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In chapter two “Psychic Fact” of The Subject as Freedom, K.C Bhattacharyya explains the
notion of psychic fact and its criteria, in contrast to objective or empirical facts. He shows how
psychic fact is revealed through non-perceptual modes of knowledge, in contrast to perceptual
modes of knowledge. These non-perceptual modes legitimize more forms of knowledge than what
traditional western metaphysics permit. Furthermore, non-perceptual knowledge is accompanied
by greater spiritual freedom compared to perceptual, empirical knowledge. In this paper I will
present Bhattacharyya’s arguments for psychic fact, non-perceptual modes of knowledge, and
spiritual freedom
Bhattacharyya opens the chapter by explaining the process of psychological introspection as
part of the discipline of spiritual psychology. Spiritual psychology is different than empirical
psychology in that it interprets empirical psychological findings (e.g. our perception and knowledge
of objects) in terms of how they indicate our stage to spiritual freedom. Psychological introspection
is “a process of abstraction from the object of its modes of relatedness to the subject” (§25). In other
words, introspection is the process when we reflect on the fact that objects we experiences are not
mind-independent but are partly constituted by our subjectivity. It is awareness that reality isn’t all
that it seems. Introspection distances us from immediate experience and gives her greater freedom
or detachment from particulars. Without introspection, we are unknowingly dependent on
particular objects and circumstances of everyday life; these particulars have control over us. For
example, someone watches a movie and is calmed by this activity. She is engaged in this act and
unknowingly depends on the movie for her state of calmness. If there were suddenly a power
outage, she would be jarred out from her calmness and might feel exasperated. In contrast, if she
weren’t dependent on the particular object of the movie, and instead engaged in psychological
introspection, in this power outage she would not be affected. In introspection she would be
dependent on the fact or self-awareness that she is watching a movie; this fact is the object that she
perceives. In this way, introspection gives us greater freedom or detachment from particulars that
usually sway our state of being.
Bhattacharyya then introduces the notion psychic fact. Psychic fact is a character of an object,
similar but distinct from how color, softness, and warmth could all be characters of an object.
Ordinary characters or properties of an object are “first degree abstractions” (§25): they are empirical
facts of an object and have some mind-independent, objective substrate to them. In contrast,
psychic fact is a “second degree abstraction” (§25); it is the character of an object that appears when
we are engaged in psychological introspection on the first degree abstractions of an object. For
example, roughness might be a first degree abstraction of tree bark, which a person notices when
she lays her hand on a tree. If she engaged in introspection (e.g. distanced herself from this
immediate experience and reflected on the fact that the roughness of this tree is dependent on her
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relation to the tree), then the psychic fact of the tree would be any fact that pertains to her
relatedness to this tree. Psychic fact isn’t fully objective, in the sense that it is not mind-independent
and depends on the act of psychological introspection. However, psychic fact isn’t “merely
subjective” (§42) either, because it also depends on a mind-independent object and isn’t freely
posited by the subject.
There is a range of kinds of psychic fact, and Bhattacharyya emphasizes four kinds: (1)
knownness, or that an object is an object only insofar as it is known to a subject (2) beauty, or an
aestheticization of particular experience, (3) absence, as a positive characteristic, and (4) the felt
body, or subjective awareness of the interior felt quality of the body. To sketch out these kinds of
psychic fact in the context of the example above, knownness (1) would be the fact that the
roughness of the tree is known to a subject contingently; the tree could potentially be known in
different ways. If the subject were a sailor with rough hands, the tree bark might feel soft. Or, if the
subject were a moth, then the tree bark might be a safe haven on which it could be camouflaged and
sleep. Beauty (2) would be a subject’s awareness that the fact that she is experiencing the tree is a
beautiful thing. The bark itself is not beautiful; it is only perceived as rough in this first degree
abstraction. But on the second degree level of abstraction, of introspection and psychic fact, the fact
that a subject experiences the bark as rough can be beautiful. Absence (3) would be a psychic fact if a
subject encountered this tree each day, and then suddenly it was struck down by a lightning storm.
She could imagine the tree as standing upright and ready for her hand to touch its bark, but this
imagined situation simply does not objectively exist. Absence is psychic fact because it involves the
second-degree reflection that a subject had a first-degree experience, which is now absent. Felt body
(4) is a psychic fact in the situation where a subject touches the tree and becomes sensorily aware of
how she embodies her hand and feels her hand from the inside, in contrast to how she can also
empirically perceive her hand from an external point of view. These four kinds of psychic fact are
united in how each involves a second-degree abstraction or removal from a first-degree experience.
All four kinds of psychic fact entail greater spiritual freedom than objective fact because the former
are not dependent on the objective particulars of the situation, but rather on the fact that a subject’s
relation to particulars necessarily influences the objectivity of these particulars.
