offended party, did expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and,
therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-51813-14. November 29, 1983.]
ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, Petitioners, v. HON.
NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, and
FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, Respondents.
Froilan M. Bacungan and Alfredo F. Tadiar, for Petitioners.
The Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; LITIGATION BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL COURT; BY WHOM CONDUCTED. —
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the municipal court a party may
conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for the purpose. Thus, in the
case of Laput v. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case
pending before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to
property through reckless imprudence.
2. ID.; ID.; APPEARANCE OF PRIVATE PROSECUTOR; PERMISSION OF FISCAL NOT REQUIRED.
— The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In
the first place, the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the
case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor’s participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the
trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor,
he can just manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the
prosecution of the case: under his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can
appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with
more reason should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and control of
the trial fiscal.
3. ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION FOR LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES; COMPLAINANT ENTITLED
TO ASSISTANCE OF A NON-LAWYER FRIEND IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE CIVIL ACTION IF
NOT EXPRESSLY WAIVED NOR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY IS MADE. — In
the two criminal cases, filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the
Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of
the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SECTION 34, RULE 138, RULES OF COURT; "A PARTY" WHO MAY CONDUCT
HIS LITIGATION IN THE COURT OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, CONSTRUED. — Section 34,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a party" who may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court of a Justice of
the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550
of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila. is not a "party" within the meaning of the said
Rule. The parties in a criminal case are the accused and the People. A complaining witness or an
offended party only intervenes in a criminal action in respect of the civil liability. The case of Laput end
Salas v. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only In respect of the accused, an a "party," in a criminal
case.
2. ID.; SECTIONS 4 AND 15, RULE 110 OF THE RULES OF COURT; CONTROLLING AND TAKE
PRECEDENCE OVER SECTION 34, RULE 138. — Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
being the more specific provisions in respect of criminal cases, should take precedence over Section 34,
Rule 138 and should be controlling (Bagatsing v. Hon. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4
provides that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control of the Fiscal, while Section 15
specially provides that the offended party may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of
the offense.
DECISION
RELOVA, J.:
Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then
Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B.
Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for
less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively,
as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion for reconsideration holding, among
others, that "the fiscal’s claim that appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in
places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are to allow non-
members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being
friends of the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to
naught." (p. 25, Rollo)
Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints
against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively,
and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of Parañaque,
Metro Manila.
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the U.P.
College of Law where, as part of the curriculum of the university they were required to render legal
assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners Malana
and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein
respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and respondent
judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the
appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise,
on September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that the Orders
of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are in plain
violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a temporary
restraining order "enjoining respondent judge and all persons acting for and in his behalf from
conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines v. Danilo San
Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of Parañaque,
Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such dates as may be fixed by said
respondent judge."
Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
"SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar."
Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is authorized to appear in court and
conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an
attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by
an attorney.
On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110
of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the private prosecutor
as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners Malana and
Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide:
"SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or
by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.
x x x
"SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Unless the offended party has waived
the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately from the criminal action, and
subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the
prosecution of the offense."cralaw virtua1aw library
And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and
control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case later on,
requires the prior approval of the fiscal.
We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the
municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for
the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput v. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to represent
the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who was
charged for damages to property through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was
committed in the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of
Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary
for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this
condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private
prosecutor’s participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if
the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that
the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision
and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the
accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to appear as
private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.
In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the
offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and,
therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant
Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of
the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979
which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of
party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan, are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby
ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of
Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 is
LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. Senior law students should study their lessons and prepare for the bar. They have no business
appearing in court.chanrobles.com :
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a party" who may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court of a
Justice of the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuban, as the complaining witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549
and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning
of the said Rule. The parties in a criminal case are the accused and the People. A complaining witness
or an offended party only intervene in a criminal action in respect of the civil liability. The case of Laput
and Salas v. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in respect of the accused, as a "party", in a criminal
case.
Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific provisions in respect of
criminal cases, should take precedence over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be controlling (Bagatsing
v. Hon. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 11976]). Section 4 provides that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the Fiscal, while Section 15 specifically provides that the offended
party may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated August 16, 1979, disallowing
the appearances of petitioners as private prosecutors in the above-mentioned criminal cases.
Teehankee and De Castro, JJ., concurs.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES,
RESPONDENTS
Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where
his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court
En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts
as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was
with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing
him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear
as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation
of trial.
