University of the Immaculate Conception vs Sec of Labor

GR 151379

Facts:

This case stemmed from the collective bargaining negotiations between petitioner University of Immaculate Concepcion,
Inc. (UNIVERSITY) and respondent The UIC Teaching and Non- Teaching Personnel and Employees Union (UNION). The
UNION, as the certified bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of the UNIVERSITY, submitted its collective
bargaining proposals to the latter on February 16, 1994. However, one item was left unresolved and this was the inclusion
or exclusion of some positions in the scope of the bargaining unit.

The UNION it filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and ULP. During the thirty (30) day cooling-off
period, two union members were dismissed by petitioner. Consequently, the UNION went on strike.

On January 23, 1995, the then Secretary of Labor, Ma. Nieves R. Confessor, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the
labor dispute.

On March 10, 1995, the UNION filed another notice of strike, this time citing as a reason the UNIVERSITY’s termination of
the individual respondents. The UNION alleged that the UNIVERSITY’s act of terminating the individual respondents is in
violation of the Order of the Secretary of Labor.

On March 28, 1995, the Secretary of Labor issued another Order reiterating the directives contained in the January 23,
1995 Order. Hence, the UNIVERSITY was directed to reinstate the individual respondents under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to the labor dispute.

The UNIVERSITY filed a MR. In the Order dated August 18, 1995, then Acting Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes denied the MR,
but modified the two previous Orders by adding:

Anent the Union’s Motion, we find that superseding circumstances would not warrant the physical reinstatement of the
twelve (12) terminated employees.

Hence, they are hereby ordered placed under payroll reinstatement until the validity of their termination is finally resolved.

Issue: WON payroll reinstatement, instead of actual reinstatement, is proper.

Held:

With respect to the Secretary’s Order allowing payroll reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement for the individual
respondents herein, an amendment to the previous Orders issued by her office, the same is usually not allowed. Article
263(g) of the Labor Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return to work and all employers
must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The phrase “under
the same terms and conditions” makes it clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. This is consistent with the idea that
any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be detrimental to the national interest.

In ordering payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement, then Acting Secretary of Labor Jose S. Brillantes said:
Anent the Union’s Motion, we find that superseding circumstances would not warrant the physical reinstatement of the
twelve (12) terminated employees. Hence, they are hereby ordered placed under payroll reinstatement until the validity of
their termination is finally resolved.

As an exception to the rule, payroll reinstatement must rest on special circumstances that render actual reinstatement
impracticable or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purposes of the law.

The “superseding circumstances” mentioned by the Acting Secretary of Labor no doubt refer to the final decision of the
panel of arbitrators as to the confidential nature of the positions of the twelve private respondents, thereby rendering
their actual and physical reinstatement impracticable and more likely to exacerbate the situation. The payroll
reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement ordered in these cases, therefore, appears justified as an exception to
the rule until the validity of their termination is finally resolved. This Court sees no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Acting Secretary of Labor in ordering the same. Furthermore, the issue has not been raised by any party in this case.

Petition denied.

G.R. No. L-49046 January 26, 1988

SATURNO A. VICTORIA, petitioner, vs. HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, DEPUTY MINISTER, and FAR EAST BROADCASTING
COMPANY, INC.,respondents.

Facts:

Victoria was employed in March 1956 by Far East Broadcasting Company as a radio transmitter operator. Sometime in July
1971, he and his co-workers organized the Far East Broadcasting FEBC Employees Association. After registering their
association with the then Department of Labor, they demanded recognition of said association by the company but the latter
refused on the ground that being a non-profit, non-stock, non-commercial and religious corporation, it is not covered by RA
875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act, the labor law enforced at that time.

Several conciliation meetings were held at the Department of Labor and in those meetings, the Director of Labor Relations
Edmundo Cabal advised the union members that the company could not be forced to recognize them or to bargain
collectively with them because it is a non-profit, non-commercial and religious organization. Notwithstanding such advice, the
union members led by Saturno Victoria as its president, declared a strike and picketed the company's premises in September
1972 for the purpose of seeking recognition of the labor union.

As a countermeasure, the company filed a case for damages with preliminary injunction against the strikers before the CFI.
Said court issued an injunction enjoining the three-day-old strike staged against the company. The complaint was later
amended seeking to declare the strike illegal.

Upon the declaration of martial law on September 21, 1972 and the promulgation of PD 21 creating the NLRC, the ad
hoc NLRC took cognizance of the strike, both cases for reinstatement due to the company's refusal to accept the union's offer
to return to work during the pendency of the case in the CFI.

