Laurel v.

Abrogar
G.R. No. 155076. January 13, 2009.
En Banc

PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS:
Respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc. In the
Amended Information, Laurel was charged with the crime of
theft for allegedly taking, using and stealing the PLDT’s
international calls and business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service on or about
September 10 to 19, 1999 in Makati City by conducting ISR or
International Simple Resale, which is a method of routing and
completing international long distance calls using lines, cables,
antennae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to
the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where
the call is destined.

PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of

providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal
properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of
theft.

However, petitioner Laurel claims that a telephone call is

a conversation on the phone or a communication carried out
using the telephone. It is not synonymous to electric current or
impulses. Hence, it may not be considered as personal
property susceptible of appropriation. PLDT does not produce
or generate phone calls. It only provides the facilities or
services for the transmission and switching of the calls. He
also insists that “business” is not personal property. Since
services of PLDT cannot be considered as “property,” the same
may not be subject of theft.

ISUUE:
Whether or not the stealing of business or service of
providing international phone calls from PLDT is a personal
property hence, may be subject of theft.

HELD:
The business of providing telecommunication or
telephone service is a personal property which can be the
object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

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 However, the amended information describes the offense
inaccurately by including in the crime of theft the long
distance international calls as belonging to PLDT.

Though it was conceded that in making the international

phone calls, the human voice is converted into electrical
energy impulses or electric current which are transmitted to
the party called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical
energy. It was also held in the assailed Decision that intangible
property such as electrical energy is capable of appropriation
because it may be taken and carried away. Electricity is
therefore a personal property under Article 416 (3) of the Civil
Code, which enumerates the “forces of nature which are
brought under control by science.

It cannot be said that such international long distance

calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT since the
latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT
merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits
said calls using its complex communications infrastructure
and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of the said telephone
calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls
were taken without its consent. It is the use of these
communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that
constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of
the telephone services and business.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Motion for Reconsideration granted, assailed judgment
reconsidered and set aside.

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 Bicerra v. Teneza
No. L-16218. November 29, 1962.

PONENTE: MAKALINTAL, J.

FACTS:
A complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance
alleging that the defendants Tomasa Teneza and Benjamin
Barbosa forcibly demolished the house of the plaintiffs worth
₱200.00; claiming to be the owners thereof. As a result of
defendants’ refusal to restore the house or to deliver the
materials to the plaintiffs, the latter asked for damages and be
declared the owners of the house in question and/or the
materials that resulted in its dismantling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the demolished house is considered as
real property.

HELD:
No, because a demolished house ceased to exist as a real
property. A house is classified as immovable property by
reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built (Art. 415,
par.1, Civil Code). This classification hold true regardless of
the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to a
different owner. But once the house is demolished, as in this
case, it ceases to exist as such hence its character as an
immovable likewise ceases.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The order appealed from is affirmed. The appeal having
been admitted in forma pauperis, no costs are adjudged.

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 Punsalan, Jr. v. Vda. De Lacsamana
No. L-55729. March 28, 1983
First Division

PONENTE: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

FACTS:
It appears that the petitioner, Antonio Punsalan, Jr. was
the former registered owner of a parcel of land situated in
Bamban, Tarlac. The petitioner mortgaged the said land to
respondent PNB (Tarlac Branch), but since the petitioner failed
to pay the stipulated amount, the property was foreclosed. The
respondent became the highest bidder in the foreclosure
proceedings.

In the meantime, in 1947, while the petitioner was

allegedly in the possession of the said property, he secured a
permit from the Municipal Mayor and right then constructed a
warehouse.

On July 26, 1978, a Deed of Sale was executed between

the respondent PNB (Tarlac Branch) and respondent Lacsamana
over the property. The amended contract particularly includes
the warehouse and improvement thereon. Respondent
Lacsamana secured title over the property in her name as well
as separate tax declarations.

Petitioner then commenced a suit for “Annulment of

Deed of Sale with Damages” against the respondents. The
petitioner impugns the validity of the sale of the building as
embodied in the Amended Deed of Sale.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the warehouse incorporated to the land
which was subjected to real estate mortgage is an immovable
property.

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HELD:
Yes. The warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is
an immovable or real property as provided in Article 415 (1) of
the Civil Code. Buildings are always immovable under the
Code. A building treated separately from the land on which it
is stood is immovable property and the mere fact that the
parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it separate and
apart from the land on which it stood in no wise change its
character as immovable property.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied without
prejudice to the refilling of the case by petitioner Antonio
Punsalan, Jr. in the proper forum. Costs against petitioner.

