FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was
LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF
MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR.
G.R. No. 80718, January 29, 1988
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two
(2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in
the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-
G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September
1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision
in said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27
October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having
been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not
being verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court.
However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect,
this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve
to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out
building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries
to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their
shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed
to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court.
First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M.
Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence
and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision
of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the
last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which
was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of
September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration
on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of
October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse
of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and
denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule
laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895,
August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing
or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on
July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified
the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the
rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with
the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound
discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate
Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643],
reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes
and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, stressed the prospective
application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace
period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave
promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides
rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable. damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to
the lack of necessary repairs.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February
27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which expired on June 30, Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private
1986, and may still be allowed. respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore,
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate
petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine
Court.
of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time inapplicable to this case.
was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the
of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the
instant petition for lack of merit.
coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the
expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of
the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek
refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their
failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case

should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the
time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication
of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues
have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.

GREGORIO R. ABAD vs. ILDEFONSO BLEZA
A.M. No. R-561-RTJ, October 13, 1986
CASE 1
In 1981, a shooting incident in a cockpit occurred where Gregorio Abad,
a colonel escaped death. In that incident, Abad had an argument with
one Potenciano Ponce and the latter’s bodyguard, Francisco Sabater Jr.
Sabater shot Abad and due to medical intervention, Abad survived.
Abad filed two separate criminal cases against Ponce and Sabater.
Ponce was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence (because there
were conflicting testimonies) while Sabater was found guilty of
frustrated homicide but with mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and lack of intent to kill.
Abad, not satisfied with Bleza’s decisions filed an administrative case
against Bleza,
CASE 2
Pacifico Ocampo was an employee of the Manila International Airport
Authority. He filed an administrative case against one Ricardo Ortiz.
After that, Ocampo alleged that Crisanto Cruz (perhaps a friend of
Ortiz? – not mentioned in the case), tried to persuade Ocampo not to
continue with the administrative case against Ortiz. Ocampo did not
accede so allegedly, Cruz filed a separate administrative complaint
against Ocampo. In turn, Ocampo filed a civil case against Cruz before
Judge Bleza. Ocampo alleged that the administrative case against him
was baseless and the same made him suffer embarrassment, mental
shock, anxieties, sleepless nights, and loss of appetite.
Ocampo won and Bleza ordered Cruz to pay for damages. Cruz filed an
administrative case against Bleza for allegedly knowingly rendering a
wrongful decision as Cruz averred that the administrative case was
based on Ocampo’s absenteeism, inefficiency and tardiness which were
all on record and same were presented as evidence which were even
(allegedly) uncontroverted.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bleza should be disciplined.
HELD:
No (in both cases). In the first case, Bleza erred in appreciating
the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to kill in favor of Sabater –
but such error does not hold him administratively liable.
In Criminal Law, in cases of frustrated homicide there is inherently an
intention to kill for if otherwise, it would have been a case of physical
injuries. Bleza found Sabater guilty of frustrated homicide hence it is
error for him to appreciate lack of intention to kill as a mitigating
circumstance.
But as a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Even on the
assumption that the judicial officer has erred in the appraisal of the
evidence, he cannot be held administratively or civilly liable for his
judicial action. A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil
action for acts done by him in the exercise of his judicial function,
however erroneous. Not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his duties makes him liable therefor. To hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of
harassment and would make his position unbearable.
In the second case, the Supreme Court took notice of the fact that it is
on appeal before the Court of Appeals hence it is premature to decide
upon it. Only after the appellate court holds in a final judgment that a
trial judge’s alleged errors were committed deliberately and in bad
faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be leveled
against him.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO ROSQUETA, JR.,
EUGENIO ROSQUETA and CITONG BRINGAS, ATTY. GREGORIO B.
ESTACIO
G.R. No. L-36138, January 31, 1974
Every now and then, although there seems to be more of such cases of
late, a member of the bar is proceeded against for failure to live up to
the responsibility owed to a client as well as to this Court. This is
another such instance. In our resolution of May 25, 1973, we required
respondent Gregorio B. Estacio, counsel de parte for appellants to
show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for
failure to file the brief for appellants within the period which expired
on March 30, 1973. He failed to show cause as thus required, and on
September 7, 1973, we issued a resolution suspending him from the
practice of law except for the purpose of filing the brief which should
be done within thirty days from receipt of notice. Then on October 22,
1973, he filed a motion for reconsideration wherein it appeared that he
did seek to explain his failure to file the brief on time, but he left it to
be mailed on June 9, 1973 with Antonio Rosqueta, Sr., father of
appellants Antonio Rosqueta, Jr. and Eusebio Rosqueta, who, however,
was unable to do so as on the 10th of June, his house caught fire. He
would impress on this Court that he was not informed of such
occurrence until the preparation of his motion for reconsideration. At
any rate, he would stress that both Antonio Rosqueta, Sr. and Salvador
Labariento, father-in-law of the third appellant, Citong Bringas,
informed him they would withdraw the appeal as they could not raise
the money needed for pursuing it. He had a supplement to such motion
for reconsideration filed on October 25, 1973 wherein he stated that
he could not secure the affidavits of appellants themselves as two of
them were in the Penal Colony in Davao and the third in the Iwahig
Penal Colony in Palawan. On November 5, 1973, this Court required
appellants to comment on a motion for reconsideration of respondent
concerning specifically their alleged desire to withdraw appeal.
Then on December 27, 1973, there was a motion of respondent
submitting two affidavits, one from Antonio Rosqueta, Jr. and the
aforesaid Citong Bringas and the other from Eusebio Rosqueta wherein
they indicated their consent and approval to respondent's motion to
withdraw appeal. The joint affidavit of the first two appellants reads as
follows: "1. That we are the same persons named above who have
been charged in Criminal Case No. L-36138 entitled People v. Antonio
Rosqueta, Jr., et al. pending on appeal before the Supreme Court of the
Philippines; 2. That we hereby consent and approve the motion to
withdraw the appeal filed by our counsel, Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio
before the Supreme Court of the Philippines on that Criminal Case No.
L-36138 their pending in said Court;
3. That we have given our consent and approval of our own will
voluntarily, without duress, force, threat or fraud or deceit; [In witness
whereof], we have hereunto set our signatures this 4th day of
December 1973 in the Municipality of Panabo, Davao."1 The affidavit
of Eusebio Rosqueta follows: "1. That I am one of the accused in that
case entitled People v. Antonio Rosqueta, Jr., et al. under G.R. No. L-
36138 now pending before the Supreme Court of the Philippines; 2.
That I hereby give my consent and approval to the Motion to Withdraw
the Appeal which has been filed by our counsel Atty. Gregorio B.
Estacio before the Supreme Court on the above-stated case; 3. That I
have reached this conclusion after I have conferred with our counsel
Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio and this statement hereby revokes and
nullifies the statement signed by me on December 5, 1973 at the
Central Sub-Colony, Iwahig Penal Colony, Palawan before witnesses,
namely, Mr. Abencio B. Gabayan and Miss Merle J. Jopida; 4. That I
have executed this affidavit of my own free will, without intimidation,
threat, fraud, deceit, duress or force; [In witness whereof], I have
hereunto set my hand this 13th day of December, 1973 in the City of
Puerto Princesa."
