UY V CA 346 SCRA 246

FACTS: This is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of CA and its resolution
denying reconsideration reversing that of the RTC declaring void the special
proceedings instituted therein by petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda Jardeleza
in view of the comatose condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., with
approval of the court, to dispose of their conjugal property in favor of co-petitioners,
their daughter and son-in-law, for the ostensible purpose of “financial need in the
personal, business and medical expenses of her ‘incapacitated’ husband”
• March 25, 1991 – Ernesto Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatose
and incapable of motor and mental functions.
• June 6, 1991 – Teodoro Jardeleza, Ernesto’s son, filed a petition for
guardianship of his father. He averred that due to Ernesto’s current
condition, he cannot competently administer his properties. In order to
prevent the loss and wasteful expenditure of Jardelezas’ real and personal
assets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to administer said
properties. He prayed that the guardianship be issued in favor of the wife
and that in the meantime, no property be negotiated, mortgaged or
alienated to third persons
• June 13, 1991 – The wife filed a petition declaring the incapacity of the
husband and assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal
properties and prayed for authorization from the court to sell a parcel of land
(lot no. 4291) due pay for medical expenses of the husband
• June 20, 1991 – RTC rendered a decision in favor of the wife’s petition
pursuant to Art. 124 FC; that the wife is the sole administrator due to the
husband’s incapacity and authorize the sale of the lot in question to pay
medical bills
• Son Teodoro opposed petition; assumption of sole administratorship and
authority to sell conjugal properties is essentially a petition for guardianship
of person and properties of Ernesto and as such it cannot be proceeded in
accordance with Art. 253 FC. It should follow the rules on special proceedings
set in ROC. Also, under NCC, Ernesto acquired vested rights as a conjugal
partner and such rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced without his consent.
• Teodoro filed motion for reconsideration on the following grounds:
1. CPG has other assets to pay off financial obligations.
2. Medical bills can be offset since Ernesto can pay on installment since
he has stocks in the hospital
3. Two of his attending physicians are his own sons who are not charging
him anything
• While motion for reconsideration was pending, the wife sold the said property
to daughter (Glenda Uy) for P 8M. July 23, 1991, the wife filed an urgent ex-
parte motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale
• December 19, 1991 – RTC denied Teodoro’s motion for reconsideration and
approved the wife’s motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale citing
that Teodoro does not have the personality to oppose the petition since the
property belongs to CPG and both spouses are still alive
• December 9, 1992 – CA reversed RTC decision and ordered RTC to declare
sale VOID.
ISSUE: Due to the comatose condition of the husband, can the wife assume sole
powers of administration over conjugal properties and dispose of a parcel of land
with the approval for the court?

HELD: CA ruled that due to the condition of the husband, the rules on summary
proceedings in relation to Art. 124 FC are not applicable. What Art. 124 covers are
situations where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the
other, or the consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. SUCH RULES DO NOT
APPLY TO CASES WHERE THE NON-CONSENTING SPOUSE IS INCAPACITATED OR
INCOMPETENT TO GIVE CONSENT. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial
guardianship under Rule 93 of 1964 ROC.

Even if the rules of summary judicial proceedings under FC applied to the wife’s
administrative powers, the wife who assumes the sole powers of administration has
the same powers and duties as a guardian under the ROC

A spouse who desires to sell a real property as such administrator of CPG must
observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial
guardians under Rule 95 ROC, not summary judicial proceedings under FC

In the present case, RTC did not comply with the procedures under ROC and the
requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under FC: it did not serve notice
of the petition to the incapacitated spouse and it did not require him to show cause
why the petition should not be granted.

