ARTICLE 17: Principals
guilty.
1. Principals by Direct Participation
a. US v. Diris (Nov 17 1913 Carson, J.)
FACTS:
 Fulgencio Seal received from the railroad company more than 400 pesos
in payment for a land they expropriated. Defendant Toman Olea, Seal’s
nephew, saw when the money was handed over and knew that it was
deposited in a trunk. Olea had free access to Seal’s house.
 On the day of the crime, Seal left the house in the morning. A short time
thereafter, the three defendants Olea, Anselmo Diris, and Eustaquio
Siaga appeared at the tienda.
o Siaga engaged Seal’s wife in conversation while the other two
went upstairs, broke the trunk and took the money.
o Seal’s wife was quite deaf. She stated that she was the two go
upstairs but Olea was her nephew and was accustomed to
seeing him there.
o Seal found out about the robbery and upon confronting Olea it
was agreed upon that if Seal wouldn’t press charges Olea would
recover the money from the other defendants.
o They went to search for Diris. Seal was told to wait until Olea
returned, but when he didn’t return Seal found him with Diris at a
barbershop. They were reported to the police.
 It was suggested by counsel that Siaga was merely a “complice”
(accessary before the fact) and was not a principal.
ISSUE: W/N Siaga is a principal in the crime.
HELD: YES.
 Siaga acted concurrently with the other two. In talking with the woman he
distracted her from what was going on upstairs. He was evidently serving
as a guard to his companions.
o One who shares the guilty purpose and aids and abets the
commission of the crime by his presence at the time of its
perpetration, even though he may not have taken an active part
in its material execution, is guilty as a principal.
 Standing guard is direct participation.
2. Principals by Inducement
a. People v. Ong Chiat Lay (Oct 26 1934 Abad Santos, J.)
FACTS:
 Ong Chiat Lay and two others, Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, were
charged with feloniously burning a building in which was located a store
belonging to the appellant. The appellant was convicted of arson while
the other two were acquitted.
 The appellant contends that the lower court erred in holding that he was
ISSUE: W/N the appellant should be acquitted.
HELD: YES.
 In order to convict a defendant as principal in the commission of a crime,
it must be shown either
(1) that he took a direct part in the execution of the criminal act;
(2) that he directly forced or induced another or others to commit
it; or
(3) that he cooperated in the commission of the offense by an act
without which it would not have been accomplished.
 It is not claimed that the appellant directly took part in the burning of the
building. It was stressed by the prosecution that he was absent from the
scene. He was prosecuted on the theory that he induced his said
codefendants to set fire to the building.
 In conspiracy, there needs to be guilty cooperation of at least two people,
in which there is a mutual dependence of the guilt of each person upon
that of the other.
 All accused should be jointly tried and convicted, or acquitted.
 An accessory cannot be held guilty unless the principal himself is also
held guilty. This rule arises from dependent criminality.
 The acquittal of the principal is an immediate and absolute discharge of
the accessory. A could not conspire with B if the latter did not conspire at
all.
 While the crime charged in the present case is not conspiracy as a
distinct offense, it is clear from the nature of the evidence presented that
appellant alone could not have committed the unlawful act.
 It is a well-settled principle of criminal law that a conviction for crime can
not be had unless the corpus delicti is first established. The appellant
was convicted on circumstantial evidence.
o To establish the corpus delicti in arson the proof of two elements
is required, namely, (1) the burning of the house or other thing,
and (2) the criminal agency in causing it.
o Corpus delicti can be proven by circumstantial evidence.
However, the circumstances must be an unbroken chain which
leads one to fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the
defendant as guilty.
o While the facts proved in the present case are sufficient to raise
grave suspicions against the appellant, they fall far short of
establishing his guilt clearly and satisfactorily.
b. US v. Indanan (Jan 29 1913 Moreland, J.)
FACTS:
 Accused Panglima Indanan was alleged to have committed the murder of
the victim Sariol. He was the headman of Parang at the time.
 Indanan sent Induk to bring Sariol to his house. Indanan ordered the
witnesses Akiran and Suhuri to tie Sariol.
 When nighttime came, Indanan ordered Sariol to be taken to the Chinese
cemetery to be killed. Indanan asserted that he had an order to that
effect from the governor.
 Indanan ordered Akiran that he (Akiran) should aid in killing Sariol, and
ordered Akiran to take his bolo.
 Sariol was taken to the cemetery and was killed. Kalyakan struck the first
blow with his bolo, and Akiran followed.
 According to the testimony of the witnesses, Indanan had a very powerful
influence over Kalyakan, Suhuri, and Akiran.
ISSUE: W/N Indanan is a principal in the case.
HELD: YES.
 The Court was in the opinion that the domination of the accused over the
persons who, at his orders, killed the deceased was such as to make him
responsible for whatever they did in obedience to such orders.
 Principals in a crime are those who directly force or induce others to
commit it.
o Force = by actual physical force or by grave fear;
o Induce directly = by command, or for consideration, or by any
other similar act which constitutes the real and moving cause of
the crime and which was done for the purpose of inducing such
criminal act and was sufficient for that purpose.
