You are on page 1of 30

DEFENSES IN NEGLIGENCE

Damnum Absque Injuria and


Last Clear Chance

GROUP 2 | CARILLO | SAISES | TAMAYO | TIBERIO | YAMAT


1
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
Cases

2
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

▰ There cannot be an actionable wrong if either


damage or wrong is absent.
▻ Injury/Wrong: illegal invasion of a legal right
▻ Damage: loss, hurt or harm resulting
▻ Damages: recompense awarded for damage suffered
▰ There is damage without injury in instances where loss
or harm was not the result of a legal violation of duty.

3
There cannot be an actionable wrong if either
damage or wrong is absent.
Board of Liquidators v. Heirs of Kalaw

4
BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS V. HEIRS OF KALAW

▰ NACOCO embarked on copra trading activities. Through general manager Kalaw,


it executed several contracts for the delivery of copra.

▰ Due to four consecutive devastating typhoons, copra production was impaired.


When it became clear that the contracts would be unprofitable, Kalaw submitted
them to the Board of Directors for approval and made a full disclosure of the
situation. After a second board meeting, they unanimously approved the
contracts.

▰ In a suit against Louis, Dreytus & Go who was one of the buyers under one of the
contracts, the Board of Liquidators (acting for a dissolved NACOCO),
compromised for P567,000.

▰ NACOCO tried to recover the settlements it made from several of its buyers, from
general manager Kalaw. NACOCO alleges that Kalaw was negligent for having
entered into the questioned contracts without prior approval of the Board of
Directors to the prejudice of the corporation and for having subsequently
approving the said contracts in bad faith/breach of trust.
5
BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS V. HEIRS OF KALAW

▰ Held: Kalaw was in good faith and is not liable for


damages suffered by NACOCO.
▻ Even in the face of an express by-law requirement of prior approval
before contracts can be accomplished, Kalaw is deemed to have
possessed the implied authority to enter into them because the
practice of the corporation has been to allow its general manager to
negotiate and execute contracts in its activities for and in behalf of
NACOCO. The Board itself by its acts and through acquiescence,
practically laid aside the by-law requirement of prior-approval.
▻ Kalaw all along thought he had the authority to enter into the
contracts and he did so in the best interests of the corporation. He
cannot be expected to predict the coming of unpredictable typhoons.
And even after, he was not remiss in his duty because he exerted
efforts to apply for a loan to stave off the losses.
6
One who makes use of his own legal right does no
injury. If damage results, from a person’s exercising
his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
Proline Sports Center v. CA

7
PROLINE SPORTS CENTER V. CA

▰ QUESTOR, the US-based owner of the trademark “Spalding” and PROLINE, the
exclusive distributor of “Spalding” products in the Philippines sent a letter of
complaint to the NBI for the manufacture of fake “Spalding” balls by UNIVERSAL.
▰ A search warrant was issued, causing the confiscation of basketballs and
volleyballs marked Spalding. Three days later, another search warrant was issued
to seal and padlock the molds, rubber mixer and boiler in UNIVERSAL’s factory.
▰ QUESTOR and PROLINE filed a criminal complaint for unfair competition. The
Minister of Justice overturned the earlier dismissal and ordered the filing of an
information for unfair competition.
▰ The trial court ruled in favor of UNIVERSAL after the prosecution failed to prove
that there was a sale of the goods, a necessary element in the crime.
▰ UNIVERSAL filed a civil case for damages against QUESTOR and PROLINE for
maliciously and without legal basis procuring search warrants, causing the sealing
and padlocking of their premises, and initiating criminal prosecution against them.
8
PROLINE SPORTS CENTER V. CA

▰ Issue: Whether UNIVERSAL is entitled to recover damages for the alleged


wrongful recourse to court proceedings by PROLINE and QUESTOR?
▰ Held: No. UNIVERSAL was unable to prove the elements of malicious
prosecution against PROLINE and QUESTOR, namely: 1) absence of probable
cause and 2) legal malice.
▻ There was no legal malice but an honest belief that the charge was meritorious. No evidence
that PROLINE and QUESTOR were solely impelled by desire to inflict needless harm and
vexation on UNIVERSAL’s business interests. PROLINE’s resort to judicial processes is not per
se evidence of ill will but was a sound judgment in taking necessary steps to safeguard the
interests of his principal, QUESTOR. If the process resulted in the closure and padlocking of
the UNIVERSAL’s factory and the company incurring litigation expenses from having to
defend itself, such were unavoidable consequences of PROLINE’s valid and lawful exercise
of their right. The expenses and annoyance of litigation form part of the social burden of living
in a society controlled by law.

9
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

Case Damage Wrong/Injury Actionable?

