#1. LIBAN vs.
GORDON The purpose of the constitutional prohibition is to prevent granting of
G.R. No. 175352
January 18, 2011
FACTS:
This case resolves the Decision promulgated by the Court which held
that respondent Gordon did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he
accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors as such
office is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of
the prohibition in Sec 13, Art 6 of the Constitution. The decision
further declared void the PNRC Charter insofar as it creates the PNRC
as a private corporation and consequently ruled that it should
incorporate under the Corporaion Code and register with the SEC if it
wants to be a private corporation.
Gordon raised that the pronouncement as to the validity of RA 95, the
PNRC Charter, should be considered obiter insofar as the
constitutionality was not raised by the parties.
PNRC, in its MPR, maintains that the constitutionality of the charter be
sustained as such was not an issue in the case. It further mentioned
that the structure of PNRC is sui generis, that it is an entity separate
and independent of government control yet it does not qualify as
strictly private in character.
In this regard, the Court reconsidered its pronouncements. It correctly
pointed out that the issue of constitutionality is not the lis mota of the
case. Therefore, not being the lis mota, the rule is that the Court
should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the
parties.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times.
The passage of these laws notwithstanding the proscription on the
creation of private corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC
is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation.
A closer look at the nature of PNRC in terms of not just structure, but
history, public service and official status merits the contention that its
structure is indeed sui generis.
The provisions of RA 95 show the historical background and legal basis
of its creation that it is a voluntary organization impressed with public
interest. National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the
public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field.
They are a protected component of the Red Cross movement under
the articles of the First Geneva Convention which focuses especially in
times of armed conflict. These national societies are therefore
organizations that are directly regulated by international humanitarian
law. They are recognized at the International level, an element which
distinguish it from NGOs and other forms of humanitarian response.
The auxiliary status of a Red Cross Society means that it is at one and
the same time a private institution and a public service organization
because the very nature of its work implies a link with the State.
It is in recognition of this sui generis character that the Charter of
PNRC has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment
under the 1935 C and during the effectivity of the 1973 and 1987 C.
the corporation is created by the State as the latters own agency or
special privileges to certain groups but based on the position paper
submitted by the PNRC, it can be seen that its Charter does not come
within the spirit of the provision, as it does not grant special privileges
to a particular individual, family or group, but creates an entity that
strives to serve the common good.
By requiring PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code, the
Decision lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under IHL and as an
auxiliary of the State. To be recognized in the international committee,
PNRC must have an autonomous status and carry out its humanitarian
mission in a neutral and impartial manner.
Thus, the Decision correctly allowing respondent to hold his position
as Chairman concurrently while serving as a Senator is a conclusion
which does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation
within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and
auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance
with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of
a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of
the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the
parties. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void
must therefore stay.
#2. BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHIL. vs. COA
G.R. No. 177131
September 25, 2007
FACTS:
The case arose when the COA issued Resolution No 00-11 where it
sought to audit the BSP and classifies the BSP for purposes of audit
supervision as among the government corporations belonging to the
Educational, Social, Scientific, Civic and Research Sector.
The BSP sought reconsideration in a letter stating its position that it is
not subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction not being a GOCC.
However, it was argued by the COA General Counsel that the ruling in
another case which spoke of the character of BSP as a government-
controlled corporation was never superseded by RA 7278 which came
later than the case, an amendatory act to the law creating the BSP
which eliminated government participation in the National Executive
Board. And although an attached agency of the DECS, it does not
change its nature and therefore must necessarily be subject to COA
audit jurisdiction.
BSP then filed for a PetRev with Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO but
was denied by COA.
The BSP reiterates its stand that the public character of its purpose
and functions do not place it within the ambit of the audit jurisdiction
of the COA as it lacks the government ownership or control that the
Constitution requires before an entity may be subject of said
jurisdiction.
The COA then cited from jurisprudence that, “The true criterion,
therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or private is
found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If
instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions,
then that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private.”
ISSUE: Whether BSP falls under the COA’s audit jurisdiction
HELD: Yes.
BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA’s audit
jurisdiction.
The BSP Charter created the BSP as a public corporation, amended by
PD 460 and further amended by CA 111 by strengthening the
volunteer and democratic character of the BSP and reducing
government representation in its governing body.
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it
was created in order to implement a State policy declared in Art 2, Sec
13 of the Constitution. Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a
special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional
mandate, comes within the class of public corporations defined by Art
44(2) of the Civil Code and governed by the law which creates it.
Under the Administrative Code, BSP’s classification is an attached
agency of the DECS which enjoys operational autonomy. However, this
characteristic does not make the attached chartered agency a private
corporation covered by the constitutional proscription.
The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or
instrumentality with juridical personality, which does not fall within
the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16,
notwithstanding the amendments to its charter. Not all corporations,
which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be
considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class
of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known
as public corporations. These corporations are treated by law as
agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject
to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to
different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or
constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative
relationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices.
Even though the amended BSP charter did away with most of the
governmental presence in the BSP Board, this was done to more
strongly promote the BSPs objectives, which were not supported
under Presidential Decree No. 460. The BSP objectives, as pointed out
earlier, are consistent with the public purpose of the promotion of the
well-being of the youth, the future leaders of the country. The
amendments were not done with the view of changing the character
of the BSP into a privatized corporation. The BSP remains an agency
attached to a department of the government, the DECS, and it was not
at all stripped of its public character.
Historically, therefore, the BSP had been subjected to government
audit in so far as public funds had been infused thereto. However, this
practice should not preclude the exercise of the audit jurisdiction of
COA
#3. PSPCA vs COA
G.R. No. 169752
September 25, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity by virtue of Act 1285
by the Philippine Commission. At the time it was created, petitioner
was composed of animal aficionados and propagandists, the objective
of which is to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or
the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands.
On December 2003, an audit team from COA visited the office of the
petitioner to conduct an audit survey but petitioner demurred on the
ground that it was a private entity not under the jurisdiction of the
COA.
Petitioner explained that:
1. there was no law under which it may be organized or incorporated at the
time of its inception;
2. there is nowhere in its charter that it is indicated as a public corporation;
3. if it were a government body, there would have been no need for the State
to grant it tax exemptions;
4. employees are under the SSS instead of GSIS;
5. petitioner does not receive any form of financial assistance from the
government;
6. CA 148 stripped petitioner of its arresting powers and the collection for
violation of the laws accrue to the Municipality where the offense was
committed;
7. no gov’t appointee sits in the BoT;
8. nothing in its charter shows that petitioner is subject to approval or control
by any gov’t agency
9. the Committee on Animal Welfare includes members from both private and
the public sectors
Respondents contended that petitioner is a body politic created by a
special legislation and endowed with a government purpose.
Therefore, the COA may audit the financial activities of the latter.
Respondents contended further that:
1. the test to determine whether an entity is a government corporation lies in
the manner of its creation
2. petitioner exercises sovereign powers, that is to enforce the laws for the
protection and welfare of animals; thus, it is deemed to be a government
instrumentality as defined under the Admin Code
3. Office of the President exercises supervision or control over the petitioner
4. The requirement under its special charter to render a report to the Civil
Governor whose functions have been inherited by the OP reflects the
nature of the petitioner as a government instrumentality
5. Despite passage of the Corporation Code, the law creating petitioner had
not been abolished
6. RA 8485 designates petitioner as a member of its Committee on Animal
Welfare
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is a government agency and may therefore
be subject to audit by the COA
HELD: Petitioner is a quasi-public corporation.
This class of corporations are private corporations that render public
service, supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary objectives.