 Indanan’s words and acts had the effect of a command.
o Since he was the headman, he seemed to be the person whose
word was law and whose commands were to be obeyed.
o He also falsely represented that he had a warrant from the
governor which authorized the killing. He did so to insure
obedience to his orders.
 Where the inducement offered by the accused is of such a nature and
made in such a way that it becomes the determining cause of the crime,
and such inducement was offered with the intention of producing that
result, then the accused is guilty by inducement of the crime committed
by the person so induced.
o The inducement must be made directly with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement
must be the determining cause of the crime.
3. Principals by Indispensable Cooperation
a. People v. Montealegre (May 31 1988 Cruz, J.)
FACTS:
 Edmundo Abadilla detected the smell of marijuana smoke from a nearby
table while he was eating at a restaurant. He quietly went outside and
saw policeman Renato Camantigue in his car which he hailed to report
the incident.
 After parking his car, Camantigue joined Abadilla in the restaurant and
also smelled the marijuana smoke coming from the table of Vicente
Capalad and Napoleon Montealegre.
o Camantigue approached the two, collared them, and said
“Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?”
o Capalad suddenly pulled out a knife from a scabbard on his
waist and started stabbing Camantigue in the back.
o Camantigue released Montealegre to get his gun, but the latter
restrained the former’s hand.
o Capald fled and Camantigue fired at him Capalad fled to a dark
alley. Camantigue abandoned the chase and asked to be taken
to the hospital. Capalad was found dead in the alley with a bullet
in his chest.
o Montealegre escaped during the confusion.
ISSUE: W/N Montealegre is a principal in the crime.
HELD: YES.
 During the trial, the appellant testified that he did not see Camantigue
being stabbed, which the Court held was unbelievable since he was one
of the principal figures of the stabbing.
 If it was true that appellant ran away before the stabbing, there would
have been nothing to restrain Camantigue from drawing his pistol.
 Appellant also testified that he knew that the victim was a policeman, and
that the victim was also in uniform.
 Appellant is a co-principal for having collaborated with Capalad in killing
the victim.
o They acted in concert, Capalad stabbing the victim 7 times while
the appellant prevented the victim from drawing his gun.
o While it is true that the accused-appellant did not himself commit
the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for
having prevented Camantigue from resisting the attack against
him.
 The requisites of Art. 17(3) are:
o (1) participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either
anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention
immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and
o (2) cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing
another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
 Although there is no evidence of a prior agreement between Capalad
and Montealegre, their subsequent acts proved the presence of
conspiracy.
o two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part
so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative
o A conspiracy may be entered into after the commencement of
overt acts leading to the consummation of the crime.
 Appellant’s acts were a positive act towards the realization of a common
criminal intent, although the intent can be classified as instantaneous.
b. People v. Simbra (Sept 30 1982 Relova, J.)
FACTS:
 Complainant Gresilda Gonzales (15 yrs) left her house to fetch water
from the well in the public market. While walking along an unlighted part
of the road, appellant Sergio Tolibas and Roberto Simbra (smelling pf
tuba) grabbed her by the arms. She struck Simbra with the hose she was
holding and shouted for help. Tolibas covered her mouth with a
handkerchief.
 The two men dragged Gresilda to the “serin” (a pile of sawdust
surrounded by grasses and big trees).
o Simbra threw her on the ground, Tolibas held down her arms
and covered her mouth and removed her pants and underwear
o Simbra succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her twice.
o Tolibas also had carnal knowledge with her 3 times while Simbra
held her down.
o The two men threatened Gresilda that if she told anyone what
happened, they will kill her.
 Simbra and Tolibas brought Gresilda to the house of Ernanita Jusay,
Tolibas’ sister. Gresilda could not leave until she was fetched by her aunt
and a policeman because the two men were guarding her.
 Tolibas claims that he had carnal knowledge with Gresilda but did so with
her consent.
ISSUE: W/N appellant Tolibas was a principal in the crime.
HELD: YES.
 Considering that the two men has sex with Gresilda against her will by
employing force and intimidation, the crime committed is rape thru direct
participation.
 When Tolibas aided Simbra and made it possible for the latter to carnal
knowledge of complainant also against her will and through force and
intimidation, appellant committed another crime of rape through
indispensable cooperation. Thus, appellant is guilty of two crimes of
consummated rape.
ARTICLE 18: Accomplices
a. People v. Doble (May 31 1982 De Castro, J.)
FACTS:
 10 men, almost all heavily armed, left the shores of Manila in a motor
banca and went to Navotas, Rizal. There intended to rob the Navotas
Branch of the Prudential Bank and Trust Company.
 8 men disembarked from the banca and went to the beach in the
direction of the bank. Shots were fired and people panicked. The shots
grew in intensity. As the commotion died down, the 8 men returned to the
banca carrying bayongs.