Tsai v. Court of Appeals

G.R. Nos. 120098- 120109. October 2, 2001
Second Division

PONENTE: QUISUMBING, J.

FACTS:
Ever Textile Mills, Inc., (EVERTEX) obtained a loan from
the petitioner PBcom, secured by a deed of Real and Chattel
Mortgage over the lot where the factory stands, and chattels
located therein as enumerated in a schedule attached to the
mortgaged contract. PBcom again granted the second loan to
EVERTEX which was secured by a Chattel Mortgaged over
personal properties enumerated in the list attached thereto.

After the date of execution of the second mortgage,

EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipment.

However, because EVERTEX failed to meet its obligation

to PBCOM, the latter commenced extrajudicial proceedings
against the petitioner EVERTEX.

In the first public auction, PBcom emerged as the highest

bidder and it consolidated its ownership over the lot and all
the properties in it. It leased the entire factory premises to
Ruby L. Tsai and later sold the factory, lock, stock and barrel,
including the contested machines.

EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale,

reconveyance, and damages with the Regional Trial Court
against PBcom.
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 Further, EVERTEX averred that machineries and
equipment were not included in the Real and Chattel Mortgage.

The RTC held that the lease and sale of said personal
properties were irregular and illegal since these are not
included in the schedules attached to the mortgaged contracts.

Dissatisfied with the ruling of the Regional Trial Court,

PBcom and Tsai appealed to the Court of Appeals wherein the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

They again filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration on

the said Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the nature of the disputed machineries
are considered as immovable properties.

HELD:
Petitioners contend that the nature of the disputed
machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on
the real property mortgaged by EVERTEX to PBcom, make them
ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New
Civil Code. This assertion, however, do not settle the issue.
Mere nuts and bolts do not foreclose the controversy. We have
to look at the parties’ intent. While it is true that the converted
properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of
Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties therein
gives us the contrary indication. In the case at bar, both the
trial and the appellate courts reached the same finding that the
true intention of PBcom and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat
the machinery and equipment as chattels.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CV
No. 32986 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Petitioners
Philippine Bank of Communications and Ruby L. Tsai are
hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally Ever Textile Mills,
Inc., the following: (1) ₱20,000.00 per month, as compensation
for the use and possession of the properties in question from
November 1986 until subject personal properties are restored
to respondent corporation; (2) ₱100,00.00 by way of exemplary
damages, and (3) ₱50,00.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses. Costs against petitioners.
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 Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals
No. L-50466. May 31, 1982.
Second Division

PONENTE: AQUINO, J.

FACTS:
Caltex loaned machines and equipment to gas station
operators under an appropriate lease agreement or receipt.
The machines and equipment consists of underground tanks,
elevated tank, elevated water tanks, water tanks, gasoline
pumps, computing pumps, water pumps, car washer, car
hoists, truck hoists, air compressors and tireflators.

The city assessor of Pasay City characterized the said

items of gas station equipment and machinery as taxable
realty. However, the city board of tax appeals ruled that they
are personalty. The assessor appealed to the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals.

The Board held in its decision on June 3, 1974 that the

definitions of real property and personal property in articles
415 and 416 of the Civil Code are not applicable to this case .
Instead, the said machines and equipment are real property
within the meaning of Real Property Tax Code and Presidential
Decree No. 464.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the pieces of gas station equipment and
machinery installed by Caltex (Phil.) Inc. are real property
subject to realty tax.

HELD:
Yes. The said equipment and machinery, as
appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by
Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which
fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for
without them the gas station would be useless, and which have
been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or
embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery
within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real
Property Tax Code.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the questioned decisions and resolution of
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals are affirmed. The
p0etition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.

Meralco Securities Industrial Corporation v. Central Board of

Assessment Appeals
No. L-46245. May 31, 1982
Second Division

PONENTE: AQUINO, J.

FACTS:
Pursuant to a pipeline concession issued under the
Petroleum Act of 1049, R.A. No. 387, the Meralco Securities
installed from Batangas to Manila a pipeline system consisting
of cylindrical steel pipes joined together and buried not less
than one meter below the surface long the shoulder of public
way.

The pipes are embedded in the soil and are firmly and
solidly welded together so as to preclude breakage or damage
thereto and prevent leakage or seepage of the oil. The valves
are welded to the pipes so as to make the pipeline system one
single piece of property from end to end.

In order to repair, replace, remove or transfer segments

of the pipeline, the pipes have to be cold-cut by means of a
rotary hard-metal pipe-cutter after digging or excavating them
out of the ground where they are buried. In points where the
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pipeline traversed rivers or creeks, the pipes were laid beneath
the bed thereof. Hence, the pipelines are permanently attached
to the land.

The provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as

real property and issued a Tax Declaration containing the
assessed values of portions of the pipeline.

Meralco Securities appealed the assessment to the Board

of Assessment Appeals of Laguna but they upheld the
assessments.

The Central Board of Assessment Appeals confirmed the

ruling of the provincial assessor and the provincial board of
assessment appeals that Meralco Securities’ pipeline is subject
to realty tax.

However, Meralco Securities insists that its pipeline is not

subject to realty tax because it is not real property within the
meaning of Article 415.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the pipelines of Meralco Securities are
subject to realty tax.

HELD:
Yes, the pipelines of Meralco Securities are real property
subject to realty tax.

Their contention that its pipeline is not subject to realty

tax because it is not a real property within the meaning of
Article 415 of the Civil Code is not sustainable. Section 2 of the
Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due “on real
property including land, buildings, machinery, and other
improvements.” It is incontestable that the pipeline of Meralco
Securities does not fall within any of the classes enumerated in
Section 3 of the Assessment Law and Section 40 of the Real
Property Tax Code.

Article 415 (1) and (3) provides that real property may
consist of constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil and
everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in
such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without
breaking the material or deterioration of the object.

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DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution are
affirmed. The petition is dismissed. No costs.

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Alejo

G.R. No. 141970. September 10, 2001
Third Division

PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:
On November 21, 1995 and January 30, 1996, Spouses
Raul and Cristina Acampados obtained loans from petitioner
and security for the payment of these credit accommodations,
the Acampados executed in favor of petitioner a Real estate
Mortgage and an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage over a
parcel of land registered in their names.

On June 3, 1996, respondent Sy Tan Se filed a Complaint

for Declaration of Nullity of TCT against Spouses Acampado.
However, the petitioner bank was not made a party to the civil
case.
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 On April 19, 1997, extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
over the mortgaged property were initiated against the
spouses for the default in the payment of their loan.

On June 17, 1997, and auction sale was conducted by the

sheriff and the petitioner submitted the highest and winning
bid. A Certificate of Sale was then issued in its favor.

When the petitioner was about to execute an Affidavit of

Consolidation after the lapsed of the period of redemption, the
petitioner was informed of the existence of the decision in the
aforementioned Civil Case declaring that the TCT in the name
of defendant Raul Acampado is null and void.

The petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition

for Annulment of the RTC Decision. However, the petition was
outrightly dismissed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for annulment of judgment is
the proper remedy available to petitioner under the
circumstances.

Whether or not the judgment of the trial court should be

annulled.

HELD:
First Issue: Proper Remedy

Yes. The petition for annulment before the Court of

Appeals was the only effective remedy to the case. It was
precisely alleged that the private respondent Sy Tan Se
purposely concealed the case by excluding the petitioner as a
defendant in the civil case even of the latter was an
indispensable party. Without due process, the former intended
to deprive the petitioner of the latter’s duly registered
property right.

As to the contention of the private respondent that there

are three different remedies available but they were not
resorted to by the petitioner is not tenable.

Petition for relief is not the proper remedy of the

petitioner since it was never a party to the case.

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 An action for quieting the title is likewise improper since
it is only filed when there is a cloud on the title to real
property or any interest therein. The subject judgment cannot
be considered as a cloud on petitioner’s title or interest over
the real property covered by the TCT, which does not have a
semblance of being a title.

Lastly, the petitioner cannot intervene to the civil case

wherein they were deprived of the knowledge about the
pendency of the case.

Second Issue: Lack of Jurisdiction

Yes. Although a mortgaged affects the land itself and not

merely the TCT covering it, the cancellation of the TCT and the
mortgage annotation exposed petitioner to real prejudice,
because its rights over the mortgaged property would no
longer be known and respected by third parties. Necessarily,
therefore, the nullification of TCT adversely affected its
property rights, considering that a real mortgaged is a real
right and a real property by itself.

Hence, it is clear that the absence of indispensable parties

renders all subsequent actuations of the court null and void.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 4930-V-
41319 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

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 Case Briefs in Property

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Laurel v. Abrogar 1-2

G.R. No. 155076

Bicerra v. Teneza 3
No. L-16218

Punsalan, Jr. v. Vda. De Lacsamana 4

No. L-55729

Tsai v. Court of Appeals 5-6

G.R. Nos. 120098 -120109

Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Central Board of

7
Assessment Appeals
No. L-50466

Meralco Securities Industrial Corporation

8-9
v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals
No. L-46245

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Alejo

10-11
G.R. No. 141970

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Submitted by: Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon
L01

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