While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they
are required by law to discharge functions for the public benefit.
The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is
public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the
corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as
the latters own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its
governmental functions, then that corporation is considered public;
otherwise, it is private.
Notes:
- Charter Test: [T]he test to determine whether a corporation is
government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is
it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function,
or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those
with special charters are government corporations subject to its
provisions
#4. THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN
G.R. No. 183752
October 14, 2008
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the
petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them
the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the
slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation
thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from
signing the same.
ISSUE: Whether the creation of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE)
as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not
recognized by law
HELD: Yes.
The BJE is to be granted the authority and jurisdiction over the
Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro by the MOA
and is to be vested the status of an associated state or at any rate, a
status closely approximating it. This concept of association is not
recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized
under our laws as having an associative relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond
anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as
a state.
The BJE is a far more powerful
entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally
different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention,[154] namely, a permanent population, a defined territory,
a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present
Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of
the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict
with the Constitution and the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that [t]he creation of
the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority
of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region.
#5. BASCO vs PAGCOR
G.R. No. 91649
May 14, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioners sought to annul PD 1869, the PAGCOR Charter because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order and because:
(1) It constitutes a waiver of the right of the Manila City government to impose
taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law,
(2) For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the
law contravenes the constitutionally enshrined principle of local authority;
(3) It violates the protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes
PAGCOR;
(4) It violates the avowed the trend of the Cory government away from the
monopolist
Amended petition: contrary to the declared national policy of the
“new restored democracy” and the people’s will as expressed in the
1987 Constitution. The decree has a gambling objective and contrary
to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Art. 2, Section 1 of Art 8 and Section 3(2)
of Art 14.
PAGCOR was created to regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise permitted by law. It also gives
territorial jurisdiction and is the third largest source of government
revenue, next to BIR and BOC.
ISSUE: Whether the PAGCOR charter is valid
HELD: Yes.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally
prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean the
Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.
The charer is beneficial not only to the Government but to society in
general. It provides funds for social impact projects and subjected
gambling to the close scrutiny regulation, supervision and control ot
eh government thereby minimizing if not eradicating the evil practices
and corruption that go with gambling. Public welfare then lies at the
bottom of PD 1869.
IN CONTRAVENTION OF MANILA’S LOCAL AUTONOMY
The City of Manila being a mere corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. Absent in its charter, such right cannot be assumed. It
must first yield to a legal act. As the Charter of Manila City is subject to
control by the Congress, municipal corporations are mere creations by
Congress.
PAGCOR is a GOCC with an original charter and thus, local
governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. Otherwise, operations might be burdened and impeded
or subjected to control by a mere local government.
Citing Justice Holmes, he said that “it can be agreed that no state or
political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a
ways as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities or
to seriously burden it is the accomplishment.”
LOCAL AUTONOMY CLAUSE
The power to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations
which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an
operative law until amended, repealed or revoked, its exemption
clause remains as an exemption to the exercise of the power of local
governments to impose taxes and fees.
The principle of local autonomy simply means decentralization ; it
does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an
“imperium in imperio.”
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable and arbitrary. A law does not
operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to
the Equal Protection Clause. The mere fact that some gambling
activities are legalized under certain conditions while the others are
prohibited does not render the applicable laws unconstitutional.
Gambling may have been the antecedent but certainly not necessarily
the cause. For the same consequence could have been preceded by an
overdose of food, drink, exercise, work and even sex.
#6. LINA vs PAÑO
G.R. No. 129093
August 30, 2001
FACTS:
This petition seeks the reversal of the decision enjoining petitioners
from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508.
Respondent Tony Clavento was appointed agent by the PCSO to install
a terminal for the operation of lotto. Mayor Calixto Cataquiz of San
Pedro, Laguna, denied to issue a mayor’s permit on the ground of an
ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which prohibits
any form of gambling, especially lotto and jueteng.
Calvento filed for declaratory relief w/ prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and TRO. He also sought to require Mayor Calixto to issue
the necessary permit and to order the annulment of said ordinance.
Respondent Judge, Francisco Paño, ruled in favour of Clavento, which
gave birth to this petition.
Petitioners contend that the resolution is a valid policy declaration of
the Provincial Government of Laguna and is likewise a valid exercise of
its police power under the General Welfare Clause of RA 7160. They
also maintained that respondents lotto operation is illegal because no
prior consultations and approval by the LGU were sought before it was
implemented, which is contrary to said law.
Respondent argues that the questioned resolution is a curtailment of
the power of the national legislature which itself had declared lotto as
legal and permitted its operations in the country. As for the
consultations and approval, respondent contends that this is not
mandatory since such requirement is merely a declaration of policy
and not a self-executing provision of the LGC. He also stated that the
operation of the lotto system is legal as it had been granted a
franchise by Congress.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the ordinance is valid
2. Whether prior consultations and approval are needed before a
lotto system can be operated in a LGU
HELD:
1. The ordinance is a mere policy statement on the part of the local
council, which is not self-executing. The Petitioners themselves
admitted that it is a policy declaration. As such and as an exercise
of to express contrary views, the resolution is valid. However, this
freedom does not mean that LGUs may enact ordinances that go
against those duly enacted by Congress. The resolution in this case
COULD NOT and SHOULD NOT be interpreted as a measure or
ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the
national government thru RA 1169, as amended by BP 42, the law
which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the
lotteries.
The power of local government units to legislate and enact
ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming
from Congress, the municipal governments being agents of the
national government. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. What
national legislature expressly allows by law, a provincial board
may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution
simply means decentralization. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state or an imperium in
imperio.
Hence, Mayor Calixto cannot avail of the ordinance as a
justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said
resolution is nothing but an expression of the local legislative unit
concerned.
2. No. From the careful reading of the provisions regarding
consultations, it is the finding of the court that such only apply to
national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented
in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a
project of the national government, but of a charitable institution,
the PCSO.
The projects and programs referred to are those whose effects are
enumerated under Section 26 of the LGC. To wit:
(1) may cause pollution,
(2) may bring about climatic change,
(3) may cause depletion of non-renewable resources
(4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover;
(5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the
planet; and
(6) other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be
implemented.
Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the
introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna.
Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by
petitioners is clearly an afterthought on their part. There is no
indication in the letter of Mayor Cataquiz that this was one of the
reasons for his refusal to issue a permit. That refusal was
predicated solely but erroneously on the provisions of
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna.
#7. LIMBONA vs MANGELIN
G.R. No. 80391
February 2, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Sultan Limbona was appointed member of the Sangguniang
Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government of Region 12. Later, he
was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang
Pampook of Central Mindanao. In his capacity, petitioner was invited
by the Acting Secretary to the November conference of the Committee
on Muslim Affairs along with the speaker of Region 9. The said
committee will undertake consultations and dialogues with local
government officials the result of which would hopefully chart the
autonomous governments of the two regions and may prod the
President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative
Commission as mandated by the Commission.
Petitioner responded that there shall be no session in the set dates
because their presence in the house committee hearing of Congress
takes precedence over any pending business in Batasang Pampook.
The Acting Secretary then forwarded the instructions of petitioner.
However, the session ensued in defiance of the instructions.
During the session, a speaker pro-tempore was authorized to preside
and on motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all
assemblymen voted in the affirmative.