In December 1972, Arbitrator Aguas rendered a joint decision in the two cases holding for the union without prejudice to
whatever decision the CFI may promulgate.
The decision of the arbitrator was successively appealed to the ad hoc NLRC, the Secretary of Labor and the Office of the
President, and was affirmed in all instances.

In April 1975, the CFI rendered judgment declaring the strike illegal inasmuch as it was for the purpose of compelling the
company to recognize their labor union which could not be legally done because the plaintiffs were not covered by Republic
Act 875

By virtue of the above decision, the company notified Saturno Victoria that he is dismissed effective April 26, 1975.
Thereupon, he filed a case before the NLRC, Regional Branch IV against the company alleging violation of article 267 LC which
requires clearance from the Secretary of Labor for every shutdown of business establishments or dismissal of employees.
Labor Arbiter Lorenzo rendered a decision in petitioner's favor declaring the dismissal to be illegal, thereby ordering
reinstatement with full backwages. On appeal, the arbiter's decision was affirmed by the NLRC. But when the commission's
decision was in turn appealed to the Secretary of Labor, it was set aside.

It held that since the strike was declared illegal, respondent acted in good faith when it dispensed with the services of
complainant. But clearance was not necessary for a mere report of the termination of services was sufficient. For failure of
respondent to file the necessary report and based on equitable considerations, complainant should be granted separation pay
equivalent to one-half month salary for every year of service.

Issue: W/N a clearance from the Secretary of Labor is still necessary before the petitioner could be dismissed.

Held: No

Ratio:

The substantive law on the matter enforced during the time of petitioner's dismissal was Article 267 LC. Article 267 reads:

No employer that has no collective bargaining agreement may shut down his establishment or dismiss or terminate the
service of regular employees with at least one [1] year of service except managerial employees as defined in this book without
previous written clearance from the Secretary of Labor.

Petitioner maintains that the abovecited provision is very clear. It does not make any distinction as to the ground for
dismissal. Whether or not the dismissal sought by the employer company is for cause, it is imperative that the company must
apply for a clearance from the Secretary of Labor.

In a recent case penned by Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento promulgated in June 1987, we had occasion to rule that the purpose
in requiring a prior clearance from the Secretary of Labor in cases of shutdown or dismissal of employees, is to afford the
Secretary ample opportunity to examine and determine the reasonableness of the request.

Technically speaking, no clearance was obtained by private respondent from the then Secretary of Labor, the last step
towards full compliance with the requirements of law on the matter of dismissal of employees. However, the rationale behind
the clearance requirement was fully met. The Secretary of Labor was apprised of private respondent's intention to terminate
the services of petitioner. This in effect is an application for clearance to dismiss petitioner from employment. The affirmance
of the restrictive condition in the dispositive portion of the labor arbiter's decision by the Secretary of Labor and the Office of
the President of the Philippines, signifies a grant of authority to dismiss petitioner in case the strike is declared illegal by the
CFI. Consequently and as correctly stated by the Solicitor General, private respondent acted in good faith when it terminated
the employment of petitioner upon a declaration of illegality of the strike by the CFI. Moreover, the then Secretary of Labor
manifested his conformity to the dismissal, not once, but twice. In this regard, the mandatory rule on clearance need not be
applied.

The strike staged by the union in 1972 was a futile move. The law then enforced, Republic Act 875 specifically excluded
respondent company from its coverage. Even if the parties had gone to court to compel recognition, no positive relief could
have been obtained since the same was not sanctioned by law. Because of this, there was no necessity on the part of private
respondent to show specific acts of petitioner during the strike to justify his dismissal.

This is a matter of responsibility and of answerability. Petitioner as a union leader, must see to it that the policies and
activities of the union in the conduct of labor relations are within the precepts of law and any deviation from the legal
boundaries shall be imputable to the leader.

Petitioner should have known and it was his duty to impart this imputed knowledge to the members of the union that
employees and laborers in non- profit organizations are not covered by the provisions of the Industrial Peace Act and the
Court of Industrial Relations [in the case at bar, the Court of First Instance] has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions of labor
unions or organizations of said non-profit organizations for certification as the exclusive bargaining representatives of said
employees and laborers.

We further agree with the Acting Secretary of Labor that what was required in the case of petitioner's dismissal was only a
report as provided under Section 11 [f] of Rule XIV of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code which provides:

Every employer shall submit a report to the Regional Office in accordance with the form presented by the Department on the
following instances of termination of employment, suspension, lay-off or shutdown which may be effected by the employer
without prior clearance within five [5] days thereafter:

xxx xxx xxx

[f] All other terminations of employment, suspension, lay-offs or shutdowns, not otherwise specified in this and in the
immediately preceding sections.

