DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACT

G.R. No. 187485, October 8, 2013

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs.
SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION, Respondent.
San Roque prays that the rule established in our 12 February 2013 Decision be
given only a prospective effect, arguing that "the manner by which the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Court of Tax Appeals(CTA) actually treated the 120 +
30 day periods constitutes an operative fact the effects and consequences of which
cannot be erased or undone.

In Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, the application of the

doctrine of operative fact was discussed as follows:

“The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox

view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive
order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that
infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties.
Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its
repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared
results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap
of paper. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts
declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the
Constitution." It is understandable why it should be so, the
Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative
or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.”

G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971

FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PANGASINAN,
defendants, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
That is precisely what happened in connection with Republic Act No. 342, the
moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then
President Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other
monetary obligations payable by war sufferers.

It was explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban:

“Where such enactment was considered in 1953

"unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged
a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be
declared null and void and without effect.
G.R. No. L-3708, May 18, 1953
ROYAL L. RUTTER, vs. PLACIDO J. ESTEBAN, defendant-appellee.
This case involves the arguments advanced against the validity of the
moratorium law is the fact that it impairs the obligation of contracts which is prohibited
by the Constitution.

The leading case on the matter is Home Building and Loan Association vs.
Blaisdell, 290 U. S., 398, decide by the Supreme Court of the United States on
January 8, 1934:

“Not only is the constitutional provision qualified by

the measure of control which the State retains over remedial
processes, but the State also continues to possess authority
to safeguard the vital interest of its people. It does not matter
that legislation appropriate to that end "has the result of
modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect." . . . . Not
only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of
protecting contracts against impairement presupposes the
maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual
relations are worthwhile a government which retains
adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of
society. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional
prohibition with the necessary residuum of state power has
had progressive recognition in the decision of this Court”

DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISMISS

G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioner’s motion to quash
the information and her motion for reconsideration.

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court

clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:

“As a general rule, an order denying a motion to

dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of
appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of
Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a
case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is
adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final
 judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a
motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a
plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of
acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If
the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to
quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The
reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or
accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense,
or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the
motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave
abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of
judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal
cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few
examples of the exceptions to the general rule.”

G.R. No. L-63559, May 30, 1986

NEWSWEEK, INC., vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

In Manalo vs. Mariano (69 SCRA 80):

“Upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar

by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for
certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the
case.

G.R. No. L-33850 January 22, 1976

DEMETRIO MANALO, petitioner, vs. HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO,

In the case of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Torres, L-24717,

December 4, 1967:

“The jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a branch of

the Court of First Instance belongs solely to that branch.
Another branch, even if it belongs to the same judicial
district, that attempts to annul the judgment of another
branch, exceeds its jurisdiction or acts with grave abuse of
discretion. certiorari and prohibition would lie to prevent one
branch of a Court of First Instance from nullifying the prior
judgment rendered by a coequal and coordinate branch.”
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY OR NON-INTERFERENCE

G.R. No. 113087 June 27, 1994

REBECCO PANLILIO, ERLINDA PANLILIO and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO,
vs.
HON. JOSEFINA G. SALONGA
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or
judgments of a co-equal court, as an accepted axiom in adjective law, serves as an
insurmountable barrier to the competencia of the Makati court to entertain the habeas
corpus case on account of the previous assumption of jurisdiction by the Cavite court,
and the designation of petitioners as guardians ad litem of the ward.

In the case of Republic vs. Reyes (155 SCRA 313 [1987]), aptly described:

“. . . the doctrine of non-interference has been regarded as

an elementary principle of higher importance in the
administration of justice that the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified, or
vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction (30-A Am Jur
605).”

G.R. No. L-30263-5 October 3, 1987

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.THE HON. ANDRES REYES
The orders of the court dated May 8, 1968, June 29, 1968 and August 27, 968
are set aside and the Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen Proceedings is hereby denied.

