
conspired in committing the offense charged.
Aggrieved, petitioner and Venturanza separately appealed their
conviction. The latter petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168548 which
was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated September 26, 2005. The
former, on the other hand, is now before us, mainly challenging the
legal and factual bases of the Sandiganbayan decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is liable under Section 3(b) of RA 3019?
HELD:
Yes. To be convicted of violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the following elements: 1) the
offender is a public officer; 2) who requested or received a gift, a
present, a share, a percentage, or benefit; 3) on behalf of the offender
or any other person; 4) in connection with a contract or transaction
with the government; 5) in which the public officer, in an official
capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.
At the time material to the case, petitioner was the mayor of the
Municipality of Culasi, Antique. As mayor, her signature, both in the
vouchers and in the checks issued by the municipality, was necessary
to effect payment to contractors (for government projects).29 Since the
case involved the collection by L.S. Gamotin of the municipality’s
outstanding obligation to the former, the right of petitioner to
intervene in her official capacity is undisputed. Therefore, elements 1,
4 and 5 of the offense are present.
Section 3(b) penalizes three distinct acts – 1) demanding or requesting;
2) receiving; or 3) demanding, requesting and receiving – any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other
person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
government and any other party, wherein a public officer in an official
capacity has to intervene under the law. Each of these modes of
committing the offense is distinct and different from one another.
Proof of existence of any of them suffices to warrant conviction.
Notwithstanding her claim that the prosecution failed to present a
special power of attorney to show Superficial’s authority to represent
L.S. Gamotin, petitioner admitted that it was Superficial (or her
husband) who received the three checks representing full payment of
the municipality’s obligation. Moreover, although the checks were
issued to L.S. Gamotin, the deposit slip showed that they were
deposited by Venturanza to the account of Superficial. Thus, contrary
to petitioner’s contention, the evidence clearly shows that Superficial
was not a stranger to the transaction between the municipality and L.S.
Gamotin, for she, in fact, played an important role in the receipt of the
final payment of the government’s obligation. It was not, therefore,
impossible for petitioner to have demanded the "grease money" from
Superficial, for after all, it was the latter who received the proceeds of
the final payment. This was bolstered by the fact that the ₱162,400.00
check in the name of Venturanza was encashed by him on the same day
that he deposited the three checks. If indeed the amount given to
Venturanza was in the form of a loan to finance his trip to Australia,
why was the grant of the loan dependent on the receipt of the final
payment to L.S. Gamotin?40 We cannot fathom how Superficial could
lend money out of the proceeds of the checks which admittedly were
received by her not in her own capacity but for and on behalf of another
person (L.S. Gamotin). The only plausible explanation is that the
amount given to Venturanza was "grease money" taken from the
proceeds of the checks issued by the municipality.
In holding that petitioner and Venturanza conspired in committing the
offense, we agree with the Sandiganbayan that the circumstances
enumerated above point to the culpability of the accused. Admittedly,
there was no direct evidence showing that petitioner demanded and
received the money but the testimony of Superficial, corroborated by
the documentary evidence and the admissions of the witnesses for the
defense, sufficiently establishes that Venturanza received the money
upon orders of petitioner.
MADELEINE MENDOZA-ONG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 146368-69 October 23, 2003
FACTS:
Sometime in February 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Laoang,
Northern Samar, passed Resolution No. 93-132,5authorizing the
municipality to borrow heavy equipment from the Philippine Army’s
53rd Engineering Battalion, to be utilized in the improvement of
Laoang’s Bus Terminal. Resolution No. 93-132 likewise mandated the
municipal government to shoulder the expenses for fuel, oil, and the
subsistence allowances of the heavy equipment operators for the
duration of the project.
Allegedly, however, the borrowed Army equipment was diverted by the
petitioner, who was then the town mayor of Laoang, to develop some
of her private properties. A concerned citizen and ex-member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Laoang, filed a complaint against petitioner and
nine (9) other municipal officers7 with the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB), Visayas, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
Acting on the complaint, Graft Investigation Officer Alfonso S.
Sarmiento of the OMB ordered herein petitioner and her co-accused to
submit their respective counter-affidavits and other controverting
evidence. Thereafter, in a Resolution8 dated August 16, 1995,
investigator Sarmiento recommended the filing of the appropriate
criminal action against petitioner for violation of Sections 3(c) and (e)
of R.A. 3019, as amended.9 Despite strenuous opposition and
objections by the defense, on August 1, 1997, two informations were
filed against her at the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with the Sandiganbayan but was
denied. Petitioner duly moved for reconsideration but this was likewise
denied by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely erred or gravely abused its
discretion in denying the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner,
particularly on the ground that the information in Criminal Case No.
23848 does not constitute an offense?
HELD:
Based on the foregoing, the elements of the offense charged in the
assailed information are as follows: (1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) he has secured or obtained, or would secure or obtain, for a person
any government permit or license; (3) he directly or indirectly
requested or received from said person any gift, present or other
pecuniary or material benefit for himself or for another; and (4) he