SABALONES V CA 230 SCRA 79

FACTS: As an ambassador petitioner Samson Sabalones was assigned to different
countries and as such, he left the administration of their conjugal properties to his
wife Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones
• 1985 – Sabalones retired as ambassador to live in the Philippines but did not
return to his family. In 1989, he filed judicial authorization to sell their
Greenhills property. He alleged that he was 68 yrs old, very sick and living
alone with no income.
• Remedies opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for
legal separation. She alleged that the Greenhills property was
occupied by her and their 6 children and they were dependent on
the rentals of their other properties. She also informed the court that
despite Sabalones’ retirement, he did not return to his legitimate family and
instead maintained a separate residence with Thelma Cumareng and their 3
children. Remedios prayed for a decree of legal separation and liquidation of
their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband’s share. Also prayed
for preventing the Sabalones from disturbing the tenants in the Forbes Park
property and disposing any of the conjugal properties
• After trial, Judge Mariano Umali found that the petitioner had indeed
contracted a bigamous marriage on October 5, 1981 with Thelma Cumareng.
The court, then, decreed the legal separation of Sabalones and Remedios ,
forfeiture of his share in the conjugal properties and non-entitlement to
support
 • Pendente lite, Remedios filed a motion for issuance of a write of preliminary
injunction preventing Sabalones from interfering in the administration of their
properties. Petitioner opposed motion
• April 7, 1992 – CA granted the preliminary injunction
• Petitioner argued that the law provides of a joint administration of the
conjugal properties by the husband and wife, citing Art. 124 FC. Also the
court failed to appoint an administrator pursuant to Art. 61 FC

ISSUE: Whether or not the wife, pendente lite, can enter into a contract of lease of
a conjugal property without the consent of both spouses

HELD: While the law does indeed grant the spouses joint administration over
conjugal properties under Art. 124 FC, Art. 61 of the same code is to be applied in
the instant case since the legal separation case filed by the wife is still pending.
Pending the appointment of an administrator over the conjugal assets, CA was
justified in allowing the wife to continue with her administration pursuant to Art. 61
FC. This provision states that after a petition for legal separation has been
filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement between
the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as
the administrator.

While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such
designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any
share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator
thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it
issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under
challenge.

The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the

status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties
and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during the
pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or
continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make
ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the
plaintiff.

RAVINA V VILLA-ABRILLE G.R. NO 160708 OCTOBER 16, 2009

FACTS: Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. In
1982, the spouses acquired lot 7 in Davao City with TCT T-88674 in their names.
Said lot was adjacent to lot 8 which Pedro acquired when he was still single and was
registered solely under his name (TCT T-26471)
• Spouses used their conjugal funds and loan from DBP to build a house on 7
and Pedro’s lot. Consequently, they made improvements, including a poultry
house and an annex
• 1991 – The husband got a mistress and started to neglect his family. The
wife was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family.
• On his own, the husband wanted to dispose of the house and two lots to the
petitioners Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. The wife opposed but the
husband still sold the property without the wife’s consent and signature
 • July 5, 1991 – While the wife and children were out, the husband and some
CAFGU members transferred all their belongings from the house to an
apartment. When they got home, the were prevented from entering the
house. Thus, the wife filed a complaint for the annulment of sale with
damages against the husband and the petitioners.
• During the trial, the husband alleged that the house was built from his
exclusive funds
• September 26, 1995 – RTC ruled in favor of the wife, declaring that the sale
of lot 8 was void, being a conjugal property while the sale of lot 7 was valid
since it was the husband’s exclusive property
• CA declared that: sale of lot 7 to petitioners is valid but the sale of lot 8 is null
and void; that the husband is ordered to return the value of the consideration
for lot 8 to petitioners; that petitioners are ordered to reconvey the house
and lot to the wife

ISSUE: Whether or not the husband can sell a property which is part exclusive and
part conjugal

HELD: Art. 160 NCC provides that “all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proven that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife.” Lot 7 is an exclusive property of the husband since it
was acquired prior to his marriage with the respondent. However lot 8 was
acquired in 1983 during the marriage of the spouses. There is no evidence proving
that the subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. The
presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of and
convincing evidence to over come the presumption.

A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the

Family Code on August 3, 1988 is governed by Art. 124 FC which states that a
disposition or encumbrance is void if done a. without the consent of both the
husband and wife , or; b. in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority
of the court.
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband’s deciwision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing
such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to

participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have
the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
 before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Unlike in the NCC which gives the wife 10 years to annul the alienation or
encumbrance, any alienation or encumbrance under the FC without the consent of
both spouses is NULL AND VOID. Just like in ACP, if the husband, without the
knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, the sale is void. If the
sale was with knowledge the not consent of the wife, the wife has 5 years from the
date of the contract to annul the sale.

