Republic of the Philippines
Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995
VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F.
MANAS, and TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.
DAVIDE JR., J.:
In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent,
pray that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which
may be discovered during the actual investigation of this complaint." They attached
thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege:
1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals
Case No. CA-G.N. CV No. 38153 of which to our surprise lost
unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition [sic]. A close perusal of the case
reveals the serious misconduct of our attorney on record, Atty.
Amado Fojas tantamount to malpractice and negligence in the
performance of his duty obligation to us, to defend us in the
aforesaid case. That the said attorney without informing us the
reason why and riding high on the trust and confidence we repose
on him either abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously
neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of
Judge Teresita Capulong Case No. 3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila so
that we were deduced [sic] in default.
2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything
was in order. That he had already answered the complaint so that
in spite of the incessant demand for him to give us a copy he
continued to deny same to us. Only to disclose later that he never
answered it after all because according to him he was a very busy
man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision dated August 17,
1993.
3. That because of Atty.
law we lost the Judge Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of
Appeals. So that it is only proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and
disbarred in the practice of his profession.
In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the
complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by
his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunately denied by the
court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the
complainants because it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the
Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was declared unlawful in
the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment in the
Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to the
merits of the case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants
(complainants herein) illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr.
Paulino Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the complainants filed this case to harass
him because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had
handled for them. The respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint for
utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer was cured and, even granting
for the sake of argument that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant
his disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law profession.
The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.
Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were
willing to submit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed.
In their separate compliance, both manifested in the affirmative.
The facts in this case are not disputed.
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and
Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor,
respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador.
The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a
complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.
In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal
Salvador's expulsion and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's
name in the roll of union members with all the rights and privileges appurtenant
thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment.
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein
for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20,
and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.
As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case
on grounds of (1) res judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in
NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since what was involved was an
intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to
dismiss.
The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered
the dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it
reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the
complainants herein to file their answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days
from notice.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and
dismissal of the case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referred to the Court of Appeals and
docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.
Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both
denied, the respondent still did not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No.
3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the complainants were declared
in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.
The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the ex-
parte reception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to
pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral
damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as
attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.
The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court,
but his services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and
unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.
The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable
negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the
complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason the latter were
declared in default and judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the
plaintiff's evidence, which was received ex-parte.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every
person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline
employment, 1 subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. 2 He must serve the client with competence and diligence, 3 and
champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. 4 Elsewise
stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the
rules of law, legally applied. 5 This simply means that his client is entitled to the
benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land
and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. 6 If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the
bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not
only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 7
The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-
91. He justifies his failure to do so in this wise:
[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial
court, 8 [he] instead, thru honest mistake and excusable neglect,
filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .
And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred,
dismissed the petition, he again "inadvertently" failed to file an answer
"[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his overzealousness as stated
earlier. . . . "
In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an
honest mistake but was "deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the
legal disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice" for, as admitted by him in his
motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to do so was "due to volume and
pressure of legal work." 9 In short, the complainants want to impress upon this Court
that the respondent has given inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an
answer.
We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default
order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly
invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work,
while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable
neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court.
Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal
work" on the other are two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first
presupposes the respondent's full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an
answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had
committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order
reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in denying
the motion to reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based on
forgetfulness because of his other commitments.
Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did
not comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of
diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that the trial court committed
such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer
even after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no
showing whatsoever that he further assailed the said decision before this Court in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove his claim of
overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it shown that he
alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had a
meritorious defense. 10 And, in his appeal from the judgment by default, he did not
even raise as one of the errors of the trial court either the impropriety of the order of
default or the court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift that
order.
Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to
understand why he took all the trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction and of questioning the
adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court and then with the Court of
Appeals, unless, of course, he meant all of these to simply delay the
disposition of the civil case. Finally, the complainants were not entirely
without any valid or justifiable defense. They could prove that the plaintiff
was not entitled to all the damages sought by him or that if he were so, they
could ask for a reduction of the amounts thereof.
We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for
the sad fate of the complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and
ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the performance of his duty to his
clients.
SO ORDERED.

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's
inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer.
Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free.

All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with
diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."

The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91
was in fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages
were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of
expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought
which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility
of any defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants
thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly
provides:

A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest
opinion on the merits and probable results of the client's case,
neither overstating nor understanding the prospects of the case.
 tasked to defend complainants claim on the properties against the claim of a certain
George Lizares (Lizares).

THIRD DIVISION
The complaint arose because respondent, allegedly after the termination of his
services in May 2000, filed a complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform
SIMON D. PAZ, A.C. No. 6125
Complainant, Board (DARAB case) in behalf of one Isidro Dizon (Dizon) for annulment of Transfer
Present: Certificate Title No. 420127-R (TCT No. 420127-R) in the name of complainant and his
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, partners.[1] Complainant explained that Dizons property, covered by Emancipation
- versus - CARPIO, Patent No. 00708554/Transfer Certificate Title No. 25214 (TCT No. 25214), was
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and among those properties purchased by complainant with respondents
VELASCO, JR., JJ. assistance. Complainant alleged that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting

ATTY. PEPITO A. SANCHEZ, Promulgated: interests when he represented Dizon in a case involving the same properties and
Respondent. September 19, 2006 transactions in which he previously acted as complainants counsel. Complainant
added that respondent filed the DARAB case with malicious machination because
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x respondent used complainants old address to serve the complaint and summons,
enabling respondent to obtain a judgment by default in Dizonsfavor.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Simon D. Paz (complainant) against
Atty. Pepito A. Sanchez (respondent) for representing conflicting interests and
violation of the lawyers oath.
The Facts
In his complaint dated 23 July 2003, complainant stated that sometime in 1995,
complainant and his partners, Alfredo Uyecio and Petronila Catap, engaged the
services of respondent to assist them purchase, as well as document the purchase, of
several parcels of land from tenant-farmers in Pampanga. Respondent was also
Complainant also stated that on 23 June 2003, respondent, despite knowledge of
complainants pending petition for review of judgment in the DARAB case, filed a
civil case (RTC case) against complainant and Sycamore Venture
Corporation[2] (Sycamore) before the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, for annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 483629-R
(TCT No. 483629-R).[3] Complainant pointed out that respondent should be punished
for forum shopping and preparing a false certification of non-forum shopping
because respondent failed to disclose complainants pending petition before the
DARAB. Complainant also charged respondent with violation of the lawyers oath
because, with malice and full knowledge of the real facts, respondent filed groundless
and false suits against complainant, his partners and Sycamore.
In his comment dated 2 October 2003, respondent stated that he has been
representing the tenant-farmers, including Dizon, in their cases before the DARAB
and the courts since 1978. Respondent also represented the tenant-farmers against the
claims of Lizares, who filed cases for the cancellation of their emancipation patents.

Respondent confirmed that in 1995, complainant and his partners expressed interest
in acquiring Dizons property. Respondent also explained that complainant and his
partners, as buyers of the tenant-farmers properties, were impleaded as defendants in
the Lizares cases. Respondent came to represent complainant and his partners
because they did not get a lawyer of their own and allowed respondent to represent
them too.[4]
On the DARAB case, respondent clarified that the complaint[5] was filed on 15 May
1997 and not, as complainant claimed, after respondents services was terminated in
May 2000. Respondent declared that he was compelled to file the case because he felt
responsible for the cancellation of TCT No. 25214. Respondent explained that he
lent Dizonstitle to complainant and his partners enabling them to transfer the title in
their names. Denying that there was malicious machination in the filing of the
DARAB case, respondent stated that the address he placed was the address of
complainant in 1997. The 20 August 2002 DARAB decision[6] specifically stated that a
copy of the complaint, summons and notices were duly served and received by
complainant and his partners. However, complainant and his partners ignored the
complaint, summons and notices, which led to the issuance of a judgment
in Dizons favor. Moreover, there was entry of judgment[7] on 21 November 2002 and
the writ of execution[8] was issued on 10 December 2002.
On the RTC case, respondent explained that he was compelled to file the case when
he discovered that TCT No. 420127-R, in the name of complainant and his partners,
was transferred in the name of Sycamore. Respondent pointed out that unless TCT
No. 483629-R is nullified, the Register of Deeds cannot execute the DARAB
decision. Respondent denied that he violated the prohibition on forum
shopping.[9] Respondent also maintained that the cases he filed were justifiable,
tenable and meritorious.
In a Resolution dated 12 November 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Commissioner San Juan) set the case for
mandatory conference on 4 March 2004. Both parties appeared and were given ten
days to submit their position papers. Both parties complied.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
The IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2005-78 dated 12 March
2005 adopting, with modification,[10] Commissioner San Juans Report and
Recommendation finding respondent guilty of violating the prohibition against
representing conflicting interests. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the
imposition on respondent of a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
law with a warning that a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the case to the Court as provided under
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[11] of the Rules of Court.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds insufficient evidence to hold respondent liable for forum shopping
and for filing groundless suits. However, the Court finds respondent liable for
violation of the prohibition on representing conflicting interests.
On Respondents Violation of the Rules
on Non-Forum Shopping
Forum shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits, either simultaneously
or successively, involving the same parties to secure a favorable judgment.[12] Forum
shopping exists if the actions raise identical causes of action, subject matter and
issues.[13] The mere filing of several
cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum shopping. [14]
The Court notes that the certification against forum shopping did not form part of the
records of the case. However, a comparison of the two cases reveal that there was no
forum shopping. Although both cases are related because Dizons property is
involved, the reliefs prayed for are different. In the DARAB case, Dizon prayed for
the cancellation of TCT No. 420127-R in the name of complainant and his partners. In
the RTC case, Dizons widow prayed for the cancellation of TCT No. 483629-R in the
name of Sycamore.Respondent cannot be held liable for forum shopping.
On Respondents Violation of the Lawyers Oath
Lawyers take an oath that they will not wittingly or willingly promote any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same. The Court
notes that the cases are still pending before the DARAB and the RTC. The Court,
therefore, does not have any basis for ruling if there was a violation of the oath.
On Respondents Violation of the Prohibition against
Representing Conflicting Interests
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
full disclosure of the facts. Lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another
client requires them to oppose.[15] The proscription against representation of
conflicting interest applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present
clients in the same action or in an unrelated action.[16]
By respondents own admission, when he filed the DARAB case on Dizons behalf
against complainant, both complainant and Dizon were respondents clients at that
time.Respondent was representing complainant in the cases against Lizares where
respondent was duty-bound to defend complainants title over the properties against
the claims ofLizares. While it is not clear from the records that the Lizares cases
included Dizons property, it is undisputed that respondent acted as complainants
counsel in the Lizares cases.At the same time, respondent was also
representing Dizon before the DARAB for cancellation
of lis pendens[17] involving Dizons property, which cancellation was needed for
complainant to purchase the Dizon property. In filing the second DARAB case
on Dizons behalf, respondent was duty-bound to assail complainants title
over Dizons property, which complainant had purchased from Dizon. Respondent
was clearly in a conflict of interest situation.
The Court notes that respondent did not specifically deny that he represented
conflicting interests. Respondent merely offered to justify his actuations by stating
that he felt it was his duty and responsibility to file the case because he felt
responsible for the cancellation of TCT No. 25214 and its subsequent transfer in
complainants name.[18] Respondent stated that he will forever be bothered by his
conscience if he did not file the case.[19] However, good faith and honest intentions do
not excuse the violation of this prohibition.[20] In representing both complainant
and Dizon, respondents duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his clients was
placed under a cloud of doubt. Respondent should have inhibited himself from
representing Dizon against complainant in the DARAB and RTC cases to avoid
conflict of interest.
In Maturan v. Gonzales, the Court said:
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of
attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his clients case. He learns from his client the weak
points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge
must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity
must be given him to take advantage of the clients secrets. A
lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss
thereof.[21]
On the Appropriate Penalty Against Respondent

