MINUCHER v.

CA

FACTS: In May 1986, an Information for violation of R.A. 6425 or the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,"
was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with theRTC. A "buy-bust
operation" was conducted in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a
prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private
respondent Arthur Scalzo. On 08 January 1988, the RTC rendered decision acquitting the two
accused.
On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed a case for damages in the RTC on account of what he claimed to
have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
Then, on 14 June 1990, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a
special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic
immunity. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
Then, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with the SC asking that Municher's complaint
for damages be ordered dismissed. The case was referred to the CA and it sustained the diplomatic
immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against him.
Minucher filed a petition for review with the SC. It reversed the decision of the CA and remanded the
case to the RTC for trial. The RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case and decided in favor
of the plaintiff. It gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence presented by him that he was
a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held
accountable for the acts complained of committed outside his official duties.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he
was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune from the
criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.
Hence, this recourse by Minucher.

ISSUE: WON Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity

HELD: YES. It was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the
country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting
well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present
controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of
customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign
from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the
head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity.
If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although
not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be
barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative
of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the
benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in parem, non
habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.
This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of Appeals elaborates:
"It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen, et al. (33 SCRA 368): `Inasmuch as
the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers
are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been
invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within
the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or
suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff,
under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a
suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
"x x x x x x x x x
"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is
being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection
afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their
individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in
excess of the powers vested in him.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long
as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the
host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to
help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.
The petition was DENIED.

US v. PURGANAN

FACTS: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.
Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC. The TRO
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The
validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before the SC but it dismissed the
Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish Jimenez the copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence.
The SOJ fied an MR and the SC reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This
Resolution has become final and executory.
Thereafter, the US represented by the DOJ, filed with the RTC the appropriate Petition for Extradition.
The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the US.
The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud the
United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax
evasion; (3) wire fraud, (4) false statements, and (5) illegal campaign contributions. In order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate
arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set
for hearing. The court granted the motion. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on
the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior
to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing. Thereafter, the court below directed the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in
cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was
granted provisional liberty. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUES:
(1) WON Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued
(2) WON Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending

HELD: (1) NO. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which
guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the
constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. Immediately upon receipt of the petition
for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the
petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law,
and whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner
to submit further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that
a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential
extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.

(2) NO. As a rule, after being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. However,
since the applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a)
there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian
or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for
the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion
in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential
power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of
government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation. On the other hand, courts
merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to prevent or excise grave abuse
and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due process" every little step of the
way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of
international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partner’s simple
request to return a fugitive.
The Petition was GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order was declared NULL and VOID, while the
challenged Orderwas SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail
bond posted by private respondent was CANCELLED. The RTC was directed to conduct the
extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our
Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law.