A.C. No.
5738 February 19, 2008 According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided
WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon
located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu
and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio
Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate
the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa
of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila4 where the parties reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation
meetings.5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued
a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and
Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his
appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed
the instant administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act of
impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the
defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear
complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the
complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he
performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the
parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina
and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal
assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was
financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice
against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the
IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their
respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD
found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7
over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against
Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the
ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he
prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief,
position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section
7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any
public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials
and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized
by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis
supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the
practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors.10
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as
the recommendation on the imposable penalty.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former
Government Lawyers
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government
service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service."
In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which [they] had intervened while in said service."
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act
complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of
Profession of Elective Local Government Officials
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their
incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless authorized
by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials
and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 12 governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors
are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation
other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That
sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a
local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings
involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the
sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours
of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned
do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by
elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of
profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA
6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials
and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.13
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the
sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and
the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the
members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan
for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the
exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to
render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the
performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod
or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach
in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours.
Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold
regular sessions only at least once a week.14 Since the law itself grants them the authority
to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session
hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization
from any other person or office for any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,
provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial
proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction
is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the
presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to
reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang
barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month. 16
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his
profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the
head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.
A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis
Secure Prior Authority From The Head Of His Department supplied)

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal
fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
the written permission of the head of the department concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII
of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides: Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. 19
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for
head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the violation of the lawyer's oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further,
That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of
so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that
professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule
it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the
provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments,
practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He
made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict
is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in
the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied) Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word
delicadeza.
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written
permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into
appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do. the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court
Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and
guidance.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers
are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to SO ORDERED.
obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of
this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission,
respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil
service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical
standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),
ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING respondents.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the
issue presented in this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en
banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its
Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer,
attorney's fees for professional services in the said case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled,
"PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of
Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the
reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino
Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid &
Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of
attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963,
Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount.
Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation
indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their
backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of
Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings petition was
opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano
Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in
Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by
Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages
as compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as
follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%
Quintin Muning .........................................................................
10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is
sought to be voided in the present petition.
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the
ground of late filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.1 He asked for
reconsideration, but, considering that the motion contained averments that go into the
merits of the case, this Court admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration
for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for review.2 The case was
considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief.3
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers'
Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,4
that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer
union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon
34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of
attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —
In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof,
the parties shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel
...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the
Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees:
for the same section adds that —
it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer
to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties
and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly
qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the
said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to
compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of
Court, providing —
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An
attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation for his services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery
of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in
court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an
attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with
PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy
demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only
to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and
the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control
for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is
stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted
prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the bar from
practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great weight of
authority is to the effect that compensation for legal services
cannot be recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice
before the court or in the jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an
attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to practice ... and
is an attorney in good standing at the time.6
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated;7 that
acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,8 and the law will not assist a person to
reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of law;9 and that if were
to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to
whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition,
aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of
attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the
services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an "agent" and
not as an attorney. 11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded
attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by
non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the
ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does
not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of
attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This
issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of
time to file the present petition for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did
not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the present petition that
was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas),
their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of
attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of its members because such
union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court,
12 on behalf of its members; and the union was organized "for the promotion of the
emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is
disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved
party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person
aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme
Court of the Philippines ...,
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the
financial burden of litigations.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law
before the Court of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not
licensed to practice, registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing
daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective
action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to
that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it
may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action
against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded
10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders
are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor and Makasiar, JJ. concur.
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS
OATH
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations
held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to
his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose
from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites
sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other
accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges.
The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon
re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment
dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a
sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months
:and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's
application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a
report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer
recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his
discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring
petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he
may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of
good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to
the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no
less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among
others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted
evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in
honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts
of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states
that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries
which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than
accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but
murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's
helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of
superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of
pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one
of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991
and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and
begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him
that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack
upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused
for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had
lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law
practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the
stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally
fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to
the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who
possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required
of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not
only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the
noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to
prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further
tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has
undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and
reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's
admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of
that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they
were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless
physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a
finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was
then possessed of good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner
has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the
sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is,
for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering
becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where
the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but
due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then
becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the
cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his
having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and
commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the
circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position
to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow
petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign
the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the
following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court
recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber.
On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a
devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and
public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts
to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to
give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere
ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at
ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises
he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers
conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of
justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone
concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with
the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a
lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and
other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is

hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set
by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to
practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978
JULIO ZETA, complainant,
vs.
FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.
BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court
interpreter of the Court of First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar
charging as follows:
l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR.
Malinao has been appearing in the municipal court
of this town for parties like attorney when he is not
an attorney. Reliable information also says he has
been appearing in the municipal courts of Daram,
Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not
authorized to do so we believe. He makes it his
means of livelihood as he collects fees from his
clients. He competes with attorneys but does not
pay anything. We believe that his doing so should
be stopped for a good government. These facts
can be checked with records of those municipal
courts.
2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being
employed in the Court of First Instance he would
instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab
land rob or coerce. In fact he has cases in the
municipal court in this town involving himself and
his men. He incite them telling them not to be
afraid as he is a court employee and has influence
over the judges. Those persons being ignorant
would believe him and so would commit crimes.
This act of Mr. Malinao is contrary to good order
and peace as he is using his supposed influences
to urge persons to commit crimes.
3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information
has it that he is unfaithfully filing his time record in
the CFI. Even he has been out practicing in the
municipal courts sometimes he would fill his time
record as present. He receives salary for those
absent days. This can be checked with time record
he has submitted and if he has any application for
leave. He may try to cure it by submitting
application for leave but this should not be allowed
as he has already committed crime.
4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND
CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable
information it is prohibited for a civil service
employee to engage in private practice any
profession or business without permission from
the Department Head. Mr. Malinao we are sure
has not secured that permission because he
should not be allowed to practice as he is not an
attorney. If that were so, he violated that Executive
Order and Civil Service Law and we are urgently
and earnestly requesting the Commissioner of
Civil Service to investigate him on this. If
warranted he should be given the corresponding
penalty as dismissal because we believe he
deserve it. (Page 2, Record.)
After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement relative to
the above complaint:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the
Secretary of Justice, Manila, thru the Honorable
District Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch I,
Catbalogan, Samar, and thru the Honorable
Judicial Superintendent, Department of Justice,
Manila, the undersigned's reply to the preceding
 endorsements, to wit: That the alleged letter-
complaint of one Julio Zeta is not inclosed in the
first indorsement, which absence has also been
noticed and noted on the right hand corner of the
said first indorsement by the Clerk of Court, of this
Court; that despite this absence, and without
waiving, however, his right to any pertinent
provision of law, but for respect and courtesy to a
Superior, he hereby states that he has not violated
any rule or law, much less Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of
the Civil Service Rules; that his participation for
defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could
not engage the services of counsel by reason of
poverty and the absence of one in the locality, said
assistance has also checked the miscarriage of
justice by the Presiding Municipal Judge, now
resigned; that he is attaching herewith a carbon-
original of a pleading submitted by Atty. Simeon
Quiachon the attorney of record for the defendants
in Civil Case No. 24, entitled 'Jose Kiskisan versus
Fidel Pacate, et al. for Forcible Entry, in the
Municipal Court of Talalora, Samar, which is a
'Motion To Withdraw Exhibits', as Annex 'A', as
part of this reply. (Page 5, Rec.)
the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over the matter
then, referred the said complaint and answer to District Judge
Segundo Zosa, Court of First Instance, Catbalogan, Western
Samar, for investigation, report and recommendation, and after
due hearing, Judge Zosa submitted his report pertinent parts of
which read thus:
Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to
subpoena the complainant, Julio Zeta, who is said
to be a resident of Zumarraga, Samar the same
had failed because the said Julio Zeta appears to
be a fictitious person
Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear
in the investigation in connection with his
complaint against Felicisimo Malinao, the Court
nevertheless proceeded to investigate the case
against him by calling Judge Restituto Duran of
Sta. Rita, Samar, Judge Juanito Reyes of
Zumarraga, Samar and Judge Miguel Avestruz of
Daram, Samar.
Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar,
declared that according to his docket books the
respondent appeared as counsel for Vicente
Baculanlan in criminal case No. 1247 in the
Municipal Court of Sta. Rita, Samar, for grave
threats and in criminal case No. 1249 for the same
accused and Romulo Villagracia for illegal
possession of firearm on August 5, 1960 and on
September 17, 1970.
Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared
that the respondent appeared as counsel in civil
case No. 39 in the Municipal Court of Daram,
Samar, entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor
Payao, et al., for forcible entry on December 15,
1962, January 26, 1963, February 18, 1963 and
on March 1, 1963.
Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27,
1969, the respondent appeared as counsel for the
defendant in civil case No. 318 of the Municipal
Court of Zumarraga entitled Restituto Centino
versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry and again on
June 17, 1970 in the same case.
From the certification of the Clerk of this Court, it
appears that the respondent had the following
entries in his daily time record:
1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960 and
September 17, 1960;
2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;
3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963, and
present also on February 18, 1963 but undertime
by 1 hour;
4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;
5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969;
and
6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but
undertime by 5 hours.
Comparing the dates when the respondent
appeared before the aforementioned Municipal
Courts with his daily time records, he made it
appear that on December 15, 1962 and February
18, 1963 he was present in his office although
according to the testimony of Judge Miguel
Avestruz he was before his Court on December
15, 1962 as well as on February 18, 1963. Again
according to Judge Juanito Reyes the respondent
appeared in his Court on June 17, 1970. The
respondent again made it appear in his daily time
record that he was present with an undertime of
five hours. The respondent did not offer any
plausible explanation for this irregularity.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the crime of falsification of his daily
time record as shown by the evidence, he had
made it appear that he was present in his office on
December 15, 1962, February 18, 1963 and June
17, 1970 when as a matter of fact he was in the
Municipal Court of Daram attending to a case
entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al.,
for forcible entry as well as in the Municipal Court
of Zumarraga attending to Civil Case No. 318
entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for
forcible entry. The Inquest Judge respectfully
recommends that he be given stern warning and
severe reprimand for this irregularity.
With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of
Section 12, Rule XVIII, Republic Act 2260, as
amended, again the evidence shows that
respondent had been appearing as counsel in the
municipal courts of Sta. Rita, Daram and
Zumarraga in violation of the rules of the Civil
Service Law. (Pp. 28-31, Record.)
We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the
conclusions of fact of the Investigator to be amply supported by
the evidence, particularly the documents consisting of public
records and the declarations of the judges before whom
respondent had appeared. It is clear to Us that respondent,
apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts
without prior permission of his superiors in violation of civil
service rules and regulations, falsified his time record of service
by making it appear therein that he was present in his office on
occasions when in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing
as counsel, without being a member of the bar, which,
furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. We, therefore,
adopt the above findings of fact of the Investigator.
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for
defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the
services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of
one in the locality" cannot, even if true, carry the day for him,
considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so
without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified
his time record of service to conceal his absence from his office
on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of times that
respondent acted as counsel under the above circumstances
would indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice
obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice.

