5. Chu v.

Judge Capellan
Facts: spouses Ofelia and Rafael Angangco filed before the MeTC an unlawful detainer complaint with application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (PMI) against the complainants.

During the preliminary conference, the complainants moved to dismiss the unlawful detainer complaint on the
grounds that: (1) the spouses Angangco failed to comply with the required barangay conciliation and to implead
the other co-owners of the property subject of the unlawful detainer case; and (2) the MeTC had no jurisdiction to
issue a writ of PMI. On the other hand, the spouses Angangco orally moved to declare the complainants in default
for their failure to file a pre-trial brief.

the respondent issued the assailed joint order17 which submitted the unlawful detainer case for decision based on
the facts alleged in the unlawful detainer complaint.

The complainants moved for reconsideration, but the respondent denied their motion. 18 The complainants
thereupon filed the present administrative complaint against the respondent. They also filed a motion asking for
the respondent’s inhibition from the unlawful detainer case. 19 The respondent eventually inhibited himself from
the case

The complainants allege that the respondent had no basis to declare them in default because no notice of
preliminary conference was issued to them.21 They argue that the issuance of a notice of preliminary conference is
mandatory and its non-issuance may be punishable under Section 2, Rule 11 of Supreme Court Administrative
Memorandum (A.M.) No. 01-2-04

Held: We find no violation committed by the respondent in not issuing a notice for the November 25, 2008
preliminary conference because his order dated October 7, 2008 already constituted sufficient notice to the
parties of the holding of such preliminary conference. In the dispositive portion of said order, the respondent
clearly set the case for preliminary conference at exactly one o’clock in the afternoon of November 25, 2008. And
both parties in the subject unlawful detainer case received copies of the respondent’s order. Therefore, the
complainants have no reason to argue that they were denied their rights to due process in this instance.

Section 2, Rule 11 of Supreme Court A.M. No. 01-2-0430 cannot be suppletorily applied to the subject unlawful
detainer case. The cited administrative memorandum specifically refers to the rules governing intra-corporate
controversies under R.A. No. 8799 and applies only to the cases defined under Section 1, Rule 1 31 thereof, which
does not include ejectment cases. Also, there is nothing in Supreme Court A.M. No. 01-2-04 that permits its
suppletory application to ejectment cases.

6. Belen v. Judge Belen

Facts: Complainant Michael B. Belen filed a Verified Complaint dated 7 March 2001 with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court, charging Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen with grave abuse of authority
and conduct unbecoming a judge. According to complainant,[1] sometime in March 2004, respondent judge filed a
case for Estafa against complainants father, Nezer D. Belen, but the same was dismissed for lack of probable cause
by Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sunega-Lagman in a Resolution dated 28 July 2004. Respondent judge filed
an Omnibus Motion before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City, alleging, inter alia, that Sunega-
Lagman was always absent during the hearings in the preliminary investigation in the estafa case. Respondent judge
likewise filed a complaint for disciplinary action against Sunega-Lagman before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline. To refute the allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman, complainant
executed an Affidavit dated 19 May 2006, which was submitted by Sunega-Lagman as evidence in the CBD
case. Complainants Affidavit stated that the allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman were false; that
Sunega-Lagman was present during the preliminary investigation hearings dated 14, 21 and 29 April 2004, and that
she was absent only once, on 6 May 2004, when she was already on maternity leave; and that it was respondent
judge who was absent during the hearings.[2]
Thereafter, respondent judge allegedly started harassing and threatening complainant with the filing of several cases
against the latter. On 11 January 2007, at 10:00 in the morning, complainant received a mobile phone text message
from the caretaker of his piggery, informing him that respondent judge arrived and was taking pictures of the
piggery. Complainant rushed to the area and saw respondent judge, accompanied by the Municipal Agriculturist and
Sanitary Inspector and the Barangay Chairman, inspecting complainants piggery.

Respondent judge also wrote several letters addressed to certain local government authorities and employees,
requesting information on complainants piggery and poultry business; advising them of the alleged violations by the
complainant of the National Building Code and certain environmental laws; and reminding the local government
authorities of their duty to forestall the issuance of municipal clearance and license to complainants business
establishment.

Held: Respondent judge wrote letters to government authorities and employees to secure public information
regarding complainants piggery and poultry business; to inform addressees of the laws allegedly being violated
bycomplainant; and to remind the addressees of their duties as government officials or employees and warn them
of the possible legal effects of neglect of public duties. In writing these letters, respondent judges use of his
personal stationery with letterhead indicating that he is the Presiding Judge of RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, and
stating that the letter was from [his] chambers, clearly manifests that respondent judge was trying to use the
prestige of his office to influence said government officials and employees, and to achieve with prompt and ease
the purpose for which those letters were written. In other words, respondent judge used said letterhead to
promote his personal interest. This is violative of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

Disqualification of Judicial Officers

1. Re: Inhibition of Judge Rojas
Facts: Atty. Rojas was appointed a judge. One of the criminal cases he inherited was one in which he acted as
prosecutor. He explained that his delay in inhibiting himself from presiding on that case was because it was only
after the belated transcription of the stenographic notes that he remembered that he handled that case. He also
says that the counsels did not object and he never held “full-blown” hearings anyway.

Held: Judge is filed & reprimanded. The Rules of Court prevent judges from trying cases where they acted as
counsel without the consent of the parties. This prevents not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of
impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. He should administer justice impartially & without delay. The prohibition does not only
cover hearings but all judicial acts (e.g. orders, resolutions) some of which Judge Rojas did make.