Issue:
whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party litigant
Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues
and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal
capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose,
or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by
aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of
the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
FERDINAND A. CRUZ v. JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, et al.
G.R. No. 154464, 11 September 2008, THIRD DIVISION, (Nachura, J.)
The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern
that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus,
a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyer's assistance, effectively undertake the
successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law
student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the
perils incident to this decision.
Petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz sought permission to enter his appearance for and on
his behalf, before the Regional Trial Court Pasay City, as the plaintiff in a Civil Case for
Abatement of Nuisance. Cruz, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation
personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required Cruz to secure a written
permission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for
himself, a party-litigant. The opposing counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial
brief to which Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after
the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, "Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa
sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next
hearing on May 2, 2002.
Petitioner Cruz then filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, praying for the
voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of
the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious
remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for
remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be
served.
Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous
allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary
inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner Cruz filed a
motion for reconsideration of the said order which was also denied in an order wherein his
appearance was also denied for the failure of Cruz to submit the promised document and
jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court.

In a motion for reconsideration, Cruz reiterated that the basis of his appearance was
not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and
are applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking
Rule 138-A.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Judge Mijares acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
RULE
138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law
curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial
court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the
legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student authorized
by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the
law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other
papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic.
Judge Mijares held that Cruz could not appear for himself and on his behalf
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she denied the appearance of Cruz as party litigant
and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case
HELD:
Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A specifically the failure of Cruz to prove on
record that he is enrolled in a recognized school's clinical legal education program and is
under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
However, Cruz insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule
138, which provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice
of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally
or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.
This rule recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to
which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with
the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly
authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the
course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the litigation. Therefore, Cruz as
plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation the Civil Case. He would then
be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the Cruz is a law student
and must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in
applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner's claim is Section 34 of Rule 138.
The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of
Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the
guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the
instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court
through Rule 138-A.
Cruz alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate
the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this decision.
In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section
34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need
of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who,
as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.
Additionally, however, Cruz contends that Judge Mijares committed manifest bias and
partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged
negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: "Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa
Huwes. Ok?" It must be noted that because of this incident, Cruz filed an administrative case
against Judge Mijares for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which the Court
dismissed for lack of merit. We now adopt the Court's findings of fact in the administrative
case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she
did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.
In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice
by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular
trial, as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound
discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on
her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her.
Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this
Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1823 August 28, 2006
ARCELY Y. SANTOS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City,
Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch 30, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative complaint filed by Arcely Y. Santos ("complainant") against Judge Ubaldino
A. Lacurom ("respondent judge"), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch 30. Complainant charged respondent judge with gross
misconduct, grave abuse of judicial authority, gross bias and partiality, and gross violation of the
Code of Judicial Ethics.
The Facts
The complaint stemmed from respondent judge’s alleged bias and partiality in favor of one Rogelio
R. Santos, Sr. ("Santos"), who had three pending cases1 before respondent judge’s sala, as shown
by the following:
1. Respondent judge allowed Santos, a non-lawyer, to appear in court and litigate personally the
three cases. Complainant pointed out that Santos was already represented by counsels2 who have
not withdrawn their appearances. Complainant alleged that respondent judge is guilty of gross
misconduct and grave abuse of judicial discretion for having allowed a non-lawyer to engage in the
practice law.
In Special Proceedings Case No. 516-AF, respondent judge, in an Order3 dated 28 February 2003,
even "appointed" Santos as lead counsel for the petitioners. As early as 26 September 2002,
complainant had been questioning the appearance of Santos as "counsel" during the proceedings in
court.4 On 11 November 2002, complainant filed a motion to expunge a pleading signed by Santos,
claiming that Santos, a non-lawyer, is not allowed to sign pleadings.5 In a Joint Resolution dated 7
February 2003, respondent judge denied complainant’s motion and stated that Santos is qualified to
conduct his litigation personally.6 Then on 20 February 2003, complainant filed a motion to
reconsider the Joint Resolution and suggested that, since Santos is now representing himself and, at
6
the same time, is being represented by counsel, respondent judge should appoint a member of the
Bar as lead counsel.7
On the other hand, complainant alleged that she and the other oppositors were not allowed to
address the court directly and respondent judge even compelled them, under the pain of contempt, to
secure the services of a lawyer to represent them.
2. Respondent judge always granted, with dispatch, all the pleadings of Santos.
3. Respondent judge had unduly delayed the execution of the 28 April 2000 Court of Appeals’
decision against Santos in Cadastral Case No. 384-AF.