This incident caused for the instant petition to transpire. Petitioner
prays that he be given in due course, that respondents be enjoined
from proceeding with their session, that a judgment be rendered
declaring the previously held proceeding as null and void, that the
election of petitioner as Speaker of Batasan Pampook be held valid
and subsisting.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner should be reinstated as Speaker (issue not
relevant, FYI only)
2. Whether the courts may rightfully intervene in the affairs of the
autonomous Sangguniang Pampook
HELD:
1. Yes.
Pending proceedings, an expulsion resolution was filed by the
Sanggunian on the ground of the ff. reasons: firstly, that he was
considered resigned after filing his COC for Congressman for the First
District of Maguindanao and no request for reinstatement was made
thereafter; secondly, that he caused to withdraw an amount of cash
from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and
emolument of some Assemblymen, and that he had filed a case before
the SC when it could have been resolved within the assembly. In this
regard, respondents submit that the instant petition had become
moot and academic.
The court did not agree that the case has been rendered moot and
academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution because such is
of no force and effect on the ground of the immutable principle of due
process alone. Petitioner was not afforded the opportunity of an
investigation nor had been heard in his defense for it does not also
appear that petitioner was made aware that he had been charged for
graft and corruption before his colleagues.
Secondly, the resolution appears to be a mere afterthought for having
been belatedly issued and a bare act of vendetta by the other
Assemblymen as petitioner was being expelled on the ground of filing
a case before the SC. It then seems that the petitioner is being
punished for seeking redress in courts, which should not be the case.
The Court therefore orders reinstatement, with the caution that
should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the
Assembly is enjoined to commence proper proceedings therefor in line
with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is
within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish
their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the
moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is
exercised with grave abuse.
2. Yes.
There are 2 kinds of autonomous governments. The first class, under
BP 337 (Old Local Gov’t Code) which was enacted prior to the 1987
Constitution and RA 7160, is under the supervision of the national
government acting through the President. The second class, under the
1987 Constitution, enjoys autonomy and is subject alone to the decree
of the organic act creating it and the accepted principles on the effects
and limits of “autonomy.”
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions
9 and 12 by PD 1618. The Decree established an “internal autonomy”
in those 2 regions “within the framework of the national sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Philippines and its Constitution,” with
legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and
responsibilities. HOWEVER it also requires that EXCEPT on matters
which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National
Government, the autonomous governments may undertake all
internal administrative matters for the respective regions. The
exceptions are as follows:
(1) National defense and security
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking,
and external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all
natural resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing.
Essentially, they belong to the first class.
Those autonomous under the first class are unarguably under the
jurisdiction of the Court. An examination of the very Presidential
Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades
us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy. In fact,
Presidential Decree No. 1618 mandates that "[t]he President shall
have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions. Secondly, In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook,
their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative
services.
Hence, the Court may assume jurisdiction.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
Ruling as to the other issue: (FYI only)
Previous sessions were declared invalid even if the Speaker invalidly
called for a recess because the issue of whether or not he could call
for a recess was not settled.
On Local Autonomy:
[A]utonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden
the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and accountable," "and ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general
supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in
the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication
of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to
be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free
to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional
author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation,"
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.
#8. DISOMANGCOP vs SECRETARY OF DPWH
G.R. No. 149848
November 25, 2004
FACTS:
For the first time in its history, the Philippines ordained the
establishment of regional autonomy with the adoption of the 1987
Constitution. The provisions under Sections 1 & 15, Article 10 mandate
the creation of the ARMM and the CAR, among others to effectuate
such mandate.
Corollary to this is the enactment of RA 6734, An Act Providing for An
Organic Act for the ARMM, which called for the holding of a plebiscite
in 13 provinces and 9 cities in the South. Only 4 provinces, Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi voted for the creation of the
autonomous region. These provinces now constitute the ARMM.
EOs were signed by then President Cory devolving to ARMM the
powers of 7 cabinet departments: (1) local government; (2) labor and
employment; (3) science and technology; (4) public works and
highways; (5) social welfare and development; (6) tourism; and (7)
environment and national resources.
9 years later, the DPWH issued DO 119 stating therein that a DPWH
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office shall be created and shall have
jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under
the DPWH w/n Marawi City and Lanao del Sur.
2 years later, President Estrada signed into law RA 8999, An Act
Establishing An Engineering District in the First Disctrict of the Province
of Lanao Del Sur and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
Congress later passed amendatory act RA 9054, An Act to Strengthen
and Expand the Organic Act for the ARMM. This act, like its forerunner,
contains detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional
Government and the retained areas of governance of the National
Government.RA 9054 lapsed into law in 2001.
In July 2001, Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang addressed a
petition to DPWH Secretary Datumanong for the revocation of DO 119,
but no action was taken on the petition; hence, they filed the same
with the First Engineering District of the DPWH ARMM in Lanao del
Sur. Their prayers are as follows:
- To annul and set aside DO 119
- To prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing the DO and RA
8999 and the release of funds for public works projects in the
administrative regions
- To compel the Secretary of DBM to release all funds for public works
projects intended for Marawi and Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM only;
and
 - To compel respondent DPWH Secretary to let DPWH-ARMM 1st Engg.
District in Lanao del Sur to implement all public works projects within its
jurisdictional area
Petitioners also allege grave abuse of discretion and that it violates the
constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out that the
challenged DO has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
with functions that have already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM
in Lanao del Sur.
Respondents maintained the validity of the DO. They submit that the
powers of the autonomous regions did not diminish eh legislative
power of Congress. They also contend that petitioners have no locus
standi to assail the constitutionality of the law and the DO, them
having no personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.
ISSUE: Whether RA 8999 and DO 119 re unconstitutional and were
issued with grave abuse of discretion
HELD: Yes.
1. On the Constitutionality of RA 8999
It is not necessary to declare RA 8999 unconstitutional, not being the
lis mota of the case. The accepted rule is that the Court will not resolve
a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case, or if the
case can be disposed of or settle on other grounds (Liban vs Gordon).
The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy
scheme. While they are classified as statutes, they are more than
ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite.
Hence, the provisions cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, RA
8999 in this case. The amendatory law has to be submitted to a
plebiscite as clarified in the transcript of the Constitutional
Commission.
Furthermore, EO 426 had already devolved to the DPWH-ARMM the
functions and powers the RA 8999 aimed to transfer. E.O. 426 clearly
ordains the transfer of the control and supervision of the offices of the
DPWH within the ARMM, including their functions, powers and
responsibilities, personnel, equipment, properties, and budgets to the
ARG. Also, according to R.A. 9054, the reach of the Regional
Government enables it to appropriate, manage and disburse all public
work funds allocated for the region by the central government.
The use of the word powers in E.O. 426 manifests an unmistakable
case of devolution. It was issued to implement the provisions of the
first ARMM Organic Act.
2. On the Constitutionality of DO 119
D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which
has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and
Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of E.O. 426. The Executive
Order was issued pursuant to R.A. 6734which initiated the creation of
the constitutionally-mandated autonomous region [87] and which
defined the basic structure of the autonomous government.
The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers,
is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao
del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order, in
effect, takes back powers which have been previously devolved under
the said executive order. D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of
E.O. 426.
3. There is partly grave abuse of discretion
Without doubt, respondents committed grave abuse of discretion.
They implemented R.A. 8999 despite its inoperativeness and repeal.
They also put in place and maintained the DPWH Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office in accordance with D.O. 119 which has been
rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
Still, on the issue of grave abuse of discretion, this Court, however,
cannot uphold petitioners argument that R.A. 8999 was signed into
law under suspicious circumstances to support the assertion that there
was a capricious and whimsical exercise of legislative authority. Once
more, this Court cannot inquire into the wisdom, merits, propriety or
expediency of the acts of the legislative branch.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
On Regional Autonomy
The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions
is to allow the separate development of peoples with distinctive
cultures and traditions. As a matter of right, these cultures must be
allowed to flourish.