Bhattacharyya elaborates that psychic fact doesn’t even require the first-degree experience to
involve a real, empirical object. As long as you believe in some object in the first-degree experience,
whether this object is imagined, illusory, or empirically real, then this experience can warrant a
second-degree reflection and be a psychic fact. Bhattacharyya uses an example of a first-degree
experience involving an illusory object to demonstrate this criteria of psychic fact. A man sees a
snake and reacts in fear, but then later realizes this snake was only a coil of rope (§30). Now, the
man does not believe that there was a snake that triggered his fear. However, the fact remains that
he experienced a snake and his fear in the previous situation. If he reflected on overall experience,
including the time when he believed in a snake and the later time when he disbelieved in the snake,
this reflection could still count as psychic fact. The content of reflection involves the man’s belief in
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that he had once believed in a snake and then disbelieved in a snake. As long as the content of
reflection involves a belief, it can be a psychic fact.
Bhattacharyya not only uses this example of experiencing an illusory object to help explain a
criteria of psychic fact, but he also uses it to show how an introspective or psychic mode of
knowledge (later called non-perceptual knowledge) is superior over a strictly empirical, perceptual
mode of knowledge, which cannot account for the whole range of our knowledge. A perceptual
mode of knowledge, applied to this example of the man and snake, can only account for the
empirical fact that there was never any snake and only a rope. However, this account leads to
unreasonable conclusions. On this perceptual account, the man’s fearful state remains an empirical
fact, but this fear could not have been triggered by a snake, for the snake never existed. Instead, the
fear must have been triggered by a rope or by nothing at all; both possible conclusions are
misleading (§30). We know the man really saw a snake, in the first instance, and was warranted in
reacting in fear given this experience. This past experience included the non-empirical,
phenomenological fact that there was a snake, which should not be simply reduced to a rope. To
talk about this case of illusory experience meaningfully, we must include non-perceptual modes of
knowledge that can account for the man’s phenomenological experiences and non-perceptual facts.
Non-perceptual modes of knowledge can account for a greater range of kinds of knowledge because
it is based on the looser criteria that the object of knowledge simply involve belief in (or experience
of) an object. In contrast, the perceptual, objective mode is based on a strict criteria that the object
of knowledge be a physical particular, whether believed in or not.
There might be a concern that Bhattacharyya simply practices empirical psychology here, in
pointing out that we have cognitive biases and sensory limitations that factor into the experiences
they have. Such empirical psychology provides just another set of empirical facts of a our
psychology that are on par with the empirical facts of objects. But this interpretation is wrong and
misses the purpose of Bhattacharyya’s project. Bhattacharyya explains psychic fact and presents the
example of illusory experience for the sake of showing how we can engage in introspection,
non-perceptual knowledge, and achieve spiritual freedom, which is metaphysically distinct from the
causal level of a our engagement with empirical objects and being dependent on these objects.
Given Bhattacharyya’s purpose, we can see that in the previous example, the man in his first-degree
experiences of fear triggered by a snake and of relief triggered by realizing it is a rope are dependent
on empirical objects and circumstances. He has little or no freedom, on this level. He is subjected to
the changeability of the objects and circumstances, and he is unaware of how they are merely
contingent. In contrast, with introspection, the man can become aware of the psychic facts of the
knownness and contingency of empirical objects and the felt body aspect and contingency of his fear.
“It is in introspection into knowledge or in the consciousness of the unreal object as such that we
realize that we believed before we knew or disbelieved and that there was then no awareness of a
distinction of the object believed from the belief” (§33). With this higher awareness gained by
introspection, the man is now engaged not with first-order empirical objects or emotions but rather
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with his second-order belief that he had experienced the empirical object and emotion. He is no
longer dependent on empirical objects and has greater freedom.
Bhattacharyya elaborates that psychic fact usually is about our relation to empirical objects,
but it can sometimes be about another psychic fact. In this special case, the psychic fact about
another psychic fact can no longer be counted as a psychic fact, since the criterion of psychic fact is
that it involve some object (whether real or illusory) that is believed in. Instead, this second-order
psychic fact counts as a “fringe” of a psychic fact (§32). Here, Bhattacharyya uses “fringe” to refer to a
representational act has a psychic fact as its content. This fringe is a sort of introspecting on psychic
fact, and counts as a non-perceptual mode of knowledge. In addition to the four kinds of psychic fact,
there are four kinds of non-perceptual modes of knowledge. They are sensing absence as a positive
feature, memory as belief in something past, imagination, and inference (§38). The content of these
modes of knowledge are not objects (whether empirical, illusory, or believed in) but rather psychic
facts. This distinction between the fringe and psychic fact comes to be important when explaining
the notion of presentation.
Bhattacharyya defines presentation as the attempt to distinguish the real empirical object as
apart from our experience of and beliefs in an object (§33). However, if we are confined to a
perceptual mode of knowledge, we can never fulfill this attempt and can only imagine the empirical
object in terms of her experiences and beliefs of the object. Perceptual modes of knowledge are
self-contained in this way; in the perceptual mode when we try to go beyond our experience of the
object, we can only arrive something within her first-order experiences. In contrast, in
non-perceptual modes of knowledge we can use introspection to examine a presentation, which
makes this presentation into a psychic fact (§33). Then, we can legitimately get beyond mere
sensory experience. We can imagine what the empirical object might be apart from experience and
belief, and this imagination never achieves an empirical conclusion. We will never arrive at a
definite, perceptual image of what the mind-independent object might look like.