In cases involving representation of conflicting interests, the Court has imposed on

the erring lawyer either a reprimand,[22] or a suspension from the practice of law from
six months[23] to two years.[24]

In this case, we deem it proper to suspend respondent from the practice of law for
one year as recommended by the IBP.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Pepito A. Sanchez GUILTY of

violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Court SUSPENDSrespondent from the practice of law
for ONE YEAR and WARNS respondent that the commission of a similar act in the
future will merit a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997]
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that
respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal
profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt,
after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath,
however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had
been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent
did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla
in June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay,
Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent
even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town
fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in
1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964.[1] It
was after the child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he
would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued
and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He
gave only P10.00 for the child on the latters birthdays. Her trust in him and their
relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another
woman.Hence, this petition.
Upon complainants motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of
witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainants failure to comment
on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid
testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating that she had
justifiable reasons in failing to file the earlier comment required and that she remains
interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied
respondents motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the
ground of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979.[2] Respondents
third motion to dismiss was noted in the Courts Resolution dated September 15,
1982.[3] In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic
organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this
case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer. [4]
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure
of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow
Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath upon payment of the required fees.[5]
Respondents hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court,
in response to complainants opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-
taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and
that respondent be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers oath in 1971 because of the
charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore
an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he
did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a
doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act
is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[6] It is a willful, flagrant, or
shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community.[7]
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang[8] quite relevant because mere
intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to
marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is
neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary
sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of
wedlock.[9]
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were
evidently consensual. We do not find complainants assertions that she had been
forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondents
girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those
years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to
have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and
actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be
easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently
with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his
dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into
because of love, not for any other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman
scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent
suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very
hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the
twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute
sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other
indiscretion attributed to him.[10] Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age,
should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyers oath.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon

Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper
fees.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5916. July 1, 2003]
SELWYN F. LAO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERT W. MEDEL, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year
suspension from the practice of law.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Selwyn
F. Lao. Atty. Robert W. Medel was charged therein with dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct unbecoming an attorney.
The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD in
this wise:
The Complaint arose from the [respondents] persistent refusal to make good on four
(4) RCBC checks totaling [t]wenty [t]wo [t]housand (P22,000.00) [p]esos. These
dishonored checks were issued by defendant in replacement for previous checks
issued to the complainant. Based on the exchange of letters between the parties, it
appears that [respondent], in a letter dated June 19, 2001, had committed to forthwith
effect immediate settlement of my outstanding obligation of P22,000.00 with Engr.
Lao, at the earliest possible time, preferably, on or before the end of June 2000. Again,
in a letter dated July 3, 2000, the [respondent] made a request for a final extension of
only ten (10) days from June 30, 2000 (or not later than July 10, 2000), within which to
effect payment of P22,000.00 to Engr. Lao. Needless to say, the initiation of this
present complaint proves that contrary to his written promises, Atty. Medel never
made good on his dishonored checks. Neither has he paid his indebtedness.[2]
In his Answer[3] dated July 30, 2001, Atty. Medel reasons that because all of his
proposals to settle his obligation were rejected, he was unable to comply with his
promise to pay complainant. Respondent maintains that the Complaint did not
constitute a valid ground for disciplinary action because of the following:
(a). Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a member of the Bar, may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wil[l]ful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wil[l]fully
appearing as an attorney for a party to case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice;
(a.1). Applying the afore-cited legal provision to the facts obtaining in the present
case, it is clear that the offense with which the respondent is being charged by the
complainant, is merely a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22, for brevity),
which is a special law, and is not punishable under the Revised Penal Code (RPC, for
brevity). It is self-evident therefore, that the offense is not in the same category as a
violation of Article 315, paragraph 2, (d), RPC, which is issuing a post-dated check or
a check in payment of an obligation, with insufficient funds in the drawee bank,
through false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud, which is a crime involving moral turpitude;
(b). If the respondent is to be disciplined by the Supreme Court, under Sec. 27, Rule
138 of the Rules, for the issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, for
payment of a pre-existing obligation to the complainant, then, verily, the said Rule
138, Sec. 27, would be a cruel and an unjust law, which the Honorable Supreme Court
would not countenance;
(c). A careful examination of the specific grounds enumerated, for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, under Sec. 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules, clearly
shows beyond a shadow of doubt that the alleged issuance of a worthless check, in
violation of B.P. 22, is NOT one of the grounds for disciplinary action against a
member of the Bar, to warrant his disbarment or suspension from his office as
attorney, by the Supreme Court; and
(d). The issuance of a worthless check by a member of the Bar, in violation of B.P. 22,
does NOT constitute dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, under Canon 1 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This is because, the door to the
law profession swings on reluctant hinges. Stated otherwise, unless there is a clear,
palpable and unmitigated immoral or deceitful conduct, of a member of the Bar, in
violation of his oath as an attorney, by the mere issuance of a worthless check, in
violation of B.P. 22, the Supreme Court is inclined to give the said attorney, the
benefit of the doubt.[4]
On August 22, 2001, complainant submitted his Reply.[5] Thereafter, IBP-CBD
Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP for
investigation and report, scheduled the case for hearing on October 4, 2001. After
several cancellations, the parties finally met on May 29, 2002. In that hearing,
respondent acknowledged his obligation and committed himself to pay a total
of P42,000 (P22,000 for his principal debt and P20,000 for attorneys
fees). Complainant agreed to give him until July 4, 2002 to settle the principal debt
and to discuss the plan of payment for attorneys fees in the next hearing.
 On July 4, 2002, both parties appeared before the IBP-CBD for their scheduled
hearing. But, while waiting for the case to be called, respondent suddenly insisted on
leaving, supposedly to attend to a family emergency. Complainants counsel objected
and Commissioner Cunanan, who was still conducting a hearing in another case,
ordered him to wait. He, however, retorted in a loud voice, Its up to you, this is only
disbarment, my family is more important.[6] And, despite the objection and the
warning, he arrogantly left. He made no effort to comply with his undertaking to
settle his indebtedness before leaving.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In his September 19, 2002 Report,[7] Commissioner Cunanan found respondent
guilty of violating the attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
former explained that, contrary to the latters claim, violation of BP 22 was a crime
that involved moral turpitude. Further, he observed that [w]hile no criminal case may
have been instituted against [respondent], it is beyond cavil that indeed, [the latter]
committed not one (1) but four counts of violation of BP 22.[8] The refusal [by
respondent] to pay his indebtedness, his broken promises, his arrogant attitude
towards complainants counsel and the [commission sufficiently] warrant the
imposition of sanctions against him.[9] Thus, the investigating commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XV-2002-598,[10] the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted
the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan and resolved to suspend
respondent from the practice of law for two years. The Resolution, together with the
records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to Rule
139-B Sec. 12(b).
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors,
but reduce the period of suspension to one year.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our
legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [11] In so doing, the peoples
faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
In the present case, respondent has been brought to this Court for failure to pay
his debts and for issuing worthless checks as payment for his loan from
complainant. While acknowledging the fact that he issued several worthless checks,
he contends that such act constitutes neither a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; nor dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is evident from the records
that he made several promises to pay his debt promptly. However, he reneged on his
obligation despite sufficient time afforded him. Worse, he refused to recognize any
wrongdoing and transferred the blame to complainant, on the contorted reasoning
that the latter had refused to accept the formers plan of payment. It must be pointed
out that complainant had no obligation to accept it, considering respondents previous
failure to comply with earlier payment plans for the same debt.
Moreover, before the IBP-CBD, respondent had voluntarily committed himself
to the payment of his debts, yet failed again to fulfill his promise. That he had no real
intention to settle them is evident from his unremitting failed commitments. His
cavalier attitude in incurring debts without any intention of paying for them puts his
moral character in serious doubt.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay
their financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these
considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or
private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.[12]
It is equally disturbing that respondent remorselessly issued a series of
worthless checks, unmindful of the deleterious effects of such act to public interest
and public order.[13]
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the
bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law. Rule 1.01 of the Code
specifically provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. In Co v. Bernardino,[14] the Court considered the issuance of
worthless checks as a violation of this Rule and an act constituting gross
misconduct. It explained thus:
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court
may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-
professional or private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however,
the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as
to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his
licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or
removing him from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]).
The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad
checks. This gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional
duties as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt. The
Commission, however, does not find him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that
he eventually paid his obligation to the complainant, albeit very much delayed.
While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant
and respondent as the transaction between them did not require the professional
legal services of respondent, nevertheless respondent's abject conduct merits
condemnation from this Court.
As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567
(1923)] the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes
which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client x x x In disciplining
the respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said: x x x As a general rule, a court will not
assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have
been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many
exceptions x x x. The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between
attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rules
prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney shall be
a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a
license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it
is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional
duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him x x x.
Thus, it was imperative for him to respect the authority of the officer assigned to
investigate his case. Assuming that he had a very important personal matter to attend
to, he could have politely explained his predicament to the investigating
commissioner and asked permission to leave immediately. Unfortunately, the former
showed dismal behavior by raising his voice and leaving without the consent of
complainant and the investigating commissioner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege.[16] It demands a
high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission,
but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.[17] In this case,
respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law
and justice.[18]
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by his gross misconduct. The
IBP Board of Governors recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law
for two years.However, in line with Co v. Bernardino,[19] Ducat Jr. v. Villalon
Jr.[20] and Saburnido v. Madroo[21] -- which also involved gross misconduct of lawyers --
we find the suspension of one year sufficient in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty of gross misconduct and
is hereby SUSPENDED for one year from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision.He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will
be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on
the IBP, as well as on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo where the erring lawyer was suspended for one
year from the practice of law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice FIRST DIVISION
Malcolm reiterated that an attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not related to his
professional duties which show him to be an unfit and unworthy lawyer. The courts
are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not
compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough
to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of
an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to
show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the
courts retain the power to discipline him x x x Of all classes and professions, the
lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the law x x x and to that doctrine we give
our unqualified support."