Respondent's liability is thus mitigated but he cannot be absolved from
the irresponsible conduct of which he is guilty. Respondent should be
aware that even in those cases where counsel de parte is unable to
secure from appellants or from their near relatives the amount
necessary to pursue the appeal, that does not necessarily conclude his
connection with the case. It has been a commendable practice of some
members of the bar under such circumstances, to be designated as
counsel de oficio. That way the interest of justice is best served.
Appellants will then continue to receive the benefits of advocacy from
one who is familiar with the facts of the case. What is more, there is no
undue delay in the administration of justice. Lawyers of such category
are entitled to commendation. They manifest fidelity to the concept
that law is a profession and not a mere trade with those engaged in it
being motivated solely by the desire to make money. Respondent's
conduct yields a different impression. What has earned a reproof
however is his irresponsibility. He should be aware that in the
pursuance of the duty owed this Court as well as to a client, he cannot
be too casual and unconcerned about the filing of pleadings. It is not
enough that he prepares them; he must see to it that they are duly
mailed. Such inattention as shown in this case is inexcusable. At any
rate, the suspension meted on him under the circumstances is more
than justified. It seems, however, that well-nigh five months had
elapsed. That would suffice to atone for his misdeed.
WHEREFORE, the suspension of Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is lifted. The
requirement to file the brief is dispensed with but Atty. Gregorio B.
Estacio is censured for negligence and inattention to duty. Likewise, as
prayed for by appellants themselves, their appeal is dismissed.
JOSE S. DUCAT, JR. vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and
CRISPULO DUCUSIN
A.C. No. 3910. August 14, 2000
Before us is a verified letter-complaint for disbarment against Attys.
Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.; Andres Canares, Jr. and Crispulo Ducusin for
deceit and gross misconduct in violation of the lawyers’ oath.
Investigation proceeded only against respondent Villalon because it
was discovered that Andres Canares was not a lawyer while Atty.
Crispulo Ducusin passed away on February 3, 1996.
In the letter-complaint, complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991,
respondent Villalon, as counsel for the family of complainant, spoke to
the father of complainant and asked that he be given the title over a
property owned by complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and
covered by TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because
he allegedly had to verify the proper measurements of the subject
property. Sometime in November, 1991, however, complainant and his
family were surprised when several people entered the subject
property and, when confronted by the companions of complainant, the
latter were told that they were workers of Canares and were there to
construct a piggery. Complainant complained to the barangay
authorities in Pinugay and narrated the incident but respondent
Canares did not appear before it and continued with the construction
of the piggery in the presence of armed men who were watching over
the construction. Complainant then went to respondent Villalon to
complain about the people of respondent Canares but nothing was
done.
Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent
Canares. In his Reply however, the latter answered that the subject
property was already sold by complainant to respondent Canares in the
amount of P450,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Real Property dated December 5, 1991 and notarized by respondent
Atty. Crispulo Ducusin. Complainant, however, averred that he never
sold the property, signed any document nor received any money
therefor, and he also denied having appeared before respondent
Ducusin who was the notary public for the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Complainant discovered that respondent Villalon claimed that
complainants father allegedly gave the subject property to him
(respondent Villalon) as evidenced by a document of sale purportedly
signed by complainant.
In his Comment, respondent Villalon denied that allegations of the
complainant and in turn, he alleged that the property was given
voluntarily by Jose Ducat, Sr. to him out of close intimacy and for past
legal services rendered. Thereafter, respondent Villalon, with the
knowledge and consent of Jose Ducat, Sr., allowed the subject property
to be used by Andres Canares to start a piggery business without any
monetary consideration. A Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land was then
signed by Jose Ducat, Sr. to evidence that he has conveyed the subject
property to respondent Villalon with the name of respondent Canares
included therein as protection because of the improvements to be
introduced in the subject property. Upon presenting the title covering
the subject property, it was discovered that the property was
registered in the name of Jose Ducat, Jr. and not Jose Ducat, Sr., but
the latter told respondents Villalon and Canares not to worry because
the land was actually owned by him and that he merely placed the
name of his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. Jose Ducat, Sr. then suggested that the
subject property be transferred directly from Jose Ducat, Jr. to
respondent Canares; hence, he (Ducat, Sr.) got the title and guaranteed
that he would return the document already signed and notarized,
which he did the following day. According to respondent Canares, the
trouble began when Jose Ducat, Sr. came to his office demanding to
know why he was not allowed to cut the trees inside the subject
property by the caretaker of respondent Canares.
On January 21, 1993, Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote to this Court and averred
that he neither signed the Deed of Sale covering the subject property
nor did he appear before the notary public Crispulo Ducusin, who
notarized the same. He averred that respondents Villalon and Ducusin
should be disbarred from the practice of law and respondent Villalon
be imprisoned for forging his signature and selling the subject property
without his consent.
In his Rejoinder, respondent Villalon denied the allegations of
complainant and maintained that he is a member of good standing of
the Integrated Bar and that he has always preserved the high standards
of the legal profession. Respondent Villalon expressed his willingness to
have the Deed of Sale examined by the National Bureau of
Investigation and reiterated that the subject property was orally given
to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. and it was only in October, 1991 that the
conveyance was reduced in writing. He added that the complainant
knew that his father, Jose Ducat, Sr., was the person who signed the
said document for and in his behalf and that this was done with his
consent and knowledge.
This Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution
adopting and approving the report and recommendation of its
Investigating Commissioner who found respondent Atty. Villalon guilty,
and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two (2)
years and likewise directed respondent Atty. Villalon to deliver to the
complainant his TCT No. M-3023 within ten (10) days from receipt of
notice, otherwise, this will result in his disbarment.
The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez are
as follows:
Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a
straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner. The sincerity and
demeanor they displayed while testifying before the Commission
inspire belief as to the truth of what they are saying. More importantly,
respondent failed to impute any ill-motive on the part of the
complainant and his witness which can impel them to institute the
instant complaint and testify falsely against him. To be sure, the
testimony of the complainant and his witness deserves the
Commissions full faith and credence.
Respondents evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired.
His defense (that he considered himself the owner of the subject
property which was allegedly given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings
hollow in the face of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible
facts.
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose
Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent (being a lawyer) knew or ought to
know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the said
property unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant
through a Special Power of Attorney. No such authorization has been
given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having given the
subject property to the respondent. This denial is not too difficult to
believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of
said property.
SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that
conveyance of a real property, whether gratuitously or for a
consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he
would consider himself the owner of the subject property on the basis
of the verbal or oral giving of the property by Jose Ducat, Sr. no matter
how many times the latter may have said that.
THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. 1 for the respondent
and Exh. A-2 for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr.
in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr.
covering the subject parcel of land which respondent prepared
allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As
earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said property.
Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a falsified document as
admitted by the respondent himself when he said that the signature
over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was
affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to
know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wifes signature is
tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said
Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper
instead of relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the subject
property was given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact
that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having executed said
document which denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of the
circumstances already mentioned.
FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. 2 for the
respondent and Exh. A-3 for the complainant) allegedly executed by
Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property
(which respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat,
Sr.) is likewise of questionable character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.
has vigorously denied having executed said document. He claims that
he has never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does
not know; that he has never appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to
subscribe to the document; and that he has never received the amount
of P450,000.00 representing the consideration of said transaction.
More importantly, the infirmity of the said Deed of Absolute Sale of
Real Property was supplied by the respondent no less when he
admitted that there was no payment of P450,000.00 and that the same
was placed in the document only to make it appear that the
conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer,
respondent knew or ought to know the irregularity of his act and that
he should have treated the document as another scrap of worthless
paper instead of utilizing the same to substantiate his defense.