In the present case, the wife filed within the prescribed period. However, her action
to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot which does not include
lot 7 which is an exclusive property of the husband.

The petitioners cannot argue that they were buyers of good faith since they knew
that at the time of the sale, Pedro was married to Mary Ann and her signature did
not appear in the deed. Even if they were to argue that the property is an exclusive
property of the husband, that they proceeded with the sale regardless of the wife’s
contention and that the she was in actual and public possession of the house at the
time of the sale, clearly indicates that they are not purchasers in good faith. CA
DECISION AFFIRMED.

FELIPE V HEIRS OF ALDON 120 SCRA 628

FACTS: Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The spouses bought
several pieces of land in 1948-1950. In 1960-1962, said lands were partitioned into
3 lots
• 1951 – the wife sold the lots to the petitioners without the consent of her
husband
• April 26, 1976 – the heirs of Aldon (wife and children) filed a complaint
against the petitioners alleging that they had orally mortgaged the said
properties to the Felipes and that an offer to redeem the properties was
made but they refused
• RTC ruled in favor of Felipe, declaring that they were the rightful owners of
the lots in question
• CA reversed the decision on the ground that the sale instituted by the wife
was invalid since the properties were conjugal in nature and that the sale was
done without the husband’s consent

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the properties in question was valid without the
consent of the husband

HELD: The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership (Art. 165 NCC).
Subject to certain exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent (Art. 166 NCC). And
the wife cannot bind the conjugal property without the husband’s consent, except in
cases provided by law (Art. 172 NCC)

In the instant case, the wife’s sale is not covered by the phrase “except in cases
provided by law.” THE SALE IS INVALID
Void or voidable? VOIDABLE
According to Art. 1390 NCC, among the voidable contracts are “those where one of
the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract (Par. 1). The wife had no
capacity to give consent to the contract of the sale. The capacity belonged not to
the husband alone but to both spouses. This is further supported by the
provision that contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife
when such consent is required, are annullable at her instance during the marriage
and within 10 years from the transaction questioned (Art. 173 NCC).

The voidable contract of the wife was subject to annulment by her husband only
during the marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract.
The wife, who was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for
its annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the
contract while the marriage subsisted because they merely had an
inchoate right to the lands sold.

The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership by
the death of Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation the wife. After the death
of their father, they acquired the right to question the defective contract insofar as
it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father’s share in the lands. The
father's share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3)
thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining to the widow.

The Felipes were purchasers of bad faith as revealed in a testimony that sometime
in December 1970, Vicente Felipe (son of the petitioners) attempted to have the
wife (Gimena) sign a ready-made document claiming the sale of the land to them.
If sale was valid, why did they need a document of sale in their favor. Because they
knew the lots still did not belong to them. CA DECISION AFFIRMED. Petitioners are
ordered to give an accounting of the fruits corresponding to the share from 1959.

CHEESMAN V IAC 193 SCRA 93

FACTS: This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner
Thomas Cheesman) to annul—for lack of consent on his part—the sale by his Filipino
wife (Criselda) of a residential lot and building to Estelita Padilla
• December 4, 1970 – Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were
married but have been separated since February 15, 1981
• June 4, 1974 – a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights was
executed by Armando Altares, conveying a parcel of land in favor of “Criselda
Cheesman, married to Thomas Cheesman.” Thomas, although aware of the
deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Tax
declarations for the said property were issued in the name of Criselda
Cheesman alone and she assumed exclusive management and
administration of the property
• July 1, 1981 – Criselda sold the property to Estelita Padilla without knowledge
and consent of Thomas
• July 31, 1981 – Thomas filed a suit for the annulment of the sale on the
ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and
consent. Criselda filed an answer alleging that the property sold was
paraphernal, having purchased the property from her own money; that
 Thomas, an American was disqualified to have any interest or right of
ownership in the land and; that Estelita was a buyer in good faith
• During the trial, it was found out that the transfer of property took place
during the existence of their marriage as it was acquired on June 4, 1974
• June 24, 1982 – RTC declared the sale executed by Criselda void ab initio and
ordered the delivery of the property to Thomas as administrator of the
conjugal property
• Thomas appealed to IAC where he assailed the granting of Estelita’s petition
for relief and resolution of matters not subject of said petition; in declaring
valid the sale to Estelita without his knowledge and consent. On January 7,
1986, IAC affirmed summary judgment decision

ISSUE: Whether or not the wife can dispose of the property in question; Whether or
not Cheesman, being an American citizen, can question the sale

HELD: Section 14, Art. XIV of 1973 Constitution provides that: “save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.”

Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by
him and his wife, he acquired no right whatsoever over the property by virtue of
that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, he
was knowingly violating the Constitution. As such, the sale to him was null
and void.

At any rate, Cheesman had and has NO CAPACITY TO QUESTION THE SUBSEQUENT
SALE OF THE SAME PROPERTY BY HIS WIFE ON THE THEORY THAT IN SO DOING HE
IS MERELY EXERCISING THE PREROGATIVE OF A HUSBAND IN RESPECT OF
CONJUGAL PROPERTY. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect
controversion of the Constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be
declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial
interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its
transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit
him to have.

Even if the wife did use conjugal funds to make the acquisition, his recovering and
holding the property cannot be warranted as it is against the constitution.
Consequently, Estelita is a purchaser in good faith since she knew that Thomas
cannot intervene in the sale or disposition of the said property. AFFIRMED

FRENZEL V CATITO G.R. NO 143958 JULY 11, 2003

FACTS: Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel, a German, married Teresita Santos in 1976
but the couple separated in fact without obtaining divorce in 1981. While in
Australia, Frenzel met Erlinda Catito, who unknown to him, was married to another
German. They fell in love and went back to the Philippines and agreed to start a
business (beauty parlor). Ederlina found a building in Manila for the parlor and used
P 20,000 from Frenzel to purchase the rights over the property and P300,000 to buy
equipment.
 • January 23, 1984 – Frenzel bought a house and lot from Victoria Binuya
Steckle for $20,000 and had it named under Catito
• Frenzel sold all his property in Australia and transferred them to an account
under Catito’s name in Manila
• July 28, 1984 – Frenzel discovered that Catito was married to another German
since October 1978 . He confronted Catito who promised him that she would
get a divorce. Frenzel paid for the lawyer’s services
•

AYUSTE V CA G.R. NO. 118784 SEPTEMBER 2, 1999

FACTS: Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste on September 24, 1961. They lived
in Manila but owned a business in Lucena managed by the husband.
• August 26, 1982 – spouses Ayuste purcahed a lot in Lucena from spouses
David. TCT was issued in the name of RAFAEL AYUSTE MARRIED TO
CHRISTINA AYUSTE
• February 27, 1987 – the husband executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Viena Malabonga for P40,000. Deed of sale showed the wife’s signature
• After the husband’s death in October 1989, the wife discovered that the
husband sold the house and lot to private respondent
• March 2, 1990 – the wife filed a complaint for the annulment of sale,
cancellation of title and damages; she alleged that her signature was forged
in the deed of sale and that the husband sold the property without her
knowledge and consent
• June 20, 1991 – RTC declared that: sale was void; property should be
reconveyed to the wife; wife should pay Malabonga for the improvements
made on the property.
• January 23, 1995 – CA reversed RTC decision by holding that the wife’s right
to bring an action for the annulment is barred by laches due to her failure to
file it during the existence of the marriage pursuant to Art. 173 NCC.1

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale made by the husband without the wife’s consent is
void; Whether or not the wife’s petition for the annulment of sale is barred by
prescription

HELD: Under the NCC, although the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership, he cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without his wife’s consent, subject only to certain exceptions specified
in the law. The remedy available to the wife in case her husband should dispose of
conjugal property without her consent is stated in Art. 173 NCC.

A sale of property of CPG made by the husband without the consent of his wife is
VOIDABLE. The action for annulment must be brought DURING THE MARRIAGE and
WITHIN 10 YEARS FROM THE QUESTIONED TRANSACTION by the wife.

