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Patrick McEvoy-Halston
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/ r
9712576
Philosophy220
Dr. JeffreyFoss
June4,2001
I
emphasizecompatibilityandprogressivedevelopment!
Theremay be a reasonwhy we shouldnot considerwhat Kuhn saysis true of
scientificparadigmsasalsoholdingtrue for theorieswhich accountfor the natureof
scientificparadigms,but onedoesnot cometo mind. Kuhn doessuggestthatthereis
somethingdistinctiveaboutscientificparadigmsthat maynot hold true for other
paradigms--political
science;art;etc.--buthe alsotells us thatwhat he hasto sayabout
scientificparadigms"are constitutiveof natureaswell" (110). Moreover,his theorysure
"looks" awfully paradigm-like.I_tappegrscompfgjgqqdfinal, He makesthe prevlotls
" rx-'-,{^-
A
theory
withitsemphasis
oncompatible uffiriiffiffiCmy4###ffi6
chang,
progressiveflavour of his own theory. He evenhighlightsa role for thosewho adopthis
theorywhich looks a lot like the role of scientistsduringthe paradignphase:fill in the
gaps. He asks:"What mustnature,includingffiffi, be like in orderthat sciencebe
possibleat all? Why shouldscientificcommunitiesbe ableto reacha firm consensus
endureacrossoneparadigmchange
unattainablein otherfields? Why shouldconsensus
after another?" (173). In other words, we should pursue solving problems which do not
challengehis paradigm, but follow, and remain to be explored, after ;t ; f
""""0r;;;.
offering us, then, a paradigm characteristically similar to a scientific paradigrn?--if it
walks like a duck, and talks like a duck . . . But by not explicitly addressingthis
Kuhn tell us that "cumulativeacquisitionof novelty is not only rare in fact but
improbablein principle" (96),andthat "[t]he manwho is strivingto solvea problem
definedby existingknowledgeandtechniqueis not,just looking around. . . [: he] knows
what he wantsto achieve,andhe designshis insbumentsanddirectshis thoughts
accordingly' (96). EdwardHunderttells us that,accordingto Piaget,"oncea concept. . .
is constructed,
it is appliedto experience. . . : it is immediatelyexternalizedso that it
4
appearsto thesubjectas a perceptuallygivenproperty of theobjectand independent
of
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thesubject'sown mentalactivity" [la; emphasisin original).Both Kuhn andPiaget
imaginethough,that natureeventuallythrowsup challengesto existingparadigms,or
schemas,which accumulate, a revolution(Kuhn) or
andwhich eventuallynecessitate
revolution-likeaccoillmodation(Piaget):a radicalreorientationin waysof mappingthe
world which accountfor the anomalies.Beforeandafterthis occurs,for Kuhn, the
scientificcommunitygoesaboutthe assuredbusinessof dealingeffectivelyand
efficiently with problemsat hand(64),while, for Piaget,childrengo abouthappilyand
effectivelyassimilatingtheir worlds. With the shift, however,for both theorists,you are
left with scientists,for Kuhn, andchildren,for Piaget,who havetroubleunderstanding
thoseoutsideof their paradigmor schema.Thuswe learnfrom Kuhn, that scientific
communitiesendup "talk[ing] througheachother" (109),andfrom developmental
that childrenaheador behindtheir peersin termsof cognitivephasewill
psychologrsts
havedifficultybeingunderstood,orunderstandingtheirpeerS.wu--l-
Thereare,however,severalsignificantwaysin which the two theoriesdiffer: (
of cognitiveschemasareintegrativeand
Piaget,contraKuhn, believesthatthe succession
progressive.Childrenmovefroman..inabilitytoexperiencethereversibm
{'
statesof affairs" (HundertI 18; emphasisin original)to beingableto do so. Onemight
imaginethat it might be neatto be ableto go back andno longerbe ableto ableto
experiencethe world this way,but what we havelost is an inability todo something, 0 lL
ratherthana capacityto view the world in a profitableway. (2) Piaget'sschsmasare
reversibilityof emphasisovertime--soif a
irreversible,whereasKuhn emphasizes
scienceemphasizesessentialessences,thendiscardsthem,atsomelaterpointth"ym
once againbeembraced.(3) Piaget'smodelhighlightssignificantchangeassomething
that a changein
that occursduringa person'slifetime,whereasKuhn emphasizes
paradigmcanonly be adoptedby a different generationof scientists,i.e., Piaget'smodel
is l,amarckianwhile Kuhn's is Darwinianin nature.(4) Finally, Piaget'sfinal schemaof
forrnal relationsis not really abouta capacityto und€rstandthe natureof the world, i.e.,
the truth,brtt, instead,involvesa capacityto useour "concrete"knowledgeof the 'teal"
world to imaginenew truths. Hoa*gljflr be analogousto the scientific enterpriseof
uncoveringtruths,the wisdom o2rctrKubn hopeshis thesiscalls into question?I
believethat the first tlree differencesbaween PiagetandKuhn amountto arguments
againstacc€pfingKuhn's prerrisethat tuth for€verlies outsidescientists'grasp,andthe
last one canbe usedto arguethat, nonetheless,
Kuhn-so long asthe readerhasbeen
seduced,persuaded,by my listing of the similaritiesbetweenthe theoriststo imagine
them asmodelsin competitionwith one another-is riglrt that this scieotific questfor huth
interfereswith bett€rprojects.