requested or received the gift, present or other pecuniary or material
benefit in consideration for help given or to be given.16
In the instant case, we find that the information in Crim. Case No. 23848
alleged that: (1) accused Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public officer,
being then the Municipal Mayor of Laoang, (2) committed the crime
charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage
of her official functions, (3) did request or receive directly or indirectly,
a gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit in the form of five
drums of diesel fuel, for herself or for another, from spouses Mr. and
Mrs. Chupo Lao, persons for whom accused Mendoza-Ong, (4) has
secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, a Municipal Government
permit or license anent the operation of the bus company, JB Lines,
owned by said spouses, in consideration for help given or to be given
by the accused. After considering thoroughly this averment as
formulated by the prosecution, we are not prepared to say that the
impugned information omitted an element needed to adequately
charge a violation of Section 3(c) of R.A. 3019.
In contrast, Section 3 (c) earlier quoted in the present case applies
regardless of whether the gift’s value is manifestly excessive or not, and
regardless of the occasion. What is important here, in our view, is
whether the gift is received in consideration for help given or to be
given by the public officer. The value of the gift is not mentioned at all
as an essential element of the offense charged under Section 3 (c), and
there appears no need to require the prosecution to specify such value
in order to comply with the requirements of showing a prima
facie case.
ARTURO A. MEJORADA vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. L-51065-72 June 30, 1987
FACTS:
Eight informations were filed by the Provincial Fiscal against the
petitioner and jointly tried before the Sandiganbayan.
Arturo A. Mejorada was a public officer who was first employed as a
temporary skilled laborer in the Bureau of Public Works on March 16,
1947, and then as right-of-way agent in the Office of the Highway
District Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila, from February, 1974 up to
December 31, 1978. As a right-of-way agent, his main duty was to
negotiate with property owners affected by highway constructions or
improvements for the purpose of compensating them for the damages
incurred by said owners.
Among those whose lots and improvements were affected by the
widening of the proposed Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. 2nd IBRD
Project, at Binangonan, Rizal were Isagani de Leon, Isaac Carlos,
Napoleon Maybituin, Dominga Villaroza, Florentino de la Cruz, Cipriano
Aran, Celestina S. Mallari and Rodolfo Rivera, all residents of Mambog,
Binangonan, Rizal.
Sometime in October or November 1977, petitioner contacted the
aforenamed persons and informed them that he could work out their
claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements
affected by the widening of said highway. In the process, Mejorada
required the claimants to sign blank copies of the "Sworn Statement on
the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties" and "Agreement
to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct improvements" pertinent to
their claims. The claimants complied without bothering to find out what
the documents were all about as they were only interested in the
payment of damages.
In said "Sworn Statements" and "Agreements to Demolish", the value
of the respective properties of the claimants were made to appear very
much higher than the actual value claimed by them. Likewise, the said
"Agreements to Demolish" reflected the value of the improvements as
per assessor" which on the average was only P2,000.00 lower than the
value declared by the owners in their sworn statements. The value as
per assessor was, in turn, supported by the Declarations of Real
Property in the names of the claimants containing an assessed value
exactly the same as that stated in the Agreements to Demolish "as per
assessor", except the claims of De la Cruz and Aran where there is only
a difference of P400.00 and P200.00, respectively. It turned out,
however, that said Declarations of Property are not really intended for
the claimants as they were registered in the names of other persons,
thus showing that they were all falsified.
A few months after processing the claims, accused accompanied the
claimants to the Office of the Highway District Engineer at the
provincial capitol of Pasig, Metro Manila, to receive payments and
personally assisted the claimants in signing the vouchers and encashing
the checks by certifying as to their Identities and guaranteeing
payment.
Right after the claimants had received the proceeds of their checks,
accused accompanied them to his car which was parked nearby where
they were divested of the amounts paid to them leaving only the sum
of P1,000.00 to each, except Isaac Carlos to whom P5,000.00 was left,
explaining to them that there were many who would share in said
amounts. All the claimants were helpless to complaint because they
were afraid of the accused and his armed companion.
The claimants, through the assistance of counsel, filed their complaints
with the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Pasig, Metro Manila, narrating in
their supporting sworn statements what they later testified to in court.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the essential elements constituting the offense
penalized by section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act have been clearly and
convincingly proven by the prosecution;
HELD:
The first element, therefore, of Section 3 (e) is that the accused must
be a public officer. This, the informations did not fail to allege.
Second, that such public officer caused undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions.
Petitioner denies that there was injury or damage caused the
Government because the payments were allegedly made on the basis
of a document solely made by the Highway District Engineer to which
petitioner had no hand in preparing. The fact, however, is that the
government suffered undue injury as a result of the petitioner's having
inflated the true claims of complainants which became the basis of the
report submitted by the Highway District Engineer to the Regional
Director of the Department of Highways and which eventually became
the basis of payment. His contention that he had no participation is
belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-agent, his duty was precisely to