Autonomy recognizes the wholeness of the Philippine society in its
ethnolinguistic, cultural and even religious diversities. The need for
regional autonomy is a response to the unresponsiveness of the
unitary system to the specific political struggles of these cultures.
The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates
the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy
to these regions.
HOWEVER, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the
establishment of a sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic, as it
can be installed ONLY within the framework of the Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic
of the Philippines.
In international law, the right to self-determination need not be
understood as a right to political separation, but rather a s a complex
net of legal-political relations between a certain people and the state
of authorities.
On decentralization: Deconcentration and devolution
A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization.
Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its
subordinates, whether geographically or functionally defined, to
exercise authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by
subnational units. It is typically a delegated power, wherein a larger
government chooses to delegate certain authority to more local
governments. Federalism implies some measure of decentralization,
but unitary systems may also decentralize. Decentralization differs
intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units that have been
authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right
against the central government.
Decentralization comes in two forms: deconcentration and devolution.
Deconcentration is administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of
functions or the delegation of authority and responsibility from the
national office to the regional and local offices. This mode of
decentralization is also referred to as administrative decentralization.
Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or
the transfer of powers, responsibilities, and resources for the
performance of certain functions from the central government to local
government units. This is a more liberal form of decentralization since
there is an actual transfer of powers and responsibilities. It aims to
grant greater autonomy to local government units in cognizance of
their right to self-government, to make them self-reliant, and to
improve their administrative and technical capabilities.
#9. BATANGAS CATV INC vs CA
G.R. No. 138810
September 29, 2004
FACTS:
Sangguniang Panlungsod enated Resolution No. 210 granting
Petitioner to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas
City. It was also provided that petitioner is authorized to charge its
subscribesr the maximum rates specified therein, provided, that any
increase in rates shall be subject to the Sanggunian.
Petitioner later on increased its rates from P88 to P180 per month. As
a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to
cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent
Sanggunian.
Petitioner filed a petition for injunction alleging that respondent
Sanggunian has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged
by CATV operators. Petitioner contends that while Republic Act No.
7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, extends to the LGUs the
general power to perform any act that will benefit their constituents,
nonetheless, it does not authorize them to regulate the CATV
operation. Pursuant to E.O. No. 205, only the NTC has the authority to
regulate the CATV operation, including the fixing of subscriber rates.
Respondents counter that:
1. First, Resolution No. 210 was enacted pursuant to Section 177(c)
and (d) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, the Local Government Code of
1983, which authorizes LGUs to regulate businesses. The term
businesses necessarily includes the CATV industry. 2. Resolution No.
210 is in the nature of a contract between petitioner and respondents,
it being a grant to the former of a franchise to operate a CATV system.
To hold that E.O. No. 205 amended its terms would violate the
constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.
ISSUE: Whether the LGU may regulate the subscriber rates charged by
CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction
HELD: No.
The resolution is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the
national legislature. There is no law authorizing LGUs to grant
franchises to operate CAT. Whaterver authority the LGUs had before,
the same had been withdrawn when President Marcos issued PD 1512
terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of
CATV system previously granted by local governments.
Today, pursuant to Section 3 of EO 436, only persons, associations,
partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional
Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate
and maintain a cable television system or render cable TV service
within a service area.
It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative
authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises.
Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision as to
impairment of the obligation of a contract does not extend to
privileges, franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its
powers, or ultra vires.
#10. DADOLE vs COA
G.R. No. 125350
December 3, 2002
FACTS:
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving
monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation
ordinance enacted by its Sangguniang Panlungsod. In 1991, Mandaue
City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge.
Later, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the
disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that
“additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates not
exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in
municipalities may be granted.”
Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices
of disallowance to petitioners RTC Judges Dadole, Caete and Vestil and
MTC Judges Boholst, Fanilag and Dagatan. The additional monthly
allowances of the petitioner were reduced to P1,000 and they were
also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000.
The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor against
the notices. The same was indorsed to the COA Regional Office which
eventually denied it.
Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for:
(1) infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City;
(2) for being not supported by any law and therefore goes beyond the
supervisory powers of the President;
(3) for lack of publication;
On the other hand, the yearly appropriation ordinance providing for
additional allowances to judges is allowed by Sex 458(a)(1) of the LGC.
In his comment, the SolGen filed a manifestation supporting the
position of the petitioner judges. He furthers that (1) DBM only enjoys
the power to review and determine whether the disbursements were
made in accordance with the ordinance passed by a local government
unit and (2) the COA has no more than auditorial visitation powers
over local government units pursuant to Sec 348 of the LGC.
Respondent COA, on the other hand, insists that the constitutional and
statutory authority of a city government to provide allowances to
judges stationed therein is not absolute. Congress may set limitations
on the exercise of autonomy. It is for the President through the DBM
to check whether these legislative limitations are being followed by
the local government units.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the
supervisory powers of the President and for not having been
published; and
(2) Whether the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the City of
Mandaue that provides for additional allowances to judges
contravenes the annual appropriation laws enacted by Congress
HELD:
(1) Yes. LBC is null and void.
Our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the
exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by
Congress and the power of supervision by the President.
Section 4 of Article 10 has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control. Supervision and control differed in meaning and extent.
Supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer
to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail to
neglect to fulfil them, the former may take such action as prescribed
by law to make them perform their duties. Control means the power
of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Clearly, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a
local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted
contrary to law. This is the scope of the President’s supervisory powers
over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his alter
egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the
Constitution; otherwise, the principle of local autonomy and
separation of the powers of the executive and legislative departments
in governing municipal corporations are violated.
Moreover, LBC 55 goes beyond the law it seeks to implement. LBC 55
sets a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances which
the law otherwise permits provided that the finances of the city
government allows for such allowances.
LBC 55 is also void on account of lack of publication in violation of the
ruling in Tañada vs Tuvera.
(2) No. COA failed to prove that the expenses of the city government
and the funds used for said expenses were taken from the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) because no evidence was submitted.
Furthermore, 90 days from receipt of the copies of the appropriation
ordinance, the DBM should have taken positive action. Otherwise,
such ordinance was deemed to have been properly reviewed and
deemed to have taken effect.
#11. PIMENTEL vs AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 132988
July 19, 2000
FACTS:
The President of the Philippines issued AO 372 which provides that all
government departments and agencies, including state universities
and colleges, GOCCs and LGUs will identify and implement measure
that will reduce by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations
for non-personal services items. Section 4 of the same provides that
pending assessment and evaluation by the Dev’t Budget Coordinating
Committee (DBCC) of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount
equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local
government units shall be withheld.
Subsequently, President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of
AO 372, by reducing to 5% the amount of IRA to be withheld from the
LGUs.
Petitioner contends that the President in issuing AO 372 was in effect
exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in
the President, however, only the power of general supervision over
LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner
furthers that the directive to withhold 10% of the IRA is in
contravention of Sec 286 of the LGC and Sec 6 of Article 10 of the
Constitution which provide for the automatic release to each of these
units its share in the national internal revenue.
The SolGen, on behalf of the respondents, claims that AO 372 was
issued to alleviate economic difficulties brought about by the peso
devaluation and constituted merely an exercise of the President’s
power of supervision over LGUs as it merely directs local governments
to identify measures that will reduce their total expenditures.
Likewise, the withholding of 10% of the IRA does not violate the
statutory prohibition because such withholding is temporary in nature
pending the assessment and evaluation by the DBCC of the emerging
fiscal situation.