In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by

respondent is grave, hence it warrants a more drastic sanction
than that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find
no alternative than to separate him from the service, with the
admonition that he desist from appearing in any court or
investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed
to practice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby

ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter in the Court of
First Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice
to reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.

Castro, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino,

Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 11316
PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant
vs.
RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a. "ATTY. PATRICK A.
CARONAN," Respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by
complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant), before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,"
whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for
purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely representing
that the former has the required educational qualifications to take the
Bar Examinations and be admitted to the practice of law.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R.
Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan. Respondent is the older of the
two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was
born on August 5, 1976.3 Both of them completed their secondary
education at the Makati High School where complainant graduated in
19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon his graduation, complainant
enrolled at the University of Makati where he obtained a degree in
Business Administration in 1997.6 He started working thereafter as a
Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the operator
of 7-11 Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis
with whom he has two (2) daughters.8 Through the years, complainant
rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store
Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa.9
Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at
the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for
one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) in 1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA and
focused on helping their father in the family's car rental business. In
1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their
three (3) children.11 Since then, respondent never went back to school
to earn a college degree.12
In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told
complainant that the former had enrolled in a law school in Nueva
Vizcaya.13
Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that
respondent passed the Bar Examinations and that he used
complainant's name and college records from the University of Makati
to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law in Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations.14 Complainant
brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences
to him.15
In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name
and identity when he saw the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on the
Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's office in
Taguig City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did not confront respondent
about it since he was pre-occupied with his job and had a family to
support.17
Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store
Manager, complainant was ordered to report to the head office of PSC
in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting his presence at
its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation
involving respondent who, at that point, was using the name "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant
appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the
NBI where he was interviewed and asked to identify documents
including: (1) his and respondent's high school records; (2) his
transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land
Transportation Office's records showing his and respondent's driver's
licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's University showing that
complainant's transcript of records from the University of Makati and
his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College
of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's University showing
respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A. Caronan."19
Complainant later learned that the reason why he was invited by the
NBI was because of respondent's involvement in a case for qualified
theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was
one of the principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.20
Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes
and commit unlawful activities, complainant took it upon himself to
inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that
respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan.21 However, problems
relating to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan"
continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter from
Quasha Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be
furnished with complainant's contact details or, in the alternative,
schedule a meeting with him to discuss certain matters concerning
respondent.22 On the other hand, a fellow church-member had also
told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan," almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives.23
Complainant also received a phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L.
Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her into believing
that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in
fact, he was not.24 Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for
gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives, and violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25
Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name
"Patrick A. Caronan," complainant developed a fear for his own safety
and security.26 He also became the subject of conversations among his
colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from his job at
PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to
stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and
illegal practice of law.28
In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him and
invoked res judicata as a defense. He maintained that his identity can
no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD
Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed30 the
administrative case31 filed by Agtarap against him, and which case
had already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in A.C.
No. 10074.32 Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used
by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to
humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit, and harass him because he filed
several administrative and criminal complaints against them before the
Ombudsman.33
On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory
conference where both parties failed to appear.34 Instead, respondent
moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015.35 On such date, however,
both paiiies again failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to
issue an Order36 directing them to file their respective position papers.
However, neither of the parties submitted any.37
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva
Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner) issued his Report and
Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely
assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic records.39 He
observed that respondent failed to controvert all the allegations against
him and did not present any proof to prove his identity.40 On the other
hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he
is the real "Patrick A. Caronan."41
Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are
siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a)
his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he
is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.42 However, based on the
Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO),
"Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to
Rosana Halili-Caronan.43
The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that the
photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A.
Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the
photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."44 These,
according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that respondent
indeed assumed complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar
Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely assumed the name, identity,
and academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor took the
Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the
name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be
dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.46 He also
recommended that respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be
barred from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for
making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to
institute appropriate actions against respondent.47
