Evidence CASE DIGESTS 1

Contents
18. City of Manila v Cabangis XXXX ​2
19. Heirs of Lim v Lim XXXX ​2
20. Nissan v United Phil Scout ​2
21. People v Tandoy ​3
22. Air France v Carrascoso ​4
23. Heirs of Luna v Afable ​7
24. Dantis v Maghinang 12 ​
25. People v Cayabyab 14 ​
26. Tan v. CA 18​
27. Republic v Marcos-Manotoc 19 ​
28. BPI v. Fidelity and Surety Co ​21
29. Lechugas v CA ​23
30 Salimbangon v Tan ​25
31. Sps Lequin v Sps Vizconde 28 ​
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS ​31
47. People v Reyes ​31
48. People v Yatco ​34
49. US v Bay ​35
50. Datoon v Judge Kapilig ​37
51. Heirs of Clemena v Heirs of Bien ​38
52. DBP Pool v Radio Mindanao Network ​40
53. People v Aling ​42
54. PEOPLE v. VILLARINO ​44
55. People v Valero ​46
56 People v Tuniaco ​48
57 People v Lauga ​49
58. Navallo v SB ​51
59. Heirs of Barredo v Besanes ​53
60. People v Janjalani 57 ​
61. Tan v Rodil Enterprises ​58

18. City of Manila v Cabangis XXXX

19. Heirs of Lim v Lim XXXX
20. Nissan v United Phil Scout
NISSAN v. UNITED PHIL
PRINCIPLE:
The best evidence rule is the rule which requires the highest grade of evidence to prove a disputed fact.
The best evidence rule will apply only when the contents of a document are the subject of the inquiry.
FACTS:
United Philippine Scout Veterans Detective and Protective Agency (United) entered into a contract for
security services with Nissan North Edsa (Nissan), it was able to post 18 security guards within Nissans
compound located in EDSA Balintawak, Quezon City.]
In the morning of 31 January 1996, Nissan informed United that its services were being terminated
beginning 5:00 p.m. of that day. When Nissan failed to act on this verbal request, Galope wrote a
Letter[9] dated 5 February 1996, addressed to Nissans general manager. After seeking a reconsideration
of its action, United’s President and Chairman of the Board wrote a Letter addressed to Nissan’s President
and General Manager, demanding payment of the amount equivalent to thirty (30) days of service in view
of Nissans act of terminating United’s services without observing the required 30-day prior written notice
as stipulated under paragraph 17 of their service contract.
As a result of Nissans continued failure to comply with Uniteds demands, the latter filed a case for Sum
of Money with damages before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pinas City.
In its Answer, Nissan maintained that the above-mentioned paragraph 17 of the service contract expressly
confers upon either party the power to terminate the contract, without the necessity of a prior written
notice, in cases of violations of the provisions thereof. Nissan alleged that United violated the terms of
their contract, thereby allowing Nissan to unilaterally terminate the services of United without prior
notice.
The trial court pronounced that Nissan has not adduced any evidence to substantiate its claim that the
terms of their contract were violated by United; and that absent any showing that violations were
committed, the 30-day prior written notice should have been observe. On appeal, the RTC and the CA
affirmed the decision of the MTC.
Petitioner Nissan insists that no judgment can properly be rendered against it, as respondent United failed,
during the trial of the case, to offer in evidence the service contract upon which it based its claim for sum
of money and damages. Nissan asserts that the resolution of this case calls for the application of the best
evidence rule.
ISSUE:
Whether the best evidence rule is applicable in the case at bar.
HELD:
NO.
Nissans reliance on the best evidence rule is misplaced. The best evidence rule is the rule which requires
the highest grade of evidence to prove a disputed fact. However, the same applies only when the contents
of a document are the subject of the inquiry. In this case, the contents of the service contract between
Nissan and United have not been put in issue. Neither United nor Nissan disputes the contents of the
service contract; as in fact, both parties quoted and relied on the same provision of the contract (paragraph
17) to support their respective claims and defenses. Thus, the best evidence rule finds no application here.
The real issue in this case is whether or not Nissan committed a breach of contract, thereby entitling
United to damages in the amount equivalent to 30 days service. Nissan did not adduce any evidence to
substantiate its claim that the terms of the contract were violated by United. It failed to point out or
indicate the specific provisions of the service contract which were violated by United as a result of the
latter’s lapses in security. In so failing, Nissans act of unilaterally terminating the contract constitutes a
breach thereof, entitling United to collect actual damages.
BQ
United entered into a contract for security services with Nissan. In the morning of 31 January 1996,
Nissan informed United that its services were being terminated beginning 5:00 p.m. of that day. After
seeking a several reconsideration of its action, United demanded payment equivalent to thirty (30) days of
service in view of Nissans act of terminating United’s services without observing the required 30-day
prior written notice as stipulated under paragraph 17 of their service contract.
In its Answer, Nissan contended that United committed breach of contract and maintained that paragraph
17 of the service contract expressly confers upon either party the power to terminate the contract, without
the necessity of a prior written notice, in cases of violations of the provisions thereof.
Will the best evidence rule apply in this case?

21. People v Tandoy

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO TANDOY y LIM, Defendant-
Appellant.
PRINCIPLE:
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where
the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.
FACTS:
Defendant Tandoy was convicted of a crime in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in RTC Makati after
a buy-bust operation was made by the Makati Police Station.
Upon appeal the accused-appellant invokes the best evidence rule and questioned the admission by the
trial court of the xerox copy of the marked P10.00 bill which was used by the poseur-buyer and contends
that the same is excluded under said rule for being a mere xerox copy.
ISSUE: WON the best evidence rule applies in this case
HELD:
No.
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where
the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.
In the case at bar, Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the
purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy
thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
Bar Question:
During a buy-bust operation, X was arrested for possession of marijuana as well as the marked money
used by the poseur-buyer. He was later on convicted in the RTC for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Upon appeal, he now invokes the best evidence rule and questions the admission of the lower court of the
Xerox copy only of the marked-money, hence lack of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Is X correct?

22. Air France v Carrascoso

AIR FRANCE, petitioner, vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents

PRINCIPLE:
In relation to Best Evidence Rule---- A written document speaks a uniform language; the spoken words
can be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air
carrier, adherence to the terms of ticket is desirable.
LONG DIGEST:
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on
March 30, 1958.
The defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a
"first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled
in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first
class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a
"white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first
class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would
be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of
the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was
having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and
pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class"
seat in the plane.
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class
ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement
of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any
specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class
ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the
availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a testimony of a witness can be used as evidence in the presence of written evidence
(airline ticket--- Best Evidence Rule)
SC RULING:
No.
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee
that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in the first-class
compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every station
for the necessary first-class reservation. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class
tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees.
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence
cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits belie the testimony of said witnesses, and
clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation
whatever.
Furthermore, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a "first class"
accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such confirmation
defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by defendant
would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong.
A written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only
to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is
desirable. The courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize
an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; and that the decision of the
Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith.
First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the
Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first
class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat
in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations,
thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting
in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But,
the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The
contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the
evidence is not even required.
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook
reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject
of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the
49a
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible.
QUICK DIGEST:
FACTS:
X, was a member of a group of Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes. Air France (AF), through
its authorized agent, PAL, issued to X a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From
Manila to Bangkok, X travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of AF forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, there was a "white man", who, the Manager
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, X refused.
X later on reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane. Now, X sues AF.
AF tried to defend its side by the testimony of its witnesses LZ and RA that although plaintiff paid for,
and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. X
contends that he paid to and received from AF a first class ticket. But AF asserts that said ticket did not
represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did
not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class
protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first
class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a testimony of a witness can be used as evidence in the presence of written evidence
SC RULING:
No.
The Best Evidence Rule provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Oral evidence cannot prevail over
written evidence in this instance.
In this case, plaintiff's ticket belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was
issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever. The court cannot believe that
after the confirmation of the ticket, the defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first
class" ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. A written
document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve
stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable.
The courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.