After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, it
appears that the findings of facts and observations of the Investigating
Commissioner, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which were all
adopted by its Board of Governors, are well-taken, the same being
supported by the evidence adduced.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the
highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of
his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and
good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by
clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his
duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of
the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the
profession.
It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of
five (5) hectares located in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by
and registered in the name of complainant herein, Jose Ducat, Jr.
Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the property was orally
given to him by complainants father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the
complete knowledge of the fact that the subject property belonged to
his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that conveyance or
transfer of any titled real property must be in writing, signed by the
registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper
special power of attorney and duly notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a
lawyer, is presumed to know, or ought to know, this process. Worse,
when the transfer was first reduced in writing in October, 1991 per
Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land, purportedly in favor of Atty. Arsenio C.
Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr., respondent Villalon knew that it
was Jose Ducat, Sr. who signed the said document of sale without any
Special Power of Attorney from the registered owner thereof, Jose
Ducat, Jr.; and that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife, Maria
Cabrido, under the word Conforme. As regards the subsequent Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991, covering the
same property, this time purportedly in favor of Andres Canares, Jr.
only, respondent Villalon admitted that there was in fact no payment
of P450,000.00 and that the said amount was placed in that document
only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a consideration.
All these taken together, coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.s
strong and credible denial that he allegedly sold the subject property to
respondent Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. and that he allegedly
appeared before respondent notary public Ducusin, convince us that
respondent Villalons acts herein complained of which constitute gross
misconduct were duly proven.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus,
every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the
standards of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility inasmuch as the relationship between an
attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost
fidelity and good faith.
We find, however, the IBPs recommended penalty of two (2) years
suspension to be imposed upon respondent Atty. Villalon too severe in
the light of the facts obtaining in the case at bar. In Cesar V. Roces vs.
Atty. Jose G. Aportadera, this Court suspended therein respondent
Atty. Aportadera for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law
for two main reasons:
(i)....His dubious involvement in the preparation and notarization of the
falsified sale of his clients property merits the penalty of suspension
imposed on him by the IBP Board of Governors; and
(ii)....The NBI investigation reveals that: (1) respondent misrepresented Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalons personal
himself to Gregorio Licuanan as being duly authorized by Isabel Roces record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be
to sell her property; (2) it was respondent who prepared the various furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
deeds of sale over Isabels subdivision lots; (3) Isabel was already
SO ORDERED.
confined at a hospital in Metro Manila on January 4, 1980, the deeds
date of execution; (4) respondent knew that Isabel was hospitalized in
Metro Manila when he subscribed the deed; (5) he knew that Isabel
died in Metro Manila soon after her confinement; and (6) he did not
give the seller a copy of the questioned deed of sale.

Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said case of Aportadera, the

record does not show that respondent Villalon had any direct
participation in the notarization by respondent notary public Crispulo
Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December
5, 1991, which was supposedly signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.
who, however, strongly denied having signed the same. The earlier
Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land dated this ___day of October 1991,
allegedly signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as vendor, covering the same
property, in favor of respondent Arsenio S. Villalon and/or Andres
Canares, Jr. was not notarized. The record also shows that Jose Ducat,
Sr. and complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father and son and that they live
in the same house at 912 Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also
disputed that respondent Villalon has been the lawyer for a number of
years of the family of Jose Ducat, Sr.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby

found guilty of gross misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent Villalon is further directed to deliver to the registered
owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the latters TCT No. M-3023 covering
the subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt of
this Decision, at his sole expense; and that failure on his part to do so
will result in his disbarment.
 PURISIMA BARBA vs. HECTOR S. PEDRO, respondent.
A.M. No. 545-SBC, December 26, 1974
Hector S. Pedro, a successful bar candidate in the 1956 examinations,
having obtained an average of 81.16%, but thus far unsuccessful in his
efforts to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath, which had to be
deferred because of a complaint for immorality filed against him by
Purisima Barba, reiterates his plea for admission to the bar. It is
unquestioned that he had amorous relations with the complainant
resulting in the birth of a child. He failed, however, to marry her, having
thereafter chosen another woman for his bride. After the lapse of
eighteen years, and considering that his conduct in the meanwhile has
not on the whole shown to be blameworthy, this Court feels that he
has sufficiently atoned for that youthful indiscretion, having in mind
likewise, that people of prominence in the municipality where he
resides, did intercede on his behalf. Accordingly, the long-sought
privilege of membership in the bar will not be denied him any longer,
but with this caveat. He must comply with his moral and legal
obligation to his child born out of wedlock with complainant Purisima
Barba.
He has in his favor a resolution of this Court that dates back to January
15, 1969: "In the matter of the petition of Hector S. Pedro to take the
oath as member of the Philippine Bar, alleging that while he passed the
bar examinations given by this Court in 1956 with an average of
81.16%, he was not permitted to take his oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar by reason of an administrative complaint against him
filed with this Court be a Miss Purisima Barba of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte, the complaint alleging immorality in that petitioner, sometime
in July, 1953, came to her house and with lewd designs succeeded in
gratifying his carnal desires, an act repeated thereafter on three
different occasions accompanied by pledges to marry, as a result of
which a child was born on April 23, 1954, a matter which when
investigated resulted in a report that the complaint was well-grounded,
petitioner being prevented thus from taking his oath; the present
petition alleging further that petitioner is now married to Mrs. Estela U.
Pedro, a public school teacher of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and that
from January 4, 1960 up to the present, he has been employed as
community development worker with the Presidential Arm on
Community Development (PACD) that he has since then conducted
himself well in his relations with the community as well as in the
performance of his duties as such official, attaching to his petition
certifications of his good behavior from the Municipal Mayor of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the Provincial Development Officer of the PACD,
the President of the San Nicolas Bar Association, and the Grand Knight
of the Knights of Columbus of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and a
resolution of the Ilocos Norte Bar Association and likewise enclosing an
affidavit of complainant Miss Purisima Barba attesting to petitioner's
good conduct and behavior and expressing that she no longer has any
opposition to his taking his oath as a lawyer this Court resolved to defer
action on such petition until petitioner has given satisfactory proof to
this Court as to the action subsequently pursued by him with reference
to the child who was born out of his relations with complainant Miss
Purisima Barba." Thereafter came this resolution of February 26, 1969:
"Hector S. Pedro having offered proof as to the action subsequently
pursued by him with reference to the child who was born out of his
relations with complainant Purisima Barba, in compliance with the
resolution of January 15, 1969, the Court resolved to allow respondent
Hector S. Pedro to take the lawyer's oath."2 Unfortunately, before he
could do so in accordance with the above resolution, there was a letter
from the aforesaid complainant Purisima Barba objecting to his taking
his oath as a lawyer, premised on the fact that the affidavit submitted
by him as to her withdrawal of her opposition to his membership in the
bar did not represent her true feelings.