As held by this Court in Bayer Philippines, Inc. vs. Agana, 63 SCRA 355
[1975]:

"Once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues

between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved
and its judicial function as regards any matter related to the
controversy litigated comes to an end. The execution of its
judgment is purely a ministerial phase of adjudication.
Indeed the nature of its duty to see to it that the claim of the
prevailing party is fully satisfied from the properties of the
loser is generally ministerial."

G.R. No. L-38701 April 8, 1975

BAYER PHILIPPINES, INC., BAYER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT vs.
THE HONORABLE ENRIQUE A. AGANA JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL

The interference issue was settled in the case of Abiera vs.

Court of Appeal, thus:
 “The doctrine as thus formulated is well settled, and
has been adhered to consistently whenever justified by the
facts in order to avoid conflict of power between different
courts of coordinate jurisdiction and to bring about a
harmonious and smooth functioning of their proceedings. For
the doctrine to apply, however, the injunction issued by one
court must interfere with the judgment or decree issued by
another court of equal or coordinate jurisdiction, and the
relief sought by such injunction must be one which could be
granted by the court which rendered the judgment or issued
the decree.”

DOCTRINE OF SUBSTITUTION

G.R. No. L-24711 April 30, 1968

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., vs. BCI EMPLOYEES and WORKERS UNION-
PAFLU, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS, CIPRIANO CID and
JUANITO GARCIA
In support of an affirmative answer to the first question, BENGUET first invokes
the so-called "Doctrine of Substitution" referred to:

General Maritime Stevedores' Union v. South Sea Shipping Lines,

L-14689, July 26, 1960. There it was remarked:

“We also hold that where the bargaining contract is to

run for more than two years, the principle of substitution may
well be adopted and enforced by the CIR to the effect that
after two years of the life of a bargaining agreement, a
certification election may be allowed by the CIR; that if a
bargaining agent other than the union or organization that
executed the contract, is elected, said new agent would have
to respect said contract, but that it may bargain with the
management for the shortening of the life of the contract if it
considers it too long, or refuse to renew the contract
pursuant to an automatic renewal clause.”

G.R. No. L-14689 July 26, 1960

GENERAL MARITIME STEVEDORES' UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
vs. SOUTH SEA SHIPPING LINE, ET AL.,

In the case of Philippine Long Distance Employees' Union vs. PLDT

and Free Telephone Workers Union, through Mr. Justice Bengzon, we
made the following observation:

“It is interesting to note in this regard that in the

United States, where we copied the present Industrial Peace
Act, an existing collective bargaining contract with a union is
a bar to subsequent certification election when ... it has a
 definite and reasonable period to run and has not been in
existence for too long a period (history, industry and customs
may affect reasonableness of the contract term ... . (Werne
Law of Labor Relations, p. 27 citing U.S. Finishing Co. 63
NLRB 575). Normally, the National Labor Relations Board
have been in existence for more than years, as no obstacle
to determining bargaining representatives. (Werne op cit. pp.
28-29, citing several cases.). . . as this contract between the
Company and the petitioner was signed December 1, 1951,
it had been in operation more than two years in August,
1954 when the certification election was ordered. It is
therefore no bar to the certification even under American
Labor Laws.”

G.R. No. L-8138 August 20, 1955

PLDT EMPLOYEES' UNION, vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE

COMPANY FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS' UNION, (PAPLU)

Explaining its position in detail, the National Labor Relations Board

said in the case of Reed Roller Bit Co. 72 N. L. R. B. 927:

“Whenever a contract is urged as a bar, the Board is

faced with the problem of balancing two separate interests of
employees and society which the Act was designed to
protect: the interest in such stability as is essential to
encourage effective collective bargaining, and the
sometimes conflicting interest in the freedom of the
employees to select and change their representatives. In
furtherance of the purposes of the Act, we have repeatedly
held that employees are entitled to change their
representatives, if they so desire, at reasonable intervals; or
conversely, that a collective bargaining contract may
preclude a determination of representatives for a reasonable
period.”