ISSUE: Whether
(1) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their
expenditures by 25%; and
(2) Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10% of their
internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's
power of general supervision over local governments
HELD:
(1) Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having
administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal
autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments
have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to
their equitable share in the national taxes release by the national
government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of
national government intervention by way of supervision. In order to
ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with
national goals.
In the case at bar, the respondents failed to meet the requisites before
the President may interfere in local fiscal matters, before the issuance
and implementation of AO 372. To wit:
 (a) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the nat’l gov’t
(b) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and
(c) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Dep’t of
Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management.
Firstly, at the very least, they did not even try to show that the
national government was suffering from an unmanageable public
sector deficit. Secondly, they did they claim having conducted
consultations with the different leagues of local governments. Without
these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust unilaterally
the LGU’s IRA.
The SolGen insists, however, that AO 372 is merely directory which is
intended to advise the undertaking of cost-reduction measures that
will help maintain economic stability. Besides, it does not contain any
sanction in case of non-compliance. Since it is not a mandatory
imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the
power of control.
The Court accepts the reassurance of the SolGen. Since no legal
sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not
follow such advice. It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor
general's contention in regard to Section 1.
(2) Section 4 of AO 372 contravenes explicit provisions of the LGC and
the Constitution. In other words, the acts alluded to are authorized by
law; but quite the opposite, Sec 4 is bereft of any legal or
constitutional basis.
This Court is not ruling out any form of reduction in the IRAs of LGUs
as the President may make necessary adjustments in case of
unmanageable public sector deficit in line with Sec 284 of the LGC.
Such reduction, however, is subject to consultation with the presiding
officers of both Houses of Congress and with the presidents of the
leagues of local governments.
Notably, the need for interaction between the national government
and the LGUs at the planning level in order to ensure that the local
development plans hew to national policies and standards. The
problem is that no such interaction or consultation was ever held prior
to the issuance of AO 372. This is why the petitioner and the
intervenor have protested and instituted this action. Significantly,
respondents do not deny lack of consultation.
In addition, Justice Kapunan cites Section 287[40] of the LGC as
impliedly authorizing the President to withhold the IRA of an LGU,
pending its compliance with certain requirements. Even a cursory
reading of the provision reveals that it is totally inapplicable to the
issue at bar. It directs LGUs to appropriate in their annual budgets 20
percent of their respective IRAs for development projects. It speaks of
no positive power granted the President to priorly withhold any
amount.
#12. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS vs ROMULO
G.R. No. 152774
May 27, 2004
FACTS:
The Province of Batangas filed to declare as unconstitutional and void
certain provisos contained in the GAA of 1999-2001 insofar as they
uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of 5b
pesos of the IRA for the Local Gov’t Svc Equalization Fund and imposed
conditions for the release thereof.
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the
“Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the
capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services
devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora
passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003
which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The
guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs
to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF
and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG
for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the
subsequent release of the corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to
declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the
General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar
as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount
of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local
Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions
for the release thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001,
and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD: Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the
OCD resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion of the IRA –
they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and
must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure
the local autonomy of local governments“. Consistent with the
principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s
power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes
supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the doing of an
act – the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or
redo the act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it
that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down the rules
or the discretion to modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just
share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the
Constitution mandates that the “just share” shall be automatically
released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t
required to perform any act to receive the “just share” – it shall be
released to them “without need of further action“. To subject its
distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules &
regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-
2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this constitutional
mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the
LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current
fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal
year. The exception does not apply in this case.
The Oversight Committee’s authority is limited to the implementation
of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither
can it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only
through a separate law and not through appropriations laws or GAAs.
Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that
should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose
content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific
purpose or a separate fiscal unit – any provision therein which is
intended to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate
provision“. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of
1991 are matters of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress
to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would unduly
infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the
degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only
comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should
also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are
based.
#13. ACORD vs ZAMORA
G.R. No. 144256
June 8, 2005
FACTS:
Pursuant to Sec 22, Art. 7 of the Constitution, President Estrada
submitted the Nat’l Expenditures Program for the Fiscal Year 2000.
The President proposed an IRA of P121.78B following the formula
provided in Sec 284 of the LGC which provides that on the third year
and thereafter after the effectivity of the LGC, the LGUs shall have a
40% share in the nat’l internal revenue taxes.
President later approved the GAA of the year 2000 which provides a
P111.78B IRA as Programmed Fund while separating the remaining
P10B as Unprogrammed Fund. The latter amount is to be released only
upon the concurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.
Thus, a number of NGOs and people’s organizations, along with three
barangay officials filed this petition against respondents challenging
the constitutionality of certain provisions of the GAA.
Petitioners contend that the pertinent sections (Sec 1, 37(A) and
special provisions 1 and 4 are:
(1) null and void as they violate the autonomy of local governments by
unlawfully reducing P10B of IRA and withholding the release of such amount
by placing the same under Unprogrammed Funds
(2) constitutive of an undue delegation of legislative power to the respondents
(who are the Executive Secretary, DBM Secretary, National Treasurer and the
COA)
(3) constitutive of amendments of the LGC
 (4) undermining the foundation of our local governance system
(5) a transgression of the Constitution and the LGC’s prohibition on any invalid
reduction and withholding of the local government’s IRA.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated constitutional mandate laid in
Sec 6, Article 10 when it made the release of IRA contingent on
whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally
submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic.
Respondents counterargue that the above constitutional provision is
addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same
does not rprevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the
release of the IRA.
ISSUE: Whether the questioned provisions violate the constitutional
injunction that the just share of local governments in the national
taxes or the IRA shall be automatically released
HELD: Yes.
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically
release the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it
enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the
executive from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch
may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties,
provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the
Constitution amendable by statute a proposition which is patently
absurd.
Moreover, there is merit in the argument of the intervenor Province of
Batangas that, if indeed the framers intended to allow the enactment
of statutes making the release of IRA conditional instead of automatic,
then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded
differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share
of local governments is qualified by the words as determined by law,
and not the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is
not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic
release of the IRA.
Additionally, to interpret the term automatic release in such a broad
manner would be inconsistent with the ruling in Pimentel v. Aguirre.
There is no substantial difference between the withholding of IRA
involved in Pimentel and that in the present case, except that here it is
the legislature, not the executive, which has authorized the
withholding of the IRA. The distinction notwithstanding, the ruling in
Pimentel remains applicable. As explained above, Article X, Section 6
of the Constitution the same provision relied upon in Pimentel enjoins
both the legislative and executive branches of government. Hence, as
in Pimentel, under the same constitutional provision, the legislative is
barred from withholding the release of the IRA.
#14. KIDA vs SENATE
G.R. No. 192671
October 18, 2011
FACTS:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No.
6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the
first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054
amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the
ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA
No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26,
2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional
elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date
every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should
have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations
for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected.
However, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for
the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and
for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections
from the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and
every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular
national and local elections.
The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-
charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional
Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly,
who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections
(2) Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates Sections
15, 16 and 18 of the Constitution
HELD:
1. Yes.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this
objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII)
of the Constitution. The objective behind setting a common
termination date for all elective officials finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations.
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local
election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
(A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used
should be understood in the sense that they have in common use and
given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails.)
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something
that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a
community or minor political subdivision. Regional elections in the
ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional
assembly representatives obviously fall within this classification, since
they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited
region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are
considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from
Article 10 of the Constitution. Autonomous regions are established
and discussed under the article wholly devoted to Local Government.
That an autonomous region is considered a form of local government
is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution.
