AT Legalism K

The aff solves the impacts of the K because the aff specifically looks into how colonial
violence is enacted through the law by the use of nuclear power while the K is just a
generic truism about state violence. The aff satisifies the alternative by ending all
governmental interference with nuclear power. The K prevents in depth analysis of
how state power works and creative solutions to limit state sovereignty
-Alt doesn't solve the K: Look the alternative calls for engagement with the law by
removing subsidies. They are trapped within technocratic Western notions of the law
that removes minor subsidies but maintains and masks the overarching system of
colonial violence. My Endres 7 evidence contextualizes how activitis can put pressure
on governments to force them to change the law while they work within the system.
Thus, the K links to their impacts more than the affirmative.
- No link: the aff doesn't specific a method of policy implementation and the endres
evidence provides the mechanism for the affirmative which means that the ought in
my advocacy was always about activism outside of normal legal means.
- The alt cannot solve the impacts of the aff: a standpoint epistemology is necessary to
prevent colonial violence from resurging
- The K replaces explicit legal violence with a faux-neutral universal activisit
perspective. The K's failure to account for different subject positions like mine and
indigenous minorities means that the alternative movement will be taken over by
paternalist colonizers who think they know better than indigenous people on how to
solve for governmental violence. This is an independent turn to their method and a
reason to vote for the permutation because the aff's standpoint epistemology has to
come first so that the alt can be successful.
- Perm: Do both: we should look beyond the law for solutions through a standpoint
epistemology.
- perm: do the affirmative and the alternative in all other instances. Either the
alternative is strong enough to overcome this one instance of law or the alternative
cannot solve the status quo which is proliferated with legal actions.
There are three net benefits to the perms:
1. the aff's standpoint epistemology can only be accessed through a permuatation
which the K alone cannot access. Only by including a standpoint epistemology can we
solve for the harms of colonialism [explain why]
2. only the aff explicitly calls for an end to nuclear production - the alternative gives
room for subversion in which nuclear power plants can continue production despite
the lack of subsidies.
3. the aff's historically examination allows for a better understanding of the state and
how legal structures perpetuate discrimination - only with the in depth analysis
provided by the affirmative can we find better solutions beyond the law to these
complex problems.

Increasing the cost of nuclear power by cutting subsidies causes a green paradox,
where firms will extract more in short term to try to beat strict regulations later.
Jensen et al 2015 (Svenn Jensen is assistant professor at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences; Kristina Mohlin is an Economist at the Environmental Defense Fund; Karen Pittel is a professor at the
University of Munich and heads the Center for Energy, Climate and Exhaustible Resources at the Ifo Institute of Economic Research; Thomas Sterner is a professor at the University of Gothenburg and senior advisor to the
Environmental Defense Fund;) “An Introduction to the Green Paradox: The Unintended Consequences of Climate Policies,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy Advance Access. July 16, 2015.
http://reep.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/07/16/reep.rev010.full.pdf [JAM]

The green paradox refers to an outcome in which climate policies such as carbon taxes, which are aimed at reducing carbon emissions,
instead have the opposite effect: emissions increase, at least for some period of time. The recent debate about the
green paradox was initially triggered by Sinn (2008), who focused on one specific reason for this paradoxical outcome: the effect of

climate policies on the long-run profits (more specifically, scarcity rents) that owners of fossil resources
expect to earn from selling their resources over time. More recently, the term green paradox has been used to more broadly describe unintended
consequences of climate policies. //// For economists, the solution to environmental problems like climate change is a Pigovian tax (i.e., a tax that is equal to the social marginal damage from
emissions) or an equivalent policy. However, for political reasons, it is likely that a carbon tax will not be set according to the Pigovian principle but rather will start low and then rise over time.