23. Heirs of Luna v Afable

G.R. No. 188299 January 23, 2013
HEIRS OF LUNA vs. AFABLE
Facts:
Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. J-7205 (T-
54199), with an area of 158.77 hectares, located in Barangay Guinobatan, Calapan City, Oriental
Mindoro.100.2856 hectares of the landholding was subjected to compulsory acquisition under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) through a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition
issued by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) and published in a newspaper of general
circulation.
Respondents were identified by the DAR as qualified farmer-beneficiaries; hence, the corresponding
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) were generated, issued to respondents and duly
registered in their names.
petitioners filed before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) Oriental Mindoro a Petition for
"Cancellation of CLOAs, Revocation of Notice of Valuation and Acquisition and Upholding and
Affirming the Classification of Subject Property and Declaring the same outside the purview of RA No.
6657."The petition was anchored mainly on the reclassification of the land in question into a light
intensity industrial zone pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 21, series of 1981, enacted by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Calapan, thereby excluding the same from the coverage of the agrarian law.
The DARAB found that petitioners’ property is exempt from the CARP as it has been reclassified as non-
agricultural prior to the effectivity of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657. According to the DARAB, the records
of the case indicate that subject parcel of land was classified as within the residential, commercial and
industrial zone by the Sangguniang Bayan of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro through Resolution No. 139,
Series of 1981, enacted on 14 April 1981 as Municipal Ordinance No. 21. Moreover, the Office of the
City Assessor has also classified the property as residential, commercial and industrial in use under the
tax declaration covering the same. Finally, the Office of the Deputized Zoning Administrator, Urban
Planning and Development Office, Calapan City, issued a Certification on 25 September 1998 stating that
"under Article III, Section 3, No. 7 of Resolution No. 139, Municipal Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1981,
areas covered by this [sic] provisions has [sic] been declared as Light Intensity Industrial Zone prior to
the approval of RA 6657 x x x.
The DARAB cited Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which provides that a
parcel of land is considered non-agricultural and, therefore, beyond the coverage of the CARP, if it had
been classified as residential, commercial, or industrial in the city or municipality where the Land Use
Plan or zoning ordinance has been approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
before 15 June 1988, the date of effectivity of RA No. 6657. The aforementioned Opinion of the DOJ
further states that all lands falling under this category, that is, lands already classified as commercial,
industrial or residential, before 15 June 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance from the DAR.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the DARAB Central Office.
The Central Office of the DARAB held that the local Adjudicator misconstrued DOJ Opinion No. 44,
Series of 1990 and, in the process, overlooked DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 2, Series of 1994
which provides the grounds upon which CLOAs may be cancelled, among which is that the land is found
to be exempt or excluded from CARP coverage or is to be part of the landowner’s retained area as
determined by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative. Thus, the DARAB
concluded, the issue of whether or not petitioners’ land is indeed exempt from CARP coverage is still an
administrative matter to be determined exclusively by the DAR Secretary or his authorized representative.
In short, an exemption clearance from the DAR is still required. In this connection, DAR AO No. 6 was
issued on 27 May 1994 setting down the guidelines in the issuance of exemption clearance based on
Section 3(c) of RA No. 6657 and DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990. Pursuant thereto, "any landowner
or his duly authorized representative whose lands are covered by DOJ Opinion No. 44-S-1990, and
desires to have an exemption clearance from the DAR, should file the application with the Regional
Office of the DAR where the land is located."
Accordingly, the DARAB set aside the Decision of the DARAB Calapan City for lack of jurisdiction and
referred the case to the Regional Office of DAR Region IV for final determination as to whether the land
covered is exempt from CARP coverage.
In an apparent response to the above ruling of the DARAB holding that petitioners still need an
exemption clearance from the DAR, petitioners filed an application for exemption from CARP coverage
of subject land.
DAR Secretary Roberto M. Pagdanganan granted petitioners’ application for exemption. It held that the
subject property has been zoned as light-industrial prior to the enactment of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program as shown by the various certifications issued by the HLURB and CPDC of Calapan City,
Mindoro stating that the subject properties were reclassified to light-industrial zone by the City of
Calapan, Mindoro and approved by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (now HLURB) per
Resolution No. R-39-04 on 31 July 1980.
Predictably, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of exemption.
In a Resolution, former DAR Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce granted respondents’
motion for reconsideration stating that the subject property is still within the ambit of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program since the same were [sic] reclassified only in 1998 through Resolution No.
151, City Ordinance No. 6, and was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan only in 2001 through
Resolution No. 218, Series of 2001 long after the effectivity of RA 6657.
Thus, the Order issued by DAR Secretary Pagdanganan was set aside, revoked and cancelled.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of this Resolution.
DAR, through then OIC Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman issued an Order denying petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration.
the CLUPPI Inspection Team, accompanied by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO),
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) and other DAR Field Personnel, conducted an ocular
inspection of the subject landholding and found that the petitioners failed to offer substantial evidence
that would warrant reversal of the Order.
Resolution No. R-39-4, Series of 1980 of the then Municipality of Calapan, conditionally approved by
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission, did not categorically place the entire landholding under Light
Industrial Zone.
The Certification issued on 8 October 1998 by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
proved that the property is still agricultural. The same provides that the landholding is within the Light
Industrial Zone (100 meters deep west and 200 meters deep east) of the Provincial Road and the rest is
Agricultural Zone based on the Zoning Ordinance approved by HLURB Resolution No. R-9-34 dated 31
July 1980. It was re-classified into residential, commercial and institutional uses pursuant to Sangguniang
Panlungsod Resolution No. 151, Ordinance No. 6 only on 23 June 1998. The 1981 Ordinance, albeit
approved by the HLURB, did not automatically reclassify the land. Physical aspects of the landholding
are actually agricultural as there are some fruit trees and generally, planted with rice. Also, the
surrounding areas are apparently agricultural in usage.
On 11 January 2006, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) submitted a report stating that the
Light Industrial Zone which covers the fraction covering 100 meters deep west and 200 meters deep east
along the provincial road traversing the property areas which were declared in the HLURB Certification
dated 08 October 1998, were already covered by Presidential Decree No. 27. Thus, there was already a
vested right over the property and can no longer be covered by an Application for Exemption Clearance.
The Order granting the motion for reconsideration filed by the farmer-beneficiaries was, therefore,
affirmed in toto.
Petitioners, consequently, filed an appeal before the Office of the President. It quoted with approval the
findings and conclusions of former DAR Secretary Pagdanganan in his Order.
According to the Office of the President, contrary to the findings and conclusions of the DAR in its
Resolution, the area where subject property is situated was really intended to be classified, not as
agricultural, as in fact it was declared as residential, commercial and institutional in 1998.
The Office of the President further held that from the time portions of subject property were declared to
be within the Light Intensity Industrial Zone in 2003, it was never established that it had been devoted to
agricultural purposes. Besides, the confirmation of its falling within the residential, commercial and
industrial zone was ahead of the Notice of Acquisition. It would not be proper to subject a residential,
commercial and industrial property to CARP anymore.
The motion for reconsideration and second motion for reconsideration of respondents were respectively
denied by the Office of the President in a Resolution
Respondents then appealed to the CA.
the CA granted the appeal based on a finding that the ruling of the Office of the President is not supported
by substantial evidence.
Hence, this petition for review wherein petitioners seek the reversal of the aforementioned decision on the
ground, among others, that the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the Decision of
the Office of the President is not supported by substantial evidence.
Issue
whether or not the land subject of this case had been reclassified as non-agricultural as early as 1981, that
is, prior to the effectivity of the CARL and, therefore, exempt from its coverage.
Ruling
Yes.
The court is inclined to give more evidentiary weight to the certification of the zoning administrator being
the officer having jurisdiction over the area where the land in question is situated and is, therefore, more
familiar with the property in issue. Besides, this certification carried the presumption of regularity in its
issuance and respondents have the burden of overcoming this presumption. Respondents, however, failed
to present any evidence to rebut that presumption.
Accordingly, since specialized agencies, such as the HUDCC and the Office of the Deputized Zoning
Administrator tasked to determine the classification of parcels of land have already certified that the
subject land is industrial, the Court must accord such pronouncements great respect, if not finality, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary.
Respondents insist that petitioners’ landholding is not included in the light intensity industrial zone under
Ordinance No. 21, yet, they never submitted any evidence to support their contention. No maps, such as a
zoning map or a land use map, clearly showing that petitioners’ property lies outside the reclassified area
were presented by respondents. Instead, what they presented were: (1) a certification from the Provincial
Irrigation Manager stating that several of the respondents were listed as beneficiaries of the Calapan Dam
Irrigators’ Association; (2) a certification from the Municipal Agriculturist of Calapan declaring that the
property is irrigated; (3) photographs of the irrigation system covering the subject landholding; (4) a letter
from the Chief of the Land Management Service of the DENR Region IV stating that the entire 158.77
hectares of the land in question falls under 18% slope; (5) photographs showing that the property is
generally planted with rice; and other documents which, however, do not prove nor support their claim
that the property has not been reclassified into non-agricultural use.
Respondents, however, did submit in the proceedings before then DAR OIC Secretary Ponce an
"approved survey plan" commissioned by the DAR allegedly "showing that only about 20 hectares or so
would be covered by" Ordinance No. 21. A copy of this plan was nevertheless not attached to the records
of this case thereby making it impossible for this Court to examine the same and draw its own
conclusions therefrom.
At any rate, as already adverted to above, the certification of the deputized zoning administrator carries
more weight by reason of his special knowledge and expertise and the matter under consideration being
under his jurisdiction and competence. He is, therefore, in a better position to attest to the classification of
the property in question.
The best evidence respondents could have presented was a map showing the metes and bounds and
definite delineations of the subject land. Since respondents failed to do so, this Court is bound to rely on
the certifications of the appropriate government agencies with recognized expertise on the matter of land
classification. Thus, through the certifications issued by the deputized zoning administrator of Calapan
City and by the HUDCC, petitioners were able to positively establish that their property is no longer
agricultural at the time the CARL took effect and, therefore, cannot be subjected to agrarian reform.
A final note: In his Order dated 21 June 2006, then OIC Secretary Pangandaman made mention of a
"report" issued by the MARO of Calapan City claiming that the area covering 100 meters deep west and
200 meters deep east along the provincial road traversing the property which was declared in the HUDCC
certification dated 8 October 1998 as light industrial has already been covered by Presidential Decree No.
27.Thus, Secretary Pangandaman concluded, there were already vested rights over the property and can
no longer be covered by an application for exemption.
The records of this case, however, do not contain a copy of the aforementioned report.Thus, the Court is
unable to scrutinize the same and make a definite ruling thereon.
In any case, an examination of the records of this case show that the earliest document evidencing
coverage under the CARP of the land subject of this dispute is the published Notice of Land Valuation
and Acquisition dated 20 August 1998. Prior thereto, all documents in connection with the compulsory
acquisition of land for agrarian reform pertain to land covered by TCT No. T-18192 with an area of 161
hectares, purportedly in the name of Mariquita A. Luna. Clearly, this land is different from the land
subject of this case which is covered by TCT No. J-7205 (T-54199). It may, therefore, be reasonably
presumed that the report adverted to refers to the land covered by TCT No. T-18192 and not to the
property under consideration herein.
Short digest:
Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land which was subjected to compulsory acquisition under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Respondents were identified by the DAR as qualified
farmer-beneficiaries, hence, Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) were issued to them.
Petitioners sought the cancellation of the said CLOAs before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB)
Calapan City. Their petition was anchored mainly on the reclassification of the land in question into a
light intensity industrial zone pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 21, series of 1981, enacted by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Calapan, thereby excluding the same from the coverage of the agrarian law.
DARAB Calapan City ordered the cancellation of the CLOAs.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the DARAB Central Office and the latter ruled in their favor.
Petitioners then appealed the decision to the Office of the President which ruled that the parcel of land is
excluded from the coverage of CARP.
Respondents appealed the Office of the President’s decision to the Court of Appeals. The CA granted the
appeal. Hence, the petition for review.

24. Dantis v Maghinang

G.R. No. 191696
ROGELIO DANTIS vs. JULIO MAGHINANG, JR

Principle: The best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced.
For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the production of the document
itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence.

Facts:
➢ Petitioner Dantis filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession against
Respondent Maghinang. Petitioner alleged that he was the registered owner of subject land,
acquiring such thru an extrajudicial partition of the estate from his deceased father. That
respondent built a house on a part of his estate; that his demands for respondent to vacate were
 unheeded.
➢ Respondent Julio denied the allegations. He said that his father bought the land from the
Petitioner’s father and that he has succeeded to its ownership. He also claims that he was entitled
to a separate registration of said lot on the basis of the documentary evidence of sale, and his
open and uninterrupted possession of the property.
➢ Defendant presented the ff evidence to prove the sale of land to his father:
1. Exhibit 3 – affidavit executed by Ignacio Dantis, grandfather of the Petitioner of the agreement to
sell such land
2. Exhibit 4 – an undated handwritten receipt evidencing downpayment for said lot
➢ But defendant admitted that the affidavit was not signed by the alleged vendor, Emilio Dantis, the
father of petitioner. Also, he admitted that the receipt he presented was admittedly a mere
photocopy.
➢ RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioner. RTC found that the documents would only serve
as proofs that the purchase price for the subject lot had not yet been completely paid and, hence,
Rogelio was not duty-bound to deliver the property to Julio, Jr. The RTC found Julio, Jr. to be a
mere possessor by tolerance.
➢ CA ruled in favor of Defendant Maghinang. It held that the undated receipt was proof of the sale of
the lot. It also ruled that the partial payment of the purchase price, coupled with the delivery gave
efficacy to the oral sale, and that Petitioner was duty-bound to convey what had been sold after
full payment of the selling price.

Issue: WON the pieces of evidence (affidavit and photocopy of the receipt) submitted by the defendant
are adequate proofs of the existence of the alleged oral contract of sale of the lot in dispute.

Ruling:
No.

Exhibit "3," the affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and, thus, cannot be accorded any evidentiary
weight. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is
anchored on three reasons: 1) absence of cross-examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and 3)
absence of oath. The affidavit was not identified and its averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio.
Accordingly, it must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay evidence.

Exhibit "4," the undated handwritten receipt, is considered secondary evidence being a mere photocopy
which cannot be admitted to prove the contents of the document. The best evidence rule requires that the
highest available degree of proof must be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents of a
document are best proved by the production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or
substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130, Section 3.

A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that:
when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.

In the case, Defendant failed to prove the due execution of the original of Exhibit "4" as well as its
subsequent loss. Also, his testimony was riddled with improbabilities and contradictions which raise
doubt on the veracity of his evidence. When asked where the original was, Defendant’s testimony gave
the impression that the original of the document was lost while it was in the possession of his parents.
During cross-examination, however, he testified that it was lost while it was in his possession. Further,
Exhibit 4 would not be an adequate proof of the existence of the alleged oral contract of sale because it
failed to provide a description of the subject lot, including its metes and bounds, as well as its full price or
consideration.

Bar Q:
X filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession against Y. Y on his defense claims that
his father bought the land from the X’s father and claims its ownership. Y presented 2 pieces of evidence
in court: (a) an affidavit executed by X’s grandfather of the agreement of the sale of said land; and (b) a
photocopy of an undated handwritten receipt evidencing downpayment for said lot. Y admitted that the
affidavit was not signed by the alleged vendor, X’s grandfather. Also, he admitted that the receipt he
presented was admittedly a mere photocopy.

Are the pieces of evidence presented adequate to prove the alleged sale?

25. People v Cayabyab

G.R. No. 167147 August 3, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
GENARO CAYABYAB y FERNANDEZ, Appellant.
Principle:
• The best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth certificate or certified true copy
thereof; in their absence, similar authentic documents may be presented such as baptismal
certificates and school records. If the original or certified true copy of the birth certificate is not
available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the family may be sufficient
under certain circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or other authentic
documents and the testimonies of the victim's mother or other qualified relative are unavailable,
the testimony of the victim may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
Facts:
❖ Alpha Jane was born on November 26, 1994. She was six years and nine months old when the
rape was committed on August 7, 2001.
❖ On that day, at around 6:00 p.m., Alpha Jane was at home taking care of her younger siblings. Her
mother went to buy kerosene, while her father was out.
❖ On the guise of teaching arithmetic, appellant Genaro Cayabyab, went to the victim's house and
asked her to lie down on her father's bed. When she refused, appellant removed her clothes and
his own clothes, then forced her to lie down on the bed and laid on top of her and inserted his
penis into her vagina. Alpha Jane shouted in pain which startled the appellant who sprayed her
4
with tear gas and left.
❖ Alpha Jane told her mother of what had happened. She immediately reported the incident to the
barangay officials and brought Alpha Jane to the Philippine Air Force General Hospital for
medical examination. She also sought assistance from the police who arrested the appellant at his
5
house.
❖ Alpha Jane was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame and on August 10, 2001,
7
to the Child Protection Unit (CPU) at UP-PGH for further medical examinations, which both
8
found hymenal abrasions and lacerations, respectively, on the victim's genitalia.
❖ On August 10, 2001, appellant was charged with rape. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi.
❖ The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It found the victim's
testimony consistent with the medical findings of the doctors. Moreover, it applied the rule that an
unsubstantiated defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over a positive and categorical
testimony of a minor victim. Finally, it appreciated the qualifying circumstance of minority and
imposed the penalty of death.