2. No.
The decision of Congress to synchronize the regional elections with the
national, congressional and all other local elections left it with the
problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the
intervening period between the expiration of the term of those
elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one (21)
months away of those who will win in the synchronized elections on
May 13, 2013.
The problem was for interim measures for this period and with the
respect due to the concept of autonomy. The need for interim
measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and
approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or
objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the
Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms..
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open
to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as
ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in
the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the
ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in
the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in
the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those
elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3)
authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last
also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume
office.]
1. Holdover option
The Court ruled out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution. Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are
covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover.
2. Special elections
Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled
August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional
elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the
exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an
adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other
elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to
the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC.
In the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended
through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration
date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands.
3. Authorization of the President to appoint OICs
 The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA
No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM
during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this
law – as the only measure that Congress can make.
The appointing power embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
classifies four groups of officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other
public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153,
it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint
pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law
facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA
No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and
for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this
is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written
and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding
to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
#15. GOV. VILLAFUERTE, JR. and PROV. OF CAMSUR vs ROBREDO
G.R. No. 195390
December 10, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioners sought to annul and set aside the issuances of the
respondent, in his capacity as then Secretary of the DILG on the
ground of unconstitutionality and for having been issued with GAD, to
wit:
(a) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2010-83, pertaining to the full disclosure
of local budget and finances, and bids and public offerings;2
(b) MC No. 2010-138, pertaining to the use of the 20% component of the
annual internal revenue allotment shares;3 and
(c) MC No. 2011-08, pertaining to the strict adherence to Section 90 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10147 or the General Appropriations Act of 2011.4
The first circular was issued after the COA conducted an examination
and audit which yielded a report that 20% of the development fund of
some LGUs were diverted to expenses for maintenance and other
operating expenses in stark violation of Section 287 of the LGC. It also
served as a reminder to LGUs of the strict mandate to ensure that
public funds shall be spent judiciously and only for the very purpose/s
for which such funds are intended.
The second circular pertained to guidelines on the appropriation and
utilization of the 20% of the IRA and that the development projects
should be utilized for social, economic dev’t and environmental mgt.
The third circular, entitled Full Disclosure of Local Budget and
Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings,” which aims to promote good
governance through enhanced transparency and accountability of
LGUs was issued.
These circulars also carry with them sanctions for non-compliance.
The petitioners argue that the assailed issuances of the respondent
interfere with the local and fiscal autonomy of LGUs embodied in the
Constitution and the LGC. In particular, they claim that MC No. 2010-
138 transgressed these constitutionally-protected liberties when it
restricted the meaning of “development” and enumerated activities
which the local government must finance from the 20% development
fund component of the IRA and provided sanctions for local
authorities who shall use the said component of the fund for the
excluded purposes stated therein.33 They argue that the respondent
cannot substitute his own discretion with that of the local legislative
council in enacting its annual budget and specifying the development
projects that the 20% component of its IRA should fund.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the
principles of local and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitution
and the LGC.
2. Whether respondent went beyond the confines of his supervisory
powers, as alter ego of the President
HELD:
1. No.
A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an
existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to
faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to
utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. It was, at
best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if they have been
complying with the law. It must be recalled that the assailed circular
was issued in response to the report of the COA that a substantial
portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually
utilized for development projects.
The term development was characterized as the “realization of
desirable social, economic and environmental outcome” does not
operate as a restriction of the term so as to exclude some other
activities that may bring about the same result. The statement of a
general definition was only necessary to illustrate among LGUs the
nature of expenses that are properly chargeable against the
development fund component of the IRA. It is expected to guide them
and aid them in rethinking their ways so that they may be able to
rectify lapses in judgment, should there be any, or it may simply stand
as a reaffirmation of an already proper administration of expenses.
2. No.
Notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs,
they are still under the supervision of the President and maybe held
accountable for malfeasance or violations of existing laws.
“Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to
discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be
construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the
act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires.”
Clearly then, the President’s power of supervision is not antithetical to
investigation and imposition of sanctions.
CONCLUSION:
The assailed issuances of the respondent, MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-
08, are but implementation of this avowed policy of the State to make
public officials accountable to the people. They are amalgamations of
existing laws, rules and regulation designed to give teeth to the
constitutional mandate of transparency and accountability.
The assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the policy of promoting
good governance through transparency, accountability and
participation. The action of the respondent is certainly within the
constitutional bounds of his power as alter ego of the President.
#16. SEMA vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 177597; G.R. No. 178628
July 16, 2008
FACTS:
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of
the province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because
Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989.
Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and
vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and
barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created
Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which
comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao
with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that
the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA
201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be
retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first
district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is
also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to
Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative
district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was
contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district
and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably
because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in
fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon
creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically
gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes
Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a
representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that
regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not
affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not
ARMM can create validly LGUs.

HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government
units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province,
city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First,
the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in
the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict
with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a
plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of
authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or
local legislative bodies the power to create local government units.
However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate
to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,
subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with
any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create
barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite
requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM
cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population
of at least 250k, and that a province, once created, should have at
least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have
a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said
district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so
Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot
validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a
legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the
creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most,
what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
#17. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 176951
November 18, 2008
FACTS:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills
converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act
on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No.
9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from
P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to
restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in
the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the
12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to
exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th
Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to
the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve
the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors,
individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the
cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February
2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007.
The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates
from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to
determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality
approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities
into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of
internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 10 of
the Constitution
(2) Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6 and
the equal protection clause of the Constitution
HELD:
(1) Yes.
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its
legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The
Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their
original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in
the Congress of the Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers.
Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted
R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised
when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted
the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic
viability for the creation of local government units—income,
population, and land area.
However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent
municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income
requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and
blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside
development and autonomy, especially accounting for these
municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective
provinces.
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the Cityhood Laws amended R.A.
No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the
Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from
the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also
amendments to the LGC itself.
(2) Yes.
Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become component cities of their respective
provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this
capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the
State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and development in
the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested
by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and
their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present.
The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Cityhood Laws are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
#18. NAVARRO vs ERMITA
G.R. No. 180050
September 11, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 to nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act
Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being unconstitutional.
Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the population of the
Province of Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A special census was afterwards
conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte which
yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants with average annual
income for calendar year 2002-2003 of P82,696,433.23 and with a land
area of 802.12 square kilometers as certified by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance.
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local Government Code, a
province may be created if it has an average annual income of not less
than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the
Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000
inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least
2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or
more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not
contribute to the income of the province.
Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was
enacted into law and a plebiscite was held subsequently yielding to
69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative. With the approval of the
people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the
Province of Dinagat Islands, Dinagat Islands was created into a
separate and distinct province.
Respondents argued that exemption from the land area requirement is
germane to the purpose of the Local Government Code to develop
self-reliant political and territorial subdivisions. Thus, the rules and
regulations have the force and effect of law as long as they are
germane to the objects and purposes of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR)
valid.
HELD: No.
The rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions
of the basic law. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the
creation of a province, including any exemption from such criteria,
must all be written in the Local Government Code. The IRR went
beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government
Code when it added the italicized portion “The land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or
more islands. “
The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the
purpose of the law as it already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by
the law in creating a territorial subdivision. Thus, there is no dispute
that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and
regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails.
#19. MIRANDA vs AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133064
September 16, 1999
FACTS:
On May 5 1994, RA 7720 which converted the municipality of
Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was signed into
law. Later on, the people of Santiago ratified the law in a plebiscite.
Later, RA 8528 was enacted which amended the former, changing the
status of Santiago from an independent component city to a
component city.