We likewise take notice of the high-handed manner in which respondent dealt

with Commissioner Cunanan during the July 4, 2002 hearing, when the former was
expected to settle his obligation with complainant. We cannot countenance the
discourtesy of respondent. He should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary
authority over him by virtue of his membership therein.[15]
[A.C. No. 6183. March 23, 2004]
EDISON G. CHENG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALEXANDER M.
AGRAVANTE, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed with the Integrated Bar of
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.
The following facts have been established by the evidence.
Respondent Atty. Alexander M. Agravante served as counsel for The Rogemson
Co., Inc. (hereinafter, Rogemson) in a case filed against it before the National Labor
Relations Commissions (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI in Davao City by
its former employee, a certain Beaver Martin B. Barril. On June 18, 1998, Labor
Arbiter Newton R. Sancho rendered a decision in favor of the complainant, and
ordered Rogemson to pay Barril separation pay and backwages. [1] A copy of said
decision was received by respondents law office on September 8, 1998. However,
respondent filed a Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC only on September 22,
1998. Consequently, the NLRC dismissed Rogemsons appeal in a Resolution dated
May 27, 1999, and made the following incisive observation:
In the case at bar, respondents through counsel were duly served with a copy of the
decision (Vol. 1, pp. 67-70) of Labor Arbiter Newton R. Sancho, dated 18 June 1998,
declaring complainant illegally dismissed from employment and awarding him with
separation pay and backwages in the total sum of P130,000.00 on September 8, 1998,
Tuesday, said date being indicated in the mailed decisions registry return receipt
which is attached to the records (Vol. 1, p. 75). Consequently, respondents had ten
(10) calendar days but not later than September 18, 1998, Friday to perfect their
appeal therefrom. However, the records similarly bear that this present appeal was
filed belatedly by way of mail on 22 September 1998. It is necessary to state these facts
candidly given the inaccurate certification by respondents counsel that he received
the decision being assailed on September 10, 1998. (Vol. 2, p. 7)
The complainants terminated the services of Atty. Agravante. Through their
new lawyers, complainants wrote Atty. Agravante, demanding that they be
compensated for the pecuniary damages they had suffered as a result of his
negligence.[2]
When it appeared that Atty. Agravante had no intention of responding to their
letter, Edison G. Cheng, General Manager of Rogemson, filed an affidavit-complaint
with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.[3] The case was then assigned to
Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay for investigation.
Allan P. Abelgas, Rogemsons Regional Sales Manager for Cebu, testified that he
only learned of the decision of the Labor Arbiter when a secretary of Atty. Agravante
informed him that a bond was required in filing an appeal to the NLRC. Abelgas was
then about to take an emergency leave of absence, so he delegated the task of
securing the bond to his sister Sheila A. Balandra, another Rogemson employee. [4]
Balandra testified that on September 18, 1998, she called up Cheng in Manila by
phone, who then authorized her to procure the bond. Balandra then called the office
of Atty. Agravante to ask if she can submit the bond on Monday, September 21,
1998. She was told to stay on the line while the secretary consulted with one of the
other lawyers in the office. When the secretary came back, she informed Balandra that
she could submit the bond on Monday, September 21, 1998 as long as it reached the
law office before 5:00 p.m.[5]
On September 21, 1998, Balandra arrived at the office of Atty. Agravante with
the bond at 4:00 p.m. She learned that Atty. Agravante had just returned from out of
town and had just opened the envelope containing the adverse decision.[6]
Not surprisingly, Agravante tells a different story. He neither admitted nor
denied receiving the decision of the Labor Arbiter on September 8, 1998. Instead, he
alleges that he was out of town on said date and only returned to his office on
September 10, 1998. Upon arriving at the office, his secretary handed to him all the
correspondence addressed to him, including the envelope containing the Labor
Arbiters decision. He alleges that there were several markings on this particular
envelope, one of which was the date September 10, 1998, and he allegedly assumed
that this was the date of receipt by his office.[7] He then informed Abelgas of the result
of the case and the period within which to file a Memorandum of Appeal. [8] The
instruction for Rogemson to proceed with the appeal came a full six (6) days later. He
offered the services of his law office for procuring the appeal bond, but he was
informed that Rogemson would take care of it. He alleges that Rogemson furnished
them with the bond only in the morning of September 22, 1998, although the bond
documents were notarized on September 21, 1998.[9]
On July 23, 2003, Commissioner Dulay submitted his Report recommending
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) months with an
admonition that a similar offense would be dealt with more severely. [10]
On August 30, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No.
XVI-2003-97, approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
The investigating commissioner found that Balandras testimony that she
furnished Agravantes law office with the appeal bond on September 21, 1998
and not on September 22, 1998, was not sufficiently rebutted by Agravante, who did
not even cross-examine her. More importantly, the fact that the Memorandum of
Appeal was filed four (4) days beyond the reglementary period for filing the same,
which resulted in its dismissal by the NLRC, shows that Agravante was guilty of
negligence.[11]
 With regard to the date of receipt of the Labor Arbiters decision, the registry
return card indicated that respondent received the same on September 8,
1998.[12] Thus, Commissioner Dulay concluded that Agravante misled the NLRC
when he certified in his Memorandum of Appeal that he received the adverse
decision of the Labor Arbiter on September 10, 1998.[13]
Before lawyers are admitted to the bar, they must first solemnly swear to do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court.[14] This oath, to which all lawyers
subscribe in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice, is not
a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards, nor is it
mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that every lawyer must uphold and
keep inviolable at all times.[15] This duty is expressed in general terms in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thus:
CANON 10--- A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
It is codified further in the following rule of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 10.01 ---A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
In the case at bar, Agravante lied when he said he received the Labor Arbiters
decision on September 10, 1998 in order to make it appear that his Memorandum of
Appeal was filed on time.
It cannot be stressed enough how important it is for a lawyer as an officer of the
court to observe honesty at all times, especially before the courts. [16] A lawyer must be
a disciple of truth,[17] and Agravante has clearly failed to live up to this duty.
Moreover, the Code of Professional Responsibility states that:
CANON 18 --- A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxxxxxxxx
Rule 18.03 --- A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client, warmth
and zeal in the defense of his rights. He must use all his learning and ability to the
end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with
the law. He must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in
support of his clients cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full
discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility
that he may displease the judge or the general public.[18]
In this case, respondents filing of the Memorandum of Appeal four (4) days
after the deadline proves that his efforts fell short of the diligence required of a
lawyer. His failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period constitutes
negligence and malpractice proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provide that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.[19]
Agravantes insistence that it was not his place to file an appeal without express
instructions from his client to do so is not persuasive. He could easily withdraw the
appeal if his client should later decide not to pursue the same.[20]
Furthermore, the belated filing of the Memorandum of Appeal cannot in any
way mitigate respondents liability; on the contrary, it shows ignorance on his part. As
a lawyer, he ought to know that his Memorandum of Appeal, having been filed
beyond the reglementary period, would surely be struck down for late filing. [21]
In sum, respondent utterly failed to perform his duties and responsibilities
faithfully and well as to protect the rights and interests of his client. [22]
A word regarding the imposable penalty. In the case of Perea v. Almadro,[23] the
respondent therein was similarly punished for negligence in the discharge of his duty
as well as misrepresentation committed before the court. In said case, the respondent
lawyer failed to file a demurrer to the evidence after asking for leave to file the
same. He compounded this transgression by spinning concocting stories about the
loss of the file of his draft, which somehow led him to believe that the pleading had
already been filed. Finding him guilty of serious neglect of his duties as a lawyer and
of open disrespect for the court and the authority it represents, as embodied in Canon
18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court suspended the respondent therein from the practice of law
for one (1) year and imposed a fine in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)
Pesos, with warning that any similar acts of dishonesty would be dealt with more