❖ The case was directly elevated to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the decision of the
17

trial court.The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the trial court and the appellate court.
❖ Despite grueling cross-examination by the defense suggesting extortion by the victim's father,
Alpha Jane remained steadfast and consistent that it was appellant who raped her. The victim's
testimony was supported by the medico-legal report of the medico-legal experts.
❖ Dr. Baluyut explained that in her findings, the terms hymenal transection at 5 oclock and
laceration at 5 oclock are synonymous. Dr. Baluyut further explained that there was prior injury
to the victim's hymen which might have been caused by the insertion of a blunt object such as an
erected penis which was compatible with the victim's claim that she had been raped.
Issue: What constitutes as the best evidence to prove the age of a person. (guidelines in appreciating age,
either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance)
Held:
22
In the case of People v. Pruna, the Court took note of conflicting pronouncements concerning the
appreciation of minority, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. There were a
number of cases where no birth certificate was presented where the Court ruled that the age of the victim
23
was not duly proved. On the other hand, there were also several cases where it was ruled that the age of
the rape victim was sufficiently established despite the failure of the prosecution to present the birth
24
certificate of the offended party to prove her age. Thus, in order to remove any confusion, we set
in Pruna the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate
and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a) If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;
b) If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 12 years old;
c) If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother
or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is
expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.78
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
25
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
To paraphrase Pruna, the best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth certificate or
certified true copy thereof; in their absence, similar authentic documents may be presented such as
baptismal certificates and school records. If the original or certified true copy of the birth certificate is not
available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the family may be sufficient under
certain circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or other authentic documents and the
testimonies of the victim's mother or other qualified relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim
may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
Unlike in Pruna, the trial court in this case made a categorical finding that Alpha Jane was only 6 years
old at the time she was raped, based not only on the testimonies of the complainant and her mother, but
also on the strength of the photocopy of Alpha Jane's birth certificate. It is well to note that the defense
did not object to the presentation of the birth certificate; on the contrary it admitted the same 'as to fact of
birth.
26
The Court is not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis that a mere photocopy of the birth certificate,
in the absence of any showing that the original copy was lost or destroyed, or was unavailable, without
the fault of the prosecution, does not prove the victim's minority, for said photocopy does not qualify as
competent evidence for that purpose.
However, there are other exceptions to the 'best evidence rule as expressly provided under Section 3, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. ' When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.[Emphasis supplied]
Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody of the local civil registrar who is
a public officer. Clearly, therefore, the presentation of the photocopy of the birth certificate of Alpha Jane
is admissible as secondary evidence to prove its contents. Production of the original may be dispensed
with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in the case at hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute
 27
the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
In the case at bar, the defense did not dispute the contents of the photocopied birth certificate; in fact it
admitted the same. Having failed to raise a valid and timely objection against the presentation of this
secondary evidence the same became a primary evidence, and deemed admitted and the other party is
28
bound thereby.
In fine, the prosecution sufficiently proved that Alpha Jane was only six-years-old, being born on
November 26, 1994, when the rape incident happened on August 7, 2001.
BAR Q
On August 10, 2001, Genaro Cayabyab was charged with rape. He was accused of raping Alpha Jane
who was six years and nine months old when the rape was committed. When arraigned, appellant
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi. The
trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It found the victim's testimony
consistent with the medical findings of the doctors. Moreover, it applied the rule that an unsubstantiated
defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over a positive and categorical testimony of a minor victim.
Finally, it appreciated the qualifying circumstance of minority and imposed the penalty of death. The
17
case was directly elevated to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of
the trial court and the appellate court.
➢ What constitutes as the best evidence to prove the age of a person.

26. Tan v. CA
G.R. No. L-56866 June 27, 1985
EDEN TAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PRINCIPLE: The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by and one who has
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination of the place or places where the documents or
papers of similar character are kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been
unable to find it. (Relate so Rule 130 Sec. 2 (a) and Sec. 4) ( Best evidence rule and Secondary Evidence)
Facts: Eden Tan arrived in Manila from Hong Kong, because of her suspicious behavior her baggage was
asked to be examined in which she refused. But the Chief customs agent assigned her an examiner and the
examiner found fancy jewelry hidden under the fruits they were also sewn to her bag and blanket. A case
was filed against her for violation of Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended.In their
defense the appellant testified that she accomplished a baggage declaration presented to her by the
stewardess aboard the plane; that she declared in her baggage declaration all the baggage including one
leather bag and bed cover, personal effects, synthetic stones, fancy jewelries, medicine, clothing and so
forth; that this baggage declaration was not presented as evidence in court and, instead the prosecution
just manifested in court that the baggage declaration could not be found; that the prosecution did not
prove first the loss of the baggage declaration before proving the contents thereof by secondary evidence
through the recollection of witnesses and that even admitting that the prosecution has proved the contents
to be such that appellant stated only "personal effect" in her baggage declaration still the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the conviction of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Did the court err in not asking for proof of the alleged lost document?
Did the court err in admitting secondary evidence due to the loss of the baggage declaration?
Ruling: The general rule concerning proof of a lost instrument is, that reasonable search shall be made for
it in the compliance where it was last known to have been, and if such search does not discover it. then
inquiry should be made of person most likely to have its custody(in the case the prosecutor since all the
documents were transferred to him), or who have some reasons to know of its whereabouts. No fixed rule
as to the necessary proof to establish loss, or what constitutes reasonable search, can be formulated. The
terms "reasonable search" and "in good faith," applied to proof of lost instruments, must be construed and
defined under the facts in each particular case; there is no inflexible definition under which they can be
applied to all cases. The sole object of each proof is, to raise a reasonable presumption, merely that the
instrument is lost. and this is a preliminary inquiry addressed to the discretion of the judge.
The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by and one who has made, in the
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination of the place or places where the documents or papers of
similar character are kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to
find it.
The loss of the baggage declaration having been duly established resort to secondary evidence, is
warranted under our rules of evidence.
Bar Question:
Xs baggage was inspected in NAIA objects violating the Tariffs and Customs code were found. X was
sued however the prosecution could not present the baggage declaration saying that it was lost. defense
now objects that proof must be shown that such baggage declaration and the testimonies given by the
witnesses of its existence should no be allowed.
is the objection of the defense proper?
27. Republic v Marcos-Manotoc
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Petitioner,

- versus

MA. IMELDA IMEE R. MARCOS-MANOTOC ​G. R. No. 171701

PRINCIPLE:
In order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be proof by satisfactory evidence of (1)
due execution of the original; (2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3)
reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original. None of the
abovementioned requirements were complied by the plaintiff. It is emphasized, even if originals of these
affidavits were presented, they would still be considered hearsay evidence if the affiants do not testify and
identify them.
FACTS:
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, the first executive act of then President Corazon C.
Aquino was to create the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Pursuant to Executive
Order No. 1, the PCGG was tasked to assist the president to recover all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.
PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint
for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who
was later substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents Imee
Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.
Amended Complaints were thereafter filed imputingactive participation and collaboration of another
persons, viz. Nemesio G. Co and Yeungs (Kam, Ho and Fan) of Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing
Corporation Phils.; and, Imelda Cojuangco for the estate of Ramon Cojuangco and Prime Holdings, in the
alleged illegal activities and undertakings of the Marcoses in relation to the ₱200 Billion Pesos ill-gotten
wealth allegation.
Petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents. However, the latter
objected on the ground that the documents were unauthenticated and mere photocopies.
On 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a RESOLUTION ADMITTING all the documentary exhibits
formally offered by the prosecution; however, their evidentiary value was left to the determination of the
Court.
Subsequently, Imelda R. Marcos, Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.; Irene Marcos-
Araneta and Gregorio Ma. Araneta III;Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan; and the
PEA-PTGWO filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence.
On 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, granting all the demurrers to evidence except the one
filed by Imelda R. Marcos. The sequestration orders on the properties in the name of Gregorio Maria
AranetaIII are accordingly lifted.
With regard to Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr., Irene Marcos and Gregorio Araneta III,
the court noted that their involvement in the alleged illegal activities was never established; neither did
the documentary evidence pinpoint their involvement therein. The court held that all presented evidence
are hearsay, for being merely photocopies and that the originals were not presented in court, nor were they
authenticated by the persons who executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed out that petitioner failed
to provide any valid reason why it did not present the originals in court. These exhibits were supposed to
show the interests of Imee Marcos-Manotoc in the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all three
of which she had allegedly acquired illegally, her alleged participation in dollar salting through De Soleil
Apparel and to prove how the Marcoses used the Potencianos as dummies in acquiring and operating the
bus company PANTRANCO.

Meanwhile, as far as the YEUNGS were concerned, the court found the allegations against them baseless.
Petitioner failed to demonstrate howGlorious Sunwas used as a vehicle for dollar salting; or to show that
they were dummies of the Marcoses. Again, the court held that the documentary evidence relevant to this
allegation was INADMISSIBLE for being mere photocopies, and that the affiants had not been presented
as witnesses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the demurrers filed by the respondents?
RULING:
NO.
It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations; the operative act on how and in what manner must be
clearly shown through preponderance of evidence.
The petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents themselves. It
is imperative; therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove petitioner’s allegations. Thus,
the photocopied documents are in violation of best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must
be the original document itself. Furthermore, petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason
why the originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the court such documents as
secondary evidence absent the affiant’s testimony.
The presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is not validly excepted under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. Under Section 3 (d), when ‘the original document is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office,’ the original thereof need not be presented. However, all
except one of the exhibits are not necessarily public documents. The transcript of stenographic notes
(TSN) of the proceedings purportedly before the PCGG may be a public document but what the plaintiff
presented was a mere photocopy of the purported TSN which was not a certified copy and was not even
signed by the stenographer who supposedly took down the proceedings. The Rules provide that when the
original document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office; a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof may prove its contents.

In order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be proof by satisfactory evidence of (1)
due execution of the original; (2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3)
reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original. None of the
abovementioned requirements were complied by the plaintiff. It is emphasized, even if originals of these
affidavits were presented, they would still be considered hearsay evidence if the affiants do not testify and
identify them.
Petitioner having failed to observe the best evidence rule rendered the offered documentary evidence
futile and worthless in alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar as the specific allegations herein
were concerned.
Hence, Sandiganbayan is correct in granting the respondents respective Demurers to evidence.

28. BPI v. Fidelity and Surety Co

CASE 28: BPI v. Fidelity and Surety Co
Principle
Parol Evidence Rule – A written agreement is presumed to contain all the terms of the agreement. But
evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing are admissible where a
mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties,
is put in issue by the pleadings. Mistake must be shown by proof of the clearest and most satisfactory
character constituting more than a preponderance of the evidence.
FACTS: Laguna Oil Co executed a promissory note in favor of Philippine Vegetable Oil Co. A later
annotation of the note made by respondent Fidelity and Surety Co. declared that “for value, received”
Fidelity obligated itself “”to hold the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. harmless against loss for having discounted
the foregoing note at the value stated therein”.
Phil. Vegetable Oil endorsed the note in blank and delivered it to BPI which paid the amount of the note.
BPI demanded payment after the note matured from Laguna Oil Co but the company was insolvent.
Fidelity refused to pay, denying its liability to BPI for discounting the note since the note refers to Laguna
Oil Co and not any other person or entity.

BPI filed a case for reformation of instrument on the ground of mistake and it offered the promissory note
as evidence to demonstrate that an error had been committed when reference was made to the Laguna
Coconut Oil Co. in the indorsement of guaranty on the note instead of the person or entity discounting the
note.
The trial court admitted the evidence and ruled that the note could not have been discounted by the
Laguna Coconut Oil Co., and that this must logically have been done by the Bank of the Philippine
Islands.
ISSUE: Whether the promissory note is admissible to prove that the indorsement of guaranty annotated
therein did not refer to Laguna Oil but to the entity discounting the note such as BPI
HELD: NO.
A written agreement is presumed to contain all the terms of the agreement. But evidence of the terms of
the agreement other than the contents of the writing are admissible where a mistake or imperfection of the
writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, is put in issue by the
pleadings.
In this case, the plaintiff has filed three distinct and conflicting complaints. The first case was dismissed
by the trial court for insufficiency of evidence but remanded by the Court for further proceedings. On the
return of the case to the lower court, the judgment was against Fidelity but was reversed and the case
dismissed on appeal. The present case is now one for reformation of instrument on the ground of mistake.
To justify the reformation of a written instrument upon the ground of mistake, the concurrence of three
things are necessary: First, that the mistake should be of a fact; second, that the mistake should be proved
by clear and convincing evidence; and, third, that the mistake should be common to both parties to the
instrument.
In the various pleadings filed by plaintiff, it has not remained loyal to any one theory of the case. For
instance, it has alleged at various times that the guaranty of the defendant was in favor of the Laguna
Coconut Oil Co., and that the guaranty was in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands; that the note
was discounted by the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company and that the note was discounted by the Bank of
the Philippine Islands; that there was no mutual mistake and that there was mutual mistake.
With all the various pleadings, all the various incidents, all the various facts, all the various legal
principles, and all the various possibilities to the forefront, the conclusion is that the plaintiff, by , has
failed to establish a mutual mistake.
BAR QUESTION FORMAT
FACTS: In a case for reformation of instrument, the Bank of the Phil. Islands offered as evidence a
promissory note executed by Laguna Oil in favor of Phil. Vegetable Oil with a note signed by Fidelity and
Surety Co. obligating itself to hold harmless Laguna Oil for any loss incurred for discounting the note.
BPI sought reformation of the instrument on the ground of mistake by Fidelity in referring to Laguna Oil.
BPI contends that the guaranty was for the protection of the person or entity discounting the note and not
for Laguna Oil. Is the promissory note admissible to prove BPI’s contention?
HELD: NO. A written agreement is presumed to contain all the terms of the agreement. But evidence of
the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing are admissible where a mistake or
imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, is put in
issue by the pleadings. Mistake must be shown by proof of the clearest and most satisfactory character
constituting more than a preponderance of the evidence.

29. Lechugas v CA
PRINCIPLE: As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court, the parol evidence rule
does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where
at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question
and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation
established thereby. (Francisco on Evidence, Vol. VII, part I of the Rules of Court, p. 155 citing 32 C.J.S.
79.).

FACTS:
Victoria Lechugas (petitioner) bought a land from a certain Leoncia Lasangue. After the purchase of the
land, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Leoncia Lasangue in her favor specified a certain land Lot
No. 5456 stated in the contract. When the defendants (respondents) occupied Lot No. 5456, petitioner
filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages (ejectment case) against the defendants but it was
dismissed. Petitioner appealed the case to the CFI (now RTC) of Iloilo.
While the appeal for the ejectment case was pending, petitioner filed another case in the RTC for the
recovery of possession against the same defendants involving the same Lot No. 5456. During the trial,
the defendants presented their star witness in the person of Leoncia Lasangue herself.
Leoncia Lasangue testified during the trial. That according to her, the lot that she sold to the petitioner
was not Lot No. 5456 but another lot, Lot 5522. Lasangue did not know how to read and write, so the
document of sale was prepared by the petitioner, thereafter, the former was made to sign it. Based on her
testimony, the lot indicated in the Deed of Sale which she sold to petitioner was erroneous. It was clear
that she did not intend to sell a piece of land already sold by her father to the predecessor-in-interest of the
defendants (respondents). This was objected by the petitioner under the Parole Evidence Rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Parole Evidence Rule apply in this case
HELD:
No. The Parole Evidence Rule will not apply in this case because it is Leoncia Lasangue who is one of the
parties to the subject Deed of Sale not the defendants. The defendants in the case were not parties to the
Deed of Sale executed between Leoncia Lasange and petitioner Lechugas.
The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the
controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale was
executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is
between petitioner and the private respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia
Lasangue, it was shown that what she really intended to sell and to be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot
No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the
petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her was the document
evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot instead.