Thereafter, on March 6, 1969, this Court suspended the effectivity of
its previous resolution of February 26, 1969, which would have allowed
him to take the lawyer's oath. Moreover, he was required to comment. sufficiently rehabilitated himself. Retribution has been exacted, He has
This he did in a pleading submitted on March 28, 1969. He denied the expiated for his offense. It is understandable that the bitterness in the
allegation of falsity concerning the affidavit of complainant. This Court heart of complainant cannot easily be erased, but that should not
then, in another resolution of April 8, 1969, referred the matter to its prove decisive. Even the most heinous of crimes prescribe after a
Legal Officer, Ricardo Paras Jr., for investigation and report. A report certain period.5 Moreover, as the transgression resulted from the
was submitted on August 26, 1969. It stated that after a careful frailty of flesh, the sociologist MacIver referring to it as "so powerful an
evaluation of the testimony given by the complainant and the appetite," an imperative of life closely associated with the
respondent, the conclusion is warranted that complainant "had all "recklessness and the caprice of desire,"6 this Court feels that all the
along thought that the document Exhibit "A" was an affidavit of years he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer would satisfy
recognition of their daughter, Imelda, and definitely not an affidavit of the requirement that failure to live up to the requisite moral standard
withdrawal of her opposition to Mr. Pedro's admission to the Philippine is not to be taken lightly. It could also be said that in offenses of this
Bar." The parties were heard on the matter on January 19, 1970, with character, the blame hardly belongs to the man alone.7
the complainant standing fast on her firm resolve to prevent
It must be impressed on respondent Hector S. Pedro, however, that
respondent from taking the lawyer's oath. That attitude she has
while his plea to take the lawyer's oath is to be granted, it is
maintained all this while. It remains her deep conviction that
indispensable, if he expects to be a member of the bar in good
respondent lacks good moral character, as proven by his failure to
standing, that he complies with the moral and legal obligation
marry her "after having carnal knowledge of her." As she pointed out in
incumbent upon him as the father of the child born out of wedlock as a
her last pleading dated July 5, 1972: "The respondent was 27 years old
result of his relationship with complainant Purisima Barba.
when he committed the acts complained of and he was very much
qualified to marry the complainant herein, but he did not comply with WHEREFORE, the resolution of March 6, 1969, suspending a previous
his promise to march her to the altar. Instead he married another resolution of February 26, 1969, is set aside and in accordance
woman. therewith, respondent Hector S. Pedro is allowed to take the lawyer's
oath as was provided in the February 26, 1969 resolution.
It cannot be denied that respondent's conduct left much to be desired.
He had committed a transgression, if not against the law, against the
high moral standard requisite for membership in the bar. He had
proven false to his word. What is worse, he did sully her honor. This on
the one side. On the other hand, eighteen years had gone by from the
time of the 1956 examinations. He was a successful bar candidate but
because of this lapse from moral propriety, he has not been allowed to
take the lawyer's oath. It likewise appears, from the testimonials
submitted, that he has behaved rather well. At least, no other misdeed
has been attributed to him. There is no affront to reason then in ruling
that the punishment, while deserved, has lasted long enough. He has
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-
NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATU vs. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU
INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971
Lacsina, Lontok and Perez and Luis F. Aquino for petitioners.
Francisco de los Reyes for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for other respondents.
Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of
the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 and October 20,
1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP.
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU
Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular
Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as
the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers
(FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group
(hereinafter referred to as the Companies).
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon
Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and
acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life
Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a
circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the
members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the
National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the
Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the
Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate
secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department, and he was
soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was receiving from
the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February 19, 1957 as personnel
manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the
negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with
the Unions.
In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted
proposals to the Companies for a modified renewal of their respective
collective bargaining contracts which were then due to expire on
September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and to make
whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective
October 1, 1957.
Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations
were conducted on the Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a
deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions
filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective
bargaining." Several conciliation conferences were held under the
auspices of the Department of Labor wherein the conciliators urged the
Companies to make reply to the Unions' proposals en toto so that the
said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for
union security in exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies
did not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that the
Unions first drop their demand for union security, promising money
benefits if this was done. Thereupon, and prior to April 15, 1958, the
petitioner Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU dropped
this particular demand, and requested the Companies to answer its
demands, point by point, en toto. But the respondent Insular Life
Assurance Co. still refused to make any counter-proposals. In a letter
addressed to the two other Unions by the joint management of the
Companies, the former were also asked to drop their union security
demand, otherwise the Companies "would no longer consider
themselves bound by the commitment to make money benefits
retroactive to October 1, 1957." By a letter dated April 17, 1958, the
remaining two petitioner unions likewise dropped their demand for
union shop. April 25, 1958 then was set by the parties to meet and
discuss the remaining demands.
From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor
demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the
matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the Unions demanded
from the Companies final counter-proposals on their economic
demands, particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-
proposals, the Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and figures
and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula which would
justify their own proposals, taking into account the financial position of
the former. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest
against what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices.
Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors
without increase in salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were
going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was
served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.
On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of
the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and
president, the respondent Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A)
quoted verbatim as follows:
We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct
picketing.
However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you
may:
1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your
intention to do so.
2. Take your meals within the office.
3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to
sleep nights at the office where comfortable cots have been prepared.
4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.
6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.
The decision to make is yours — whether you still believe in the
motives of the strike or in the fairness of the Management.
The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few
unionists who were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter of May
21, 1958.
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called
off on May 31, 1958, some management men tried to break thru the
Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958 Garcia, assistant corporate
secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section,
respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in
front of the Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket
line, tossed aside the placard of a picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight
ensued between them, in which both suffered injuries. The Companies
organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer,
who with the said respondent Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the
picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to
the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance
offered by some picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of
photographs as evidence, the Companies then filed criminal charges
against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of Manila. During the
pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise
filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of First
Instance of Manila which, on the basis of the pendency of the various
criminal cases against striking members of the Unions, issued on May
31, 1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the
said court, from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and
peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the
free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the
Companies' building.
On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent
Olbes, sent individually to the strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted
hereunder in its entirety:
The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.
Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more
convinced of our decision.
We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold
your positions open for long. We have continued to operate and will
continue to do so with or without you.
If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group
Companies, and if there are no criminal charges pending against you,
we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home
office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to
obtain your replacement.
Before, the decisions was yours to make. So it is now.
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the
members of the Unions, except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's
office and by the courts. These three cases involved "slight physical
injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of the Companies
giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be
replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to
report back to work on June 2, 1958.
However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required
them not only to secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of
Manila but also to be screened by a management committee among
the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening
committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges.
However, all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose
from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the
Companies without being required to secure clearances from the
fiscal's office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had
secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies readmitted
only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and
members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the
ground that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the
respondents," without however stating the specific acts allegedly
committed. Among those who were refused readmission are Emiliano
Tabasondra, vice president of the Insular Life Building Employees'
Association-NATU; Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance
Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU; and Isagani Du Timbol,
acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees
Association-NATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately
notified months later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of
June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act
1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been
readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given
to them.
On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice against the Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint
specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the
members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted
action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to
abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of comfortable
cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by
warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2,
1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the
members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike
on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in
the strike.
On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the
material allegations of the complaint, stating special defenses therein,
and asking for the dismissal of the complaint.
After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through
Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez, rendered on August 17, 1965 a
decision dismissing the Unions' complaint for lack of merit. On August
31, 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration
of the said decision, and their supporting memorandum on September
10, 1965. This was denied by the Court of Industrial Relations en banc
in a resolution promulgated on October 20, 1965.
Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower
court erred:
1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in
sending out individually to the strikers the letters marked Exhibits A
and B;
2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the striking members of the Unions in the matter
of readmission of employees after the strike;
3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for
dismissing officials and members of the Unions without giving them the
benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their side in
regard to activities undertaken by them in the legitimate exercise of
their right to strike; and
4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of
the Unions, with full back wages, from June 2, 1958 to the date of their
actual reinstatement to their usual employment.
