Disini v.

The Secretary of Justice

Case Summary and Outcome

The Supreme Court of Philippines declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 as unconstitutional. It held that Section 4(c)(3) violated the right to
freedom of expression by prohibiting the electronic transmission of unsolicited commercial
communications. It found Section 12 in violation of the right to privacy because it lacked
sufficient specificity and definiteness in collecting real-time computer data. It struck down
Section 19 of the Act for giving the government the authority to restrict or block access to
computer data without any judicial warrant.

Facts

The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court of the Philippines on the
constitutionality of several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, Act No. 10175.

The Petitioners argued that even though the Act is the government’s platform in combating illegal
cyberspace activities, 21 separate sections of the Act violate their constitutional rights, particularly
the right to freedom of expression and access to inforamtion.

In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the duration of a temporary restraining order
against the government to halt enforcement of the Act until the adjudication of the issues.

Decision Overview

Justice Abad delivered the Court’s opinion.

The government of Philippines adopted the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 for the purpose
of regulating access to and use of cyberspace. Several sections of the law define relevant cyber
crimes and enable the government to track down and penalize violators.

Among 21 challenged sections, the Court declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Act as
unconstitutional.

Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic communications,

commonly known as spams, that seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale of products and services
unless the recipient affirmatively consents, or when the purpose of the communication is for
service or administrative announcements from the sender to its existing users, or “when the
following conditions are present: (aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a
simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic
messages (opt-out) from the same source; (bb) The commercial electronic communication does
not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message; and (cc) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of the message in
order to induce the recipients to read the message.”
The government argued that unsolicited commercial communications amount to both nuisance
and trespass because they tend to interfere with the enjoyment of using online services and that
they enter the recipient’s domain without prior permission.
The Court first noted that spams are a category of commercial speech, which does not receive the
same level of protection as other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression ,”but is
nonetheless entitled to protection.” It ruled that the prohibition on transmitting unsolicited
communications “would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial
ads addressed to him.” Accordingly, the Court declared Section4(c)(3) as unconstitutional.
Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement without a court warrant “to collect or record
traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a
computer system.” Traffic data under this Section includes the origin, destination, route, size,
date, and duration of the communication, but not its content nor the identity of users.

The Petitioners argued that such warrantless authority curtails their civil liberties and set the
stage for abuse of discretion by the government. They also claimed that this provision violates the
right to privacy and protection from the government’s intrusion into online communications.
According to the Court, since Section 12 may lead to disclosure of private communications, it must
survive the rational basis standard of whether it is narrowly tailored towards serving a
government’s compelling interest. The Court found that the government did have a compelling
interest in preventing cyber crimes by monitoring real-time traffic data.
As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the Court first recognized that the right at
stake concerned informational privacy, defined as “the right not to have private information
disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.” In determining whether
a communication is entitled to the right of privacy, the Court applied a two-part test: (1) Whether
the person claiming the right has a legitimate expectation of privacy over the communication, and
(2) whether his expectation of privacy can be regarded as objectively reasonable in the society.

The Court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable expectation of privacy over their
communications transmitted online. However, it did not find the expectation as objectively
reasonable because traffic data sent through internet “does not disclose the actual names and
addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded Internet Protocol
(IP) addresses.”

Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section 12 does not enjoy the
objective reasonable expectation of privacy, the existence of enough data may reveal the personal
information of its sender or recipient, against which the Section fails to provide sufficient
safeguard. The Court viewed the law as “virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities
to engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing whatever specified communication they want.”

Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity and definiteness as to ensure
respect for the right to privacy.

Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to a computer data
found to be in violation of the Act. The Petitioners argued that this section also violated the right
to freedom of expression, as well as the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes a personal property, entitled to
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Also, the Philippines’ Constitution
requires the government to secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to seize a personal
property or to block a form of expression. Because Section 19 precluded any judicial intervention,
the Court found it unconstitutional.

Antonio Villegas vs Abelardo Subido

Then Metro Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas approved the appointing of 91 women
street sweepers in the City of Manila. But the appointing would still have to be approved by
the Office of Civil Service Commission under Commissioner Abelardo Subido. Subido refused
to extend approval to such appointments on the ground that appointing women to manual
labor is against Memorandum Circular No. 18 series of 1964. Subido pointed out that putting
women workers with men workers outside under the heat of the sun and placing them under
manual labor exposes them to contempt and ridicule and constitutes a violation of the
traditional dignity and respect accorded Filipino womanhood. Villegas however pointed out
that the said Memo has already been set aside by the Office of the President hence the same
is no longer in effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of said women workers should be confirmed by the
Civil Service Commissioner.
HELD: Yes, the appointments must be confirmed. The basis of Subido was not on any law
or rule but simply on his own concept of what policy to pursue, in this instance in accordance
with his own personal predilection. Here he appeared to be unalterably convinced that to
allow women laborers to work outside their offices as street sweepers would run counter to
Filipino tradition. A public official must be able to point to a particular provision of law or rule
justifying the exercise of a challenged authority.
Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The
government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and
enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of
discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act.
There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a
valid grant, they are devoid of power. It must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be
permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. Neither the high dignity of the office nor
the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law
becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid.

Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v CA 348 SCRA 265 December 15, 2000

Facts: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school paper were
subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed
before the Board following the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually
explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a
written statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants,
instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have
the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the
defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for
prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of
said Discipline Board over the defendants.

Issue: WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants.

Held: The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and the Disciplinary
Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution
guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to
attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare
calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate
upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always
absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out
disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus
Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the
articles they write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to investigate is
an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and
regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning.
That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions
of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the authority
to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.
PT&T vs NLRC

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as
“Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as
reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as
replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and
July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee
where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form
under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When
petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a
memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder
about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from
the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993
declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular
employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an
employee.

HELD:

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free
to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best
business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and
by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved
principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the
company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the
labor code:

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition
of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated,
or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason
of marriage.”
 The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the
right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her
freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable
right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as
an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be
prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the
laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.

SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands
concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer
for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a
temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since
the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor
dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules
and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court
may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides
guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as
strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that
may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service
Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike
by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action
which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any
legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government
employees” and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by
the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor
disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of
injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

PASEI vs DRILON
163 SCRA 380

Facts:Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the

recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the
Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims
that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to
all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is
in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power.
Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation
in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided
by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the
challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral
agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to
ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue:Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department
Order No. 1.

Decision:SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the
Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the
special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies
only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not
import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification,
provided that:

1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the
deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to
travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may
be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of
police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general
welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE
with rule making powers.