Is Kulur correctthat scientific paradigmsareneith€rintegrativenor progressivgin
the sensethat they leavevery importantways of understandingthe world out from
paradign to paradigm.?I am not c€rtain;but if we arenot looking at the pastwith Kuhn's
map in mind, perhapswe will begin to noticethe kind of integrativeprogressionhe
claimsdoesnot exist. For instance,Kuhn drawsour attentionto extrernereluctanceof
'lrofessionals" (171; scientists?)to acc€ptDarwin's theory. The oneideathat was
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hopingscientistsstopchasingdownnature'sfiuths: I picturea new generationof
potentialscientistspreferringfi,garativetruthsto literal ones--"allthe world really is a
stage,you know; anyonewho asksto seethe wood andnailsis nothingbut an annoying
JN fuddy-duddy,or worse,a subversive!"
MichaelRusein his article"DarwinismDefended"(1982)tells us, with greatpassion,
not only that creationismdoesnot accountfor the "facts,"but that,if a creationist
paradigmprevailed,it would stifle the scientificenterpriseofaccumulatin$truths--no
smallthing,because - wtrifi"ttiffifshes
for Ruse,it is thescientificenterprise usfrom <a
\- *-.
thebrutes" (327).Hetellsusthat: UJ {
"-
For thosewho arefamiliar with Ruse,this maybe a stretch,but imaginehim asthe basis
for our conceptualmodelof the "scientist." Now revisit Kuhn's thesis. You might
wonderif Kuhn's scientists,thoughfitting a popularimageof a scientistasdetachedand
unemotional,might be somewhat'trnreal." Ruse,powerfrrlly,is telling us of the
importanceto him of modelsasthingsof beauty. They seemto havenearreligious
significance:they arepart of mans'"salvation." Might this havebeentrue for scientists
(-
throughouthistory andif so,arescientistssomalleablethat they arecapableof
imagininganymodelthey aredeeplyimmersedin this way? If Newton'smodelallowed
no conceivablerole, or place,whatsoever,for God,yet still accountedfor anomalies
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I find this theory suggestive,though I do not accept that being able to imagine oneself as something's
"servant/slave" necessarily proves your maturity--the opposite may be true: these days scientists never seem to tire
telling us we are really automatons, perhapsbecausethey secretly enjoy imagining thernselvesas exceptions to the
rule?
t2
' Don Lepan(1995),in fact, inspiredby Piaget,looksto literatureto seeif thereactuallyis an increasein
"cognitive sophistication"in the writings of the "giants of literature" acrosstime. He finds them:
Shakespeare, HaroldBloom andhis "Inventionof the Human"be damned!,is dethroned.Shakespeare
with his "one hundredandone derogatorywordsappliedto women" is gettinga hard time from feminist
critics aswell. And my professorof EnglishHistory,JohnMoneynsurprisedme (andhimselfactually)last
semester,by askinghimself out loud if theremight "in a very real sense"be a quantumleap with Jane
Austin in the range,and subtlety,of emotionsexplored. Thoughbeginningto wobble,ffid perhaps
contraryto what is found in the science,the currenthegemonicparadigmin the humanitiesfavours
relativity, and enjoysscoffing at thosewho believethat "progress'ncanbe somethingmore thanan
ideological,power-saturated, construct(oh, if only we couldbe Uebermenschen like them,andseebeyond
our ideologicalfog asthey areableto do!)
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Bibliography
Abram, David. "The Mechanicalandthe Organic:On the Tmpactof Metaphorin Scienc€,"h Stephen
SchneiderandPenelopeBoston,eds,Scientistson Gaia,Cambridge:MIT Press,1991.
Harding,Sandra.WhoseScience?WhoseKnowledge?:ThinkingfromWomen'sLives,Ithica:Cornell
UniversityPress,1991.
Press,
LePan,Don. TheCognitiveRanlution in WesternCulture:Ihe Birth of Expectation,Broadview
1995