On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XXI-2015-607,48 adopting the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering
that: (a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from
being admitted to the Bar.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear
and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan"
and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely
assumed the latter's name, identity, and academic records to enroll at
the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and
take the Bar Examinations.
As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and
complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on August
31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma
Atillo.49 Respondent himself also stated that he is married to Rosana
Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO records
showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not
to Rosana Halili-Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph taken of
respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August
16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the
IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant
submitted numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the
University of Makati bearing his photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high
school yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" under it;54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and
2013.55
To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent
falsely used complainant's name, identity, and school records to gain
admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly
recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys.
The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name
is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from admission to the Bar. Under
Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission
to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, VIZ.:
Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar
examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he
has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the
study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an
authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for
admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course,
the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in
arts or sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of
concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history, and
economics. (Emphases supplied)
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree.
While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later and entered
the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating.56
Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.
The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later
on complete his college education and earn a law degree under his real
name.1âwphi1 However, his false assumption of his brother's name,
identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the
Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.57
Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character.58
In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S.
Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as
Member of the Philippine Shari 'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R.
Melendrez,59the Court explained the essence of good moral character:
Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from
good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the
estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and
professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.60 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity,
and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into
controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to
resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral
character is essential in those who would be lawyers.61 This is
imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation
which exists between him and his client, as well as between him and
the court.62
Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by
pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also
tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous
activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against
him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal
profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold
its integrity and dignity.63
WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the
name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A.
Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar
Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of
appropriate civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:
(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is
ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;
(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law
or making any representations as a lawyer;
(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the
Philippine Bar in the future;
(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to respondent under the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan"
and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in
such name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and
(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE
notices and POST in the bulletin boards of all courts of the country a
photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan,"
with a warning that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a
statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick
A. Caronan."
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014
STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET,
Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet
(complainants) filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L.
Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CED), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services
of Atty. Guaren for the titling of a residential lot they acquired in
Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) including expenses relative to its
proceeding; that it was agreed that full payment of the fee shall be
made after the delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an
advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave; that
Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of
their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration, original copy of the
deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and
original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren
asked for additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00)
which they dutifully gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always
reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would say that
the titling was in progress; that they became bothered by the slow
progress of the case so they demanded the return of the money they
paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same provided that the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) be deducted to answer for
his professional fees.
Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-
client relationship between them, Atty. Guaren made a special
appearance against them in a case pending before the Metropolitan
Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).
Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an
acceptance fee of ₱10,000.00, but denied that the amount was
inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed, however,
that he received the payment of ₱1,000.00 and ₱6,000.00; that their
agreement was that the case would be filed in court after the
complainants fully paid his acceptance fee; that he did not take the
documents relative to the titling of the lot except for the photocopy of
the tax declaration; and that he did not commit betrayal of trust and
confidence when he participated in a case filed against the
complainants in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in
behalf of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to
appear in the said hearing.
In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August 24, 2012, the
Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Guaren to have violated the
Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted the titling of
complainants’ lot and despite the acceptance of ₱7,000.00, he failed to
perform his obligation and allowed 5 long years to elapse without any
progress in the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be
disciplined for appearing in a case against complainants without a
written consent from the latter. The CBD recommended that he be
suspended for six (6) months.
In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,2 the IBP Board of Governors, adopted
and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of
the CBD, suspending Atty. Guaren from the practice of law for three
(3) months only.
The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the
unethical conduct of Atty. Guaren, except as to the penalty.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is
not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy
is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a
livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests
or what they owe to themselves.3