Bar Q: X bought a land from Y. After the purchase of the land, a Deed of Sale was executed. The Deed
of Sale specified Lot No. 5456 as the subject of the contract. When Z occupied Lot No. 5456, X filed an
ejectment suit against Z, thereafter filed a petition for the recovery of possession against the same
defendants and the same disputed lot. Defendants Z took Y to testify before the trial court. Based on Y’s
testimony, the lot indicated in the Deed of Sale which she sold to X was erroneous and not the lot she
intended to sell. X objected on the ground of the Parole Evidence Rule. Rule on the objection.
(1000points)

30 Salimbangon v Tan

CASE NO. 30
SALIMBANGON VS. SPOUSES TAN

PRINCIPLE: The exclusionary provision enumerated in Section 9 of Rule 130 or the parol evidence rule
admits of exceptions. The Tans had put in issue the true intent and agreement of the parties to the partition
when they alleged in their complaint that, contrary to what paragraph 2 quoted above seems to imply, the
easement was actually for the benefit of Lots D and E only. Hence, the Tans were entitled to introduce
evidence to establish the true intent and agreement of the parties although this may depart from what the
partition agreement literally provided.

FACTS:

Guillermo Ceniza died intestate on July 11, 1951, leaving a parcel of land at
Poblacion, Mandaue City. Twenty years later on July 17, 1973 his children Benedicta, Guillermo, Jr.,
Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition, adjudicating
and dividing the land among themselves . Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street. But Lots D and
E were not. To give these interior lots access to the street, the heirs established in their extrajudicial
partition an easement of right of way consisting of a 3-meter wide alley between Lots D and E that
continued on between Lots A and B and on to the street which was then embodied in the individual titles
issued to the heirs. The partition resulted in an unequal division of the property so the heirs modified their
agreement by eliminating the easement of right of way along Lots A, D, and E, and instead, imposed a 3-
meter wide alley that ran exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the
street. Victoria later swapped lots with Benedicta with the result that Victoria became the owner of Lot A
and there she built a residential house and two garages, one abutted the street while the other used the
easement of right of way of lot B.
Respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought Lots B, C, D, and E from all their
owners. The Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement area. They also closed the
gate that the Salimbangons built. Unable to use the old right of way, the Salimbangons lodged a complaint
with the City Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans. For their part, the Tans filed an action with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue against the Salimbangons in Civil Case MAN-3223 for the
extinguishment of the easement on Lot B and damages with application for preliminary injunction. The
Salimbangons filed their answer with counterclaims.

After hearing or on February 9, 2001 the RTC rendered judgment, upholding the Salimbangons easement
of right of way over the alley on Lot B, the lot that belonged to the Tans.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the RTC decision. This prompted
them to file the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in admitting in evidence contrary to the parol evidence rule Eduardo Cenizas
testimony respecting the true intent of the heirs in establishing the easement of right of way as against
what they stated in their written agreement.

RULING:

The Salimbangons point out that the CA ought to have rejected Eduardo Cenizas testimony that the heirs
had intended to establish the easement of right of way solely for the benefit of the interior Lots D and E
which had no access to the city street. The partition agreement also made Lot A, now owned by the
Salimbangons, a beneficiary of that easement.

The parol evidence rule, said the Salimbangons, precluded the parties from introducing testimony that
tended to alter or modify what the parties had agreed on above.

But the exclusionary provision of the parol evidence rule admits of exceptions. Section 9, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence states:

Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
The term agreement includes wills. (7a)

Here, the Tans had put in issue the true intent and agreement of the parties to the partition when they
alleged in their complaint that, contrary to what paragraph 2 quoted above seems to imply, the easement
was actually for the benefit of Lots D and E only. Consequently, with the above averment, the Tans were
entitled to introduce evidence to establish the true intent and agreement of the parties although this may
depart from what the partition agreement literally provided.

At any rate, as the CA said, the Salimbangons did not object at the hearing to admission of Eduardo
Cenizas testimony even when this seemed at variance, as far as they were concerned, with the partition
agreement among the heirs. Consequently, the Salimbangons may also be deemed to have waived their
right to now question such testimony on appeal.

SHORT DIGEST:

GC died intestate on July 11, 1951, leaving a parcel of land. Twenty years later, his children BC, GC,Jr.,
VS, EC, and CC executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition, adjudicating and dividing the
land among themselves . Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street but Lots D and E were not. The
heirs established in their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way which was then embodied in
the individual titles issued to the heirs. The partition resulted in an unequal division of the property so the
heirs modified their agreement by eliminating the easement of right of way and instead, imposed a 3-
meter wide alley that ran exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the
street. VS later swapped lots with BC with the result that VS became the owner of Lot A and there she
built a residential house and two garages, one abutted the street while the other used the easement of right
of way of lot B.
Respondent spouses ST and ET bought Lots B, C, D, and E from all their owners. They built
improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement area. Unable to use the old right of way, VS lodged
a complaint with the City Engineer. The Ts filed an action in the RTC for the extinguishment of the
easement on Lot B and damages with application for preliminary injunction which ruled in favor of VS.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the RTC decision. This prompted
them to file the present petition.

31. Sps Lequin v Sps Vizconde

[G.R. NO. 177710 : OCTOBER 12, 2009]
SPS. RAMON LEQUIN AND VIRGINIA LEQUIN V. SPS. RAYMUNDO VIZCONDE AND
SALOME LEQUIN VIZCONDE
Principle:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading… (b) The failure of
the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto.
SHORT DIGEST:
FACTS:
Petitioners bought the entire subject property consisting of 10,115 square meters from Carlito de Leon.
The title of the subject property was duly transferred to petitioners' names. Respondents, on the other
hand, bought the dried up canal (adjacent to the subject property) consisting of 1,012 square meters from
de Leon.. As later confirmed by de Leon, however, the 1,012-square meter lot claimed by respondents is
part of the 10,115-square meter lot petitioners bought from him.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Sum of Money and Damages against
respondents for the declaration of the Kasulatan as null and void ab initio. CA, without going into details,
ruled that the contract of sale was not simulated, as it was duly notarized, and it clearly showed petitioners
as sellers, and respondents as buyers, of the 512-square meter lot, subject matter of the sale. Petitioners
alleged that the Kasulatan did not express the true intent of the parties, hence parol evidence shall apply.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acceptance of parol evidence applies to the instant case.
RULING:
Yes. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to
modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading… (b) The
failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto.
LONG DIGEST:
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon Lequin, husband of petitioner Virginia Lequin, is the brother of respondent Salome L.
Vizconde and brother-in-law of respondent Raymundo Vizconde. With this consanguine and affinity
relation, the instant case developed as follows:
In 1995, petitioners, residents of Diamond Court, Brixton Ville Subdivision, Camarin, Caloocan City,
bought the subject lot consisting of 10,115 square meters from one Carlito de Leon (de Leon). The sale
was negotiated by respondent Raymundo Vizconde. The subject lot is located near the Sto. Rosario to
Magsaysay road in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija. Adjacent thereto and located in between the subject lot and the
road is a dried up canal (or sapang patay in the native language).

In 1997, respondents represented to petitioners that they had also bought from Carlito de Leon a 1,012-
square meter lot adjacent to petitioners' property and built a house thereon. As later confirmed by de
Leon, however, the 1,012-square meter lot claimed by respondents is part of the 10,115-square meter lot
petitioners bought from him. Petitioners believed the story of respondents, since it was Raymundo who
negotiated the sale of their lot with de Leon. With the consent of respondents, petitioners then constructed
their house on the 500-square meter half-portion of the 1,012 square-meter lot claimed by respondents, as
this was near the road. Respondents' residence is on the remaining 512 square meters of the lot.
Given this situation, a lawyer advised petitioners that the 1,012-square meter lot be segregated from the
subject lot whose title they own and to make it appear that they are selling to respondents 512 square
meters thereof. This sale was embodied in the February 12, 2000 Kasulatan where it was made to appear
that respondents paid PhP 15,000 for the purchase of the 512-square meter portion of the subject lot. In
reality, the consideration of PhP 15,000 was not paid to petitioners. Actually, it was petitioners who paid
respondents PhP 50,000 for the 500-square meter portion where petitioners built their house on, believing
respondents' representation that the latter own the 1,012-square meter lot. In July 2000, petitioners tried to
develop the dried up canal located between their 500-square meter lot and the public road. Respondents
objected, claiming ownership of said dried up canal or sapang patay.
This prompted petitioners to look into the ownership of the dried up canal and the 1,012 square-meter lot
claimed by respondents. Carlito de Leon told petitioners that what he had sold to respondents was the
dried up canal or sapang patay and that the 1,012-square meter lot claimed by respondents really belongs
to petitioners.
Thus, on July 13, 2001, petitioners filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Sum of
Money and Damages against respondents with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28 in Cabanatuan
City, praying, among others, for the declaration of the February 12, 2000 Kasulatan as null and void ab
initio, the return of PhP 50,000 they paid to respondents, and various damages.
RTC AND CA:
The trial court found, inter alia, lack of consideration in the contract of sale while the appellate court, in
reversing the decision of the trial court, merely ruled that the contract of sale is not simulated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acceptance of parol evidence applies to the instant case.
RULING:
Yes. Parol evidence applies to the instant case The CA misappreciated the evidence duly adduced during
the trial on the merits.
The appellate court's finding that there was no fraud or fraudulent machinations employed by respondents
on petitioners is bereft of factual evidentiary support. We sustain petitioners' contention that respondents
employed fraud and machinations to induce them to enter into the contract of sale. As such, the CA's
finding of fact must give way to the finding of the trial court that the Kasulatan has to be annulled for
vitiated consent.
The affidavit or Sinumpaang Salaysay of de Leon attests to the foregoing facts. Moreover, de Leon's
testimony in court confirmed and established such facts. These were neither controverted nor assailed by
respondents who did not present any countervailing evidence. On its face, the contract of sale appears to
be supported by a valuable consideration. We, however, agree with the trial court's finding that this is a
simulated sale and unsupported by any consideration, for respondents never paid the PhP 15,000
purported purchase price.
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence gives both the general rule and exception as
regards written agreements, thus:
SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it
is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
The second exception provided for the acceptance of parol evidence applies to the instant case. Lack of
consideration was proved by petitioners' evidence aliunde showing that the Kasulatan did not express the
true intent and agreement of the parties. As explained above, said sale contract was fraudulently entered
into through the misrepresentations of respondents causing petitioners' vitiated consent.
Moreover, the evidence of petitioners was uncontroverted as respondents failed to adduce any proof that
they indeed paid PhP 15,000 to petitioners. Indeed, having asserted their purchase of the 512-square meter
portion of petitioners based on the Kasulatan, it behooves upon respondents to prove such affirmative
defense of purchase. Unless the party asserting the affirmative defense of an issue sustains the burden of
proof, his or her cause will not succeed. If he or she fails to establish the facts of which the matter
asserted is predicated, the complainant is entitled to a verdict or decision in his or her favor.16
In the instant case, the record is bereft of any proof of payment by respondents and, thus, their affirmative
defense of the purported purchase of the 512-square meter portion fails.

ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS

47. People v Reyes
Admissions and Confessions
People vs Reyes
Principle:
The evidence applicable in this case is about Admissions and Confessions of a party. Sec. 26 of Rule 130
of the Rules of court provides:
“The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given against him.”
As to the Ruling in this case, the Court held “Enough, however, may be gathered from his testimony in
open court to identify Gatchalian as one of the assailants, the conversation he overheard in the rice field
being admissible as an admission and as part of the res gestæ.”
Facts:
This is case of murder and physical injury. The victims in this case who were murdered were members of
Military Police, namely, Benjamin Nery and Alfredo Laguitan. The victim for the physical injury is
Francisco Orsino, also a member of Military Police (MPs).
The accused are:
Eusebio Perez (which case was dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence against him)
Pedro Reyes (who later on was discharged because he was used as prosecution witness)
Gervasio Due alias Oliveros (remained at large)
Marcelo Due alias Pipit (remained at large)
Vicente Gatchalian alias Magallanes (herein appellant)
Maximino Austria alias Severino Austria alias Big Boy (herein appellant)
The transcript of the testimony taken before the Pampanga judge and the documentary evidence in
connection therewith are all before us, and the Court, after examining the same, has voted to affirm the
verdict of guilt of appellants Austria and Gatchalian, because from the evidence it appears beyond
reasonable doubt that:
In the night of Good Friday of 1946 (April 19) while religious celebrations were in full swing in the
barrio of Cacutud, Arayat, Pampanga and the "pabasa" was being performed (reading and singing of the
story of the Crucifixion) the herein appellants assisted by Marcelo Due alias Pipit, Gervasio Due alias
Oliveros and one Peping, all armed with pistols, approached three members of the military police,
Philippine Army, i. e. privated Benjamin Nery, Alfredo Laguitan and Francisco Orsino — hereafter to be
designated MP's for short — who were peacebly seated, entirely unarmed, in a store watching the affair.
At the point of their guns they drove the latter to the road leading to Magalan and at a short distance
(about ten meters from the "pabasa" or "cenaculo") shot them from the back and left them lying on the
ground.