I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters,
exhibits A and B, constituted a legitimate exercise of their freedom of
speech. We do not agree. The said letters were directed to the striking
employees individually — by registered special delivery mail at that —
without being coursed through the Unions which were representing
the employees in the collective bargaining.
The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually
during a strike following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining
that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were
open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an
unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of
collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually
instead of through their collective bargaining representatives. (31 Am.
Jur. 563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133 F2d 676,
146 ALR 1045)
Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a
collective bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to
negotiate with his employees individually in connection with changes in
the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual
bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the
employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the
employees' bargaining representative (Melo Photo Supply Corporation
vs. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332).
Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting
unwarranted acts of interference. Thus, the act of a company president
in writing letters to the strikers, urging their return to work on terms
inconsistent with their union membership, was adjudged as
constituting interference with the exercise of his employees' right to
collective bargaining (Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621). It is
likewise an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all
employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified therein,
otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform their jobs.
Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the
employer or his representative urging the employees to cease union
activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. All the
above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to
undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to
which they are entitled free from the employer's molestation.
Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to
the employees in order to entice them to return to work, it is not
protected by the free speech provisions of the Constitution (NLRB v.
Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same is true with exhibit B
since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking
employees in the event they did not report for work on June 2, 1958.
The free speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable
where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains
a promise of benefit, or threats, or reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs.
Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB vs. Goigy Co., 211 F2d
533, 35 ALR 2d 422).
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to
"bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and
occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in excess of
eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would
abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-
breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor
practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer
to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they
are represented by a union, since the employees thus offered
reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of
returning to work would be.
Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor
organizations are the following acts: the offer of a Christmas bonus to
all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the making of a
request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the purpose
of mollifying employees after the employer has refused to bargain with
the union, or for the purpose of inducing striking employees to return
to work; the employer's promises of benefits in return for the strikers'
abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and the
employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after the strike started, to
a group of strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if the strikers
returned to work, they would receive new benefits in the form of
hospitalization, accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building
to work in.
Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of
the lower court which states that "the officers and members of the
complainant unions decided to call off the strike and return to work on
June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by the Manila Court of
First Instance," the respondents contend that this was the main cause
why the strikers returned to work and not the letters, exhibits A and B.
This assertion is without merit. The circumstance that the strikers later
decided to return to work ostensibly on account of the injunctive writ
issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic
quality of the letters, which were calculated, or which tended, to
interfere with the employees' right to engage in lawful concerted
activity in the form of a strike. Interference constituting unfair labor
practice will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of
being thwarted or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the
result intended. For success of purpose is not, and should not, be the
criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes
unfair labor practice.
The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced
employees within the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the
employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said
tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under
section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct
evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by
statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference
that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect
on self-organization and collective bargaining.
Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by
themselves alone but should be read in the light of the preceding and
subsequent circumstances surrounding them. The letters should be
interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine,"
... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be
evaluated not only on the basis of their implicit implications, but were
to be appraised against the background of and in conjunction with
collateral circumstances. Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion
by an employer which, though innocent in themselves, frequently were
held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they
were uttered, the history of the particular employer's labor relations or
anti-union bias or because of their connection with an established
collateral plan of coercion or interference.
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of
proposals for an amended renewal of their respective collective
bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe
Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as
personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary, respectively,
with attractive compensations. After the notice to strike was served on
the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the Department of
Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors
without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling these
employees to resign from their unions. And during the negotiations in
the Department of Labor, despite the fact that the petitioners granted
the respondents' demand that the former drop their demand for union
shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department of
Labor, the respondents adamantly refused to answer the Unions'
demands en toto. Incidentally, Enage was the chairman of the
negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining
between the former and the Unions. After the petitioners went to
strike, the strikers were individually sent copies of exhibit A, enticing
them to abandon their strike by inducing them to return to work upon
promise of special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru
their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three
truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who,
despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied
by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters
wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of
the premises of the Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on the
part of the picketers and the strike-breakers.lâwphî1.ñèt Then the
respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three
of which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight
misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents
were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance
restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the
free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway
and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and
in, of the Companies' buildings. On the same day that the injunction
was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent — again individually and by
registered special delivery mail — to the strikers, threatening them
with dismissal if they did not report for work on or before June 2, 1958.
But when most of the petitioners reported for work, the respondents
thru a screening committee — of which Ramon Garcia was a member
— refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of
"pending criminal charges." However, when almost all were cleared of
criminal charges by the fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly
refused admission to 34 officials and union members. It is not,
however, disputed that all-non-strikers with pending criminal charges
which arose from the breakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were
readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among the non-strikers
with pending criminal charges who were readmitted were Generoso Plaza Moraga, Manila
Abella, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Federico INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATION
Barretto, Manuel Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact Plaza Moraga, Manila .
that the fiscal's office found no probable cause against the petitioning for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING...
strikers, the Companies adamantly refused admission to them on the
pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the
However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day
respondents," without stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly
period, reckoned from January 27, 1958. This simply proves that the
committed. They were soon to admit, however, that these alleged
reason for the strike was not the deadlock on collective bargaining nor
inimical acts were the same criminal charges which were dismissed by
any lack of economic concessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958, the
the fiscal and by the courts.
respondents categorically stated what they thought was the cause of
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the the "Notice of Strike," which so far as material, reads:
issuance of the letters, exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that
3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the
the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not
union shop, you filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor
destroy unionism within them.
Relations on 27 January 1958, citing `deadlock in collective bargaining'
To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure which could have been for no other issue than the union shop."
replacements for them in order to protect and continue their business,
The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice
the CIR held the petitioners' strike to be an economic strike on the
of strike was filed. And the actual and main reason for the strike was,
basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that there was a
"When it became crystal clear the management double crossed or will
"deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of the supposed
not negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to refusal collectively and
testimonies of some union men who did not actually know the very
considering the unfair labor practice in the meantime being committed
reason for the strike. It should be noted that exhibit 4, which was filed
by the management such as the sudden resignation of some unionists
on January 27, 1958, states, inter alia:
and [who] became supervisors without increase in salary or change in
responsibility, such as the coercion of employees, decided to declare
the strike." (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958, p. 14.) The truth of this assertion is
TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
amply proved by the following circumstances: (1) it took the
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR MANILA
respondents six (6) months to consider the petitioners' proposals, their
Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic]
only excuse being that they could not go on with the negotiations if the
unions intends to go on strike against
petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (exh. 7,
respondents' letter dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.
dropped the demand for union shop, the respondents did not have a
Plaza Moraga, Manila
counter-offer to the petitioners' demands. Sec. 14 of Rep. Act 875
required the respondents to make a reply to the petitioners' demands
THE FGU INSURANCE GROUP
within ten days from receipt thereof, but instead they asked the
petitioners to give a "well reasoned, workable formula which takes into
account the financial position of the group companies."
II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the
strikers, namely: (1) the employee must be interested in continuing his
work with the group companies; (2) there must be no criminal charges
against him; and (3) he must report for work on June 2, 1958,
otherwise he would be replaced. Since the evidence shows that all the
employees reported back to work at the respondents' head office on
June 2, 1953, they must be considered as having complied with the first
and third conditions.
Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also
complied with the second condition. It is not denied that when the
strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63 members of the Unions
were refused readmission because they had pending criminal charges.