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides

that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he

shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and

diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount
of ₱7,000.00 as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however,
failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of
complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached
his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when he
neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY

of having violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective from receipt of this
Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be

included in the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the
country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014
VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA,
Respondents.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.
When this court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law,
the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the
application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This
includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring the
authority to practice law.
For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's motion to lift
one-year suspension from the practice of law.1
In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo
I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility3 and of the
Lawyer's Oath.4 Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize
documents in their stead, in violation of Sections 2455 and 2466 of the
Notarial Law. This court suspended respondents from the practice of
law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified
them from reappointment as notaries public for two years.
Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration,7
praying that respondents be disbarred, not merely suspended from the
practice of law. In the resolution8 dated September 6, 2006, this court
denied complainant Lingan's motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the
Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II, filed the
undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.9
In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July
14, 2006, complainant Lingan wrote the Commission on Human
Rights. Lingan requested the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga
following the latter's suspension from the practice of law.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law,
the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution10
dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as
Director/Attorney VI of the. Commission on Human Rights Regional
Office for Region II. According to the Commission on Human Rights
En Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law
"prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for
want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is
suspended."11
Atty. Baliga · argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not
connected with his functions as Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the
practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. He
prayed for clarification of this court's resolution dated June 15, 2006
"to prevent further injury and prejudice to [his] rights."12
This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory
pleading as this court does not render advisory opinions.13
On May 8, 2009, this court received ·a letter from complainant Lingan.
In his letter14 dated May 4, 2009, Lingan alleged that Atty. Baliga
continued practicing law and discharging his functions as Commission
on Human Rights Regional Director, in violation of this court's order
of suspension.
Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the Commission on
Human Rights En Banc 's resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as
Regional Director. On Atty. Baliga's motion, the ommission
reconsidered Atty. Baliga's suspension and instead admonished him
for "[violating] the conditions of his commission as a notary
public."15 According to complainant Lingan, he was not served a copy
of Atty. Baliga's motion for reconsideration.16
Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director necessarily required
the practice of law. A Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as Attorney
VI. Since this court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law,
Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non-lawyer . . . and [was] disqualified to
hold the position of [Regional Director] [during the effectivity of the
order of suspension]."17 The Commission on Human Rights,
according to complainant Lingan, should have ordered Atty. Baliga to
desist from performing his functions as Regional Director.
Complainant Lingan prayed that this court give "favorable attention
and action on the matter."18
This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office of the
Bar Confidant for report and recommendation.19
In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29, 2009, the Office of
the Bar Confidant found that the period of suspension of Attys.
Calubaquib and Baliga had already lapsed. It recommended that
respondents be required to file their respective motions to lift order of
suspension with certifications from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Executive Judge of the court where they might
appear as counsel and state that they desisted from practicing law
during the period of suspension.
On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty.
Baliga to perform his functions as Regional Director during the period
of suspension, the Office of the Bar Confidant said that the
Commission "deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]"21 this court's order of
suspension. According to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Commission on Human Rights had no power to "[alter, modify, or set
aside any of this court's resolutions] which [have] become final and
executory. "22
Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar Confidant
recommended that this court require him to submit a certification from
the Commission on Human Rights stating that he desisted from
performing his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended
from the practice of law.23
The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that Atty.
Baliga and the Commission .on Human Rights be required to comment
on complainant Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued to
perform his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended
from the practice of law.
On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation,24 arguing that his
suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension
from public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch the coverage of [his
suspension from the practice of law] to [his] public office would be
tantamount to [violating] his constitutional rights [sic] to due process
and to the statutory principle in law that what is not included is
deemed excluded."25
In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this court required
respondents to file their respective motions to lift order of suspension
considering the lapse of the period of suspension. This court further
ordered Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights to
comment on complainant Lingari's allegation that Atty. Baliga
continued performing his functions as Regional Director while he was
suspended from the practice of law. The resolution dated September
23, 2009 provides:
Considering that the period of suspension from the practice of law and
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public imposed on
respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this Court resolves:
(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from
notice, to FILE their respective motions to lift relative to their
suspension and disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public and SUBMIT certifications from the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and Executive Judge of the Court where