1 Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.
Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. (n)
In the present case, the deed of sale was executed on February 27, 1987. The
husband died on October 13. 1989. But the wife only filed her complaint on March
2, 1990. Although her action was filed with the prescribed period, IT WAS NOT
BROUGHT DURING THE EXISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE which was dissolved upon the
death of the husband. Hence, the action for annulment filed by the wife was barred
for not having been filed on time.

Registration of sale with the Register of Deeds constitutes a notice to the whole
world. Since the deed of sale was registered on March 5, 1987, the wife is
presumed to have constructive notice of the sale form such date. CA DECISION
AFFIRMED.

VILLARANDA V SPOUSES VILLARANDA G.R. NO 153447 FEBRUARY 23, 2004

FACTS: This controversy revolves around a Deed of Exchange executed by and
between two brothers, petitioner Vincente Villaranda and respondent Honorio
Villaranda
• A 471sqm lot was inherited by the two brothers from their parents. Estate
administrator Bebiano Luminarias leased 124 sqm to Honorio from May 1,
1976 to May 31, 1986. Vicente inherited 64.22sqm of the property that had
not been leased to Honorio
• July 6, 1976 – brothers executed Deed of Exchange, agreeing that Vicente will
convey his 64.22sqm portion to Honorio in exchange for the share in the
500sqm property in Macasandig covered by TCT 2138. Honorio took
posession of the 64.22sqm lot after and constructed improvements
• April 6, 1992 – subdivision plan for lot 448-B was completed. Vicente’s
64.22sqm lot was designated as lot 448-B-7. Other heirs were issued their
own TCTs for their respective shares
• Spouses Villaranda brought an action for specific performance before RTC to
compel Vicente to comply with his obligations under the Deed of Exchange,
alleging that they could not fully use or dispose of the Macasindig property
because Vicente has not yet identified his portion in the 500sqm property.
They also asked to Vincente to lot 448-B-7 to them in compliance with his
obligations under the deed
• During the pendency of the case, Honorio conditionally sold the lot 448-B-7 to
Colorhouse Laboratories Inc
• Vicente did not deny that he entered into a deed of exchange with his brother
but contended that he was not bound to it since the property had not been
delivered so the deed has not been consummated. Also, the deed was
revoked by both parties. According to him, he and the other co-heirs
requested Honorio to rescind the agreement since it was unfair. Honorio
agreed provided that certain conditions were met, which Vicente claimed to
have complied.
• Vicente argues that the deed of exchange is void since the signature of
Honorio’s wife is missing in the instrument. Honorio argues that this does not
make the deed of exchange void, but MERELY VOIDABLE.
• CA held that the provisions of NCC were applicable to the present case since
the deed of exchange has been entered into prior to the enactment of FC.
Thus, the absence of the wife’s signature on the deed made it only voidable
not void. Also the wife had 10 years to seek for annulment of sale but
brought no action; her omission or refusal to rescind it. The spouses’ cause
 of action had accrued not form the date of the execution of the deed but
only from the moment Vicente refused to cause the transfer of his
title to Honorio, 2 months prior to filing of the present case

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of exchange entered into by the husband without
the wife’s consent is void
HELD: Since the deed was entered into on July 6, 1976 prior to the effectivity of
FC, NCC provisions are applicable. The Macasindig lot was part of Honorio and
Ana’s conjugal properties.

Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without
the wife’s consent. x x x

Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any
act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in
the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or
her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the
property fraudulently alienated by the husband.

According to Art 166, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of
the CPG without the wife’s consent. This provision must be read in conjunction with
Art. 173. The latter states that an action to annul an alienation or encumbrance
may be instituted by the wife during the marriage and within 10 years from the
transaction questioned. THE LACK OF CONSENT ON HER PART WILL NOT MAKE THE
HUSBAND’S ALIENATION OR ENCUMBRANCE OF REAL PROPERTY OF CPG VOID BUT
MERELY VOIDABLE. Hence, the deed is valid until and unless annulled.

There is evidence that any action to annul the transfer made by Honorio was ever
brought by his wife within 10 years from the transaction questioned. Her right to
bring an action to invalidate the contract has prescribed.