However, despite the fact that they were able to secure their
respective clearances 34 officials and union members were still refused
readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical to
the Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that non-strikers who
also had criminal charges pending against them in the fiscal's office,
arising from the same incidents whence the criminal charges against
the strikers evolved, were readily readmitted and were not required to
secure clearances. This is a clear act of discrimination practiced by the
Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a violation of sec.
4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act.
The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in
general. They separated the active from the less active unionists on the
basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists
belonging to the first category were refused readmission even after
they were able to secure clearances from the competent authorities
with respect to the criminal charges filed against them. It is significant
to note in this connection that except for one union official who
deserted his union on the second day of the strike and who later
participated in crashing through the picket lines, not a single union
officer was taken back to work. Discrimination undoubtedly exists
where the record shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers
has been less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied
reinstatement.
So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although
authorized by the Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the
employees who participated in an illegal strike, dismissed only the
leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of discrimination
against those dismissed and constituting a waiver of the employer's
right to dismiss the striking employees and a condonation of the fault
committed by them."
It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate
themselves from charges of discrimination in the readmission of
strikers returning to work — the respondents delegated the power to
readmit to a committee. But the respondent Olbes had chosen Vicente
Abella, chief of the personnel records section, and Ramon Garcia,
assistant corporate secretary, to screen the unionists reporting back to
work. It is not difficult to imagine that these two employees — having
been involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the
strike — were hostile to the strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of
placing in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of
reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring.
Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is
having the machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees
hostile to the strikers, and reinstating a union official who formerly
worked in a unionized plant, to a job in another mill, which was
imperfectly organized.
Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the
members of the screening committee admitted the discrimination
committed against the strikers, they tossed back and around to each
other the responsibility for the discrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted
that in exercising for the management the authority to screen the
returning employees, the committee admitted the non-strikers but
refused readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6, 1962, pp. 15-19, 23-
29). Vicente Abella, chairman of the management's screening
committee, while admitting the discrimination, placed the blame
therefor squarely on the management (tsn., Sept. 20, 1960, pp. 7-8, 14-
18). But the management, speaking through the respondent Olbes,
head of the Companies, disclaimed responsibility for the
discrimination. He testified that "The decision whether to accept or not
an employee was left in the hands of that committee that had been
empowered to look into all cases of the strikers."
Of course, the respondents — through Ramon Garcia — tried to explain
the basis for such discrimination by testifying that strikers whose
participation in any alleged misconduct during the picketing was not
serious in nature were readmissible, while those whose participation
was serious were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56). But even this
distinction between acts of slight misconduct and acts of serious
misconduct which the respondents contend was the basis for either
reinstatement or discharge, is completely shattered upon a cursory
examination of the evidence on record. For with the exception of
Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal sent to the other strikers cited the
alleged commission by them of simple "acts of misconduct."
III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not
a single dismissed striker was given the opportunity to defend himself
against the supposed charges against him. As earlier mentioned, when
the striking employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the
respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the
necessary clearances; but when all, except three, were able to secure
and subsequently present the required clearances, the respondents
still refused to take them back. Instead, several of them later received
letters from the respondents in the following stereotyped tenor:
This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular
Life-FGU Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958.
The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you
committed acts of misconduct while picketing during the last strike.
Because this may not constitute sufficient cause under the law to
terminate your employment without pay, we are giving you the
amount of P1,930.32 corresponding to one-half month pay for every
year of your service in the Group Company.
Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JOSE M. OLBES
President, Insurance Life
Acting President, FGU.
The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of
misconduct" attributed to the dismissed strikers were the same acts
with which the said strikers were charged before the fiscal's office and
the courts. But all these charges except three were dropped or
dismissed.
Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the
striking unions do not indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.
Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance
Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, was refused
reinstatement allegedly because he did not report for duty on June 2,
1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the overwhelming
evidence adduced at the trial and which the respondents failed to
rebut, negates the respondents' charge that he had abandoned his job.
In his testimony, corroborated by many others, Tabasondra particularly
identified the management men to whom he and his group presented
themselves on June 2, 1958. He mentioned the respondent Olbes'
secretary, De Asis, as the one who received them and later directed
them — when Olbes refused them an audience — to Felipe Enage, the
Companies' personnel manager. He likewise categorically stated that
he and his group went to see Enage as directed by Olbes' secretary. If
Tabasondra were not telling the truth, it would have been an easy
matter for the respondents to produce De Asis and Enage — who
testified anyway as witnesses for the respondents on several occasions
— to rebut his testimony. The respondents did nothing of the kind.
Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents'
attention to his non-admission and asked them to inform him of the
reasons therefor, but instead of doing so, the respondents dismissed
him by their letter dated July 10, 1958. Elementary fairness required
that before being dismissed for cause, Tabasondra be given "his day in
court."
At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after
notice to return, does not constitute abandonment nor bar
reinstatement. In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the taking
back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination although the five
strikers who were not reinstated, all of whom were prominent in the
union and in the strike, reported for work at various times during the
next three days, but were told that there were no openings. Said the
Court:
... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported,
that, in taking back six union men, the respondent's officials
discriminated against the latter on account of their union activities and
that the excuse given that they did not apply until after the quota was
full was an afterthought and not the true reason for the discrimination
against them. (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58
Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381)
The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned
after being refused readmission on June 2, 1958, is not persuasive.
When the employer puts off reinstatement when an employee reports
for work at the time agreed, we consider the employee relieved from
the duty of returning further.
Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite
the fact that the Companies spent more than P80,000 for the vacation
trips of officials, they refused to grant union demands; hence, he
betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies. We do not find this
allegation convincing. First, this accusation was emphatically denied by
Tongos on the witness stand. Gonzales, president of one of the
respondent Companies and one of the officials referred to, took a trip
abroad in 1958. Exchange controls were then in force, and an outgoing
traveller on a combined business and vacation trip was allowed by the
Central Bank, per its Circular 52 (Notification to Authorized Agent
Banks) dated May 9, 1952, an allocation of $1,000 or only P2,000, at
the official rate of two pesos to the dollar, as pocket money; hence,
this was the only amount that would appear on the books of the
Companies. It was only on January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133
(Notification to Authorized Agent Banks), that the Central Bank lifted
the exchange controls. Tongos could not therefore have revealed an
amount bigger than the above sum. And his competence in figures
could not be doubted considering that he had passed the board
examinations for certified public accountants. But assuming arguendo
that Tongos indeed revealed the true expenses of Gonzales' trip —
which the respondents never denied or tried to
disprove — his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's
right to discuss and advertise the facts involved in a labor dispute, in
accordance with section 9(a)(5) of Republic Act 875 which guarantees
the untramelled exercise by striking employees of the right to give
"publicity to the existence of, or the fact involved in any labor dispute,
whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling or by any method not
involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only the right, it is as well
the duty, of every unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute for the
purpose of informing all those affected thereby. In labor disputes, the
combatants are expected to expose the truth before the public to
justify their respective demands. Being a union man and one of the
strikers, Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on whether or
not the respondent Companies were justified in refusing to accede to
union demands. After all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not
a part of management. And his statement, if indeed made, is but an
expression of free speech protected by the Constitution.
Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor
relation is to me a constitutional and useful right. Labor is free ... to
turn its publicity on any labor oppression, substandard wages,
employer unfairness, or objectionable working conditions. The
employer, too, should be free to answer and to turn publicity on the
records of the leaders of the unions which seek the confidence of his
men ...