The culprit here is the reaction on the supply side of the

A green paradox arises if this policy backfires and the environmental problem worsens.

fossil fuel market. Because fossil fuels are nonrenewable resources, their prices reflect not only the cost
of production but also their scarcity. Thus, owners of fossil fuels enjoy scarcity rents and maximize their
profits by deciding when to extract their coal, oil, or gas reserves. If a future tightening of climate policy
threatens to decrease future scarcity rents, then to maximize profits, fossil fuel owners will decide to
extract less in the future and extract more today instead. This forward shift in extraction is known as
the weak green paradox. If, despite climate policy, resource owners can still extract almost all of their resources
profitably, then the forward shift in extraction might actually increase cumulative damages—an outcome known as
a strong green paradox. ////
 Warming Inevitable
warming is inevitable - we’ve passed the tipping point of 400 ppm of CO2
Emerson 9/28/16
Sarah Emerson is a contributing editor for Vice and is citing the Scripps Institution of Oceanography.
https://motherboard.vice.com/read/goodbye-world-weve-passed-the-carbon-tipping-point-for-good?utm_source=dmfb “Goodbye World:
We’ve Passed the Carbon Tipping Point For Good” NT 16
It’s a banner week for the end of the world, because we’ve officially pushed atmospheric carbon levels past their
dreaded 400 parts per million. Permanently. According to a blog post last Friday from the Scripps Institution of
Oceanography, “it already seems safe to conclude that we won’t be seeing a monthly value below 400
ppm this year—or ever again for the indefinite future.” Their findings are based on weekly observations of carbon dioxide at Hawaii’s Mauna Loa Observatory,
where climate scientists have been measuring CO2 levels since 1958. What’s so terrifying about this number? For several years now, scientists have been warning us that if

atmospheric carbon were allowed to surpass 400 parts per million, it would mark a serious “tipping point”
into some unstoppable climate ramifications. In 2012, the Arctic was the first region on Earth to cross this
red line. Three years later, for the first time since scientists had begun to record them, carbon levels remained above 400 parts per million for an entire month. This time,
experts believe we’re stuck here for good, due to the cyclical effects of Mauna Loa’s CO2 curve. Carbon levels
usually reach an annual low point near the end of September, Scripps notes, but this year, those numbers are hovering around 401 parts per million. There’s a chance that we’ve haven’t seen
2016’s lowest carbon levels yet, but the institution deems that occurrence “almost impossible.” If there’s an inkling of a silver lining here, it’s that scary numbers could scare people into action.
For example, the Paris Agreement—an international convention dedicated to fighting climate change and its effects—has laid out some firm goals directly tied to carbon levels. All countries
who adopt the agreement are bound to prevent global average temperatures from rising above pre-industrial levels of 1.5°C. One of the primary means for achieving that will be to limit
emissions, and enforce ambitious clean energy mandates. However, the 60 nations who have ratified the agreement so far only account
for 47.76 percent of the world’s carbon emissions. So in light of that, here are some of climate change’s other
permanent effects, listed in no particular order. Extinction No explanation required here. While difficult to estimate, extinction rates have
accelerated to 1,000 times their rate before the existence of modern Homo sapiens. The World Wildlife Fund guesses that 10,000
species become extinct every year. Due to climate change, one fourth of Earth’s species could vanish by 2050. Food
chain disruption Inextricably tied to extinction, food chains are likely to become permanently
unbalanced as apex predators and their prey begin to disappear. In the Arctic, for example, rising ocean temperatures are
impacting the growth of sea algae, which in turn, deprives populations of zooplankton, cod, seals, and polar bears
of vital nutrients. Over the last 50 years, average temperatures throughout Alaska and western Canada have risen
by as much as 7°F. Rising sea levels In the near future, humans, among other species, will be catastrophically affected by sea
level changes. As ancient glaciers begin to melt, coastlines elsewhere will flood, and communities will become displaced. By 2100,
approximately 13 million people are projected to lose their homes due to rising sea levels. In some parts of the world, such as the Pacific Ocean, that's already

started to happen. Scientists theorize that even if we prevent global average temperatures from rising above 2°C, earlier
sea level changes will still be irreversible. Ocean acidification Considered a crucial barometer of environmental health, ocean
acidity is already wiping out entire marine ecosystems. The planet’s oceans are constantly absorbing excess CO2, causing their pH to decrease,
literally acidifying the water. As a result, vast expanses of life-sustaining coral, such as Australia’s Great Barrier Reef, are bleaching and dying.

While coral polyps could still take hold and regrow into reefs, scientists anticipate that bleaching events will leave long-lasting marks

on the face of ocean ecosystems.