4. Respondent judge denied complainant’s letter-request8 dated 16 March 2001 for respondent judge
to inhibit himself from the cases to avoid suspicion of bias, prejudice, conflict of interest and partiality.
Complainant alleged that respondent judge used his office to advance and protect the interests of
Santos, respondent judge’s "close friend," to the prejudice of complainant and in violation of Canon
29 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Code).
Complainant pointed out that in an earlier case10 respondent judge inhibited himself because Santos
is respondent judge’s "close friend."11
Complainant also added that respondent judge refused to inhibit himself because he was protecting
his interest in Villa Benita Subdivision ("subdivision"). Complainant explained that all three cases
involved properties in the subdivision12 and that respondent judge is an incorporator,13 a director, an
officer and a legal adviser14 of Villa Benita Homeowners Association ("VBHA"). VBHA allegedly filed
several cases before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) against Fabern’s Inc.
and complainant. Complainant asserted that respondent judge had personal knowledge of the facts
of the HLURB cases. Complainant added that in refusing to inhibit himself, respondent judge violated
Rule 3.12 (a)15 and Canon 516 of the Code.
In its 1st Indorsement dated 15 May 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required
respondent judge to comment on complainant’s allegations and to show cause why he should not be
sanctioned as a member of the Bar for violation of Canon 9, Rule 9.0117 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In an Answer dated 27 June 2003, respondent judge offered the following explanations:
1. Respondent judge, citing Section 34, Rule 13818 of the Rules of Court (Rules), admitted that he
allowed Santos to litigate personally his cases before the court.
On Special Proceedings Case No. 516-AF, respondent judge explained that he merely "recognized"
Santos as lead counsel because his counsel was often absent from the proceedings.19 Respondent
judge added that complainant’s counsel did not object to the appointment of Santos as lead counsel,
but merely suggested that lead counsel should be a member of the Bar. Respondent judge also
added that, if complainant did not agree with respondent judge’s decision on the matter, complainant
should have filed a petition for certiorari.
Respondent judge also explained that complainant was allowed to address the court directly, though
not at length because complainant was represented by counsel.
2. Respondent judge denied that he always granted the pleadings of Santos.
3. Respondent judge denied that the Court of Appeals’ decision in Cadastral Case No. 384-AF has
remained unenforced because of his bias in favor of Santos. Respondent judge stated that he had
ordered the implementation of the decision as early as 25 September 200020 and issued a writ of
execution on 25 October 2002.21
4. Respondent judged stated that he denied complainant’s request to inhibit himself because he can
fairly hear and decide the cases.
On respondent judge’s inhibition in Civil Case No. 3074-AF, respondent judge explained that he
inhibited himself from the case because Santos was his "close friend," while respondents were not
respondent judge’s friends. In these cases, respondent judge pointed out that he was friends with
both Santos and the other parties22 to the cases, in effect, "neutralizing" respondent judge’s close
friendship with Santos.
Respondent judge explained that Santos became a "close friend" when Santos lent his portable
bunker to Dr. Ferdinand Lacurom ("Dr. Lacurom"), respondent judge’s son, during the construction of
Dr. Lacurom’s house in the subdivision. Respondent judge also admitted that the officers of Fabern’s
Inc. extended a favor to Dr. Lacurom when they facilitated the cementing of the road in front of Dr.
Lacurom’s house.23 However, respondent judge denied that he received any favor from Santos.
On the matter of VBHA, respondent judge denied that he had any interest to protect in the
subdivision, as respondent judge is not a landowner, or homeowner, or lessee in the subdivision.
Respondent judge clarified that Dr. Lacurom is the one who owns property in the subdivision and that
respondent judge stayed there only on some occasions. Respondent judge admitted that he is a
"nominal" incorporator and adviser of VBHA.24 Atty. Napoleon Reyes, president of VBHA, requested
respondent judge to agree to be an incorporator of VBHA "to lend a bit of prestige to the association."
However, respondent judge stated that his only participation in VBHA was to sign the registration
7
documents of VBHA. Respondent judge clarified that he never attended any of the meetings of
VBHA, nor has he any knowledge of any case filed by VBHA before the HLURB.
Respondent judge also stated that if complainant filed the proper motion for inhibition, he would have
granted the same.