severely.[24] Evidently, this case seems to be on all fours with the case at bar, so we are
thus constrained to increase the penalty recommended by the IBP.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Alexander M.
Agravante is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year and
is FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 2884. January 28, 1998]
IRENE RAYOS-OMBAC, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO A.
RAYOS, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case stemmed from a petition for disbarment filed with this Court by Mrs.
Irene Rayos-Ombac against her nephew, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, a legal practitioner
in Metro Manila, for "his failure to adhere to the standards of mental and moral
fitness set up for members of the bar."[1]
The records show that in January 1985, respondent induced complainant who
was then 85 years old to withdraw all her bank deposits and entrust them to him for
safekeeping.Respondent told her that if she withdraws all her money in the bank,
they will be excluded from the estate of her deceased husband and his other heirs will
be precluded from inheriting part of it.
Acting on respondent's suggestion, complainant preterminated all her time
deposits with the Philippine National Bank on January 18, 1985. She
withdrew P588,000.00.
Respondent then advised complainant to deposit the money with Union Bank
where he was working. He also urged her to deposit the money in his name to
prevent the other heirs of her husband from tracing the same.
Complainant heeded the advice of respondent. On January 22, 1985, respondent
deposited the amount of P588,000.00 with Union Bank under the name of his wife in
trust for seven beneficiaries, including his son. The maturity date of the time deposit
was May 22, 1985.
On May 21, 1985, complainant made a demand on respondent to return
the P588,000.00 plus interest. Respondent told her that he has renewed the deposit for
another month and promised to return the whole amount including interest on June
25, 1985. Respondent, however, failed to return the money on June 25, 1985.
On August 16, 1985, respondent informed complainant that he could only
return P400,000.00 to be paid on installment. Complainant acceded to respondent's
proposal as she was already old and was in dire need of money.
On the same date, respondent and complainant executed a memorandum of
agreement stating:
"WHEREAS, on January 22, 1985, (complainant) entrusted for safekeeping to
(respondent) the sum of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS
(P588,000.00) which sum of money was withdrawn by the parties from the Philippine
National Bank on said date.
WHEREAS, the said amount was deposited by (respondent) with the consent of
(complainant) with the UNION BANK, J.P. Rizal Branch, Makati, Metro Manila.
WHEREAS, upon mutual agreement of the parties, they have agreed as they hereby
agree on the following terms for the purpose of disposing of the above sum, to wit:
1. Of the sum of P588,000.00 received in trust, (respondent) shall return only the sum
of P400,000.00 to (complainant) in the following manner:
a) P100,000.00 upon execution of this agreement;
b) P200,000.00 on or before October 19, 1985, to be covered by postdated check;
c) P100,000.00 on or before November 19, 1985, to be covered by a postdated check.
2. (Respondent) hereby undertakes and guarantees that at the time the aforesaid
postdated checks fall due, the same should be backed up with sufficient funds on a
best efforts basis.
3. That the remaining balance of P188,000.00, (respondent) hereby acknowledges the
same as his indebtedness to (complainant) to be paid by the former when able or at
his option.(Complainant) however assures (respondent) that she will not institute any
collection suit against (respondent) (sic), neither will she transmit the same by way of
testamentary succession to her heirs, neither are (respondent's) heirs liable.
4. That the parties have executed this agreement with the view of restoring their
previous cordial filial relationship."[2]
In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, respondent issued to
complainant the following checks:
1. UCPB Check No. 487974 dated August 19, 1985 in the amount of P100,000.00;
2. UCPB Check No. 487975 dated October 19, 1985 in the amount of P200,000;
3. UCPB Check No. 487976 dated November 19, 1985 in the amount
of P100,000.00.
 Complainant was not able to encash UCPB Check No. 487974 as it was
dishonored due to insufficient funds.
Respondent, nonetheless, asserted that he was not duty-bound to fund the
check because under paragraph 2 of the memorandum of agreement, he only
guaranteed that the checks shall be "backed up with sufficient funds on a best efforts
basis." This prompted the other relatives of respondent and complainant to intervene
in the brewing dispute between the two. They begged respondent to pay his
obligation to complainant. Heeding their plea, respondent replaced UCPB Check No.
487974 with two new checks, one for P64,800.00 and another
forP35,200.00. Complainant was able to encash the first check but not the second
because it was dishonored by the drawee bank. The remaining checks, UCPB Check
No. 487975 and UCPB Check No. 487976, were likewise dishonored by the drawee
bank for lack of funds.
On November 15, 1985, complainant filed a complaint for estafa against
respondent and a corresponding information was filed against him by the provincial
fiscal.
Respondent thereafter made a proposal to complainant for an amicable
settlement. To pay his debt, respondent offered to complainant two second hand cars
and cash amounting toP40,000.00. Complainant refused the offer because she needed
cash to provide for her daily needs.
The records also show that respondent filed several suits against complainant.
First, in February 1985, respondent filed a criminal case for estafa against
complainant. It appears that respondent has previously told the tenants of a parcel of
land owned by complainant that she had promised to sell them the land and that she
had authorized him to negotiate with them. He obtained from the tenants advance
payment for the lots they were occupying. Respondent then prepared a special power
of attorney[3] authorizing him to sell the land and asked complainant to sign
it. Complainant, however, refused to sign because she did not intend to make
respondent her attorney-in-fact. Hence, the tenants sued respondent for
estafa. Respondent, in turn, sued complainant for estafa for allegedly reneging on her
promise to sell the land.
Then, on April 5, 1986, respondent filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Review
Acts of Administratrix as a Prelude for Formal Motion to (sic) her Discharge" in
Special Proceedings No. 5544 for the settlement of the estate of complainant's
husband, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan.[4] Respondent filed the pleading although he was not a party to the case.
Finally, on May 19, 1986, respondent indicted complainant for "falsification by
private individuals and use of falsified documents under Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code" for allegedly making untruthful statements in her petition for
appointment as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband.[5]
Thus, in June 1986, complainant filed with this Court a complaint to disbar
respondent on two grounds: (1) that respondent employed clever scheme to defraud
complainant, and (2) that respondent filed frivolous cases against complainant to
harass her.
Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for disbarment against
complainant's counsel, Atty. Abelardo Viray. The complaint cited four causes of
action: (1) assisting client to commit tax fraud; (2) use of unorthodox collection
method; (3) ignorance of the law; and (4) subornation of perjury.[6]
Both disbarment cases were consolidated and referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
The cases were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation and disposition pursuant to Section 20 Rule 139-B which took effect on
June 1, 1988.
After investigation, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP recommended
the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two years. It also
recommended the dismissal of the complaint to disbar Atty. Viray for lack of merit.[7]
On January 27, 1996, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No.
XII-96-22 stating:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above entitled case, hereinmade part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation therein to
be supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Respondent Atty. Orlando A. Rayos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for two (2) years and the complaint against Atty. Abelardo V. Viray is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit."[8]
On June 6, 1996, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with regard to
Administrative Case No. 2884.[9] The Board of Governors of the IBP, however, denied
the motion in Resolution No. XII-96-193.[10]
On September 15, 1997, respondent filed with this Court a Motion to Lift
Suspension for Two Years, alleging that complainant has executed an affidavit
withdrawing the complaint for disbarment.[11]
We deny the motion of respondent.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
Rule 1.03 of the same Code, on the other hand, provides:
 "A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause."

Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as his oath

as an attorney when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting to him all her
money, and later refused to return the same despite demand. Respondent's wicked
deed was aggravated by the series of unfounded suits he filed against complainant to
compel her to withdraw the disbarment case she filed against him. Indeed,
respondent's deceitful conduct makes him unworthy of membership in the legal
profession. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one's good
standing in the profession.[12]

Considering the depravity of respondent's offense, we find the penalty

recommended by the IBP to be too mild. Such offense calls for the severance of
respondent's privilege to practice law not only for two years, but for life.