However, this impossibility does not mean imagination is futile or empty. In terms of
spiritual psychology, this imagination is a non-perceptual mode of knowledge and positively
achieves greater forms of non-perceptual knowledge and spiritual freedom. “It is in the
[imaginative, non-perceptual] awareness of the illusory that the presentation definitely emerges
from the perceived object into which it was merged” (§35). In engaging in this imaginative act, or
pursuit of non-perceptual knowledge, we becomes increasingly detached from first-degree
experience and free from the influences of empirical objects.
Freedom from empirical objects involves a rejection of belief (§36). A non-perceptual fact is
a special kind of fact in which we do not believe or disbelieve. Instead, a non-perceptual fact is
suspended in belief and takes on a positive presence of potentiality. “The object is a possibility within
the psychic only in the sense that it can be actualized, not that it will or need be actualized” (§53).
Beholding a non-perceptual fact, detached from empirical objects and with greater spiritual
freedom, we do not have to attempt to unconceal some perceptual presence. Non-perceptual
knowledge does not have to obey physical-mechanical laws or warrant causal explanations. Instead
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in a non-perceptual mode of knowledge is an “ideal mode of realization or intuition” (§38). The facts
intuited in this mode are in an idealized, abstracted form, free from particulars. To return to the
previous explanation of the four kinds of psychic fact—knownness, beauty, absence, and felt
body—when we introspect (or engage in a non-perceptual mode of knowledge) on each kind of
psychic fact, we behold that psychic fact warrants an ideal, pure potentiality and is free from any
need to be empirically understood or actualized. Recalling the previous example of the psychic facts
pertaining to a subject’s touching a tree, the psychic fact of beauty here involves her awareness of the
fact that she touches the tree and experiences its roughness. This beauty, in itself, is a pure
potentiality in which she has positive, aesthetic feeling, and there are no requirements for her to
understand this beauty as an empirical object. This beauty is detached, or freed, from empirical
objects, and is only symbolized within the empirical object. In this way, we can see that empirical
objects each signify non-perceptual facts of pure potentiality, such as beauty. This relation is similar
to a word and its meaning, which is not something empirical and believed in, but rather something
that can be achieved or actualized.
It is important for Bhattacharyya to qualify that non-perceptual facts are not illusory. “The
imagination is not an illusion but only incomplete or unrealized knowledge... symbolizing may be a
step toward knowledge of metaphysical reality as a subjective reality and need not be in the service
of willing or feeling only” (§51). Non-perceptual facts would only be illusory if they were evaluated
according to perceptual standards and put to the service of discovering empirical facts. For example,
it is obvious that beauty is not an empirical object, which can be physically measured and
manipulated. However, according to psychic or spiritual standards, beauty is real, and a legitimate
kind of knowledge. Surprisingly, acknowledging beauty as a kind of knowledge is actually more
consistent with empirical reality. We know, empirically, that our sensory perception is not only
finite and fallible, but also dependent on our subjectivity.1 There is a “facthood of the constructive
function by which the perceivable object comes to be for the subject” (§44). Any sort of empirical
facthood is partly constructed by our subjectivity. So if we trust our perceptual knowledge (which
depends on subjectivity and empirical objects), we should also trust our non-perceptual knowledge
(which depends solely on subjectivity, since the content of non-perceptual knowledge is psychic
fact, and not empirical objects). So, we should allow for non-perceptual facts to count as legitimate
forms of knowledge.
Bhattacharyya adds that non-perceptual modes of knowledge involve “a faith that is
spiritually demanded to be entertained [and] cannot be taken to be incapable of being turned into
knowledge” (§45). There is faith because we cannot demand for objective facts to ground a
non-perceptual mode of knowledge; we cannot ask for this certainty in an objective reality. If you
ceased to have faith, and instead transformed this potentiality found in non-perceptual fact into an
objective fact that you could be completely certain about, then this fact would be tethered to the
1
In the previous chapter “The Notion of Subjectivity” Bhattacharyya shows that the meaning of empirical
objects depends on public recognition and societal rules, which in turn depend on human individuals to
maintain these rules. In this way, empirical objects depend on subjectivity.
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empirical world and cease to lead to spiritual freedom. For example a person introspects on the
psychic fact of the absence of her favorite tree, but then changes the situation and walks over to a
real, objective tree that she can touch. Her spiritual freedom in this introspective state, a
non-perceptual mode of knowledge, is lost. In order to have spiritual freedom, she must forgo the
need for empirical realization and belief, and instead embrace the state of pure potentiality. With
this freedom, “nature is still to the Psyche as a magic or playful appearance” (§56). From the point of
view of non-perceptual modes of knowledge, what we ordinarily know to be natural and real are in
fact contingent appearances. We are detached from particulars and free to experience the idealized
varieties of fact that come from non-perceptual knowledge.