they may appear as counsel, stating that respondents have
actually ceased and desisted from the practice of law during the
entire period of their suspension and disqualification, unless
already complied with in the meantime;
(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification
from the Commission on Human Rights [CHR] stating that he
 has been suspended from office and has stopped from the
performance of his functions for the period stated in the order
of suspension and disqualification, within ten (10) days from
notice hereof;
(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to
COMMENT on the allegations of complainant against them,
both within ten (10) days from receipt of notice hereof; ...27
(Emphasis in the original)
In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga
filed their respective motions to lift order of suspension.28 Atty.
Baliga also filed his comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that
he continued performing his functions as Regional Director during his
suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga alleged that
as Regional Director, he "perform[ed], generally, managerial
functions,"30 which did not require the practice of law. These
managerial functions allegedly included ."[supervising] ... the day to
day operations of the regional office and its personnel";31 "monitoring
progress of investigations conducted by the [Commission on Human
Rights] Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the implementation of all
other services and assistance programs of the [Commission on Human
Rights] by the different units at the regional level";33 and
"[supervising] . . . the budgetary requirement preparation and
disbursement of funds and expenditure of the [Regional Office]."34
The Commission allegedly has its own "legal services unit which takes
care of the legal services matters of the [Commission]."35
Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require the
practice of law, Atty. Baliga claimed thaf he "faithful[ly] [complied]
with [this court's resolution suspending him from the practice of
law]."36
The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment37 dated
November 27, 2009. It argued that "the penalty imposed upon Atty.
Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty
that may be imposed upon him as a public official for the same
acts."38 According to the Commission, Atty. Baliga's suspension from
the practice of law is a "bar matter"39 while the imposition of penalty
upon a Commission on Human Rights official "is an entirely different
thing, falling as it does within the exclusive authority of the
[Commission as] disciplining body."40
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this
court's resolution of the issue and would "abide by whatever ruling or
decision [this court] arrives at on [the] matter. "41 In reply42 to Atty.
Baliga's comment, complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga again
disobeyed this. court. Atty. Baliga failed to submit a certification from
the Commission on Human Rights stating that he was suspended from
office and desisted from performing his functions as Regional
Director.
As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his
position as Regional Director and only performed generally
managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga
admitted to defying the order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to
performing the functions of a "lawyer-manager,"43 which under the
landmark case of Cayetano v. Monsod44 constituted practice of law.
Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of Regional Director/
Attorney VI requires the officer "to be a lawyer [in] good standing."45
Moreover, as admitted by Atty. Baliga, he had supervision and control
over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga
practiced law while he held his position as Regional Director.
With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in
reassuming his position as Regional Director, complainant Lingan
countered that if Atty. Baliga were really in good faith, he should have
followed the initial resolution of the Commission on Human Rights
suspending him from office. Atty. Baliga did not even furnish this
court a copy of his motion for reconsideration of the Commission on
Human Right's resolution suspending him from office. By "playing
ignorant on what is 'practice of law', twisting facts and
philosophizing,"46 complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga "[no
longer has that] moral vitality imperative to the title of an attorney."47
Compfainant Lingan prayed that Atty. Baliga be disbarred.
On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty.
Calubaquib.48 He was allowed to resume his practice of law and
perform notarial acts subject to compliance with the requirements for
issuance of a notarial commission.
On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for evaluation, report, and recommendation Atty. Baliga's
motion to lift one-year suspension and the respective comments of
Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights.49
In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18, 2010, the Office
of the Bar Confidant stated that Atty. Baliga "should not [have been]
allowed to perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities [as
Regional Director] which [required acts constituting] practice .of
law."51 Considering that Atty. Baliga claimed that he did not perform
his functions as Regional Director which required the practice of law,
the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the Commission on
Human Rights be required to comment on this claim. The Office of the
Bar Confidant also recommended holding in abeyance the resolution
of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift suspension "pending [the Commission
on Human Right's filing of comment]."52
In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court held in abeyance
the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension. The
Commission on Human Rights was ordered to comment on Atty.
Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as
Regional Director.
In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on Human
Rights reiterated that the penalty imposed on Atty. Baliga as a member
of the bar is separate from the penalty that might be imposed on him as
Regional Director. The Commission added that it is "of honest belief
that the position of [Regional Director] is managerial and does not
[require the practice of law]."55 It again manifested that it will "abide
by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives on [the] matter."56
The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift
order of suspension should be granted.
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We,
therefore, suspend him further from the practice of law for six months.
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience."57 It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics
of the [legal] profession"58 or "[rendering any kind of] service [which]
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."59
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is
considered practice. of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,60 this court cited
the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed
that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring
"[the use of] legal knowledge or legal talent"61 is practice of law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created
under the Constitution with power to investigate "all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights[.]"62 It is divided
into regional offices with each office having primary responsibility to
investigate human rights violations in its territorial jurisdiction.63
Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director who is given
the position of Attorney VI.
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and
Monitoring of Human Rights Violations and Abuses, and the Provision