 As a result of the shooting, may people got killed and injured.
o Two of the men went into the bank asking for their money to be
changed but was refused because the bank didn’t have small
denominations. Suddenly, 3 armed men entered and fired at the
ceiling and walls.
o When the tellers said that they did not have the key for the vault,
the men shot at the vault until the doors opened. However, they
could not get anything because the compartments were locked.
o The men went to the two teller cages and took the money inside.
o Beside the bank was a police outpost. Policemen heard the
gunshots. Some of the policemen were hit by the shots coming
from the left side of the bank.
 It is noteworthy that the three appellants Simeon Doble, Antonio
Romanquin, and Cresencio Doble had no participation in the crime.
o SG recommends the acquittal of Simeon.
o SG observed that Simeon only met with the malefactors in his
house to discuss the crime and that he did not perform any act
tending to the perpetration of the robbery and had no direct
participation therein.
o His act only amounts to joining in a conspiracy and is not
punishable.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Simeon can be considered as an accomplice in the crime. NO.
2. W/N Antonio and Cresencio can be considered as accomplice in the
crime. YES.
HELD:
1.
 Even if the SG’s contention is rational, Simeon’s statement before the
Navotas Police Dept. that “he has not yet received his share” gives the
impression that Simeon has given material or moral support or
encouragement to the principal culprits.
o However, a reading of his whole extrajudicial statement would
erase that impression, and reveals the true import of that
statement as intended only to show that Simeon had nothing to
do with commission of the crime and therefore did not receive
any share of the fruits thereof.
 The only link between Simeon and the crime is his house was used as
the meeting place of the malefactors for their final conference. He did not
join them because of a 5-year old foot injury.
 His mere presence in his house where the conspirators met, and for
merely telling them that he could not join them because of his foot injury,
and will just wait for them, evidently as a mere gesture of politeness in
not being able to join them in their criminal purpose, for he could not be
of any help in the attainment thereof, and also to avoid being suspected
 that he was against their vicious plan for which they may harm him,
Simeon is by no means a co-conspirator, not having even taken
active part in the talks among the malefactors in his house.
2.
 Cresencio’s consenting to look for a banca, however, did not necessarily
make him a co-conspirator. Neither would it appear that Joe Intsik
wanted to draft Cresencio into his band of malefactors that would commit
the robbery more than just asking his help to look for a banca. He also
did not receive a share of the loot.
 Antonio, for his part, appears not to be known to the principal malefactors
still at large, to be asked to join actively in the conspiracy. The amount
received by Romaquin indicates that the malefactors did not consider
appellant as their confederate in the same character as those
constituting the band of robbers. The sum given to Romaquin could very
well represent only the rental of his banca, and for the cooperation he
extended to the malefactors.
 The apprehension of the actual robbers that Antonio might speed away
in fear of being implicated is further proof that Antonio was not
considered a co-conspirator (they didn’t trust him).
 Cresencio testified that when he was given the gun to cover Antonio, he
returned it because he didn’t know how to use it and that they were
guarded by someone else near the beach.
 At most, the two men’s liability are of accomplices.
o They joined in the criminal design when Cresencio consented to
look for a banca and Romaquin provided it when asked by the
gang leader Joe Intsik, and then brought the malefactors to the
scene of the robbery, despite knowledge of the evil purpose for
which the banca was to be used.
o Appellants thus cooperated but not in an indispensable manner.
Even without appellants providing the banca, the robbery could
have been committed.
 There must be a community of unlawful purpose between the principal
and accomplice and assistance knowingly and intentionally given, to
supply material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense and in
an efficacious way.
 What appellants may be said to have joined is the criminal design to rob,
which makes them accomplices. Their complicity must be limited to the
robbery and not the killing.
ARTICLES 19 & 20: Accessories
a. Vino v. People (Oct 19 1989 Gancayco, J.)
FACTS:
 Roberto Tejada left his house to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to
watch TV. While Roberto’s father Ernesto was resting, he heard two
gunshots. He then heard Roberto cry out that he had been shot.
 After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and victim’s brother Julius saw appellant
Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle. The latter was carrying an
armalite.
 At the hospital Roberto identified Jessie as the assailant in his ante-
mortem statement.
 Vino and Jessie were charged with murder. Vino was found guilty by the
TC as an accessory to the crime of murder.
ISSUE: W/N Vino is an accessory to the crime.
HELD: YES.
 Vino was charged in the information as a principal but was convicted as
an accessory; this is entirely possible.
o Under Art. 16 of the RPC, the two other categories of persons
responsible for the commission of the same offense are the
accomplice and the accessory.
o Vino knew about the commission and was present therein since
he was driving the bicycle that Jessie was on. He actively
assisted in the principal’s escape.
 The trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the
charge against the principal.
o The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice
and accessory are distinct from each other.