The attackers were Huks, and the motive of the killing was obviously the enmity existing between the
outlaw organization and the forces of peace and order.

Nery and Laguitan died as a result of the shooting. Private Orsino suffered serious injuries. His leg, shot
and fractured, need about six months to heal.
Pedro Reyes turned state evidence, but he did not confirm every statement he had previously made at the
fiscal's investigation. He testified, however, that at about seven o'clock that night he saw, among the
people gathered at the "pabasa," "Pipit" (Marcelo Due) Piping, Gervasio Due alias Oliveros, Vicente
Gatchalian and Maximino Austria alias Big Boy; that Pipit and Piping (Felipe Sese) called him and told
him that Oliveros wanted to talk with him; that talking with Oliveros he was invited by the latter to speak
to the MP's (the members of the military police, Nery, Laguitan and Orsino); that he refused; that
thereafter he heard several detonations; that he ran to the rice field and there he met Oliveros (Gervasio
Due) and Gatchalian talking, the former declaring he was sure the MP he had shot will die and Gatchalian
making the same assurance as to the MP he (Gatchalian) had shot in turn. Reyes had previously told the
authorities in his affidavit Exhibit A, in addition to what he related in court, that Oliveros, Magallanes and
Big Boy had approached the three MP's and lined them up on the road, after which shots were heard.
Enough, however, may be gathered from his testimony in open court to identify Gatchalian as one of
the assailants, the conversation he overheard in the rice field being admissibile as an admission and as
part of the res gestæ. (U. S. vs. Remigio, 37 Phil., 599; People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985; People vs.
Durante, 53 Phil., 363.)
In relation to the evidence presented in this case, among the evidence presented were the alleged
admissions or confessions of Gatchalian and Austria. Thus:
Lieutenant Fidel Martinez and Secundino Quintas declared under oath that Vicente Gatchalian admitted
before the latter, while under investigation, that he had shot one of the MPs who died later. Gatchalian
even showed how he had fired at the MP from the back, posing for a picture (Exhibit H).
Lieutenant Quintans likewise asserted that Severino Austria had voluntarily signed the confession Exhibit
E wherein said Austria made the following statements:

"Q. ​What did you do on that same night?

A. ​
While we were at the back of the `Cenaculo', OLIVEROS ordered PEPIT and FELIPE SESE to
see if there are any MP soldiers in the vicinity of the `Cenaculo'. PEPIT and FELIPE SESE did as ordered
and came with the information that there are three MP soldiers in one of the stores near the `Cenaculo'.

"Q. What did you do when you were informed thus?

A. BASIBAS, MAGALLANES, BATUIN, OLIVEROS, and I went to the place where the MP soldiers
were and I myself talked with one of the said soldiers, and I asked him to stand and come with me where
we could talk together, but he refused, so I drew my pistol and forced him to come with me. OLIVEROS
held one of the soldiers, Magallanes held the other and forced them to come with us.
"Q. Why and where were you taking the MP soldiers?
A. To talk with them in front of the house of SEGUNDO GUEVARRA.
"Q. What happened when you took the soldiers?
A. While we were walking about 10 meters from the `Cenaculo', the soldier who was with me tried to
grab the pistol that I was holding with my right hand. Suddenly I heard about 4 shots from behind, so I
also fired at the soldier who was with me."
The picture of Austria reenacting the crime in Exhibit G.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented (the admission and confession made by Gatchalian and Autria) are
admissible.
Ruling:
Yes. The evidence offered was not objected to.
We are thus satisfied from the foregoing of the guilty participation of the appellants in this gruesome
business. Their defense of alibi is weak and untenable. The Solicitor General's brief substantially proves
conspiracy between them and their other co- accused who are still at large. There are three offenses: two
murders and one serious physical injuries, for which all the accused must do penance irrespective of the
actual deed of each.
Wherefore, the penalty imposed on the appellants being in accordance with law, it is hereby affirmed,
with costs.
BUT it is the Dissenting opinion of Justice Perfecto provides:
The testimonies of Fidel Martinez and Segundino S. Quintans as to the supposed oral admission of
Vicente Gatchalian and the written statement Exhibit E signed by Severino Austria, are completely
valueless because of the uncontradicted testimonies of the two appellants to the effect that they were
maltreated, tortured and threatened to be killed. To make the intimidation more effective, three shovels
were supplied at hand for the digging of the graves intended for the appellants. Neither Martinez nor
Quintans ever dared to testify again to rebut the declarations, of Gatchalian and Austria as to the
intimidation and third degree to which they had been subjected and in relation with which they had shown
visible and tangible marks on their bodies, such as the black spots and scars which they exhibited at the
trial. Sgt. Macasaquet was singled out by appellants as one of those who inflicted the maltreatments and
torture, and yet the prosecution dared not to call Sgt. Macasaquet to the witness stand to deny the
declarations of the two appellants.

48. People v Yatco

PEOPLE v. YATCO
(This is a 1955 case, so I assume that the old rules of court is still in force at the time of the decision)
PRINCIPLES:
1. SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his
guilt as to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.
2. There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to
admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead
to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People
can no longer appeal.
FACTS:
In an amended information filed by the City Attorney, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another
whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of one Jose
Ramos. Hearing started and several witnesses were presented.
In the meantime, Juan allegedly made an extra judicial confession to one of the witnesses (which will be
presented later on) before a certain Atty. Arturo Xavier of the NBI.
While the prosecution presented one of its witnesses, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban
interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and
therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban.
The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground:
that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and
Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a
number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances.
ISSUE:
WON it is correct for the court to exclude the confession made by a defendant to prove conspiracy
between them without prior proof of such consipiracy.
HELD:
NO. It is not correct.
The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule
123, providing that:
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this
case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. vs.
Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718; People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985).

Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix
Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817:
In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously
administered in the courts where trial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor.
The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the
form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first
instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether
testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney
offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the
attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat
of the battle over which the presides, a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the
relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and
the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and
possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, — a step
which this Court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first
instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much
harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is duty, upon final
consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If
this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this Court then has
all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility
of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.

49. US v Bay
#49 US vs. BAY
G.R. No. L-9341 August 14, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SERVANDO BAY, defendant-appellant.
On the night of June 7 of the present year, 1913, in the barrio of San Teodoro of the township of Calapan,
Mindoro, Servando Bay accidentally met Florentina Alcones walking along the beach, and, on finding
that she was alone, did maliciously and criminally drag her toward a place covered with underbrush, and
there by means of force and intimidation did lie with her against her will.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is substantially as follows: That the complaining
witness and the accused are neighbors: that about 7 o'clock in the evening of June 7, 1913, when turning
from her rice field she was joined by the accused, and that a short distance from the mouth of Subaan
River he caught hold of her, picked her up, and carried her to the edge of some thickets, where he threw
her on the ground and attempted to have carnal intercourse with her; that angered by her resistance he
drew his dagger, and force her under threat of her life to accede to his desires; that a party who were
passing near the place where the crime was committed heard her cries, and put into shore; that one of the
party stepped ashore, and seeing the accused get up from the place where the woman claims the crime
was committed. That the accused made no explanation of his conduct or his presence there, and left the
place forthwith; that immediately thereafter the woman, accompanied by some of the party from the boat,
went to the councilman of the barrio and made complaint; that the accused, having been brought before
the councilman and asked had he committed the crime of which he was charged, admitted that he had;
that thereafter the accused was sent to the justice of the peace, who held him for trial.
Upon his evidence the accused was convicted in the RTC.
On appeal, the defense contends that the victim appears to be much more than twice the age of the
accused, and anything but attractive in her personal appearance . His contention is that the charge of rape
is a pure fabrication, and that it was brought by the woman for the sole purpose of wreaking her
vengeance and spite upon the accused, with whom she had a quarrel over the trespass of one of his
carabaos on her land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in accepting as true the testimony of the complaining witness and of
the witnesses called by the prosecution to corroborate her.
RULING:
SC found no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the substantials rights of the accused, and the
judgment entered in the court below convicting and sentencing him.
Her evidence, supported by that of other witnesses for the prosecution, is so convincing and conclusive
that we are forced to believe that he did it in fact commit the atrocious crime with which he is charged.
There can be no possible doubt that he was present when the party on board the boat were attracted to the
place where she raised her outcry charging him with the assault, and that he was present later or when he
presented her complaint to the councilman of the barrio. Under such circumstances, we are convinced that
an innocent man would instantly and indignantly repudiate such a charge, and attempt there and then to
establish his innocence, explaining how he came to be there present with the woman, and the conditions
under which she had made the false charge.
The witnesses called both for the prosecution and the defense go into considerable detail as to all that
occurred at the time when the party on board the boat responded to the calls of the woman and
immediately thereafter, and yet there is not the slightest indication in the evidence that there was on the
part of the accused any such indignant denials and protests as would be expected from an innocent man
suddenly confronted with such a charge under such circumstances. Indeed his conduct at that time was, to
our minds, wholly at variance with that which might fairly be expected from him, granting the truth of his
testimony and that of the other witnesses for the defense.
Having in mind the fact that the trial judge saw and heard the witness testify, and upon a full review of all
the evidence, we are of opinion that there is nothing in the record which would justify us in disturbing the
findings of the court below as to the degree of credit which should be accorded the various witnesses, or
as to the guilt of the accused of the crime of which he was convicted.

50. Datoon v Judge Kapilig

50 DATOON vs. JUDGE KAPILIG
Principle:
The presumption is that no person would declare anything against himself unless such declaration were
truth.
Facts:
Before this Court is a verified Complaint1 filed on March 17, 2009, by complainant Jocelyn Datoon
(Datoon) charging respondent Judge Bethany G. Kapili (Judge Kapili), Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court Branch 24, Maasin City (RTC), with Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the Judiciary, and Gross
Misconduct amounting to Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, relative to an incident which occured
at the Salvacion Oppus Yñiguez Memorial Hospital (SOYMH) in Maasin City, Southern Leyte.
Datoon averred that on December 11, 2008, at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, she was in the labor
room of SOYMH waiting to give birth. She was accompanied by her father, Jose Gagan (Gagan).
Suddenly, they were disturbed by the appearance of Judge Kapili who appeared to her to be drunk as his
face was reddish and his eyes were sleepy. She noticed a gun at his waist over his tucked-in t-shirt and she
became nervous. Judge Kapili entered the labor room calling "Lor, Lor," looking for his wife, Dr. Lorna
Kapili (Dr. Kapili), a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist. Not seeing his wife around, Judge Kapili left
and entered the delivery room, but returned to the labor room a few minutes later. Datoon was crying, as
she was already having labor pains at the time. Judge Kapili then pointed his gun at her and asked
"What’s your problem?" This caused her to start crying hysterically while saying "Please don’t sir, have
pity." At this time, she was lying in bed while Judge Kapili was standing at the left side of the bed near
her head. At that moment, a woman entered the room and informed Judge Kapili of the whereabouts of
Dr. Kapili, after which he left. Datoon claimed that because of this incident, she was unable to go through
normal delivery of her baby and had to undergo caesarian operation instead.
Judge Kapili argues that this is a form of extorsion and in fact the father of Datoon said that they will not
dismiss the case unless they are paid P150,000. Respondent introduced witnesses, Both Judge Paler-
Gonzales and Hernandez testified that Datoon admitted to them that she signed the Complaint and
Affidavit without meeting the lawyers who prepared the same. Hernandez further bared that Datoon
admitted to him that Judge Kapili never pointed a gun at her. On her part, Judge Paler-Gonzales testified
that Datoon admitted that she was not sure if the contents of her Complaint and Affidavit were true
because she was inpain at the time of the incident.
ISSUE:
Whethr or not admissions of a party may be given in evidence against him or her?
RULING:
Yes,Datoon failed to address these accusations as she was not presented for rebuttal. Section 26, Rule 130
of the Rules of Evidence provides that admissions of a party may be given in evidence against him or her.
Datoon’s admission against her interest, as narrated by two credible and neutral witnesses, militates
against the credibility of her charges. The presumption is that no person would declare anything against
himself unless such declaration were true.
BAR EXAM QUESTION
X files a case against Z for conduct unbecoming of the judge. X puts in her affidavit that on December 11,
2008, at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, she was in the labor room of SOYMH waiting to give birth.
Z entered the room drunk and pointed a gun at her which resulted to a caesarian operation. However, Z
presented witnesses that X admitted to them that she signed the Complaint and Affidavit without meeting
the lawyers who prepared the same. they further bared that X admitted to him that Z never pointed a gun
at her. X also admitted that she was not sure if the contents of her Complaint and Affidavit were true
because she was inpain at the time of the incident.
Can admissions of a party may be given in evidence against him?