The OCA’s Report and Recommendation
In its Report dated 21 November 2003, the OCA recommended that the complaint be re-docketed as
an administrative matter and that respondent judge be fined P5,000. The OCA found respondent
judge administratively liable for recognizing Santos as lead counsel despite the fact that Santos had
two counsels of record. The OCA did not find respondent judge liable for the delay in the execution of
the decision of the Court of Appeals in Cadastral Case No. 384-AF, as the delay was brought about
by the parties themselves. On respondent judge being an incorporator and adviser of VBHA and his
refusal to inhibit himself from the cases, the OCA opined that the subject cases are not covered by
the rule on mandatory disqualification of judges, hence, respondent judge’s inhibition rested upon his
own discretion.
In a Resolution dated 21 January 2004, the Court resolved to docket the case as a regular
administrative matter and required the parties to manifest within ten days from notice if they were
willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings on record. Respondent judge
manifested affirmatively. Complainant filed a memorandum dated 9 August 2004 reiterating her
allegations. In turn, respondent judge also submitted a memorandum on 21 August 2004.
Complainant filed the present administrative complaint on 5 May 2003 when respondent judge was
still presiding judge of Branch 29 and pairing judge of Branch 30. Respondent judge compulsorily
retired on 16 May 2003. However, his retirement does not render this administrative case moot.25
The Court’s Ruling
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in the complaint.26 In this case, complainant failed to prove that respondent judge granted
with dispatch all the pleadings of Santos and that respondent judge was responsible for the delay in
the execution of the Court of Appeals’ decision in Cadastral Case No. 384-AF. Hence, the Court
dismisses this particular charge.
On a Party’s Right to Self Representation
The Rules recognize the right of an individual to represent himself in any case in which he is a party.
The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and that
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. 27 The individual
litigant may personally do everything in the progress of the action from commencement to the
termination of the litigation.28 A party’s representation on his own behalf is not considered to be a
practice of law as "one does not practice law by acting for himself, any more than he practices
medicine by rendering first aid to himself."29
Therefore, Santos can conduct the litigation of the cases personally. Santos is not engaged in the
practice of law if he represents himself in cases in which he is a party. By conducting the litigation of
his own cases, Santos acts not as a counsel or lawyer but as a party exercising his right to represent
himself. Certainly, Santos does not become a counsel or lawyer by exercising such right.
The Court, however, notes the use of the disjunctive word "or" under the Rules, signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated,30 to mean
that a party must choose between self-representation or being represented by a member of the bar.
During the course of the proceedings, a party should not be allowed to shift from one form of
representation to another. Otherwise, this would lead to confusion, not only for the other party, but for
the court as well. If a party, originally represented by counsel, would later decide to represent
himself, the prudent course of action is to dispense with the services of counsel and prosecute or
defend the case personally.31
For the orderly administration of justice, respondent judge should not have allowed Santos to litigate
personally because Santos was already represented by counsel. Respondent judge should have
required Santos to choose between self-representation or being represented by counsel.
Moreover, respondent judge should not have recognized Santos as lead counsel. The "lead counsel"
is the lawyer on either side of a litigated action who is charged with the principal management and
direction of the party’s case, as distinguished from his collaborating counsels or subordinates. 32 In
recognizing Santos as "lead counsel", respondent judge made it appear that Santos was a counsel
or lawyer when he is not. To repeat, when a party represents himself in his own case, he does so not
as a counsel or lawyer but as a party exercising his right of self-representation.
On Respondent Judge’s Inhibition
The Court agrees with the OCA’s finding that respondent judge’s inhibition from the cases was
discretionary. The three cases do not fall under the instances covered by the rule on the mandatory
disqualification of judges33 and the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience
and sound discretion on the part of the judge.34
8
Besides, complainant did not follow the proper procedure for the disqualification of judges.
In Constante v. Pimentel,35 the Court ruled that the procedure for disqualification of judges in Section
2, Rule 13736 must be substantially followed.
On Respondent Judge’s Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
On respondent judge’s admission that Dr. Lacurom received a favor from the officers of Fabern’s
Inc., respondent judge violated Rule 5.0437 of the Code. Fabern’s Inc. is the petitioner in Cadastral
Case No. 384-AF, which was then pending before respondent judge’s sala. Respondent judge
should have advised Dr. Lacurom not to accept any favor from Fabern’s Inc. or from any of its
officers38 or principal stockholders. Judges, as occupants of exalted positions in the administration of
justice, must pay a high price for the honor bestowed on them.39 Their private, as well as their official
conduct, must always be free from the appearance of impropriety.40
On respondent judge’s close friendship with Santos, such fact did not render respondent judge guilty
of violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Santos did not influence
his official conduct as a judge in the cases where Santos was a party.41 Complainant failed to present
any convincing proof that respondent judge gave any undue privileges in his court to Santos, or that
Santos benefited from his personal relations with respondent judge, or that respondent judge used
his influence, if any, to favor Santos.