 An accessory may nevertheless be convicted of a crime even if the
principal is acquitted.
o The identity of the assailant was not clearly established. Jessie
was merely seen carrying the armalite and riding on the bicycle
with Vino.
o The victim did not immediately reveal to his father and brother
who did it. The bullet was also not subject to ballistic
examinations.
o Jessie was acquitted as the trial court was not persuaded that he
was positively identified to be the man with the gun riding on the
bicycle driven by Vino.
o Vino’s trial established his guilt as an accessory beyond
reasonable doubt. The identity of the assailant is of no
significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory.
ARTICLES 21, 24, 25
 People v. Echegaray (Feb 7 1997 Per Curiam)
FACTS:
 Appellant Leo Echegaray was convicted for raping his 10-year old
daughter in April 1994, during the effect of RA 7659 or the Death
Penalty Law.
 Appellant seeks to reverse the decision of the death sentence imposed
upon him.
 Appellant questions the constitutionality of RA 7659, stating that
according to the Consti the death penalty is a severe and excessive
penalty in crimes where no death results from the offense (Art. III Sec.
19(1)) and that the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of Art. III Sec. 11 of the Consti.
 The death penalty is an ancient practice and was used by our
forefathers. The dawning of civilization brought sensitization to the past
barbarity of state power under the rule of law.
 One of the powers of the state is to secure society against threatened
and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislature enacts criminal laws that
define and punish illegal acts, and the judiciary tries and sentences
criminals in accordance with these laws.
 The list of offenses punishable by death are lengthened by the legislature
as a response to the emergencies of the times.
 After the Marcos regime, the 1987 Consti was enacted. The first draft of
what is now Art. III Sec. 19(1) was originally worded as “Excessive fines
shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, or
the death penalty inflicted. Death penalty already imposed shall be
commuted to reclusion perpetua.”
o The framers of the Consti decided for the Constitutional abolition
of the death penalty so that the legislature cannot enact a law to
restore it.
 HOWEVER, the original wording did not survive the debate. It was stated
that although the Consti abolishes the death penalty, it should be
afforded some flexibility to future legislation since its absolute abolition
can leave society helpless in the face of future upsurge of crimes or
emergencies.
 Art. III Sec. 19(1) was amended, and now reads: “Excessive fines shall
not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.”
 Senate Bill 891 was approved on third reading on August 16, 1993. It
was consolidated with House Bill 62.
 On December 31, 1993, RA 7659 entitled “An Act to Impose the Death
Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the
Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for
Other Purposes,” took effect.
ISSUE: W/N RA 7659 is unconstitutional.
HELD: NO.
 Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in
Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty “for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes.”
o The constitutional exercise of this limited power to reimpose the
death penalty entails: (1) that Congress define or describe what
is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and
penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in
accordance with the definition or description set in the death
penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be
imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in
court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance
with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and
(3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly
motivated by “compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
o Congress defined heinous crimes as crimes which are
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of
their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized
and ordered society.
 Senators Lina and Tanada demanded for the specification of the
elements of heinous crimes. However, there are two types of crimes in
the death penalty bill:
o (1) crimes penalized by reclusion perpetua to death
o (2) crimes penalized by mandatory capital punishment upon the
attendance of certain specifies qualifying circumstances.
 Under R.A. No. 7659, there are enumerated crimes which are penalized
by reclusion perpetua to death. All the foregoing crimes are not capital
crimes per se, the uniform penalty for all of them being not mandatory
death but the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In other
words, it is premature to demand for a specification of the heinous
elements in each of the foregoing crimes because they are not anyway
mandatorily penalized with death.
 On the other hand, RA 7659 also enumerated the crimes imposed with
the mandatory death penalty.
 Heinous crimes have implications in the scheme of the larger socio-
political and economic context in which the State finds itself to be
struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged
masses.
 The Court held that RA 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting
the mandatory death penalty. As for those punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death, the proper time to determine their heinousness is
when on automatic review the Court is called to pass on a death
sentence with the TC meting out the death sentence in exercise of its
judicial discretion.
 The Court held that the death penalty is imposed on heinous crimes
because
o the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable
acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts
with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the
 masses from abject poverty through organized governmental
strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry
o they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both
their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would
pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of
government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so
 Appellant relies on the case Furman v. Georgia wherein it was
categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading, or
inhuman punishment. However, this contention is misleading and
inaccurate.
o The defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the
nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the
discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the
death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional
discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death
penalty.
 Appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter,
unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life.
o He cites the case of Coker v. Georgia wherein it was stated that
rape is deserving of a serious punishment, but it does not
compare with murder.
o The Court disagreed with the US SC’s contention that the gauge
of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is
the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the
victim.
 The forfeiture of life simply because life was taken, never
was a defining essence of the death penalty in the
context of our legal history and cultural experience;
rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes
because the perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely
destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the
masses from abject poverty through organized
governmental strategies based on a disciplined and
honest citizenry, and because they have so caused
irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and
the society and a repetition of their acts would pose
actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival
of government, they must be permanently prevented
from doing so.
ARTICLES 25 & 26
PDEA v. Brodett (Sept 28 2011 Bersamin, J.)