In Papa v Montenegro, the SC explained that the legal prohibition against the
disposition of the conjugal property by the spouse without the consent of the other
has been established NOT FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD PERSONS BUT ONLY OF THE
OTHER SPOUSE for whom the law desires to save the conjugal partnership from
damages that might be caused. Vicente, not being the proper party, cannot avail
himself of the remedy prescribed by Art. 173. CA DECISION AFFIRMED.

AINZA V CA G.R. NO 165420 JUNE 30, 2005

FACTS: Concepcion alleged that spouses Padua owned a lot with unfinished
building in QC; sometime in 1987, she bought ½ of the lot from the spouses for
P100,000
• No deed of sale was executed but cash payment was received by spouses
Padua and ownership was transferred to Ainza. Ainza authorized her
daughter (Natividad) and husband (Ceferino) to occupy the premises and
make improvements on the unfinished building
 • Thereafter, Padua had the lot partitioned into 3 and registered it under their
names
• Respondent Antonio Padua claimed that he bought the lot in 1980 and
introduced the improvements thereon. Between 1989 and 1990, spouses
Padua allowed Natividad and Ceferino to occupy the premises temporarily. In
1994, they caused the subdivision of the property and 3 separate titles were
issued
• Antonio requested Natividad to vacate the premises but the latter refused
and claimed that Concepcion owned the property. Antonio filed an ejectment
suit on April 1, 1999. Concepcion, through Natividad, filed a civil case for
partition of real property and annulment of titles and damages on May 4,
1999
• Antonio claimed that his wife, Eugenia, admitted that Concepcion offered to
buy one third (1/3) of the property who gave her small amounts over several
years which totaled P100,000.00 by 1987 and for which she signed a receipt.
• January 1, 2001 – RTC rendered judgment in favor of Concepcion cancelling
TCTs and ordered the subdivision of the property into 2 lots and awarded ½
to Concepcion citing that the sale was consummated when both contracting
parties complied with their respective obligations
• CA reversed RTC decision applying Art 124 FC that since the property is
conjugal, the written consent of the husband must be obtained for the sale to
be valid
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale between Concepcion and Eugenia is valid without
the written consent of Antonio
HELD: The verbal contract of sale did not violate the provisions of the Statute of
Frauds that a contract for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable unless the
contract or some note or memorandum of the sale is in writing abs subscribed by
the party charged or his agent. When the verbal contract has been completed,
executed or partially consummated, its enforceability will not be barred by
the Statute of Frauds. Where one party has performed his obligation, oral
evidence will be admitted to prove the agreement. The oral contract of sale
between Eugenia and Concepcion was evidenced by a receipt signed by Eugenia
and Antonio’s testimony that she sold the property to Concepcion.
It is clear that the subject property is conjugal and sold by the wife (Eugenia) in
April 1987 prior to the effectivity of FC, in which Art. 254 repealed Title V Book I
NCC on property relations between husband and wife. However, Art. 256 limited its
retroactive effect only to cases where it would not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with NCC or other laws. In the present case, the
vested rights of Concepcion will be impaired or prejudiced by the
application of the FC; hence, the provisions o f the NCC will be applied.
The consent of both husband and wife is necessary for the sale of the conjugal
property to be valid. The husband’s consent cannot be presumed. Except in the
testimony of Natividad, there is no clear evidence that the husband participated or
consented to the sale of the conjugal property. The wife alone is incapable of
giving consent to the contract. Therefore, in the absence of the husband’s consent,
the disposition made by the wife is VOIDABLE.
The contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion being an oral contract, the
action to annul the same must be commenced within 6 years from the time the
right of action accrued. Since the wife sold the property in April 1987, the husband
should have asked the courts to annul the sale on or before April 1993. No action
was made by the husband to annul the same, hence his right to seek its annulment
was extinguished by prescription.
Even if we were to apply the 10-year prescriptive period under Art. 173, the
husband is still barred from instituting an action to annul the same because since
April 1987, more than 10 years had already lapsed without any such action being
filed.
The sale of the conjugal property by the wife without the consent of the
husband is VOIDABLE. It is binding unless annulled. The husband failed
to exercise his right to ask for the annulment within the prescribed period,
hence, he is now barred from questioning the validity of the sale between
his wife and Concepcion.