However, it would have been more prudent if respondent judge avoided hearing the cases where
Santos was a party because their close friendship could reasonably tend to raise suspicion that
respondent judge’s social relationship with Santos would be an element in his determination of the
cases of Santos.42 This may erode the trust of the litigants in respondent judge’s impartiality and
eventually, undermine the people’s faith in the administration of justice.43 Judges must not only
render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any
suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.44
On the Appropriate Penalty Against Respondent Judge
Respondent judge’s actuations constitute simple misconduct, a less serious charge punishable with
(a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for a period of not less than one month
but not more than three months; or (b) fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.45 However, considering that respondent judge had retired compulsorily on 16
May 2003 after twenty-eight years of service in the government and that this is respondent judge’s
first offense, the P10,000 withheld from his retirement benefits46 should be forfeited as sufficient
penalty for his administrative offense.47
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom GUILTY of simple
misconduct and ORDERS the FORFEITURE of the P10,000 withheld from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459 October 14, 2003
IMELDA Y. MADERADA, complainant,
vs.
Judge ERNESTO H. MEDIODEA, 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Cabatuan and Maasin,
Iloilo, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level court may -- without having to resign from
their posts -- conduct their own litigation in person as well as appear for and on their own behalf as
plaintiffs or defendants. However, appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff subjects the
employee to administrative liability.
The Case and the Facts
A Complaint1 dated January 3, 2002, was filed by Imelda Y. Maderada against Judge Ernesto H.
Mediodea of the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo. In the
Complaint, the judge was charged with "gross ignorance of the law amounting to grave misconduct"
for failing "to observe and apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure" in Civil Case No. 252.2
On September 7, 2001, complainant filed before the 12th MCTC of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo --
presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol -- an action for forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary
injunction, temporary restraining order (TRO) and damages3 covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. Because complainant was the clerk of court in the aforesaid sala, Judge Tersol inhibited
herself from the case. Thus, Executive Judge Tito Gustilo designated respondent judge to hear and
decide the case.
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In an Order4 dated September 13, 2001, respondent required the defendants in the civil case to show
cause why the preliminary injunction should not be granted. Respondent judge scheduled the
hearing on September 21, 2001, but defendants therein filed a Manifestation5 on September 17,
2001, praying that they be given an additional period of ten days to file an answer. After the
September 21 hearing, respondent reset the hearing to September 28, 2001. 6Meanwhile, the
defendants filed their Opposition7 to complainant’s prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO. The
September 28 hearing was held in abeyance after the defendants’ lawyer questioned the authority of
complainant to appear on behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.8 Respondent gave the
defendants ten days9 to file a motion to disqualify complainant from appearing as counsel and
thereafter to complainant to file her opposition thereto.
In his Order10 dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied the defendants’ Motion11 to disqualify
complainant from appearing on behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.
Complainant filed a total of three Motions12 praying for judgment to be rendered on the civil case. In
an Order13 dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied complainant’s Motions because of the
pending hearing for the issuance of a restraining order and an injunction. He likewise denied the
defendants’ Motion for extension of time to file an answer.14 Complainant did not ask for a
reconsideration of the denial of her Motion for Rendition of Judgment.
In his Comment15 on the Complaint, respondent contends that complainant filed a Petition for his
inhibition after filing two administrative cases against him. He argues that the mere filing of
administrative charges against judges is not a ground for disqualifying them from hearing cases. In
the exercise of their discretion, however, they may voluntarily disqualify themselves. It is worth noting
that respondent later inhibited himself from Civil Case No. 252. The case was then reassigned to
Judge Loida Maputol of the 14th MCTC, San Miguel-Alimodian-Leon, Iloilo.