of CHR Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the following powers
and functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to
"[Commission on Human Rights] matters;"65
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional
offices;66
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of
human rights complaints in the absence of the legal officer or
investigator;67
 d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among
parties and discuss "immediate courses of action and protection
remedies and/or possible submission of the matter to an
alternative dispute resolution";68
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including
notices, letter-invitations, orders, or subpoenas within the
territorial jurisdiction of the regional office;69 and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights
cases prepared by the legal officer.70
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession.
Oaths and affirmations are usually performed by members of the
judiciary and notaries public71 - officers who are necessarily members
of the bar.72 Investigating human rights complaints are performed
primarily by the Commission's legal officer.73 Discussing immediate
courses of action and protection remedies and reviewing and
approving draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal
officer require the use of extensive legal knowledge.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human
Rights Regional Director constitutes practice of law. Thus, the
Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in good
standing and authorized to practice law.74 When the Regional Director
loses this authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended
from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary
qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or
suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional
Director.
This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one
year on June 15, 2006, "effective immediately."75 From the time Atty.
Baliga received the court's order of suspension on July 5, 2006,76 he
has been without authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary
qualification to his position as Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As the Commission on Human Rights
correctly resolved in its resolution dated January 16, 2007:
WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect,
prevents Atty. Baliga from assuming his post, for want of eligibility in
the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended. This is
without prejudice to the investigation to be conducted to the practice
of law of Atty. Baliga, which in the case of all Regional Human Rights
Directors is not generally allowed by the Commission;
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on
Human Rights of the Philippines resolved to put into effect and
implement the legal implications of the SC decision by decreeing the
suspension of Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga in the discharge of his functions
and responsibilities as Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in
Tuguegarao City for the period for which the Supreme Court
Resolution is in effect.77 (Emphasis in the original)
In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director,
the Commission on Human Rights did not violate Atty. Baliga's right
to due process. First, he was only suspended after: investigation by the
Commission on Human Rights Legal and Investigation Office.78
Second, the Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard
when he filed his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not
supported by the record. It was also immaterial.1âwphi1 He held the
position of Commission on Human Rights Regional Director because
of his authority to practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga
was disqualified to hold that position.
All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director constituted practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have
desisted from holding his position as Regional Director.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience
to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty.
Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of law for six months for
practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of
suspension.
We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position
as Regional Director despite lack.of authority to practice law.1âwphi1
We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the
resolution dated April 13, 2007, reconsidering its first resolution
suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead,
the Commission admonished Atty. Baliga and sternly warned him that
repeating the same offense will cause his dismissal from the service.
The resolution with CHR (III) No. A2007-045 dated April 13, 2007
reads:
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent
Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga prays before the Honorable Commission to
recall and annul his suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney VI of
the Commission on Human Rights - Regional Office No. II, per 16
January 2007 Commission en Banc Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-
013.
The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the
Commission that Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga is totally blameless and should
not suffer the appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his Lawyer's oath.
The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is
concerned with the transgression by Atty. Baliga of his oath of office
as government employee. As records have it, the Commission granted
Atty. Baliga authority to secure a commission as a notary public. With
this, he is mandated to act as a notary public in accordance with the
rules and regulations, to include the conditions expressly set forth by
the Commission.
With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court resolution
in SC Administrative Case No. 5277 dated 15 June 2006, the
Commission cannot close its eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is
clearly repugnant to the conduct of an officer reposed with public trust.
This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being
enraged, and censure Atty. Baliga for having contravened the
conditions of his commission as a notary public. What was granted to
Atty. Baliga is merely a privilege, the exercise of which requires such
high esteem to be in equal footing with the constitutional mandate of
the Commission. Clearly, Atty. Baliga should keep in mind that the
Commission exacts commensurate solicitude from whatever privilege
the Commission grants of every official and employee.
The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one
year suspension imposed on him pursuant to the Supreme Court
resolution. The Commission believes that the further suspension of
Atty. Baliga from the office may be too harsh in the meantime that the
Supreme Court penalty is being served. This Commission is prevailed
upon that the admonition of Atty. Baliga as above expressed is
sufficient to complete the cycle of penalizing an erring public officer.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in
Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013 and imposes the penalty of
admonition with a stem warning that a repetition of the same will merit
a penalty of dismissal from the service.80 (Emphasis in the original)
The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution
dated April 13, 2007. This resolution caused Atty. Baliga to reassume
his position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite lack of authority
to practice law.
We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.81 The
Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other issuances, modify
or defy this court's orders of suspension from the practice of law.
Although the Commission on Human Rights has the power to appoint
its officers and employees,82 it can only retain those with the
necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding.