The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential
information, Tongos committed not only a betrayal of trust but also a
violation of the moral principles and ethics of accountancy. But
nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants under
the Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of Accountancy
formulated in 1954, is this stated. Moreover, the relationship of the
Companies with Tongos was that of an employer and not a client. And
with regard to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin Carillo,
both vice-presidents of the Trust Insurance Agencies, Inc. about the
alleged utterances made by Tongos, the lower court should not have
given them much weight. The firm of these witnesses was newly
established at that time and was still a "general agency" of the
Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude that they were more
inclined to favor the respondents rather than Tongos.
Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Daño, Vicente Alsol
and Hermenigildo Ramirez, opined the lower court, were constructively
dismissed by non-readmission allegedly because they not only
prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente
Abella, chief of the personnel records section of the Companies, from
entering the Companies' premises on May 21, 1958, but they also
caused bruises and abrasions on Garcia's chest and forehead — acts
considered inimical to the interest of the respondents. The Unions,
upon the other hand, insist that there is complete lack of evidence that
Ner took part in pushing Garcia; that it was Garcia who elbowed his
way through the picket lines and therefore Ner shouted "Close up,"
which the picketers did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino Bugay's placard
and a fight ensued between them in which both suffered injuries. But
despite these conflicting versions of what actually happened on May
21, 1958, there are grounds to believe that the picketers are not
responsible for what happened.lâwphî1.ñèt The picketing on May 21,
1958, as reported in the police blotter, was peaceful (see Police blotter
report, exh. 3 in CA-G.R. No. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where
Ner was acquitted). Moreover, although the Companies during the
strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie building at Escolta,
Manila; Tuason Building at San Vicente Street, Manila; and Ayala, Inc.
offices at Makati, Rizal, Garcia, the assistant corporate secretary, and
Abella, the chief of the personnel records section, reported for work at
the Insular Life Building. There is therefore a reasonable suggestion
that they were sent to work at the latter building to create such an
incident and have a basis for filing criminal charges against the
petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for injunction from the
court of first instance. Besides, under the circumstances the picketers
were not legally bound to yield their grounds and withdraw from the
picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate
exercise of their rights, they had every reason to defend themselves
and their rights from any assault or unlawful transgression. Yet the
police blotter, about adverted to, attests that they did not resort to
violence.
The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket
line do not affect or diminish the right to strike. Persuasive on this
point is the following commentary: .

We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately
quite usual in any extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is
essentially a battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in it are
human beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising passions
call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket line. The
transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in
the contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight.
Violence of this nature, however much it is to be regretted, must have
been in the contemplation of the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13
of Act 29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing therein should be construed so
as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike.
If this were not so, the rights afforded to employees by the Act would
indeed be illusory. We accordingly recently held that it was not
intended by the Act that minor disorders of this nature would deprive a
striker of the possibility of reinstatement.
Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon Garcia
was but a necessary incident of the strike and should not be considered
as a bar to reinstatement. Thus it has been held that:
Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a
strike is no bar to reinstatement.
Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were
transgressions of law, they amount only to mere ordinary
misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement.
In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that
unlawful acts are not bar to reinstatement.
Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges
against non-striking employees before the fiscal's office, they were
readily admitted, but those strikers who had pending charges in the
same office were refused readmission. The reinstatement of the
strikers is thus in order.
[W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty
with those whose reinstatement is opposed, or in other ways, gives rise
to the inference that union activities rather than misconduct is the
basis of his [employer] objection, the Board has usually required
reinstatement."
Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio
Ibarra allegedly because he committed acts inimical to the interest of
the respondents when, as president of the FGU Workers and
Employees Association-NATU, he advised the strikers that they could
use force and violence to have a successful picket and that picketing
was precisely intended to prevent the non-strikers and company clients
and customers from entering the Companies' buildings. Even if this
were true, the record discloses that the picket line had been generally
peaceful, and that incidents happened only when management men
made incursions into and tried to break the picket line. At any rate,
with or without the advice of Ibarra, picketing is inherently explosive.
For, as pointed out by one author, "The picket line is an explosive front,
charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-
management dispute. It may be marked by colorful name-calling,
intimidating threats or sporadic fights between the pickets and those
who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 752).
The picket line being the natural result of the respondents' unfair labor
practice, Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a
bar to reinstatement. Besides, the only evidence presented by the
Companies regarding Ibarra's participation in the strike was the
testimony of one Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of the board
of directors of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers and
Employees Union-NATU, who became a "turncoat" and who likewise
testified as to the union activities of Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and
others (annex C, Decision, p. 27) — another matter which emphasizes
the respondents' unfair labor practice. For under the circumstances,
there is good ground to believe that Encarnacion was made to spy on
the actvities of the union members. This act of the respondents is
considered unjustifiable interference in the union activities of the
petitioners and is unfair labor practice.
It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an
employer of union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances
of interference, restraint or coercion of employees in connection with
their right to organize, form and join unions as to constitute unfair
labor practice.
... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization than such
activity even where no discharges result. The information obtained by
means of espionage is in valuable to the employer and can be used in a
variety of cases to break a union." The unfair labor practice is
committed whether the espionage is carried on by a professional labor
spy or detective, by officials or supervisory employees of the employer,
or by fellow employees acting at the request or direction of the
employer, or an ex-employee..."
IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the
officials and members of the Unions, with full back wages from June 2,
1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual
employment. Because all too clear from the factual and environmental
milieu of this case, coupled with settled decisional law, is that the
Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor practices committed
by the respondents, and that when the strikers reported back for work
— upon the invitation of the respondents — they were discriminatorily
dismissed. The members and officials of the Unions therefore are
entitled to reinstatement with back pay.
[W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on
the part of an employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the
strikers are entitled to reinstatement with back pay.
An employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions of
the Act is entitled to reinstatement with back pay upon an adjudication
that the discharge was illegal."
And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege
that the positions of these union members have already been filled by
replacements.
Where the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to
the strike or where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an
"unfair labor practice," the employer cannot successfully urge as a
defense that the striking or lock-out employees position has been filled
by replacement. Under such circumstances, if no job sufficiently and
satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the aggrieved
employee can be found, the employer must discharge the replacement
employee, if necessary, to restore the striking or locked-out worker to
his old or comparable position ... If the employer's improper conduct
was an initial cause of the strike, all the strikers are entitled to
reinstatement and the dismissal of replacement employees wherever
necessary; ... .
A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what date
should the backpay payable to the unionists be computed? It is now a
settled doctrine that strikers who are entitled to reinstatement are not
entitled to back pay during the period of the strike, even though it is
caused by an unfair labor practice. However, if they offer to return to
work under the same conditions just before the strike, the refusal to
re-employ or the imposition of conditions amounting to unfair labor
practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act and
the employer is liable for backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell
Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, L-19778, Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 124; Id.,
Resolution on motion for reconsideration, 13 SCRA 258; see also
Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 730 and the cited cases). We
have likewise ruled that discriminatorily dismissed employees must
receive backpay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from
the date of their discharge (Cromwell Commercial Employees and
Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra).
The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work
on June 2, 1958, which the latter did. A great number of them,
however, were refused readmission because they had criminal charges
against them pending before the fiscal's office, although non-strikers
who were also facing criminal indictments were readily readmitted.