Respondent avers that the delay in the resolution of the case cannot be attributed to him, considering
that he was mandated by law and the rules of procedure to pass upon every motion presented before
him.16 Besides, complainant allegedly failed to present evidence necessary for the immediate
resolution of her prayer for preliminary injunction.17 Moreover, she supposedly failed to exhaust the
remedies available to her to question the validity of his Orders. Instead, she tried to compel him to
render a decision on the case.18
Respondent likewise refutes complainant’s assertion that she appeared as counsel on her own
behalf because she could not afford the services of a lawyer. Such claim was allegedly without basis,
since her compensation and other benefits as clerk of court were more than enough to pay for the
services of counsel.19 He further alleges that she did not secure authority from this Court to appear as
counsel, and that she failed to file her leave of absence every time she appeared in court. 20
Evaluation and Recommendation of the Court Administrator
The OCA agreed with respondent that the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for in the
Complaint should first be resolved before judgment should be rendered in the principal action.
However, it opined that the prayer for preliminary injunction should have been decided within 30 days
from the filing thereof. It noted that both the motion for preliminary injunction and the principal action
for forcible entry remained unresolved even after four months had already lapsed since the filing of
Civil Case No. 252.1a\^/phi1.net
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of ₱1,000 with a
stern warning that a similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.21
It did not, however, find complainant completely faultless. It therefore undertook another round of
investigation, the subject of which was complainant’s appearance in court as counsel for herself and
on behalf of her co-plaintiff without court authority.
According to the OCA, officials and employees of the judiciary must devote their full time to
government service to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice. Although they are
not absolutely prohibited from engaging in a vocation or a profession, they should do so only with
prior approval of this Court. The OCA added that "[e]ngaging in any private business, vocation or
profession without prior approval of the Court is tantamount to moonlighting, which amounts to
malfeasance in office."22
Thus, it recommended that Complainant Maderada be fined in the amount of ₱1,000 for appearing
as counsel without authority from this Court, with a stern warning that any similar infraction in the
future would be dealt with more severely. The OCA also recommended that she be directed to file
her application for leaves of absence on the days she had appeared in court to litigate her case.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA, but modify the penalty to conform to
the rules.
Administrative Liability
The Rules of Court clearly provide that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, regardless of
the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.23 These actions are summary in nature, because they involve the disturbance
of the social order, which should be restored as promptly as possible.24 Designed as special civil
10
actions, they are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure to disencumber the courts from the
usual formalities of ordinary actions.25 Accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure that may
cause unnecessary delays should be carefully avoided.26 The actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are designed to provide expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved. Both are "time procedures" designed to bring immediate relief. 27
Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA, in an action for forcible entry, parties are entitled to the
provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of court actions or proceedings prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain from doing a
particular act or acts.28 It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it
is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.29Since this remedy is granted prior to the judgment
or final order, we agree with both the OCA and respondent that the prayer for preliminary injunction
should first be resolved before the main case of forcible entry is decided.
However, respondent should have resolved the Motion for Preliminary Injunction within 30 days from
its filing. There can be no mistaking the clear command of Section 15 of Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
"Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction -- The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession
against the plaintiff.
"A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within five
(5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his
possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof." (Italics
ours)
Judges have no other option but to obey. In fact, the provision uses the word "shall" to evince its
mandatory character. We cannot subscribe to the belief of respondent that since there was a prayer
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the main case for forcible entry would have to wait until
after he shall have decided the injunction plea, no matter how long it took. If that were so, then the
main case would lose its summary nature.
Respondent should have known that since a prayer for preliminary injunction is merely a provisional
remedy in an action for forcible entry, it should lend itself to the summary nature of the main case.
This is the very reason why the Rules of Court mandate that a preliminary injunction in a forcible
entry case be decided within 30 days from its filing. Preliminary injunctions and TROs are
extraordinary remedies provided by law for the speedy adjudication of an ejectment case in order to
save the dispossessed party from further damage during the pendency of the original action.
Time and time again, this Court has impressed upon judges the need to decide, promptly and
judiciously, cases and other matters pending before their courts.30 To a large extent, the public’s faith
and confidence in the judicial system is boosted by the judicious and prompt disposition of cases and
undermined by any delay thereof.31 Judges are thus enjoined to decide cases with dispatch.
Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction on them. Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifically obliges judges to dispose of
the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Often have we ruled that
their inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency.32 To avoid sanction, they should ask this Court for an extension and give their reasons
for the delay.
Although respondent is correct in asserting that he is mandated to rule on every motion, he cannot
use this excuse to evade the clear command of the rule that cases should be decided within the
prescribed period. This Court notes with concern the plethora of motions and pleadings filed in this
case, which should have been tried under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Yet, even after four
months had lapsed since the filing of the original Complaint for forcible entry, the prayer for
preliminary injunction and the main case remained unresolved.