negotiate with property owners who are affected by highway
constructions for the purpose of compensating them.
On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them consists in
their being divested of a large proportion of their claims and receiving
payment in an amount even lower than the actual damage they
incurred. They were deprived of the just compensation to which they
are entitled.
Third, the injury to any party, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference was done through
manifest, partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner argues that for the third element to be present, the alleged
injury or damage to the complainants and the government must have
been caused by the public officer in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions and inasmuch as when the damage
was caused to the complainants, he was no longer discharging his
official administrative functions, therefore, he is not liable for the
offense charged.
The argument is devoid of merit. The Sandiganbayan established the
fact that the petitioner took advantage of his position as a right-of-way-
agent by making the claimants sign the aforementioned agreements to
demolish and sworn statements which contained falsified declarations
of the value of the improvements and lots. There was evident bad faith
on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the values of the true
claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of the
amounts due them.
In view of the above holding. We also dispose of the fourth issue which
relates to the allegation that petitioner cannot be convicted for a
violation of the Anti-Graft Law because the evidence adduced by the
prosecution is not the violation of Section 3 (e) but the crime of
robbery. Contrary to the petitioner averment. We find no variance
between the offense charged in the information and the offense
proved. The prosecution was able to establish through the
corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented how through
evident bad faith, petitioner caused damage to the claimants and the
Government. The manner by which the petitioner divested the private
parties of the compensation they received was part of' the scheme
which commenced when the petitioner approached the claimants and
informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the
values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of
the Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. The evidence presented by the
prosecution clearly establish a violation of Section 3(e).
ROLANDO E. SISON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 170339, 170398-403 March 9, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner was the municipal mayor of Calintaan, Occidental Mindoro,
a fourth-class municipality, from July 1, 1992 to June 30, 1995, while
Rigoberto de Jesus was the municipal treasurer. On July 18, 1994, state
auditor Elsa E. Pajayon conducted a post-audit investigation which
revealed that during petitioners incumbency, no public bidding was
conducted for the purchase of a Toyota Land Cruiser, 119 bags of
Fortune cement, an electric generator set, certain construction
materials, two Desert Dueler tires, and a computer and its accessories.
Pajayon also found out that there were irregularities in the documents
supporting the acquisitions.
Thus, on June 4, 1998, petitioner and de Jesus were indicted before the
Sandiganbayan for seven counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act (RA) 3019. Petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the Informations.
Accused de Jesus has remained at large.
During the trial, he admitted that indeed, no public bidding was
conducted insofar as the purchases he was being accused of were
concerned. When asked how the purchases were made, he answered
that they were done through personal canvass. Accordingly, no public
bidding could be conducted because all the dealers of the items were
based in Manila. It was therefore useless to invite bidders since nobody
would bid anyway.
The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty as charged.As such, he was
meted in each Information an imprisonment term ranging from six
years and one month as minimum to ten years as maximum and
perpetual disqualification from holding public office. The
Sandiganbayan also ordered that an alias warrant of arrest be issued
against accused de Jesus.
On appeal, the Court dismissed the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019?
HELD:
To be found guilty under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the following
elements must concur: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the act
was done in the discharge of the public officers official, administrative
or judicial functions; (3) the act was done through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (4) the public
officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
It is undisputed that the first two elements are present in the case at
bar.
The third element of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed in
three ways, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. Proof ofanyof these three in connection with
the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is enough to
convict.
Partiality is synonymous with bias which excites a disposition to see and
report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are. Bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will;
it partakes of the nature of fraud. Gross negligence has been so defined
as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property.
In the instant case, petitioner was grossly negligent in all the purchases
that were made under his watch. Petitioner's admission that the
canvass sheets sent out by de Jesus to the suppliers already contained
his signatures because he pre-signed these forms only proved his utter
disregard of the consequences of his actions. Petitioner also admitted
that he knew the provisions of RA 7160 on personal canvass but he did
not follow the law because he was merely following the practice of his
predecessors. This was an admission of a mindless disregard for the law
in a tradition of illegality. This is totally unacceptable, considering that
as municipal mayor, petitioner ought to implement the law to the
letter. As local chief executive, he should have been the first to follow
the law and see to it that it was followed by his constituency. Sadly,
however, he was the first to break it.
Petitioner should have complied with the requirements laid down by
RA 7160 on personal canvass, no matter how strict they may have been.