Warming is inevitable - the livestock industry causes more than 51% of warming
Vrbicek 15
Andy Vrbicek is a JD candidate at Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University. His primary legal interests include greenhouse gas and factory
farm regulation. He’s citing the World Bank study on climate change, which is hella qualified. http://www.new-
harvest.org/the_world_s_leading_driver_of_climate_change_animal_agriculture “The World’s Leading Driver of Climate Change: Animal Agriculture” NT 16
livestock industry, the significant contribution to water and air
Most reading this article are probably aware of the animal cruelty issues surrounding the

pollution, and the strain on water, land, and energy resources. But few people likely think of livestock in the context
of global warming and climate change. We should. It is important that cultured meat proponents are able to refer interested parties to the full breadth of the factory
farming industry’s environmental impact—including and especially its significant contribution to climate change and global warming. In a widely-cited report, Livestock’s Long Shadow (LS),
the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) posited the livestock industry contributes 18% of the world’s greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions.1 Conversely, in Livestock and Climate Change (LCC), environmental assessment experts at the World Bank

found the industry is actually responsible for a staggering 51% of global GHG emissions.2 By way of comparison, even
18% is more than the entire transportation sector’s emissions.3 But which figure is more accurate? GETTING TO THE MEAT OF THE MATTER:
THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY & GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS This article reveals how the FAO obfuscates and trivializes livestock’s impact on

global warming, and why the industry almost certainly does account for half the world’s climate change-
driving GHG emissions. As an initial matter, it is worth noting the widely disparate World Bank and FAO estimates do not
represent a mere “he said she said” or proper “battle of the experts”—the World Bank authors of LCC are both
environmental assessment experts, while not a single FAO author of LS is an environmental assessment
expert.4 This of course violates international environmental assessment best practices for projects which have a significant environmental impact (like global livestock and feed
production).5 In fact, for committing an “elementary error” in environmental assessment, a portion of LS was

forced to be retracted.6 Defenses of the FAO’s report in light of the World Bank’s 51% figure have been shoddy and only
furthered skepticism towards FAO estimates.7 MISSING ANIMALS In LCC, the World Bank posited that there were
some 50 billion livestock animals worldwide, while the FAO in LS used a figure of only 21.7 billion (despite the fact other reports from within the FAO itself
had suggested the number was much higher, and other governmental agencies had estimated the number at around 50

billion).8 Soon after publication of LS, the FAO effectively conceded 21.7 billion was erroneous when their own website listed the number at 56 billion—a figure 258% greater than used in
LS, and 10% greater than used in LCC.9 More recent estimates suggest the planet currently homes 70 billion livestock

animals.10 As a brief aside, global meat demands are only rising. A 2013 FAO report suggests livestock demand is expected to
increase 70% by 2050.11 Yet, the FAO does not address alternative means of satisfying growing protein needs—and thus eschews an essential task of environmental impact
assessments, the consideration of alternatives—but only recommends greater livestock intensity.12 The FAO does suggest the livestock sector can potentially curb GHG emissions by 30%
through better practices and technology, but this claim is dubious given livestock specialists have typically only found room for a 10% reduction.13 The World Bank authors in LCC, on the other
hand, do acknowledge the obvious need to reduce our unsustainable livestock populations and do discusses the prospects of alternative protein sources. LIVESTOCK RESPIRATION Beyond
grossly undercounting livestock populations, further accounting for the wide discrepancy between the reports, the FAO did not count CO2 from animal
respiration, whereas the World Bank did. Yet, according to the Kyoto Protocol livestock respiration should be counted.14 And there is good reason for it:
“Livestock [like automobiles] are a human invention and convenience, not part of pre-human times, and a molecule of CO2 exhaled by livestock is no more natural than one from an auto
tailpipe… Today, tens of billions more livestock are exhaling CO2 than in pre-industrial days ….”15 METHANE AND GLOBAL
WARMING POTENTIAL TIMEFRAMES Finally, the FAO used a “global warming potential” (GWP) value for methane per a 100-year timeframe, whereas the World Bank used a 20-year
timeframe. For the purpose of counting GHG emission, each greenhouse gas is assigned a GWP value according to its capacity to warm the planet relative to an equivalent amount of CO2over
Methane is an extremely potent GHG gas: Per figures used in LS and LCC respectively, ton for ton methane
a given period of time.