Legal duty/obligation of Kalaw as


general manager to “execute contracts
necessary and essential to proper
accomplishment of NACOCO’s purpose,
P1,343,274.52 worth of settlements paid upon prior approval of the Board” based
Board of Liquidators
by Board of Liquidators to buyers in on by-laws. No
v. Heirs of Kalaw Kalaw contracts
However,
• Board by its acts and acquiescence
gave implied authority
• Loss due to 4 consecutive typhoons

Valid and legal exercise of PROLINE’s


right to resort to judicial process in
• Closure and padlocking of factory order to safeguard interests of principal
Proline v. CA No
• Litigation expenses QUESTOR.
• No desire to inflict needless harm
but honest belief of merits of charge.

10
2
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
Cases

11
LAST CLEAR CHANCE

▰ When does Last Clear Chance apply?


▻ Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or
▻ When it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should
be attributed to the incident
(Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA)

12
The person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence
of the other party.
Picart v. Smith

13
PICART v. SMITH

▰ Picart was riding his pony while crossing a bridge 75 meters long and 4.8 meters
wide. He was on the right side of the road although he should be on the left side.

▰ Smith was driving his automobile at 10-12 mph on the same side as Picart from the
other end. As Smith neared the bridge, he saw the horseman and blew his horn.

▰ Instead of going to the left side, Picart pulled the pony closely up against the railing
on the right side of the bridge, thinking there was not enough time to cross to the
other side.

▰ Smith continued driving on the same side without reducing speed.

▰ When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting
across to the other side, Smith quickly turned his car to the right to escape hitting
the horse. The automobile passed so close to the animal that it became frightened
and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it
was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was
broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
14
PICART v. SMITH

▰ Picart was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of
the road. In such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately
and directly responsible.

▰ The negligence of the defendant Smith succeeded the


negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances, the law is that the person who has the last
fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party.
▰ It was not within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a
place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the
defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing
that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing
this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. 15
Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to
determine whose negligence — the plaintiff's or the defendant's —
was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not
simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, by
the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate."
Pheonix Construction v. IAC

16
PHEONIX CONSTRUCTION v. IAC

▰ At about 1:30AM, Dionisio was on his way home from a dinner meeting where he had
taken "a shot or two" of liquor. He was driving his Volkswagen car and had just
crossed the intersection of Gen. Lacuna and Gen. Santos Streets and was proceeding
down Gen. Lacuna Street, when his car headlights allegedly failed. He switched his
headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away
from his car.
▰ The dump truck, owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. and driven by Carbonel was
parked on the right hand side of Gen. Lacuna Street, facing the oncoming traffic.
▰ The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner
as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were
no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices
▰ Dionisio tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and
his car smashed into the dump truck. Dionisio suffered some physical injuries
including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of 2 gold
bridge dentures.
17
PHEONIX CONSTRUCTION v. IAC

▰ Legal and proximate cause was the negligence of petitioner Carbonel


▻ The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability
not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or
reflector devices.

▰ Donisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck


driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an
efficient intervening or independent cause.
▻ Petitioners argue that Dionisio had the “last clear chance.” However, the task of the courts is
not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to
imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate.“ The Court’s real duty is to
determine whose negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.

▻ Consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts (Art. 2179, CC).
18
A jeep at 30kph coming towards a truck that had been
brought to a full stop while 30m away, has the last clear
chance to avoid collision by stopping in his turn or swerving
his jeep away from the truck.
Glan People’s Lumber v. CA

19
GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER v. CA

▰ At about 1:45PM, Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan
Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached from the South
Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City
▰ At about that time, the cargo truck driven by defendant Zacarias, coming from the
opposite direction of Davao City had just crossed said bridge.
▰ At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a
consequence of which Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries.
Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly
damaged while the left side of the jeep was extensively damaged. After the impact, the
jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the
truck.
▰ The instant case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late
Engineer Calibo against the driver and owners of the cargo truck.

20
GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER v. CA

▰ Even ignoring the telltale indicia of negligence on the part of Calibo, and assuming some
antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in failing to keep within his designated lane,
the physical facts would still absolve the latter of any actionable responsibility for the
accident under the rule of the last clear chance.
▰ Both drivers had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance of 150 meters.
Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of approximately 30kph. The respondents Calibo
et al. have admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it,
and the truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still 30 meters away.
▰ From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what
judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident,
while still at that distance of 30 meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving
his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a
speed of only 30kph.
▰ In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely
rely on a supposed right to expect the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.
21
Antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery
of damages for supervening negligence of another if the latter,
who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence.