Manila Electric v. Quisumbing

G.R. No. 127598 February 22, 2000

Facts:

Members of the Private respondent union were dissatisfied with the terms of a CBA with petitioner. The parties in
this case were ordered by the Sec. of Labor to execute a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) wherein.The CBA
allowed for the increase in the wages of the employees concerned. The petitioner argues that if such increase were
allowed, it would pass off such to the consumers.

Issue: W/N matters of salary are part of management prerogative

RULING: Yes. There is no need to consult the Secretary of Labor in cases involving contracting out for 6 months or
more as it is part of management prerogative. However, a line must be drawn with respect to management
prerogatives on business operations per se and those which affect the rights of the workers. Employers must see to it
that that employees are properly informed of its decisions to attain harmonious labor relations and enlighten the
worker as to their rights.

The contracting out business or services is an exercise of business judgment if it is for the promotion of efficiency
and attainment of economy. Management must be motivated by good faith and contracting out should not be done to
circumvent the law. Provided there was no malice or that it was not done arbitrarily, the courts will not interfere with
the exercise of this judgment.

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

Doctrine: Social Justice

LAUREL, J.:

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act
No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the
use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced
and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to
pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well.

Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth
Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:

1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in
the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means
of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice

5. Caltex Filipino Manager and Supervisors Association v. CIR, 44 SCRA 350

FACTS: The Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors' Association is a labor organization of Filipino managers
supervisors in Caltex (Philippines), Inc., respondent Company in this proceeding. On February 8, 1965 the
Association sent a set of proposals to the Company wherein one of the demands was the recognition of the
Association as the duly authorized bargaining agency for managers and supervisors in the Company. To this the
Company countered stating that a distinction exists between representatives of management and individuals
employed as supervisors and that it is Company's belief that managerial employees are not qualified for membership
in a labor organization; hence, it is digested that the Association institute a certification proceeding so as to remove
any question with regard to position titles that should be included in the bargaining unit. The Association felt
disinclined to follow the suggestion of the Company and so on February 22, 1965 the Company initiated a
certification proceeding docketed as Case 1484- MC. On March 8, 1965 the Association filed notice to strike. On
the basis of the strike notice filed on March 8, 1965 and in view of acts committed by the Company which the
Association considered as constituting unfair labor practice, the Association struck on April 22, 1965. The
Company, filed Case No. 1484-MC(1) praying among others, to declare the strike of Caltex Filipino Managers and
Supervisors Association “illegal”.. The Association's charge for unfair labor practices against the Company and its
officials on September 10, 1965, in Case No. 4344- ULP against Caltex (Philippines), Inc., W. E. Menefee and B.F.
Edwards. According to the latter, the Company and some of its officials, including B.F. Edwards, inquired into the
organization of the Association and he manifested his antagonism to it and its President; that another Company
official, W.E. Menefee issued a statement of policy designed to discourage employees and supervisors from joining
labor organizations; that the Company refused to bargain although the Association commands majority
representation; that due to the steps taken by the Company to destroy the Association or discourage its members
from continuing their union membership, the Association was forced to file a strike notice; that on April 22, 1965 it
declared a strike; and that during the strike the Company and its officers continued their efforts to weaken the filed
with respondent court denied the charges of unfair labor practice.

ISSUE: (a) Whether or not the CIR has jurisdiction over Case No. 1484-MC(1); (b) Whether or not the strike staged
by the Association on April 22, 1965 is illegal and, incident thereto, whether respondent court correctly terminated
the employee status of Jose Mapa, Dominador Mangalino and Herminigildo Mandanas and reprimanded and
admonished the other officers of the Association; and (c) Whether or not respondent court correctly absolved the
respondents in Case No. 4344-ULP from the unfair labor practice charge.