51. Heirs of Clemena v Heirs of Bien

CASE NO. 51: HEIRS OF PEDRO CLEMEA Y ZURBANO,Petitioners,vs. HEIRS OF IRENE B.
BIEN,Respondents.
PRINCIPLES:

​
A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter contradict it.
The exception is found only in those rare instances when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion
and because of strong reasons to support its stand, may relieve a party from the consequences of his
admission. (Jovito Salonga, Philippine Law of Evidence 121 [1958 ed.], Reginal Publishing Company)

​The acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown
that the admission was made through palpable mistake. (Irlanda v. Pitargue 22 Phil. 383 [1912])

​
A party's testimony in court sworn to and subject to cross-examination by the other party is not
susceptible to an objection on the ground that it is self-serving. Interest alone is not a ground for
disregarding a party's testimony (National Development Company v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission 126 Phil. 226 [1967])
BAR EXAM QUESTION:

​Irene B. Bien is the absolute owner of a riceland described in Tax Declaration (TD) No. 5299, in
Bolo, Albay--one of the lots involved in two consolidated cases for recovery of possession and ownership
filed through her Attorney-in-fact Gregorio Clemea, from Pedro Clemea y Zurbano, the administrator of
the said riceland, who deliberately continued to occupy and usurp the possession and use and has ever
since refused to relinquish the possession of the same to the lawful owner thereof notwithstanding the fact
that he has no right or any color of title over the said land. By reason of this unlawful occupation and
usurpation by Pedro Clemea y Zurbano, Irene B. Bien will suffer damages and in fact suffered damages at
the rate of 50 cavans of palay yearly. In his answer, Pedro Clemea y Zurbano alleged that the land was
his and that it was in his exclusive possession. Neither Bien nor Zurbano lived to see the end of the trial.
They were substituted by their respective heirs. The heirs of Zurbano insist that they cannot be held liable
to the heirs of Bien for the harvest on the following grounds: (1) The heirs of Zurbano never took
possession of the property declared in TD No. 5299 and (2) The evidence, the testimony in court of the
Attorney-in-fact Gregorio Clemea, relied upon by the appelate court to determine the amount of damages,
proceeding as it did from one of the plaintiffs, was self-serving and therefore could not have been a
proper basis for such an award.
ISSUES:
Was the contention of the heirs of Zurbano that they never took possession of the land in issue tenable?
Was the testimonial evidence of the Attorney-in-fact Gregorio Clemea self-serving and therefore could
not have been a proper basis for an award of damages?
ANSWERS:
No, their contention that they never took possession of the land was untenable.
No, the testimonial evidence of the Attorney-in-fact Gregorio Clemea was not self-serving and could be
a proper basis for an award of damages.
RULING:

​
1. The predecessor Pedro Clemea y Zurbano alleged in his answer that the land declared in
TD 5299 was in his exclusive possession. That statement, insofar as it confirmed the allegation in the
complaint that petitioners' predecessor had retained possession of the land in question, took on the
character of a judicial admission contemplated in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.

​
A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter contradict it.
The exception is found only in those rare instances when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion
and because of strong reasons to support its stand, may relieve a party from the consequences of his
admission. (Jovito Salonga, Philippine Law of Evidence 121 [1958 ed.], Reginal Publishing Company)

​The acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown
that the admission was made through palpable mistake. (Irlanda v. Pitargue 22 Phil. 383 [1912]). The rule
was more forcibly stated by Mr. Justice Street in the 1918 decision Ramirez v. Orientalist Co. 38 Phil. 634
[1918]:
An admission made in a pleading can not be controverted by the party making such admission; and all
proof submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should simply be ignored by the court,
whether objection is interposed by the opposite party or not.

​
The above Ramirez ruling was reiterated in Joes Radio and electrical Supply v. Alto Electronics
Corp., 104 Phil. 333 (1958) and Santiago v. De los Santos, 158 Phil. 809 (1974)

​And in Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil 227 (1948), the Court declared that:
the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A
party cannot subsequently take a position contrary to, or inconsistent with, his pleadings.
The assertion of the Heirs of Zurbano that they were never in possession of the land cannot hold up
against these pronouncements. As substituting defendants, they were bound by the admission of Pedro
Clemea y Zurbano, their predecessor in the litigation (31A C.J.S. Evidence 302). Without any showing
that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made, petitioners
cannot now contradict it.
Self-serving evidence is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves its proponent's interest
(Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 813 [1995]). The term, if used with any legal sense, refers only to
acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of court, and it does
not include testimony that he gives as a witness in court (31A C.J.S. Evidence 302). Evidence of this sort
is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is, lack of opportunity for cross-
examination by the adverse party and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud
and fabrication (National Development Company v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 126 Phil. 226
[1967]). In contrast, a party’s testimony in court sworn and subject to cross-examination by the other
party is not susceptible to an objection on the ground that it is self-serving. (National Development
Company v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 126 Phil. 226 [1967]).
For all the Heirs of Zurbano's protestations against the use of Gregorio Clemea's testimony, they never
once alleged, much less tried to show, that the latter's testimony was inaccurate or untrue. Thus, the Court
cannot subscribe to the view that a party’s testimony favorable to himself must be disregarded on account
solely of his interest in the case. Interest alone is not a ground for disregarding a party's testimony
(National Development Company v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 126 Phil. 226 [1967]). The
interest of a witness does not ipso facto deprive his testimony of probative force or require it to be
disregarded, and the trier of facts is entitled to accept as much of the witness testimony as he finds
credible and to reject the rest (32A C.J.S. Evidence 1031 [2]).
Hence, the Court held that the appellate court committed no reversible error in relying on Gregorio
Clemea’s testimony. The award of damages must stand.

52. DBP Pool v Radio Mindanao Network

DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE COMPANIES, Petitioner,
vs.
RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC., Respondent.
Principles:
1. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, which means
19
those facts which are derived from his perception. A witness may not testify as to what he
merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony
is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.
2. The rule in res gestae (meaning see below) applies when the declarant himself did not testify and
provided that the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant complies with the following
requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances
Facts:
Radio Mindanao owns several broadcasting stations all over the country. DBP Pool covered respondent’s
transmitter equipment under Fire Insurance. Condition number 6 of the insurance exempt the insurer for
any loss or damage occasioned by, inter alia, insurrection, rebellion, revolution.
Subsequently, respondent’s radio station located in Bacolod City was razed by fire. Respondent sought
recovery under the insurance policies but the claims were denied on the ground that the cause of loss was
an excepted risk excluded under condition no. 6.
According to DBP Pool the fire was caused by members of the CPP-NPA, thus it is categorically fall
under insurrection, rebellion or revolution.
During the presentation of evidence, DBP Pool, offered the following evidence:
a. The testimony of witnesses Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres and SPO3 Leonardo Rochar who were
admittedly not present when the fire occurred. Their testimony was limited to the fact that an
investigation was conducted and in the course of the investigation they were informed by
bystanders that "heavily armed men entered the transmitter house, poured gasoline in it and then
lighted it.
Issue:
1. Whether the testimony of individuals (Torres and Rochar) who are not present at the time of the
occurrence of the alleged facts admissible.
2. Whether the testimony of witnesses by standers who are present at the time of the occurrence of the
alleged facts admissible under the res gestae.
Ruling:
1. No.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides; Testimony generally confined to personal
knowledge; hearsay excluded.
A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, which means those
19
facts which are derived from his perception. A witness may not testify as to what he merely learned
from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay
and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. The hearsay rule is based upon
serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence inasmuch as such evidence
are not given under oath or solemn affirmation and, more importantly, have not been subjected to cross-
examination by opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-
court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.
2. No. (although the by standers are present in the scene, their testimony is not considered res gestae
thus cannot be an exception to hearsay rule) (what is res tae? See below).
Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to those exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or after the
commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity
for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The rule in res gestae applies when the
declarant himself did not testify and provided that the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant
complies with the following requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;
(2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3)
21
that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.
In the case the declarations cannot be considered as part of res gestae. While it may concede that these
statements were made by the bystanders during a startling occurrence, it cannot be said however, that
these utterances were made spontaneously by the bystanders and before they had the time to contrive
or devise a falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres received the bystanders’ statements while
they were making their investigations during and after the fire. It is reasonable to assume that when these
statements were noted down, the bystanders already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk
to one another and exchange information, not to mention theories and speculations, as is the usual
experience in disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take place. It cannot therefore be
ascertained whether these utterances were the products of truth. That the utterances may be mere idle talk
is not remote.
Bar type question:
DBP Insurance company insured the transmission equipment of Radio Mindanao Network under a fire
insurance policy. Under the policy, the insurer will not be liable for damages caused by insurrection,
rebellion or revolution.
Sometimes, the transmission equipment was razed by fire. Radio Mindanao was denied recovery from the
insurance on the ground that the fire was due to NPA insurrection thus exempted.
During the trial DBP offered as evidence the testimonies of Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres and SPO3 Leonardo
Rochar, who testified that under their investigation it was found out from the witnesses by-standers that
the fire was caused by armed men alleged to be part of NPA.
Issue and Ruling same. same.

53. People v Aling

G.R. No. L-38833 March 12, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
AIROL ALING Y MAJURI, accused whose death sentence is under review.

Principle:

The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against his penal
interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a
man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage" (Sec. 5[bbl, Rule 131, Rules of Court).

Facts:

Accused was charged of paracide for killing his wife. Accused admitted in open court voluntarily that he
is married with the victim and he killed the victim. Accused was sentenced to death by the trial court.

Issue:

Is their a need to adduce evidence that accused is married to the victim in order to convict him in a crime
paracide?

Ruling:

No.

The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against his penal
interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a
man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage"

He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his testimony to his father-in-law. That implies that
the deceased was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity. Her failure to visit him n
prison and her neglect of their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their marital status.

The contention that the accused did not understand fully he nature and effect of Ms plea of guilty is belied
by the record. The trial judge, a Muslim, took pans to follow the rule that in case a plea of guilty is
entered in a capital case, evidence should be received in order to leave no room for reasonable doubt that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and that he had full knowledge of the meaning and
consequences of his plea of guilty (People vs. Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).

In this case, the arraignment was postponed three times in order to enable his counsel to confer with him
and explain to him the consequences of his plea of guilty. The accused testified. His confession and the
affidavit of the policemen who investigated him were presented in evidence.

The contention that the crime was mitigated by the plea of guilty lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong and the circumstance that the accused is a non-Christian is not well taken because he is a quasi-
recidivist. The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism cannot be offset by generic
investigating circumstances.
The fact that he escaped from confinement in order to kill his wife shows a high degree of perversity and
incorrigibility His being a non-Christian cannot serve to extenuate the heinousness of his offense. He
understood the gravity of his crime because he had attained some education. He reached first year high
school and he used to be a checker in a stevedoring firm.

However, only since Justices (Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad
Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera) voted for the imposition of the death penalty.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the modification that, for lack of one vote, the
accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

54. PEOPLE v. VILLARINO

People vs. Villarino
FACTS:
- "BBB", together with her 10-year old daughter "AAA" and her younger son "CCC" went to the house of
their relative in to attend the fiesta.
- SPO4 Genoguin was in his house entertaining his guests, one of whom was appellant. While personally
serving food and drinks to appellant, SP04 Genoguin noticed that the latter was wearing a bracelet and a
necklace with pendant. Appellant even allowed SPO4 Genoguin to put on the bracelet.
- The appellant passed by the house of Rodrigo Olaje (Rodrigo). At that time, Rodrigo noticed appellant
wearing a bracelet and a necklace with pendant. He was also wearing a white sleeveless t-shirt (sando).
- The appellant was at the house of "BBB’s" aunt. "BBB" offered him food. "BBB" also noticed that he
was dressed in a white sando and that he wore jewelry consisting of a bracelet and a necklace with
pendant. He was seen wearing the same sando and jewelry while drinking at the basketball court.
- "BBB" told "AAA" to go home to get a t-shirt for her brother. "AAA" obeyed. However, she no longer
returned. She received information that a dead child had been found.
- A bracelet and a pendant were recovered from the crime scene. Rodrigo and "BBB" identified
these pieces of jewelry as those seen on the appellant. They also identified the sando on "AAA’s"
arm as the appellant’s.
- The appellant was found in the house near the seashore of the same barangay. He was drunk and violent.
He resisted arrest and had to be bodily carried to the motorboat that would take him to the municipal
building in Almagro, Samar. The arresting team made the appellant take off his clothes since they were
wet. When he complied, his briefs revealed bloodstains.
- The police brought appellant to Calbayog City for medical examination since he had scratches and
abrasions on his body. While waiting for a boat ride, the police team took a coffee break. SPO4 Genoguin
was momentarily left alone to guard the appellant. During this short period, the appellant voluntarily
admitted to SPO4 Genoguin that he committed the crime charged. He also told SPO4 Genoguin that he
could keep the pendant and bracelet if he would retrieve the t-shirt and throw it into the sea.
- RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of rape with homicide.
CA found the appellant guilty only of homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of accused-appellant of rape with homicide solely on the basis of
circumstantial evidence is correct.
RULING: YES. In this special complex crime of rape with homicide, the unsolicited and spontaneous
confession of guilt by the appellant to the police officer is admissible in evidence. The circumstantial
evidence is also sufficient to sustain the conviction of the appellant even if no spermatozoa was found in
the victim’s body during an autopsy.
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the following elements must concur: (1) the appellant
had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force,
threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force,
threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman. When the victim is a minor, however, it is sufficient
that the evidence proves that the appellant had sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with the
victim.
In the instant case, appellant voluntarily confessed to raping and killing "AAA" to SPO4 Genoguin. He
even offered to give the pieces of jewelry to the latter if his sando is thrown into the sea. The appellant did
not deny this accusation nor assail its truthfulness.
When appellant confessed to the crime, he was alone with SPO4 Genoguin, and no force or intimidation
was employed against him. The confession was spontaneously made and not elicited through questioning.
The trial court did not, therefore, err in holding that compliance with the constitutional procedure on
custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case.
At any rate, even without his confession, appellant could still be convicted of the complex crime of rape
with homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in the crime through circumstantial evidence
which were credible and sufficient, and led to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed the
complex crime of rape with homicide. The absence of spermatozoa does not necessarily result in the
conclusion that rape was not committed. Convictions for rape with homicide have been sustained on
purely circumstantial evidence. In those cases, the prosecution presented other tell-tale signs of rape such
as the laceration and description of the victim’s pieces of clothing, especially her undergarments, the
position of the body when found and the like.
Bar Question:
B, together with her 10-year old daughter A and her younger son C went to the house of their relative
in Barangay D to attend the fiesta to be held the next day. B told A to go home to Barangay D1 to get a t-
shirt for her brother. A obeyed. However, she no longer returned. B received information that a dead child
had been found in Barangay D1. She proceeded to the area where she identified the child’s body as that of
her daughter A. A bracelet and a pendant were recovered from the crime scene. Also, a sando was
recovered on A’s arm. Prior to the incident, three witnesses saw X wearing the white sleeveless t-shirt, a
necklace with pendant and a bracelet. They identified these pieces of jewelry and sando as those seen on
X. X was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. X voluntarily admitted to a
police officer that he committed the crime charged. Is the unsolicited and spontaneous confession of guilt
by X to the police officer admissible in evidence? Is the circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain the
conviction of the appellant even if no spermatozoa was found in the victim’s body during an autopsy?
YES.
55. People v Valero
Case: People vs. Valero
Facts:

