MIJARES V.

RANADA

G.R. No. 139325. April 12, 2005

FACTS: On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court (US District
Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos
Estate). The action was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human
rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during
the Marcos regime. The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Courts jurisdiction over the
complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations of international law . These plaintiffs brought
the action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, particularly
consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972
and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody of military or
paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the class consisted of approximately ten thousand (10,000)
members; hence, joinder of all these persons was impracticable.
The institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) of the US Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions of which were invoked by the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the US
District Court certified the case as a class action and created three (3) sub-classes of torture, summary
execution and disappearance victims, trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and an
award of compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of the plaintiff class. Then, on 3 February 1995,
the US District Court, presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment (Final
Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five
Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final
Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered
on 17 December 1996.
On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial Court, City of Makati
(Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. They alleged that they are members of the
plaintiff class in whose favor the US District Court awarded damages. They argued that since the Marcos
Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of the US District Court had become final and
executory, and hence should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court then in force.
On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-
payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos
(P410.00) as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary
amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). The
Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the proper computation and payment of
docket fees. In response, the petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment
is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was
proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141.
On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada of the Makati RTC issued the
subject Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Respondent judge opined that contrary to the
petitioners submission, the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation,
as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money,
allowing for easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. On that score, Section 7(a) of Rule
141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find application, and the RTC estimated the proper amount of
filing fees was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had not been
paid.
Not surprisingly, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which Judge Ranada denied in
an Order dated 28 July 1999. From this denial, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
assailing the twin orders of respondent judge.] They prayed for the annulment of the questioned orders,
and an order directing the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 97-1052 and the conduct of appropriate
proceedings thereon.
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the
suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of money or
recovery of damages. They also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy
Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render inutile the liberal construction
ordained by the Rules of Court, as required by Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
particularly the inexpensive disposition of every action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Final Judgment issued by the US District Court if Hawaii is already conclusive
as to the parties in the present case for the complaint for the enforcement of the Final Judgment before
the RTC.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court said that the procedural rule now outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure has remained unchanged down to the last word in nearly a century. Section 48
states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam.
For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an
action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. However, in both cases, the foreign
judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice
to the party,] collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign
judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential
that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.
It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign
judgment, even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the
purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order for the
court to properly determine its efficacy. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to enforce a foreign
judgment in the Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate
measure for such purpose. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, and clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in essence a vindication of a
right prescinding either from a conclusive judgment upon title or the presumptive evidence of a right.
Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for enforcement of
judgment must be brought before the regular courts.
 There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the
enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising from the facts or allegations that occasioned the
foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an essential difference in the
right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. For example, in a complaint for damages against
a tortfeasor, the cause of action emanates from the violation of the right of the complainant through the
act or omission of the respondent. On the other hand, in a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign
judgment awarding damages from the same tortfeasor, for the violation of the same right through the
same manner of action, the cause of action derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign judgment
itself.
More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the above example, the complainant will
have to establish before the court the tortious act or omission committed by the tortfeasor, who in turn is
allowed to rebut these factual allegations or prove extenuating circumstances. Extensive litigation is thus
conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and amount of damages are assessed. On the other
hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself,
and not the facts from which it prescinds.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of
jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law.
The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect
party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants,
to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and in a
larger sense to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrers Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest
and quietness
There is also consensus as to the requisites for recognition of a foreign judgment and the defenses
against the enforcement thereof. As earlier discussed, the exceptions enumerated in Section 48, Rule 39
have remain unchanged since the time they were adapted in this jurisdiction from long standing American
rules. The requisites and exceptions as delineated under Section 48 are but a restatement of generally
accepted principles of international law. Section 98 of The Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, states
that a valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be
recognized in the United States, and on its face, the term valid brings into play requirements such notions
as valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties. Similarly, the notion that fraud or collusion may
preclude the enforcement of a foreign judgment finds affirmation with foreign jurisprudence and
commentators, as well as the doctrine that the foreign judgment must not constitute a clear mistake of law
or fact. And finally, it has been recognized that public policy as a defense to the recognition of judgments
serves as an umbrella for a variety of concerns in international practice which may lead to a denial of
recognition.
The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign judgment has been
recognized in this jurisdiction. This defense allows for the application of local standards in reviewing the
foreign judgment, especially when such judgment creates only a presumptive right, as it does in cases
wherein the judgment is against a person. The defense is also recognized within the international sphere,
as many civil law nations adhere to a broad public policy exception which may result in a denial of
recognition when the foreign court, in the light of the choice-of-law rules of the recognizing court, applied
the wrong law to the case. The public policy defense can safeguard against possible abuses to the easy
resort to offshore litigation if it can be demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to our constitutional
values.
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to
recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally
accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part
of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in
international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological
element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it. It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the Final Judgment is not
conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of a right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate.
Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. This ruling, decisive as it is on the
question of filing fees and no other, does not render verdict on the enforceability of the Final
Judgment before the courts under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that matter any other issue
which may legitimately be presented before the trial court. Such issues are to be litigated before the trial
court, but within the confines of the matters for proof as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39.