Respondent is reminded that in order to meet the deadlines set for deciding cases, judges should at
all times remain in full control of the proceedings in their sala.33 They should not be at the mercy of
the whims of lawyers and parties, for it is not the latter’s convenience that should be the primordial
consideration, but the administration of justice.34 1awphi1.nét
To reiterate, judges are bound to dispose of the court’s business promptly and to decide cases within
the required period. They are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the
performance of their judicial functions and duties. As held by this Court in Gallego v. Acting Judge
Doronila:35
"We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge especially at a time when the clogging of
court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary whose present leadership has launched an all-out
program to minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket congestion and undue delay in the disposition of
cases. Judges are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their
judicial functions and duties."36
11
The prompt disposition of cases becomes even more pronounced when a municipal trial court is
called upon to decide a case governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure. As eloquently put by
Justice Jose C. Vitug, speaking for the Court in Cruz Jr. v. Judge Joven:37
"x x x. Being the paradigm of justice in the first instance, a municipal trial court judge, more than any
other colleague on the bench, is the immediate embodiment of how that trust is carried out. In the
evolvement of the public perception on the judiciary, there can likely be no greater empirical data that
influences it than the prompt and proper disposition of cases before the courts."38
We have often held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against erring
judges. Given the facts of this case, a fine of ₱10,000 is appropriate pursuant to current
jurisprudence39 and Rule 140.40
As to Complainant Maderada, the OCA recommended that she be fined in the amount of ₱1,000 for
supposedly engaging in a private vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court. The
Office of the Court Administrator held that her appearance as counsel for herself and on behalf of her
co-plaintiff was tantamount to moonlighting, a species of malfeasance in office.
Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private vocation or profession when she
appeared on her own behalf in court, the necessary implication was that she was in the practice of
law. We clarify. A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by law. Section 34 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
"SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with
the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar."
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress --
from its commencement to its termination.41 When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are
restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise,
ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded.42 Individuals have long been permitted to manage,
prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the
practice of law.43 "One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices
medicine by rendering first aid to himself."44
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or
vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by
rendering legal advise to others.45Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
"x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or
employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private
practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x."46 (Citations omitted)
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to
the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines profession in the collective sense as referring to "the members of
such a vocation."47In turn, vocation is defined as "a person’s regular calling or business; one’s
occupation or profession."48
The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to litigate their own case in court. The
right of complainant to litigate her case personally cannot be taken away from her. Her being an
employee of the judiciary does not remove from her the right to proceedings in propria persona or to
self-representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of a right cannot make one administratively liable.
Thus, we need not go into a discussion of the Court’s ruling in Cayetano v. Monsod49 regarding the
extent of the practice of law.
However, it was also clearly established that complainant had appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff
in the case below, for which act the former cannot be completely exonerated. Representing oneself is
different from appearing on behalf of someone else.
The raison d’etre for allowing litigants to represent themselves in court will not apply when a person
is already appearing for another party. Obviously, because she was already defending the rights of
another person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be argued that complainant was
merely protecting her rights. That their rights may be interrelated will not give complainant authority
to appear in court. The undeniable fact remains that she and her co-plaintiff are two distinct
individuals. The former may be impairing the efficiency of public service once she appears for the
latter without permission from this Court.
12
We cannot countenance any act that would undermine the people’s faith and confidence in the
judiciary, even if we consider that this was the first time complainant appeared in court, that she
appeared for her own sister, and that there was no showing she did so for a fee. Again we should be
reminded that everyone connected with an office that is charged with the dispensation of justice
carries a heavy burden of responsibility.50 Given these circumstances, the penalty of reprimand51 is
sufficient.

This Court reiterates its policy not to tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that falls short
of the exacting norms of public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image
of the judiciary. Thus, it will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its employees
in order not to diminish the people’s faith in our justice system. But when the charge has no basis, it
will not hesitate to shield the innocent court employee from any groundless accusation that trifles with
judicial processes,52 and that serves only to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice.53

WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea is hereby found GUILTY of gross

inefficiency in failing to observe the reglementary periods in deciding cases, and is FINED in the
amount of ₱10,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or of a similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely. On the other hand, Imelda Y. Maderada is hereby REPRIMANDED
for appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff without court authority and is likewise warned that
a future similar act shall be sanctioned more severely.1awphi1.nét

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Corona, J., on leave.

13