​
Lucila Valero alias Rosing and Alfonsito Valero alias “Pipe”, a deafmute whose case was
dismissed since he didn’t understand the proceedings against him, were accused in two separate
complaints, one for double murder and the other for frustrated murder. In the morning of February 22,
1969, two children of Ceferino Velasco died of poisoning while his other child, Imelda, almost died had it
not been for medical assistance. They were at the balcony of their house where they ate the bread. During
the investigation, it was revealed that Ceferino Velasco was seen throwing poisoned rats into a river near
his house; the dead bodies of the children, the dead puppies under the balcony, and slices of bread
containing poison were found in the crime scene. The bread contained endrin, a poisonous substance.
According to the autopsy and necropsy report, the children died due to endrin poisoning.

​
The prosecution presents evidence to prove that the bread was given to the children by Pipe, who
received the same from Rosing; while the defense’ evidence sought to prove that the children might have
eaten one of the poisoned bread, which was used by their father to poison rats in his garden. The
prosecution presented 3 witnesses: Rodolfo Quilang, who allegedly saw the defendant Rosing hand
“something wrapped in a piece of paper” to Pipe; and Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco, who
allegedly obtained information regarding the incident from Pipe, after interviewing him through sign
language. During the course of the proceedings, it was established that Quilang made several
inconsistencies in his testimony and was observed to be lying; and that both Jaime and Velasco
testimonies only add confusion as to the source of the poisoned bread.

​
The trial court gave weight to the prosecution’s evidence and conjured the accused’s psychiatric
abnormality as probable cause to find the defendant guilty as charged and sentenced the latter to death.

Issue: Whether or not the admission of evidence was proper to warrant the imposition of the death
penalty against the defendant.

Ruling: No. Trial court judgment is reversed.

Jaime and Velasco’s testimonies are purely hearsay and are inadmissible.
There are several compelling reasons that should have made the trial Court reject the testimony of both
Jaime and Velasco. Pipe who was the alleged source of the vital information for the prosecution was never
presented as a witness either for the prosecution or for the defense. Jaime and Velasco were presented as
prosecution witnesses to convey to the Court what they learned from Pipe by sign language.
The evidence is purely hearsay. The presentation of such evidence likewise violates the principle of res
inter alios acta. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
With particular reference to the testimony of Ceferino Velasco, its admission cannot be justified by
claiming that it is a part of the res gestae. When Pipe allegedly revealed to Ceferino Velasco that the
source of the poisoned bread was the defendant, the children had not eaten or tasted it. Nobody was yet
poisoned. Stated otherwise, there was no startling occurrence yet. With reference to the testimony of
Jaime, there is no showing that Pipe made the extrajudicial revelation spontaneously when he was still
under the influence of startling occurrence. Pipe made his extrajudicial revelation not spontaneously but
after an interview through the complicated process of sign language.

Failure to object to hearsay evidence will not affect its’ weight.

The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay
evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of
the same does not give such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make any
incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of
evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.

The evidence violates defendant’s constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face and violates
due process.

To give weight to the testimonies of Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco, whether considered as hearsay
evidence or as part of res gestae and make the same the basis for the imposition of the death penalty
gravely violates the constitutional right of the defendant to meet the witnesses face to face and to subject
Pipe to the rigid test of cross-examination, the only effective means to test the truthfulness, memory,
intelligence, and in this particular case, the ability of the deaf-mute, Alfonsito Valero alias Pipe, to
communicate with the outside world. In a conflict between a provision of the constitution giving the
defendant a substantive right and mere technical rules of evidence, we have no choice but to give effect to
the constitution.
The cross-examination of Pipe, the source of the vital information for the prosecution, would have shown
clearly his incompetence as a witness. During the preliminary investigation in the Municipal Court,
experts on deaf-mutes like Belen Herreros who is the official interpreter of the only school for the deaf
and the blind in the Philippines, assisted by Mrs. Felicidad Vinluan who is the principal of the school of
the deaf and the blind, Mesdames Gilda Tatum and Salud Natividad, examined Alfonsito Valero alias Pipe
and reported to the Municipal Court that "questions addressed to him (Alfonsito Valero) and answers
given by him cannot be accurately interpreted."

SHORT DIGEST:
Facts:
Accused is sentenced to death for double murder and frustrated murder due to poisoning. The prosecution
presents three witnesses to prove the charge against the defendant. Among the three witnesses, two of
them testified as to what P told them after interviewing the latter through sign language. P, a deafmute
who was present during the incident, was never made a witness by the prosecution or the defense; nor was
he cross-examined.

Issue: Rule on the admissibility of the evidence.

Answer:

​I would rule against the admissibility of the witnesses’ testimony.

​
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value. Further, whether the
testimony of a witness is considered as hearsay evidence or as part of res gestae, will gravely violate the
constitutional right of the defendant to meet the witnesses face to face.

​
In this case, the testimony of the witnesses is only hearsay since the same information was
acquired by them from P. Since P was not presented as a witness for the prosecution or the defense, any
information obtained from him would violate the defendant’s constitutional right to meet the witnesses
face to face. Hence, the witnesses’ testimony is inadmissible.

56 People v Tuniaco
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ROMULO TUNIACO, JEFFREY DATULAYTA and ALEX ALEMAN, Accused.
ALEX ALEMAN, Appellant.
Principle:
Requirements for valid extrajudicial declaration.
Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing.
Bar Q.
Accused A, B and C were charged with murder of X. C's statement regarding the case was taken by the
police officer extrajudicially after being informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the
assistance of counsel of his own choice and asked him if he was willing to give a statement. C admitted
that they killed X. Trial court rendered judgment finding C guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on his
confession. Is C's extrajudicial admissible in evidence? What are the requirements for valid extrajudicial
declaration?
Suggested answer:
Yes. Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing. These requirements were met here. The accused was
assisted by counsel during custodial investigation. Furthermore, it is a settled rule that where the
defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was
presented, all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness. All requirements are met, thus, C's
admission is admissible in evidenc.

57 People v Lauga
G.R. No. 186228 March 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS
TERIO, Accused-Appellant.

Principle: ​The extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence.
Short digest:
FACTS: L was accused of the crime of qualified rape against his own daughter, 13 years old. One of the
witnesses for the prosecution was B, a bantay bayan in the barangay. B invited L to the police station and
L admitted to him that he raped his daughter because he was unable to control himself.
L contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s extrajudicial confession without counsel admissible in evidence?
RULING: No.
The specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related
function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for
under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in
evidence.
However, SC agreed with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not deduced
solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but "from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt."

Long digest:
FACTS:
Appellant Lauga was charged of qualified rape by his daughter. Testimonies revealed that the victim was
left alone at home while his father was having drinking spree at the neighbor’s place. Her mother decided
to leave because appellant has the habit of mauling her mother every time he gets drunk. Her only brother
also went out with some neighbors.
At around 10pm, appellant woke up the victim, removed his pants and slid inside the blanket covering the
victim and removed her pants and underwear. Appellant had warned the victim not to shout for help. He
proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her daughter by threatening her with his fist and a knife. Soon
after, the victim’s brother arrived and saw her crying. Appellant claimed he scolded the victim for staying
out late. The two decided to leave the house.
While on their way to their maternal grandmother’s house, victim recounted to her brother what happened
to her. They later told the incident to their grandmother and uncle who sought the assistance of Moises
Boy Banting. Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. He was invited to the
police station to which he obliged. Appellant admitted to Banting that he indeed raped her daughter
because he was unable to control himself.
The trial court convicted the accused for qualified rape. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification
the ruling of the trial court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s extrajudicial confession without counsel admissible in evidence?

HELD: Negative.

Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay
bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of
peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises
Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan,"
particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a
state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights
provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is
concerned.

​
Even if the extrajudicial confessions were not admitted as evidence, it does not warrant the
acquittal of the accused. The appellant’s conviction is upheld because of the strong evidence showing his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

58. Navallo v SB
​
G.R. No. 97214 July 16, 1994

ERNESTO NAVALLO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

DIGEST

Facts: Petitioner is the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of Numancia National Vocational School.
Provincial Auditor Espino found Navallo to be short of P16,483.62. Leopoldo A. Dulguime was directed
by Espino to complete the preliminary examination and to conduct a final audit. Dulguime broke the seal,
opened the vault, and made a new cash count. Dulguime next examined the cashbook of Navallo.
Dulguime confirmed Navallo's shortage of P16,483.62. Dulguime made a Report of Examination and
wrote Navallo a letter demanding the restitution of the missing amount. The latter neither complied nor
offered any explanation for the shortage.

On 11 May 1978, an information charging petitioner with having violated Article 217, paragraph 4, of the
Revised Penal Code, was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte.

A warrant of arrest was issued, followed by two alias warrants of arrest, but accused-petitioner Ernesto
Navallo still then could not be found.

On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was, however, later released on provisional
liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond. When arraigned by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC")
on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not guilty. On 22 May 1986, upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC
transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. On 27 January 1989, Special
Prosecutor Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case
was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. The matter
was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was docketed
(Criminal Case No. 13696) with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by the
Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused
had posted a bail bond. The bond, having been later found to be defective, on 30 August 1989, a new
bond was approved and transmitted to the Sandiganbayan.

Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the
offense and the person of the accused and (2) that since the accused had already been arraigned by the
RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. On 15
September 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying Navallo's motion. On 20 October 1989,
Navallo was arraigned; he pleaded, "not guilty," to the charge. Trial ensued.

The Sandiganbayan pronounced that the accused guilty of the crime of malversation of public
funds.Accused-petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

Issue: a) Whether the petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the certification
prepared by State Auditing Examiner Leopoldo Dulguime.

b) Whether the guilt of petitioner has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt
as to warrant his conviction for the offense imputed against him.
Ruling: A) No. Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused is under
"custodial investigation," or is "in custody investigation," which we have since defined as any
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." A person under a normal audit examination is
not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law
enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been
"pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by his own
testimony.

Navallo may have been persuaded, but certainly not pressured, to sign the auditor's report. Furthermore,
Navallo again contradicted himself when, in his very petition to this Court, he stated:

Bearing in mind the high respect of the accused with his superior officer and taking into consideration his
gratitude for the favors that his superior officer has extended him in recommending him the position he
held even if he was not an accountant, he readily agreed to sign the auditor's report even if he was not
given the opportunity to explain the alleged shortage.

B) Yes. Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code states that "(t)he failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use." An accountable officer, therefore, may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of
direct proof of misappropriation as long as there is evidence of shortage in his accounts which he is
unable to explain.

The claim that the amount of the shortage represented the unliquidated cash advance of Macasemo does
not inspire belief. No details whatsoever were given by the accused on the matter such as, for instance,
when and for what purpose was the alleged cash advance granted, what step or steps were taken by
Navallo or Macasemo to liquidate it. In fact, Navallo admitted that he did not even ask Macasemo as to
how he (Navallo) could be relieved of his responsibility for the missing amount when he was promised by
Macasemo that everything would be all right. When Navallo was already in Manila, he did not also even
write Macasemo about the shortage.

Finally, the pretense that the missing amount was the unliquidated cash advance of Macasemo and that
Navallo did not collect tuition fees in 1976 was advanced for the first time during the trial, that is, 12 long
solid years after the audit on January 30, 1978. Nothing was said about it at the time of the audit and
immediately thereafter.

BAR QUESTION FORMAT

Facts: Petitioner is the collecting and disbursing officer of a vocational school. He was found to have
misappropriated public funds for private benefit after a COA audit. He failed to restitute the amount
despite COA demands. A warrant of arrest was issued but petitioner pleaded not guilty and invokes his
right to custodial investigation since during the COA audit and actual cash count he was made to sign the
certification on the fund shortage in the absence of a counsel. He further contends that the shortage of
funds was due to the assurance of certain M to settle his unliquidated cash advance and his failure to do so
resulted to the fund shortage.

Issue: a) Whether the petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the certification
prepared by State Auditing Examiner Leopoldo Dulguime.

b) Whether the guilt of petitioner has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt
as to warrant his conviction for the offense imputed against him.

Ruling: ​A) No. Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused is
under "custodial investigation," or is "in custody investigation," which we have since defined as any
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." A person under a normal audit examination is
not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law
enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been
"pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by his own
testimony.