Dura lex sed lex. The law is difficult but it is the law. These requirements
are not empty words but were specifically crafted to ensure
transparency in the acquisition of government supplies, especially since
no public bidding is involved in personal canvass. Truly, the
requirement that the canvass and awarding of supplies be made by a
collegial body assures the general public that despotic, irregular or
unlawful transactions do not occur. It also guarantees that no personal
preference is given to any supplier and that the government is given
the best possible price for its procurements.
The fourth element is likewise present. While it is true that the
prosecution was not able to prove any undue injury to the government
as a result of the purchases, it should be noted that there are two ways
by which Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be violated the first, by causing
undue injury to any party, including the government, or the second, by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference. Although neither mode constitutes a distinct offense, an
accused may be charged under either mode or both. The use of the
disjunctive or connotes that the two modes need not be present at the
same time. In other words, the presence of one would suffice for
conviction.
POLITICAL LAW: unwarranted benefit, advantage, preference
The word unwarranted means lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason.
Advantage means a more favorable or improved position or condition;
benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action.
Preference signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice
or estimation above another.
In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the
accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the
exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions. Petitioner
did just that. The fact that he repeatedly failed to follow the
requirements of RA 7160 on personal canvass proves that unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference was given to the winning suppliers.
These suppliers were awarded the procurement contract without the
benefit of a fair system in determining the best possible price for the
government. The private suppliers, which were all personally chosen by
respondent, were able to profit from the transactions without showing
proof that their prices were the most beneficial to the government.
The petitioner is guilty of seven counts of violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act (RA) 3019.
GENEROSO TRIESTE, SR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION)
G.R. No. 70332-43 November 13, 1986
FACTS:
The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against
the herein petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law
are all similarly worded as the information presented in Criminal Case
No. 6856 which is hereunder quoted:
Trieste was the mayor of Numancia, Aklan. In 1980, during his term, the
Municipality of Numancia purchased construction materials from
Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation. Trieste was allegedly
the president of said corporation. Trieste was then sued for allegedly
violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act particularly for
willfully and unlawfully having financial or pecuniary interest in a
business, contract or transaction in connection with which said accused
intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is
prohibited by law from having any interest.
Trieste, in defense, said that he already divested his interest from the
corporation when he took his office as mayor; that he sold his shares to
his sister; he presented evidence to that effect. The Solicitor General
doubted said sale because it was not registered in the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Further, the advertisement of Trigen in the local
rotary club.
Sandiganbayan: Convicted the petitioner in all the twelve (12) criminal
cases.
ISSUE:
Whether the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers
and other supporting papers constitute a violation of the provisions of
Section 3 (h) of Rep. Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act?
Was damage or prejudice, as an element of the offense under Section
3 (h) of the said law, caused to the Government or the Municipality of
Numancia as a result of the contracts in question and as a corollary
thereto, was undue advantage and gained by the transacting
corporation?
HELD:
No. Prosecution failed to prove charges; evidence discloses absence of
bidding and award. The prosecution's lone witness, Treasurer Aniceto
Vega, testified that there never was a public bidding conducted
because all the transactions were made by direct purchases from
Trigen.

The elements essential in the commission of the crime are:

a) The public officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a business,
contract or transaction;
b) In connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity.
Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of one will
not warrant conviction.

Evidence showed that there actually was no bidding conducted. In the

absence of public bidding, how can one ever imagine that Trieste has
awarded the supply and delivery of construction materials to Trigen?

By signing the vouchers for the purchase and payment of construction

materials, Trieste also cannot be said to have ‘intervened’ in
contemplation of RA 3019. The vouchers were signed AFTER payment
had already been made, such payment having been authorized by the
municipal treasurer.

What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual

intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary
interest in order that liability may attach. The official need not dispose
his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the
firm in its contract with the office. For the law aims to prevent the don-
tenant use of influence, authority and power.

There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as

Mayor, used his influence, power, and authority in having the
transactions given to Trigen. He didn't ask anyone-neither Treasurer
Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter, to get the construction
materials from Trigen.

Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction

Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the

municipality, which by the way, has been dealing with it even before
petitioner had assumed the mayorship on March 3, 1980. Personal
canvasses conducted found that Trigen's offer was the lowest, most
reasonable, and advantageous to the municipality.