FACTS:
 Accused Richard Brodett and Jorge Joseph were charged with violating
RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
 The accused sold and delivered 60 blue-colored tablets with Motorola
logos, contained in 6 sachets. The tablets were METAMPHETAMINE.
 Brodett was also separately charged for the illegal possession of the
following:
o 4 yellow tablets with Playboy logos and 10 transparent capsules
with white powder inside, which were ECSTASY
o 5 sachets of a white powdery substance which was COCCAINE
o 5 sachets of COCCAINE placed in a light-yellow folder paper
o 3 sachets containing dried leaves of
TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL
 During the RTC proceedings, Brodett filed a Motion to Return Non-Drug
Evidence and averred that during his arrest, the PH Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) seized his personal non-drug affects including a 2004
Honda Accord.
 The RTC granted his motion, however PDEA moved to reconsider the
order but was denied.
 PDEA elevated the matter to the CA, but it was dismissed.
ISSUE: W/N PDEA has the right to withhold the release of the car to Brodett.
HELD: YES.
 PDEA contends that the decision of the CA was not in accordance with
the intent of the framers of RA 9165.
o The car was registered under Myra Brodett and was seized
during a legitimate operation.
o They assert that even if the car belonged to a third person, her
ownership did not authorize its release because she was under
the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of
the crime.
 Brodett counters that RA 9165 states that confiscation and forfeiture of
the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act may be done by PDEA,
unless such proceeds or instruments are the property of a third person
not liable for the crime.
 The court with the jurisdiction over the offense can seize the instruments
used to commit crime and illegally owned or possessed contraband.
o The accused must not profit from his crime and must not acquire
property or possession thru the unlawful act.
o To return to the convict from whom the contraband was taken, in
one way or another, is not prudent or proper, because doing so
will give rise to a violation of the law for possessing the
contraband again.
 Property used as evidence must be returned once the criminal
proceedings to which it relates have terminated, unless it is then subject
to forfeiture or other proceedings.
 Sec. 20 of RA 9165 provides that instruments or tools with which the
crime was committed, unless they are property of a third person not
liable for the crime, shall be destroyed without delay.
 Art. 45 of the RPC states that: Such proceeds and instruments or tools
shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they
be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those
articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.
 The Office of the City Prosecutor states that the delivery to the RTC of
the listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout
the duration of the trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the
Defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary value.
 PDEA also contends that the car should not have been released
because it had been seized from accused Brodett during a legitimate
anti-illegal operation.
 The Court agrees with the PDEA and the Office of the City
Prosecutor.
o The RTC granted Brodett’s Motion while the criminal
proceedings were still going on and the trial was yet to be
completed.
o Ordering the release of the car at that poin tof the proceedings
was premature, considering that the third paragraph of Section
20 expressly forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any
property, or income derived therefrom, that has been confiscated
from the accused charged under R.A. 9165 during the pendency
of the proceedings in the RTC.
o The determination of whetheror not the car would be subject of
forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to be
rendered in the proceedings.
o To release it before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the
trial court and the parties access to it as evidence.
Republic v. Glasgow (Jan 18 2008 Corona, J.)
FACTS:
 The Republic of the PH petitions to review the order of the RTC
dismissing their complaint for forfeiture filed against the Glasgow Credit
and Collection Services (Glasgow) and Citystate Savings Bank
(CSBI).
 The complaint was filed pursuant to RA 9160 (Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 2001).
 ***
Enrile v. Salazar (Jun 5 1990 Narvasa J.)
FACTS:
 The validity and the limits of the applicability of the doctrine of People v.
Hernandez is questioned in the present case, 34 years after it was
decided.
 Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the
crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder committed
during the period of a failed coup. He was charged alongside spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio and Gregorio Honasan.
 Enrile, thru his counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging that
he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
o held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the
statute books;
o charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no
complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was
conducted, hence was denied due process;
o denied his right to bail; and
o arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally
determined the existence of probable cause.
 The SG contended that the information in Hernandez charged murders
and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Enrile et
al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but
not in furtherance, of rebellion.
 The SG would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo")
arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another,
which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48 RPC, and is the
subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito
compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or
less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph,
with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it
should not apply.
ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of Hernandez applies to the case.
HELD: YES.
 If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were
punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following
penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime
of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances
present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the
crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in
the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not
be imposed upon him.
 The petitioner’s contention that he was charged with a non-existent crime
is meritorious. Read in the context of Hernandez, Enrile can only be
merely charged with simple rebellion. The other acts are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion as means necessary for its
perpetration.
 The petitioners are entitled to bail before final conviction, as a matter of
right.
 The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes committed in carrying
out rebellion are deemed absorbed.
People v. Valdez (Sept 25 2000 Quisumbing, J.)
FACTS:
 Appellant Abe Valdez was found by the RTC to be guilty of violating RA
6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. He was sentenced to death
by lethal injection.