B) Yes. Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code states that "(t)he failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use." An accountable officer, therefore, may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of
direct proof of misappropriation as long as there is evidence of shortage in his accounts which he is
unable to explain.

59. Heirs of Barredo v Besanes

HEIRS OF BARREDO VS BESAÑES
Principle:
FACTS:
Estrella Javier (Javier) owned and operated J.M. Javier Builders Corporation, a logging company located
in Sta. Filomena, Iligan City, where Jose Barredo (Barredo) was employed as a heavy equipment
mechanic. The logging company was situated on three properties covering a total area of 6,858 square
meters and consists of three parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 47571, 47572
and 47573. Situated on the land was a camp with a four-unit bunkhouse where employees, for
convenience, were allowed to stay.
Sometime in 1978, Barredo was terminated from his employment due to the closure of Javier’s company
which experienced business reverses. This prompted Barredo to file with the then Ministry of Labor a
case for illegal dismissal and unpaid wages against Javier.
Parties entered into an amicable settlement considering Barredo as not to have abandoned his job, and let
him stay in the camp free of charge with financial assistance. Further, Javier complied Ministry of Labor’s
order to pay Barredo separation pay.
Javier sold the three parcels of land to Lavoiser Besañes (Besañes) as evidenced by a deed of sale. Javier
ordered Barredo to vacate the land. Javier, nevertheless, gave to the wife of Barredo the sum of
P10,000.00 as a form of financial assistance. Subsequently, a fence was constructed around the land and
Besañes introduced substantial improvements thereto such as a modern rice mill, warehouses, and office
buildings.
Barredo, claiming that he was an agricultural tenant of Javier, filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) a claim for his right of pre-emption and redemption under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL).
MARO determined that the tenancy relationship could not be determined due to the insufficiency of
evidencehe DARAB ruled that there was an implied contract of tenancy between Javier and Barredo,
because the latter was allowed to cultivate the land and that the former was receiving her share of the
produce through her niece. In addition, the DARAB held that Javier’s offer of P10,000.00 and a land
as a homelot to Barredo was indicative of the existence of a tenancy relationship between them.
Being a tenant of Javier, the DARAB concluded that Barredo was entitled to security of tenure and was
thus entitled to the possession of the properties in dispute in accordance with law.CA ruled that no
tenancy relationship existed between Javier and Barredo for the following reasons: first, a landholder and
11
tenant relationship was wanting; second, Barredo failed to substantiate his claim of agricultural
12 13
production; third, the claimed sharing agreement presented some doubts; and fourth, it was contrary to
ordinary human experience for Barredo, who claimed he was a tenant, not to complain when the coconut
trees found on the properties were leased to tuba gatherers in 1993.
Barredo dies and was substituted by his heirs.
ISSUE:
whether or not Barredo is an agricultural tenant and, therefore, enjoys security of tenure.
RULING:
NO.
ON THE ISSUE OF AGRICULTURAL TENANCY
There is a tenancy relationship between parties if the following essential elements concur:
1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2) The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
16
6) The harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.

In the first place, it is undisputed that Barredo was an employee of Javier in the latter’s logging business.
Barredo, like his co-employees, was allowed to live in the bunkhouse of the company for his
convenience. Clearly, therefore, the relationship of Javier and Barredo was one between an employer and
an employee, and not between a landowner and a tenant. The continued stay of Barredo in the premises of
the company was the result of the Order of the then Ministry of Labor which recognized the terms of the
amicable settlement of Barredo and Javier in their labor dispute. It cannot be therefore claimed that such
order converted the relationship of Barredo and Javier into one of tenancy as clearly Barredo’s stay in the
property was by mere tolerance and was ordered by the Ministry of Labor. Moreover, the inexistence of
tenancy relations is bolstered by the fact that Barredo’s stay was "free of charge" as contained in the order
of the Ministry of Labor.

Furthermore, this Court is inclined to believe that Barredo’s activities in the properties cannot be
classified as one for agricultural production. The records show that Barredo did not plant any additional
coconut trees other than the ones already planted. While the DARAB ruled that Barredo had planted crops
and vegetables, the extent of such production was not described and, more importantly, is not supported
by evidence on record. Other than his bare allegation, Barredo has failed to substantiate the extent of his
so-called agricultural production.

ON RULES OF EVIDENCE
This Court finds that the offer of 100 square meters of land to Barredo by Javier does not prove the
existence of a tenancy agreement. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an
offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability. We share the observation of the CA that such
offer may have stemmed from a motivation to buy peace or as an act of compassion for Barredo.
Based on the foregoing discussion, Barredo’s petition must fail. The existence of a tenancy relationship
cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of
27
tenure. Occupancy and continued possession of the land will not ipso facto make one a de
28
jure tenant. Based on the evidence as presented by Barredo, he has failed to discharge his burden of
proving that all the essential elements of tenancy exist. It bears to stress that this Court has ruled time and
again that all the requisites of an agricultural tenancy must be proved by substantial evidence and the
absence of one will not make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant.
The MARO declared that because of the insufficiency of evidence, the determination of the existence of
tenancy relationship could not be ascertained. Likewise, the Regional Adjudicator declared that Barredo
was not the tenant of Javier. It was, therefore, incorrect for the DARAB to reverse such conclusions and
findings, more so since its own findings were not supported by evidence on record.
Petition is DENIED.
Short digest:
Facts:
Javier owns a logging company, Barredo was employed as a heavy equipment mechainic and he was
allowed to stay in the bunkhouse. The business suffered reverses, in consequence he was terminated from
his employment. This prompted Barredo to file illegal dismissal case against Javier. The two parties
entered into a compromise agreement, Barredo was allowed to remain in the bankhouse and given
financial assistance (This was also by virtue of the order of the Ministry of Labor).
Javier sold his lots to Besañes, the latter ousted Barredo. Barredo then filed a case before MARO alleging
that there was tenancy relationship bet. Javier and him. MARO and DAR ruled that there was an absence
of tenancy agreement. CA ruled otherwise.
ISSUE:
WON there was tenancy relationship existed.
RULING:
NO.
the relationship of Javier and Barredo was one between an employer and an employee, and not between a
landowner and a tenant. The continued stay of Barredo in the premises of the company was the result of
the Order of the then Ministry of Labor which recognized the terms of the amicable settlement of Barredo
and Javier in their labor dispute. It cannot be therefore claimed that such order converted the relationship
of Barredo and Javier into one of tenancy as clearly Barredo’s stay in the property was by mere tolerance
and was ordered by the Ministry of Labor.
RULES ON EVIDENCE:
This Court finds that the offer of 100 square meters of land to Barredo by Javier does not prove the
existence of a tenancy agreement. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an
offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability. We share the observation of the CA that such
offer may have stemmed from a motivation to buy peace or as an act of compassion for Barredo.
Petition is DENIED.

60. People v Janjalani

People vs Janjalani
Principle:
Extrajudicial confessions- may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused
as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Judicial confession- admissible against the declarant's co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity
to cross-examine the former.
Bar Q:
Accused A, B, C and D were charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murders due to a
bombing of a bus along Ayala Avenue. A and B, in separate exclusive interviews with XYZ Network,
confessed their guilt on national television. Additionally, B an accused-turned-state witness admitted their
guilt before the court. Rule on the admissibility of B’s confession.
Answer:
B’s confession is admissible as provided for by Sec. 30 of Rule 130, “The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.”
Long digest
Facts:
On February 14, 2005, as the RRCG bus was along EDSA, two men were running after the bus and
insisted on riding it. The conductor, Elmer Andales, obliged and allowed the two to ride the vehicle.
However, Andales noticed that the two men were acting very suspicious as they were sitting separately.
One of the two men sat at the back of the bus, despite it not being full, and seemed to be tinkering with
something under the seat. Both men also kept on asking Andales whether the bus would stop at Ayala
Avenue. When the bus eventually did, the two hurriedly alighted despite the objection of the bus driver
and conductor as there was a Makati ordinance against such. Moments later, Elmer Andales felt an
explosion and realized that it was the RRCG bus.
Shortly thereafter, the Abu Sayyaf Group claimed responsibility over the bombing and members of the
group were charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Those who were caught were
here in accused-appellants Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and
Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, accused-appellants.
Subsequently, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview some time after
the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine's Day bombing incident. In another exclusive
interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally,
accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14
February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed
that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
The accused-appellants pleaded guilty to the multiple murder charge but pleaded not guilty to the multiple
frustrated murder. However, eventually both withdrew their plea of not guilty and pleaded their guilt on
all the charges against them. The lower court founded their guilt upon the testimony of Andales, the
conductor, and their extrajudicial confession on national tv.
Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions made by the accused-appellants are sufficient to establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling:
Yes.
The accused-appellants assert that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out that
the testimony of the conductor was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was
insufficient. Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence for the
prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of
the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali.
Andales positively identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had acted suspiciously
while inside the bus; On the other hand, Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad
the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan and Trinidad was
sufficiently established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial
admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive television interviews, as they
both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the perpetrators of the Valentine's Day bombing.
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are
admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People
v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial
admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators.

61. Tan v Rodil Enterprises

Tan vs. Rodil Enterprises
Facts:
Rodil Enterprises is a lessee of the subject premises, the Ides ORacca Building owned by the Republic of
the Philippines .
Rodil Enterprises subleased a space thereof, known as Botica Divisoria to herein petitioner, Luciano Tan.
A Complaint for Unlawful Detainer was filed by Rodil Enterprises against Luciano Tan with the MeTC
In his Answer, Luciano Tan insists that he is a legitimate tenant of the government who owns the Ides
ORacca Building and not of Rodil Enterprises. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint, and
for the return of whatever amount Rodil Enterprises had collected from 1987 to 1997, or during such time
when he was still paying rentals to the latter.
On 27 June 2000, the MeTC issued an Order, recognizing an agreement entered into in open court by
Luciano Tan and Rodil Enterprises. The Order, inter alia, declared, thus:
On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open court to the following terms to put an
end to this civil case for ejectment between them:
1.) that [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September, 1997 up to the present,
which is the outstanding obligation of [Luciano Tan] as of June, 2000, on or before June 30, 2000; and
2.) [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day of each
month after June 30, 2000. [8]
On 14 August 2000, Luciano Tan filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, averring therein
that he had agreed to pay all the rentals due on the subject premises and to pay the subsequent monthly
rentals as they fall due.
The MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of Rodil Enterprises
The RTC rendered a Decision reversing the judgment. It found that the MeTC erred in holding that the
offer to compromise by Luciano Tans counsel was akin to an admission of fact.
Petitioner posits that the aforesaid admission, made in open court, and then, reiterated in his Motion to
Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, cannot be taken as an admission of his liability, citing Section 27,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which states, inter alia, that an offer of compromise in a civil case is not a
tacit admission of liability.
Issue:
Whether Luciano Tan made a judicial admission anent his liability as a sublessee of Rodil Enterprises.
Ruling:
Yes.
The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of liability. It is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror.
The rule, however, is not iron-clad.
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the
case and the intent of the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the
existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the
offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the existence
of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the admission is
admissible to prove such indebtedness.
In the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court of Appeals properly appreciated petitioners admission as an
exception to the general rule of inadmissibility.
The evidence on record indubitably shows that respondent [Luciano Tan] is a sublessee of petitioner
[Rodil Enterprises] who failed to pay rentals from 01 September 1997 and even until the case was filed
before the [M]etropolitan [T]rial [C]ourt, when respondent [Luciano Tan] agreed in principle in open
court to the following terms:
1) that the defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September, 1997 up to
the present, which is the outstanding obligation of the defendant as of June, 2000, on or before June 30,
2000; and
2) defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day
of each month after June 30, 2000.
[Luciano Tan] in effect made an implied judicial admission that there was a subsisting contract of
sublease between him and petitioner, and that he was remiss in the payment of rentals from 01 September
1997 up to that day. Respondent [Luciano Tan]s admission was further bolstered by the fact that he filed a
Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals. By such acts, respondent [Luciano Tan] accepted the truth
of petitioner [Rodil Enterprises] allegation of the existence of a contract of sublease between them and of
his non-payment of the rentals from 01 September 1997. A judicial admission is an admission made in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, verbal or written, by a party accepting for the purposes of the
suit the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter disprove.
Facts:
A is a lessee of a building owned by B which was subleased to C.
A files a complaint for unlawful detainer against B for failure to pay his rents.
C insists that he is a legitimate tenant of B who owns the building and not of A. Thus, prayed for the
dismissal of the Complaint, and for the return of whatever amount A had collected from 1987 to 1997, or
during such time when C was still paying rentals to A.
MeTC issued an Order recognizing an agreement entered into in open court by A and C. C agreed to pay
the amount of rentals stated in the agreement.
C filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, averring therein that he had agreed to pay all the
rentals due on the subject premises and to pay the subsequent monthly rentals as they fall due.
RTC rendered a Decision reversing the judgment of MeTC. It found that the MeTC erred in holding that
the offer to compromise by C’s counsel was akin to an admission of fact.
Issue:
WON C made a judicial admission anent his liability as a sublessee of A.
Ruling:
C in effect made an implied judicial admission that there was a subsisting contract of sublease between
him and A based on their agreement. C’s admission was further bolstered by the fact that he filed a
Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals. By such acts, C accepted the truth of A’s allegation of the
existence of a contract of sublease between them and of his non-payment of the rentals. A judicial
admission is an admission made in the course of the proceedings in the same case, verbal or written, by a
party accepting for the purposes of the suit the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot
thereafter disprove.