Petitioner, Jose Miranda, mayor of Santiago assailed the
constitutionality of RA 8528 due to lack of ratification through
plebiscite pursuant to Section 10, Article 10 of the Constitution.
Petitioners also contend the petition raises a political question which
the Court lacks jurisdiction.
The Solicitor General contends, on the contrary, that the law merely
reclassified the city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units, hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is
unnecessary.
ISSUE: Whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an
independent component city to a mere component city requires the
approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite
HELD: Yes.
Pursuant to Setion 10, Art 10 of the Constitution, the consent of the
people of the local government directly affected is required to serve as
a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating,
dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of LGUs.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of
Santiago from an independent component city to a component city
are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial as posited by
the Solicitor General. Among these changes are: (a) the independence
of the city as a political unit will be diminished; (b) the city mayor will
be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial
governor, (c) resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago
will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela; (d) that will
be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province.
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of
Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it
required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the
purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should
not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when
R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is
more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes
their right.
Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the LGC provides that:
(f) Plebiscite - (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU
or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity
of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance
fixes another date.
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in
character, so long as they result in a material change in the local
government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political
and economic rights of its people.
#20. SAMSON vs AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133076
September 22, 1999
FACTS:
On February 23, 1998, President FBR signed RA 8535 into law, creating
the City of Novaliches out of 15 brgys. Of QC. Petitioner, incumbent
councillor of the 1st district of QC, is now before the Court challenging
the unconstitutionality of said law.
Petitioner contends that RA 8535:
(a) failed to conform to the criteria established by the LGC as
to the requirements of income, population and land area;
seat of government; and no adverse effect to being a city of
QC; and its IRR as to furnishing a copy of the QC Council of
brgy resolution; and
(b) essentially amended the Constitution.
He also asserted that certifications were not presented to Congress
during the deliberations that led to the law’s passage. Likewise, there
is no certification attesting that the mother LGU would not be
adversely affected by the creation of the City of Novaliches, in terms of
income, population and land area.
The Solicitor General in its comment claimed, however, that the
allegations are not substantiated with convincing proof. They argued
that petitioner had the burden of proof to overcome the legal
presumeption that Congress considered all the legal requirements
under the LGC in passing the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8535 is unconstitutional
HELD: RA 8535 is constitutional.
Firstly, all presumptions are indulged in favour of constitutionality; one
who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its
invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship
does not render it unconstitutional; that the courts are not concerned
with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a
liberal interpretation of the constitution in favour of constitutionality
should be adopted. Simply, a person asserting the contrary has the
burden of proving his allegations clearly and unmistakably.
(1) As to requirements
Section 7 of the LGC provides that the creation of a LGU or its
conversion from one level to another shall be based on verifiable
indicators of viability such as income, population and land area.
These indicators shall be attested to by the DOF, NSO and the LMB
of the DENR.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area,
population and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of
said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements
as prescribed in the IRR of the LGC which should be not less than
20M. But as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance,
the combined average annual income of the 13 brgys was around
26M.
With respect to the population, NSO estimated that the
population in the brgys is around 346,310, exceeding the 150,000
requirement in the IRR. Having met this requirement, there’s no
more need to meet the land requirement of 100 sqkm since the
law provides that the proposed city must comply as regards
income and population or land area.
(2) As to lack of attestation through certification
During the hearings, the DBM, DILG, and Finance Officials were
present along with other officers armed with official statistics and
reference materials. In their official capacity, they spoke and shed
light on population, land area and income of the proposed city.
Their official statements could serve the same purpose
contemplated by law requiring certificates. Their affirmation as
well as their oath as witnesses in open session of either the
Senate or the House of Representatives give even greater
solemnity than a certification submitted to either chamber
routinely.
(3) As to failure of specifying the seat of government of the proposed
City of Novaliches
 Indeed, a reading of R.A. No. 8535 will readily show that it does
not provide for a seat of government. However, this omission is
not as fatal to the validity of R.A. No. 8535 as petitioner makes it
to be. We agree with respondents that under Section 12 of the
LGC the City of Novaliches can still establish a seat of government
after its creation.
(4) As to non-furnishing of a copy of the petition to the concerned QC
brgys
Such will also not render invalid R.A. No. 8535. The evident
purpose of this requirement is to inform the City Council of the
move to create another city and to enable it to formulate its
comments and recommendations on said petition. The Quezon
City Council members are obviously aware of the petition since
the matter has been widely publicized in the mass media.
(5) As to amending the Constitution
The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way
result in a prohibited amendment of the Constitution. The
ordinance appended to the Constitution merely apportions the
seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative
districts in the country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro
Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and
municipalities as claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of the
ordinance in or appendix of the Constitution will only result in its
erroneous interpretation.
#21. MARIANO vs COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 118577
March 7, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7854 which is entitled,
“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized
City to be known as the City of Makati” among the following grounds:
(1) It did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati
by metes and bounds, with technical description s, in violation of Sec 10, Art
10 of the Constitution in relation to Secs 7 and 450 of the LGC
(2) It attempts to alter or restart the three consecutive term limit for local
elective officials in violation of the Sec 8, Art 10 and Sec 7 of Art 6 of the
Constitution (FYI only)
(3) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law and such
fact was not expressed in the title of the bill and is violative of the
Constitution (FYI only)
ISSUE: Whether or not non-delineation of the technical descriptions of
the territorial boundary of Makati would render the law
unconstitutional
HELD: No.
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a LGU lies on the possibility that any uncertainty in the
boundaries of local government units may sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the
people's welfare. However, the delineation of the land area of the
proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries.
However, said delineation did not change even by an inch the land
area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not
add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati.
In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's
land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality.
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate
reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not
defined. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the
territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig
over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming
sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators
felt that the dispute should be left to the courts and thus decided
against any fact finding.
The Court also said that the territory requirement of newly-created
LGUs, as long as they may be reasonably ascertained by referring to
common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, then the
legislative intent has been sufficiently served.
#22. CAWALING JR. vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 146319
October 26, 2001
FACTS:
Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of
Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant
thereto.
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into
law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging
The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of
Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC held a
plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted
the matter for ratification proclaimed the creation of the City of
Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite.
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the
present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite
on the following grounds: (FYI only)
(1) The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-
day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54
thereof; and
(2) Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty
(20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.
Petitioner instituted another petition assailing the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional:
(1) The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates
Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section
10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or
a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city"; and
(2) R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City
of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution . (FYI only)
Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a
component city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a
cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A.
No. 8806 has done.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8806 was unconstitutional for it provides
the creation of an LGU through merger and not conversion as provided
under the LGC
HELD: The law is constitutional.
Petitioner’s interpretation of Sec 450(a) of the LGC is erroneous. The
phrase “A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into
a component city” is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by
which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
allows the merger of local government units to create a province, city,
municipality or barangay.
Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a
division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized
under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall
comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.
#23. AQUINO vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 189793
April 7, 2010
FACTS:
RA 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative
districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill No.
4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on
12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act
No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards that requires a
minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative
district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population
of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
ISSUE: Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district
in a province.
HELD: No.
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution
states that: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.”
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a
province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at
least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a
city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase
"each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand"
from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than
that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but
not for a province.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative,
but not so for a province.
#24. TAN vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155
July 11, 1986
FACTS:
Prompted by the enactment of BP 885 entitled “An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros
del Norte.” Petitioners herein, who are residents of the Province of
Negros Occidental, filed to prohibit the COMELEC from conducting the
plebiscite pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law.
The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of
Negros del Norte and excluded the voters from the rest of the
province of Negros Occidental.