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by

complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or
disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly
proven.[13] This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They
are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person
who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens
may have in the proper administration of justice.[14] Hence, if the evidence on record
warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of
complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. In the instant case, it has been
sufficiently proved that respondent has engaged in deceitful conduct, in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this

decision be attached to respondent's record in the Bar Confidant's Office and
furnished the IBP and all our courts.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5235. March 22, 2000]
FERNANDO C. CRUZ AND AMELIA CRUZ, complainants, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO
C. JACINTO, respondents. Jurisä
RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
In their sworn complaint, spouses Fernando C. Cruz and Amelia Manimbo Cruz seek
the disbarment of Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
through Commissioner Jesulito A. Manalo of the Commissioner on Bar discipline,
conducted an investigation. Thereafter, he submitted his Findings and
Recommendation, thusly:
This is a disbarment case filed by the spouses Fernando and Amelia
Cruz against Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto. This case was filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline last 30 January 1991.
The evidence of the complainants show that sometime in June 1990,
Atty. Ernesto Jacinto, lawyer of the couple in an unrelated case,
requested the Cruz spouses for a loan in behalf of a certain
Concepcion G. Padilla, who he claimed to be an old friend as she
was allegedly in need of money. The loan requested was for PhP
285,000.00 payable after 100 days for PhP 360,000 to be secured by a
real estate mortgage on a parcel of land located at Quezon City. Scä
juris
The spouses, believing and trusting the representations of their
lawyer that Padilla was a good risk, authorized him to start
preparing all the necessary documents relative to the registration of
the Real Estate Mortgage to secure the payment of the loan in favor
of the Cruz spouses.
On 4 July 1990, the complainants agreed to the request of Atty.
Jacinto and were presented by the latter with a Real Estate
Mortgage Contract and a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 127275 in
the name of Concepcion G. Padilla. The amount of PhP 285,000.00
was given by the spouses to the respondent in cash (PhP
270,000.00) and a PBCom check no. 713929 for PhP 15,000.00.
Upon maturity of the loan on 15 October 1990, the spouses
demanded payment from Concepcion G. Padilla by going to the
address given by the respondent but there proved to be no person
by that name living therein. When the complainants verified the
genuineness of TCT No. 127275 with Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, it was certified by the said office to be a fake and spurious
title. Further efforts to locate the debtor-mortgagor likewise proved
futile. Jurisä sc
In their sworn affidavits given before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the spouses claim that they relied much on the
reassurances made by Atty. Jacinto as to Concepcion G. Padillas
credit, considering that he was their lawyer. It was also their trust
and confidence in Atty. Jacinto that made them decide to forego
meeting the debtor-mortgagor.
The complainants evidence also included the sworn statements of
Estrella Ermino-Palipada, the secretary of the respondent at the
Neri Law Office, and Avegail Payos, a housemaid of Atty. Jacinto.
Ms. Palipada stated that:
1. she was the one who prepared the Real Estate Mortgage Contract
and the Receipt of the loan upon the instruction of the respondents;
2. she was a witness to the transaction and never once saw the
person of Concepcion G. Padilla, the alleged mortgagor; and that
3. she was instructed by Atty. Jacinto to notarize the said contract
by signing the name of one Atty. Ricardo Neri.
Avegail Payos, the housemaid of the respondent, in turn stated that
she was the one who simulated the signature of one Emmanuel
Gimarino, the Deputy Register of Deeds of Quezon City upon the
instruction of Atty. Jacinto. This was done to make it appear that
the real estate mortgage was registered and the annotation to
appear at the back of the TCT as an encumbrance.
On 14 November 1997, a case for Estafa thru Falsification of Public
documents under Art. 315 was filed against Atty. Jacinto. He was
arrested and detained by the NBI.
The defense of the respondent, on the other hand, was embodied in
his Answer with Motion to Dismiss filed with the Commission on
Bar Discipline. Therein, he alleged that the criminal information for
estafa thru falsification filed against him had already been
dismissed because of the voluntary desistance of the
complainants. MisjÓ uris
In his version of the facts, Atty. Jacinto averred that while he
indeed facilitated the loan agreement between the Cruz spouses
and Concepcion G. Padilla, he had no idea that the latter would
give a falsified Certificate of Title and use it to obtain a loan. He
claimed that he himself was a victim under the circumstances.
Respondent further alleged that he had not been remiss nor
negligent in collecting the proceeds of the loan; that in fact, he had
even advanced the full payment of the loan due to the
complainants from his own savings, even if Concepcion G. Padilla
had not yet paid, much less found.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is every lawyers sworn duty to obey the laws of the land to
promote respect for law and legal processes. The Code of
Professional Responsibility command that he shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Rule 1.01, Code
of Professional Responsibility) Jjä lex
In the instant case, there was a clear yet unrebutted allegation in
the complaint that the Respondent had ordered his secretary and
housemaid to falsify the signatures of the notary public and the
Deputy Register of Deeds respectively to make it appear that the
real estate mortgage contract was duly registered and thus binding.
While it may be true that the complaint for Estafa thru Falsification
filed against the Respondent had been dismissed, the dismissal was
because of the complainants voluntary desistance and not a finding
of innocence. It neither confirms nor denies Respondents non-
culpability. Furthermore, it is well-settled that disciplinary
proceedings are "sui generis", the primary object of which is not so
much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the court and the public
from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the
professions persons whose disregard of their oath have proven
them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as
members of the bar. Thus, disciplinary cases may still proceed
despite the dismissal of civil and/or criminal cases against a
lawyer.
A lawyer who does any unlawful fraudulent or dishonest act may
and should be held administratively liable therefor. In the case at
bar, the Respondent should not be made an exception. While it may
be shown that he indeed advanced the payment due to his
erstwhile clients, such will not exempt him from administrative
liability. At best it can only mitigate. Respondent is recommended
to be suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law.
(Findings and Recommendation, pp. 1-4) NewÓ miso
On February 28, 1998, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution XIII-97-
199 adopting and approving the Findings and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A" and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, respondent Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months for his
unlawful, fraudulent or dishonest act.
(Notice of resolution [dated Feb. 28, 1998]).
In his Comment and Answer with Motion to Dismiss, respondent averred that
complainants have no cause of action against him as the same has been waived,
settled, and extinguished on account of the affidavits of voluntary desistance and
quitclaim executed by them in the criminal case filed against him. Ncmmis
The assertion must necessarily fail. The practice of law is so intimately affected with
public interest that it is both a right and a duty of the State to control and regulate it
in order to promote the public welfare. The Constitution vests this power of control
and regulation in this Court. Since the practice of law is inseparably connected with
the exercise of its judicial power in administration of justice, the Court cannot be
divested of its constitutionally ordained prerogative which includes the authority to
discipline, suspend or disbar any unfit and unworthy member of the Bar by a mere
execution of affidavits of voluntary desistance and quitclaim (par. [5], Sec. 5, 1987
Constitution).
A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court (Maligsa vs. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408 [1997]), and the
complainants who called the attention of the Court to the attorneys alleged
misconduct are in no sense a party, and have generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice (Rayos-
Ombac vs. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93 [1998]).
Undeniably, respondent represented complainants in the loan transaction. By his own
admission, he was the one who negotiated with the borrower, his long-time friend
and a former client. He acted not merely as an agent but as a lawyer of complaints,
thus, the execution of the real estate mortgage contract, as well as its registration and
annotation on the title were entrusted to him. In fact, respondent even received his
share in the interest earnings which complainants realized from the transaction. His
refusal to recognize any wrongdoing or carelessness by claiming that he is likewise a
victim when it was shown that the title to the property, the registration of the real
estate mortgage contract, and the annotation thereon were all feigned, will not at all
exonerate him. Scncm

As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business
transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. However, the
measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with
this client is a much higher standard than is required in business dealings where the
parties trade at arms length. Business transactions between an attorney and his client
are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully
watch these transactions to be sure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his
client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is
in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client.
Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in
an attorneys favor (Nakpit vs. Valdes, 286 SCRA 758 [1998]). Further, his fidelity to
the cause of his client requires him to be evermindful of the responsibilities that
should be expected of him.

Verily, a lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as
counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his former client. The reason
for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust
and confidence at the highest degree (Maturan vs. Gonzales, 287 SCRA 943
[1998]). Sdaamiso

Respondent utterly failed to perform his duties and responsibilities faithfully and
well as to protect the rights and interests of his clients and by his deceitful actuations
constituting violations of the Code of Professional Responsibilities must be subjected
to disciplinary measures for his own good, as well as for the good of the entire
membership of the Bar as a whole.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the resolution of the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and orders respondent Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months with the warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Sdaad