contributes to global warming 23 times more than CO2 when viewed over a 100-year timeframe, and
72 times more over a 20-year timeframe (methane’s GWP diminishes over time relative to CO2because methane stays in the atmosphere for only 12 years,
whereas CO2 lingers for over 100). Importantly, after publication of both LS and LCC, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) adjusted methane’s GWP values over a 10-, 20-,
for using outdated GWP values for methane, both
and 100-timeline, to 108, 86, and 34 respectively.16 Others give values even higher still.17 Thus,

LS and LCC estimates of the livestock’s contribution to global warming are conservative in this respect.
TIPPING POINTS, FEEDBACK LOOPS & WHY GWP TIMEFRAMES MATTER Most projections of climate change presume that future

changes—greenhouse gas emissions, temperature increases and effects such as sea level rise—will
happen incrementally. A given amount of emission will lead to a given amount of temperature increase that will lead to a given amount of smooth incremental sea level rise.
But pushing global temperatures past certain thresholds could trigger abrupt, unpredictable and
potentially irreversible changes that have massively disruptive and large-scale impacts.18 Because the
livestock industry is the world’s leading emitter of methane—with 44% of the industry’s total GHG
emissions in the form of methane19—which GWP timeframe is used is important. One hundred-year timeframes, such as used by the
FAO, are problematic. The IPCC states this on the matter: “There is no scientific argument for selecting 100 years compared

with other choices. The choice of time horizon is a value judgment since it depends on the relative weight assigned to effects at different times.”20 Yet, the IPCC’s equivocality
here is unfortunate and ignores compelling reasons why a 20-year (or shorter) timeframe is a far more relevant metric. The International Energy Agency has

suggested that unless drastic reductions are immediately achieved, atmospheric GHG’s could reach
levels which will inevitably result in irreversible catastrophic climate change.21 Thus, as many scientists have recommended,22
environmental assessment experts should use 10- or 20-year GWP timeframes, as policy makers must be primarily focused on the coming decade or two, opposed to the coming century.23
Modest warming over the coming decades could trigger runaway feedback loops, catastrophic tipping
points leading to exponential warming. For instance, as temperatures rise and melt permafrost and methane
clathrates, more methane is released causing accelerated warming, which in turn causes more melting
and methane release, which in turn causes further accelerated warming, and so on and so forth.24 Thus 100-year
timeframes are largely irrelevant for failing to reflect the urgency of the matter and the immediate need for significant reductions in potent GHG’s like methane. Indeed, viewed under a 10-
year timeframe, methane is seen as the world’s leading driver of global warming, greater even than CO2.25
 Structural violence first
Prioritize everyday acts of violence – only when we accept violence personally can we
justify it on a larger scale, which is the gateway to genocide and interstate war.
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 04 (Nancy, Professor of Anthropology at University of California Berkeley, Philippe ,
Professor of Anthropology at University of Pennsylvania, “Introduction: Making Sense of Violence”, Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)
Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and
peacetime violence. Close attention to the "little" violences produced in the structures, habituses, and
mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More
important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of "violence studies" that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social
and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in
this anthology we are positing a
violence continuum comprised of a multitude of "small wars and invisible genocides" (see also Schcpcr-Hughes
1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public
registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The
violence continuum also refers to the ease with which
humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the
license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are
flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist
use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary,
it
is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal
times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in
overextending the concept of "genocide" into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk
lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogcnocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by "ordinary" good-enough
citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of
California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for
managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the "small wars and invisible
genocides" to which we refer. Tins applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland. California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New
York City. These are "invisible" genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but
quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right
before our eyes [us] and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu's partial and unfinished theory of violence (sec Chapters 32
and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence
hidden in the minutiae of "normal" social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the
exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence,
especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state
repression. Similarly, Basaglia's notion of "peacetime crimes" - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence.
Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the
extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US
immigration and naturalization border raids on "illegal aliens" versus the US government-engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee "Trail of Tears."
Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal "stability" is purchased with the currency
of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied "strangle-holds." Every day forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain
kind of domestic "peace" possible. It
is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public
secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the
phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken
place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is
based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man,
the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the
affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the "normative" socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent
of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it
is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal
capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hyper-
vigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render
participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we
would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dchumanization, depersonalization,
pseudospeciation, and rcification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant
hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin's view of late modern history* as a chronic "state of emergency" (Taussig, Chapter 31).