These strikers who were refused readmission on June 2, 1958 can thus
be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed employees and are
entitled to backpay from said date. This is true even with respect to the
petitioners Jose Pilapil, Paulino Bugay, Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were
found guilty only of misdemeanors which are not considered sufficient
to bar reinstatement (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining,
p. 854), especially so because their unlawful acts arose during incidents
which were provoked by the respondents' men. However, since the
employees who were denied readmission have been out of the service
of the Companies (for more than ten years) during which they may
have found other employment or other means of livelihood, it is only
just and equitable that whatever they may have earned during that
period should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate
somewhat the liability of the company, pursuant to the equitable
principle that no one is allowed to enrich himself at the expense of
another
The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and
acceptance by the dismissed employees of separation pay. This Court
has ruled that while employers may be authorized under Republic Act
1052 to terminate employment of employees by serving the required
notice, or, in the absence thereof, by paying the required
compensation, the said Act may not be invoked to justify a dismissal
prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal for union activities.
... While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment
to terminate the employment of its employee by serving notice on him
one month in advance, or, in the absence thereof, by paying him one
month compensation from the date of the termination of his
employment, such Act does not give to the employer a blanket
authority to terminate the employment regardless of the cause or
purpose behind such termination. Certainly, it cannot be made use of
as a cloak to circumvent a final order of the court or a scheme to
trample upon the right of an employee who has been the victim of an
unfair labor practice.
Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of fact
of the Court of Industrial Relations are supported by substantial and
credible proof. This Court is not therefore precluded from digging
deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union of Philippine
Education Employees v. Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; Lu
Do & Lu Ym Corporation v. Philippine-Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, 11
SCRA 134 [1964]).
V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt
the respondent Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of
Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private respondents, on
the ground that the former wrote the following in his decision subject
of the instant petition for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same
on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: .
... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:
In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as
to whether or not the acts of the employees concerned justified the
adoption of the employer of disciplinary measures against them, the
mere fact that the employees may be able to put up a valid defense in
a criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or neutralize
the employer's right to impose discipline on said employees. For it is
settled that not even the acquittal of an employee of the criminal
charge against him is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline
on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charged was
based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's
interest... The act of the employees now under consideration may be
considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal. (Lopez,
Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-
20179-81, December 28, 1964.)
The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which
contained the underscored portions of the above citation read
however as follows:
Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito
Vicente, we are inclined to uphold the action taken by the employer as
proper disciplinary measure. A reading of the article which allegedly
caused their dismissal reveals that it really contains an insinuation
albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure by the
Manila Chronicle management upon the City Fiscal's Office, resulting in
the non-filing of the case against the employer. In rejecting the
employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente and Aquino was
justified, the lower court considered the article as "a report of some
acts and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his official
functions" and, therefore, does away with the presumption of malice.
This being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the matter should not
have been viewed or gauged in the light of the doctrine on a
publisher's culpability under the Penal Code. We are not here to
determine whether the employees' act could stand criminal
prosecution, but only to find out whether the aforesaid act justifies the
adoption by the employer of disciplinary measure against them. This is
not sustaining the ruling that the publication in question is qualified
privileged, but even on the assumption that this is so, the exempting
character thereof under the Penal Code does not necessarily erase or
neutralize its effect on the employer's interest which may warrant
employment of disciplinary measure. For it must be remembered that
not even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against
him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its
employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges was based
constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest.
In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his
"suspicion," which actually amounts to a public accusation, that his
employer is exerting political pressure on a public official to thwart
some legitimate activities on the employees, which charge, in the least,
would sully the employer's reputation, can be nothing but an act
inimical to the said employer's interest. And the fact that the same was
made in the union newspaper does not alter its deleterious character
nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the ground that it is a
union activity, because such end can be achieved without resort to
improper conduct or behavior. The act of the employees now under
consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause
for dismissal.
It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the
paragraph quoted by the respondent Judge do not appear in the
pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L-20179-81. Moreover,
the first underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For
it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...," in
this Court's decision. Finally, the second and last underlined sentence
in the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision, appears
not in the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other
sentence is, but in the immediately succeeding paragraph.
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment
for contempt against the respondent Judge and the respondents'
counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a
result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the
respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many
pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to
imagine that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious
work, clerical errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the
respondents' counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the
quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge's decision, to copy it Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there
verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the was no substantial change in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling
underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's which they cited. It is our view, nonetheless, that for their mistake,
decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the they should be, as they are hereby, admonished to be more careful
particular ruling in this Court's decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the when citing jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of
acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 is reversed and
to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should set aside, and another is entered, ordering the respondents to
the act upon which the criminal charges were based constitute reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their
nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest." former or comparatively similar positions, with backwages from June 2,
1958 up to the dates of their actual reinstatements. Costs against the
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this
respondents.
Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges
and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and
punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and
salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's
decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and
litigants, take their bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in
article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of
last resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial,
et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court
establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever
present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the
decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct
meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who
may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar
meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations
of authorities culled not only from this Court's decisions but from other
sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down
to the last word and punctuation mark, appellate courts will be
precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved precious
time in finding out whether the citations are correct.
 FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 1998
FACTS:
M/V Pavlodar owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping
Company (FESC) arrived at the port of Manila. Senen Gavino was
assigned by the Manila Pilot's Association (MPA) to conduct docking
manuevers for the safe berthing of the vessel. Gavino stationed himself
in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside
him. When the vessel was already about 2000 feet from the pier,
Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to
the crew of the vessel. However, the anchor did not hold as expected.
The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between
the crew members. When Gavino inquired about the commotion,
Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it. The bow of the
vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage
to the pier. PPA filed a complaint for a sum of money against FESC,
Gavino and MPA. CA ruled in favor of PPA holding them liable with
MPA (employer of Kavankov) entitled to reimbursement from Gavino.
ISSUE:
Are the counsels for the parties committed acts which require
the exercise of the court's disciplinary powers?
HELD:
YES. The records show that the law firm of Del Rosario and Del
Rosario thru its associate, Atty Tria, is the counsel of record for FESC in
both GR no 130068 and GR no 130150. GR 130068 which is assigned to
the Court's second division, commenced with the filing of a verified
motion for extension of time which contained a certification against
forum shopping signed by counsel Tria stating that to the best of his
knowledge there is no action or proceeding pending in the SC, CA or
any other tribunal. Reviewing the records, the court finds that the
petition filed by MPA in GR no, 130150 then pending with the third
division was duly filed with a copy thereof furnished by registered mail
to counsel for FESC (atty Tria). It would be fair to conclude that when
FESC filed its petition GR no 130068, it would already have received a
copy of the copy of the petition by MPA. It was therefore encumbent
upon FESC to inform the court of the pending action. But considering
that it was a superfluity at that stage of the proceeding, it being
unnecessary to file such certification of non-forum shopping with a
mere motion for extension, the court disregarded such error. On the
other hand, it took the OSG, representing PPA, an ordinately and
unreasonably long period of time to file its comment, thus unduly
delaying the resolution of these cases. In GR no 130068, it took 210
days before the OSG filed its comment. FESC was not even furnished
with a copy. In G.R. no 130150 it took 180 days before comment was
filed. This disinclination of the OSG to seasonably file required
pleadings constitutes deplorable disservice to the public and can only
be categorized as inefficiency on the part of the govt law office.
Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario,
specifically its associate Tria is reprimanded and warned that a
repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with severely. The original
members of the legal team of the OSG are admonished and warned
that a repetition shall also be dealt with more stringently. Baka lang
itanong kung ano ruling: The decision of the CA is affirmed. Gavino,
MPA and FESC are declared solidarily liable with MPA entitled to
reimbursement from Gavino for such amount of the adjudged
pecuniary liability in excess of the amount equivalent to 75% of its
prescribed reserved fund.