The OSG filed their comment arguing that the challenged statute
should be accorded the presumption of legality and that the law is not
void on its face and that the petition does not show a clear, categorical
and undeniable demonstration of the supposed infringement of the
Constitution. Respondents state that the powers of the Batasang
Pambansa (Congress) to enact the assailed law is beyond question and
does not infringe the Constitution because the requisites of the LGC
have been complied with, that the excluded areas do not fall within
the meaning and scope of the term “unit or units affected.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscite to be conducted excluding the
rest of the province of Negros Occidental is valid
HELD: No.
Sec 3, Article 10 of the Constitution makes it imperative that there be
first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in
the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or
merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is
inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province
of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the
division of its existing boundaries to create the proposed new province
of Negros del Norte.
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that both political units would
be affected. First would be the parent province of Negros Occidental
because its boundaries would be substantially altered and secondly,
the other as it would be composed of the area subtracted from the
mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del
Norte.
It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case of
Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, invoked by respondents, We find very
lucidly expressed the strong dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad
Santos, a distinguished member of this Court, as he therein voiced his
opinion, which We hereunder quote:
2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all
of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in
the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a
merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision.
This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the—
forerunner of the ruling which We now consider applicable to the case
at bar.
#25. DELA CRUZ vs PARAS
G.R. Nos. L-42571-72
July 25, 1983
FACTS:
Petitioners Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators
filed for the prohibition of Ordinance No. 84 which prohibits the
operation of night clubs, under the following grounds:
(1) It is null and void as a municipality has no authority to
prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling
(2) It is violative of the petitioner’s right to due process and the
equal protection of the law as the license previously given
to petitioners were withdrawn without judicial notice
In their answer, respondents aver that the Municipal Council is
authorized by law not only to regulate but to prohibit the
establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs. They also
said that it is not violative of due process because property rights are
subordinate to public interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation can prohibit the
exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit
of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
HELD: No.
Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as
follows:
“The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations,
not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein ."
The general welfare clause has two branches:
1. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority,
and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary
to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred
upon the municipal council by law.
2. The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the
specific functions of the council which are enumerated by law. It
authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve
the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein.' It is a general rule that ordinances passed by
virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must
be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of
the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the
State.”
If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly
the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. In the two
leading cases above set forth, this Court had stressed reasonableness,
consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal
corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the
State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking
power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The
objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be
attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field.
Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth.
The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this
instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the
case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and
property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned
by those therein employed.
The general welfare clause, a reiteration of the Administrative Code
provision, is set forth in the first paragraph of Section 149 defining the
powers and duties of the sangguniang bayan. It read as follows:
"(a) Enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such
as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and
convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the
prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and insure the protection of property therein; ..."
It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of
night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying
on their business.
#26. BINAY vs DOMINGO
G.R. No. 92389
September 11, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved
Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved
families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a
month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available
funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission
approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified
a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the
program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said
resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation
thereof for the following reasons:
(1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare,
safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati;
(2) government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and,
(3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few
individuals.
ISSUES: Whether Resolution No. 60 is an invalid exercise of the police
power under the general welfare clause for not benefiting the whole
and being not connected with public safety, general welfare, etc. of
the inhabitants of Makati
HELD: No.
In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is
not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient
and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring
the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been
said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide
for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and
convenience as consistently as may be with private rights.
It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied
with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general
welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened
to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the
greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or
general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation
of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed
inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely
indicate the limits of police power.
COA's additional objection is based on its contention that "Resolution
No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered
thereby should be for a public purpose, ... should be for the benefit of
the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality
and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present
case."
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not
unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the
Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared
towards state policies to provide adequate social services (Section 9,
Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5,
Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and
respect for human rights. (Section 11, Ibid." (Comment, p. 12)
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The
support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police
power in the promotion of the common good.
#27. TANO vs SOCRATES
G.R. No. 110249
August 21, 1997
FACTS:
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing
the constitutionality of:
(1) Ordinance No. 15-92 entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE
SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA
CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING
EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF"
(2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending to
engage in any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or
having in his possession any of the articles for which a permit is
required to be had, to obtain first a Mayor’s and authorizing and
directing to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes
containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto Princesa
and,
(3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION
PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING,
SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC
ORGANISMS”
The petitioners contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of
due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from
the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the
Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to
issue the permit.
They also claim that it took away their right to earn their livelihood in
lawful ways; and insofar as the Airline Shippers Association are
concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation
and entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and
essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful
conclusion
Public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial
Government's power under the general welfare clause; they likewise
maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional
HELD: No.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution
enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to local
government units which unquestionably involve the exercise of police
power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal
objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a "closed season" for the
species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five
years; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of
Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction
due to illegal fishing activities.
Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, LGUs have the power to
enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to
grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees
or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of
explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami,
and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other
methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of
applicable fishing laws. Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang
bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang
panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to [p]rotect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which
endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms
of destructive fishing and such other activities which result in
pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of
ecological imbalance.
It imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod,
and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to
"[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other
forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result
in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of
ecological imbalance."
#28. WHITE LIGHT CORP. vs CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. 156052
January 20, 2009
FACTS:
Then City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance
No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission,
Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila.” The ordinance sanctions any
person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of
room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than
twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation
(TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who
own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a
motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention
on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as
operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
The RTC declared the ordinance null and void as it “strikes at the
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by
the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the right to operate
economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit
relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be
consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the
LGC which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they
contended that under Art III, Sec 18 of the Revised Manila Charter,
they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary
and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void
since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an
invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
CA reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of
the ordinance; hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
of the State
HELD: No, Ordinance No. 7774 is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind the City of Manila v Laguio Jr
ruling and the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. All three
ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals
including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments.
This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no
wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these
establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is
another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and
regulate the lives of its citizens
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more
than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police
power as conferred on local government units by the Local
Government Code through such implements as the general welfare
clause.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the
use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use
and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and
certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.
SC recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be
deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the
same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the
Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The
term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of
the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027,
to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, which respondent mayor approved. It was enacted pursuant to the
subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common police power delegated to local government units, a principle
welfare. described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within
constitutional limits to promote the order, safety, heath, morals and
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be general welfare of the society. The ordinance classifies parcels of land
recognized and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling nearby the Pasig river from Industrial to Commercial and disallowed
state interest. Governmental powers should stop short of certain the operation of industries and other businesses in the area. Among
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. the businesses situated in the area are the Pandacan Terminals of the
oil companies Caltex Phils Inc., Petron Corp. and Pilipinas Shell
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving Petroleum Corp.
patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in
with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Later, the City of Manila and the DOE entered into a memorandum of
ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular that the scaling down of the terminals was the most viable option.
class, require an interference with private rights and the means must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on
not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to
other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the
of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation terminals of the oil companies. The issues raised by petitioners are as
must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means follows:
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of 1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. 2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend
or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
Petitioners contend that respondent has the legal duty to enforce the
Ordinance and remove the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already
Instead, he has allowed them to stay.
prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing
laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
Respondent’s defense is that the ordinance has been superseded by
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be
the MOU and the resolutions.
more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement
of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
Whether or not
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of
the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent
#30
that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit
#31
activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
“wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion
#32
of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
#33
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to
the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
#34
public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be
restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
#35
However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments
#36
as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the
operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the
#37
rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance
rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a
#38
day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
#39
#29. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. ATIENZA
G.R. No. 156052
#40
February 13, 2008
#41
FACTS:
#42