HELD: Respondent's court's jurisdiction over Case No. 1484-MC(1) has to be tested by the allegations, reading of
said pleading shows that the same is for injunctive relief under Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875 (Magna Carta
of Labor); for contempt, obviously pursuant to See, 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 in conjunction with Sec. 3 (b)
of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and for forfeiture of the employee status of the strikers by virtue of their
participation in what the Company considered as an "illegal strike." It is well known that the scheme in Republic
Act No. 875 for achieving industrial peace rests essentially on a free and private agreement between the employer
and his employees as to the terms and conditions under which the employer is to give work and the employees are
to furnish labor, unhampered as far as possible by judicial or administrative intervention. On this premise the
lawmaking body has virtually prohibited the issuance of injunctive relief involving or growing out of labor disputes.
The prohibition to issue labor injunctions is designed to give labor a comparable bargaining power with capital and
must be liberally construed to that end (U.S. vs. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 79 F. Supp. 485, Certiorari
denied, 69 S. Ct. 137, 335 U.S. 867, cause remanded on other grounds, 174 F. 2nd 160, 85 U.S. App. D.C.,
certiorari denied 70 S. Ct. 140, 338 U.S. 872, 94 L. Ed. 535). It is said that the prohibition creates substantive and
not purely procedural law. (Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board, 49 F. Supp. 886).
Within the purview of our ruling, speaking through Justice Labrador, in Social Security Employees Association
(PAFLU), et al. vs. The Hon. Edilberto Soriano, et al. (G.R. No. L-20100, July 16, 1964, 11 SCRA 518, 520), there
can be no injunction issued against any strike except in only one instance, that is, when a labor dispute arises in an
industry indispensable to the national interest and such dispute is certified by the President of the Philippines to the
Court of Industrial Relations in compliance with Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 875. As a corollary to this, an
injunction in an uncertified case must be based on the strict requirement See. 9 (d) of Republic Act No. 875; the
purpose of such injunction is not to enjoin the strike itself, but only unlawful activities. To the extent, then, that the
Company sought injunctive relief under Sec. 9(d) of Republic Act No.875, respondent court had jurisdiction over
the Company's "Urgent Petition" dated April 26, 1965. We now come to the issue as to whether the strike staged by
the Association on April 22, 1965 is illegal. To begin with, we view the return-to-work agreement of May 30, 1965
as in the nature of a partial compromise between the parties and, more important, a labor contract; consequently, in
the latter aspect the same "must yield to the common good" (Art. 1700, Civil Code of the Philippines) and "(I)n case
of doubt ... shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer" (Art. 1702, ibid). To our mind
when the Company unqualifiedly bound itself in the return-to-work agreement that all employees will be taken back
"with the same employee status prior to April 22, 1965," the Company thereby made manifest its intention and
conformity not to proceed with Case No. 1484-MC, (c) relating the illegality of the strike incident. For while it is
true that there is a reservation in the return-to-work agreement as follows: 6. The parties agree that all Court cases
now pending shall continue, including CIR Case No. 1484-MC. we think the same is to be construed bearing in
mind the conduct and intention of the parties. The failure to mention Case No. 1484-MC(1) while specifically
mentioning Case No. 1484-MC, in our opinion, bars the Company from proceeding with the former especially in the
light of the additional specific stipulation that the strikers would be taken back with the same employee status prior
to the strike on April 22, 1965. The records disclose further that, according to Atty. Domingo E. de Lara when he
testified on October 9, 1965, and this is not seriously disputed by private respondents, the purpose of Paragraph 10
of the return-to-work agreement was, to quote in part from this witness, "to secure the tenure of employees after the
returnto-work agreement considering that as I understand there were demotions and suspensions of one or two
employees during the strike and, moreover, there was this incident Case No. 1484-MC(1)" (see Brief for the Petition
pp. 41-42). To borrow the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Citizens Labor Union Pandacan Chapter vs. Standard
Vacuum Oil Company (G.R. No. L-7478, May 6, 1955), in so far as the illegality of the strike is concerned in this
proceeding and in the light of the records. ... the matter had become moot. The parties had both abandoned their
original positions and come to a virtual compromise and agreed to resume unconditionally their former relations. To
proceed with the declaration of illegality would not only breach this understanding, freely arrived at, but to
unnecessarily revive animosities to the prejudice of industrial peace. In addition, it is clear that the strike of the
Association was declared not just for the purpose of gaining recognition but also for bargaining in bad faith on the
part of the Company and by reason of unfair labor practices committed by its officials. Significantly, in the
voluntary return-to-work agreement entered into between the Company and the Association, thereby ending the
strike, the Company agreed to recognize for membership in the Association the position titles mentioned in Annex
"B" of said agreement. The guilty conduct of the Company before, during after the strike of April 22, 1965 cannot
escape the Court's attention. It will suffice to mention typical instances by way of illustration. Long prior to the
strike, the Company had interferred with the Cebu Supervisors' Union by enticing Mapa into leaving the Union
under the guise of promotion in Manila; shortly before the strike, B.R. Edwards, Manager-Operations, had inquired
into the formation and organization of the petitioner Association in this case. During the strike, in addition to the
culpable acts of the Company already narrated above, due significance must be given to the inclusion initially of J.J.
Mapa and A. Buenaventura, the Association's President and Vice-President respectively, in 1965, in two coercion
cases filed at that time and their subsequent elimination from the charges the initiative of the Company after the
settlement of strike; the cutting off of telephone facilities extended Association members in the refinery; and the use
of a member of the Association to spy for the company. The discriminatory acts practiced by the Company against
active unionists after the strike furnish further evidence that Company committed unfair labor practices as charged.