Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
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There cannot be an actionable wrong if either
damage or wrong is absent.
Board of Liquidators v. Heirs of Kalaw
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BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS V. HEIRS OF KALAW
▰ In a suit against Louis, Dreytus & Go who was one of the buyers under one of the
contracts, the Board of Liquidators (acting for a dissolved NACOCO),
compromised for P567,000.
▰ NACOCO tried to recover the settlements it made from several of its buyers, from
general manager Kalaw. NACOCO alleges that Kalaw was negligent for having
entered into the questioned contracts without prior approval of the Board of
Directors to the prejudice of the corporation and for having subsequently
approving the said contracts in bad faith/breach of trust.
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BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS V. HEIRS OF KALAW
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PROLINE SPORTS CENTER V. CA
▰ QUESTOR, the US-based owner of the trademark “Spalding” and PROLINE, the
exclusive distributor of “Spalding” products in the Philippines sent a letter of
complaint to the NBI for the manufacture of fake “Spalding” balls by UNIVERSAL.
▰ A search warrant was issued, causing the confiscation of basketballs and
volleyballs marked Spalding. Three days later, another search warrant was issued
to seal and padlock the molds, rubber mixer and boiler in UNIVERSAL’s factory.
▰ QUESTOR and PROLINE filed a criminal complaint for unfair competition. The
Minister of Justice overturned the earlier dismissal and ordered the filing of an
information for unfair competition.
▰ The trial court ruled in favor of UNIVERSAL after the prosecution failed to prove
that there was a sale of the goods, a necessary element in the crime.
▰ UNIVERSAL filed a civil case for damages against QUESTOR and PROLINE for
maliciously and without legal basis procuring search warrants, causing the sealing
and padlocking of their premises, and initiating criminal prosecution against them.
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PROLINE SPORTS CENTER V. CA
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DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
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2
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
Cases
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LAST CLEAR CHANCE
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The person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence
of the other party.
Picart v. Smith
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PICART v. SMITH
▰ Picart was riding his pony while crossing a bridge 75 meters long and 4.8 meters
wide. He was on the right side of the road although he should be on the left side.
▰ Smith was driving his automobile at 10-12 mph on the same side as Picart from the
other end. As Smith neared the bridge, he saw the horseman and blew his horn.
▰ Instead of going to the left side, Picart pulled the pony closely up against the railing
on the right side of the bridge, thinking there was not enough time to cross to the
other side.
▰ When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting
across to the other side, Smith quickly turned his car to the right to escape hitting
the horse. The automobile passed so close to the animal that it became frightened
and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it
was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was
broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
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PICART v. SMITH
▰ Picart was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of
the road. In such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately
and directly responsible.
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PHEONIX CONSTRUCTION v. IAC
▰ At about 1:30AM, Dionisio was on his way home from a dinner meeting where he had
taken "a shot or two" of liquor. He was driving his Volkswagen car and had just
crossed the intersection of Gen. Lacuna and Gen. Santos Streets and was proceeding
down Gen. Lacuna Street, when his car headlights allegedly failed. He switched his
headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away
from his car.
▰ The dump truck, owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. and driven by Carbonel was
parked on the right hand side of Gen. Lacuna Street, facing the oncoming traffic.
▰ The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner
as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were
no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices
▰ Dionisio tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and
his car smashed into the dump truck. Dionisio suffered some physical injuries
including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of 2 gold
bridge dentures.
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PHEONIX CONSTRUCTION v. IAC
▻ Consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts (Art. 2179, CC).
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A jeep at 30kph coming towards a truck that had been
brought to a full stop while 30m away, has the last clear
chance to avoid collision by stopping in his turn or swerving
his jeep away from the truck.
Glan People’s Lumber v. CA
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GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER v. CA
▰ At about 1:45PM, Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan
Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached from the South
Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City
▰ At about that time, the cargo truck driven by defendant Zacarias, coming from the
opposite direction of Davao City had just crossed said bridge.
▰ At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a
consequence of which Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries.
Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly
damaged while the left side of the jeep was extensively damaged. After the impact, the
jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the
truck.
▰ The instant case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late
Engineer Calibo against the driver and owners of the cargo truck.
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GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER v. CA
▰ Even ignoring the telltale indicia of negligence on the part of Calibo, and assuming some
antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in failing to keep within his designated lane,
the physical facts would still absolve the latter of any actionable responsibility for the
accident under the rule of the last clear chance.
▰ Both drivers had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance of 150 meters.
Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of approximately 30kph. The respondents Calibo
et al. have admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it,
and the truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still 30 meters away.
▰ From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what
judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident,
while still at that distance of 30 meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving
his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a
speed of only 30kph.
▰ In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely
rely on a supposed right to expect the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.
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Antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery
of damages for supervening negligence of another if the latter,
who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence.
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LBC AIR CARGO v. CA
▻ The incident occurred in an instant, where no appreciable time had elapsed, from the moment
Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact, that could have afforded the victim a last clear
opportunity to avoid the collision.
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Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.
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PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v. CA
▰ This case stemmed from a complaint filed by the respondent Rommel's Marketing
Corporation (RMC) to recover from the Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the sum of
P304,979.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current account with said bank
but which were not credited to its account, and were instead deposited to the account of one
Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner
bank.
▰ RMC maintained 2 current accounts with the Pasig branch of PBC. Romeo Lipana, President
of RMC, entrusted RMC funds to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said
funds in the current accounts of RMC. These deposits were deposited in the account of
Bienvenido Cotas, husband of Irene.
▰ Irene’s modus operandi: She would accomplish 2 copies of the deposit slip. The original showed the
name of her husband as depositor and his account number. On the duplicate copy was written the
account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller,
Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these
deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip.
▰ After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate
copy and change the account number written thereon, which is that of her husband's, and make it
appear to be RMC's account number. 26
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v. CA
▰ Under the doctrine of "last clear chance“, PBC was indeed the culpable party.
▻ This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act
of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening
negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the
last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
Case Facts Contributory negligence? Who had last clear chance? Liable?
LBC Air Cargo v. Tano, in a van, made a hasty left Yes, on the part of Monterola
Tano, who had the duty to
CA check/signal before turning under
turn and crashed into Monterola’s because he was running fast
the Land Transportation and
Tano is liable.
motorcyle on a dusty road. despite poor visibility.
Traffic Code.
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DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
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THANK YOU!
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