 Prosecution witness SPO3 Marcelo Tipay testified that he received a tip
about the presence of a marijuana plantation allegedly owned by Valdez.
o The following day, a police team went to the plantation. They
found Valdez alone in his hut and saw 7 ft. high marijuana plants
in 2 rows. Valdez admitted that the plants were his.
o The plants were uprooted and Valdez was arrested.
ISSUE: W/N Valdez was correctly sentenced to death by lethal injection.
HELD: NO.
 The confiscated plants were obtained during an illegal search and
seizure.
o There was no warrant even if the police officers had enough time
to get one.
o Even if the lot was unfenced, the right against unreasonable
searches is the immunity of one’s person which includes his
property.
 The trial court relied on Valdez admitting ownership to the plants in
convicting him.
o This admission was not done while being under custodial
investigation.
o The OSG avers that Valdez was not yet under custodial
investigation when he admitted to ownership and his rights to
counsel were not yet attached.
o The Constitution plainly declares that any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
o An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but
starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect.
o The moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or
even plain information from a person suspected of having
committed an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted by
counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
 At the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was
already under investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police
was no longer a general inquiry.
 In trying to elicit information from appellant, the police were already
investigating appellant as a suspect. At this point, he was already under
custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet
been arrested.
o Custodial Investigation is "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."
o Even before Valdez was arrested, the police made him take
incriminating photos in front of the plants. It may be inferred that
he had already been deprived of his freedom of action.
 Valdez’ admission was flawed in its admissibility.
o For a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with
the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it
must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
o Valdez’ admission was verbal. It was also uncounseled.
 The trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to convict
appellant of the offense charged. These were the seized marijuana
plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of ownership.
o There was no other evidence presented to link appellant with the
offense charged.
 The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved..."
 Absent the required degree of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled
to an acquittal.
People v. de Leon (Oct 8 1926 Villamor, J.)
FACTS:
 Defendant Vicente de Leon entered the yard of Vicente Magat and
without violence and intimidation took, with intent to gain, 2 game
roosters belonging to Magat and Ignacio Nicolas.
 De Leon was prosecuted for 2 crimes of theft.
 The trial court found De Leon guilty for only 1 crime of theft, holding that
the theft of 2 roosters constituted only 1 crime.
ISSUE: W/N 2 crimes of theft should be imposed upon the defendant.
HELD:
 The act of taking 2 roosters in response to the unity of thought of the
criminal purpose on one occasion is not affect by the fact that the
roosters belonged to 2 distinct persons.
 There is no series of acts for the accomplishment of different purposes,
but only 1 of which was consummated and determines the existence of
only 1 crime.
o The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on the same
occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent
existence of their own, because there are not two distinct
appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate
crimes.
 It is not necessary in theft for the culprit to know the owner of the thing
stolen, because the law does not require it nor does it affect the criminal
liability, but only the restitution or indemnification of damages.
 The fact that the things taken belong to different persons does not
produce a multiplicity of crimes, which must be punished separately.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
Indeterminate Sentence – a prison sentence which consists of a range of
years.
Act 4103 – enacted on December 5, 1933; amended by Act 4225 and RA
4203 (June 19, 1965)
People v. Simon (Jul 29 1994 Regalado, J.)
FACTS:
 Accused Martin Simon was charged with violating RA 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He allegedly sold 4 tea bags of
marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer.
o The police unit of Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga was
informed by a NARCOM operative that a certain “Alyas Pusa”
was conducting illegal drug activities.
o A buy-bust team was then formed and proceeded to Sto. Cristo.
The informant pointed out Simon and one of the operatives
asked him if he had marijuana. Simon sold 2 tea bags of
marijuana and was subsequently arrested.
 Upon arrest, Simon orally waived his right to counsel.
 The trial court found Simon guilty of violating RA 6425 and sentenced
him to life imprisonment.
 RA 6425 was further amended by RA 7659.
o Under the amendment, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed if the drug involved weighed 5.750 grams
or more for marijuana. Less than that, the penalty shall be prison
coreccional to reclusion perpetua.
o Simon only had 3.8 grams of marijuana in his custody.
ISSUE: W/N RA 7659 should be given retroactive effect.
HELD:
People v. Gabres (Feb 6 1997 Vitug, J.)
FACTS:
 Five counts of estafa were filed against spouses Perlito and Lucrecia
Gabres, the latter being herein appellant.
o The spouses defrauded Joel Panida by representing themselves
as licensed recruiters for overseas employment.
o They took 45k from Panida which they misappropriated for their
own use.
 The spouses were also accused of engaging in large scale illegal
recruitment that constitutes economic sabotage.
o Oreta Nisperos heard the the spouses were recruiting factory
workers for Korea. Together with her son Ramil, Joel Panida,
Julius Aoay, Tarciso Dacsig, Jr., Jonard Dulay, and Ronaldo
Mirabueno, promised to pay for the required placement fees.
o The spouses assured them that they could expect their
departure within a few days. However, the call from their
supposed employer never came.
o After months of waiting, the applicants demanded the return of
their money from the spouses. They were issued 4 10k checks,
but they all bounced.
o The applicants sought the assistance of the PH Overseas
Employment Admin-CAR (POEA-CAR). It certified that the
spouses were not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment.
o Perlito was able to evade arrest and Lucrecia was the only one
tried. She was found guilty of all 6 charges.