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]
ATTY. AUGUSTO G. NAVARRO, for and in behalf of PAN-ASIA
INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY.
ROSENDO MENESES III,respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case against respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses III was
initiated by a complaint-affidavit[1] filed by Atty. Augusto G. Navarro on June 7, 1994
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(hereinafter, the Commission), for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International
Commodities, Inc. Herein complainant charges respondent Meneses with the
following offenses, viz.: (1) malpractice and gross misconduct unbecoming a public
defender; (2) dereliction of duty, by violating his oath to do everything within his
power to protect his clients interest; (3) willful abandonment; and (4) loss of trust and
confidence, due to his continued failure to account for the amount of P50,000.00
entrusted to him to be paid to a certain complainant for the amicable settlement of a
pending case.[2]
The complaint-affidavit alleged that Frankwell Management and Consultant,
Inc., a group of companies which includes Pan Asia International Commodities, Inc.,
through its Administrative Manager Estrellita Valdez, engaged the legal services of
respondent Atty. Meneses. While serving as such counsel, Atty. Meneses handled
various cases and was properly compensated by his client in accordance with their
retainer agreement.[3] One of the litigations handled by him was the case of People vs.
Lai Chan Kow, a.k.a. Wilson Lai, and Arthur Bretaa, pending before Branch 134,
Regional Trial Court of Makati. On December 24. 1993, respondent received the sum
of P50,000.00 from Arthur Bretaa, the accused in said case, to be given to therein
offended party, a certain Gleason, as consideration for an out-of-court settlement and
with the understanding that a motion to dismiss the case would be filed by
respondent Meneses.
Despite subsequent repeated requests, respondent failed to present to his client
the receipt acknowledging that Gleason received said amount. A verification made
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati revealed that no motion to dismiss or any
pleading in connection therewith had been filed, and the supposed amicable
settlement was not finalized and concluded.Despite repeated demands in writing or
by telephone for an explanation, as well as the turnover of all documents pertaining
to the aforementioned case, respondent Meneses deliberately ignored the pleas of
herein complainant.
The case was assigned by the Commission to Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez for investigation. Respondent was thereafter ordered to submit his answer
to the complaint pursuant to Section 5, rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.[4] Two
successive ex parte motions for extension of time to file an answer were filed by
respondent and granted by the Commission.[5] On November 14, 1994, respondent
filed a motion to dismiss,[6] instead of an answer.
In said motion, respondent argued that Atty. Navarro had no legal personality
to sue him for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. because his
legal services were retained by Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc.; that
Navarro had not represented Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. in any case
nor had been authorized by its board ofdirectors to file this disbarment case against
respondent; that the retainer agreement between him and Frankwell Management
and Consultant, Inc. had been terminated as of December 31, 1993 according to the
verbal advice of its Administrative Officer Estrellita Valdez; that the case of Arthur
Bretaa was not part of their retainer agreement, and Bretaa was not an employee of
Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc. which retained him as its legal counsel;
and that the settlement of said case cannot be concluded because the same was
archived and accused Bretaa is presently out of the country.
Herein complainant, in his opposition to the motion to dismiss,[7] stresses that
respondent Meneses is resorting to technicalities to evade the issue of his failure to
account for the amount of P 50,000.00 entrusted to him; that the respondents
arguments in his motion to dismiss were all designed to mislead the Commission;
and that he was fully aware of the interrelationship of the two corporations and
always coordinated his legal work with Estrellita Valdez.
On November 28, 1994, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
resolved to deny said motion to dismiss for lack of merit and directed respondent to
file his answer.[8] On January 2, 1995, respondent filed a manifestation that he was
adopting the allegations in his motion to dismiss his answer.[9] When the case was set
for hearing on February 9, 1995, respondent failed to attend despite due notice. He
thereafter moved to postpone and reset the hearing of the case several times allegedly
due to problems with his health.
On the scheduled hearing on June 15, 1995, respondent again failed to
attend. The commissioner accordingly received an ex parte the testimony of
complainants sole witness, Estrellita Valdez, and other documentary
evidence.[10] Thereafter, complainant rested its case. Respondent filed a so-called
Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Recall Complainants
Witness for Cross-Examination[11] which was granted by the Commission.[12] Estrellita
Valdez was directed by the Commission to appear on the scheduled hearing for
cross-examination.
Several postponement and resetting of hearings were later requested and
granted by the Commission. When the case was set for hearing for the last time on
May 31, 1996, respondent failed to attend despite due notice and repeated
warnings. Consequently, the Commission considered him to have waived his right to
present evidence in his defense and declared the case submitted for resolution. [13]
On February 4, 1997, the Commission on Bar Discipline, through its
Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, submitted its Report and
Recommendation[14] to the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. The Commission ruled that the refusal and/or failure of respondent to
account for the sum of P50,000.00 he received from complainant for the settlement of
the aforestated case of Lai Chan Kow and Arthur Bretaa proves beyond any shadow
of a doubt that he misappropriated the same, hence he deserved to be penalized.
The Commission recommended that respondent Meneses he suspended from
the practice of the legal profession for a period of three (3) years and directed to
return the P50,000.00 he received from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the resolution. It further provided that failure on his part to comply with
such requirement would result in his disbarment.[15] The Board of Governors adopted
and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in
its Resolution No. XII-97-133, dated July 26, 1997.[16]
On August 15, 1997, the Court received the Notice of Resolution, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and the records of this case
through the Office of the Bar Confidant for final action pursuant to Section 12 (b) of
Rule 139-B.[17] It appears therefrom that respondent was duly furnished a copy of said
resolution, with the investigating commissioners report and recommendation
annexed thereto.
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines that respondent Meneses misappropriated the money entrusted to him
and which he has failed and/or refused to account for to his client despite repeated
demands therefor. Such conduct on the part of respondent indicating his unfitness for
the confidence and trust reposed on him, or showing such lack of personal honesty or
of good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action extending to disbarment.[18]
Respondent Meneses misconduct constitute a gross violation of his oath as a
lawyer which, inter alia, imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for
money or malice. He blatantly disregarded Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall account for all money
or property collected or received for or from his client. Respondent was merely
holding in trust the money he received from his client to used as consideration for
amicable settlement of a case he was handling. Since the amicable settlement did no
materialize, he was necessarily under obligation to immediate return the money, as
there is no showing that he has a lien over it. As a lawyer, he should be scrupulously
careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a
high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted. [19]
The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue
him is unavailing. Section 1 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that
proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken
by the Supreme Court motu propio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon
the verified complainant of any person. The right to institute a disbarment
proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining
suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of
public interest and the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the
charge. The evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar
Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and recommended sanctions.
It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who
may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment[20] subject
however, to the provision of Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[21] Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to
him.[22] Respondent Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation to inform his client of the
status of the case and to respond within a reasonable time to his clients request for
information. Respondents failure to communicate with his client by deliberately
disregarding its request for an audience or conference is an unjustifiable denial of its
right to be fully informed of the developments in and the status of its case.
On January 7, 1998, the Bar Confidant submitted to the Court a copy of the letter
of Atty. Augusto G. Navarro, dated December 18, 1997, to the effect that although a
copy of the aforestated Resolution No. XII-97-133 was personally delivered to
respondents address and received by his wife on October 9, 1997, he had failed to
restitute the amount of P50,000.00 to complainant within the 15-day period provided
therein. Neither has he filed with this Court any pleading or written indication of his
having returned said amount to complainant. In line with the resolution in this case,
his disbarment is consequently warranted and exigent.
A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the resolution is in order. The
dispositive portion thereof provides that:
x x x Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) years and is hereby directed to return the Fifty
Thousand Pesos he received from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of this resolution. Failure on his part to comply will result (i)n
his DISBARMENT.[23]
In other words, it effectively purports to impose either a 3-year suspension or
disbarment, depending on whether or not respondent duly returns the amount to
complainant. Viewed from another angle, it directs that he shall only be suspended,
subject to the condition that he should make restitution as prescribed therein.
Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the imposition of penalties in
criminal cases, it has long been the rule that the penalty imposed in a judgment
cannot be in the alternative, even if the law provides for alternative penalties, [24] not
can such penalty be subject to a condition.[25] There is no reason why such legal
principles in penal law should not apply in administrative disciplinary actions which,
as in this case, also involve punitive sanctions.
Besides, if the purpose was to extenuate the liability of respondent, the only
possible and equivalent rule is in malversation cases holding that the restitution of
the peculated funds would be analogous to voluntary surrender if it was immediately
and voluntarily made before the case was instituted.[26] The evidently is not the
situation here. Also the implementation of the penalty provided in the resolution will
involve a cumbersome process since, in order to arrive at the final action to be taken
by this Court, it will have to wait for a verified report on whether or not respondent
complied with the condition subsequent.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rosendo Meneses III is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of