LBC Air Cargo v. CA

22
LBC AIR CARGO v. CA

▰ Monterola, on his Suzuki motorcycle, was headed towards Mangagoy on the


right lane along a national road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur, while the LBC air
cargo van driven by Tano was coming from the opposite direction, on the way to
the airport.
▰ Approaching the airport road to his left, Tano saw two vehicles racing from the
opposite direction which formed clouds of dust making visibility extremely bad.
▰ Instead of waiting for the dust to settle, Tano made a sharp left turn towards
the airport road, and as he was about to reach the center of the right lane, the
motorcycle emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the cargo van,
killing the former’s driver.
▰ A criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against Tano,
as well as a civil suit for damages.
23
LBC AIR CARGO v. CA

▰ The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Tano.


Tano should not have made a left turn under the conditions admitted
by him.
▻ Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, before a driver turns from a direct line, in this
case to the left, the driver must first see to it that there are no approaching vehicles and, if
there are, to make the turn only if it can be made in safety, or at the very least give a signal
that is plainly visible to the driver of such other vehicle.

▰ Tano’s invocation of the doctrine of last clear chance fails.


▻ From the facts, it was seen that the victim was traveling along the lane where he was rightly
supposed to be.

▻ The incident occurred in an instant, where no appreciable time had elapsed, from the moment
Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact, that could have afforded the victim a last clear
opportunity to avoid the collision.
24
Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.

Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA

25
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v. CA

▰ This case stemmed from a complaint filed by the respondent Rommel's Marketing
Corporation (RMC) to recover from the Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the sum of
P304,979.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current account with said bank
but which were not credited to its account, and were instead deposited to the account of one
Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner
bank.

▰ RMC maintained 2 current accounts with the Pasig branch of PBC. Romeo Lipana, President
of RMC, entrusted RMC funds to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said
funds in the current accounts of RMC. These deposits were deposited in the account of
Bienvenido Cotas, husband of Irene.
▰ Irene’s modus operandi: She would accomplish 2 copies of the deposit slip. The original showed the
name of her husband as depositor and his account number. On the duplicate copy was written the
account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller,
Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these
deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip.

▰ After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate
copy and change the account number written thereon, which is that of her husband's, and make it
appear to be RMC's account number. 26
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v. CA

▰ Under the doctrine of "last clear chance“, PBC was indeed the culpable party.
▻ This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act
of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening
negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the
last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.

▰ Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in


entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter
with the opportunity to defraud the company, it cannot be denied that
the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to
avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing
their self-imposed validation procedure. 27
LAST CLEAR CHANCE

Case Facts Contributory negligence? Who had last clear chance? Liable?

Picart’s horse was stopped on the Smith, since his negligence


Yes, on the part of Picart because
Picart v. Smith left side of the lane. Smith’s car
he was on the wrong lane.
succeeded the negligence of Smith is liable.
sped towards it, swerving too late. Picart by an appreciable interval.

Phoenix Dionisio’s car, smashed into a Carbonel, because his negligence


Yes, on the part of Dionisio
Construction v. dump truck driven by Carbonel that
because his headlights were off.
was the proximate cause, although Carbonel is liable.
IAC was parked askew. his negligence preceded Dionisio’s

Glan People’s Calibo’s jeep, zigzagging, collided


None, Zacarias was on the correct Calibo, because he had sufficient
Lumber v. CA with Zacarias’ truck which was at a
lane. time to stop or swerve.
Zacarias is NOT liable.
stop 30m away

LBC Air Cargo v. Tano, in a van, made a hasty left Yes, on the part of Monterola
Tano, who had the duty to
CA check/signal before turning under
turn and crashed into Monterola’s because he was running fast
the Land Transportation and
Tano is liable.
motorcyle on a dusty road. despite poor visibility.
Traffic Code.

Philippine Bank of An employee of RMC defrauded Yes, RMC was negligent in


The PBC bank teller, who failed to
Commerce v. CA RMC by depositing RMC checks in entrusting cash to a dishonest
observe validation procedure.
The bank is liable.
her husband’s account in PBC. employee.

28
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

Case Damage Wrong/Injury Actionable?


Legal duty/obligation of Kalaw as
general manager to “execute contracts
necessary and essential to proper
accomplishment of NACOCO’s purpose,
P1,343,274.52 worth of settlements paid upon prior approval of the Board” based
Board of Liquidators
by Board of Liquidators to buyers in on by-laws. No
v. Heirs of Kalaw Kalaw contracts
However,
• Board by its acts and acquiescence
gave implied authority
• Loss due to 4 consecutive typhoons

Valid and legal exercise of PROLINE’s


right to resort to judicial process in
• Closure and padlocking of factory order to safeguard interests of principal
Proline v. CA No
• Litigation expenses QUESTOR.
• No desire to inflict needless harm
but honest belief of merits of charge.

29
THANK YOU!

30

You might also like