2. People v. Judge Ong and Imelda Marcos

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction seeking to nullify and set aside the resolutions issued by public respondent Gregory S. Ong,
Associate Justice and Chairperson of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan

Petitioner likewise prays that public respondent be permanently enjoined from presiding over the trial and sitting in
judgment in these ten consolidated cases against private respondent Ms. Imelda R. Marcos for violation of Section
3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The above cases relate intimately to Civil Case No. 0141 (forfeiture case) arising from the petition for forfeiture
filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
to recover from former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and herein private respondent (collectively, respondents)
funds alleged to be ill-gotten and deposited under different Swiss bank accounts in the name of several foreign
foundations.

According to Prosecutor Sulit, it was at this juncture that she and Atty. Elissa V. Rosales, the Fourth Division Clerk of
Court whom she requested to accompany her during her visit, heard public respondent say:

Actually, ayaw ko sa kasong yan, idi-

dismiss ko yan, puro hearsay lang naman ang sinasabi ni Chavez nongumupo ako minsan sa trial
nyo.[16]

Petitioner avers that public respondent even confirmed at a later date to Special Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio that
he issued that statement.[17]

Perceiving the remark to be prejudicial and revealing a predisposition to dismiss the criminal cases, petitioner moved
for the inhibition of public respondent. Petitioner also contends that public respondents apparent dislike of Atty.
Chavez who is a key witness for the prosecution, taken with

his judicial record[18] of favoring the Marcoses in the earlier forfeiture case, bolstered petitioners fear that the
criminal cases would not be tried before an impartial tribunal.

The hostility towards Atty. Chavez was purportedly evidenced by another statement made by public respondent in
open court whereby he expressed displeasure over the letter [19] he received from the former requesting for the
consolidation of the ten cases at a time when these cases were still being separately heard by the Third and Fourth
Divisions. Public respondent was likewise alleged to have been overheard as saying he did not like Atty. Chavez
because mayabang yan.[20] In view of this, petitioner prayed that public respondent voluntarily inhibit himself from
hearing the cases pursuant to Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.

Held: It must be borne in mind that the inhibition of judges is rooted in the Constitution, specifically Article III, the
Bill of Rights, which guarantees that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law. Due process necessarily requires that a hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal[27] because unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge. All the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision
would come from a partial and biased judge.

Public respondent is reminded of the principle that judges should avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but
even the mere appearance of impropriety[35] for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. [36] In insulating
the Bench from unwarranted criticism, thus preserving a democratic way of life, it is essential that judges be above
suspicion.[37] It bears stressing that the duty of judges is not only to administer justice but also to conduct
themselves in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of irregularity. [38] This arises from the avowed duty of
members of the bench to promote confidence in the judicial system. Occupying as they do an exalted position in
the administration of justice, judges must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon them. Hence, any act
which would give the appearance of impropriety becomes, of itself, reprehensible

3. Bgen (Ret) Ramsical v. Judge Hernandez

Facts: Petitioner, Retired BGen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS),[3] signed several deeds of sale for the acquisition of parcels
of land for the development of housing projects and for other concerns. However, it appears that the landowners
from whom the AFP-RSBS acquired the lots executed unilateral deeds of sale providing for a lesser consideration
apparently to evade the payment of correct taxes. Hence, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an
extensive investigation in 1998 on the alleged anomaly.
 In its Report the Committee concluded that there were irregularities committed by the officials of the AFP-
RSBS and recommended the prosecution of those responsible, including petitioner, who had signed the unregistered
deeds of sale as AFP-RSBS President.

Accordingly fourteen (14) informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner for violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents

Then,, junior officers and enlisted men from elite units of the AFP took over the Oakwood Premier
Apartments at Ayala Center in Makati City to air their grievances about graft and corruption in the military. In
response to the incident, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo created a Fact-Finding Commission (Feliciano
Commission) wherein respondents wife, Professor Carolina G. Hernandez, was appointed as one of the
Commissioners.

the Feliciano Commission submitted its Report recommending, among others, the prosecution of
petitioner. President Arroyo then issued Executive Order No. 255 creating the Office of a Presidential Adviser under
the Office of the President to implement the recommendations of the Feliciano Commission.[7] Professor Carolina G.
Hernandez was appointed as Presidential Adviser in the newly created office. Shortly thereafter, respondent Justice
Hernandez was appointed as Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan and assigned to its Fourth Division.

On October 11, 2004, eight additional informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner.
Two were assigned to the Fourth Division of the court, one for violation of R.A. No. 3019, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 28022, and the other for estafa through falsification of public documents, docketed as Criminal Case No. 28023.

petitioner filed two motions to inhibit Justice Hernandez from taking part in the case pending before the
Fourth Division. Petitioner cited that Justice Hernandezs wife, Professor Hernandez, was a member of the Feliciano
Commission and was tasked to implement fully the recommendations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
including his criminal prosecution. Further, the spousal relationship between Justice Hernandez and Professor
Hernandez created in his mind impression of partiality and bias, which circumstance constitutes a just and valid
ground for his inhibition under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.

Held: The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under the first paragraph of the
cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances
mentioned. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the
judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.

An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture and is not one of the just or valid
reasons contemplated in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for which a judge may
inhibit himself from hearing the case. The bare allegations of the judges partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in
the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble
role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor. Verily, for bias and
prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the involuntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough.

we should stress that marital relationship by itself is not a ground to disqualify a judge from hearing a case. Under
the first paragraph of the rule on inhibition, No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife
or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.... The relationship mentioned therein
becomes relevant only when such spouse or child of the judge is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably failed to show that Professor Carolina G. Hernandez is financially or
pecuniarily interested in these cases before the Sandiganbayan to justify the inhibition of Justice Hernandez under
the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137.