ISSUE: W/N the penalty should be modified.
HELD: YES.
 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the
penalty shall be "that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed" under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed" for the offense.
o The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty
prescribed by the RPC for the offense, without first considering
 any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime.
o The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the
sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the
range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the
periods into which it might be subdivided.
o The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
 The amount of 22k involved in the case should be taken as analogous to
a modifying circumstance in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence and not as the initial determination of the
indeterminate penalty, since penal laws should be interpreted in favor of
the accused.
 The penalty prescribed for the estafa charge against Gabres is prison
correccional minimum to medium.
o The minimum period of the indeterminate sentence should be
anywhere within 6 mos. & 1 day to 4 yrs. & 2 mos.
o The maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should be 6
years & 1 day because the amounts involved exceeded 22k, plus
additional 1 year for each additional 10k.
 The Court modified the penalties imposed by the trial court as follows:
o In the criminal case where amount involved is 45k, the minimum
penalty should be reduced to 4 years and 2 mos. of prison
coreccional, the maximum of the allowable minimum penalty of
the indeterminate sentence.
o 50k: minimum penalty is reduced to 4 years & 2 mos. of prison
coreccional. Maximum is 6 year and 1 day of prison mayor plus a
period of 2 years for each additional 10k for a total max. period
of 8 years and 1 day of prison mayor.
o In 2 criminal cases where the amounts were 40k, the min penalty
is 2 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision coreccional. Max is 6
years and 1 days of prison mayor plus 1 year.
o All the other penalties were affirmed without modification.
People v. Lampaza (Nov 24 1999 Panganiban, J.)
FACTS:
 Accused Egmedio Lampaza was charged with the rape of Teodora
Wacay and, applying the ISLAW, was sentenced to 12 years and 1 day
to 14 years and 8 months as minimum, and 17 years and 4 months and 1
day to 20 years as maximum by the trial court.
 The CA modified his penalty to reclusion perpetua.
 The antecedent facts are as follows:
o Teodora’s nephew found her running out of one of the nipa huts
in the farm. When she reached him, she was sobbing and very
pale. She explained to him that she was afraid of somebody and
could not stay in their Barangay.
o Teoora identified the accused during the trial. She stated that
she was at her farm and was about to graze the animals when all
of a sudden Lampaza came from behind her and twisted both
her arms. He then lifted her and brought her to the nipa hut.
There, he threatened her with his bolo and raped her.
ISSUE: W/N the penalty should be modified.
HELD: YES.
 Under the law in effect when the crime was committed, the penalty for
simple rape was reclusion perpetua. In imposing a lower indeterminate
penalty, the trial court erred, because the Indeterminate Sentence Law
does not apply when the offense involved is punishable with reclusion
perpetua.
People v. Ducosin (Dec 14 1933 Butte, J.)
FACTS:
 Appellant Valeriano Ducosin was convicted of frustrated murder against
one Rafael Yanguas, and was referred to the SC for the proper
interpretation and application of Act 4103 or the ISLAW. This is the first
case involving said law.
 ISLAW was enacted on Dec. 5 1933
 Under Art. 288 RPC, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Under Art. 50, the penalty for a
frustrated felony is the one next lower degree from the penalty for the
consummated felony.
o In the present case, the penalty is prison mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, of 10 years
and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.
 Ducosin has the fixed penalty within the minimum period, 10 years and 1
day to 12 years, leaving to the discretion of the court the precise time to
be served within this range.
ISSUE: W/N the penalty should be modified.
HELD: YES.
 Act 4103 was enacted after the appeal to SC. The Court is now required
to revise the sentence pursuant to the law.
 Under Sec. 1 of the Act, instead of a single fixed penalty there should be
two penalties referred to as “maximum” and “minimum”.
o The prisoner must serve the minimum penalty before he is
eligible for parole.
 How shall the maximum and minimum be determined?
o MAXIMUM
 Must be determined in accordance with the provisions of
the RPC exactly as if the Act was never passed.
 The Act does not make inoperative the RPC.
 According to its legislative history, attention was called in
taking care that the Act not be in conflict with the RPC.
 o In this case, the maximum penalty is correct. It should be 10
years and 1 day, reclusion temporal in its medium, because of
the plea of guilty.
o MINIMUM
 Shall not be less than the minimum imprisonment period
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC
to the offense.
 This provision gives the courts the widest discretion they
have ever had.
 The Court construes the expression in Sec. 1 “the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by said Code for
the offense” to mean that the penalty next lower
determined by the court in the case is the maximum.
o In this case, the next lower penalty to the maximum is prison
correccional in its maximum period to prison mayor in its medium
period (4 years and 2 months and 1 day to 10 years).