As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a

"privilege burdened with conditions."83 To enjoy the privileges of
practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental
fitness, [maintain] the highest degree of morality[,] and [faithfully
comply] with the rules of [the] legal profession."84

WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the

practice of law for six ( 6) months. Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of
one (1) year and six (6) months of suspension from the practice of law,
effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this resolution.

SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Commission on
Human Rights.

SO ORDERED.
[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA,
respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the
requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession.
Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession
of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on
the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice
law even if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed
the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar,
complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant
charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar
during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution
of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on
the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and
grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet
a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC)
of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent
filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent
represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for
George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent
is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not
allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter
engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent
filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning
vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to
take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of
Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same
resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint
against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific
assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that
he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person
who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001
pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the
canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as
a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001
which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy
of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May
2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further
claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that
complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate
for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint
be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll
of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents
Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance
before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan.
Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao
(Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning
candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao
in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the
MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1)
respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an
employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment)
reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is motivated
mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as
counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the
MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the
MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May
2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious
doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also
believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to
deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore
recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine
Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law
which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for
Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as
secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does
not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the
records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to
22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes
in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph
of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned
Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE
T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he
had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him
before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also
retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001,
Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been
authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party
and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the
MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as
counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the
REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel
for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the
proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of
Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath.
Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1[1] the Court elucidated
that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation
in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters
of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics
supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,2[2] the Court held that practice of law means
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render
any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various
pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the
charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself
counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority
to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member
of the Philippine Bar.3[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this
privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust4[4] since a lawyer is an
officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of
law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed
the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced
law without a license.5[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In
Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6[6] a candidate passed the bar examinations but
had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held
in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to
the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person
who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
contempt of court.7[7] misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice
law.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to
finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent the Philippine Bar.
passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.8[8] Respondent should SO ORDERED.
know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.9[9]

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law

does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any
court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang

Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized
practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon
Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your
acceptance.10[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation
effective 11 May 2001.11[11] Thus, the evidence does not support the
charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence

shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his

B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by
petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the
degree of Bachelor of Laws in 19791 and passed the same year's bar
examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine
International Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful
bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on
13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly
because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5
given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a
vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files,
Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then
that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had
signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance
record.7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He
stated that he was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that
he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated
"under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the
signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his
status as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys
lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten."9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll
number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide
his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the
instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys.11
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory
conference on the matter on 21 September 201212 and submitted a
Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The
OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It
explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory
conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his
negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in
the instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition
of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of
disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious
ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character
when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of
Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s
attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who
acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30
years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to
file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you
say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s
gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of apprehension
and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to
do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as
necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for
disqualification from the practice of law,17 which is more than what we
can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates
that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics
of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses
the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal
practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18
Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company,
and the Energy Development Corporation.19
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged
member of the Philippine Bar.1âwphi1 While the practice of law is not
a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold
this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and
moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from
all liability for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period
spanning more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as
"neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an
honest error of judgment."22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from
the legal consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil
motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25
Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first
operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he
had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the
Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had
signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an
honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado
should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys,
as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.26
When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law
without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for
admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s
assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such
without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding,
however, is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached
after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case,
while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect
contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of
law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect
contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against
him.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is
hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this
Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of
₱32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year
period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is
STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of
law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be
severely by this Court.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional Responsibility, Confidant, the Integrated Bar
which provides:
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the circulation to all courts in the country.
unauthorized practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from
assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice
of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision,
because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the
unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law
students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are
bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards
of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon

9have warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31
As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him
from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a
penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of
law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000.
During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed
to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any
act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.