this decision be attached to respondents personal records in this Court and furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, together with all courts in the county.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]
IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates
back to the 50s during their schooldays in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School.
Their closeness extended to their families and respondent became the business
consultant, lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in
Moran Street, Baguio City.[1] For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase
the Moran property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the property in
thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement,
respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank (in the amounts of P65,000.00
and P75,000.00) which he used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then
issued in respondents name.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil
died on July 8, 1973, respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his
widow, complainant IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976, respondents law firm,
Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Joses
estate. Complainant was appointed as administratix of the estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate
proceedings. It appears that respondent excluded the Moran property from the
inventory of Joses estate. On February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title to the
Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing
with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance
with damages against respondent and his corporation. In defense, respondent
claimed absolute ownership over the property and denied that a trust was created
over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this
administrative case to disbar the respondent. She charged that respondent violated
professional ethics when he:
I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property (Pulong
Maulap) which belonged to the estate he was settling as its
lawyer and auditor.
II. Excluded the Moran property from the inventory of real estate
properties he prepared for a client-estate and, at the same
time, charged the loan secured to purchase the said excluded
property as a liability of the estate, all for the purpose of
transferring the title to the said property to his family
corporation.
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that
retained him as its counsel and auditor.[2]
On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondents offer to
serve as lawyer and auditor to settle her husbands estate. Respondents law firm then
filed a petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not include
the Moran property in the estates inventory. Instead, respondent transferred the
property to his corporation, Caval Realty Corporation, and title was issued in its
name. Complainant accused respondent of maliciously appropriating the property in
trust knowing that it did not belong to him. She claimed that respondent has
expressly acknowledged that the said property belonged to the late Nakpil in his
correspondences[3] with the Baguio City Treasurer and the complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondents auditing firm (C. J.
Valdes and Co., CPAs) excluded the Moran property from the inventory of her
husbands estate, yet included in the claims against the estate the amounts
of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which respondent represented as her husbands loans
applied probably for the purchase of a house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondents law firm (Carlos J.
Valdes and Associates) filed the petition for the settlement of her husbands estate in
court, while respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as accountant
of both the estate and two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent represented
conflicting interests when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors
Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against her husbands estate which was represented
by respondents law firm. Complainant averred that there is no distinction between
respondents law and auditing firms as respondent is the senior and controlling
partner of both firms which are housed in the same building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In
hisANSWER,[4] respondent initially asserted that the resolution of the first and second
charges against him depended on the result of the pending action in the CFI for
reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership of the Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the
reconveyance case that he did not hold the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as
he is its absolute owner. Respondent explained that the Nakpils never bought back
the Moran property from him, hence, the property remained to be his and was rightly
excluded from the inventory of Nakpils estate.
 As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against
the estate which included his loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and
renovation of the Moran property. In charging his loans against the estate, he stressed
that the list drawn up by his accounting firm merely stated that the loans in
respondents name were applied probably for the purchase of the house and lot in
Moran Street, Baguio City. Respondent insisted that this was not an admission that
the Nakpils owned the property as the phrase probably for the purchase did not
imply a consummated transaction but a projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter
(Exhibit H) of his accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real
estate taxes for the Moran property on behalf of the Nakpils. He contended that the
letter could be a mere error or oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did
not own the Moran property for: (1) complainants February 1979 Statement of Assets
and Liabilities did not include the said property, and; (2) complainant, as
administratrix, signed the Balance Sheet of the Estate where the Moran property was
not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and
accounting firms in the settlement of her husbands estate.[5] However, he pointed out
that he has resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as 1974. He alleged
that it was Atty. Percival Cendaa (from the law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates) who
filed the inestate proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when
his law firm represented the estate in the inestate proceedings while his accounting
firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) served as accountant of the estate and prepared the
claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He proffered
the following reasons for his thesis: First, the two claimants were closely related to the
late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a family corporation of the Nakpils of which
the late Nakpil was the President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the late
Nakpil who, upon the latters death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These two
claimants had been clients of his law and accounting firms even during the lifetime of
Jose Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation of conflicting interests was with the
knowledge and consent of complainant as administratrix. Third, there was no conflict
of interests between the estate and the claimants for they had forged a modus vivendi,
i.e., that the subject claims would be satisfied only after full payment of the principal
bank creditors. Complainant, as administratrix, did not controvert the claims of
Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Complainant has started paying off the claims of
Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the banks claims. Complainant did
not assert that their claims caused prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the work of Carlos J.
Valdes and Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate for the firm
prepared a true and accurate amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his
law and accounting firms as early as August 15, 1974. [6] He rejoined his accounting
firm several years later. He submitted as proof the SECs certification of the filing of
his accounting firm of an Amended Articles of Partnership. Thus, it was not he but
Atty. Percival Cendaa, from the firm Carlos J. Valdes and Associates, who filed the
intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand, the claimants were represented by
their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent alleged that in the remote
possibility that he committed a breach of professional ethics, he committed such
misconduct not as a lawyer but as an accountant who acted as common auditor of the
estate and its creditors. Hence, he should be held accountable in another forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY.[7] She maintained
that the pendency of the reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of
her disbarment complaint against respondent for the issue in the latter is not the
ownership of the Moran property but the ethics and morality of respondents conduct
as a CPA-lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondents Annexes to his Reply (such as the
Statement of Assets & Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate)
which showed that complainant did not claim ownership of the Moran property were
all prepared by C. J. Valdes and Co. as accountant of the estate of Jose Nakpil and
filed with the intestate court by C. J. Valdes and Associates as counsel for the estate.
She averred that these Annexes were not proofs that respondent owned the Moran
property but were part of respondents scheme to remove the property from the estate
and transfer it to his family corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the
documents because of the professional counsel of respondent and his firm that her
signature thereon was required. Complainant charged respondent with greed for
coveting the Moran property on the basis of defects in the documents he himself
prepared.
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the
list of claims against the estate and the letter regarding Nakpils payments of realty tax
on the Moran property) which were prepared by his law and accounting firms and
invoke other documents prepared by the same firms which are favorable to him. She
averred that respondent must accept responsibility not just for some, but for all the
representations and communications of his firms.
Complainant refuted respondents claim that he resigned from his firms from
March 9, 1976 to several years later. She alleged that none of the documents
submitted as evidence referred to his resignation from his law firm. The documents
merely substantiated his resignation from his accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER,[8] respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him
liable for representing the interests of both the estate and the claimants without
showing that his action prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is not per se anomalous
for respondents accounting firm to act as accountant for the estate and its creditors.
He reiterated that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as
lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate and its claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the
creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by his
accounting or law firm but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his law firm did
not oppose these claims as they were legitimate and not because they were prepared
by his accounting firm. He emphasized that there was no allegation that the claims
were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of respondents law firm to object to
these claims damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution,[9] we deferred further action on the
disbarment case until after resolution of the action for reconveyance between the
parties involving the issue of ownership by the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant
moved for reconsideration on the ground that the issue of ownership pending with
the CFI was not prejudicial to her complaint which involved an entirely different
issue, i.e., the unethical acts of respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We granted her motion
and referred the administrative case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[10]
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court
ruled that respondent held the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that
complainant waived her right over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court
held that respondent was the absolute owner of the Moran property. The Decision
was elevated to this Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainants appeal to this
Court, the OSG submitted its Report[11] on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied
heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals then pending review by this Court.
The OSG found that respondent was not put on notice of complainants claim over the
property. It opined that there was no trust agreement created over the property and
that respondent was the absolute owner thereof. Thus, it upheld respondents right to
transfer title to his family corporation. It also found no conflict of interests as the
claimants were related to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the dismissal
of the administrative case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves
the disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and
law practice in connection with the property of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business
transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith.[12] The
measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with
his client is a much higher standard than is required in business dealings where the
parties trade at arms length.[13] Business transactions between an attorney and his
client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts
carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer
over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an
attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his
client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is
considered in an attorneys favor. [14]
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report.
These findings were based mainly on the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
action for reconveyance which was reversed by this Court in 1993.[15]
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in
the aforementioned reconveyance case.[16] It is well-established that respondent
offered to the complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by reason of
their close relationship dating as far back as the 50s. She reposed her complete trust in
respondent who was the lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late
husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil agreed that the former would purchase the
Moran property and keep it in trust for the latter. In violation of the trust agreement,
respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and refused to sell the
property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond
the reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later transferred it to his
corporation.
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and
respected the trust nature of the Moran property. Respondents bad faith in
transferring the property to his family corporation is well discussed in this Courts
Decision,[17] thus:
x x x Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the
lifetime of the late Jose Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly recognized
it. x x x (H)e repudiated the trust when (he) excluded Pulong Maulap from
the list of properties of the late Jose Nakpil submitted to the intestate court
in 1973. x x x
xxx
The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties x x
x can be bolstered by Exh. I-2, an annex to the claim filed against the estate
proceedings of the late Jose Nakpil by his brother, Angel Nakpil, which
was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes & Co., the accounting firm of herein
respondent. Exhibit I-2, which is a list of the application of the proceeds
of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December 1973 by the late Jose
Nakpil, x x x contains the two (2) loans contracted in the name of
respondent. If ownership of Pulong Maulap was already transferred or
ceded to Valdes, these loans should not have been included in the list.
Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the
arrangement outlined in Exh. J was that respondent Valdes would x x x
take over the total loan ofP140,000.00 and pay all of the interests due on
the notes while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would continue to live
in the disputed property for five (5) years without remuneration save for
regular maintenance expenses. This does not mean, however, that if at
the end of the five-year period petitioner (Nakpil) failed to reimburse
Valdes for his advances, x x x Valdes could already automatically assume
ownership of Pulong Maulap. Instead, the remedy of respondents Carlos
J. Valdes and Caval Realty Corporation was to proceed against the estate
of the late Jose M. Nakpil and/or the property itself. (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainants documentary
evidence (Exhibits H, J and L), which she also adduced in this administrative case,
should estop respondent from claiming that he bought the Moran property for
himself, and not merely in trust for Jose Nakpil.[18]
It ought to follow that respondents act of excluding Moran property from the
estate which his law firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his
client. If respondent truly believed that the said property belonged to him, he should
have at least informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its
ownership, respondent should have formally presented his claim in the intestate
proceedings instead of transferring the property to his own corporation and
concealing it from complainant and the judge in the estate proceedings. Respondents
misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly
unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the
two loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were
obtained by respondent for the purchase and renovation of the property which he
claimed for himself. Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by
disclaiming knowledge or privity in the preparation of the list of the estates liabilities.
He theorizes that the inclusion of the loans must have been a mere error or oversight
of his accounting firm. It is clear that the information as to how these two loans
should be treated could have only come from respondent himself as the said loans
were in his name. Hence, the supposed error of the accounting firm in charging
respondents loans against the estate could not have been committed without
respondents participation. Respondent wanted to have his cake and eat it too and
subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain. Respondent violated
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer
owes fidelity to his clients cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests. It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an
attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to represent both
sides of an issue.[19] The proscription against representation of conflicting interests
finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general
matter[20] and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. It applies
although the attorneys intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good
faith.[21] However, representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where the
parties consent to the representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is
not enough for the clients must give their informed consent to such representation.
The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent of conflict and the
possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his clients. [22]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of
it creditors are adverse to each other. Respondents accounting firm prepared the list
of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two
creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate
which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the
estate. In fact, at one instance, respondents law firm questioned the claims of creditor
Angel Nakpil against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the
intestate proceedings. He points out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaa, from his
law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case in court. However,
the fact that he did not personally file the case and appear in court is beside the point.
As established in the records of this case and in the reconveyance case, [23] respondent
acted as counsel and accountant of complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil.
Respondents defense that he resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as
1974 (or two years before the filing of the intestate case) is unworthy of merit.
Respondents claim of resignation from his law firm is not supported by any
documentary proof. The documents on record [24] only show respondents resignation
from his accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these documents reveal that
respondent returned to his accounting firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the
intestate proceedings for the settlement of Joses estate had not yet been terminated. It
does not escape us that when respondent transferred the Moran property to his
corporation on February 13, 1978, the intestate proceedings was still pending in
court. Thus, the succession of events shows that respondent could not have been
totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes &
Associates was the legal counsel of the estate[25] and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes
& Co., CPAs, was the auditor of both the estate and the two claimants against
it.[26] The fact, however, that complainant, as administratrix, did not object to the set-
up cannot be taken against her as there is nothing in the records to show that
respondent or his law firm explained the legal situation and its consequences to
complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement does not amount to an
acquiescence based on an informed consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not
negate the conflict of interest. When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his
interest is per se adverse to the estate. As correctly pointed out by complainant, if she
had a claim against her husbands estate, her claim is still adverse and must be filed in
the intestate proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm
in a position where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate
proceedings, the duty of respondents law firm was to contest the claims of these two
creditors but which claims were prepared by respondents accounting firm. Even if
the claims were valid and did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable.
The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the representation is
probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondents duty to inhibit either of his
firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest,
he could not be charged before this Court as his alleged misconduct pertains to his
accounting practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both
professions. He is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his
name. In the case at bar, complainant is not charging respondent with breach of ethics
for being the common accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is charged
for allowing his accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the
same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the proceedings where
these claims were presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics and
undesirable as it placed respondents and his law firms loyalty under a cloud of
doubt. Even granting that respondents misconduct refers to his accountancy practice,
it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The
rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct,
even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [27] Possession of good moral
character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.

Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his
conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity
of the legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to always live up to the
standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship
between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost
fidelity and good faith. [28] In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full
fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and
transactions with his clients. [29]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES

guilty of misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year effective from receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction
shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4539. May 14, 1997]
ROMANA R. MALIGSA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARSENIO FER
CABANTING, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING is charged by Romana R. Maligsa in a
verified affidavit-complaint for disbarment with conduct unbecoming a lawyer for
certifying under oath a Deed of Quitclaim dated 5 May 1992 [1] over a piece of
property subject of a pending civil case before the Regional Trial Court Br. 45,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. U-5434.[2]
On 11 March 1996 we required respondent to comment on the complaint. He
failed to comply despite service upon him of our Resolution together with copy of the
complaint.
On 22 October 1996 we considered the failure of respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer
Cabanting to file his comment as waiver of his right to do so and directed the case
submitted for decision.
On the basis of the complaint and the supporting documents, this Court finds
sufficient legal basis for disciplinary action against respondent for making it appear
in the Acknowledgmentof the Deed of Quitclaim in question that the affiant therein
signed the document and acknowledged the contents thereof before him as Notary
Public on 5 May 1992 when in truth and in fact the affiant did not and could not have
done so.
The evidence clearly discloses that on 5 May 1992 a Deed of Quitclaim was
purportedly executed by one Irene Maligsa in favor of Juanito V. Abaoag over a
parcel of land located in Cablong, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.[3] The subject document
was notarized by respondent on the same date. The document was apparently used
as evidence against complainant in a pending civil case for annulment of OCT No. P-
31297, quieting of title with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order plus damages.
The complainant alleges that the Deed of Quitclaim could not have been
executed and notarized on 5 May 1992 because the affiant Irene Maligsa died on 21
April 1992 or sixteen (16) days earlier.[4] Moreover, Irene Maligsa could not have
signed the document because she "never knew how to write as she uses the thumb
mark in every transaction she entered." [5]
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 [6] provides
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking
the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made
under the official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate
shall so state.
Furthermore, the Acknowledgment contained in the questioned document
specifically provides "BEFORE ME personally appeared IRENE MALIGSA x x x
x" [7] Clearly, the party acknowledging must personally appear before the Notary
Public or any other person authorized to take such acknowledgment of instruments
or documents.
In the case before us, it would have been physically and legally impossible for
the affiant Irene Maligsa to have executed the alleged Deed of Quitclaim on 5 May
1992 and to have personally subscribed to its authenticity and validity before
respondent notary public on the same date, affiant having died on 21 April 1992.
Also, it behooves respondent as a notary public to require the personal appearance of
the person executing a document to enable the former to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the affiant.
Quite importantly, this is not the first time that respondent has been involved in
an act of malpractice in violation of his oath as a lawyer and the Canons of
Professional Ethics.
In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v. Cabanting,[8] the Court
suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6) months from the
practice of law. In those cases respondent purchased his client's property which was
still the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding contrary to the prohibition stated in
Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code and Art. II of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Under the circumstances, a recollection of the basic principles of professional ethics in
the practice of law is apropos.
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end
a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen
in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the legal profession. [9]
Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest
in a substantial degree and protection of the interest requires preventing those who
are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the
public and the courts and the administrative offices generally.[10] Notarization of a
private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in
court without further proof of its authenticity.

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to

subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by
public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost
respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.
Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he
must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. By
his effrontery of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document, he has made a mockery
of the legal solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his

professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court. [11] Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior
misconduct hereinbefore mentioned for which he was penalized with a six (6) month
suspension from the practice of law, with a warning that repetition of the same or
similar act would be dealt with more severely, the contumacious behavior of
respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades the legal profession indeed
warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent ATTY. ARSENIO FER

CABANTING guilty of grave misconduct rendering him unworthy of his continued
membership in the legal profession; consequently, he is ordered DISBARRED from
the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective
immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as well as the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the
personal files of respondent.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 1474. January 28, 2000]
CRISTINO G. CALUB, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARBRAHAM A.
SULLER, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
What is before the Court is a complaint for disbarment against respondent premised
on grossly immoral conduct for having raped his neighbor's wife.
In the morning of January 20, 1975, while complainant was away, respondent Atty.
Abraham A. Suller went to the complainant's abode in Aringay, La Union ostensibly
to borrow a blade.
As the respondent was a friend of the family and a neighbor, the complainant's wife
let him in. Thereafter, respondent began touching her in different parts of her body.
When she protested, respondent threatened her and forced her to have sexual
intercourse with him. At that moment, complainant returned home to get money to
pay for real estate taxes. When he entered the house, he saw his wife and respondent
having sexual intercourse on the bed.[1] She was kicking respondent with one foot
while the latter pressed on her arms and other leg, preventing her from defending
herself.
On January 23, 1975, complainant filed with the Municipal Court, Aringay, La Union
a criminal complaint[2] for rape against respondent. The case was later remanded to
the Court of First Instance, Agoo, La Union.
On June 3, 1975, Cristino G. Calub filed with the Supreme Court the instant complaint
for disbarment against respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller.[3]
On June 16, 1975, the Court required respondent to file an answer within ten (10)
days from notice.[4]
On July 14, 1975, respondent filed his answer. He denied the accusation as a
fabrication.[5]
On July 21, 1975, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report, and recommendation.[6]
From 1975 until 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings where
both parties appeared with their respective counsel. In a petition filed on November
6, 1978, respondent prayed for the suspension of proceedings pending final
termination of Criminal Case No. A-420 pending with the Court of First Instance, La
Union, Branch 3, Agoo.[7] Kycalr
On December 11, 1978, the Court referred the petition to the Solicitor General, the
case having been referred to him previously.[8]
In 1991, the investigation of the case was transferred to the Committee on Bar
Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines. On August 28, 1991 the latter sent notice
of hearings to both parties.[9]
On January 23, 1992, the Committee issued an order terminating the proceedings and
considering the case submitted for resolution as notice to complainant remained
unserved while respondent failed to appear despite due notice. [10]
On March 3, 1993, the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a
resolution recommending that the disciplinary penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year be meted on respondent. [11]
The record discloses that the Court of First Instance acquitted respondent Suller for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Such acquittal,
however, is not determinative of this administrative case.
The testimonies of witnesses in the criminal complaint, particularly that of the
complainant suffice to show that respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner
in having carnal knowledge of his neighbor's wife without her consent in her very
home.
"A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court."[12]
In this case, we find that suspension for one year recommended by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines is not sufficient punishment for the immoral act of respondent. The
rape of his neighbor's wife constituted serious moral depravity even if his guilt was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal prosecution for rape. He is not
worthy to remain a member of the bar. The privilege to practice law is bestowed
upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally
important, morally.[13] "Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all times in order to
maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity." [14]
WHEREFORE, respondent Abraham A. Suller is DISBARRED from the practise of
law. Let his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.