 The basic purpose of the ISLAW is to “uplift and redeem
valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and
excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness.”
 The criminal should be considered first as an individual
and second as a member of society. Penalties shall not
be standardized but fitted to the individual to protect
social order.
 The factors that should be considered in determining
the minimum penalty are: (1) His age, especially with
reference to extreme youth or old age; (2) his general
health and physical condition; (3) his mentality, heredity
and personal habits; (4) his previous conduct,
environment and mode of life (and criminal record if
any); (5) his previous education, both intellectual and
moral; (6) his proclivities and aptitudes for usefulness or
injury to society; (7) his demeanor during trial and his
attitude with regard to the crime committed; (8) the
manner and circumstances in which the crime was
committed; (9) the gravity of the offense
 The ISLAW aims to individualize the administration of
criminal law.
o In this case, the appellant was unfortunately convicted before the
effectivity of Act 4103. The Court ruled that they minimum period
is 7 years, which is within the range of the penalty next lower
degree to the maximum.
PROBATION
P.D. 968 – establishing a probation system and the appropriation for its funds
(Jul 24 1976)
Mustapha v. People (Oct 20 2015 Peralta, J.)
FACTS:
 Petitioner Mustapha Dimakuta was indicted for violating RA 7610 or the
Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and
Discriminatory Act.
o Mustapha committed a lascivious conduct upon AAA, 16 years
old, by embracing her, touching her breast and private part
against her will and without her consent.
 The RTC sentenced Mustapha to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from 10 years of prison mayor (minimum) to 17
years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal (maximum), with the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
 Mustapha elevated the matter to the CA. The CA modified the penalty to
6 months of arresto mayor (minimum) to 4 years and 2 months of prision
correctional (maximum).
 Instead of further appealing the case, Mustapha filed before the CA a
motion to allow him to apply for probation. He cited Colinares v. People
wherein the petitioner was allowed to apply for probation after his
sentence was reduced on appeal.
o The CA denied the motion. It ruled that Colinares did not apply
because in it the petitioner raised the issue of the correctness of
the penalty.
o The CA cited Lagrosa v. People as the applicable case, wherein
the application for probation was denied because the petitioners
assailed the merits of their convictions rather than the penalty.
ISSUE: W/N Mustapha should be allowed to apply for probation.
HELD: NO.
 HISTORY OF THE PROBATION LAW
o Probation was first introduced by the Americans and was for
juvenile delinquents. As for those above 18, under Act. 4221
those who were convicted and sentenced on appeal were
allowed to be placed on probation after the sentence has
become final and the service has begun. However, Act. 4221
was declared unconstitutional by the SC.
o During Martial Law, Marcos issued PD 968 which allowed the
filing of an application for probation at any time after the
defendant had been convicted and sentenced.
 It was amended to state that the application may be
made after the defendant had been convicted and
sentenced but BEFORE he begins to serve.
 It was again amended, allowing the convicted and
sentenced defendant to apply within the 15-day period
for perfecting an appeal.
 Colinares held that since the trial court imposed a penalty which was
beyond what was allowed by the Probation Law, which was erroneous,
 the accused was deprived of his choice to apply for probation and was
instead compelled to appeal the case.
o The accused in Colinares should not have been allowed to have
the benefit of probation. The Probation Law is not a penal law to
be liberally construed in favor of the accused.
 Probation may be filed even if the accused has filed a notice of appeal
when:
o The appeal is merely intended for the correction of the penalty
imposed by the lower court, which when corrected would entitle
the accused to apply for probation
o The appeal is merely intended to review the crime for which the
accused was convicted and that the accused should only be
liable to the lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
crime for which he was originally convicted and the proper
penalty imposable is within the probationable period.
 Before an appeal is filed based on the grounds enumerated above, the
accused must first file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
trial court based on the grounds above and manifest his intent to apply
for probation once the motion is granted. Without such motion, the
appeal should be denied.
 The notice of appeal should contain the following averments:
o that an earlier motion for reconsideration was filed but was
denied by the trial court;
o that the appeal is only for reviewing the penalty imposed by the
lower court or the conviction should only be for a lesser crime
necessarily included in the crime charged in the information; and
o that the accused-appellant is not seeking acquittal of the
conviction.
 Probation shound not be granted:
o When the accused is convicted by the trial court of a
crime where the penalty imposed is within the probationable
period or a fine, and the accused files a notice of appeal
o When the accused files a notice of appeal which puts the merits
of his conviction in issue, even if there is an alternative prayer for
the correction of the penalty imposed by the trial court or for a
conviction to a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the
crime in which he was convicted where the penalty is within the
probationable period.
 IN THE PRESENT CASE, Mustapha appealed the trial court’s judgment
of conviction before the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in finding him
guilty of violationg RA 7610.
o Mustapha anchored his appeal on a claim of innocence and/or
lack of evidence. This is inconsistent with the Probation Law that
the only qualified penitent offender should be allowed to apply for
probation.